A Greek Lexicon of Plato's *Charmides*

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν το ὠφελίμως

Diotimos Editions

2026

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ἔρως · love....468
ἔρως αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων · love of itself and of the other loves....470
ἐρωτάω · ask....473
ἑταῖρος · friend....474
ἕτερος · other....475
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εὖ πέφυκα · be well made by nature....478
εὖ πράττειν · do well....481
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εὐδαιμονία · happiness....487
εὐδαίμων · happy....489
εὐδοκιμέω · be admired....492
εὐήθης · simpleton....493
εὐηθικός · simple-minded....493
εὐλαβέομαι · beware....494
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εὔπορος · better provided with a way through....496
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κάλλος · beauty....560
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καλός · beautiful, fine....565
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καλῶς · well, finely....571
καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως · finely and beneficially....574
κατὰ σμικρόν · little by little....577
κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας · according to the kinds of knowledge....577
κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν · in your opinion....580
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καταγελάω · make a mockery of....582
κατανοέω · come across, notice....583
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κεφαλή · head....585
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κινέω · move, prod....590
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ὀξύτης · sharpness....729
ὁράω · see....730
ὀρθότης · rightness....730
ὀρθῶς · correctly....733
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παραδίδωμι · hand over....776
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παρρησιάζομαι · speak frankly....785
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πλῆθος · number....794
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ποιέω · make, do....798
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ποίησις · making....803
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πρόδρομος · advance guard....824
πρόειμι · keep moving....824
προκαλέομαι · challenge....825
πρὸς ἄλλο · in relation to something else....826
πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα · to themselves and to each other....829
πρὸς ἑαυτό · in relation to itself....831
προσαγορεύω · address....834
προσδιδάσκω · teach (one thing) more....835
πρόσειμι · be (there) in addition....835
προσεπίσταμαι · also know....836

προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν · pay attention....837
προσκαθοράω · have a view of (it) as well....839
προσποιέομαι · pretend....840
πρόσρημα · greeting....843
πρόσρησις · greeting....843
προσφέρω · apply, treat....846
προτίθημι · propose....846
προφήτης · foreteller....847
πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα · first and foremost....848
πυκτεύω · box....850
πυνθάνομαι · hear, ask....851
P Rho....852
ῥῆμα · words....852
Σ Sigma....853
σαφής · clear, plain....853
σκέπτομαι · look into....853
σκεῦος · equipment....857
σκέψις · way of looking into it....857
σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον · examine the argument....860
σκοπέω · look into....863
σκυτική · cobbling....867
σκυτοτομέω · cobble....867
σκυτῶν τομή · cutting leather....868
Σόλων · Solon....871
σοφία · wisdom....872
σοφία ἢ κάλλος · wisdom or beauty....874
σοφός · wise....877
σπουδή · pains....878
σταθμητός · measure....878
σταθμός · weight....879
στατική · weighing....879
στλεγγίς · strigil....880
στρατηγική · generalship....880
στρατηγός · general....881

στρατόπεδον · army, camp....881
συγγένεια · kinship....882
συγχωρέω · concede, grant, agree....883
συλλήβδην · in short, taking all together....886
συλλογίζομαι · put together....887
συμβαίνω · follow, happen....888
συμβουλεύω · advise....890
συμβουλή · advice....891
συμπάσχω · catch....891
συμπλάττω · make up....892
σύμφημι · say the same....894
συνεργός · work alongside....895
συνήθης διατριβή · old haunts....895
συνίημι · understand....898
συνομολογέω · agree on....898
σφόδρα · vigorously, very....900
σφοδρός · vigorous....901
σῴζω · come out alive, come through safe....901
σῶμα · body....902
σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς · body without the soul....905
σωτήρ · Savior....908
Σωφρόνει · Be temperate!....908
σωφρονέω · be temperate....909
σωφρόνως · temperately....913
σωφροσύνη · temperance....916
σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια · temperance and health....922
σωφροσύνη καλόν τι · temperance something fine....924
σωφροσύνη παροῦσα · temperance, by being present....927
σώφρων · temperate....930
T Tau....934
τὰ ἀγαθά · good things....934
τὰ γεγονότα · everything that has happened....936
τὰ δέοντα · what he ought....939
τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν · doing one's own business....941

τὰ ἔξω · the things outside....946
τὰ ἐρωτικά · the ways of love....946
τὰ κακά · bad things....948
τὰ μέλλοντα · all that is going to be....951
τὰ νῦν ὄντα · everything that is now....954
τὰ ὄντα · the things that are....956
ταριχοπωλέω · sell salt fish....959
ταὐτόν · the same....960
ταχέως · quickly....961
τάχος · speed, quickness....961
ταχύς · quick, fast....964
ταχυτής · quickness....964
τεκμαίρομαι · infer....965
τεκμήριον · proof....966
τέλος · crown....966
τέχνη · craft, art....969
τεχνικῶς · expertly....973
τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων · assign each word....973
τίθημι · lay down....976
τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν · good and bad....977
τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον · its own work....980
τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι · being done well....983
τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν · acting quietly....986
τὸ καλόν · the beautiful....988
τὸ λογιστικόν · calculation....991
τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι · not knowing....993
τὸ νοσῶδες · the diseased....996
τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος · the whole and the part....998
τὸ πεττευτικόν · draughts....1000
τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι · the third time, for the Savior....1003
τὸ ὑγιεινόν · the healthy....1005
τοπάζω · make a guess....1008
τυγχάνω · turn out, be in fact....1009
τῷ τινῶν εἶναι · by its being of particular things....1009

Υ Upsilon....1013
ὑβριστικῶς · with insolence....1013
ὑγιαίνω · be healthy....1013
ὑγίεια · health....1014
ὑγιής · healthy....1017
ὑπάρχω · belong, be true of....1019
Ὑπερβόρεος · Hyperborean....1020
ὑπερφυῶς · extraordinarily....1020
ὑπέχειν λόγον · answer for....1021
ὑποβαίνω · fall short....1023
ὑπογελάω · laugh slyly....1024
ὑποδεέστερος · inferior....1024
ὑπόδεσις · footwear....1025
ὑποδέω · shoe....1025
ὑποκριτής · actor....1026
ὑποτίθημι · lay down, advise....1027
ὑφαίνω · weave....1029
ὑφαντική · weaving....1030
Φ Phi....1033
φαίνομαι · seem, appear....1033
φάρμακον · remedy....1036
φάσκω · claim....1039
φαῦλος · ordinary, poor....1042
φέρειν τοὔνομα · apply the word....1042
φθέγγομαι · utter....1045
φιλοσοφία · philosophy....1045
φιλόσοφος · philosopher....1048
φιλοτίμως · eager to shine....1049
φλέγομαι · be on fire....1049
φοβέομαι · fear, be afraid....1050
φόβος · fear....1050
φρόνιμος · of sense....1053
φυλάττω · stand guard....1053
φύλλον · leaf....1054

φύω · be by nature.....1055
φωνή · sound.....1057
X Chi.....1061
Χαιρεφῶν · Chaerephon.....1061
χαίρω · rejoice.....1062
χαλκοῦ ἐργασία · working bronze.....1062
Χαρμίδης · Charmides.....1065
χασμάομαι · yawn.....1066
χράομαι · use, be in need.....1066
χρῆμα · possessions.....1067
χρήσιμος · useful.....1067
χρηστός · useful.....1068
χρῶμα · color.....1069
χωρὶς ἑκατέρου · of the two separately.....1071
Ψ Psi.....1074
ψευδής · a liar.....1074
ψυχή · soul.....1077
Ω Omega.....1082
ὠθέω · shove.....1082
ὠφελέω · benefit.....1082
ὠφελία · benefit.....1085
ὠφέλιμος · beneficial.....1088
ὠφελίμως · beneficially.....1091

About this Lexicon

This Lexicon accompanies the Diotimos Editions facing-page edition of Plato's *Charmides*: John Burnet's Greek text (Oxford, 1903, in the corrected impression of 1909), with a new English translation and notes. Its headwords are the Greek words and phrases on which the dialogue's argument and drama turn, set out in the order of the Greek alphabet: single words under their dictionary form, and the dialogue's own formulas and quotations, such as ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν or Homer's αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ, under the words in which they are spoken. Each heading gives the Greek with the edition's English after it.

There are two kinds of entry. The words that carry the argument or the drama have full articles. An article opens with an italic line saying what the word is in the dialogue, and a line of its forms, each with a transliteration and the edition's English. **At a Glance** gives, in four short paragraphs, the word, its part in the *Charmides*, its rendering in the edition, and a place to read. **Meaning** gives the derivation and the ordinary sense of the word in Plato's Athens; **Use in the book** follows it through the dialogue; **Places to read** lists the passages in the order of the dialogue, every one of them unless the lead sentence says otherwise. Where the material allows, **Elsewhere in Plato** and **Other ancient sources** follow, each claim with its reference. **Translation in this edition** sets out how the edition renders the word, and the readings of Burnet's text where they bear on it. **See also** points to related headwords. The other words have short entries: the forms attested in the dialogue with their places, a gloss, and the passages that matter.

References are to the Stephanus pages and sections printed in the margins of both pages of the edition (156e); the line of Burnet's page is added where a reading is discussed (156e4). Quotations of the dialogue are the edition's English, word for word. "The edition's note at 157a" is one of the translator's notes at the foot of the English page; "the apparatus" is Burnet's, at the foot of the Greek page; the Glossary and the Key Words are the

edition's own. B, T and W are Burnet's three principal manuscripts: the Bodleian Plato, written in 895, and the manuscripts in Venice and Vienna. The scholars named from the apparatus, among them Heindorf, Ast, Badham, Cobet and Schanz, are the editors and critics of Plato in the nineteenth century whose readings and conjectures Burnet records. Other works of Plato are cited by Stephanus page, other authors by their standard divisions, with the sources in the notes; translations from them are the compiler's own. A reading that is the compiler's, and not the text's, is marked as such ("can be read as").

A passage is told in full in one entry, the one whose word it turns on; other entries give it a clause and point to that entry. This printing holds six hundred and sixty-nine entries, three hundred and seven articles and three hundred and sixty-two short entries, from ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν to ὠφελίμως.

A Alpha

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν · what one knows and what one does not know

The formula of Critias' last definition · Charmides

ἅ τε οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν, *ha te oiden kai ha mē oiden*, "what one knows and what one does not know"; τὸ ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν εἰδέναι, *to ha oiden kai ha mē oiden eidenai*, "to know what one knows and what one does not know"; ἅ τε ᾔδει καὶ ἃ μὴ ᾔδει, *ha te ēidei kai ha mē ēidei*, "what he knew and what he did not know"

At a Glance

The word. Two relative clauses, "what one knows" and "what one does not know", both the objects of εἰδέναι, "to know": the formula asks for a knowledge of where one's own knowledge stops.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates draws the formula out of the claim of Critias, guardian and cousin of the young Charmides, the boy whose temperance the dialogue examines, that temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and Critias accepts it as what temperance and knowing oneself are (167a). Socrates asks whether such a thing is possible and whether it would benefit us (167b). The argument reduces it to knowing only *that* one knows (170c–d), and the ending counts it among the concessions the argument did not allow (175b–c).

In this edition. "Knowing what one knows and what one does not know", with "know" for each of the three verbs of knowing, εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι, so that the formula reads the same at each return.

A place to read. 169d–170d, where Socrates refuses to take the formula as the same thing as knowledge of knowledge.

Meaning

Οἶδα (*oida*), "I know", is a perfect with the force of a present, from the root of εἶδον (*eidon*), "I saw", and of Latin *videre*: to know is to have seen. The formula sets two such knowings side by side, the things a man knows and the things he does not, and asks that he know both lists, each as what it is. That is not omniscience. A man could know very little and still have the knowledge the formula describes, if he knew exactly how little. At 167a it carries a second power with it, the power to examine others: to see "what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not".

Use in the book

Socrates introduces the formula as a gloss on Critias. Critias has said that temperance, "alone of all the kinds of knowledge", is "knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge", and has granted that it would then also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge (166e). Socrates spells out what such a knowledge would give its owner: "Then only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not; and he will likewise be able to inspect others ... and no one else will. And this is being temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: knowing what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you are saying?" "It is," he said (167a). Three things are now one: knowledge of knowledge, knowing oneself, and the formula (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης).

Socrates then puts two questions, "first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know, ⟨that one knows it and⟩ that one does not know it; and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b). The words in angle brackets come from later manuscripts (the edition's note at 167b), and they say what the formula means: of what one knows, that one knows it; of what one does not, that one does not. The first question goes to the procession of parallels at 167c–169a (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς)

and is left to "a great man" (169a). At 169d Socrates grants, for now, only that knowledge of knowledge is possible.

The joint between knowledge of knowledge and the formula then gives way. Granting that much, Socrates asks "how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not?" (169d). Critias argues that whoever has a knowledge that knows itself will know himself; Socrates does not dispute that (see ἀμφισβητέω), but asks "what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?" "Because, Socrates, this is the same as that." "Perhaps," Socrates says, "but I'm afraid I'm my same old self: again I don't understand how it is the same thing" (169e–170a). A knowledge of knowledge can tell only that "this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge" (170a); the healthy is known by medicine and what belongs to house-building by house-building (170c). So "the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows", and temperance "would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know" (170c–d; see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν). The formula has split in two: the *what* belongs to the crafts, and temperance keeps only the *that*.

The formula was also the source of the benefit hoped for. If, "as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know", we would "live our lives without error", and households and cities would be well run (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία); this is what they meant, Socrates says, "when we said what a great good it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know" (172a). He grants the formula once more for the sake of the dream (172c–d), and the dream ends in doubt that living knowledgeably makes anyone happy (173a–174b). At the close he names the formula among the concessions "that did not follow in the argument", made without considering that no one can know what he does not know at all (175b–c; see ἄλογος).

Many readers, the edition's note at 167a says, see in the knowledge of the lack of knowledge a portrait of Socrates as the *Apology* draws him, and the formula can be read as the dialogue's nearest approach to that portrait. What

the argument breaks is Critias' claim that a knowledge whose only object is knowledge could supply it, since only the craft that knows the healthy can tell whether a man knows the healthy (170e–171c). The dialogue's own procedure, examining "whether what is said is true or not" (161c; see ἀληθής) case by case, can be read as the way the formula is actually met, one claim at a time and never by a knowledge of knowledge as such.

Places to read

Every passage in which the formula is stated or recalled, with its echo in the dream (173b).

167a Socrates draws the formula from Critias' definition: only the temperate man will know what he knows and what he does not, and inspect others; Critias agrees that this is temperance and knowing oneself.

167b The two questions: whether it is possible to know what one knows and what one does not know, and what benefit there would be in knowing it.

169d Granting knowledge of knowledge for now, Socrates asks how it makes one more able to know what one knows and what one does not.

169e–170a Critias holds that the two are the same; Socrates does not understand how.

170c–d The man with only knowledge of knowledge will know not what he knows but only that he knows; temperance would not be knowing what one knows and what one does not know.

171d–172a If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, we would live without error; this was the great good they spoke of.

172c–d Socrates grants again, for the sake of argument, that temperance is knowing what one knows and what one does not know.

173b In the dream no one would escape notice who "pretended to know what he did not know".

175b–c Among the concessions that did not follow: the temperate man would know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not, that he does not; it is impossible to know what one does not know at all.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology*, Socrates' defence at his trial, the formula's second half, what one does not know, is his whole claim to wisdom. After examining a

politician reputed wise, he reasons that neither of them seems to know anything fine and good, but that the other supposes he knows when he does not, "whereas I, not knowing, do not suppose that I know either"; he looks to be the wiser by this one small point, that what he does not know he does not suppose he knows (21d). That is a refusal to think, not a knowledge, and it asks less than Critias' formula.

Two later dialogues tie the same refusal to temperance. In the *Sophist* the unnamed visitor from Elea, a Greek city in southern Italy, describes the cross-examiners who set a man's opinions side by side until they contradict one another; the man refuted grows ashamed, is rid of the opinions that block learning, and is left pure, "holding that he knows those things alone which he does know, and nothing beyond them". Theaetetus, the young mathematician who answers him, calls this "the best and most temperate" of states (230b–d). At the end of the *Theaetetus* Socrates tells the same young man that if his inquiry bears no fruit he will at least be gentler with his companions, "temperately not thinking that you know what you do not know" (210c). In both, temperance follows from refutation; neither makes it a knowledge of knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon, the Athenian soldier and writer who also kept company with Socrates and left his own memoirs of him, reports that Socrates did not separate wisdom from temperance, and that he did not count the lack of knowledge as madness, but held that "not knowing oneself, and believing and supposing that one knows what one does not know" came closest to it.[1] In another conversation he has Socrates say that those who know themselves know what is fitting for them and "distinguish what they can do and what they cannot".[2] Xenophon's Socrates joins self-knowledge to the formula as Critias does, but he means a man's knowledge of his own capacities, not a knowledge of knowledge.

[1] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.4 (wisdom and temperance not separated) and 3.9.6 (madness).
[2] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.25–26.

Translation in this edition

The Glossary records the ruling: εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι are all "know", so that "the formula 'knowing what one knows and what one does not know' keeps the same verb wherever it recurs" (167a–b, 169d–170a, 170d, 171d, 172a, 172c). The angle brackets at 167b are printed in the English, the one place where the edition marks a supplied phrase; the Editorial Note says it marks such additions only where they change the sense. At 167a7 and 169e8 the chief manuscripts have καὶ ἅτε where Burnet prints καὶ ἃ, "and what": B and T at 167a, where he follows W, and B, T and W at 169e, where he follows the Ambrosianus 56, a manuscript in Milan. At 170a3–4 the scholar Hoenebeek Hissink bracketed the formula's own words there (ἃ οἶδεν ... οἶδεν εἰδέναι) as spurious; Burnet keeps them. At 171d the past ᾔδει, "knew", marks the formula as a supposition recalled.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀληθής; ἄλογος; ἁμαρτία; ἀμφισβητέω; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν.

Ἀβάρις · Abaris

Ἀβάρις, *Abaris*, "Abaris"

Attested: Ἀβάριδος (*Abaridos*; 158b). Abaris the Hyperborean, a legendary holy man from the far north, whom later tradition made a priest of Apollo.[3] Socrates names him once, beside Zalmoxis, the Thracian god-king of 156d, as a master of charms: if temperance is already present in Charmides and he is temperate enough, "then you would have no further need of charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean", and the remedy for the head should be given him straightaway (158b–c). Herodotus, the historian of the fifth century BC, writing on the Hyperboreans, declines to tell "the story about Abaris, who is said to be a Hyperborean", of how he

[3] Iamblichus, *On the Pythagorean Life* 91, where he is a priest of Apollo among the Hyperboreans.

carried his arrow round the whole earth without eating.[4] The edition's note at 158b adds that later tradition made him a healer and a maker of charms. Set beside Zalmoxis, he can be read as giving Socrates' charm a second exotic pedigree, from still farther north, beyond the north wind itself.

See also Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; Ὑπερβόρεος.

ἀγαθός · good

The good, which temperance is agreed to be · Charmides

ἀγαθός, *agathos*, "good"; ἀγαθοὶ ἄνδρες, *agathoi andres*, "good men"; τὰ ἀγαθά, *ta agatha*, "good things"; τὸ ἀγαθόν, *to agathon*, "the good"; μέγα ἀγαθόν, *mega agathon*, "a great good"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀγαθός is good of its kind and good for someone: the good doctor, the good man, and the thing that does a person good.

In the *Charmides*. From Charmides' second answer to the last page, temperance is assumed to be good. Temperate men are good men (160e); Socrates has "a prophetic hunch" that temperance is "something beneficial and good" (169b); and at the end he still thinks it "a great good" (175e). Critias begins by defining temperance as "the doing of good things" (163e) and ends by naming the knowledge of "good ... and bad" as the one that makes us happy (174b).

In this edition. "Good" throughout, and "good and bad", never "good and evil", for the pair.

A place to read. 174b–175a, where the knowledge of good and bad turns out to be the one that benefits, and temperance is left without it.

Meaning

Ἀγαθός (*agathos*) has no agreed etymology. In Homer, the poet of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, a man is ἀγαθός at something, in close fighting or at the war-

[4] Herodotus 4.36.1.

cry,[5] and the word long kept a sense of rank beside its sense of merit, as in the gentleman's phrase καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (154e; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός). Its neuter with the article, τὸ ἀγαθόν (*to agathon*), is "the good", joined by crasis at 174e into τἀγαθόν. For Plato what is good does good: the good is never far from the beneficial, and the *Charmides* tests temperance by asking what good it does.

Use in the book

The good first enters as a premise against Charmides' second answer, that temperance is modesty. Temperate men are good men, and nothing is good that does not make men good; so temperance is good as well as fine (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). Homer's line on modesty then shows modesty to be "both not good and good", and temperance, which "makes good those it is present with", cannot be modesty (161a–b; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς). Good here is what improves its possessor.

Critias makes the good the object of temperance. Socrates sums up his distinctions: "it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings"; asked to define more plainly, Critias says, "I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163d–e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The doctor who benefits a patient without knowing that he has done so soon troubles the definition (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

Once Critias has turned temperance into knowledge of knowledge, the good becomes the test that it must pass. Socrates will not accept the definition "until I have looked into whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not. For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good" (169b; see ὠφέλιμος). He recalls "what a great good it would be to know what one knows and what one does not know" (172a), asks whether easier learning is "the good that temperance has" (172b), and then withdraws the agreement: "we too easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew" (172d). Even granting the

[5] Homer, *Iliad* 13.314 (good in close fighting) and 2.408 (Menelaus, good at the war-cry).

definition entire, "it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a).

The answer comes from Critias himself: the knowledge that makes us happy is the one by which he knows "good ... and bad", and without it nothing is done well and beneficially (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν); temperance, a knowledge "of nothing else", cannot be it (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).

Critias' first answer and his last meet, as the edition's Key Words point out: he defined temperance as the doing of good things, and the knowledge he finally names is the knowledge of good and bad. Between the two, temperance as knowledge of knowledge has lost its hold on the good. The dialogue gives up the definition and keeps the premise. Socrates blames himself as "a poor inquirer", not temperance: "For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a). The good is the one point that the inquiry never surrenders, and it can be read as the measure by which every definition in the dialogue has failed.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

154e Critias calls Charmides "thoroughly beautiful and good" in soul too.

156b Socrates appeals to what "good doctors" say about curing the eyes with the head.

156e Everything, "bad and good alike", starts from the soul and flows into the body.

160e–161b Temperate men are good men, and what is good makes men good; Homer's line makes modesty both not good and good; so temperance is not modesty.

163d–e Critias calls what is appropriate to one, and one's own, good, and defines temperance as the doing of good things.

166d It is a common good for practically all men that each of the things that are should become plain.

167e No one thinks there is a wish which wishes for no good, but for itself and the other wishes.

169b Socrates has a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good.

172a–b The great good of knowing what one knows and what one does not; Socrates asks whether easier learning is the good that temperance has.

172d–173a The agreement that temperance, if it were of that kind, would be a great good as guide of household and city is withdrawn; it is not clear that it does us any good.

174b–175a The knowledge that makes us happy is of good and bad; without it nothing is done well and beneficially; temperance, knowledge of nothing else, is the craftsman of no benefit.

175e–176a Socrates still thinks temperance a great good, and whoever has it blessed.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* states as doctrine what the *Charmides* reaches by elimination. Socrates calls the form of the good "the greatest subject of learning", the thing whose use makes just acts and everything else serviceable and beneficial; without knowledge of it, the fullest knowledge of everything else would profit us nothing, any more than owning anything profits us without the good (505a–b). In the *Euthydemus* Socrates and the young Clinias conclude that health, wealth and the other things called good are neither good nor bad in themselves: led by ignorance they are greater evils than their opposites, led by wisdom greater goods, so that wisdom alone is good and ignorance alone bad (281d–e). At the end of the *Laches*, the dialogue on courage, the knowledge of good and bad again ends an inquiry: the definition of courage offered by Nicias, the Athenian general, followed out, becomes a knowledge of all goods and evils, which would be the whole of virtue and not a part of it (199c–e; the edition's note at 174c).

Translation in this edition

Ἀγαθός is "good" at every place, and the Key Words of the edition record that the pair ἀγαθός and κακός is "good and bad", not "good and evil", all three times it matters (156e, 163e, 174b–d), "so that the reader can see Critias' last answer return to his first". The English "good" also renders other words: Καλῶς γε σύ ... ποιῶν is "Good for you" (156a, 162e), and ὦ βέλτιστε, "best of men", is "my good Critias" (162d) and "my good fellow" (163e). At 173a, ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται, literally "produces good for us", is "does us any

good". In the apparatus B reads the plural *ἀγαθῶν* at 167e4, "for no goods"; and on the gap that Goldbacher and Schanz find at 160e11, see *ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ*.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; *ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ*; *αἰδώς*; *ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός*; *ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ*; *κακός*; *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*; *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*; *πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν*; *τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν*; *ὠφέλιμος*.

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός · good doctor

The good doctors whose rule Socrates borrows · Charmides

οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἰατροί, *hoi agathoi iatroi*, "good doctors"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀγαθός, "good", with ἰατρός, "doctor": the doctor good at his craft.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates explains his charm by appealing to what Charmides has "probably heard good doctors say": they will not cure the eyes without the head, nor the head without the whole body (156b–c). The Thracian doctor of Zalmoxis grants that "the Greeks were right" so far, and adds the soul (156d–157a).

In this edition. "Good doctors"; ἰατρός is "doctor" throughout.

A place to read. 156b–157c, from the good doctors' rule to the Thracian's.

Meaning

Ἰατρός (*iatros*) is the healer, from ἰᾶσθαι (*iasthai*), "to heal". Greek medicine of the fifth century had its own writers, whose treatises came down under the name of Hippocrates, and "good doctors" in Socrates' mouth are doctors of that learned kind, as the edition's note at 156c says. The phrase is an appeal to authority made to a boy who knows the authorities by reputation: "It is like what you have probably heard good doctors say yourself" (156b).

Use in the book

Socrates comes to the phrase already in a doctor's part. Critias has him introduced to the boy as "a doctor" and asks, "What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b). The good doctors give the pretended doctor his first principle. "When someone comes to them with sore eyes, they tell him, I believe, that they cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own, but must treat the head at the same time if the eyes too are to be in good condition; and again, that to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" (156b–c). "On this principle they put the entire body on a regimen and try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c; see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος). Socrates asks the boy to agree before he goes on, and he does (156c; see αἰσθάνομαι). The agreement is what lets Socrates take heart again (156d).

The Thracian doctor of Zalmoxis, from whom Socrates learned the charm, both endorses and outbids them. "This Thracian said that the Greeks were right to say what I was telling you just now"; but Zalmoxis teaches that "one must not try to cure the body without the soul either", and that the Greek doctors fail because "they neglect the whole" (156d–e; see αἴτιος; ἀμελέω; Ζάλμοξις). The good doctors are good as far as they go. Their whole is the body; the Thracian's is the whole human being, whose good and bad flow from the soul (156e–157a). Doctors who treat the body alone are making "the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings" (157b; see ἁμάρτημα).

The doctor returns in the argument as the test case of a craftsman. At 164a–c Socrates asks whether a doctor always knows when his treatment has benefited (see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ), and at 170e–171c whether the temperate man could tell "the true doctor from the one who is not" (see ἀληθινός). The good doctors of the prologue are the standard that both passages assume.

Places to read

The one passage in which the phrase occurs, with the Thracian's answer to it.

156b–c Good doctors will not cure the eyes without the head, nor treat the head apart from the whole body; Charmides agrees that this is what they say, and that it is so.

156d–157b The Thracian grants that the Greeks were right, but adds that the body is not to be cured without the soul, and that the Greek doctors neglect the whole.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laws* draws a portrait of the good doctor. The Athenian stranger who leads that dialogue contrasts the slave doctors who go the rounds giving orders "like a tyrant", without any account of the illness, with the free doctor who treats free men: he examines the disease "from the beginning and according to nature", shares his thinking with the patient and his friends, learns from them and teaches the patient as far as he can, and prescribes nothing "until he has somehow persuaded him" (720a–e). Socrates, who will not apply the remedy until the boy hands over his soul, and who asks Charmides at the start whether he will have the charm by persuading or without (156a), can be read as the free doctor of the *Laws*, and the Thracian's charm as the persuasion that comes first.

In the *Gorgias* the same pairing of doctor and persuasion appears from the other side. Gorgias of Leontini, the teacher of rhetoric, boasts that he has often gone with his brother and other doctors to a patient who would not take a drug or submit to the knife, and persuaded him by rhetoric alone when the doctor could not (456b). The *Charmides* gives the persuading to the doctor himself.

In the *Phaedrus* Socrates asks whether the nature of the soul can be understood without "the nature of the whole", and Phaedrus, his young companion in that dialogue, answers on Hippocrates' authority that not even the body's can (270c). The edition's note at 156c sets the good doctors' rule beside this passage.

Translation in this edition

Τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἰατρῶν (156b) is "good doctors", without the article. Ἰατρός is "doctor" throughout, and the Glossary lists it at 156b–157b, 164a–c, 170e–171c and 173b; ἰατρική is "medicine". At 156d7 Burnet, after Cobet,

brackets ἰατροί in ἰατροὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες, so that the Thracian grants that "the Greeks", not "the Greek doctors", were right.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; αἰσθάνομαι; αἴτιος; ἀληθινός; ἁμάρτημα; ἀμελέω; Ζάλμοξις; ἰατρική; ἰατρός; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ · makes good

The premise that what is good makes good · Charmides

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ, *agathous poiei*, "makes good"; ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται, *agathous apergazetai*, "make men good"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν is to make people good: the work of whatever is good in them.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates uses it twice against Charmides' answer that temperance is modesty. Nothing can be good "that does not make men good" (160e), and temperance is good, "if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad" (161a). Modesty, on Homer's word, sometimes does not.

In this edition. "Make men good" for ἀπεργάζεσθαι at 160e, and "makes good" for ποιεῖν at 161a.

A place to read. 160e–161b, the refutation of modesty.

Meaning

The phrase joins the adjective ἀγαθός (*agathos*), "good", as predicate, to ποιεῖν (*poiein*), "to make", or to its stronger cousin ἀπεργάζεσθαι (*apergazesthai*), "to work out, produce". It states a principle of likeness between cause and effect: a good thing present in someone makes him good. The principle is assumed, not argued, and Charmides grants it at once.

Use in the book

Socrates sets the premise before Homer's line is quoted. Charmides has agreed that temperance is fine, and has said "Yes" to "And temperate men are good men, too?"; then, "Now could anything be good that does not make men good?" "Certainly not." "Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well" (160e). The Greek of 160e asks whether anything "that does not make men good" (ὃ μὴ ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται) could be good, so that the step from good men to a good thing rests on the principle that good is known by what it makes.

Homer's line on the man in need provides the counter-case, a modesty "both not good and good" (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ). Socrates restates the premise in its strongest form: "But temperance is good, if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad" (161a). The condition is double. Temperance must always make good and never bad, so a quality that is good in some company and bad in other company, as modesty is for the needy beggar, fails the test (161a–b; see αἰδώς).

The premise also prepares the end of the dialogue. The second of Socrates' two questions about Critias' definition is what benefit it would bring (167b), whether it "would benefit us or not" (169b), and the verdict is that, so defined, it is "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a). A temperance that did not make its possessor good or better off would not be good, on the principle Charmides granted at 160e, and Socrates ends by refusing to believe that temperance is that (175e).

Places to read

Both passages in which the phrase occurs.

160e Nothing could be good that does not make men good; so temperance is not only fine but good.

161a–b Temperance is good if it makes good those it is present with and does not make them bad; modesty, no more good than bad, is not temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates uses the same principle against Polemarchus, son of the host Cephalus, who has said that justice is helping

friends and harming enemies. Harming a man makes him worse in human excellence, and the just cannot make men unjust by justice, any more than musicians can make men unmusical by music: "it is not the work of heat to cool, I think, but of its opposite", nor the work of the good to harm (335c–d). In the *Meno* Socrates puts it as an inference: "by virtue we are good", and if good, beneficial, "for all good things are beneficial" (87e).

Translation in this edition

"Make men good" renders ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται (160e) and "makes good" ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ (161a), so that the English shows one premise stated twice in the same verb. At 160e11 Burnet's apparatus records Goldbacher's conjecture, which would add words making the inference explicit, and Schanz's mark of a gap in the text; the edition translates Burnet's text, in which the step is left to the reader.

See also

ἀγαθός; αἰδώς; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἀπεργάζομαι; ποιέω; ὠφέλιμος.

ἄγαλμα · statue

ἄγαλμα, *agalma*, "statue"

Attested: ἄγαλμα (*agalma*; 154c). A thing in which one delights, from ἀγάλλεσθαι, "to glory in"; above all the image of a god set up in a sanctuary. When Charmides comes in, not one of the boys looks anywhere else, "not even the littlest: they were all gazing at him as if he were a statue" (154c). The edition's note on the word says that the boys gaze as worshippers gaze, and points to the *Symposium*, where Alcibiades, the Athenian general and admirer of Socrates, likens him to the hollow figures of Silenus in the sculptors' shops and uses ἀγάλματα for the images of gods inside (215b, 216e–217a). In the *Charmides* the word belongs to the admiration of the body; Socrates' next move is to ask whether the soul inside is as well made (154d–e).

See also εἶδος; θεάομαι; κάλλος; καλός.

ἀγανακτέω · be aggrieved

ἀγανακτέω, *aganakteō*, "be aggrieved"

Attested: ἀγανακτῶ (*aganaktō*; 175d twice, 175e). To be vexed or indignant at something done to oneself or to another. The verb marks the three steps of Socrates' lament after the inquiry has shown the agreed definition "to be of no benefit": "For my own part I am less aggrieved. But on your account, Charmides ... I am very aggrieved, if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance"; and "I am still more aggrieved on account of the charm I learned from the Thracian, if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing" (175d–e). The grievance rises from himself to the boy to the charm, and it turns at once into a refusal: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer" (175e; see ζητητής).

See also ἐπῳδή; ζητητής; σπουδή.

ἀγεννῶς · did his breeding credit

οὐκ ἀγεννῶς, *ouk agennōs*, "did his breeding credit"

Attested: ἀγεννῶς (*agennōs*; 158c), in the negative οὐκ ἀγεννῶς. Ignobly, in a manner unworthy of one's birth (γέννα); "not ignobly" is an understatement for "nobly". Asked whether he is temperate, Charmides blushed, and the narrator adds that "he gave an answer that did his breeding credit" (158c): that it was not easy either to agree or to deny. The edition's note at 158c observes that the word belongs to the same family as "wellborn" (γενναῖον, 157b) and the pedigree Socrates has just recited (157e–158a); the boy can be read as answering as his ancestors would have him answer. The family has already sounded at the height of the prologue, in the narrator's address to his listener, ὦ γεννάδα, "my noble friend" (155d).

See also αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνερυθριάω; γενναῖος; πατρῷος.

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ · not know oneself, that one is temperate

The doctor who is temperate without knowing it · Charmides

ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ, *agnoei d' heauton hoti sōphronei*, "but does not know himself—that he is temperate"; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν, *ou gignōskei heauton hōs epraxen*, "does not know himself—how he has acted"; ἀγνοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν … σωφρονεῖν, *agnoounta auton heauton … sōphronein*, "that a man who does not know himself is temperate"

At a Glance

The word. A Greek construction in which the subject of a clause becomes the object of the verb before it: "he does not know himself, that he is temperate", for "he does not know that he is temperate".

In the *Charmides*. Socrates tests Critias' definition, that temperance is the doing of good things, with a doctor who benefits his patient, and so acts temperately, without knowing that he has done so (164a–c). Critias would rather take back what he has granted than "concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate", and turns the phrase round into his next definition: temperance is knowing oneself, as the inscription at Delphi, the seat of Apollo's oracle, bids (164c–d).

In this edition. The English keeps the doubled object with a dash, "does not know himself—how he has acted", so that the reader hears "know himself" before Critias seizes on it.

A place to read. 164a–d, from the doctor to the inscription at Delphi.

Meaning

Ἀγνοεῖν (*agnoein*), "not to know, be unaware of", takes here an accusative of the person and a clause introduced by ὅτι, "that", saying what about him is not known (164c6); its positive partner, γιγνώσκειν, does the same with ὡς, "how", a few lines earlier (164c1). Grammarians call the figure prolepsis: the subject of the clause is anticipated as the object of the main verb, as in the English of the King James Bible, "I know thee who thou art" (Mark 1:24). In

ordinary Greek the figure means no more than "he does not know that he is temperate". In the *Charmides* it sets "himself" beside the verb of knowing three times in a few lines.

Use in the book

Critias has just given his "plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e). Socrates lets it stand and asks another question: "But this I do wonder at ... whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate." "But I don't think so," Critias says (164a). Socrates reminds him that he allowed craftsmen to be temperate "even when they make other people's things" (164a; see δημιουργός), and takes the doctor. In making someone healthy he "makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating"; he does what he ought; "And isn't the man who does what he ought temperate?" "Temperate indeed" (164a–b; see τὰ δέοντα).

The next question opens the gap: a doctor need not know when his treatment benefits, and so sometimes "does not know himself—how he has acted" (164b–c; see οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν); and so, "sometimes, having acted beneficially, he acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself —that he is temperate?" (164c).

Critias refuses the conclusion outright: "But that, Socrates ... could never happen. If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate" (164c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνατίθημι). Then, without a pause: "In fact I would almost say that this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself", and he appeals to the inscription at Delphi (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν).

The construction carries the argument across. Twice the doctor "does not know himself" with a clause to say what about himself (164b–c); the third time the clause has gone, and the phrase stands alone, "a man who does not know himself" (164d). A doctor unaware of the outcome of a treatment has become a man ignorant of himself, and Critias' new definition is the denial

of that phrase. The edition's note at 164c takes the wording as preparing, perhaps by design, the "know thyself" on which Critias is about to seize. What the doctor lacked, though, was knowledge of benefit, and the dialogue returns to that lack at 174c–d (see ὠφελίμως).

Places to read

Every passage in the argument of the doctor.

164a Socrates wonders whether Critias thinks the temperate do not know that they are temperate; Critias says he does not.

164a–b A doctor who makes a patient healthy benefits himself and the patient, does what he ought, and is temperate; perhaps he need not know when his treatment benefits.

164b–c The doctor sometimes does not know himself, how he has acted; acting beneficially, he is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.

164c–d Critias would rather retract than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, and says that temperance is knowing oneself.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades*, a dialogue whose authorship has been doubted since the nineteenth century, closes the same loop from the other side. Socrates leads the young Alcibiades to agree that whoever knows something of the body knows what is his, not himself; so "no doctor knows himself, insofar as he is a doctor", nor any trainer insofar as he is a trainer, and "if temperance is knowing oneself, none of these is temperate by his craft" (131a–b). The *Charmides*' doctor, temperate in Critias' sense though he does not know himself, becomes in the *Alcibiades* a man whose craft gives him no claim to temperance at all.

Translation in this edition

The edition's note at 164c explains that the Greek is literally "does not know himself, how he acted", that it makes the doctor himself the object of "know", and that "the same construction recurs just below". The dashes keep both parts in the English without smoothing them into "does not know how he has acted". Stobaeus, the anthologist of the fifth century AD, quotes

164d–165a; Burnet follows him in one word at 164d1 (see αἰσχύνομαι), and records his different order of the words for "a man who does not know himself" (164d3).

See also

ἀγνοέω; αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; δημιουργός; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἰατρός; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; τὰ δέοντα; ὠφελίμως.

ἀγνοέω · not know, be ignorant

Not knowing, from the boy to the man who knows everything · Charmides

ἀγνοεῖν, *agnoein*, "not know"; ἀγνοῶν, *agnoōn*, "the man who is ignorant"; ἀγνοοῖ, *agnooi*, "was ignorant of"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀγνοεῖν is not to know, to be unaware: from the negative prefix and the root of γιγνώσκειν, "to know".

In the *Charmides*. The verb measures whose not knowing is forgivable. The boy may be excused "at his age" (162e); Critias will not allow that a temperate man could be unaware of his temperance (164a–d); the man who has only knowledge of knowledge is "ignorant of" what the crafts know (170c); and Socrates imagines a man "ignorant of nothing" and asks which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy (174a–b).

In this edition. "Not know" where the English can keep the verb of knowing (162e, 164a–d), and "be ignorant" at 170c and 174a, the only places where "ignorant" stands in the English.

A place to read. 170c–d, where the man with knowledge of knowledge turns out to be ignorant of what he knows.

Meaning

Ἀγνοεῖν (*agnoein*) is the plain verb of unawareness: to miss a fact, not to recognize a person, not to know a thing one might have known. It differs from ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (*anepistēmosynē*), the "lack of knowledge" that the

argument sets beside knowledge from 166e, which names the absence of a body of knowledge, and which the edition keeps tied to its root rather than calling it ignorance (Key Words). The English of the *Charmides* has no noun "ignorance": ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, the one Greek noun that might take it, is kept as "lack of knowledge", and the verb does the rest.

Use in the book

The first use excuses. When Critias turns on Charmides for not knowing what the author of "doing one's own business" meant, Socrates intervenes: "it is no wonder that he doesn't know, at his age. You, though, may reasonably be expected to know, both because of your age and because of the study you have given it" (162e; see ἐπιμέλεια). Not knowing is fitting in a boy and a reproach in a man of study.

The second use is the one Critias will not grant. Socrates asks whether he thinks "that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate", and a doctor who benefits without knowing it brings the question home (164a–c). Critias would rather retract than concede "that a man who does not know himself is temperate" (164d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

The third use turns Critias' own definition against him. If temperance is only knowledge of knowledge, its owner knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, and cannot know by temperance "that he knows the healthy"; so "the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows" (170c). The ignorance here is of the objects of the crafts, and it is built into the definition: the man whom Critias made temperate by self-knowledge turns out ignorant of everything except that he knows something.

The last use is a supposition. Socrates asks whether the happy man is the one who knows everything, "the sort of man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing" (174a). Even of him Socrates asks which knowledge makes him happy, and Critias answers, the knowledge of good and bad (174b). The man ignorant of nothing is not made happy by the extent of his knowledge, but by one knowledge in it.

Taken together, the four uses can be read as setting out the dialogue's view of not knowing. The boy's ignorance is no fault; Critias' horror of being thought ignorant of himself drives him to a definition he cannot defend; the definition produces an ignorance it cannot see; and to be ignorant of nothing would not be enough. What matters is not how much one knows, but which knowledge one has.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

162e It is no wonder that Charmides does not know, at his age; Critias may be expected to know.

164a Socrates wonders whether Critias thinks the temperate do not know that they are temperate.

164c The doctor who acts beneficially is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.

164d Critias will not concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.

170c The man who has only knowledge of knowledge is ignorant of what the crafts know, and will know not what he knows, but only that he knows.

174a Socrates imagines a man who knows past, present and future and is ignorant of nothing, and asks which knowledge makes him happy.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Philebus* Socrates makes not knowing oneself the root of the ridiculous. The ridiculous is a kind of badness, he tells Protarchus, one of the young men present, "the opposite of what the inscription at Delphi says"; and when Protarchus asks whether he means "Know thyself", Socrates says that its opposite would be "not knowing oneself at all". Those who do not know themselves fail in three ways: they think themselves richer than they are, or bigger and handsomer, or, most often, better in soul, above all in wisdom, so that most people are "full of quarrels and of a false opinion of their own wisdom" (48c–49a). Critias, "used to being admired on every occasion" (169c), can be read as an instance of the commonest of the three.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon gives Socrates the verb in a conversation with Charmides himself, who is able but shy of speaking to the people (see αἰδώς). Socrates ends, "My good man, do not be ignorant of yourself", and urges him to turn from examining the affairs of others to examining himself.[6]

Translation in this edition

Ἀγνοεῖν is "not know" at 162e, 164a and 164c–d, where the English needs the same verb as the "know" around it, and "be ignorant" at 170c ("the man who is ignorant of these") and 174a ("was ignorant of nothing"). At 170c the Greek has the singular object, ὁ τοῦτο ἀγνοῶν, "the one ignorant of this", which the English makes plural to cover the healthy and what belongs to house-building just named.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; αἰδώς; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γιγνώσκω; ἐπιμέλεια; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἶδα; τὰ γεγονότα.

ἀγνώς · stranger

ἀγνώς, *agnōs*, "stranger"

Attested: ἀγνῶτας (*agnōtas*; 153a). Unknown; of persons, a stranger, someone one does not know. In the wrestling-school kept by Taureas, an Athenian, Socrates finds "a great crowd, some of them strangers to me but most of them people I knew" (153a–b): τοὺς μὲν καὶ ἀγνῶτας ἐμοί, τοὺς δὲ πλείστους γνωρίμους. The opposite word, γνώριμος, "known", returns at once in the news from Potidaea, the city in the northern Aegean that Athens had been besieging, that "many people we know were killed" (153c). A dialogue that will ask what it is to know oneself can be read as opening by dividing the room into those Socrates knows and those he does not.

See also γνώριμος; ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου; παλαίστρα.

[6] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.7.9; Charmides' plea is at 3.7.5.

ἀγχίνοια · quick-wittedness

ἀγχίνοια, *anchinoia*, "quick-wittedness"

Attested: ἀγχίνοια (*anchinoia*; 160a). Quickness of mind, from ἄγχι, "near", and νοῦς, "mind": a mind that is close to its object at once. In the argument against Charmides' first answer Socrates asks, "And isn't quick-wittedness a kind of sharpness of the soul, and not a quietness?" "True" (160a), and goes on to show that in understanding, inquiry and deliberation the quickest is praised (160a–b; see ἡσυχιότης; ὀξύτης). In the *Republic* Socrates says that natures quick to learn, retentive, quick-witted (ἀγχίνοι) and sharp are seldom willing to live in an orderly way, with quiet and steadiness, while the steady natures are slow to learn and fill with sleep and yawning when they must work (503c–d): which can be read as the very terms of Charmides' answer, kept apart in two kinds of men. Aristotle, Plato's pupil, reports a saying that can be read against Socrates' praise of quick deliberation: people say that one should act quickly on what has been deliberated but deliberate slowly; and quick-wittedness, a kind of knack for hitting the mark, is not the same as good deliberation.[7]

See also ἡσυχιότης; ὀξύτης; ταχύς.

ἄδην ἔχω · have one's fill

ἄδην ἔχειν, *hadēn echein*, "to have one's fill"

Attested: ἄδην εἴχομεν (*hadēn eichomen*; 153d). Ἄδην is "to satiety, enough and more", and with ἔχειν, "to have", it means to have had one's fill of something. After the news from Potidaea, "When we had had our fill of all that, I asked them my own questions in turn about things here at home: how philosophy was doing these days, and about the young men" (153d). Homer uses the adverb of war: Hector, the Trojan champion, is to be driven "to his fill of battle", ἄδην ... πολέμοιο.[8] Socrates can be read as having had his fill of

[7] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.9, 1142b2–6.

[8] Homer, *Iliad* 13.315; compare 19.423, where Achilles will not stop before he has driven the Trojans to their fill of war.

battle, and turning to wisdom and beauty, of which no one in the dialogue has had enough.

See also ἀνερωτάω; διηγέομαι; φιλοσοφία.

ἀδικέω · do an injustice

Charmides' courtesy, and what is owed to Socrates · Charmides

ἀδικῶ, *adikō*, "I'd be doing you an injustice"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀδικεῖν is to do wrong, to act against δίκη, right; with a person as its object, to wrong him.

In the *Charmides*. Once, as a courtesy. Asked whether he is sure he has Socrates' name right, Charmides says he would be doing him an injustice if he had not, since Socrates is much talked about among the boy's age-mates (156a).

In this edition. "I'd be doing you an injustice if I didn't."

A place to read. 155e–156b, from the leaf and its charm to Socrates' promise to speak frankly.

Meaning

Ἀδικεῖν (*adikein*) is the verb of ἄδικος, "unjust", the negative of δίκη, which is both custom and the right that custom secures. Its range runs from crime to a breach of manners: to wrong someone is to fail to give him what is his due. Charmides' εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε is literally "unless I am doing wrong", and it makes knowing a man's name a matter of what is owed to him.

Use in the book

The exchange comes just after the boy has chosen persuasion over compulsion. He will copy the charm down "If I persuade you, Socrates" (156a; see πείθω). Socrates asks, "And you are sure you have my name right?" "I'd be doing you an injustice if I didn't," he said. "You're talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a

boy, keeping company with Critias here." "Good for you," I said. "Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm" (156a–b; see παρρησιάζομαι). The joke is that the visiting doctor of Critias' ruse is no stranger: the boy knows him by reputation and by sight, and it is his knowing that lets Socrates speak to him more frankly about the charm, which he goes on to expound (156b–157c).

Justice is not one of the dialogue's subjects. The just appears only once more, as the object of statesmanship, beside the healthy as the object of medicine, in Socrates' question whether knowledge of knowledge is the same as "knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just" (170a–b; see δίκαιος). The temperate man of Critias' definition, knowing only knowledge, would not know it. Elsewhere the root is only the ordinary "right" (157d, 175a).

The courtesy of 156a can be read against the end. The boy who would think it a wrong not to know Socrates' name will, in the last lines, use force on him at his guardian's order and refuse him even "a preliminary hearing", the first step of due process (176c; see ἀνάκρισις; βιάζομαι). The dialogue opens with a young man giving Socrates his due, and closes with the same young man taking it away in fun.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs, and the dialogue's other mention of the just.

156a Charmides would be doing Socrates an injustice not to know his name; Socrates is much talked about among the boys, and Charmides remembers him with Critias.

170a–b Knowledge of knowledge is not the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just, which is statesmanship.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* shows the same reputation among the boys. Lysimachus, an elderly Athenian looking for teachers for his son, recalls as Socrates is named that the boys, talking among themselves at home, often mention Socrates and praise him, and he asks them, "is this the Socrates you are always talking

about?" "Certainly, father, this is the one" (180e–181a). In both dialogues the young know Socrates by talk before their elders introduce him.

Translation in this edition

"I'd be doing you an injustice if I didn't" renders Εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ γε, literally "unless I am doing wrong", with the condition turned round into English idiom. Socrates' reply, Καλῶς γε σύ ... ποιῶν, literally "you do well", is "Good for you", as again at 162e.

See also

ἀκριβόω; ἀνάκρισις; βιάζομαι; δίκαιος; ἡλικιώτης; παρρησιάζομαι; πείθω.

ἀδύνατος · impossible, unable

The impossible, and the inquirer who cannot · Charmides

ἀδύνατον, *adynaton*, "impossible", "cannot possibly"; ἀδύνατα παντάπασι, *adynata pantapasi*, "altogether impossible"; ἀδύνατος εἶναι, *adynatos einai*, "could not"; ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ... ζητεῖν, *adynaton logōi ... zētein*, "unable to inquire ... by argument"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀδύνατος is what lacks δύναμις, power: of a thing, impossible; of a person, unable.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates' first question about Critias' knowledge of knowledge is whether it is possible (167b), and his parallels make it look impossible (167c, 168e). Critias will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions Socrates asks for (169c). At the end Socrates recalls that they conceded something impossible (175c), and tells the boy that, if he has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, "unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a).

In this edition. "Impossible" of things, "cannot possibly" in the medical rule, "could not" and "unable" of persons.

A place to read. 168e–169a, where Socrates sorts the impossible cases from the merely doubted.

Meaning

Ἀδύνατος (*adynatos*) is the negative of δυνατός, "able, possible", from δύναμις (*dynamis*), "power, capacity". Said of things, the neuter ἀδύνατον is "impossible"; said of persons, the adjective means "unable, powerless". The *Charmides* uses both, and the first is at home in an argument about powers, since what is impossible is what nothing has the power to be or do (168b–169a; see δύναμις).

Use in the book

The word enters as medical doctrine. The Thracian teaches that the Greek doctors neglect the whole, "and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος).

In the argument it frames the first of Socrates' two questions, "first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know" (167b). He warns at once: "Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible" (167c). After sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, the greater and the double (167c–168d), he sorts the cases: "some appear to us to be altogether impossible, while others are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves? For with magnitudes and numbers and such things it is altogether impossible, isn't it?" (168e). The impossible cases are magnitudes and numbers, such as a greater that would have to be smaller than itself (168b–c); the doubted ones are "hearing and sight, and indeed motion moving itself and heat burning itself", which "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others" (168e–169a; see ἀπιστία; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Knowledge stands with the doubted, and the question is left to "a great man" (169a).

The personal sense follows. Socrates confesses, "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a), and Critias, caught

by the same perplexity, "was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible (169d), and the argument goes on to its benefit.

The end recalls both senses. Among the concessions that did not follow, they agreed that the temperate man knows of what he does not know that he does not know it, "without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all" (175c; see ἄλογος). And Socrates, aggrieved for the boy, says that if Charmides has temperance he would sooner advise him "to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument", and to think himself the happier the more temperate he is (176a; see λῆρος).

The two senses divide the inquirers. Critias will not say that he cannot; Socrates says so of himself at 169a, and at 176a invites the boy to think it of him; and it is he who keeps the inquiry going. The admission of inability can be read as the dialogue's mark of the man who still has a way through.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

156e When the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well.

167c Knowledge of itself, looked at in other cases, will seem impossible.

168e Some cases are altogether impossible, others strongly doubted; with magnitudes and numbers it is altogether impossible.

169c Critias will not concede that he could not make the distinctions Socrates asked for.

175c They conceded, without considering it, that one could know what it is impossible to know.

176a Socrates would sooner be thought a babbler, unable to inquire by argument.

Elsewhere in Plato

The rule behind the impossible cases can be read in the *Republic*: "plainly one and the same thing will not consent to act or be acted upon in opposite ways, in the same respect and towards the same thing, at one time" (436b). A greater that is greater than itself would also be smaller than itself, and so

would undergo opposites in relation to the same thing (*Charmides* 168b–c). One of the doubted cases is settled elsewhere. Self-motion, which the *Charmides* leaves among the things some would disbelieve (168e), becomes in the *Phaedrus* the definition of soul: "only what moves itself, since it does not abandon itself, never ceases moving" (245c–e), and the *Laws* says the same (895e–896a), as the edition's note at 169a points out.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders by sense: "cannot possibly be well" for ἀδύνατον ... εὖ ἔχειν (156e), "impossible" at 167c, 168e and 175c, "could not make the distinctions" for ἀδύνατος εἶναι διελέσθαι (169c), and "unable to inquire" for ἀδύνατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν ζητεῖν (176a). Its positive, δυνατός, is "possible" in Socrates' first question and in the grant that follows (167b, 169d).

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἄλογος; ἀπιστία; δύναμις; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; δυνατός; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; λῆρος; μέγας ἀνήρ; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

αἰδώς · modesty

Modesty, Charmides' second answer · Charmides

αἰδώς, *aidōs*, "modesty"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰδώς is the sense of shame or respect that holds a person back, before the gods, an elder or the eyes of others; in a boy it shows as a blush.

In the *Charmides*. Charmides' second answer: temperance "makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful", and is "the same thing as modesty" (160e). Socrates refutes it with a line of Homer: modesty is no good thing for a man in need, but temperance is always good (161a–b).

In this edition. "Modesty", with "feel shame" and "bashful" for the words of the same answer.

A place to read. 160d–161b, from "look within yourself" to the verdict.

Meaning

Αἰδώς (*aidōs*) is the feeling that checks a person before he acts: reverence before a god or a guest, respect for an elder, shame at what others will think. Homer's captains rally their men with the cry "Shame, Argives!"[9] The edition's Key Words describe it as "the sense of shame or respect that holds a person back", not modesty about one's achievements and not prudery. It is close to αἰσχύνη, shame at disgrace, and in a well-brought-up youth it was the visible form of σωφροσύνη: the boy who blushes, keeps quiet and knows his place (the edition's note at 157a).

Use in the book

The answer is the fruit of a new method. After quietness has been refuted, Socrates asks Charmides to look within himself, consider what temperance makes him, and say properly and like a man what it seems to be (160d–e; see ἀνδρικῶς; ἐμβλέπω; ἐννοέω). Charmides paused, "and after thinking it over to himself very much like a man, said, 'Well, I think temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and that temperance is the same thing as modesty'" (160e). He describes what the narrator has already seen in him, the blush and the bashfulness of 158c (see αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνερυθριάω).

The refutation is quick. Temperance is fine; temperate men are good men; nothing is good that does not make men good; so temperance is good (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). Then Homer's line on the man in need makes modesty "both not good and good" (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ), and temperance, which makes good those it is present with, cannot be a thing that is sometimes bad: "Then temperance would not be modesty, if the one is in fact good, while modesty is no more good than bad" (161a–b). Charmides accepts at once, "Well, I think that is rightly said, Socrates", and passes to a definition he has heard from someone else (161b).

The premise that settles the matter is borrowed from a line about a beggar. What the refutation shows is that modesty is a feeling whose worth depends on its occasion, good in a boy at table and bad in a beggar at the

[9] Homer, *Iliad* 8.228 (Agamemnon), 15.502 (Ajax); compare 16.422 (Sarpedon to the Lycians).

door, while temperance, as the argument assumes throughout, is good always. Socrates refutes the definition and not the boy. The bashfulness stays with Charmides, who is "most temperate in soul" in Socrates' lament at 175d–e, and the modest boy gives up his answer readily. Critias, who claims he would not be ashamed to take back what he has said (164d), is the one who later "was ashamed in front of the company" and would not admit that he was at a loss (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι).

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs, with the scene at 158c that the answer describes.

158c Charmides blushes when asked whether he is temperate; his bashfulness is becoming at his age.

160d–e Told to look within himself, he answers that temperance makes a person feel shame and bashful, and is the same thing as modesty.

160e–161a Temperance is fine and good; Homer says modesty is no good thing for a man in need; so modesty is both not good and good.

161a–b Temperance always makes good those it is present with; modesty, no more good than bad, is not temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

Three other dialogues give αἰδώς three different places. In the myth that the sophist Protagoras of Abdera tells in the *Protagoras*, Zeus, afraid that the human race would perish, sends Hermes to bring men "modesty and justice", to be the order of cities and the bonds of friendship; he is to give them to all, not as the crafts are given, one doctor for many, and the man unable to share in them is to be put to death as a disease of the city (322c–d). In the *Euthyphro* Socrates disputes a poet he does not name, whose line later sources assign to the *Cypria*, an early epic of the Trojan cycle: "where there is fear, there is also modesty". Many fear disease and poverty without being ashamed of them, so the truth is the reverse, that where there is modesty there is also fear, modesty being a part of fear as the odd is a part of number (12a–c). In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger distinguishes the fear of evils to come from the fear of a bad reputation, "which we, and I think everyone, call

shame"; the lawgiver holds it in the highest honour and calls it αἰδώς, and its opposite, boldness, shamelessness (646e–647a). In each of the three αἰδώς is prized for what it holds back, and in none is it the whole of a virtue: in the *Protagoras* it is half of what lets men live in cities, in the *Euthyphro* a part of fear, in the *Laws* a fear the lawgiver enlists.

Other ancient sources

In the history of the war between Athens and Sparta written by Thucydides, the Spartan king Archidamus, counselling his people against a hasty war with Athens, says that the Spartans are good in war and wise in counsel because they are orderly: good in war "because modesty has the largest share in temperance, and courage in a sense of shame".[10] Charmides' answer can be read as taking this common opinion one step further, from the largest share to the whole.

In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* Charmides himself pleads αἰδώς. Urged by Socrates to enter public life, he answers that "modesty and fear" are inborn in men and come over them far more in crowds than in private company.[11] Aristotle declines to treat αἰδώς as a virtue at all: it is more like a feeling than a settled state, "a sort of fear of ill repute", and it shows in the body, since those who are ashamed blush.[12] The *Charmides* can be read as reaching a like result by another road, since a feeling that is good in one man and bad in another cannot be the virtue that is good in all.

Translation in this edition

Αἰδώς is "modesty" at all five of its places (160e4; 161a4, a6, a11; 161b1), and the Glossary lists it under that word (160e–161b). In the same answer αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν is "makes a person feel shame" and αἰσχυντηλόν "bashful" (160e). The bashfulness of 158c is another word (158c; see αἰσχυντηλός). At 161b1 Burnet, following Ast, brackets the negative μή in αἰδὼς δὲ [μὴ] οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν, and the English translates the text without it: "while modesty is no more good than bad".

[10] Thucydides 1.84.3.
[11] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.7.5.
[12] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9, 1128b10–14.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; αἰσχύνομαι; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνδρείως; ἀνδρικῶς; ἀνερυθριάω; ἐμβλέπω; ἐννοέω; σωφροσύνη.

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ · modesty is no good thing

Homer's line on modesty · Charmides

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ κεχρημένῳ ἀνδρὶ παρεῖναι, *aidōs d' ouk agathē kechrēmenōi andri pareinai*, "Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need"

At a Glance

The word. A line of the *Odyssey* (17.347), spoken of the disguised Odysseus as he is sent to beg among the suitors.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates quotes it to show that modesty is "both not good and good", and so cannot be temperance, which is good always (161a–b).

In this edition. Set off as verse, as Burnet sets it on a line of its own, and kept literal at the end, "to be present", because the argument takes up the verb.

A place to read. 160e–161b.

Meaning

Κεχρημένος (*kechrēmenos*), the perfect participle of χράομαι in the sense "to be in want", is "a man in need"; παρεῖναι (*pareinai*) is "to be present with" (see πάρειμι; χράομαι). In the *Odyssey*, Odysseus, home in Ithaca disguised as a beggar, sits at the threshold of his own hall. Telemachus, Odysseus' son, sends the swineherd Eumaeus to him with bread and meat, and tells him to bid the stranger go round and beg from every one of the suitors, "for modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need" (17.345–347).[13] When Eumaeus passes the message on, the line ends differently: Telemachus "says that modesty is no good thing for a beggar man" (ἀνδρὶ προΐκτῃ,

[13] Homer, *Odyssey* 17.345–352.

17.352). Plato quotes line 347 as the *Odyssey* has it; the beggar belongs to Eumaeus' version five lines later.

Use in the book

Socrates brings Homer in as an authority whom Charmides will not dispute: "Well then ... don't you believe that Homer is right when he says *Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need?*" "I do," he said. "So it seems modesty is both not good and good." "It appears so" (161a). The second half of the conclusion, that modesty is also good, is not argued; it is the boy's own answer of a moment before, and Charmides grants it.

The verb carries over into the next step. "But temperance is good, if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad" (161a): "those it is present with" renders οἷς ἂν παρῇ, the verb of Homer's παρεῖναι. Modesty present with the needy man does him no good; temperance present with anyone makes him good. So temperance is not modesty (161a–b; see αἰδώς).

The edition's note at 161a allows that "one may feel the argument helps itself to a line about a beggar's shyness". The choice can be read as part of the comedy: the boy whose bashfulness has just been admired is answered with a line about a beggar, and the most beautiful youth in Athens is set beside Odysseus in rags at his own door. The quotation also sets the presence of temperance as the thing to be judged by its effects, the question to which Socrates returns at the end, when he fears that temperance will be of no benefit to Charmides "by being present in you" (175e; see πάρειμι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα).

Places to read

The passage in which the line is quoted and used.

160e–161b Homer's line makes modesty both not good and good; temperance makes good those it is present with; so modesty is not temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

Socrates quotes the same line at the end of the *Laches*, the dialogue on courage, for the opposite purpose. He advises that all of them, old as they are,

should look for the best teacher they can find, first for themselves and then for the boys, and he sets Homer against anyone who would mock men of their age for going to school: Homer "said that modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need", and so, letting the mockers go, they should take care of themselves and of the boys together (201a–b). Lysimachus, who had asked for his advice, agrees (201b). In the *Laches* the line licenses the old to be unashamed in learning; in the *Charmides* it shows that a feeling the young are praised for is no virtue.

Other ancient sources

Hesiod, the early epic poet, has a near twin in the *Works and Days*: "modesty is no good thing to escort a man in need, modesty, which greatly harms men and helps them".[14] Its second line, as the edition's note at 161a observes, is Socrates' conclusion.

Translation in this edition

The English sets the line in italics on a line of its own, as Burnet sets the Greek (Editorial Note), and keeps Homer's last word, "to be present", which the argument takes up two lines later. The edition's note at 161a gives the source, the *Odyssey* 17.347, the parallel at *Laches* 201b, and Hesiod's couplet.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς; πάρειμι; πιστεύω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; χράομαι.

αἴνιγμα · riddle

The riddle of "doing one's own business" · Charmides

αἴνιγμα, *ainigma*, "riddle"

At a Glance

The word. An αἴνιγμα is a dark saying, whose sense is not the sense of its words.

[14] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 317–318.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates calls the definition Charmides has heard, that temperance is "doing one's own business", a riddle (161c), shows that its words taken at face value are absurd, and concludes that its author, being wise, "put it forward as a riddle" (162b). Charmides suggests that the author may not have known what he meant, and looks across at Critias (162b). Critias later has the god at Delphi speak "rather riddlingly" (164e).

In this edition. "Riddle", with "speak in riddles" and "rather riddlingly" for the verb and the adjective.

A place to read. 161b–162b, from the saying heard to the sly laugh.

Meaning

Αἴνιγμα (*ainigma*) comes from αἰνίττεσθαι (*ainittesthai*), "to hint, speak darkly", and that from αἶνος (*ainos*), a tale with a point, such as a fable. The riddle was a game of the symposium and of children, and the oracles spoke in riddles. A riddle presupposes a speaker who knows what he means and a hearer who must work it out; to call a saying a riddle is to credit its author with a sense he has hidden.

Use in the book

Charmides offers his third answer as something heard: "that temperance would be doing one's own business" (161b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Socrates suspects Critias at once, and when Charmides asks what difference it makes whom he heard it from, Socrates agrees that what matters is not who said it but whether it is true, and adds, "But I'd be surprised if we even find out how it stands: it looks like a kind of riddle" (161c; see ἀληθής).

The reason is that the words cannot mean what they say: "the man who said that temperance is doing one's own business ... surely did not mean it the way the words sound" (161d). Taken literally, a writing-master who writes names other than his own, or boys who write their enemies' names, do other people's business; a city in which each man wove and washed his own cloak and cobbled his own shoes would not be well managed; yet a temperately managed city would be (161d–162a; see ἀλλότριος). So its author, being no simpleton, "was speaking in riddles" (162a–b; see

αἰνίττομαι). Asked whether it was some fool, Charmides answers, "He was thought to be very wise indeed." "Then I am quite certain he put it forward as a riddle, on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one's own business is" (162b).

Charmides turns the courtesy round. He does not know what the saying means: "But perhaps there is nothing to stop even the man who said it from not knowing what he meant." "And as he said this he laughed slyly and looked across at Critias" (162b). Socrates had treated the riddle as a hidden sense; the boy suggests it may be a confusion, and points to its author. Critias, "eager to shine before Charmides and the company", takes the argument over (162c–e) and answers the riddle with distinctions of words that he says he learned from Hesiod (163b–d; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν).

The riddle returns on Critias' own lips. Reading the inscription at Delphi as the god's greeting, "Be temperate!", he has the god say it "rather riddlingly" (164e; see αἰνιγματώδης). The edition's note at 165a hears the echo: Socrates three times called "doing one's own business" a riddle, and now Critias makes riddling the god's own style. The man suspected of a riddle he could not explain now explains a god's riddle, and defines temperance by it as knowing oneself.

The riddle is Socrates' polite name for a definition that is false as stated. Its use in the *Charmides* can be read as a lesson in what to do with an authority: assume a sense, and then look for it. The search fails for "doing one's own business", and the dialogue never says what its author meant.

Places to read

Every passage in which the riddle is named, with the refutation between them.

161c What matters is whether what is said is true; the saying looks like a kind of riddle.

161d–162a Its author did not mean it the way the words sound; taken literally it is refuted by the writing-master and the city of self-made cloaks.

162a–b Its author, being no simpleton, was speaking in riddles.

162b He was thought very wise, so he put it forward as a riddle; Charmides suggests that he may not have known what he meant, and looks at Critias.

164e–165a Critias says that the god at Delphi greets those who enter with "Be temperate!", rather riddlingly.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* Socrates turns the riddle against his accuser. Meletus, whose indictment charges him with not believing in gods while believing in spirits, "seems like a man composing a riddle and testing whether the wise Socrates will see that I am playing with him and saying things that contradict each other" (27a); and a little later, if spirits are gods, "this would be what I say you are riddling and joking about" (27d). Here a riddle is a contradiction offered as a test. In the *Republic* the many beautiful things, which are also ugly, and the many doubles, which are also halves, are compared to "the children's riddle about the eunuch and his throw at the bat": like it, they waver between being and not being, and cannot be fixed in thought either way (479b–c).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the riddle's form exactly: it is "to say things that are so while joining together things that are impossible", which can be done only with metaphors.[15] The saying of the *Charmides* can be read as fitting the definition from the other side: its words, put together literally, yield the impossible, a well-run city in which no one makes anything for anyone else.

Translation in this edition

Αἴνιγμα is "riddle" at 161c and 162b, αἰνίττεσθαι "speak in riddles" at 162a, and the comparative αἰνιγματωδέστερον, used as an adverb, "rather riddlingly" at 164e; the Glossary lists the family under "riddle" (161c, 162a–b, 164e). At 161c the dative αἰνίγματι ... τινι ἔοικεν is "it looks like a kind of riddle".

See also

αἰνιγματώδης; αἰνίττομαι; ἀληθής; ἀλλότριος; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; εὐήθης; ἠλίθιος; προβάλλω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑπογελάω.

[15] Aristotle, *Poetics* 22, 1458a26–29.

αἰνιγματώδης · rather riddlingly

αἰνιγματωδέστερον, *ainigmatōdesteron*, "rather riddlingly"

Attested: αἰνιγματωδέστερον (*ainigmatōdesteron*; 164e). Riddling, like a riddle; the neuter comparative serves as an adverb, "rather riddlingly". In Critias' reading of the inscription at Delphi the god greets everyone who enters with nothing other than "Be temperate!", "But he says it, as a prophet would, rather riddlingly", for "Know thyself" and "Be temperate" are the same (164e–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Σωφρόνει). The word gives the god the manner of the saying Socrates had called a riddle (161c–162b; see αἴνιγμα). Plato uses the adjective again in the *Theaetetus*, where the geometer Theodorus complains that the followers of Heraclitus, the philosopher of Ephesus who taught that all things flow, answer any question by drawing "riddling little phrases" from a quiver and shooting them off (180a); and the *Second Alcibiades*, a dialogue generally thought not to be Plato's, says that all poetry is "by nature riddling", not for any passer-by to understand (147b).

See also αἴνιγμα; αἰνίττομαι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; μάντις; Σωφρόνει.

αἰνίττομαι · speak in riddles

Speaking darkly, and reading a wise man charitably · Charmides

αἰνίττεσθαι, *ainittesthai*, "speak in riddles"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰνίττεσθαι is to speak in riddles, to hint at a meaning without saying it.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' conclusion that the author of "doing one's own business", being no simpleton, was speaking in riddles (162a–b).

In this edition. "Was speaking in riddles", for the imperfect ᾐνίττετο.

A place to read. 162a–b.

Meaning

Αἰνίττεσθαι (*ainittesthai*) is a deponent verb from αἶνος (*ainos*), a tale with a point, and stands behind αἴνιγμα, "riddle" (see αἴνιγμα). It is used of oracles and poets, and of anyone who says one thing and means another; it implies that the speaker knows his meaning and hides it.

Use in the book

Socrates has shown that "doing one's own business", taken at the sound of its words, is refuted by every craft that works for others (161d–162a). He draws the conclusion in the form of an inference about the speaker: "Then, as it seems, the man who said that temperance was doing one's own business was speaking in riddles, as I said just now; for surely he was not such a simpleton" (162a–b; see εὐήθης). The reason given is the speaker's standing, not the saying's content. A wise man would not say something so plainly false; therefore he meant something else. When Charmides confirms that the man "was thought to be very wise indeed", Socrates is "quite certain" (162b).

The verb carries a double irony. Socrates suspects, and the narrator soon says he thinks it "entirely true", that the speaker is Critias, sitting on the boy's other side (155c, 161b–c, 162c); the charity he extends to an absent sage is extended to a man in the room who must now justify it. And Charmides, by suggesting that the speaker may not have known what he meant (162b), questions the assumption on which the verb rests, that whoever speaks in riddles knows the answer.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs, with its frame.

161c–162b The saying looks like a riddle; taken literally it fails; so its author, no simpleton, was speaking in riddles; thought very wise, he put it forward as a riddle.

Elsewhere in Plato

The same inference, from the speaker's standing to a hidden sense, recurs at important moments. In the *Apology* Socrates, told that the god at Delphi had said no one was wiser than he, asks himself, "What can the god be saying, and

what is he hinting at in riddles?", since he knows he is not wise, and yet the god surely does not lie, "for that is not lawful for him" (21b). In the *Republic* the saying of Simonides, the lyric poet of Ceos, that justice is giving back to each what is owed cannot mean returning a weapon to a madman; so "Simonides, it seems, was speaking in riddles, poetically, about what justice is", meaning that it is giving each what is fitting (332b–c). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates suggests that Protagoras, wise as he was, spoke in riddles to the crowd of us and told the truth to his pupils in secret (152c); and in the *Phaedo* he grants that the founders of the mystery rites were perhaps hinting in riddles long ago that the uninitiated will lie in mud in Hades (69c). In each the verb marks a charitable reading of a respected source. Unlike the god, Simonides, Protagoras and the founders of the rites, the source in the *Charmides* is in the room and can be asked.

Translation in this edition

Ἠινίττετο (*ēinitteto*, 162a) is the imperfect, the capital H carrying its iota beside it rather than beneath, as Burnet prints it at the head of a sentence; the English gives the continuous sense, "was speaking in riddles". The Glossary lists it under "riddle" with αἴνιγμα (161c, 162a–b, 164e).

See also

αἴνιγμα; αἰνιγματώδης; εὐήθης; ἠλίθιος; σοφός; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

αἱρέω · be caught

αἱρεῖσθαι, *haireisthai*, "to be caught"

Attested: αἱρεῖσθαι (*haireisthai*; 155d). To take, to catch; in the passive, to be taken. The verb occurs once, in the lines of the poet Cydias that Socrates recalls when he sees inside Charmides' cloak: the fawn that comes into the lion's presence is "to be caught as a portion of meat" (155d–e; see Κυδίας). Μοῖραν αἱρεῖσθαι κρεῶν is literally "to be taken as a portion of meats". Cobet proposed αἰτεῖσθαι, "to ask for a portion", and Burnet keeps the manuscripts' αἱρεῖσθαι (apparatus, d7). Socrates' ἑαλωκέναι, "I had been

caught", which follows, is from a different verb used as its passive (see ἁλίσκομαι). In Cydias the hunter is the boy, not, as in the *Lysis*, the lover (206a; see ἁλίσκομαι). The compound ἐξαιρεῖν, "remove" (172a, 174c), is a word of its own (see ἐξαιρέω).

See also ἁλίσκομαι; ἐξαιρέω; θρέμμα; Κυδίας; νεβρός; τὰ ἐρωτικά.

αἰσθάνομαι · notice, sense

Noticing, and sensing nothing · Charmides

ἤσθησαι, *ēisthēsai*, "haven't you noticed"; αἰσθάνονται, *aisthanontai*, "sense"; αἰσθανομένη, *aisthanomenē*, "senses"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰσθάνεσθαι is to perceive by the senses, and so to notice, to become aware.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. Socrates asks Charmides whether he has noticed what good doctors say and that it is so (156c); and he asks Critias whether there is a sense of senses that "senses none of the things the other senses sense" (167d).

In this edition. "Notice" at 156c, "sense" at 167d, so that verb and noun, "senses ... sense", keep their family there.

A place to read. 167c–d.

Meaning

Αἰσθάνεσθαι (*aisthanesthai*) is the verb of αἴσθησις (*aisthēsis*), "perception, sense" (see αἴσθησις). It covers seeing, hearing and the other senses, and their extension to any becoming aware: one perceives a sound, and one perceives that one has been deceived. The perfect ἤσθησαι, "you have perceived", is "you have noticed".

Use in the book

The first use belongs to the charm. Socrates has explained that good doctors treat the part with the whole, and asks, "Haven't you noticed that this is

what they say, and that it is so?" "Certainly," he said (156c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). Two things are asked: whether the boy has heard what doctors say, and whether he has seen that it is true. His assent lets Socrates take heart and go on (156d).

The second belongs to the argument against knowledge of knowledge. After a sight that sees no colour and a hearing that hears no sound, Socrates asks whether any sense is a sense of senses and of itself "which senses none of the things the other senses sense", and Critias thinks not (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The verb names the work that the impossible sense would lack: to sense is to sense something, a colour, a sound, and a sense that sensed only senses would sense nothing.

The two uses can be read together. At 159a Socrates assumed that temperance, if present, "must give rise to some sense" in the boy, from which he could form an opinion of it (see αἴσθησις). Charmides could notice the doctors' rule as one notices anything outside him; whether temperance can be noticed within oneself in the same way is the question that Critias' definition raises and that the parallel at 167d makes hard.

Places to read

Both passages in which the verb occurs.

156c Has Charmides noticed that good doctors say they treat the part with the whole, and that it is so? He has.

167d There is no sense of senses and of itself that senses none of the things the other senses sense.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* can be read as giving the reason that no sense can be a sense of senses. Socrates gets Theaetetus to agree that what we perceive through one power we cannot perceive through another, what we perceive through hearing through sight, or the reverse; so whatever we think about both, sound and colour together, we cannot perceive through either organ (184e–185a). Thinking that both exist, that each is different from the other and the same as itself, is, in Theaetetus' answer, which Socrates welcomes, the work

of "the soul itself through itself" (185d–e). On that account a perception of perceptions can be read as no perception at all, but thought.

Translation in this edition

At 156c the perfect ἤσθησαι, in the question ἢ οὐκ ἤσθησαι, is "Haven't you noticed", the negative carrying Socrates' expectation of assent. At 167d the participle αἰσθανομένη and the finite αἰσθάνονται are "senses" and "sense", beside "a sense of senses" for αἰσθήσεων ... αἴσθησις, so that the English keeps the single family of the Greek through the sentence.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; αἴσθησις; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀκοή; ὄψις; συλλήβδην.

αἴσθησις · sense

The sense that temperance must give rise to · Charmides

αἴσθησις, *aisthēsis*, "sense"; αἰσθήσεις, *aisthēseis*, "senses"

At a Glance

The word. Αἴσθησις is perception, and a sense: sight, hearing and the rest, and the awareness they give.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates' method for the first question rests on it: if temperance is present in Charmides, "it must give rise to some sense", from which he will have an opinion about it, and since he speaks Greek he can say what it is (159a). Later the senses supply the first parallels against knowledge of knowledge (167c–d).

In this edition. "Sense", singular and plural.

A place to read. 158e–159a, the method.

Meaning

Αἴσθησις (*aisthēsis*), the noun of αἰσθάνεσθαι, "to perceive" (see αἰσθάνομαι), is both the act of perceiving and the power that perceives: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch. It can also be any awareness, as one may have a perception

of a quality in oneself. At 159a it is that wider awareness; at 167d it is the senses proper.

Use in the book

The method of 158e–159a sets out a chain. "For it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it. For surely, if it really is in you, it must give rise to some sense, from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is. Don't you think so?" "I do," he said (159a). Presence gives rise to a sense, the sense to an opinion, and the opinion, "since you know how to speak Greek", to words: "you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?" "Perhaps," he said (159a; see δόξα; ἑλληνίζω; ἔνειμι). The edition's note at 159a observes that, on one reading, the remark states an assumption the inquiry will lean on, that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words. The boy's "Perhaps" is the first doubt about the chain.

The second use comes in the procession of reflexive powers. Critias denies that there is a sense of senses and of itself that senses nothing the other senses sense (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). A sense has an object outside itself, and without one it is not a sense.

The two uses face each other across the dialogue. At 159a temperance in the soul is assumed to be perceptible to its owner, like any quality. At 167d the perception of perception, with no object of its own, is denied. When Critias makes temperance a knowledge whose only object is knowledge, the parallel of the senses tells against him, and the method of 159a, which treated temperance as something felt within, can be read as having asked the right kind of question from the start: what does temperance do in a person (160d), not what does it know of itself.

Places to read

Both passages in which the noun occurs.

158e–159a If temperance is present in Charmides it must give rise to some sense, from which he has an opinion of it, and can say what it is.

167d There is no sense of senses and of itself which senses none of the things the other senses sense.

Elsewhere in Plato

The chain of 159a, from perception to opinion to speech, can be read as drawn out in the *Philebus*. A man who sees something from far off under a tree asks himself what it is and answers himself, "It is a man"; if someone is with him, he says aloud to his companion what he said to himself, "and so what we were calling opinion has become speech" (38c–e). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates calls thinking the conversation the soul holds with itself, asking and answering, and opinion a statement spoken not to another, nor aloud, but silently to oneself (189e–190a). Charmides is asked to do aloud what the soul, on these accounts, does within.

Translation in this edition

Αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν (159a) is "give rise to some sense", and the plural αἰσθήσεις at 167d is "senses". "Sense" keeps the English close to the verb "senses" in the same sentence at 167d (see αἰσθάνομαι).

See also

αἰσθάνομαι; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; δόξα; ἑλληνίζω; ἔνειμι; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; παρέχω.

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς · a sense of senses and of itself

The procession of powers turned on themselves · Charmides

αἰσθήσεων μὲν αἴσθησις καὶ ἑαυτῆς, *aisthēseōn men aisthēsis kai heautēs*, "a sense of senses and of itself"

At a Glance

The word. A perception whose objects are the other perceptions and itself, and nothing that the other perceptions perceive.

In the *Charmides*. The summary case in Socrates' procession of powers turned on themselves (167c–168a): sight, hearing, sense, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each imagined as being of itself and of its kind and of none

of the usual objects. Critias denies every one. Knowledge, as he has defined it, would be the only thing of this sort.

In this edition. "A sense of senses and of itself", with "sight of itself and of the other sights" and its fellows on the same pattern.

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

The phrase gives αἴσθησις (*aisthēsis*), "sense", two genitives of object: the plural αἰσθήσεων, "of senses", and the reflexive ἑαυτῆς, "of itself". Each case in the procession has three parts: it is of itself, it is of the others of its kind, and it is of none of the things of which the others are. That is exactly the structure Critias gave to temperance, a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of nothing else (166c, 167b–c; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).

Use in the book

Socrates warns that the claim will look impossible when tried on other cases (167c; see ἀδύνατος), and tries it. A sight "which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise; and which, though it is sight, sees no color" (167c–d; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). A hearing that hears no sound, but only itself and the other hearings (167d; see ἀκοή; μὴ ἀκοαί). Then the summary: "taking all the senses together, see whether you think there is any sense which is a sense of senses and of itself, but which senses none of the things the other senses sense." "I don't think so" (167d; see συλλήβδην).

The procession turns from perception to the desires: a desire for no pleasure but for itself and the other desires, a wish that wishes for no good, a love that is "love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves", a fear that fears "not one of the things that are dreadful", an opinion of opinions with no opinion about anything else (167e–168a; see βούλησις; δόξα; ἐπιθυμία; ἔρως; φόβος). Critias denies them all. Then the turn: "But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?" "We are." "Then isn't it strange, if there really is such a thing?

For let's not yet insist that there isn't; let us go on looking into whether there is" (168a).

The procession argues by likeness, and Critias had already objected to that kind of argument: temperance, he said, is "not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge", and Socrates was "looking for some likeness" where there was none (165e–166b). Socrates does not claim to have proved the impossible. He gives a reason in what follows: each power is defined by what it is of, so that a hearing that heard itself would have to have a sound, and a sight that saw itself would have to have a colour (168b–e; see ἀκοή; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). He sorts the cases into the impossible and the doubted, and leaves knowledge among the doubted, for "a great man" to decide (168e–169a).

The comedy of the examples "looks deliberate and deadpan", the edition's note at 167d says, and the note at 167e adds that a love of no beautiful thing, after the prologue, is "perhaps a pointed one": it is offered to a company that has just watched every man in the room fall in love with a beautiful boy. The problem is not comic. A self-knowledge that had no object but knowing would be like a perception that perceived only perceiving, and whether there could be such a thing is the question the dialogue declines to settle.

Places to read

Every stage of the procession.

167b–c Knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge looks impossible when tried on other cases.

167c–d A sight of itself and of the other sights that sees no colour; a hearing that hears no sound; a sense of senses and of itself that senses nothing the other senses sense.

167e A desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful, each only of itself and the others of its kind.

168a A fear that fears nothing dreadful, an opinion of opinions; knowledge, as Critias defines it, would be of this kind, and that is strange.

168b–169a Each power is of something; what is greater than itself would be smaller than itself; hearing that hears itself would have a sound; some cases are impossible, some doubted, and knowledge is left undecided.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates makes the principle explicit, as the edition's note at 168b says: powers are a kind of thing by which we are able to do what we can, and he means sight and hearing as examples; he tells one power from another only by what it is set over and what it accomplishes (477c–d). In the *Theaetetus* no sense perceives the objects of another, and what is common to them is grasped by "the soul itself through itself" (184e–185e; see αἰσθάνομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes up the same puzzle, without naming the *Charmides*, in his work *On the Soul*. Since we perceive that we see and hear, he says, it must be by sight that we perceive that we see, or by another sense; but that other sense would have to perceive both sight and its object, colour, so that there would be two senses of the same thing, or a sense of itself; and if it were another, either the series would go on without end or some sense would be of itself, so it may as well be the first. Then he states the difficulty of 168d–e: if to perceive by sight is to see, and what is seen is colour or what has colour, then if anything is to see that which sees, that which sees will itself have colour. His answer is that perceiving by sight is not one thing, since by sight we also judge darkness and light when we are not seeing, though not in the same way, and that what sees is in a way coloured, because each sense organ takes in what it perceives without its matter.[16] What Socrates left to "a great man" can be read as answered by Aristotle, who changes what it is for a sense to have an object.

Translation in this edition

The English keeps the three parts of each case in the same order and the same words: "sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise" (167c), "hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings" (167d), "a sense of senses and of itself" (167d). "Taking all the senses together" renders

[16] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12–25.

συλλήβδην ... περὶ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων. At 167c10 Burnet prints μὴ ὄψεων, "non-sights", with B and W, against T's singular μὴ ὄψεως.

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἰσθάνομαι; αἴσθησις; ἀκοή; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; βούλησις; βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; δόξα; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἔρως; ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; μὴ ἀκοαί; μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; συλλήβδην; φόβος.

αἰσχρός · improper, ugly

The opposite of the fine, in manners and in movement · Charmides

αἰσχρόν, *aischron*, "improper"; τὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ, *ta tou aischrou*, "the ugly ones"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰσχρός is ugly to look at and shameful to do, the opposite of καλός in both its senses.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. In the prologue, it would not be "improper" for the boy to talk with grown men in front of his guardian (155a). In the argument, actions done laboriously and quietly are "the ugly ones" (159d), and so not temperate, since temperance is fine.

In this edition. "Improper" and "ugly", by sense.

A place to read. 159c–d.

Meaning

Αἰσχρός (*aischros*) is formed from αἶσχος (*aischos*), "shame, disgrace". Said of the body it is "ugly", of an act "shameful", of conduct "improper". The edition's Key Words note that it means both "ugly" and "shameful", as its opposite καλός means both "beautiful" and "fine" (see καλός). The root runs through the dialogue: in αἰσχύνεσθαι, "to feel shame" (160e), in αἰσχυντηλός, "bashful" (158c, 160e), and in the name of Critias' father, Callaeschrus (153c, 169b), whose two parts are the roots of "beautiful" and "shameful".

Use in the book

The first use concerns manners around a beautiful boy. Socrates asks Critias why he does not call the youngster over: "Even if he were younger still, there would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a; see ἐπίτροπος). The guardian's presence is what makes the conversation proper.

The second comes in the refutation of quietness. Charmides grants that temperance is "one of the fine things" (159c), and Socrates runs through the schoolboy's lessons: writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running, jumping, "and all the actions of the body: aren't the ones done nimbly and quickly the fine ones, and the ones done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones?" "So it appears" (159c–d). Since temperance is fine, quickness, not quietness, would be the more temperate, "as far as the body goes, at any rate" (159d; see ἡσυχιότης; καλός).

The edition's note at 159c points out that the refutation rests on the premise, granted at once, that temperance is something καλόν. The argument can be read as working because one pair of words covers two judgements: what looks graceless in a race is ugly, and what is ugly cannot be the fine thing temperance is agreed to be. The word that governs propriety in the prologue governs the movements of the body in the argument, and the two meet in a boy whose blush, the narrator says, made him look even more beautiful (158c).

Places to read

Both passages in which the word occurs.

155a It would not be improper for the boy to talk with Socrates in front of his guardian and cousin.

159c–d In the body the actions done quickly are the fine ones and those done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones; so quickness, not quietness, would be more temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Symposium* can be read as giving the custom behind 155a. Pausanias, one of the guests who speak in praise of Love, explaining the Athenian law of

love, says that it seems to honour lovers, but that fathers set attendants over the boys who are loved and do not allow them to talk with their lovers (182d–183d). In the *Gorgias* Socrates gets Polus, the young teacher of rhetoric, to agree that bodies, colours, shapes, sounds and practices are called beautiful by reference to their use or the pleasure they give, so that the fine is defined by pleasure and good, and the ugly by the opposite, by pain and bad (474d–475a). The *Charmides* uses the pair without defining it.

Translation in this edition

Αἰσχρὸν ἂν ἦν (155a) is "there would be nothing improper", the negative coming from the οὐδέ that opens the sentence (155a4); τὰ τοῦ αἰσχροῦ (159d), literally "the things of the ugly", is "the ugly ones"; just before it Burnet brackets βραδέα, "slowly", on Heindorf's conjecture, and the English leaves it out. At 155a5 Burnet prints Goldbacher's εἰ ἔτι ἐτύγχανε, "even if he were still", where the manuscripts differ.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; αἰσχυντηλός; ἐπίτροπος; ἡσυχιότης; καλός; μόγις; ταχύς.

αἰσχύνομαι · feel shame, be ashamed

Shame in the answer, and shame in the man who answers · Charmides

αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν, *aischynesthai poiein*, "makes a person feel shame"; αἰσχυνθείην, *aischyntheiēn*, "be ashamed"; ᾐσχύνετο, *ēischyneto*, "was ashamed"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰσχύνεσθαι is to feel shame, to be ashamed of an act or before persons.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, each about a speaker and his words. Charmides says that temperance "makes a person feel shame" (160e). Critias would "sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly" (164c–d). And Critias, "used to being admired on every occasion",

is "ashamed in front of the company" and will not admit that he is at a loss (169c).

In this edition. "Feel shame" and "be ashamed".

A place to read. 169c–d.

Meaning

Αἰσχύνεσθαι (*aischynesthai*) is the middle of αἰσχύνειν, "to disfigure, disgrace", from αἶσχος, "shame". With an infinitive it is to be ashamed to do something, with a participle to be ashamed at doing it, and with an accusative of persons to feel shame before them, as Critias feels shame before "the company" (τοὺς παρόντας, 169c). Shame of this kind is shame at being seen.

Use in the book

The first use is the boy's. Asked to look within and say what temperance makes him, Charmides answers that temperance "makes a person feel shame" and is modesty (160e; see αἰδώς). Socrates refutes the definition, and the boy gives it up without embarrassment (161b).

The second is Critias' boast. Rather than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, "I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly" (164c–d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι). He does take it back, and more than he was asked: "Everything before this I give up to you" (165b).

The third undoes the boast. When Socrates asks him to show that knowledge of knowledge is possible and beneficial, Critias catches Socrates' perplexity "like people who catch a yawn", and, "Since he was used to being admired on every occasion, he was ashamed in front of the company; he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c–d; see ἁλίσκομαι; εὐδοκιμέω), and he covered up his perplexity instead (169d; see ἐπικαλύπτω). Socrates must grant the point himself, "to keep our argument moving" (169d). The company is the one before which, at 162c, Critias was "eager to shine before Charmides and the company", τοὺς παρόντας both times (162c2, 169c7): the ambition that

brought him into the argument and the shame that stops him there can be read as one trait seen twice.

The verb measures a reversal. The boy names shame as the mark of temperance and is refuted. Critias disowns shame when retracting costs him nothing, and gives way to it when admitting perplexity would cost him the company's admiration. The shame that serves inquiry, at one's own ignorance, is the one he lacks; the shame he has, before an audience, stops the inquiry. Charmides' definition, refuted in argument, can be read as vindicated in the drama: the man without the right shame is the one who proves least temperate.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

160e Charmides says that temperance makes a person feel shame and bashful, and is modesty.

164c–d Critias would sooner retract, and not be ashamed to say he spoke wrongly, than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.

169c–d Used to being admired, Critias is ashamed before the company, will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions, and covers up his perplexity.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* names the shame that stops an argument. Callicles, the ambitious Athenian with whom the dialogue ends, recalls that Polus had accused Gorgias of contradicting himself out of shame, and says that Polus has now fared the same: ashamed to say what he thought, he was tied up in the argument and muzzled (482c–e). Socrates takes up the diagnosis as praise of Callicles: Gorgias and Polus, wise and friendly as they are, lack frankness and are "more bashful than they should be", so far gone in shame that each has dared to contradict himself before many people on the greatest matters, while Callicles has the frankness they lack (487a–b). In the *Sophist*, refutation leads the man refuted into shame and so frees him from the opinions that block learning (230b–d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Critias at 169c shows the first kind of shame and is denied the second.

Translation in this edition

Αἰσχύνεσθαι ποιεῖν (160e) is "makes a person feel shame", αἰσχυνθείην (164d) "be ashamed", and ᾐσχύνετο τοὺς παρόντας (169c) "he was ashamed in front of the company". At 164d1 Burnet prints μή from Stobaeus after "not be ashamed", where B and T have ὅτι μή.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; αἰδώς; αἰσχρός; αἰσχυντηλός; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀνατίθημι; ἀπορία; ἐπικαλύπτω; εὐδοκιμέω; χασμάομαι.

αἰσχυντηλός · bashful

The blush the narrator sees, and the word the boy chooses · Charmides

τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν, *to aischyntēlon*, "bashfulness"; αἰσχυντηλόν, *aischyntēlon*, "bashful"

At a Glance

The word. Αἰσχυντηλός is prone to shame, bashful; with the article the neuter names the quality.

In the *Charmides*. The narrator's word for the boy's blush, "his bashfulness was becoming at his age" (158c), and the boy's own word for what temperance makes a man (160e).

In this edition. "Bashfulness" at 158c and "bashful" at 160e.

A place to read. 158c–d.

Meaning

The adjective belongs to the verb αἰσχύνομαι, "to feel shame" (see αἰσχύνομαι), with the suffix *-ηλός*, which marks a tendency, as in ἀπατηλός, "deceitful", from ἀπατάω: inclined to feel shame. With the article, τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν is bashfulness as a trait. It differs from αἰδώς as a disposition differs from the feeling it is disposed to (see αἰδώς).

Use in the book

Socrates has asked Charmides directly whether he agrees with Critias that he has temperance enough. "Charmides blushed. For one thing, he looked even more beautiful — his bashfulness was becoming at his age—and for another, he gave an answer that did his breeding credit" (158c; see ἀγεννῶς; ἀνερυθριάω). His answer is itself bashful: if he denies that he is temperate he will be saying something odd against himself and showing up Critias as a liar, and if he affirms it and praises himself, "that will probably seem obnoxious. So I don't know what answer to give you" (158d; see ψευδής). The edition's note at 158c reads the blush and the refusal either to boast or to run himself down, "on a natural reading", as "a picture of sōphrosynē in its commonest sense, modesty, before anyone has tried to define it".

Two pages later the boy uses the narrator's word in his definition: temperance "makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful" (160e). The edition's note at 160e finds it "hard not to see a self-portrait in the answer". The narrator had already placed the quality: it was becoming "at his age" (τῇ ἡλικίᾳ). That qualification can be read as the refutation in advance. A quality fitting at one age, and not at every age, is not the virtue that is good in all (161a–b; see αἰδώς).

Places to read

Both passages in which the word occurs.

158c Charmides blushes; his bashfulness is becoming at his age, and his answer does his breeding credit.

160e Temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and is modesty.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle says what the narrator implies. Modesty (αἰδώς) fits not every age but youth: because the young live by feeling and so go wrong often, we think they should be modest and held in check by it, and we praise the modest among them; but bashfulness (αἰσχυντηλός) earns an older man no praise, since he should do nothing that brings shame.[17] In the *Rhetoric* he counts the

[17] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.9, 1128b13–21.

young as bashful, "for as yet they take nothing else to be fine; custom has been their only schooling".[18] The bashful boy of 158c, whose answer did his breeding credit, can be read as fitting both descriptions.

Translation in this edition

Τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν (158c) is "bashfulness" and αἰσχυντηλόν (160e) "bashful"; the Glossary lists both under "bashful". The bashfulness of 158c is this adjective, the word of Charmides' own answer, and not αἰδώς, which is "modesty" (160e–161b). Τῇ ἡλικίᾳ ἔπρεψεν is "was becoming at his age".

See also

ἀγεννῶς; αἰδώς; αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνερυθριάω; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; ψευδής.

αἰτιάομαι · blame

αἰτιάομαι, *aitiaomai*, "blame"

Attested: ᾐτιώμην (*ēitiōmēn*; 175a). To hold responsible, to blame. When temperance has turned out to be "the craftsman of no benefit", Socrates says, "So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose?" (175a). The fear was spoken at 172e, that "we were not looking into it correctly", and the reproach at 172c, shared with Critias, that "perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose". The imperfect, "I was blaming", recalls a reproach already made, and δικαίως, "rightly" or "justly", endorses it. Socrates blames himself, not temperance, again at the close: "rather, I am a poor inquirer" (175e; see ζητητής).

See also αἴτιος; ζητητής; σκοπέω.

[18] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.12, 1389a28–29.

αἴτιος · reason

αἴτιος, *aitios*, "reason"

Attested: αἴτιον (*aition*; 156e). Responsible for something, and so, in the neuter, the cause or reason. In the Thracian's teaching, Zalmoxis says that one must not cure the body without the soul, "and that this is the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: they neglect the whole" (156e; see ἀμελέω). The word sits where a doctor's diagnosis would: the cause of the Greek doctors' failure is a method, neglect of the whole, not a disease. The verb of the same family, αἰτιᾶσθαι, "to blame", is Socrates' word for his own failure as an inquirer at 175a (see αἰτιάομαι).

See also αἰτιάομαι; ἀμελέω; διαφεύγω; Ζάλμοξις.

ἀκοή · hearing

Hearing, which could hear itself only if it had a sound · Charmides

ἀκοή, *akoē*, "hearing"; ἀκοαί, *akoai*, "hearings"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀκοή is the sense of hearing, the act of hearing, and what is heard: a report, hearsay.

In the *Charmides*. A test case for knowledge of knowledge. Socrates asks whether there is "a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings" (167d); hearing, he then argues, is the hearing of nothing but sound, so a hearing that heard itself would have to have a sound (168d). He leaves hearing among the cases doubted, not those proved impossible (168e–169a).

In this edition. "Hearing", plural "hearings", with "sound" for its object.

A place to read. 168b–169a.

Meaning

Ἀκοή (*akoē*) is the noun of ἀκούειν, "to hear" (see ἀκούω). It names the power and the act, the ear, and what comes by ear, a report or hearsay. The

Charmides uses it only of the sense, but its definitions arrive by the other kind of hearing: Charmides offers his third answer as something he "once heard someone say" (161b).

Use in the book

Hearing is the second case in Socrates' procession, after sight: "And a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings?" "Not that either" (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; μὴ ἀκοαί). Critias denies it as he will deny the rest.

Socrates then gives the principle behind the denial. A power is a power of something: the greater is greater than the smaller, the double is double of the half. "Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed? I mean something like this: hearing, we say, was the hearing of nothing but sound, wasn't it?" "Yes." "Then if hearing is to hear itself, it will hear itself as having a sound; for it could not hear otherwise." "Absolutely necessary" (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; οὐσία; φωνή). Sight follows: to see itself, it must have some colour (168d–e).

The conclusion is milder than the argument suggested. The greater and the double are "altogether impossible" when turned on themselves; hearing is among the cases that some would disbelieve and others perhaps not (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; ἀπιστία). Hearing, then, sets a condition, not an impossibility: it could hear itself if it had a sound. What the condition would mean for knowledge is told under δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

167d There is no hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself, the other hearings and the non-hearings.

168d Hearing is the hearing of nothing but sound, so if it hears itself it must have a sound.

168e–169a Hearing and sight, motion and heat, turned on themselves, would raise disbelief in some but perhaps not in others.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* takes sight and hearing as its examples of powers, each told apart by what it is set over and what it accomplishes (477c–d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). In the *Theaetetus* what we think about sound and colour together is grasped by neither hearing nor sight (184e–185b; see αἰσθάνομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in *On the Soul*, makes the activity of the thing heard and of the hearing one and the same, though their being is not the same: the sound in act and the hearing in act occur together, when what can sound sounds and what can hear hears.[19] On that account a hearing in act does in a sense have the sound it hears, which can be read as a reply to the condition of 168d.

Translation in this edition

Ἀκοή is "hearing", and its plural *ἀκοαί* "hearings" (167d), with τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν "the non-hearings". Φωνή, its object, is "sound" all three times: "hears no sound" (167d), "the hearing of nothing but sound" and "as having a sound" (168d). At 167d4 B reads the relative ἥ, "which", and T the particle ἦ; Burnet prints the relative.

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἰσθάνομαι; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀκούω; ἀπιστία; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μὴ ἀκοαί; οὐσία; ὄψις; φωνή.

ἀκολουθέω · follow

ἀκολουθέω, *akoloutheō*, "follow"

Attested: ἀκολουθήσοντος (*akolouthēsontos*; 176b). To follow, go along with, attend. When Critias says it will be proof of the boy's temperance if he lets Socrates charm him and does not desert him, Charmides answers, "Count on it ... I'll follow him and not desert him" (176b; see ἀπολείπω).

[19] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.2, 425b26–426a1.

The Greek, ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος καὶ μὴ ἀπολειψομένου, is a future participle with ὡς and its subject understood, "take it that I will follow", and the edition renders the construction "Count on it", as it renders the same form "Count on force" a few lines later (176c; see βιάζομαι). The family also gives Critias' "attendant", ἀκόλουθος (155b), and the compound ἐπακολουθῆσαι, "follow" what a doctor says and does (171b; see ἐπακολουθέω). The boy who came over at a servant's call ends by promising to be Socrates' follower.

See also ἀπολείπω; βιάζομαι; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπακολουθέω.

ἀκούω · hear

ἀκούω, *akouō*, "hear"

Attested: ἀκήκοας (*akēkoas*; 156b, 161b), ἀκούσας (*akousas*; 156d, 157c, 169c), ἤκουσα (*ēkousa*; 161b, 161c), ἤκουσας (*ēkousas*; 162b), ἀκηκοέναι (*akēkoenai*; 162c), ἀκήκοα (*akēkoa*; 163d), ἀκούει (*akouei*; 167d twice), ἀκούσεται (*akousetai*; 168d twice), ἀκούσειεν (*akouseien*; 168d), ἄκουε (*akoue*; 173a). To hear, and to hear of or from someone. The dialogue's first authorities come by hearing: what Charmides has "probably heard good doctors say" (156b), the definition he "once heard someone say" (161b), which Socrates suspects he has "heard ... from Critias here" (161b), as the narrator later confirms (162c), and the sophist Prodicus of Ceos, from whom Socrates has "heard ... countless distinctions between words" (163d). Charmides asks "whom I heard it from" and Socrates answers that what matters is whether it is true (161c; see ἀληθής). In the argument the verb becomes the sense itself: a hearing "which hears no sound, but hears itself" (167d), which, if it heard itself, "will hear itself as having a sound" (168d; see ἀκοή). Socrates also hears the boy's approval and takes heart (156d), Critias hears him and is caught by perplexity (169c), and the dream begins, "Hear my dream, then" (173a).

See also ἀκοή; ἀληθής; ἐπακολουθέω; Πρόδικος; πυνθάνομαι.

ἀκριβόω · have right

ἀκριβόω, *akriboō*, "are sure you have ... right"

Attested: ἀκριβοῖς (*akribois*; 156a). To make exact, and so to know or have accurately, from ἀκριβής, "exact". When Charmides has chosen to have the charm by persuading Socrates, Socrates asks, "And you are sure you have my name right?" (καὶ τοὔνομά μου σὺ ἀκριβοῖς;). The boy answers that he would be doing him an injustice if he had not, since Socrates is much talked about among his age-mates and he remembers him from childhood (156a; see ἀδικέω). The exchange licenses the frankness that follows (156a–b; see ἀδικέω; παρρησιάζομαι).

See also ἀδικέω; μιμνήσκομαι; ὄνομα; παρρησιάζομαι.

ἀλαζών · impostor

The impostor whom temperance would turn away · Charmides

ἀλαζών, *alazōn*, "impostor"; τοὺς ἀλαζόνας, *tous alazonas*, "the impostors"

At a Glance

The word. An ἀλαζών is a pretender: the man who claims a knowledge or a power he does not have.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' dream of rule by temperance: temperance, presiding over prophecy, "turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future" (173c).

In this edition. "Impostors", as the Glossary records.

A place to read. 173a–d, the dream.

Meaning

The origin of the word is unknown. The edition's note at 173c describes the ἀλαζόνες as the stock pretenders of comedy, men who claimed knowledge or powers they lacked. The word names, from the outside, the man whom the temperate man of 167a would be able to detect, by inspecting in others "what he thinks he knows but does not" (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Use in the book

The argument had already shown that a temperance which is only knowledge of knowledge could not tell "the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is" (170e; see ἀληθινός; προσποιέομαι). The dream grants it that power anyway, to ask a further question. "If temperance ruled us as fully as could be ... wouldn't everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge? No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know" (173a–b; see φάσκω). Our equipment, clothing and footwear would be made expertly by genuine craftsmen (see ἀληθινός); and prophecy too, granted to be "knowledge of what is going to be", would be purged, since temperance, "presiding over it, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future" (173c; see ἐπιστατέω; μαντική).

The impostor is the last figure the dream removes, and the prophet the last expert it installs. Socrates soon brings the prophet back as the man Critias may mean, and Critias accepts him "and another as well" (173e–174a); the argument that follows ends in the knowledge of good and bad, without which even a world rid of impostors would not be happy (174b–d).

The edition's note at 173c adds that the word names the man Socrates' questioning exposes. The *Charmides* adds a nearer irony. The definition under which temperance would turn away impostors is Critias', and it was Critias who, caught by perplexity, "kept covering up his perplexity" before the company rather than admit it (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι). The dialogue can be read as showing that the pretender is not always a stranger at the door.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs, in its setting.

173a–c In the dream, temperance would let no pretended pilot, doctor or general deceive us, would see everything made by genuine craftsmen, and would turn away the impostors and set up the true prophets.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic*, as the young man turns democratic, his desires find the stronghold of his soul empty of learning, fine pursuits and true words, and take it; then "false and boastful" words and opinions (ψευδεῖς καὶ ἀλαζόνες) rush up and hold the same place in their stead (560b–c). In the *Philebus* Protarchus, asked whether pleasure or mind is nearer kin to truth, calls pleasure "the biggest impostor there is": in the pleasures of love, the saying goes, even perjury is forgiven by the gods (65c–d).

Other ancient sources

Comedy supplies the type. In the *Clouds* of the comic poet Aristophanes, first staged in 423 BC, the young Pheidippides knows the men of Socrates' school as "the impostors, the pale ones, the barefoot ones", among them "the wretched Socrates and Chaerephon", the friend who runs to greet Socrates at the opening of the *Charmides* (153b); in the *Birds* the hero Peisetaerus answers an oracle-monger with a mock oracle of his own, that when an impostor comes uninvited to a sacrifice he is to be beaten, and later tells the astronomer Meton that the city has resolved to beat all impostors.[20] Xenophon says that Socrates turned his companions from imposture by showing what befalls a man who wants to seem a good flute-player, general or pilot without being one.[21] Aristotle's examples of those who pretend, for gain, to qualities that others can profit from and whose absence can go unnoticed are the prophet, the wise man and the doctor.[22] The dream's pilot, general, doctor and prophet are all on these lists.

Translation in this edition

Τοὺς ἀλαζόνας (173c) is "the impostors", and the Glossary lists the word under "impostor". The pretenders of 170e and 173b, προσποιούμενος, are "who pretends" and "who pretended", so that the English keeps the noun for the stock type and the verb for the act.

[20] Aristophanes, *Clouds* 102–104; *Birds* 983–985, 1016.
[21] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.7.1–3.
[22] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.7, 1127b17–20.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; αἰσχύνομαι; ἀληθινός; ἀποτρέπω; ἐξαπατάω; ἐπιστατέω; μαντική; μάντις; προσποιέομαι; φάσκω.

ἀλήθεια · truth

The truth the inquiry could not find · Charmides

ἀλήθεια, *alētheia*, "truth"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀλήθεια is truth: what is so, and what is said as it is.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the end. The inquiry, Socrates says, "is no more able to find the truth. It has made such a mockery of the truth" that what they agreed on as temperance "it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175d).

In this edition. "The truth".

A place to read. 175b–d, Socrates' reckoning with the inquiry.

Meaning

Ἀλήθεια (*alētheia*) is the noun of ἀληθής, "true" (see ἀληθής), a word built on the negative prefix and the root of λανθάνειν (*lanthanein*), "to escape notice". In its make-up, then, the true is what does not escape notice; in use it is simply what is so, and what is said as it is. The root can be heard in the dialogue's worries: Socrates would scrutinize even himself "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166d; see λανθάνω), and in the dream no pretender would "escape our notice" (173b).

Use in the book

Socrates sums up the concessions that the argument did not allow: that there is knowledge of knowledge, and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, so that the temperate man might know of what he does not know that he does not know it (175b–c; see ἄλογος). Then he turns the

inquiry into an actor: "Still, though it found us so simple-minded and so easy to deal with, our inquiry is no more able to find the truth. It has made such a mockery of the truth that what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175c–d; see ζήτησις; καταγελάω; συμπλάττω; ὑβριστικῶς). The edition's note at 175d describes the inquiry as an insolent mocker, and the "magnificence" of the concessions as irony.

The sentence divides the work into what the inquirers did and what the inquiry did. They agreed, made up and laid down a definition: συμπλάττοντες, "made up", is the verb of modelling a figure in clay. The inquiry, given every advantage, did not find the truth; but it did expose the made-up definition as useless, and that exposure is its mockery. The truth is not found, and it is the truth that the inquiry mocks, by showing up what they had put in its place. The result can be read as negative only in part: the aim Socrates set at 166d, that "each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is", has been met for one thing, the agreed definition, which is now plain for what it is.

Socrates does not blame the truth or the inquiry. He blames himself, "a poor inquirer", and keeps his conviction: "For I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e; see ζητητής).

Places to read

The one passage in which the noun occurs.

175c–d The inquiry, though its partners were simple-minded and easy to deal with, could not find the truth, but mocked it, showing their agreed definition to be of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

Socrates sets the truth above persons in two famous sentences. In the *Symposium*, when the poet Agathon says he cannot contradict him, Socrates answers, "No, dear Agathon: what you cannot argue against is the truth, since arguing against Socrates is no hard thing" (201c). In the *Phaedo*, on the day of his death, he asks Simmias and Cebes, his two Theban friends, to care little for Socrates and far more for the truth: to agree with him where he

seems to them to say something true, and where not, to strain against him with all the argument they can (91c). The *Charmides* says the same in its own terms at 166d–e (see ἀληθής; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν).

Translation in this edition

Τὴν ἀλήθειαν (175d) is "the truth", and αὐτῆς in κατεγέλασεν αὐτῆς, "mocked it", is rendered by repeating the noun: "made such a mockery of the truth". The verb "find" depends on a reading. At 175d1 Burnet prints T's εὑρεῖν, "to find"; B has ἐρεῖν, "to say", and a later hand in B αἱρεῖν, "to grasp".

See also

ἀληθής; ἀληθινός; ἄλογος; ζήτησις; ζητητής; καταγελάω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; λανθάνω; συμπλάττω; ὑβριστικῶς.

ἀληθής · true

Whether what is said is true · Charmides

ἀληθής, *alēthēs*, "true"; ἀληθῆ λέγειν, *alēthē legein*, "be right"; ἀληθῆ λέγεται, *alēthē legetai*, "are said truly"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀληθής is true, of statements and reports; ἀληθῆ λέγειν, "to say true things", is to be right.

In the *Charmides*. The dialogue's test for a definition: "what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not" (161c), repeated when Critias takes the argument over (162e). The same test is put to the doctor, whose claims only medicine can judge (171b). In answers the word is the plain "True" or "You're right".

In this edition. "True", "truly", "right", and "accurate" of the news from Potidaea (153c).

A place to read. 161b–162e, from the rule to Critias' taking over.

Meaning

Ἀληθής (*alēthēs*) is formed from the negative prefix and the root of λανθάνειν (*lanthanein*), "to escape notice": in its make-up, what does not escape notice (see ἀλήθεια). It is said of reports and speakers, of what is so, and in the neuter plural of true things said. Its adverb, in the phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς, "truly, really", marks the real against the counterfeit and is treated with ἀληθινός (see ἀληθινός).

Use in the book

The word first measures a report. "Well, the word here ... is that the fighting was very heavy, and that many people we know were killed in it." "The word," I said, "is reasonably accurate" (153b–c).

It becomes a rule when Charmides offers a definition he has heard. Socrates suspects Critias; Charmides asks, "But what difference does it make, Socrates ... whom I heard it from?" "None," I said. "For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not." "Now you are talking sense," said he (161c). When Critias takes the argument over, Socrates restates the purpose: "I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not" (162e). When Critias complains that Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about (166c), Socrates answers with the same rule turned on persons: Critias is to dismiss the question which of them is being refuted (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν).

The rule is kept in argument and broken in the drama. The boy who said that the source made no difference is the one who, when the saying fails, "laughed slyly and looked across at Critias" (162b); and the narrator, who said "None", tells his friend that "it was entirely true, as I had suspected, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias" (162c). Critias, "as angry with Charmides as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses", takes the saying back as his own (162d–e). The dialogue tests the saying and shows the man.

The test returns in the argument about the doctor. The man who looks into medicine "correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in

what is healthy and diseased", and Critias agrees that he must examine "whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly" (171b). No one can do this without medicine (171b–c). The truth of a claim can be judged only by knowledge of its subject, and that is the point on which knowledge of knowledge fails (see ἀληθινός; ἡ ἰατρικός).

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

153c The report of the heavy fighting at Potidaea is reasonably accurate.

160a Charmides answers "True": quick-wittedness is a sharpness of the soul.

161c What matters is not who said it, but whether what is said is true.

162c It was entirely true, as Socrates had suspected, that Charmides had the definition from Critias.

162e Socrates would rather look into it with Critias, to see whether what was said is true.

164a Perhaps nothing stops Critias from being right that temperance is the doing of good things.

166a Socrates grants, "That's true": calculation and geometry have no work like a house.

168c Critias answers "True": there is no double of anything but a half.

171a Critias answers "True": medicine is a knowledge.

171b The examiner of a doctor must see whether the things said are said truly and the things done done rightly.

174d Critias answers "You're right": without the knowledge of good and bad, nothing would be done well and beneficially.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Phaedrus* states the rule of 161c as a rebuke. When Phaedrus mocks Socrates for making up stories from Egypt or wherever he pleases, Socrates reminds him that at the shrine of Zeus at Dodona, the ancient oracle in north-western Greece, it was said that the first prophetic words came from an oak, and that the people of that time, not being as wise as the young men of today, were simple enough to listen to an oak or a rock so long as it told the truth: "but for you, it may be, it matters who is talking and from what land; you do not ask only whether things are so or otherwise" (275b–c).

Translation in this edition

The edition renders by context: "reasonably accurate" for ἐπιεικῶς ἀληθῆ (153c); "true" in the rule and its restatement (161c, 162e) and in the narrator's "entirely true" (162c); "right" for ἀληθῆ λέγειν (164a); "You're right" (174d) and "That's true" (166a) for the same Ἀληθῆ λέγεις; "True" as an answer (160a, 168c, 171a); and the adverb "truly" for ἀληθῆ λέγεται, "are said truly" (171b).

See also

ἀκούω; ἀλήθεια; ἀληθινός; ἔα χαίρειν; εἴτε … εἴτε μή; ᾖ ἰατρικός; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; ὀρθῶς; ψευδής.

ἀληθινός · genuine

The genuine craftsman and the true doctor · Charmides

ἀληθινός, *alēthinos*, "genuine"; ὡς ἀληθῶς, *hōs alēthōs*, "truly", "true"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀληθινός is real, genuine, the thing that is what it claims to be; ὡς ἀληθῶς, "as truly", is "really, truly".

In the *Charmides*. The true doctor whom a temperance of knowledge alone could not tell from the pretender (170e–171c); and in Socrates' dream,

the "genuine craftsmen" we would use and the "true prophets" temperance would set up (173c).

In this edition. "Genuine" for the adjective; "true" and "truly" for ὡς ἀληθῶς.

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Ἀληθινός (*alēthinos*) is formed from ἀληθής, "true" (see ἀληθής), but is said of things and persons rather than of statements: not a true report, but a real thing, as against a counterfeit. The phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς, the adverb of ἀληθής with an intensifying ὡς, marks the real as against the apparent: "the one who truly is" a doctor.

Use in the book

The genuine is the other half of the pretended. Knowledge of knowledge, Socrates argues, could tell only that a man has some knowledge, not what; so the temperate man "will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not" (170e; see προσποιέομαι). To "tell the true doctor from the one who is not", the temperate man "will surely not discuss medicine with him", for the doctor "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased"; knowledge of knowledge belongs to temperance alone, so, deadpan, "the medical man doesn't know about medicine either" (170e–171a; see ἐπαΐω). The examiner must test the doctor "in so far as he is a doctor", in what is healthy and diseased, and no one can do that without medicine (171b–c; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). So temperance of this kind can tell the genuine from the pretender in no field "except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman" (171c; see ὁμότεχνος).

The phrase then turns to the speakers. "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates," Critias says, and Socrates agrees, "By the dog ... I think so too": "For truly, even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a; see ἄτοπος; νὴ τὸν κύνα).

The dream then grants what the argument denied. If temperance ruled, our goods would be expertly made "because we would be using genuine craftsmen", and temperance would set up "the true prophets" (173c; see ἀλαζών). The concession is made to ask the next question, whether a world of genuine craftsmen would make us do well and be happy (173d). It would not, without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d). Genuineness in every craft is not enough; the dialogue asks what the genuine crafts are for.

Places to read

Every passage in which ἀληθινός or ὡς ἀληθῶς occurs.

170e Temperance of this kind could not tell the pretended doctor from the one who truly is, nor tell the true doctor from the one who is not.

172e Critias finds Socrates' words truly strange; truly, even granting the definition, it is not clear that temperance does us good.

173c In the dream we would use genuine craftsmen, and temperance would set up the true prophets.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* the genuine doctor loses to his imitation before an ignorant judge. Cookery, Socrates says, has crept in beneath medicine and claims to know which foods are best for the body; set cook and doctor to contend before children, or before grown men with no more sense than children, over which of them understands wholesome and harmful food, and the doctor would die of hunger (464d–e). The *Gorgias* fears that the many cannot tell the genuine from the counterfeit; the *Charmides* shows that a temperance of knowledge alone could not either.

Translation in this edition

Ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς (173c) is "genuine craftsmen"; B has the singular, ἀληθινὸν δημιουργόν, and Burnet prints the plural with T, W and Stobaeus. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα (170e) is "the one who truly is", τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρόν "the true doctor" (170e), and τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις "the true prophets" (173c). In Critias' ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς and Socrates' ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ (172e) the phrase is "truly".

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀληθής; ἄτοπος; ἐπαΐω; ᾗ ἰατρικός; ἰατρός; νὴ τὸν κύνα; ὁμότεχνος; προσποιέομαι; τεχνικῶς.

ἁλίσκομαι · be caught

Caught by beauty, and caught by perplexity · Charmides

ἑαλωκέναι, *healōkenai*, "to have been caught"; ἁλῶναι, *halōnai*, "to be caught"

At a Glance

The word. Ἁλίσκεσθαι is to be caught or taken: of game, of a captured city, of a man convicted.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. Socrates, having seen inside the boy's cloak, felt that he "had been caught" like the fawn in Cydias' lines (155e). Critias, catching Socrates' perplexity "like people who catch a yawn", is "caught by perplexity himself" (169c).

In this edition. "Caught" both times.

A place to read. 155c–e, the prologue's crisis.

Meaning

Ἁλίσκεσθαι (*haliskesthai*), perfect ἑάλωκα, is used in place of a passive for αἱρεῖν (*hairein*), "to take": the hunter takes, the quarry is caught (see αἱρέω). It is the word for a city that falls and a man found guilty. Socrates' "caught" answers the αἱρεῖσθαι, "to be caught", of the verse he has just quoted (the edition's note at 155e; see αἱρέω).

Use in the book

The prologue builds to the first capture. The boy sits down between Socrates and Critias; Socrates' boldness is "knocked clean out"; Charmides gives him "a look beyond words", and the whole wrestling-school swirls round them, until Socrates, on fire, is no longer in his own possession (155c–d; see ἐμβλέπω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι). He thinks of Cydias' fawn that comes into the lion's presence "to be caught as a portion of meat", "for I felt I had been

caught by just such a creature myself" (155d–e; see αἱρέω; θρέμμα; Κυδίας; νεβρός). As the edition's note at 155e observes, in the usual image the lover hunts the boy, while in Cydias' the lover is the fawn and the boy the lion. Socrates recovers enough to answer "that I did" know the remedy (155e), and the charm-talk restores him: "little by little my boldness began to gather itself together, and I was rekindled" (156d).

The second capture is Critias'. Asked to show that knowledge of knowledge is possible and beneficial, he sees Socrates at a loss, and "it was like people who catch a yawn from those they see yawning opposite them: he too seemed to me to be forced by my perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself" (169c; see ἀπορία; χασμάομαι). The edition's note at 169c points out that the verb is the one Socrates used of himself at 155e.

The two captures mirror each other. Socrates is caught by something outside him, the boy's beauty, and he recovers by talking; the edition's note at 155d records the reading, held by many, that here Socrates passes a test: set on fire, he recovers himself and talks philosophy. Critias is caught by something caught from Socrates, and he does not recover: ashamed before the company, he "kept covering up his perplexity" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι). The man taken by beauty can be read as the temperate one, and the man taken by perplexity, who will not own it, as the one who is not.

Places to read

Both passages in which the verb occurs.

155c–e Socrates sees inside the boy's cloak, is on fire, recalls Cydias' fawn caught by the lion, and feels he has been caught by such a creature himself.

169c–d Critias, seeing Socrates at a loss, catches his perplexity like a yawn and is caught by it, but will not admit it.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Lysis* the lover is the hunter again. Socrates tells the young Hippothales, who is in love with the boy Lysis, that whoever is wise in matters of love does not praise his beloved before he has caught him, since the beautiful, when praised, grow proud, and the prouder they are, "the harder they are to catch" (206a). In the *Meno* perplexity is caught from

Socrates as it is at 169c, by Meno, a young Thessalian nobleman, who likens him to the torpedo-fish (80a–d; see ἀπορία).

Translation in this edition

Ἑαλωκέναι (155e) and ἁλῶναι (169c) are both "caught", so that the echo is audible in English. At 169c the apparatus questions the verb beside ἁλῶναι, ἀναγκασθῆναι, "forced" (see ἀναγκάζω).

See also

αἱρέω; αἰσχύνομαι; ἀναγκάζω; ἀπορία; ἐμβλέπω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; θρέμμα; Κυδίας; νεβρός; τὰ ἐρωτικά; φλέγομαι; χασμάομαι.

ἄλλος · other

ἄλλος, *allos*, "other"

Attested: in the sense "other than itself", ἄλλο (*allo*; 166a, 169a, 170b, 174d), ἄλλου (*allou*; 166c, 167b, 168c, 168d, 174e), ἄλλης (*allēs*; 175a twice) and ἄλλῃ (*allēi*; 175a). Other, something else. In the argument about knowledge the word marks what a knowledge or power is of, as distinct from itself. Each knowledge is of something "distinct from the knowledge itself" (166a); "All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves" (166c); Critias' temperance would be "knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge" (167b–c); "there is no double of anything but a half" (168c); hearing is "the hearing of nothing but sound" (168d); a thing may by nature have its power "only in relation to something else" (169a); beside medicine and statesmanship, knowledge of knowledge is "nothing but knowledge" (170b); temperance "would be something else for us" if the knowledge of good and bad is what benefits (174d); it is knowledge of knowledge "and of nothing else" (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός); and health belongs "to another craft", as benefit does (175a). Its ordinary uses, "the others", "anyone else", run through the whole dialogue. The neighbouring ἕτερος, "something other than calculation itself" (166a–b), has its own entry (see ἕτερος).

See also ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος; πρὸς ἄλλο.

ἀλλότριος · belonging to others

What belongs to others, against one's own · Charmides

τὰ ἀλλότρια, *ta allotria*, "what belongs to others"; ἀλλότρια, *allotria*, "belonging to others"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀλλότριος is what belongs to another, not one's own: the opposite of οἰκεῖος, "one's own, appropriate".

In the *Charmides*. Twice, each time as the other side of "one's own". Socrates' absurd law would have each man keep "his hands off what belongs to others" (162a); Critias says that Hesiod regarded "everything harmful as belonging to others" (163c).

In this edition. "Belonging to others", as the Glossary records.

A place to read. 161e–163d.

Meaning

Ἀλλότριος (*allotrios*) is formed from ἄλλος (*allos*), "other": what is another's, foreign, alien. It is said of property, of affairs, of a stranger's land and of a stranger himself. To keep one's hands off what belongs to others was an ordinary rule of honesty.

Use in the book

The first use belongs to Socrates' literal reading of "doing one's own business". He asks whether a city would be well managed "under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle, keeping his hands off what belongs to others and working at and doing his own?" "I don't think so," he said (161e–162a; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Here what belongs to others is other people's work and goods, and keeping off it would end the exchange that makes a city.

The second belongs to Critias' reply. He takes the formula over and reads it through Hesiod: work is no disgrace, but not every making is a work; "For things made finely and beneficially he called works ... And we must say that he regarded only such things as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others" (163c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; οἰκεῖος). Socrates restates it: "it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good" (163d). Critias has turned a distinction of ownership into a distinction of value. On his reading the harmful belongs to others by definition, so the man who does his own does only what is fine and beneficial, and temperance becomes "the doing of good things" (163e).

The two uses mark the two readings of the formula. The literal reading fails because no city can live by it; Critias' reading succeeds by redefining "one's own" as "good", and so empties the formula of its plain sense. The dialogue never recovers the plain sense.

Places to read

Both passages in which the word occurs.

161e–162a A city under a law that made each man keep his hands off what belongs to others and make his own things would not be well managed.

163c–d Critias' Hesiod regarded only what is made finely and beneficially as one's own, and everything harmful as belonging to others; Socrates restates this as calling what is one's own good.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* gives the formula back its plain sense in a new place. Judges in the just city, Socrates says, will aim above all at this: that each should "neither hold what belongs to others nor be robbed of what is his"; and so, in this way too, holding and doing what is properly one's own would be agreed to be justice (433e–434a). There the formula is the order of a city in which each does his own work for all, not a rule that each make everything for himself.

Other ancient sources

Hesiod's own lines, a few verses after the one Critias quotes, set other men's goods against work in the plain sense: "if you turn your foolish heart from other men's possessions to work".[23]

Translation in this edition

Τῶν ἀλλοτρίων (162a) is "what belongs to others" and ἀλλότρια (163c) "belonging to others"; the Glossary sets it against οἰκεῖος, "appropriate to one", which Critias opposes to it (163c–d). The phrase τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, "other people's things" or "other people's business" (163a), is a different expression and has its own entry (see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες).

See also

ἑαυτοῦ; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; Ἡσίοδος; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; οἰκεῖος; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός · and of nothing else

The restriction that leaves temperance without benefit · Charmides

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός, *allou de oudenos*, "and of nothing else"; οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ... ἢ ἑαυτῆς, *ouk allou tinos ... ē heautēs*, "of nothing else but itself"

At a Glance

The word. "Of nothing else": a genitive of object that confines a knowledge to what has just been named.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates' reminder at 174e: "didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?" It blocks Critias' last attempt to set temperance over the knowledge of the good.

In this edition. "And of nothing else".

A place to read. 174d–175a.

[23] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 315–316; the line Critias cites is 311.

Meaning

Ἄλλου (*allou*), "of another", with οὐδενός (*oudenos*), "of none", and δέ marking the contrast with the μόνον, "only", before it: temperance is of knowledge only, and of nothing besides. The restriction is Critias' own. He gave it at 166c, "All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves, but this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself", and Socrates stated it at 167b–c as "one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge".

Use in the book

The restriction made temperance unique, and it made the parallels of 167c–168a strange: a sight that sees no colour, a love that loves nothing beautiful (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). At the end it decides the outcome. Critias has named the knowledge of good and bad as the one that makes us happy (174b), and tries to bring it under temperance, which, he says, presides over the other kinds of knowledge and so would rule over this one too, and benefit us (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω).

Socrates answers with the restriction: "Would it also make us healthy ... and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work? Or didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else? Isn't that so?" "It seems so" (174e; see διαμαρτύρομαι; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). Then temperance will not be "the craftsman of health", since health belongs to another craft; nor of benefit, since that work too was given to another craft; "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (174e–175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The phrase is the hinge of the last refutation. Critias' definition is caught between two demands: to be unlike every other knowledge, which the restriction secures, and to benefit us, which needs an object, the good. To rule over the other kinds of knowledge is not to have their objects. The restriction he accepted to make temperance unique is what makes it useless.

Places to read

The passages in which the restriction is stated and used.

166c Critias: all the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, not of themselves; temperance alone is of itself and the others.

167b–c Socrates states it: one single knowledge which is of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.

168a Socrates restates it: knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

174d–175a Critias would set temperance over the knowledge of the good; Socrates recalls that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of nothing else; so it is the craftsman neither of health nor of benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The principle behind "each of those crafts its own work" is set out in the *Ion*. Socrates asks the rhapsode Ion whether a certain work has not been given by the god to each craft to know, so that what we know by the pilot's art we shall not know by medicine, and so for all the crafts (537c–d). In the *Euthydemus* Socrates and Clinias look for the kingly art that would rule over all the others and make men happy, and find themselves going round in a circle, unable to say what it produces (291b–292e), as the edition's note at 174c observes. Critias' "presides over" asks for that kingly art; his definition has already denied it any object of its own.

Translation in this edition

Ἐπιστήμης μόνον ... καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός (174e) is "knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else". Διεμαρτυρόμεθα, "we called to witness, declared solemnly", is "solemnly declare", and the edition keeps its weight: the restriction was a formal undertaking.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἄλλος; διαμαρτύρομαι; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον.

ἄλογος · absurd

The absurd, which the concessions came to · Charmides

ἀλογώτερον, *alogōteron*, "more absurd"

At a Glance

The word. Ἄλογος is without λόγος: without account or reason, absurd; also without speech.

In the *Charmides*. Once in Burnet's text. Nothing, Socrates says, could appear "more absurd" than their concession that the temperate man knows, of what he does not know, that he does not know it (175c). The manuscripts B and W also have the word at 158c, where T has "not easy".

In this edition. "Absurd".

A place to read. 175b–c.

Meaning

Ἄλογος (*alogos*) joins the negative prefix to λόγος (*logos*), which is speech, account, reason and argument at once. What is ἄλογον cannot be given an account of: it is unreasonable, absurd. The same word is used of beasts, which lack speech, and of magnitudes that have no common measure. Socrates' idiom at 175c, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον, is literally "more absurd than anything whatever".

Use in the book

Socrates counts the concessions "that did not follow in the argument", each made, as he says twice, "though the argument did not allow it": that there is knowledge of knowledge, and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, "so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it. This we conceded with the utmost magnificence, without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all; for our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them. And yet, I think,

nothing could appear more absurd than this" (175b–c; see ἀμῶς γέ πως; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογία).

The word is chosen with λόγος in view. What they conceded was what the λόγος did not allow, and the result is ἄλογον, without λόγος. The absurdity is a contradiction: to know of something that one does not know it, one must in some way know it; but it is something one does not know "at all" (μηδαμῶς).

The absurdity belongs to the formula as Critias' definition made it, a knowledge by which the temperate man would know the very objects of the knowledges he lacks (175b). Socrates' own aim, not to "think I know something when I don't" (166d; see λανθάνω), claims less and does not run into it. The dialogue's last word on the formula can be read as marking the limit of Critias' version, not of the Socratic disclaimer (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

At 158c the manuscripts divide. When Socrates asks Charmides whether he is temperate, the boy says, in T, that it was "not easy" (οὐ ῥᾴδιον) either to agree or to deny; in B and W, that it was "unreasonable" (ἄλογον). On the reading of B and W the boy would call the question itself absurd; on T's, he finds it hard, which fits his blush.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs in Burnet's text, and the manuscripts' reading at 158c.

158c B and W read ἄλογον, "unreasonable", where Burnet prints T's "not easy": either to agree or to deny that he is temperate.

175b–c Nothing could be more absurd than the conceded claim that the temperate man knows, of what he does not know, that he does not know it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* meets the same absurdity in the puzzle of false judgement. Socrates and Theaetetus agree that about each thing one either knows it or does not, and that it is impossible for one who knows a thing not to know it, or for one who does not know it to know it (188a–b); to take what one knows for what one does not know would be "a monstrosity" (188c). In the

Gorgias the word marks the line between craft and knack: Socrates will not call cookery a craft, because it has no account of the nature of what it applies, and "I do not call a craft anything that is without an account" (465a).

Translation in this edition

Ἀλογώτερον (175c) is "more absurd"; "absurd" renders no other word in the edition's English, and ἄτοπος, "strange" or "odd", is kept apart (see ἄτοπος). At 158c7 Burnet prints οὐ ῥᾴδιον from T and a variant in W, against ἄλογον in B and W, and the English follows: "it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny".

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀδύνατος; ἀμῶς γέ πως; ἄτοπος; λανθάνω; λόγος; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογία.

ἁμάρτημα · mistake

ἁμάρτημα, *hamartēma*, "mistake"

Attested: ἁμάρτημα (*hamartēma*; 157b). A mistake, a particular error, from ἁμαρτάνειν, "to miss the mark". The Thracian, teaching Socrates the remedy and the charm, told him to let no one persuade him to treat a man's head with the remedy unless the man first handed over his soul to be treated with the charm: "For that ... is the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings: some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b). The mistake is a method, and its object is the whole human being; its sister noun ἁμαρτία, "error", returns when Socrates imagines the life without error that temperance would bring (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία). The phrase "in treating human beings" renders περὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, "in the case of human beings".

See also ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου.

ἁμαρτία · error

Error, which temperance would remove · Charmides

ἁμαρτία, *hamartia*, "error"

At a Glance

The word. Ἁμαρτία is a missing of the mark, an error, from ἁμαρτάνειν, "to miss".

In the *Charmides*. In the life that temperance, as first supposed, would give. If the temperate knew what they knew and did not, "we would live our lives without error", and "with error removed and rightness leading", households and cities would do well and be happy (171d–172a). Socrates then doubts that this would be a great good (172d).

In this edition. "Error" and "without error".

A place to read. 171d–172a.

Meaning

Ἁμαρτάνειν (*hamartanein*) is to miss: a target, a road, and so the right thing to do. Ἁμαρτία (*hamartia*) is the act or state of missing; ἁμάρτημα, a particular mistake (157b; see ἁμάρτημα); ἀναμάρτητος, with the negative prefix, "unerring". The word has no special sense of sin; in the *Charmides*, as in the passages below, it is the failure of anyone who acts without knowledge.

Use in the book

Socrates recalls the benefit they had first expected. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, and could examine others, it would be "of enormous benefit to us to be temperate. For we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us. For neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them. ... And so a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too ... For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who

do well must be happy" (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης; παραδίδωμι).

The chain runs from knowledge to the absence of error, from the absence of error to rightness, from rightness to doing well, and from doing well to happiness. The last step rides on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, to act well and to fare well, as the edition's note at 172a points out. Socrates breaks the chain at the other end. He withdraws the agreement that "it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew" (172d), and his dream grants every craft without error, a world of genuine craftsmen, and then asks whether we would be happy (173a–d). We would not, without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d). Error removed in each craft is not the same as doing well in life.

The edition's note at 172a remarks on the irony many readers have felt in the picture of "us" ruling a city without error, spoken to Critias, who was later the leading figure among the Thirty, the oligarchy that ruled Athens in 404–403 BC.[24]

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with its sequel.

171d–172a If the temperate knew what they knew and did not, we would live without error; with error removed and rightness leading, households and cities would do well and be happy.

172c–d Socrates doubts that it would be a great good if each did what he knew and handed the rest to those who know.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthydemus* Socrates gets Clinias to agree that wisdom makes men fortunate everywhere, "for wisdom would surely never err, but must act rightly and succeed" (280a). In the first book of the *Republic* the sophist Thrasymachus argues that no craftsman errs insofar as he is a craftsman: "the one who errs errs when his knowledge fails him" (340d–e). Both make error

[24] Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.3.2 (Critias among the Thirty) and 2.3.15–56 (his quarrel with Theramenes).

the absence of knowledge, as the *Charmides* does at 171d–e; the *Charmides* adds that knowledge in each craft would still not make us happy.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that Socrates' accuser charged him with teaching his companions to despise the laws, by saying that it was foolish to appoint the city's rulers by lot when no one would be willing to use a pilot, a builder or a piper chosen by lot, though their errors do far less harm than errors in the city; and that the same accuser named Critias and Alcibiades among those who had kept company with Socrates and done the city great harm.[25] The accuser's argument can be read as turning the picture of 171d–172a, rule by those who know, against Socrates, with Critias as its proof.

Translation in this edition

Ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης (171e–172a) is "with error removed"; B has διῃρημένης, "divided off", and Burnet prints ἐξῃρημένης with T and W. Ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν (171d) is "we would live our lives without error"; Burnet prints T's διεζῶμεν, "live through", against ἐζῶμεν, "live", in B, W and a later hand in T.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἁμάρτημα; ἀναμάρτητος; ἐξαιρέω; εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης; παραδίδωμι.

[25] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.9 (the lot) and 1.2.12 (Critias and Alcibiades).

ἄμαχος · invincible

ἄμαχος, *amachos*, "invincible"

Attested: ἄμαχον (*amachon*; 154d). Not to be fought, irresistible, from μάχη, "battle". When Chaerephon says that the boy, stripped, would seem to have no face, his figure is so perfectly beautiful, and the others all agree, Socrates swears by the hero Heracles: "Heracles! What an invincible man you are describing, if he has just one little thing more" (154d). The one little thing is that "where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made" (154e; see εὖ πέφυκα). Spoken by a man just back from the battle at Potidaea, the word can be read as keeping the language of the camp (153b–d), and it makes Charmides' beauty a force no one in the room can resist, as the next page shows (155c–e). The verb λέγετε, "you are describing", is the reading of later manuscripts; B, T and W have λέγεται.

See also εὖ πέφυκα; Ἡρακλῆς; πρόσειμι; ψυχή.

ἀμελέω · neglect

ἀμελέω, *ameleō*, "neglect"

Attested: ἀμελοῖεν (*ameloien*; 156e). To neglect, to have no care for, with the thing neglected in the genitive. In the Thracian's teaching, most diseases elude the Greek doctors because "they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see ἐπιμέλεια; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). The text here is made by Burnet. B and T read τὸ ὅλον ἀγνοοῖεν, "they do not know the whole"; ἀμελοῖεν is a variant noted in T and the reading of Stobaeus, who has τοῦ ἄλλου ἀμελοῖεν, "they neglect the rest"; and τοῦ ὅλου, "the whole", in the case that ἀμελεῖν takes, is Burnet's own emendation (apparatus, e4; see τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). The printed text makes the doctors' fault carelessness rather than ignorance, and it chimes with ἐπιμέλειαν, "caring for", in the next clause.

See also αἴτιος; ἐπιμέλεια; ὅλος; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

ἀμήχανος · beyond words

ἀμήχανος, *amēchanos*, "beyond words"

Attested: ἀμήχανον (*amēchanon*; 155d). Without means or contrivance (μηχανή), and so what no means can manage: overwhelming, indescribable. As Critias tells the boy that Socrates knows the remedy, Charmides "gave me a look with those eyes of his, a look beyond words, and was just getting under way with a question" (155c–d); the Greek, ἀμήχανόν τι οἷον, is "a thing past all contriving". A moment later Socrates sees inside his cloak and is on fire (155d; see ἁλίσκομαι). Plato uses the word more than once of a beauty beyond measure: in the *Republic* Plato's brother Glaucon calls the good "a beauty past all reckoning", if it provides knowledge and truth and is itself above them in beauty (509a); and in the *Symposium*, as Alcibiades tells it, Socrates answers him "very ironically" that if what he says is true, he must be seeing in Socrates a beauty past all contriving, far above his own good looks (218d–e).

See also ἁλίσκομαι; ἐμβλέπω; κάλλος; ὄμμα.

ἀμπεχόνη · clothing

ἀμπεχόνη, *ampechonē*, "clothing"

Attested: ἀμπεχόνην (*ampechonēn*; 173b). A wrap, a garment thrown round the body, from ἀμπέχειν, "to put round"; and so clothing in general. In Socrates' dream of rule by temperance, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge, and "our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us, and much else besides, because we would be using genuine craftsmen" (173b–c; see ἀληθινός; τεχνικῶς). The word belongs to the dream's list of goods that knowledge would perfect, and to the dialogue's run of homely examples, the cloak of 161e and 165e and the clothes of 174c (see ἀμφιέννυμι; ἱμάτιον).

See also ἀληθινός; ἀμφιέννυμι; ἱμάτιον; σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς; ὑπόδεσις.

ἀμφιέννυμι · clothe

ἀμφιέννυμι, *amphiennymi*, "clothe"

Attested: ἠμφιέσθαι (*ēmphiesthai*; 174c). To put clothes round someone; in the perfect, to have clothes on. Socrates asks Critias what would happen if the knowledge of good and bad were taken away from the other kinds of knowledge: "will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed"? Critias answers, "No less" (174c). The point follows: what will be gone is "each of these things being done well and beneficially" (174d). The perfect infinitive says only that we would have clothes on; "well" in "well clothed" belongs to the English idiom, and the "well" that matters is the εὖ of "well and beneficially".

See also ἀμπεχόνη; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική; ὠφελίμως.

ἀμφισβητέω · dispute

ἀμφισβητέω, *amphisbēteō*, "dispute"

Attested: ἀμφισβητῶ (*amphisbētō*; 169e). To dispute, to raise a counter-claim, from ἀμφίς, "apart", and βαίνειν, "to go": to go two ways. Critias has argued that whoever has a knowledge that knows itself will know himself, as whoever has speed is fast; Socrates grants it: "That isn't what I'm disputing ... that when someone has what knows itself, he will know himself" (169e), and asks what necessity there is for the next step (see *ἀνάγκη*). The verb marks exactly where the disagreement lies. Socrates accepts the step from self-knowing knowledge to self-knowledge and disputes the next, from self-knowledge to the formula, which Critias claims is "the same as that" (170a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

See also ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀνάγκη; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; συγχωρέω.

ἁμῶς γέ πως · in some way or other

ἁμῶς γέ πως, *hamōs ge pōs*, "in some way or other"

Attested: ἁμῶς γέ πως (*hamōs ge pōs*; 175c). An adverbial phrase of Attic speech, "somehow at any rate", made of ἁμῶς, "in some way", with the particle γε and the enclitic πως, "somehow", which repeats it. It comes once, at the heart of the absurdity that ends the argument. Among the concessions that did not follow, they let the temperate man know of what he does not know that he does not know it, "without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all" (175c; see ἄλογος). The phrase is set against μηδαμῶς, "at all", literally "in no way", on the same line: to know a thing "in some way or other" cannot be squared with not knowing it "at all". Burnet prints the phrase with T and W; B has ἄλλως γέ πως, "in some other way" (apparatus, c5). The contradiction lies in two adverbs. In the *Protagoras* the phrase marks the least share that will do: men think anyone mad who does not at least claim to be just, Protagoras explains, since everyone must share in justice "in some way or other", or not be among men at all (323b–c).

See also ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἄλογος; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν.

ἀναγιγνώσκω · read

ἀναγιγνώσκειν, *anagignōskein*, "reading"; ἀναγιγνώσκῃ, *anagignōskēi*, "reads"

Attested: ἀναγιγνώσκειν (*anagignōskein*; 159c, 161d, 161e), ἀναγιγνώσκῃ (*anagignōskēi*; 161d). To read, literally "to know again", to recognize the letters one has learned; the word of the schoolroom. It serves in two arguments drawn from the boy's own lessons. Against quietness Socrates asks, "And reading? Quickly, or slowly?" "Quickly" (159c; see βραδέως; ταχέως), in a list that marches the boy back through his schooling at the writing-master's, the lyre-master's and the wrestling-trainer's (the edition's note at 159c). Against "doing one's own business" he asks whether the writing-master "does nothing when he writes or reads", and whether he

writes and reads "only his own name" (161d), concluding that the boys were not doing their own business, "if writing and reading are doing something" (161e; see γραμματιστής; γράφω). The same school activity refutes two definitions in turn. The simple verb γιγνώσκειν, "to know", becomes the verb of Critias' definition, knowing oneself (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

See also βραδέως; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γραμματιστής; γράφω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ταχέως.

ἀναγκάζω · be forced

Compulsion, which the inquiry refuses and the argument applies · Charmides

ἀναγκασθήσεται, *anankasthēsetai*, "is going to be forced"; ἀναγκάζῃ, *anankazēi*, "be forced"; ἀναγκασθῆναι, *anankasthēnai*, "to be forced"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀναγκάζειν is to put someone under ἀνάγκη, "necessity": to compel, by force, by law, by circumstance or by argument. In the *Charmides* it occurs only in the passive.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, each of a person forced. Critias jokes that the boy's headache will be a godsend "if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well" (157c–d); Socrates proposes a shared inquiry "so that you won't be forced to say what you don't want to" (158e); and Critias, seeing Socrates at a loss, seems "to be forced" by Socrates' perplexity into his own (169c).

In this edition. "Be forced" all three times.

A place to read. 158c–e, from the boy's dilemma to the offer of a joint inquiry.

Meaning

Ἀναγκάζειν (*anankazein*) is the verb of ἀνάγκη (see ἀνάγκη). Where the noun names a constraint, the verb makes it someone's act: a master compels a slave, a law a citizen, an argument the man who has granted its premises. The passive, the only voice of the verb in the dialogue, puts the weight on the one

who suffers the compulsion, and leaves open whether what forces him is a person, a fact or a chain of reasoning.

Use in the book

The three uses name three kinds of compulsion. The first is Critias' joke, the compulsion of circumstance. Socrates has just said that the Thracian forbade him to treat the head before the soul (157b–c); Critias answers that the head will do the forcing: "this trouble with his head will turn out to be a godsend for the young man, if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well" (157c–d; see ἀσθένεια; ἕρμαιον). The joke turns the Thracian's order upside down, with the body driving the soul to its cure.

The second is a compulsion refused. Asked whether he has temperance, the boy has said that he can neither agree nor deny without either showing up his guardian as a liar or praising himself (158c–d). Socrates removes the bind by making the question a shared one: "we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won't be forced to say what you don't want to, and I in turn won't set about my doctoring without looking into things" (158d–e; see ἀσκέπτως; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The offer ends with a choice: "if not, let's leave it" (158e). The inquiry begins by consent, and the boy consents gladly.

The third is the compulsion of the argument itself, working by contagion. When Socrates admits that he is at a loss, Critias seems to him "to be forced by my perplexity" into perplexity of his own (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; ἀπορία). No argument forces Critias; Socrates' own perplexity does, passing to him as a yawn passes, and his shame keeps him from saying so (see αἰσχύνομαι).

The verb measures the distance between the inquiry and the scene that closes the dialogue. Socrates promises the boy that he will not be forced to say what he does not want to; at the end the boy, at his guardian's order, will use force on Socrates: "So you'll use force," Socrates asks, "and won't even give me a preliminary hearing?" "Count on force," the boy answers (176c; see βιάζομαι). The dialogue can be read as moving from the compulsion that argument exerts on a willing partner to the violence that needs no argument at all.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

157c–d Critias: the trouble with his head will be a godsend if on account of it the boy is forced to improve his mind as well.

158e Socrates proposes to look into the question together, so that the boy will not be forced to say what he does not want to.

169c Seeing Socrates at a loss, Critias seems forced by his perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates makes compulsion the first step of education. If one of the prisoners in the cave were set free and "forced all at once to get to his feet, twist his neck round, walk, and lift his eyes to the light", he would be in pain and dazzled; and if someone pointed to each thing passing by and "forced him, by questioning, to say what each thing is", he would be at a loss and think the shadows truer; and if he were dragged by force up the steep ascent, he would be pained and angry (515c–516a). The prisoner can be read as forced to answer as the boy of the *Charmides* is promised he will not be. Critias' joke, in which an ailment drives the boy to improve his mind, can be read as nearer to the cave than to Socrates' offer.

Translation in this edition

Ἀναγκασθήσεται (157c9) is a future passive, "is going to be forced"; ἀναγκάζῃ (158e1) a present passive subjunctive in the purpose clause μήτε … μήτ', "so that you won't be forced … and I in turn won't"; ἀναγκασθῆναι (169c6) an aorist passive infinitive, which the nineteenth-century English scholar Charles Badham would delete; Burnet keeps it and asks whether Plato wrote ἀναπλησθῆναι, "infected", the verb Thucydides uses of catching the plague (apparatus, c6; Thucydides 2.51; the edition's note at 169c). The edition uses "forced" for all three, and the same English word serves for βιάζεσθαι at the end, "use force" (176c), where the Greek has a different verb.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναγκαῖος; ἀνάγκη; ἀπορία; ἀσθένεια; ἀσκέπτως; βιάζομαι; ἔρμαιον; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι.

ἀναγκαῖος · must, necessarily

What follows, and what must be looked into · Charmides

ἀναγκαῖον, *anankaion*, "must", "necessarily"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀναγκαῖος is "necessary", what ἀνάγκη imposes; its neuter with εἶναι, ἀναγκαῖον, is "it is necessary", "one must".

In the *Charmides*. Five times, always as the impersonal ἀναγκαῖον. The good doctors say one "must treat the head" with the eyes (156b); Critias refuses to accept what "necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier" (164c); whoever wants to examine medicine "must look into it" where it is found (171a–b); those who act without error "must necessarily do finely and well" (172a); and "one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random" (173a).

In this edition. "Must" at 156b, 171a–b and 173a; "necessarily" at 164c; "must necessarily" at 172a.

A place to read. 164c–d.

Meaning

Ἀναγκαῖος (*anankaios*) is the adjective of ἀνάγκη (see ἀνάγκη). It covers what cannot be otherwise, what is needed for something else, and what is binding on a person; the impersonal ἀναγκαῖον, with an infinitive, says that a thing must be done or must follow. In argument it names the consequence that a partner is bound to grant once he has granted the premises.

Use in the book

The word marks two kinds of "must", the must of a consequence and the must of a duty, and the dialogue sets them against each other.

The consequence is what Critias will not accept. Socrates has drawn from his definition, the doing of good things, the result that a doctor may act temperately without knowing that he does so. Critias answers that it could never happen, and that if Socrates thinks "that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier", he would sooner take back some of his agreements than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164c–d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι). Faced with a necessary consequence he dislikes, he gives up the premises rather than accept it, and proposes a new definition. The move is legitimate; but it can be read as the first time Critias lets a conclusion decide which premises he will keep, a habit that returns when he tries to bring the knowledge of good and bad under temperance (174d–e).

The chain that leads from temperance to happiness uses the word for a consequence: those without error "must necessarily do finely and well in every action", and those who do well must be happy (172a; see ἁμαρτία). Socrates does not deny the logic; he withdraws the premise that fed it, that it would be a great good for each of us to do what we knew and hand over the rest to those who knew (172d).

The duty is to look, as the good doctors' rule is a duty to treat (156b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). Whoever wants to examine medicine "must look into it in the things in which it is found" (171a–b); and when the dream comes to him, Socrates says, "I think I'm talking nonsense ... All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see εἰκῇ; ληρέω). The necessity of inquiry outranks the speaker's doubt about his own sense, and it is tied to care of oneself, the very thing the dialogue is trying to define.

The two necessities meet at the end. The argument there has many steps that "did not follow" (175b; see ἄλογος), and Socrates counts them as concessions the partners made, not as consequences the argument forced. The duty to look can be read as reaching back to what one has already agreed to.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

156b Good doctors say that one cannot cure the eyes alone, but must treat the head at the same time.

164c–d If what Socrates draws necessarily follows from Critias' earlier agreements, Critias would sooner take some of them back.

171a–b Whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found.

172a Those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy.

173a One must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates claims the opposite strength for a conclusion. Doing wrong, he says, is worse and more shameful than suffering it, and these results, "if one may put it a little coarsely, are pinned down and tied with arguments of iron and adamant, or so at least it would seem as things stand", which Callicles, or someone more vigorous than he, must undo if he can; yet he adds that his own account is always the same, that he does not know how these things are, only that no one he has met can say otherwise without making himself ridiculous (508e–509a). Necessity there is the strength of an argument that no one has yet undone, and it sits beside a confession of ignorance. Critias, by contrast, treats a consequence he dislikes as a reason to retract.

Translation in this edition

The English never uses the adjective "necessary" for ἀναγκαῖον: it says "must" at 156b8, 171a11 and 173a4, "necessarily follows" for ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι συμβαίνειν at 164c9, and "must necessarily ... must" at 172a2, where the one ἀναγκαῖον governs both καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, "do finely and well", and εὐδαίμονας εἶναι, "be happy". The order of the words is Burnet's: B has καλῶς πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, with the verb twice, and T and W

ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν (apparatus, a1). The noun ἀνάγκη has its own renderings (see ἀνάγκη).

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἄλογος; ἁμαρτία; ἀναγκάζω; ἀνάγκη; ἀνατίθημι; εἰκῇ; ληρέω; συμβαίνω.

ἀνάγκη · necessity, must

The bond of an oath, and the bond of an argument · Charmides

ἀνάγκη, *anankē*, "must", "necessity", "Necessarily"; πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, *pollē anankē*, "Absolutely necessary"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνάγκη is necessity: constraint, what cannot be otherwise, and in conversation a strong form of assent, "Necessarily".

In the *Charmides*. Nine times. Socrates "must obey" the oath he swore to the Thracian (157c); temperance, if present, "must give rise to some sense" (159a); Socrates asks whether a doctor "must" know when his treatment is beneficial (164b); Critias answers "Necessarily" and "Absolutely necessary" to the steps about the greater and about hearing (168b–d), and "Necessarily" again of the examiner of doctors (171b); sight that sees itself "must have some color" (168d); and Socrates asks "what necessity is there" that someone who has a knowledge that knows itself should know what he knows and what he does not know (169e).

In this edition. "Must", "Necessarily", "Absolutely necessary", and "necessity" at 169e.

A place to read. 169d–170a.

Meaning

Ἀνάγκη (*anankē*) is the constraint that cannot be resisted or talked away. It is the force of circumstance and of nature, the hold of a bond such as an oath or kinship, the compulsion of a master, and the necessity of a conclusion. In

dialogue the bare noun is an answer, Ἀνάγκη, "it must be so", and πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, literally "much necessity", is an emphatic yes. The verb ἀναγκάζειν and the adjective ἀναγκαῖος are of the same family (see ἀναγκάζω; ἀναγκαῖος).

Use in the book

The first necessity in the dialogue is not logical at all. Socrates has explained the Thracian's order not to treat the head before the soul, and he binds himself to it: "So I—for I have sworn him an oath, and I must obey—I shall obey" (157c; see ὄμνυμι). The Greek is ἀνάγκη πείθεσθαι, and πείθεσθαι, "obey", is the passive of "persuade" (the edition's note at 157c): Socrates is under necessity to be persuaded, by an oath he chose to swear.

The second sets the method of the first inquiry. If temperance is present in the boy, it "must give rise to some sense" from which he would have an opinion about it (159a; see αἴσθησις). The third is a necessity Critias refuses: asked whether a doctor "must" know when his treatment is beneficial, he answers, "Perhaps not" (164b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). Had he said yes, his definition would have escaped this objection.

In the long examination of things that relate to themselves the word passes to Critias, as his assent. The greater must be greater than something smaller: "Necessarily." If something were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself: "Absolutely necessary, Socrates." Hearing that hears itself will hear itself as having a sound: "Absolutely necessary" (168b–d; see ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). Socrates adds the same necessity in his own voice, that sight seeing itself "must have some color" (168d). Critias grants the steps one after another, twice with the emphatic "Absolutely necessary", and each step brings nearer the conclusion that a knowledge of knowledge is impossible or doubtful.

The turning point is a question about necessity. Socrates has granted for argument's sake that a man who has a self-knowing knowledge will know himself; he then asks, "But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?" (169e; see ἀμφισβητέω). Critias answers not with a necessity but with an identity: "this

is the same as that" (170a). The rest of the argument separates what Critias declared the same.

Read together, the uses divide the necessities of the dialogue between its two speakers. Socrates binds himself only by the necessity of his oath; the necessities of the argument he states, asks after and tests. Critias says "Necessarily" to steps that bind him, and "Perhaps not" to the one step that would have blocked the objection.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

157c Socrates has sworn an oath to the Thracian and must obey.

159a If temperance is in the boy, it must give rise to some sense, from which he would have an opinion about it.

164b Socrates asks whether a doctor must know when his treatment is beneficial; Critias says perhaps not.

168b–d Critias answers "Necessarily" and "Absolutely necessary" to the steps about the greater and about hearing; sight that sees itself must have some colour.

169e What necessity is there that someone with a self-knowing knowledge should know what he knows and what he does not know?

171b The examiner of a doctor must judge whether what is said is true and what is done is right: "Necessarily."

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Glaucon draws a distinction that can be read as implicit in the *Charmides*. When Socrates says that the men and women among the guardians, living and exercising together, will be drawn to union "by an inborn necessity", and asks whether he seems to be speaking of necessities, Glaucon answers: "Not geometrical ones, but erotic necessities, which are likely to be sharper than those at persuading and drawing the mass of the people" (458d). The *Charmides* can be read as setting out from an erotic necessity, Socrates on fire at the sight inside the boy's cloak (155d), and arguing by geometrical ones.

In the *Timaeus* the dialogue's chief speaker, Timaeus of Locri, makes mind and necessity the two sources of the world, and persuasion the way the

one rules the other. Having described what was made by mind, he turns to what comes about through necessity: the world was born of a mixture of the two, "mind holding sway over necessity by persuading it to steer the greater part of what comes to be toward the best", necessity being overcome by wise persuasion (47e–48a). The first necessity of the *Charmides*, Socrates' necessity to be persuaded by his oath (157c), can be read as a small likeness of that order.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle lists the senses of "necessary" in his *Metaphysics*: what one cannot live without; what is needed for a good to come about or an evil to be avoided, as drinking the drug is necessary in order not to be ill; what is forced, which goes against impulse and choice and is therefore painful, so that necessity "is thought, and rightly, to be deaf to persuasion", since it opposes motion according to choice and reasoning; and, the sense on which the others depend, what cannot be otherwise, to which belongs the necessity of what has been demonstrated.[26] The *Charmides* can be read as touching most of them: the remedy for the head, the force of its last page (see βιάζομαι), and the necessity of a conclusion, the only one Socrates tests. His oath is a necessity of another kind, one he laid on himself.

Translation in this edition

The noun is "must" where it governs an infinitive (157c2, 159a1, 164b7, 168d10), "Necessarily" where it stands alone as an answer (168b9, 171b10), "Absolutely necessary" for Πολλὴ ἀνάγκη (168c3, 168d8), and "necessity" in Socrates' question at 169e8, τίς ἀνάγκη, where the English keeps the noun because the question is about necessity itself. At 168d10 Burnet prints T's ἀνάγκη, where B has ἀνάγκην.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀμφισβητέω; ἀναγκάζω; ἀναγκαῖος; βιάζομαι; ὄμνυμι; πείθω.

[26] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.5, 1015a20–b9.

ἀναζωπυρέω · be rekindled

ἀνεζωπυρούμην, *anezōpyroumēn*, "I was rekindled"

Attested: ἀνεζωπυρούμην (*anezōpyroumēn*; 156d). To kindle again, to blow the embers back into flame, from ζώπυρον, a live coal, the spark kept alive to relight a fire; in the passive, to be rekindled. Once the boy has accepted the good doctors' principle, Socrates says, "When I heard his approval I took heart again; little by little my boldness began to gather itself together, and I was rekindled" (156d; see ἀναθαρρέω; θρασύτης). The edition's note at 156d observes that the word picks up "I was on fire" at 155d: "the fire of desire has become the fire of confidence" (see φλέγομαι). The fire that took Socrates out of his own possession returns as the spirit of argument. In the *Republic* Socrates uses the verb of the soul in study: it is hard to believe, he tells Glaucon, that in the mathematical sciences an instrument in every soul is cleansed and rekindled, one that other pursuits destroy and blind, though it is better kept safe than a myriad eyes, for truth is seen by it and by nothing else (527d–e).

See also ἀναθαρρέω; θρασύτης; κατὰ σμικρόν; φλέγομαι.

ἀναθαρρέω · take heart again

ἀνεθάρρησα, *anetharrēsa*, "I took heart again"

Attested: ἀνεθάρρησα (*anetharrēsa*; 156d). To regain courage, θάρρος, after fear or dismay. Socrates uses it of himself when the boy accepts the doctors' principle: "When I heard his approval I took heart again" (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀποδέχομαι). The word answers 155c, where his former boldness "had been knocked clean out of me" (see ἀπορέω; ἐκκόπτω). It is the boy's agreement, not his own effort, that gives Socrates back his nerve. The simple verb returns when Socrates passes the courage on to Critias, bidding him take heart and answer (166d; see ἀποκρίνομαι; θαρρέω).

See also ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀποδέχομαι; ἀποκρίνομαι; ἀπορέω; ἐκκόπτω; θαρρέω; θρασύτης.

ἀνάκειμαι · be set up

ἀνακεῖσθαι, *anakeisthai*, "was set up"

Attested: ἀνακεῖσθαι (*anakeisthai*; 164d). To be laid up as an offering, to stand dedicated in a temple; it serves as the perfect passive of ἀνατιθέναι, "to dedicate" (see ἀνατίθημι). Critias uses it of the inscription "Know thyself" at Delphi: "For it seems to me that the inscription was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of 'Rejoice!'" (164d; see γράμμα; πρόσρησις; χαίρω). The verb treats the words on the temple as an object in it, an ἀνάθημα like a statue or a tripod, and so gives Critias' reading the weight of the god's property: what is set up in the god's house speaks in the god's voice. It stands in the same speech as Critias' offer to take back his earlier agreements and his praise of the man who dedicated the inscription (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι).

See also ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γράμμα; Δελφοί; πρόσρησις; χαίρω.

ἀνάκρισις · preliminary hearing

ἀνάκρισις, *anakrisis*, "preliminary hearing"

Attested: ἀνάκρισιν (*anakrisin*; 176c). An examination, from ἀνακρίνειν, "to question closely"; at Athens, the preliminary hearing held by a magistrate before a case went to court. Near the end of the dialogue Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting, Charmides answers for both that they have finished, and Socrates protests: "So you'll use force," I said, "and won't even give me a preliminary hearing?" (176c; see βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι). The edition's note at 176c explains that Socrates protests "in the language of the courts" that force is to be used on him "without even this first step of due process". The joke has an edge. The man who has spent the dialogue examining others asks to be examined before he is overruled (see ἀδικέω), and the edition's other note at 176c recalls that these two later ruled Athens by force.

See also ἀδικέω; βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι; ἐπίτροπος.

ἀναμάρτητος · without error

The life temperance would give, described once it has been ruled out · Charmides

ἀναμάρτητοι, *anamartētoi*, "without error"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀναμάρτητος is "unerring", "without error", the adjective of ἁμαρτάνειν, "to miss", with the negative prefix: one who does not miss.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the picture of what temperance would give if it were knowing what one knows and what one does not: "we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us" (171d–e).

In this edition. "Without error".

A place to read. 171c–172a, from the failure to tell a doctor from a pretender to the promise of happiness.

Meaning

Ἀναμάρτητος (*anamartētos*) is formed from ἀ-, "not", and the root of ἁμαρτάνειν, "to miss the mark" (see ἁμαρτία). Said of a person, it means one who makes no mistakes; said of conduct, blameless. Applied to a whole life, as here, it claims more than skill in any one thing: a life in which no act misses.

Use in the book

The adjective stands in a sentence built on conditions contrary to fact. "For if, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know ... then, we say, it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate. For we would live our lives without error" (171d). The Greek verbs are past tenses with ἄν, the form for what is not the case, and Socrates has just shown that it is not: a temperance that is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge could tell neither a doctor from a pretender nor any other expert from a man without expertise, except one of the temperate man's own craft (171c). The life without error is described at the moment it has been ruled out, as a picture of what was hoped for.

The error the adjective removes is not only the temperate man's own. It reaches "all the others who were ruled by us", because the temperate would undertake nothing they did not know, would find those who did know and hand things over to them, and would allow those they ruled only what they would do correctly (171d–e; see ἄρχω; παραδίδωμι). The life without error is a political order, a household and a city run by knowledge, and the chain runs on from it to rightness, doing well and happiness (171e–172a; see ἁμαρτία).

Socrates goes on to doubt even the counterfactual, withdrawing the premise that it would be a great good for men to do what they know and hand over what they do not know to those who do (172d), and the dream that follows ends in the knowledge of good and bad (172d–174c; see ἁμαρτία; ἐπιστημόνως). Freedom from error in each art is not yet knowing what is worth doing.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs.

171d–e If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, and could examine others, we would live our lives without error, we who had temperance and all who were ruled by us.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the *Republic* the same adjective undoes Thrasymachus' definition of justice as the advantage of the stronger. Socrates asks whether the rulers in each city are without error or such as to make mistakes; Thrasymachus grants that they can err, and so that they make some laws rightly and some wrongly, to their own disadvantage (339c). To save his definition he then invents the ruler "in the precise sense", who as such never errs (340d–e; see ἁμαρτία). The *Charmides* and the *Republic* can be read as reaching the same question from opposite sides: whether anyone who rules can rule without error, and whether such rule would be good for the ruled.

Other ancient sources

The Stoics, the school founded at Athens by Zeno of Citium about 300 BC, made the adjective a mark of their wise man. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, reports their doctrine that the wise alone are free, and kings as well, since kingship is a rule accountable to no one which can exist only among the wise; Chrysippus, the third head of the school, said that the ruler must have knowledge of goods and evils, and that none of the base has it; the wise alone are fit to rule, to judge and to speak, and they are without error, since they are not liable to fall into it.[27] The Stoic sage can be read as uniting what the *Charmides* keeps apart: rule, freedom from error, and the knowledge of good and bad that Critias names at 174b.

Translation in this edition

Ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν (171d6–7) is "For we would live our lives without error", the adjective standing in the predicate. In the next words, αὐτοί τε [καὶ] οἱ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἔχοντες, Burnet brackets καί, which Heindorf deleted (apparatus, d7): without it the sense is "both we ourselves who had temperance", and the English follows the bracket, making the temperate and "we" the same people. On the reading διεζῶμεν, see ἁμαρτία.

See also

ἁμάρτημα; ἁμαρτία; ἄρχω; ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης; παραδίδωμι.

ἀναμιμνήσκομαι · recollect, remember

ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, *anamimnēiskesthai*, "recollecting"; ἀνεμνήσθην, *anemnēsthēn*, "I have just remembered"

Attested: ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι (*anamimnēiskesthai*; 159e), ἀνεμνήσθην (*anemnēsthēn*; 161b). To call back to mind, to recollect, the compound of μιμνήσκεσθαι with ἀνά, "up, again". In the argument against quietness Socrates asks, "And what about recollecting and remembering? Is it finer to do them quietly and slowly, or vigorously and quickly?" "Vigorously," he

[27] Diogenes Laertius 7.121–122.

said, "and quickly" (159e; see μέμνημαι). Then the boy remembers something: "I have just remembered something I once heard someone say: that temperance would be doing one's own business" (161b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). What he recollects is a saying of Critias, and the narrator is sure of it (162c; see ἀκούω). The recollection is of a borrowed answer, not of anything learned within. The verb has a weightier use in the *Meno*, where Socrates, telling what priests and poets say about the immortal soul that has seen all things, concludes that nothing prevents a man who has recollected one thing, which men call learning, from finding out all the rest, "provided he has courage and does not flag in the search; for searching and learning, it turns out, are recollection through and through" (81c–d). The boy's quick recollection of a saying can be read as the opposite of that slow and brave search.

See also ἀκούω; ἀνδρείως; ἀνευρίσκω; μέμνημαι; μιμνήσκομαι; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ἀνατίθημι · take back, dedicate

Retracting and dedicating, in one verb and one breath · Charmides

ἀναθείμην, *anatheimēn*, "take back"; ἀναθέντι, *anathenti*, "the one who dedicated"; ἀναθείς, *anatheis*, "the dedicator"; ἀνέθηκεν, *anethēken*, "dedicated"; ἀναθέντες, *anathentes*, "those who dedicated"; ἀναθεῖεν, *anatheien*, "could dedicate"; ἀνέθεσαν, *anethesan*, "dedicated"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνατιθέναι is "to set up": in the active, to set up an offering in a temple, to dedicate; in the middle, to take back a move at draughts, and so to retract.

In the *Charmides*. In a single speech of Critias. He would sooner "take back" some of his earlier agreements than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164c–d), and in the next sentence agrees "with the one who dedicated the inscription" at Delphi (164d); the verb then returns five times in his account of the inscriptions (164e–165a).

In this edition. "Take back" for the middle; "dedicate", "the one who dedicated", "the dedicator" for the active.

A place to read. 164c–165b.

Meaning

Ἀνατιθέναι (*anatithenai*) is τιθέναι, "to put", with ἀνά, "up": to put something up, and so to set it up as an offering in a sanctuary, where the object becomes an ἀνάθημα, a dedication (see ἀνάκειμαι). The middle, "to put back for oneself", was the word for taking back a move in a board game, and from the board it passed to argument: to withdraw what one has granted. The edition's note at 164d records both senses and observes that "Critias retracts and dedicates in one breath".

Use in the book

Critias uses the middle at the moment he abandons his definition. Rather than accept that a doctor can act temperately without knowing it, he says that he "would sooner take back some of it" (164c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀναγκαῖος). It is a player's word: the move is withdrawn and the game goes on. Critias, who here takes back a move, will later bristle when Socrates offers him draughts as the knowledge that makes us happy (174b; see τὸ πεττευτικόν).

The active follows at once. Temperance, he would almost say, is knowing oneself, and he agrees "with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi" (164d; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Δελφοί). Critias then tells a history of dedications. The first dedicator meant "Know thyself" as the god's greeting (164d; see ἀνάκειμαι; πρόσρησις), and "that, I think, is what the dedicator had in mind when he dedicated it" (164e; see χαίρω). Those "who dedicated the later inscriptions, 'Nothing too much' and 'Pledge, and ruin is near'", mistook the greeting for advice, and "so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less, they wrote these up and dedicated them" (165a; see Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν).

The two senses can be read as one gesture. What Critias takes back from the argument he replaces with something set up at Delphi: his new definition

arrives as a dedication, with the god's authority and a claim to know what the dedicator "had in mind". The irony of the story is that it is itself a reading of an inscription, offered by a man who has just told Socrates that the god speaks "rather riddlingly" (164e–165a; see αἰνιγματώδης). Socrates answers the whole speech by refusing the part it gives him: Critias is treating him as though he claimed to know the answers to what he asks, whereas he inquires because he does not know (165b–c).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

164c–d Critias would sooner take back some of his earlier agreements than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.

164d He agrees with the one who dedicated the inscription "Know thyself" at Delphi.

164e The god's greeting to those who enter is "Be temperate", and that is what the dedicator had in mind when he dedicated it.

165a Those who dedicated the later inscriptions took "Know thyself" for advice, and wrote up and dedicated useful advice of their own.

Elsewhere in Plato

The middle is a courtesy of Socratic argument. In the *Gorgias* Socrates tells Polus that if Gorgias and he have gone wrong, he is willing to take back whichever of their agreements Polus thinks wrongly made, on one condition, that Polus curb his long speeches (461d); and he then invites Polus himself to take back what he thinks fit and to question and be questioned in turn (462a). In the *Protagoras*, arguing with "the many" about being overcome by pleasure, he tells them that they may still take back their account (354e). Retraction, in these places, keeps the argument going; Critias can be read as using it to change the subject.

The active is used of the same inscriptions in the *Protagoras*, with a different history. There Socrates names seven men of old, among them "our Solon", the Athenian lawgiver and poet, and the Spartan Chilon, who came together and "dedicated to Apollo, in his temple at Delphi, the first fruits of their wisdom, writing what everyone celebrates, 'Know thyself' and

'Nothing too much'" (343a–b). In the *Protagoras* both maxims are the sages' dedication; in Critias' story only "Know thyself" is the god's, and "Nothing too much" is the later work of men who misread it.

Other ancient sources

Pausanias, the travel writer of the second century AD, records that the maxims are written in the forecourt of the temple at Delphi. They were written, he says, by the men whom the Greeks call sages, and he names them, noting that Plato put Myson of Chen, a village on Mount Oeta, in the place of Periander, son of Cypselus and tyrant of Corinth; these men, "on coming to Delphi, offered to Apollo the much-sung 'Know thyself' and 'Nothing too much'".[28] His account, like the *Protagoras*, makes both maxims the dedication of the same men.

Translation in this edition

English has no single verb for both senses, and the edition divides them: "take back" for ἀναθείμην (164d1) and "dedicate" for the active forms (164d5, 164e4–5, 165a3, 165a7), with "the dedicator" for ὁ ἀναθείς (164e5). The perfect passive ἀνακεῖσθαι, "set up" (164d6), belongs to the same verb (see ἀνάκειμαι).

See also

αἰνιγματώδης; αἰσχύνομαι; ἀναγκαῖος; ἀνάκειμαι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γράμμα; Δελφοί; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; πρόσρησις; τὸ πεττευτικόν; χαίρω.

ἀνδρείως · like a man

ἀνδρείως, *andreiōs*, "like a man"

Attested: ἀνδρείως (*andreiōs*; 160e). Bravely, manfully, the adverb of ἀνδρεῖος, "brave", from ἀνήρ, "man"; ἀνδρεία is courage. Sending the boy back to look within himself after quietness has failed, Socrates asks him to consider what sort of person temperance makes him, and then to "tell me,

[28] Pausanias 10.24.1.

properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be" (160d–e; see ἐμβλέπω). The edition's note at 160e gives the literal sense, "bravely", and points out that the narrator answers with an adverb from the same root, ἀνδρικῶς (see ἀνδρικῶς). The request asks a shy boy for courage, and what it calls for is the courage to say what he thinks after looking at himself; his answer, that temperance is modesty, is the boy's own (see αἰδώς). In the *Meno* bravery is the condition of the search that Socrates calls recollection (81c–d; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι).

See also αἰδώς; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἀνδρικῶς; ἐμβλέπω; συλλογίζομαι.

ἀνδρικῶς · very much like a man

πάνυ ἀνδρικῶς, *pany andrikōs*, "very much like a man"

Attested: ἀνδρικῶς (*andrikōs*; 160e). In a manly way, the adverb of ἀνδρικός, "manly", from ἀνήρ, "man". Socrates has asked the boy to answer "properly and like a man" (160e; see ἀνδρείως), and the narrator reports that he did: he paused, "and after thinking it over to himself very much like a man", answered that temperance is modesty (160e; see αἰδώς). The second adverb is not the first repeated. Socrates asked for bravery; the narrator praises the boy's bearing, the pause and the private reflection, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν διασκεψάμενος, "thinking it over to himself" (see διασκέπτομαι). The answer that follows describes the boy himself, as the edition's note at 160e observes, and the manliness of his thinking can be read as shown in its first test: he gives up the answer readily when refuted (161b).

See also αἰδώς; ἀνδρείως; διασκέπτομαι; ἐπέχω.

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη · lack of knowledge

The absence of a knowledge, which only that knowledge can detect · Charmides

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, *anepistēmosynē*, "lack of knowledge"; ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν, *anepistēmosynōn*, "lacks of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνεπιστημοσύνη is the want of ἐπιστήμη, of a knowledge or expertise: not ignorance in general, but the absence of a particular knowledge.

In the *Charmides*. Ten times in nine passages, from 166e to 174e, always paired with ἐπιστήμη except in the dream (173d), where it stands alone. Socrates draws it out of Critias' definition, asking whether a knowledge of knowledge "would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge", and Critias agrees (166e). The argument then shows that only medicine knows the lack of medicine (170a–171c), the dream sets temperance to stand guard so that the lack of knowledge cannot "slip in and work alongside us" (173d), and the last argument returns to the pair (174d–e).

In this edition. "Lack of knowledge", and the plural "lacks of knowledge" at 174d.

A place to read. 170a–171c.

Meaning

Ἀνεπιστημοσύνη (*anepistēmosynē*) is built from ἀνεπιστήμων, "without knowledge, unskilled", the negative of ἐπιστήμων, with the abstract ending -σύνη, as in σωφροσύνη. It is a rare word. Greek had commoner words for not knowing: ἄγνοια, unawareness (see ἀγνοέω), and ἀμαθία, ignorance, stupidity. Ἀνεπιστημοσύνη is narrower than either. It is the lack of an ἐπιστήμη, and since the argument treats crafts such as medicine and house-building as kinds of knowledge (165c–d; see ἐπιστήμη), it is the lack of a craft: what the quack has instead of medicine. The edition's Key Words say that the English keeps it "visibly tied to its root rather than calling it ignorance".

Use in the book

The word enters as a consequence. Critias has said that temperance alone is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge; Socrates adds, "Then ... if it is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge?" "Certainly" (166e; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης). The addition gives temperance its work. A knowledge of knowledge and of its lack would let the temperate man examine what he knows and does not, and inspect others, "to see what a person knows and thinks he knows" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The pair is repeated as the definition is restated (167c, 169b).

The argument then breaks the pair apart. Knowledge of knowledge can tell only "that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge"; it is not the same as "knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, and as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just", which are medicine and statesmanship (170a–b). The lack that matters is always the lack of something, and only the knowledge of that something can detect it. So "if temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, it will be able to tell neither a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does", nor any other expert from a pretender, except in his own craft (171c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος). A knowledge of lack of knowledge in general turns out to know no lack in particular.

In the dream the word becomes a figure. Granting everything, Socrates pictures the human race acting and living knowledgeably, "since temperance, standing guard, would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us" (173d; see παρεμπίπτω; συνεργός; φυλάττω). The lack of knowledge is an intruder at the workbench, and temperance a sentry; the question is still whether a life so guarded would be happy. At the end Socrates sets the pair against the knowledge that does benefit: "For it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad" (174d), and he asks whether they did not "solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else" (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).

The word can be read as carrying the dialogue's portrait of Socrates. What he does is detect the lack of knowledge in those who think they know (the edition's note at 170d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The argument shows that he could not do it by a knowledge of knowledge alone; his examinations proceed within a subject, courage in the *Laches* (190d–e), piety in the *Euthyphro* (5c–d), temperance here, where the question is what someone claims to know.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

166e If temperance is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

167c The one knowledge which is of itself and the other kinds of knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

169b Socrates asks Critias, who lays down that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, to show that it is possible and beneficial.

170a–b Knowledge of knowledge is not the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy or of the just, which are medicine and statesmanship.

171c If temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, it cannot tell a real doctor from a pretender.

172b Perhaps the good of knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge is that one learns more easily and examines others better.

173d In the dream temperance stands guard and does not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us.

174d The knowledge that benefits is not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad.

174e They declared long ago that temperance is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* turns the pair into a comedy of infinite regress. Socrates has likened the mind to an aviary in which pieces of knowledge fly about like birds, and Theaetetus suggests that pieces of lack of knowledge fly there too, so that a man who catches one by mistake believes something false. Socrates

objects that he will still think he has caught a knowledge; and the refuter, he says, will laugh and ask whether they now mean to say that there are knowledges of the knowledges and of the lacks of knowledge, kept by their owner in some other ridiculous aviary, so that they will be forced to run round to the same place ten thousand times and get nowhere (199e–200c). The *Charmides* stops at the first knowledge of knowledge and asks what it could do; the *Theaetetus* lets the series run on and shows that it never ends.

Translation in this edition

"Lack of knowledge" at every place, and "lacks of knowledge" for the plural ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν at 174d5, where the English coins a plural to keep the pairing with "kinds of knowledge". At 171c5 Burnet prints ἀνεπιστημοσύνης with B and W; T adds ἐπιστήμη, "and knowledge of the lack of knowledge".

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγνοέω; ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ὁμότεχνος; παρεμπίπτω; συνεργός; φυλάττω.

ἀνερυθριάω · blush

ἀνερυθριάσας, *anerythriasas*, "blushed"

Attested: ἀνερυθριάσας (*anerythriasas*; 158c). To blush, to redden, from ἐρυθρός, "red", with ἀνά, "up": the colour rising in the face. Asked whether he agrees with Critias that he already has temperance enough, "Charmides blushed. For one thing, he looked even more beautiful" (158c). The blush comes before any word and answers the question better than the words that follow, in which he declines either to boast or to run himself down (158c–d). The edition's note at 158c reads blush and refusal together as a picture of temperance in its commonest sense, before anyone has tried to define it (see αἰσχυντηλός). Plato's young men blush where a truth about them is near the surface: Hippothales, asked whom he loves, blushes, and blushes more when Socrates says he can tell a lover at a glance (*Lysis* 204b–c); the young

Hippocrates, son of Apollodorus, who has woken Socrates before dawn to be taken to Protagoras, blushes in the first light when he has to admit that he goes to Protagoras to become a sophist (*Protagoras* 312a). The most famous blush is not a young man's: Socrates says that he then saw what he had never seen before, Thrasymachus blushing, when the sophist had been driven to agree that the just man is wise and good (*Republic* 350c–d).

See also ἀγεννῶς; αἰδώς; αἰσχυντηλός; κάλλος.

ἀνερωτάω · ask in turn

ἀνηρώτων, *anērōtōn*, "I asked them my own questions in turn"

Attested: ἀνηρώτων (*anērōtōn*; 153d). To question, to inquire, ἐρωτᾶν with ἀνά. Socrates has given the company the news from the camp, answering "whatever anyone asked" (153d, where T has the related ἀνέρομαι and B the simple verb, ἂν ἔροιτο; apparatus, d1); then, he says, when they had had their fill of that (see ἄδην ἔχω), "I asked them my own questions in turn about things here at home", about philosophy and about whether any of the young men had turned out outstanding in wisdom or beauty or both (153d; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος). The turn in the conversation is marked by αὖθις, "in turn": the questioned becomes the questioner. With it the narrative of the war gives way to the dialogue proper, and Socrates' first questions already hold its two subjects, philosophy and the beautiful young.

See also ἄδην ἔχω; ἐρωτάω; σοφία ἢ κάλλος; φιλοσοφία.

ἀνευρίσκω · find out

ἀνευρίσκων, *aneuriskōn*, "finds things out"

Attested: ἀνευρίσκων (*aneuriskōn*; 160a). To find out by search, to discover, εὑρίσκειν with ἀνά. In the argument against quietness, "in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person, I imagine, the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty, who is thought to deserve praise, but the one who does it most easily and most quickly" (160a–

b; see βουλεύομαι; ζήτησις). The compound names the result of inquiry, as ζήτησις names the search. The simple verb εὑρίσκειν, "find", runs through the rest of the dialogue as the measure of failure: Socrates would be surprised "if we even find out how it stands" (161c), and at the end they "cannot discover" to which of the things that are the name temperance belongs (175b), while the inquiry "is no more able to find the truth" (175d; see ἀλήθεια; ἐξευρίσκω). At 175b Burnet prints εὑρεῖν from a variant noted in T, where B and T have ἔχειν, "have", and at 175d T's εὑρεῖν against B's ἐρεῖν (apparatus, b3, d1). The quick finder praised at 160a is not found in the dialogue. In the *Meno* the compound names what recollection makes possible (81c–d; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι).

See also ἀλήθεια; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; βουλεύομαι; ἐξευρίσκω; ζητέω; ζήτησις.

ἀνεψιός · cousin

ἀνεψιός, *anepsios*, "cousin"

Attested: ἀνεψιόν (*anepsion*; 154b), ἀνεψιοῦ (*anepsiou*; 155a). A cousin, in Attic the child of one's father's or mother's brother or sister. Critias introduces the boy: "Charmides, our uncle Glaucon's son. My cousin" (154b). The Glaucon meant is Charmides' father, not Plato's brother of the *Republic*. Socrates then names the relation that matters for the scene: there would be nothing improper in the boy talking with them "in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a; see αἰσχρός; ἐπίτροπος). Critias is both his ward's kinsman and the man responsible for him, and the dialogue keeps the double role in view to the end, when the boy obeys him as guardian (176c). The edition's note at 153c explains the family: Critias was cousin of Plato's mother, and Charmides her brother; Plato is writing of his uncle and his mother's cousin.

See also αἰσχρός; ἐπίτροπος; Κριτίας; οἰκία; συγγένεια; Χαρμίδης.

ἄνοια · folly

ἄνοια, *anoia*, "folly"

Attested: ἄνοιαν (*anoian*; 156c). Want of νοῦς, "mind, sense": folly, senselessness. The good doctors say "that to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" (156c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ὅλος). The word is the doctors' judgement on a method, not an insult to a person, and Socrates turns it at once to his own purpose: the Thracian, he reports, said that his king Zalmoxis carries the same rule from the head to the soul, so that one must not try to cure the body without the soul either (156d–e). Folly here is a failure to see the whole of which the part is part. The *Timaeus* gives the word a medical sense of its own: the disease of the soul is ἄνοια, and it has two kinds, madness and ignorance (86b). The doctors' "folly" can be read as the second kind, a failure of understanding, not a loss of reason.

See also ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; νοῦς; ὅλος.

ἀνωφελής · of no use, of no benefit

The verdict on temperance as defined, and on its inquirer · Charmides

ἀνωφελές, *anōpheles*, "of no use", "of no benefit"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀνωφελής is "unprofitable", "of no use", the negative of the family of ὄφελος, "use", and ὠφελεῖν, "to benefit".

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in Socrates' verdict. What is agreed to be the finest of all things "would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b); and the inquiry has shown what they agreed on and laid down as temperance "to be of no benefit" (175d).

In this edition. "Of no use" at 175b, where it plays on "use"; "of no benefit" at 175d.

A place to read. 175a–176a.

Meaning

Ἀνωφελής (*anōphelēs*) is formed from ἀ-, "not", and the stem of ὄφελος, "use, help", and ὠφελεῖν, "to help, to benefit": what brings no profit or help. It is the negative of ὠφέλιμος, "beneficial", the word on which the dialogue's second question turns: whether temperance, if it were knowledge of knowledge, would benefit us (167b, 169b; see ὠφέλιμος).

Use in the book

The verdict falls on temperance as they have defined it, and Socrates lays the blame once on the inquirer and once on the definition; the virtue itself he still calls "a great good" (175e). At 175a Socrates has shown that temperance, as defined, would be "the craftsman of no benefit" (see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός), and he turns at once on himself, saying that he was right to blame himself (175a; see αἰτιάομαι): "For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b; see ὄφελος). The play on ὄφελος in ἀνωφελές puts the failure where Socrates puts it, in his inquiring.

The second use comes after the list of concessions (175b–c; see ἄλογος). The inquiry, personified, has mocked the truth and shown what they had made up between them and laid down as temperance "with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175d; see ἀλήθεια; ὑβριστικῶς). What is of no benefit here is their own construction, the thing they modelled and set up, not the virtue it was meant to describe.

Socrates then says so in so many words. He would be aggrieved if he had taken great pains to learn a charm "for a thing worth nothing", but he does not think it so: he is "a poor inquirer", and temperance "a great good" (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; ζητητής). The dialogue that set out to ask whether temperance benefits us ends by finding the account of it of no benefit and the inquirer of no use, while temperance itself is declared a great good. The verdict moves the question from the virtue to those who try to define it.

Places to read

Both passages in which the word occurs.

175a–b What is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if Socrates were of any use at inquiring well.

175d The inquiry has shown the definition they made up and laid down to be of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* the word names the philosopher's fate in a bad city. Socrates tells Adeimantus, Plato's other brother, that the few who have tasted philosophy and seen the madness of the many know that no one acts soundly in politics, and that a man who went to the aid of justice would be like a man fallen among wild beasts, unwilling to join in their wrongs and unable alone to hold out against them all, and would perish before he could help his city or his friends, "of no use to himself or to anyone else". So he keeps quiet and does his own business, like a man sheltering behind a wall from a storm of dust and wind (496c–d). Quietness and doing one's own business, two of the definitions the *Charmides* rejects (159b, 161b), can be read as returning there as the refuge of the man who would otherwise be useless.

In the *Lysis* the word measures friendship. Socrates tells the boy Lysis that in matters where we are of no use, no one will love us, not even our father or mother; if he becomes wise, all will be his friends, since he will be useful and good (210c–d). Beside the *Lysis*, the end of the *Charmides* can be read as a paradox: the boy asks to be charmed by Socrates every day (176b), though Socrates' inquiry has been, by his own account, of no use.

Translation in this edition

The Key Words say that at 175b "Socrates plays on ophelos in anōphelēs, 'of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well', and the English keeps the play"; the Glossary records "of no use" at 175b and "of no benefit" at 175d. "Use" and "useful" are otherwise kept for ὄφελος, χρηστός and χρήσιμος, and "benefit" for ὠφέλιμος and its family, so that the second verdict answers Socrates' question about benefit in its own terms.

See also

ἀγανακτέω; αἰτιάομαι; ἀλήθεια; ἄλογος; ζητητής; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ὄφελος; ὑβριστικῶς; χρηστός; ὠφέλιμος.

ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος · worthy of its name

ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος, *axion tou onomatos*, "worthy of its name"

Attested: ἄξιον τοῦ ὀνόματος (*axion tou onomatos*; 165e). Having had Critias accept that medicine produces health, and added that house-building produces houses, Socrates asks him what fine work temperance, being knowledge of oneself, produces for us, "worthy of its name" (165e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). A work "worthy of its name" would have to answer to what σωφροσύνη means, soundness of mind (see σωφροσύνη); the question assumes that the name tells what the thing should do. Critias refuses the question, since calculation and geometry produce no works (165e–166a). The name returns at the end, when Socrates says that they cannot discover "to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης; ὄνομα). The dialogue begins its last argument by asking for a work worthy of the name and ends by not finding the thing the name was given to. The adjective ἄξιος appears also in the praise of the quick deliberator, "thought to deserve praise" (160a–b), and in Socrates' fear of having learned a charm "for a thing worth nothing" (175e).

See also ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον; νομοθέτης; ὄνομα; σωφροσύνη; φέρειν τοὔνομα.

ἀπαθανατίζω · make immortal

ἀπαθανατίζειν, *apathanatizein*, "make one immortal"

Attested: ἀπαθανατίζειν (*apathanatizein*; 156d). To make immortal, the compound of ἀθανατίζειν with ἀπό. Socrates says that he learned the charm on campaign "from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said even to make one immortal" (156d; see Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ). The edition's note

at 156d explains the source: Herodotus calls the Getae, a Thracian people, οἱ ἀθανατίζοντες, those who hold themselves immortal, because they believed that they do not die but go to Zalmoxis, and Plato's verb "is a compound of Herodotus' word".[29] The claim gives the Thracian's medicine its reach: doctors who can make men immortal would be the right teachers of a cure that begins with the soul (156e–157a). Socrates reports it with "are said", and leaves the reader to weigh it.

See also Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; ἰατρός; ψυχή.

ἀπεργάζομαι · produce

The work a knowledge leaves behind, and the work temperance cannot show · Charmides

ἀπεργάζοιτο, *apergazoito*, "could produce"; ἀπεργάζεται, *apergazetai*, "produces", "make", "does"; ἀπεργάζεσθαι, *apergazesthai*, "producing", "produces"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀπεργάζεσθαι is to work something off to completion: to finish, to produce, to make a thing into what it becomes. Its object is an ἔργον, a work.

In the *Charmides*. Eight times. Socrates asks the boy what sort of thing temperance "could produce" in a person (160d) and whether anything is good "that does not make men good" (160e); he counts "producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft" as doing something (161e); he says what medicine and house-building "produce" if Critias were to ask him, and asks what fine work temperance produces, "worthy of its name" (165c–e); and he doubts that temperance, as defined, "does us any good" (173a).

In this edition. "Produce" at 160d, 161e and 165c–e; "make" in "make men good" (160e); "does us any good" (173a).

A place to read. 165c–166a.

[29] Herodotus 4.93–94.

Meaning

Ἀπεργάζεσθαι (*apergazesthai*) is ἐργάζεσθαι, "to work" (see ἐργάζομαι), with ἀπό, which marks completion: to bring a work to its end. With a double accusative it is to make someone into something, as temperance would make men good. It belongs to the vocabulary of the crafts, in which every art is known by what it turns out: health from medicine, houses from house-building, a cloak from weaving.

Use in the book

The verb carries the craft model of knowledge, and the dialogue tests the model on temperance and finds it wanting.

The model appears first in the boy's second search. Socrates asks him to consider what sort of person temperance makes him, and what sort of thing it would be "that could produce such a person" (160d; see αἰδώς; ἐμβλέπω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). The answer, modesty, falls to the premise that nothing is good "that does not make men good" (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). In the argument against "doing one's own business", Socrates widens "doing" to cover every production: "healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e; see ἔργον; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Critias answers by setting making apart from doing and working (163b–c; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

The model is applied directly at 165c–e. Once temperance is a knowledge, Socrates asks what it produces. Medicine, "being knowledge of the healthy", produces health, "a fine work for us"; house-building produces houses; so Critias ought to be able to answer the question, "Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?" (165c–e; see ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias rejects the question. Calculation and geometry produce nothing one could point to, as a house is the work of house-building (165e–166a; see λογιστική). Socrates grants it, and moves from the work a knowledge produces to the object it is of: calculation is of the even and the odd (166a; see ἄρτιος). The change of question opens the way to a knowledge whose object is knowledge.

The verb returns once more, when the work has been lost. Even if temperance were of the kind they now define, "it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a). The Greek is ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται, "produces good for us", and the question of the work, set aside at 166a, has come back as the question of benefit. At the end Socrates finds that the work of benefit was assigned to another craft (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι), and temperance is left "the craftsman of no benefit" (see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The dialogue can be read as showing that Critias won the argument about works at 166a and lost it at 175a.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

160d Socrates asks the boy what sort of thing temperance could produce in a person.

160e Could anything be good that does not make men good?

161e Healing, building and weaving, and producing any work of craft, are doing something.

165c–e Medicine produces health and house-building houses; what fine work does temperance produce, worthy of its name?

173a Even if temperance is of this kind, it is not clear that it does us any good.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthydemus* the same question defeats Socrates himself. Telling his old friend Crito of a search for the knowledge that would make us happy, he recalls that they asked what work the kingly art produces: medicine, "ruling all it rules", provides health, and farming produces food from the earth, but the kingly art, ruling all that it rules, "what does it produce?" Crito cannot say, and Socrates confesses that they could not either; they knew only that it must be beneficial and give us something good (291d–292a). The edition's note at 174c compares the passage, where the search goes round in a circle.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle opens his ethics with a distinction that can be read as the one Critias appeals to. Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good, but ends differ: "some are activities,

others are works beyond them", and where there are ends beyond the actions, the works are by nature better than the activities; the end of medicine is health, of shipbuilding a ship, of generalship victory.[30] Critias' calculation and geometry can be read as belonging, on this distinction, among the arts whose end is their own activity.

Translation in this edition

"Produce" renders the verb wherever the work of a craft is in view (160d8, 161e8, 165c11, 165d2, 165d5, 165e1). At 160e11 ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται is "make men good", and at 173a1 ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται is "does us any good", where English idiom takes over; on the 160e premise see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς; ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; ἀποδίδωμι; ἄρτιος; ἐμβλέπω; ἐργάζομαι; ἔργον; καλὸν ἔργον; λογιστική; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ἀπιστέω · be doubted

ἀπιστεῖται σφόδρα, *apisteitai sphodra*, "are very strongly doubted"

Attested: ἀπιστεῖται (*apisteitai*; 168e). To disbelieve, to distrust; in the passive, to be disbelieved, doubted. Sorting the cases of things that might have their power in relation to themselves, Socrates asks Critias whether he sees that some appear altogether impossible, while others "are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves" (168e; see ἀδύνατος). The passive leaves the doubters unnamed, and a moment later Socrates names them only as "some people" (169a; see ἀπιστία). The verb is the family's mark of a question left open, not of a conclusion. In the *Republic* Socrates says that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides, "a wise man, and an inspired one", and yet does not know what his saying about justice means (331e; see ἀποδίδωμι); Socrates can be read as in the same position in

[30] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1, 1094a1–9.

the *Charmides* with the wise author of "doing one's own business" (162a–b; see αἰνίττομαι).

See also ἀδύνατος; αἰνίττομαι; ἀπιστία; ἀποδίδωμι; σφόδρα.

ἀπιστία · disbelief

What some would doubt and others not, and a man who does not trust himself · Charmides

ἀπιστίαν ⟨ἂν⟩ παράσχοι, *apistian an paraschoi*, "would raise disbelief"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀπιστία is disbelief, distrust, want of πίστις, "trust, belief". To "provide disbelief" is to give someone grounds for doubt.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' sorting of the things that might relate to themselves: hearing and sight, motion moving itself and heat burning itself "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others" (168e–169a). The family is wider: Socrates asks the boy whether he believes Homer (161a), says that some cases "are very strongly doubted" (168e), and does not trust himself to decide (169a).

In this edition. "Disbelief"; the verb ἀπιστεῖσθαι is "be doubted", and πιστεύειν is "believe" and "trust".

A place to read. 168e–169b.

Meaning

Ἀπιστία (*apistia*) is the negative of πίστις, the trust one places in a person, a word or an argument. It covers both the state of not believing and the quality of a thing that is hard to believe. The family runs through the vocabulary of persuasion, since πείθειν, "persuade", shares its root with πίστις: what one believes is what one has been persuaded of (see πείθω; πιστεύω).

Use in the book

The word marks a grade between the impossible and the possible. Socrates has gone through sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear, opinion, the greater

and the double, and sorts them: some are "altogether impossible", the magnitudes and numbers; the rest are doubted (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος). The doubted cases are described by their effect on hearers. They "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others". Disbelief is not a property of the thing, as impossibility is; it depends on who is asked, and the question needs "a great man" to settle it (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ).

The family then turns on the speaker. "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a; see πιστεύω). The man who has just said that some would disbelieve and some would not places himself among those who cannot decide, and so neither affirms that a knowledge of knowledge can exist nor accepts that it is temperance (169a–b; see ἀποδέχομαι; διισχυρίζομαι). Against this distrust he sets one thing he does hold, by a "prophetic hunch", that temperance is beneficial and good (169b; see μαντεύομαι).

The first use of the family is the opposite case. Refuting modesty, Socrates asks the boy whether he does not believe "that Homer is right" about modesty and the man in need, and the boy says that he does (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ). The boy's trust in a poet costs him his definition; Socrates' distrust of himself keeps the question about knowledge open. The dialogue can be read as preferring the second: belief taken from authority settles too quickly, and an admitted doubt is what lets the inquiry go on.

Places to read

The one passage in which the noun occurs.

168e–169a Hearing and sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates names two kinds of disbelief that match the two questions of the *Charmides*. Asked to explain how the guardians are to share women and children, he says that it is not easy to go through, since it raises many grounds for disbelief, more even than what came before: it would be disbelieved that what is proposed is possible, and, even if it came about entirely, it would be disbelieved that it would be best (450c). In the

Charmides the questions are whether a knowledge of knowledge is possible and, if it is, whether it would benefit us (167b, 169b; see ὠφέλιμος).

In the *Phaedo* disbelief becomes a danger. Phaedo, who tells the story of Socrates' last day, recalls that after the objections of Simmias and Cebes the listeners felt themselves thrown back into disbelief, not only of the arguments already given but of any that might follow (88c). Socrates warns them against becoming haters of argument, as men who have trusted too readily without skill become haters of men (89d–e). The *Charmides* can be read as showing the other way: Socrates distrusts himself, not argument.

Translation in this edition

Ἀπιστίαν ⟨ἂν⟩ παράσχοι (169a1), literally "would provide disbelief", is "would raise disbelief". The particle ἄν, which makes the verb potential, is Heindorf's addition (apparatus, a1), printed by Burnet in angle brackets. The verb of the family is "be doubted" at 168e (see ἀπιστέω); πιστεύειν is "believe" at 161a and "trust" at 169a.

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἀπιστέω; ἀποδέχομαι; διισχυρίζομαι; μαντεύομαι; μέγας ἀνήρ; πείθω; πιστεύω; ὠφέλιμος.

ἀπογράφω · copy down

ἀπογράψομαι, *apograpsomai*, "I'll copy ... down"

Attested: ἀπογράψομαι (*apograpsomai*; 156a). To write off, to copy; in the middle, to copy for oneself, to take down in writing; in the law courts, to register property or to lodge a written charge. Socrates has told the boy that the remedy is a leaf with a charm, without which the leaf is no use, and the boy answers at once: "Then I'll copy the charm down from you" (156a; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). Socrates replies with a question that changes the transaction: "If you persuade me ... or even if you don't?" (156a; see πείθω). A charm copied down would be a text that works without its speaker; Socrates' charm, as he goes on to explain, is "beautiful words" that produce

temperance in the soul (157a; see λόγοι καλοί), and the exchange can be read as doubting that such words could be taken away on a tablet. The *Phaedrus* voices that suspicion of the written cure openly, when the Egyptian god Theuth offers writing to King Thamus as a remedy for memory and is told that it will breed forgetfulness (274e–275a; see φάρμακον).

See also ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἐπῳδή; λόγοι καλοί; πείθω; φάρμακον.

ἀποδέχομαι · accept

Receiving an account, at once or after looking · Charmides

ἀποδέχῃ, *apodechēi*, "you accept"; ἀποδέχομαι, *apodechomai*, "I do", "accept"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀποδέχεσθαι is to receive from someone, and so to accept what he offers: a payment, a guest, a statement or an argument.

In the *Charmides*. Four times, at three moments. The boy accepts the good doctors' principle (156c); Critias accepts that medicine produces health, "a fine work for us" (165d); and Socrates will not accept that a knowledge of knowledge is temperance until he has looked into whether it benefits us (169b).

In this edition. "Accept", and "I do" for Critias' one-word answer at 165d.

A place to read. 169a–c.

Meaning

Ἀποδέχεσθαι (*apodechesthai*) is δέχεσθαι, "to receive", with ἀπό, "from": to take something from someone's hands. In argument it is the word for receiving a λόγος as sound, a little more than agreeing and a little less than being convinced: one accepts a principle in order to build on it. Its opposite is to send the account back, as one returns a bad coin.

Use in the book

The three moments make a sequence, from acceptance on hearsay to acceptance refused until the inquiry is done.

The boy accepts first, and quickly. Socrates has set out what good doctors say, that the part is treated with the whole, and the boy has agreed that this is what they say and that it is so (see αἰσθάνομαι); then: "And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?" "Absolutely" (156c). The principle is accepted because it is said and seems so, and the acceptance is what Socrates needs: hearing it, he takes heart again (156d; see ἀναθαρρέω). The whole account of the Thracian charm rests on it.

Critias accepts next, and the acceptance commits him to more than he sees. Socrates would answer that medicine produces health, "a fine work for us," and he adds, "if you accept that." "I do" (165d; see ἀπεργάζομαι). The small concession brings in the model of a knowledge known by its work, and when Socrates asks what fine work temperance produces, Critias must reject the question he has just let in (165e).

Socrates refuses last. Having left it to "a great man" to decide whether knowledge is among the things that relate to themselves, he says: "I can neither say with confidence whether it is possible ... nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance, until I have looked into whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not" (169a–b; see ἀπιστία; διισχυρίζομαι). Acceptance becomes the end of an inquiry, not its beginning. The dialogue can be read as giving the verb to the three speakers in the order of their caution: the boy who accepts what doctors say, the guardian who accepts what he does not examine, and the inquirer who accepts nothing he has not looked into.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156c The boy agrees that the good doctors' principle is well said, and accepts it.

165d Socrates says that medicine produces health, a fine work, if Critias accepts that; Critias does.

169b Socrates cannot say whether a knowledge of knowledge is possible, nor accept that it is temperance until he has looked into whether it would benefit us.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* acceptance binds as it binds Critias. Simmias says that arguments which prove from likelihoods are impostors, but that the account of recollection and learning was given through a hypothesis "worthy of acceptance": that our soul exists before it enters a body just as surely as the being that bears the name "what it is". "I have accepted this, as I persuade myself, adequately and rightly. So I must not, it seems, accept from myself or from anyone else the claim that the soul is a harmony" (92d–e). Having received one account, he is obliged to send back another. In the *Charmides* Critias receives a premise without seeing what it excludes; Simmias sees it and lets it decide.

Translation in this edition

"Accept" at 156c8 and 169b2. At 165d2–3 the English keeps the condition, "if you accept that", and renders the answer, Ἀποδέχομαι, "I accept", by the idiomatic "I do". The λόγος accepted at 156c is "the principle", one of the senses the Glossary records for the word.

See also

αἰσθάνομαι; ἀναθαρρέω; ἀπεργάζομαι; ἀπιστία; διισχυρίζομαι; λόγος; ὁμολογέω; συγχωρέω.

ἀποδίδωμι · assign

ἀπέδομεν, *apedomen*, "we assigned"

Attested: ἀπέδομεν (*apedomen*; 170e, 175a). To give back, to render what is due, and so to assign something to whom it belongs. Both uses are about assigning a knowledge or a work to its craft. At 170e the doctor "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased", and "about knowledge the doctor knows nothing; that, we assigned to temperance alone" (170e; see ἰατρός). At

175a the same verb takes benefit away from temperance: "Nor of benefit either, then, my friend; for we just now assigned this work in turn to another craft, didn't we?" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ὠφελία). The argument is an allotment, each craft receiving its object and its work; what is assigned to one cannot be claimed by another, and temperance, given knowledge of knowledge, is left with no work of its own. The verb's commonest sense, to give back what is owed, is the definition of justice that Polemarchus takes from Simonides in the *Republic*: it is just "to give back to each what is owed" (331e; see ἀπιστέω).

See also ἀπιστέω; ἐπιστήμη; ἰατρός; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; τέχνη; ὠφελία.

ἀποδύω · strip

ἀποδῦναι, *apodynai*, "strip"; ἀπεδύσαμεν, *apedysamen*, "strip"

Attested: ἀποδῦναι (*apodynai*; 154d), ἀπεδύσαμεν (*apedysamen*; 154e). To take off clothes, to strip, as athletes did to exercise. Chaerephon says that if the boy "were willing to strip", his figure would put his face out of mind (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εὐπρόσωπος). Socrates, as the same note says, takes Chaerephon's verb and turns it on the soul: "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure? At his age he must surely be willing to have a conversation" (154e; see διαλέγομαι; ψυχή). The edition's note at 154e explains that "Athletes exercised naked, so 'if he were willing to strip' is nothing strange in a palaestra". The dialogue that follows can be read as the stripping of the soul that Socrates proposes, conducted in the wrestling-school (see παλαίστρα). The *Theaetetus* uses the image against Socrates: Theodorus complains that the Spartans at least let a man choose between stripping and going away, whereas Socrates plays the part of Antaeus, the Libyan giant who forced strangers to wrestle with him: he lets no one who comes near go until he has stripped him and made him grapple in words (169a–b).

See also ἀπρόσωπος; διαλέγομαι; εὐπρόσωπος; παλαίστρα; ψυχή.

ἀποκρίνομαι · answer

Answering in one's own person, and the reluctance to do it · Charmides

ἀποκρινόμενος, *apokrinomenos*, "answered", "answer"; ἀπεκρινάμην, *apekrinamēn*, "answer"; ἀπεκρίνατο, *apekrinato*, "gave an answer"; ἀποκρίνωμαι, *apokrinōmai*, "give"; ἀποκρίνασθαι, *apokrinasthai*, "to answer"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀποκρίνεσθαι is to answer, especially a question; in dialogue it names the part of the one who is questioned.

In the *Charmides*. Six times. Socrates answers Chaerephon, "Like this, as you see" (153b); smitten, he "did somehow manage to answer" that he knew the remedy (155e); the boy "gave an answer that did his breeding credit" (158c), then says he does not know "what answer to give" (158d), and at first is "not at all willing to answer" (159b); Socrates tells Critias to "answer the question as it seems to you" (166d).

In this edition. "Answer", and "give" in the boy's "what answer to give you" (158d).

A place to read. 158c–159b.

Meaning

Ἀποκρίνεσθαι (*apokrinesthai*) is the middle of ἀποκρίνειν, "to separate, to set apart"; in Attic the middle is the ordinary word for "to reply". In the dialogues the answerer has a role with rules: he says what he thinks, briefly (*Gorgias* 449b–c; *Protagoras* 334c–d), and accepts the consequences of what he has said. The noun is ἀπόκρισις, "answer" (see ἀπόκρισις); the partner's word is ἐρωτᾶν, "to ask" (see ἐρωτάω).

Use in the book

The verb follows the dialogue from casual reply to the answerer's obligation.

Its first two uses are Socrates' own, and they are jokes against him. Asked how he came out of the battle alive, he answers, "Like this, as you see" (153b; see Χαιρεφῶν): the evidence is in front of them. Asked by the boy whether he knows the remedy, he "did somehow manage to answer that I did" (155e; see

μόγις), the man of easy speech reduced to a struggle for a word by what he saw inside the cloak (see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι).

The boy's uses show a modest answerer. Asked whether he has temperance, he blushes and "gave an answer that did his breeding credit" (158c; see ἀγεννῶς): that he could not deny it without speaking against himself and showing up Critias as a liar, nor agree without praising himself and seeming obnoxious, "So I don't know what answer to give you" (158d; see οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι). Asked what temperance is, "At first he hung back, and was not at all willing to answer" (159b). Socrates' answer to the boy's difficulty is to make the inquiry a joint one, so that, as Socrates puts it, "you won't be forced to say what you don't want to" (158e; see ἀναγκάζω).

The last use states the rule. Critias has accused Socrates of trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about (166c); Socrates replies that he examines his own words for fear of thinking he knows what he does not, and then: "take heart, my dear fellow ... answer the question as it seems to you", and leave aside whether it is Critias or Socrates who is refuted (166d–e; see ἀληθής; ἔα χαίρειν; θαρρέω). The answerer is to say what seems true to him and leave the question of who wins aside.

Between the boy and the rule stands the change of answerers at 162c. Charmides, wanting not to answer for a definition he had from Critias, hands it back to its author (see ἀπόκρισις; ὑπέχειν λόγον). The dialogue's answers can be read as good when they are the speaker's own: the boy's quietness and modesty are his; the borrowed formula has to be answered for by the man it belongs to.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

153b Socrates answers Chaerephon's question how he came out of the battle alive: "Like this, as you see."

155e Overcome, Socrates somehow manages to answer that he knows the remedy.

158c–d The boy blushes and gives an answer that does his breeding credit; he does not know what answer to give.

159b At first he hangs back and is not at all willing to answer.

166d–e Socrates tells Critias to take heart and answer the question as it seems to him.

Elsewhere in Plato

The rule of 166d is stated in other dialogues as a condition of argument. In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates tells Thrasymachus, "do not answer contrary to what you think, so that we may get somewhere" (346a). In the *Gorgias* he begs Callicles, "by the god of friendship", neither to think he should play with him nor to answer whatever comes to hand contrary to what he thinks (500b). In both places, as in the *Charmides*, the answerer is asked to put his own belief at risk; the boy who at first will not answer, and then gives an answer that is not his own, shows two ways of failing to do so.

Translation in this edition

"Answer" at each place; at 158d5–6, οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, literally "I do not have what I may answer you", is "I don't know what answer to give you". At 166d8–9 ἀποκρινόμενος τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ὅπῃ σοι φαίνεται is "answer the question as it seems to you": θαρρῶν and ἀποκρινόμενος are participles hanging on the one imperative ἔα χαίρειν, "say goodbye to", and the English makes all three commands.

See also

ἀγεννῶς; ἀληθής; ἀναγκάζω; ἀπόκρισις; ἔα χαίρειν; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐρωτάω; θαρρέω; μόγις; οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι; ὑπέχειν λόγον; Χαιρεφῶν.

ἀπόκρισις · answer, definition

ἀπόκρισιν, *apokrisin*, "answer"; ἀποκρίσεως, *apokriseōs*, "definition"

Attested: ἀπόκρισιν (*apokrisin*; 162c), ἀποκρίσεως (*apokriseōs*; 162c). An answer, the noun of ἀποκρίνεσθαι (see ἀποκρίνομαι); in the dialogues it is often the answer to the question "what is it?", and so a proposed definition. Both uses come in the narrator's aside at 162c. Socrates is now sure "that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias", and the

boy, "wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it, kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted" (162c–d). The noun names the same thing twice, once as what was given and once as what must be defended: the boy can repeat an answer, but only its author can answer for it (see ὑπέχειν λόγον). When the boy said that the author "was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b), he was, as the edition's note there observes, paying his guardian a compliment that may already carry the tease that follows.

See also ἀκούω; ἀποκρίνομαι; Κριτίας; ὑπέχειν λόγον.

ἀποκρύπτομαι · hide

ἀποκρυπτόμενος, *apokryptomenos*, "hiding"

Attested: ἀποκρυπτόμενος (*apokryptomenos*; 174b). To hide away, to conceal; in the middle, to keep something hidden from someone. Critias has at last named the knowledge that makes us happy, the knowledge of good and bad, and Socrates explodes: "You rascal! … All this time you've been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy …" (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κύκλῳ; μιαρός; περιέλκω). The charge is affectionate abuse, and it is also a reading of the argument: the answer was there to be had, and the long way round through knowledge of knowledge kept it out of sight. Socrates' accusation answers the narrator's report at 169d that Critias "kept covering up his perplexity" (see ἐπικαλύπτω): Critias, who hid what he did not know, is now accused of hiding what he did.

See also ἐπικαλύπτω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κύκλῳ; μιαρός; περιέλκω.

ἀπολαύω · get out of

ἀπολαυσόμεθα, *apolausometha*, "we shall get out of"

Attested: ἀπολαυσόμεθα (*apolausometha*; 172c). To have the enjoyment of, to get the benefit of something, with a genitive; often ironic, of the good

or ill one gets out of a thing. Having found that no knowledge of the kind first supposed, one that would know what it knows and what it does not, has turned up anywhere (172a), Socrates offers a smaller benefit: that whoever had it would learn more easily and examine others better. "Is it some such things as these, my friend, that we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is?" (172b–c; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην). The verb belongs to the language of profit and enjoyment, and it lowers the tone of the question: not what temperance is, but what one gets from it. Critias accepts the smaller good, "Perhaps that is how it is", and Socrates at once doubts that even the larger one would benefit us (172c–d; see ὠφέλιμος).

See also ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ὀνίνημι; ὠφελία; ὠφέλιμος.

ἀπολείπω · desert

ἀπολείπῃ, *apoleipēi*, "desert"; ἀπολειψομένου, *apoleipsomenou*, "not desert"; ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται, *apoleloipos hēmas estai*, "will be gone from us"

Attested: ἀπολελοιπὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσται (*apoleloipos hēmas estai*; 174d), ἀπολείπῃ (*apoleipēi*; 176b), ἀπολειψομένου (*apoleipsomenou*; 176b). To leave behind, to desert, as at 174d, where the perfect has "us" for its object; in the middle, with a genitive, to be parted from someone, to fall away from him, as at 176b. At 174d, if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away from the other kinds of knowledge, "each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent" (174d). At the end Critias makes the boy's constancy the proof of his temperance: "if you let Socrates charm you and don't desert him, great or small", and the boy promises to follow him and not desert him (176b; see ἀκολουθέω; ἐπᾴδω). The two uses can be read together: what departs when the knowledge of good and bad departs is the good use of every craft, and what the boy promises is not to depart from the man who has been looking for it.

See also ἀκολουθέω; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τεκμήριον.

ἀποπληρόω · satisfy

ἀποπληρώσαις, *apoplērōsais*, "you will satisfy"

Attested: ἀποπληρώσαις (*apoplērōsais*; 169c). To fill up, to make good a lack, and so to satisfy a person who wants something. Socrates asks Critias to show first that a knowledge of knowledge is possible and then that it is beneficial: "And then perhaps you will satisfy me as well that you are right about what temperance is" (169b–c; see δυνατός; ὠφέλιμος). The verb pictures Socrates' doubt as an emptiness to be filled by argument. Critias cannot fill it, and covers his own perplexity instead (169c–d; see ἀπορία). The same image opens a famous question in the *Protagoras*: Socrates asks the sophist to "fill up in my soul" what he wondered at in his speech, the question of the unity of virtue (329c–d; see ἀρετή).

See also ἀπορία; ἀρετή; δυνατός; ὠφέλιμος.

ἀπορέω · be at a loss

Having no way through, said by Socrates of himself · Charmides

ἠπόρουν, *ēporoun*, "I was at a loss"; ἀπορῶ, *aporō*, "I can find no way through", "I find none"; ἀποροῦντα, ἀποροῦντος, *aporounta*, *aporountos*, "at a loss", "my perplexity"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀπορεῖν is to be ἄπορος, without πόρος, "a way through": to be at a loss, to have no means or no answer.

In the *Charmides*. Six times, always of Socrates. He "really was at a loss" when the boy sat down beside him (155c), had been at a loss how to show the boy the charm's power (156b), tells Critias "I can find no way through" (167b), and is seen "at a loss" by Critias, who seems to him to be forced by his perplexity into perplexity of his own (169c).

In this edition. "Be at a loss"; "find no way through" at 167b, where Socrates sets his state against Critias being "better provided with a way through"; "my perplexity" for the participle at 169c.

A place to read. 167a–c.

Meaning

Ἀπορεῖν (*aporein*) belongs to πόρος, a ford, a passage, a means of getting across, and so a resource. The ἄπορος has no passage and no resources; the εὔπορος is "well provided with ways" (see εὔπορος; πορίζω). The verb ranges from material want, being without means, to the state of a mind that cannot find its way in an argument, which is the sense of ἀπορία in the dialogues (see ἀπορία). The edition's note at 167b explains the play on πόρος and observes that "Plato's Socratic dialogues, this one among them, characteristically end in aporia".

Use in the book

The verb belongs to Socrates alone, and it moves from his body to his mind. The first time it is the lover's helplessness: when the boy sat down between him and Critias, "then, my friend, I really was at a loss: the boldness I'd had before, sure as I was that I would talk to him with the greatest of ease, had been knocked clean out of me" (155c; see ἐκκόπτω; θρασύτης). The second is the speaker's: "Just now I was at a loss how to show you its power" (156b), said once the boy's courtesy has let him speak frankly (see ἀδικέω; παρρησιάζομαι). In both, the loss is overcome by the conversation: the boldness gathers again and he is "rekindled" (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω).

The third is the philosopher's, and it is a declaration. Having set out his two questions, whether knowing what one knows and does not is possible and what benefit it would bring, Socrates says: "Come then, Critias ... look into it, and see whether, on these matters, you turn out to be better provided with a way through than I am: for I can find no way through. Shall I tell you where I find none?" (167b). He offers his perplexity as a place to begin, and shows where it lies, in the list of senses and powers that relate to themselves (167c–168e; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The Key Words set the pair beside the dialogue's word for its method, "look into", and make aporia that method's failure: "Socrates admits to being at a loss (167b); Critias catches it from him like a yawn and will not admit it (169c)".

The last uses are Critias' view of him: "When Critias heard this and saw me at a loss", he seemed "to be forced by my perplexity" into perplexity of his own (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; ἀπορία). Socrates' admitted loss is catching, and Critias hides his (169c–d; see ἀπορία). The man at a loss is the one who keeps the inquiry going.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155c When the boy sits down beside him, Socrates is at a loss, his boldness knocked out of him.

156b He had been at a loss how to show the boy the power of the charm.

167b Socrates can find no way through, and offers to tell Critias where he finds none.

169c Critias sees Socrates at a loss and seems forced by his perplexity into his own.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Theaetetus* Socrates says that he is the son of a midwife and practises her art, but that no one knows it: not knowing, "they do not say this about me, but that I am the strangest of men and make people be at a loss" (149a; see ἄτοπος). The report gives only the effect; the *Charmides* adds the cause: Socrates makes Critias be at a loss because he is at a loss himself.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes going through the difficulties the first task of inquiry. Those who want to find the way through, he says, must first go through the difficulties well, for the later ease is the solving of the earlier difficulties, and one cannot untie a knot one does not know; perplexity of thought shows the knot in the matter, since the man at a loss is like a man in bonds, unable to go forward either way.[31] The *Charmides* can be read as naming the knot at 167b and leaving it tied.

[31] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 3.1, 995a24–33.

Translation in this edition

"At a loss" at 155c5, 156b2 and 169c3; at 167b7 ἀπορῶ. ἦ δὲ ἀπορῶ, φράσω σοι; is "I can find no way through. Shall I tell you where I find none?", to answer εὐπορώτερος, "better provided with a way through"; at 169c5 ὑπ' ἐμοῦ ἀποροῦντος, literally "by me being at a loss", is "by my perplexity", which joins the verb to the noun ἀπορία in the next line. The Glossary lists the family under "at a loss" and refers to the Key Words, "Look into, and at a loss".

See also

ἀδικέω; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀπορία; ἄτοπος; ἐκκόπτω; εὔπορος; θρασύτης; παρρησιάζομαι; πορίζω; σκοπέω.

ἀπορία · perplexity

The perplexity that catches, and the one that is covered up · Charmides

ἀπορίας, *aporias*, ἀπορίαν, *aporian*, "perplexity"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀπορία is the state of having no way through: want of means, and in thought the difficulty in which one cannot go forward.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, both of Critias. Seeing Socrates at a loss, he seems "to be caught by perplexity himself" (169c), and, ashamed before the company, he "kept covering up his perplexity" (169d).

In this edition. "Perplexity".

A place to read. 169b–d.

Meaning

Ἀπορία (*aporia*) is the noun of ἀπορεῖν (see ἀπορέω), the condition of the ἄπορος, the man without a πόρος, a way across. It can mean poverty, a lack of resources, and so of any means to an end; in argument it is the point at which a question has no visible answer. The dialogues give it a double value: it is a

defeat for the man who thought he knew, and a beginning for the man who wants to learn.

Use in the book

The noun is used only of Critias, and in two constructions that say what perplexity does to him. In the first he is its victim: by Socrates' perplexity he seems "to be forced ... to be caught by perplexity himself" (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναγκάζω). The Greek is ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, the construction of the agent: perplexity is the hunter, as the beautiful boy was Socrates' at 155e. In the second he is its keeper: "he said nothing clear, but kept covering up his perplexity" (169d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἐπικαλύπτω). What Socrates has, he names; what Critias has, he hides.

The scene turns on that difference. Socrates' perplexity comes first, as the verb, and is avowed (167b; see ἀπορέω); Critias' comes from it as a yawn passes from one man to another (169c; see συμπάσχω; χασμάομαι), and is concealed because he "was used to being admired on every occasion" (169c; see εὐδοκιμέω). The same state is a starting point in one man and an embarrassment in the other. Socrates grants a step himself "to keep our argument moving" (169d), and the inquiry goes on without Critias admitting that he cannot make the distinctions asked of him. The dialogue can be read as defining by example the self-knowledge it cannot define by argument: the man who knows that he is at a loss is in the better state.

The noun does not return, but the state does. At the end Socrates says that "we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα), and the boy, asked whether he has temperance, answers, "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't. For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?" (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The edition's note at 167b observes that Plato's Socratic dialogues, "this one among them, characteristically end in aporia". Socrates and the boy end in it openly; Critias, who hid his at 169c–d, can be read as ending instead in command (176b–c).

Places to read

Both passages in which the noun occurs.

169c Critias seems forced by Socrates' perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself.

169d Ashamed before the company, he says nothing clear and covers up his perplexity.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Meno* the perplexity Socrates passes on is named and defended. Meno says that he had heard Socrates was always at a loss himself and made others so, and that now Socrates is bewitching him, drugging him and simply charming him, so that he has become full of perplexity; he is like the flat torpedo-fish, which numbs whoever touches it, and Meno is numb in soul and mouth and has no answer to give (80a–b). Socrates accepts the likeness on one condition: "if the torpedo is itself numb as it makes others numb, I am like it; if not, not. For it is not that I am well provided myself and make others be at a loss; I am more at a loss than anyone, and so I make others be at a loss too" (80c). He then offers to look into the question together (80d). The charm, the contagion and the offer of a joint inquiry are all in the *Charmides*; what the *Meno* adds is Socrates' own account of how the infection works.

In the *Symposium* Diotima of Mantinea, the wise woman from whom Socrates says he learned about love, gives perplexity a part in Love's birth. When the gods feasted for the birth of Aphrodite, Poros, Resource, son of Metis, Cunning, lay drunk with nectar in the garden of Zeus, and Penia, Poverty, who had come to beg, "plotting because of her own perplexity to have a child by Poros", lay down beside him and conceived Love (203b–c). Love is the child of a way and a want of one. The *Charmides*, which begins with Socrates at a loss before a beautiful boy, can be read as showing the same parentage in the love of wisdom.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes perplexity the beginning of philosophy. It was through wonder, he says, that men first began to philosophize, wondering first at the

puzzles near at hand and then going through the difficulties about greater things; and the man who is at a loss and wonders "thinks himself ignorant", so that men philosophized to escape ignorance, pursuing knowledge for the sake of knowing and not for any use.[32] The *Charmides* can be read as showing both halves of the remark: Socrates, at a loss, knows that he does not know, and the inquiry ends by finding temperance, as they had defined it, of no use.

Translation in this edition

"Perplexity" at both places (169c6, 169d1), and the participle ἀποροῦντος at 169c5 is "my perplexity", so that the English shows the noun passing from Socrates to Critias in a single sentence.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναγκάζω; ἀπορέω; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπικαλύπτω; εὐδοκιμέω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα; συμπάσχω; χασμάομαι.

ἀποτρέπω · turn away

ἀποτρέπειν, *apotrepein*, "turns away"

Attested: ἀποτρέπειν (*apotrepein*; 173c). To turn away, to deter, to avert. In the dream Socrates grants, if Critias likes, that prophecy is knowledge of what is going to be, and that temperance, presiding over it, "turns away the impostors" and sets up the true prophets (173c; see ἀλαζών; μάντις; προφήτης). The verb is the office of a gatekeeper. Temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, would stand at the door of every craft and send the pretenders off, as it would not allow the lack of knowledge "to slip in" (173d; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; παρεμπίπτω). Its derivative ἀποτρόπαιος, "averting", was the title of gods who turn evil away, as in the "shrines of the averting gods" of the *Laws* (854b); the dream can be read as giving the role to temperance, and the argument has already shown that it could not tell the impostor from the true expert (170d–171c).

[32] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982b12–21.

See also ἀλαζών; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἐπιστατέω; μάντις; παρεμπίπτω; προφήτης.

ἀπρόσωπος · no face

ἀπρόσωπος, *aprosōpos*, "had no face"

Attested: ἀπρόσωπος (*aprosōpos*; 154d). Without a face, faceless, from πρόσωπον, "face", with the negative prefix. Chaerephon has asked Socrates whether the boy has not a lovely face, εὐπρόσωπος; Socrates says "Extraordinarily", and Chaerephon goes on: "And yet if he were willing to strip ... you'd think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful" (154d; see ἀποδύω; εὐπρόσωπος). The joke sets two compounds of the same word against each other: the boy is fair of face, but stripped he would seem faceless, his body eclipsing his features. Socrates caps it by asking to see the boy's soul stripped first (154e; see ψυχή). The order of the scene can be read as the dialogue's own: face, body, soul, each beauty displacing the one before.

See also ἀποδύω; εἶδος; εὐπρόσωπος; πάγκαλος; Χαιρεφῶν; ψυχή.

ἀρετή · virtue

A family's inheritance, in a dialogue about one part of virtue · Charmides

ἀρετῇ, *aretēi*, "virtue"

At a Glance

The word. Ἀρετή is excellence: the quality that makes anything good at what it is, a horse at running, an eye at seeing, a man at being a man. "Virtue" is its usual English.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' praise of the boy's family. The house of his father's side "has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness" (157e–158a).

In this edition. "Virtue".

A place to read. 157d–158b.

Meaning

Ἀρετή (*aretē*) is the quality that makes a thing ἀγαθός, "good", and the man who has most of it ἄριστος, "best". In the praise of a house, as at 157e–158a, it was a mark of birth and standing as much as of conduct: the ἀγαθός man had ἀρετή as he had land and ancestors (see ἀγαθός). In Plato's dialogues the word is turned inward, to the goodness of the soul: the *Meno* opens with the question whether it can be taught (70a), and in the *Protagoras* Socrates asks whether wisdom, temperance, courage, justice and piety are five names for one thing or five things (349b). Temperance, the subject of the *Charmides*, is one of those parts.

Use in the book

The one appearance of the word belongs to the old sense. Critias has said that the boy is thought the most temperate of anyone, and Socrates answers with an encomium of his descent: no one could easily point to two houses in Athens likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two he is sprung from, for the paternal house, that of an earlier Critias, son of Dropides (the edition's note at 157e), was celebrated by the lyric poet Anacreon of Teos and by Solon "for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness"; and the mother's side is no different, since no man on the continent, it is said, was thought handsomer or bigger than the boy's uncle Pyrilampes when he went there as ambassador (157e–158a; see εὐδαιμονία; Σόλων; συγγένεια). Virtue stands between beauty and happiness, as one of the goods a house hands down; and Socrates concludes, "Born of such people, you are likely to be first in everything" (158a; see εἰκός). The edition's note at 158b observes that he is "laying it on", and the note at 158a that Plato is praising his own family.

The dialogue then examines one part of virtue and never names virtue again. Its definitions are of temperance alone, and its method treats temperance as a thing that a person either has or lacks, which the boy should be able to sense in himself (159a). Only at the end does the argument reach

toward the whole. The knowledge that makes us happy, Critias answers at last, is the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἀγαθός). The *Charmides* begins with ἀρετή as an inheritance, an excellence one is born to like beauty, and can be read as ending with the suggestion that the virtue it was looking for is a knowledge, which no one inherits.

Places to read

The one passage in which the word occurs.

157e–158a The boy's paternal house was celebrated by Anacreon, Solon and other poets for its beauty, virtue and happiness.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laches* Socrates proposes the procedure the *Charmides* follows. Asked how the boys may best acquire virtue, he says: "let us not look into the whole of virtue at once, my good man, since that is perhaps too large a work, but first see whether we are equal to knowing some part of it", and he chooses courage (190c–d). In the *Protagoras* he asks the sophist the question that the single-virtue dialogues leave over: whether virtue is one thing of which justice, temperance and holiness are parts, or whether these are all names of one and the same thing; and if parts, whether they are parts as the mouth, nose, eyes and ears are parts of a face, or as pieces of gold are parts of gold, differing only in size (329c–d). The *Charmides* does not raise the question, but its last argument, by finding no work for temperance that is not the work of the knowledge of good and bad, can be read as pressing toward the view that the virtues are at bottom one knowledge. At the end of the *Laches* the knowledge of good and bad surfaces in the same way and wrecks the definition of courage: a knowledge of all goods and evils would be not a part of virtue but the whole of it (199c–e; the edition's note at 174c; see ἀγαθός).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle narrows temperance to one field. Having discussed courage, he turns to temperance, saying that these two "seem to be the virtues of the non-rational parts", and that temperance, a mean concerning pleasures, is

concerned with those of the body, and not with all of these.[33] The *Charmides* tries a wider range of senses, from quiet behaviour and modesty to self-knowledge, and never treats temperance as the government of bodily pleasure.

Translation in this edition

Ἀρετῇ (158a1) is "virtue", in the list κάλλει τε καὶ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ, "beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness". The Glossary has no entry for the word.

See also

ἀγαθός; εἰκός; εὐδαιμονία; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; πατρῷος; Σόλων; συγγένεια; σωφροσύνη.

ἁρμονικός · harmonious

τὸ ἁρμονικόν, *to harmonikon*, "the harmonious"

Attested: ἁρμονικόν (*harmonikon*; 170c). Belonging to ἁρμονία, the fitting together of notes in a scale; with the article, what is harmonious, the object of music. Socrates lists what each knowledge knows: one "knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance, and so on for everything" (170c; see μουσική; οἰκοδομικός). The neuter adjective names the object as medicine's object is named, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, "the healthy" (see τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The refrain "and not by temperance" is the point: every object belongs to its own knowledge, and a knowledge of knowledge alone would know none of them, only "that he knows" (170c–d). Music is one of the boy's school subjects (159c, 160a; see κιθαρίζω), and its object returns here as one of the things temperance cannot know.

See also κιθαρίζω; μουσική; οἰκοδομικός; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

[33] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.10, 1117b23–1118a2.

ἄρτιος · even

τοῦ ἀρτίου, *tou artiou*, "the even"

Attested: ἀρτίου (*artiou*; 166a twice). Even, of numbers; the opposite of περιττός, "odd". When Critias objects that calculation and geometry produce no works, Socrates answers that he can still say what each knowledge is of: "Calculation, for instance, is surely of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other, isn't it?" "Certainly." "And the odd and the even are something other than calculation itself?" "Of course" (166a; see λογιστική; περιττός). The even and the odd are the first example of an object distinct from the knowledge that knows it, and the example prepares the question that Critias meets by denying that temperance is like the others: what is temperance knowledge of, "that is something other than temperance itself?" (166b). The edition's note at 166a observes that the definition of calculation is almost word for word that of the *Gorgias* (451b–c).

See also λογιστική; περιττός; πλῆθος; πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα.

ἄρχω · rule, begin

Rule by knowledge in the argument, rule by force after it · Charmides

ἤρχοντο, *ērchonto*, "were ruled"; ἤρχομεν, *ērchomen*, "we ruled"; ἄρχοι, *archoi*, "ruled"; ἄρχουσα, *archousa*, "rule over"; ἀρχομένου, *archomenou*, "began"; ἀρξάμενος, *arxamenos*, "starting"

At a Glance

The word. Ἄρχειν is to be first: to begin, and to lead and rule; for "begin" Attic prose mostly uses the middle. Its noun ἀρχή is both "rule" and "beginning".

In the *Charmides*. Of rule five times, in the picture of a household and city run by temperance (171d–e), in the dream that begins "If temperance ruled us as fully as could be" (173a), and in Critias' claim that temperance would "rule over" the knowledge of the good (174e). Of beginning twice:

Socrates tells Critias that he understood him "almost as soon as you began" (163d), and the boy will obey his guardian "starting from this very day" (176c).

In this edition. "Rule" and "be ruled"; "began" and "starting" for the middle.

A place to read. 171d–172a, with 176c.

Meaning

Ἄρχειν (*archein*) joins two ideas that English keeps apart: to be first in time, to begin, and to be first in rank, to command. The ἄρχων is a ruler, and at Athens the title of the chief magistrates; ἀρχή is office and empire as well as origin and first principle. The active governs a genitive of those ruled; the middle, ἄρχεσθαι, is the usual Attic word for beginning one's own action.

Use in the book

Rule enters the dialogue with the knowledge that was to make temperance beneficial. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, the life without error would extend to "all the others who were ruled by us"; we would not allow "the others we ruled" to do anything but what they could do correctly, and a household and a city run by temperance would be run well, "and everything else that temperance ruled" (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος). The temperate are rulers, and the benefit of their knowledge passes to their subjects through command.

The dream extends the rule to the whole of life. "If temperance ruled us as fully as could be, being such as we are now defining it, wouldn't everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge?" (173a–b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; ὄναρ). No false pilot or doctor or general would deceive us, and the human race would act and live knowledgeably (173b–d). But Socrates cannot see that it would therefore do well and be happy, and the argument finds that only the knowledge of good and bad makes us so (174b–c).

Critias tries to recover the benefit by rule. Temperance, he says, presides over the other kinds of knowledge, and so, "since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us" (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω).

Socrates answers with the crafts: then temperance, and not medicine, would make us healthy, and would do the work of every craft (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός). To rule over a knowledge is not to have it, and temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, would be a ruler without a work of its own.

The middle sense closes the dialogue. Critias orders the boy to let Socrates charm him and not desert him; the boy will obey his guardian, and "Then I'll do it," he says, "starting from this very day" (176c; see ἐπίτροπος). The next lines are about plotting and force (176c–d; see βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι). The edition's note at 176c reminds the reader that some twenty-five years later these two ruled Athens by force, Critias among the Thirty and Charmides among the Ten set over the Piraeus, the port of Athens. The dialogue that pictured temperance ruling a city by knowledge can be read as ending on the first day of a rule of another kind.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs, in both senses.

163d Socrates understood what Critias meant almost as soon as he began.

171d–e If temperance were knowing what one knows and does not, we and all who were ruled by us would live without error; household, city and everything else temperance ruled would be run well.

173a The dream: if temperance ruled us as fully as could be, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge.

174e Critias: since temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, it would rule over the knowledge of the good as well, and benefit us.

176c The boy will obey his guardian, starting from this very day.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates draws from the crafts a principle of rule that the *Charmides* can be read as assuming. The true pilot is a ruler of sailors and seeks what is advantageous for the sailor, not for himself; and "nor does anyone else who holds any office, while he acts as ruler, look to or prescribe his own advantage; he looks to the advantage of the man under his rule, the one for whom he does his work" (342d–e). Rule, so understood, is a craft, and its good is the good of the ruled; it can be read as the hope of

171d–e, that the ruled would share in the rulers' freedom from error. In the fifth book the same hope becomes the dialogue's most famous proposal: unless philosophers rule as kings in the cities, or those now called kings and rulers take to philosophy genuinely and adequately, there will be no rest from evils for cities (473c–d).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that Socrates said that kings and rulers are not those who hold the sceptre, nor those chosen by whoever happens to be there, nor those who obtain office by lot, nor those who have used force or deception, but those who know how to rule; and he showed that, on a ship, the one who knows rules and everyone else, the owner included, obeys him.[34] The list sets rule by knowledge against rule by force and fraud, and the last pages of the *Charmides* can be read as moving between the two.

Translation in this edition

"Ruled" and "rule" render the active and passive (171d8, 171e3, 171e7, 173a8, 174e1); at 174e1 ἄρχουσα, literally "ruling", is "would rule over", beside ἐπιστατεῖ (174d9), "presides over", and the English keeps both. The middle is "began" at 163d1 and "starting" at 176c4. The noun ἀρχή appears in the phrase ἐξ ἀρχῆς, "from the beginning", "at the start" (163d, 167b, 171d, 172c; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς).

See also

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπίτροπος; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; ὄναρ; πόλις.

[34] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.10–11.

ἀσθένεια · complaint, trouble

ἀσθενείας, *astheneias*, "complaint"; ἀσθένεια, *astheneia*, "trouble"

Attested: ἀσθενείας (*astheneias*; 155b), ἀσθένεια (*astheneia*; 157c); the verb ἀσθενοῖ (*asthenoi*; 155b) and the adverb ἀσθενέστερον (*asthenesteron*; 172b). Want of strength, σθένος: weakness, and so sickness, a bodily complaint. The word begins Critias' ruse: "Boy, call Charmides. Tell him I want to introduce him to a doctor about the complaint he was telling me about the other day" (155b; see ἰατρός; προσποιέομαι). It returns in Critias' joke after Socrates has explained the charm, where "this trouble with his head" will be a godsend if it forces the boy to improve his mind (157c–d; see ἀναγκάζω; ἕρμαιον). After 158c, where Socrates still speaks of "the remedy for the head", the headache is never mentioned again; the edition's note at 155b observes that the remedy and the headache drop out while the charm returns at the close. The adverb names a weakness of another kind: without knowledge of knowledge, Socrates suggests, people examine others "more feebly and poorly" (172b; see ἐξετάζω).

See also ἀναγκάζω; βαρύνω; ἐξετάζω; ἕρμαιον; ἰατρός; κεφαλή; προσποιέομαι.

ἀσκέπτως · without looking into things

ἀσκέπτως, *askeptōs*, "without looking into things"

Attested: ἀσκέπτως (*askeptōs*; 158e). Without examination, unconsidered, the adverb of ἄσκεπτος, "unexamined", the negative verbal adjective of σκέπτεσθαι, "to look into". Socrates proposes a joint inquiry into whether the boy has temperance, partly so that the boy will not be forced to speak against his will (see ἀναγκάζω), and partly, as he puts it, so that "I in turn won't set about my doctoring without looking into things" (158e; see ἰατρική). The word puts Socrates' pretended medicine under the rule of inquiry: even a doctor in pretence will not treat before he has looked, and the edition's Glossary notes that ἰατρική is "doctoring" here, "of Socrates' pretence". The negative adverb belongs to the family of σκοπεῖν and

σκέπτεσθαι, the dialogue's constant word for what the partners do, which the edition renders "look into" wherever the repetition can be heard (Key Words, "Look into, and at a loss"; see σκέπτομαι; σκοπέω).

See also ἀναγκάζω; ἰατρική; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; σκέπτομαι; σκέψις; σκοπέω.

ἀσμένως · glad

ἀσμένως, *hasmenōs*, "glad"

Attested: ἀσμένως (*hasmenōs*; 153a). Gladly, with pleasure, the adverb of ἄσμενος, "glad". The dialogue's first sentence: "We had got back from the army at Potidaea the evening before, and after so long away I was glad to make for my old haunts" (153a; see διὰ χρόνου; στρατόπεδον; συνήθης διατριβή). The adverb marks the return from war to the wrestling-school and to talk, the life Socrates prefers; the Greek is literally "gladly I went", and the English turns the adverb into the speaker's feeling. Burnet prints ἀσμένως with B; T has ἀσμένως, and Hirschig conjectured the adjective ἄσμενος, "glad" (apparatus, a2). The gladness of the opening sets the tone against which the news of the battle, "many people we know were killed", is heard a moment later (153b–c; see ἀγνώς).

See also ἀγνώς; διὰ χρόνου; παλαίστρα; στρατόπεδον; συνήθης διατριβή.

ἀσπάζομαι · greet

ἠσπάζοντο, *ēspazonto*, "started greeting"; ἠσπαζόμην, *ēspazomēn*, "greeted"

Attested: ἠσπάζοντο (*ēspazonto*; 153b), ἠσπαζόμην (*ēspazomēn*; 153c). To welcome, to greet with affection, often with an embrace. "When they saw me come in so unexpectedly, they started greeting me at once from across the room, from every side" (153b; see ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου), and once Chaerephon has sat him down, "I sat down beside him, greeted Critias and the others, and gave them the news from the camp" (153c; see Χαιρεφῶν). The imperfects picture the greetings going on, a room in motion. The dialogue returns to greeting in Critias' reading of Delphi, where "Know thyself" is the god's

greeting to those who enter, in place of the human "Rejoice!", χαῖρε (164d–e; see πρόσρησις; χαίρω). The human greetings of the opening are warm and unreflective; the god's, on Critias' account, is a command to know oneself.

See also ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου; πρόσρησις; Χαιρεφῶν; χαίρω.

ἄτη · ruin

ἄτη, *atē*, "ruin"

Attested: ἄτη (*atē*; 165a). Ruin, and in the poets the blindness of mind that brings it, personified as the goddess Ate. The word ends the third Delphic maxim as Critias quotes it, "Pledge, and ruin is near" (165a; see Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη): those who dedicated the later inscriptions, he says, took "Know thyself" for advice and set up useful advice of their own (see ἀνατίθημι). The edition's note at 165a gives the usual reading, that whoever stands surety for another has ruin at hand, and records that the saying was assigned to one or another of the Seven Sages, the wise men of old named in the *Protagoras* (343a; see ἀνατίθημι). In Homer Ate is a power and not only an outcome: Agamemnon, king of the Greeks at Troy, blames Zeus, Fate and the Fury for casting savage ἄτη into his mind on the day he took Achilles' prize, and calls her Zeus' first-born daughter, who leads every man astray: her feet are tender, for she never sets them on the ground but goes over the heads of men.[35] Plato's Agathon quotes the two lines on her feet (19.92–93) in the *Symposium* as proof of a god's tenderness (195d). In the *Charmides* the word keeps only its plain sense, the ruin that follows a rash promise.

See also ἀνατίθημι; ἐγγύη; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; συμβουλή.

ἀτιμάζω · slight

ἀτιμάσῃς, *atimasēis*, "slight"

Attested: ἀτιμάσῃς (*atimasēis*; 173d). To dishonour, to hold in no esteem, from ἄτιμος, "without honour, τιμή". Socrates has granted in his

[35] Homer, *Iliad* 19.86–94.

dream that the human race would act and live knowledgeably, but doubts that it would therefore do well and be happy. Critias answers: "And yet ... you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν; τέλος). The verb belongs to the language of honour, and it can be read as characteristic of Critias, "used to being admired on every occasion" (169c; see εὐδοκιμέω), who answers an argument as though a rank were at stake. Socrates does not slight the word; he asks what the knowledge is of, cobbling, bronze-working, wool (173d–e; see σκυτῶν τομή), until Critias names the knowledge of good and bad (174b). The honour Critias claims for "knowledgeably" turns out to belong to one knowledge only.

See also ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν; εὐδοκιμέω; σκυτῶν τομή; τέλος; φιλοτίμως.

ἄτοπος · odd, strange

What has no place among the things one knows: the boy's modesty, and the argument's results · Charmides

ἄτοπον, *atopon*, "odd", "strange"; ἄτοπ' ἄττα, *atop' atta*, "some strange things"; ἄτοπα, *atopa*, "strange things"

At a Glance

The word. Ἄτοπος, "out of place": what has no place in the usual order of things, and so odd, strange, absurd; of a person, unaccountable.

In the *Charmides*. Six times. The boy finds it "an odd thing" to speak against oneself (158d); after that the word belongs to the argument: "what a strange thing we are trying to say" (167c), "isn't it strange, if there really is such a thing?" (168a), "some strange things come to light" (172c, and in the past tense at 172e), and Critias' retort, "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates" (172e).

In this edition. "Odd" once (158d), "strange" everywhere else.

A place to read. 172c–173a.

Meaning

The adjective is formed from τόπος, "place", with the negative prefix: the ἄτοπον has no place where it belongs. In conduct it is the unseemly, in speech the absurd, in a man the eccentric who fits no type. In argument it names a result that will not sit with what one already knows, the sign that something earlier has gone wrong. The strange is not yet the impossible, and the *Charmides* keeps the two apart.

Use in the book

The first speaker to use the word is the boy. Asked whether he is temperate, he finds both answers closed: "if I say I'm not temperate ... not only is it an odd thing to say such things against oneself, but at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar" (158d; see ἐπιδείκνυμι). The oddness is social, the unseemliness of running oneself down in company. The Greek, αὐτὸν καθ' ἑαυτοῦ, "oneself against oneself", can be read as a first, unwitting turn of the reflexive that will carry the second half of the dialogue.

From then on the word is Socrates', and it marks the places where the argument stops fitting. Having stated Critias' knowledge "of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge", he says, "Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible" (167c; see ἀδύνατος). After the sight that sees no colour and the fear that fears nothing dreadful (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), he applies the word to knowledge itself: "Then isn't it strange, if there really is such a thing? For let's not yet insist that there isn't; let us go on looking into whether there is" (168a; see διισχυρίζομαι). The strange is a reason to look further, not a verdict, and when he sorts the cases a little later he puts some among the impossible and leaves others "very strongly doubted" (168e; see ἀπιστέω).

The second group comes after the concessions. Granting that knowledge of knowledge is possible, Socrates suspects "our search has been to no useful purpose. I infer this because some strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind" (172c; see τεκμαίρομαι). He withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good for each to do what he knows and

hand the rest over to those who know (172d). Critias protests, "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates," and Socrates takes the word back from him: "By the dog ... I think so too; and it was with my eye on this very point that I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me" (172e; see νὴ τὸν κύνα). In Socrates' mouth the word describes what the argument shows; in Critias' it describes Socrates. The second use can be read as the one Plato's other characters make of the word, when they find not the argument but the man out of place.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

158d The boy: to say he is not temperate would be an odd thing to say against oneself.

167c Socrates: see what a strange thing we are trying to say; in other cases it would seem impossible.

168a After the parallels: isn't it strange, if there really is such a knowledge? Let us go on looking.

172c Some strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind.

172e Critias: you are saying truly strange things; Socrates: so I think too, and that is what I meant by the strange things coming to light.

Elsewhere in Plato

The word is regularly turned on Socrates. In the *Theaetetus* he reports that people call him the strangest of men, who makes others be at a loss (149a; see ἀπορέω). In the *Phaedrus*, after he has praised the spot by the river where they sit, Phaedrus tells him that he seems a most unaccountable man, like a stranger being shown the sights, who never sets foot outside the city walls (230c–d). In the *Gorgias* Callicles breaks off to tell him how strange he is, and a mere speaker to the crowd (494d). Alcibiades in the *Symposium* makes the word the summit of his praise: Brasidas, the Spartan general, may be likened to Achilles, and Nestor and Antenor, the old counsellors of Homer's Greeks and Trojans, to Pericles, the Athenian statesman, but such is this man's strangeness, ἀτοπία, in himself and in his talk, that no one past or present comes near him, unless he is likened to silens and satyrs (221c–d). In

the *Charmides* the strangeness has passed to the argument; Critias' retort at 172e briefly hands it back to the man.

Translation in this edition

"Odd" at 158d2, where the word is a matter of manners; "strange" at 167c4, 168a10, 172c5, 172e3 and 172e5, so that the reader can follow one word through the second half of the dialogue. Ὡς ἀληθῶς at 172e3 is "truly". At 172e5 Burnet prints Badham's conjecture ἄτοπ' ἄττ', which makes Socrates repeat exactly the words of 172c5; B and T have ἄτοπά γ', and Bekker read ἄτοπά τ' (apparatus, e5).

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀπιστέω; ἀπορέω; διισχυρίζομαι; ἐπιδείκνυμι; νὴ τὸν κύνα; τεκμαίρομαι.

αὖθις · in turn, again another time

αὖθις, *authis*, "in turn", "again another time"

Attested: αὖθις (*authis*; 153d, 169d). Back, again; of time, hereafter. At 153d it turns the conversation round: when the company had had their fill of the news from Potidaea, "I asked them my own questions in turn about things here at home" (153d; see ἀνερωτάω). At 169d it puts a question off. Critias cannot make the distinctions asked of him, and Socrates, "to keep our argument moving", proposes: "let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time, whether it is so or not" (169d; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; συγχωρέω). The other time does not come in the dialogue, except as a confession: at 175b Socrates lists this among the things "we conceded ... though the argument did not allow it or say that there was" (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The adverb is a common courtesy of Socratic argument. In the *Gorgias* Socrates would rather converse with Gorgias than hear a display, which can wait "for another time" (447c; see διαλέγομαι), and in the *Philebus* he defers in almost the same words, εἰς

αὖθις ἐπισκεψόμεθα, "we shall look into it again", the question whether the life of thought is the most divine of lives (33b–c).

See also ἀνερωτάω; διαλέγομαι; ἐπισκέπτομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω.

αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει · knows itself

Critias' principle: whoever has a knowledge that knows itself will know himself · Charmides

ἐπιστήμην ἥ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, *epistēmēn hē autē hautēn gignōskei*, "knowledge which knows itself"; τὸ αὐτὸ γιγνῶσκον, *to hauto gignōskon*, "what knows itself"

At a Glance

The word. A relative clause, "which itself knows itself": αὐτή, "itself", is the subject, and the reflexive αὑτήν the object; both are feminine because their noun is ἐπιστήμη, "knowledge".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' argument that whoever has a knowledge which knows itself will know himself (169e). Socrates grants it and asks the question it does not answer.

In this edition. "Knowledge which knows itself"; "what knows itself".

A place to read. 169d–170a.

Meaning

The phrase gives knowledge the grammar of a person. Critias' definition had stated the object with a genitive, a knowledge "of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e, and in the other order at 166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν); here knowledge is the subject of the verb "know" and its own object. The edition's Key Words observe that from 166c the argument passes, without comment, from a man's knowledge of himself to a knowledge's knowledge of itself, and that the dialogue never quite resolves the difference (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). At 169e Critias tries to close the gap in one step.

Use in the book

Socrates has granted knowledge of knowledge for the sake of argument and asks what it adds: "how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not? For this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself and being temperate is, isn't it?" (169d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). Critias answers: "Certainly ... and it does follow, Socrates. For if someone has knowledge which knows itself, he himself would be of the same kind as what he has. Just as when someone has speed he is fast, and when he has beauty, beautiful, and when he has knowledge, knowing, so when he has knowledge that is knowledge of itself, then surely he will be knowing himself" (169d–e; see γνῶσις; ταχύς). The edition's note at 169e states the principle, "that whoever has a thing becomes such as the thing he has", and points out that each pair shares a root (see γνῶσις).

Socrates does not dispute it: "That isn't what I'm disputing ... that when someone has what knows itself, he will know himself. But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?" Critias replies, "Because, Socrates, this is the same as that" (169e–170a; see ἀμφισβητέω; ἀνάγκη; ταὐτόν). The concession costs Socrates nothing, and the next step shows why. Speed makes its owner fast because speed is a quality; a knowledge that knows itself makes its owner a knower of knowledge, and what such a knower can tell is only which of the things before him is knowledge and which is not (170a; see διαιρέω). By 170c–d he will know "only that he knows". The self known through a self-knowing knowledge can be read as a knower in general, with nothing in particular known: the man has become such as the thing he has, and the thing is empty.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with its answer.

169d–e Critias: whoever has knowledge which knows itself will be of the same kind as what he has, and will know himself.

169e–170a Socrates grants that whoever has what knows itself will know himself, and asks why he must know what he knows and what he does not; Critias: because the two are the same.

Elsewhere in Plato

Self-motion, which Socrates leaves among the doubted cases (168e–169a), becomes in the *Phaedrus* the definition of soul (245c–e; see ἀδύνατος; κίνησις). Self-motion found a place in Plato's philosophy; a knowledge that knows itself and nothing else did not.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the divine intellect think itself: if it is the most excellent thing, its thinking is a thinking of thinking. He then meets a difficulty, "but knowledge and perception and opinion and thought appear always to be of something else, and of themselves only on the side", and answers that in some cases the knowledge is the thing known: where the objects have no matter, what thinks and what is thought are not different but one.[36] The difficulty's list, knowledge, perception and opinion, can be read as the *Charmides*' list; the question Socrates does not trust himself to settle (169a), Aristotle settles. In *On the Soul* he asks whether the intellect is itself an object of thought, and answers that it is, as its objects are, for in things without matter what thinks and what is thought are the same.[37]

Plotinus, the Platonist philosopher of the third century AD, opens a treatise on the knowing natures with the question whether what thinks itself must be complex, and goes on to ask whether the intellect would know itself merely by knowing its objects, knowing of what is its own that it knows it, but no longer who it is that knows, or would know both its own things and itself.[38] The question can be read as the difficulty of 170c–d, a knower who knows that he knows and no more, pressed further; the answer, that in the intellect knower and known are one, is Plotinus' own.

Translation in this edition

Ἐπιστήμην ἡ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει (169e1) is "knowledge which knows itself", and τὸ αὐτὸ γιγνῶσκον (169e6–7) "what knows itself". The English

[36] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.9, 1074b33–1075a5.
[37] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.4, 429b26–430a5.
[38] Plotinus, *Enneads* 5.3.1; the answer at 5.3.5.

keeps "itself" for the knowledge and "himself" for the man (αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, "he will know himself"), so that the step Critias takes from one to the other stays visible. Γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς (169e4) is "knowledge that is knowledge of itself" (see γνῶσις).

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀμφισβητέω; ἀνάγκη; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γνῶσις; διαιρέω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; κίνησις; ταὐτόν; ταχύς.

ἀφίημι · give up

ἀφίημι, *aphiēmi*, "I give up"

Attested: ἀφίημι (*aphiēmi*; 165b). To send away, let go, release; of a claim, to give it up, to remit it. Critias, having read the inscription at Delphi as the god's greeting, abandons everything he has said before: "Everything before this I give up to you—perhaps what you said about it was more correct, perhaps what I said, but nothing that we said was really clear—but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself" (165b; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον). The release is generous in form and can be read as convenient in fact: it lets go of the doing of good things, which had just been shown to allow a temperate man who does not know that he is temperate, as though it were a debt forgiven to the other side. It completes the move he began a page earlier, when he said he "would sooner take back some of it" than concede a temperate man who does not know himself (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι). Socrates answers by refusing the position the release assigns him, that of a man who claims to know the answers to what he asks (165b–c; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν).

See also ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον.

ἀφορίζω · mark off

ἀφορίζεσθαι, *aphorizesthai*, "marking off"

Attested: ἀφορίζεσθαι (*aphorizesthai*; 173e). To mark off by boundaries, from ὅρος, a boundary stone; and so to set apart, to define. Critias has just said that nothing crowns doing well but living knowledgeably, and Socrates has asked about what: cutting leather, working bronze, wool? Critias will not call these men happy, and Socrates concludes: "Then we are no longer holding to the argument ... that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy. For these people live knowledgeably, and you do not admit that they are happy; rather, I think, you are marking off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things" (173e; see ἐμμένω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; σκυτῶν τομή). The word draws a boundary inside the territory of knowledge, and the search for what lies within it leads to the knowledge of good and bad (174b). The line rests on three corrections, which Burnet records: ζῶντα, "one who lives", is Schleiermacher's, for ζώντων in B and T; σύ, "you", is Bekker's, for εὖ; and δοκεῖς, "you seem", comes from the second Basel edition of Plato (1556), for δοκεῖ (apparatus, e9). The manuscripts' text is hard to make sense of, and Burnet's sentence rests on all three corrections.

See also ἐμμένω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ὁρίζω; σκυτῶν τομή.

ἄχρως · that has no color

ἄχρων, *achrōn*, "anything that has no color"

Attested: ἄχρων (*achrōn*; 168d), neuter singular with οὐδέν, "nothing colourless". Without colour, χρῶμα. The word gives the principle of 168d its clearest case. A power exercised on itself must have the character its power is directed at, so "sight too, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must have some color; for sight will never see anything that has no color" (168d–e; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; χρῶμα). The colourless is what sight, by its nature, cannot reach, and it rules out the sight "which, though it is sight, sees no color" of the procession (167c–d; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). In the

Phaedrus the being that truly is, in the region beyond the heavens, is ἀχρώματος, "without colour", as it is without shape and beyond touch, and can be beheld only by intellect, the soul's helmsman (247c). Set beside the *Charmides*, the passage can be read as finding the colourless an object after all, though not of sight.

See also δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ὄψις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; χρῶμα.

B Beta

βαδίζω · walk

βαδίζειν, *badizein*, "walking"

Attested: βαδίζειν (*badizein*; 159b). To walk, to go on foot at an ordinary pace. It comes in Charmides' first definition: temperance is "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: walking in the streets and talking, and doing everything else, in the same manner" (159b; see διαλέγομαι; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ). The edition's note at 159b explains the boy's "quietly" as the bearing of a well-brought-up boy in the street, and compares Aristophanes' *Clouds*, where the Just Argument, recalling the old education "when temperance was the custom", has the boys of each district walk, βαδίζειν, in good order through the streets to the lyre-master's, lightly clad, even through snow.[39] Charmides describes temperance as he has been taught to show it, in his gait and his speech. Socrates answers with the boy's schooling and games, where the quick is finer (159c–d), and returns to the walking at the end of the argument with the noun (160c; see βαδισμός).

See also βαδισμός; διαλέγομαι; ἡσυχῇ; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ.

βαδισμός · walking

ἐν βαδισμῷ, *en badismōi*, "in walking"

Attested: βαδισμῷ (*badismōi*; 160c). Walking, gait; the noun of βαδίζω. Socrates closes his refutation of quietness by covering both flanks: even if quiet actions were no fewer among the fine than quick ones, "even so temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly, whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else" (160c; see ἡσυχῇ; λέξις). The two nouns, walking and talking, answer the boy's two verbs at

[39] Aristophanes, *Clouds* 961–965.

159b, βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι (see βαδίζω; διαλέγομαι), so that the argument returns his examples to him by name. The edition's note at 160d leaves open "whether the argument is fair to what Charmides meant": he had described a manner of walking, and Socrates has refuted a speed.

See also βαδίζω; διαλέγομαι; ἡσυχῇ; λέξις; ταχέως.

βαρύνω · feel heavy

βαρύνεσθαι, *barynesthai*, "feels rather heavy"

Attested: βαρύνεσθαι (*barynesthai*; 155b). To weigh down; in the passive, to be weighed down, oppressed, with the part affected in the accusative. Critias provides the pretext for the meeting: "You know, only lately he was saying that his head feels rather heavy when he gets up in the morning. What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b; see κεφαλή; φάρμακον). The heaviness is the boy's complaint (see ἀσθένεια), and it casts Socrates as a doctor; the edition's note at 155b observes that the remedy and its charm frame the opening of the dialogue and that the charm returns at its close, "though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again". The small symptom serves the large design, for the doctors' principle that the part is treated with the whole leads, through Zalmoxis, to the soul (156b–157a; see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος).

See also ἀσθένεια; κεφαλή; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; φάρμακον.

βαρύς · heavy

βαρυτέρου, *baryterou*, "the heavier"; βαρύ, *bary*, "the heavy"; βαρύτερον, *baryteron*, "heavier"

Attested: βαρυτέρου (*baryterou*; 166b), βαρύ (*bary*; 166b), βαρύτερον (*baryteron*; 168c). Heavy, weighty. The word serves twice in the argument. At 166b weighing is Socrates' second example of a knowledge whose object is something other than itself: "weighing is the weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight; and the heavy and the light are something other than

weighing itself" (166b; see κοῦφος; σταθμός; στατική). At 168c it is among the comparatives that cannot be applied to themselves: "what is more than itself will also be less, will it not, and what is heavier lighter, and what is older younger" (168c–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). In the *Republic* Socrates names measuring, counting and weighing as the aids that keep the apparently greater or smaller, more or heavier, from ruling in us (602d). Weighing in the *Charmides* has the humbler office of a model: a knowledge with an object distinct from itself, which is what Critias' temperance does not have.

See also ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; κοῦφος; σταθμός; στατική.

Βασίλη · Basile

τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ, *tou tēs Basilēs hierou*, "the shrine of Basile"

Attested: Βασίλης (*Basilēs*; 153a). A local Athenian goddess, the Queen, as the name means. The dialogue's first scene is set beside her shrine: Socrates, back from the army at Potidaea, went "into the wrestling-school of Taureas, the one opposite the shrine of Basile" (153a; see καταντικρύ; παλαίστρα). The edition's note at 153a says that she "was a local Athenian goddess worshipped together with Codrus and Neleus", and that an inscription of 418/17 BC regulates their precinct (IG I^3 84). Herodotus remembers Codrus as a king of Athens, and names Neleus, son of Codrus, as the founder of Miletus.[40] The name is not secure in the manuscripts: B has βασιλης with ικ written above it, which would make βασιλικῆς, "royal", and T has βασιλικῆς; Burnet prints the goddess (apparatus, a4).

See also καταντικρύ; παλαίστρα.

βιάζομαι · use force

The force that ends the dialogue, where persuasion and argument give out · Charmides

[40] Herodotus 5.76 (Codrus); 9.97 (Neleus).

βιάσῃ, *biasēi*, "you'll use force"; ὡς βιασομένου, *hōs biasomenou*, "Count on force"; βιαζομένῳ, *biazomenōi*, "use force"

At a Glance

The word. Βιάζεσθαι, to use force, βία, on someone; to overpower, to compel against his will. Its opposite is πείθειν, to persuade.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, all in the last lines. "So you'll use force," Socrates asks, "and won't even give me a preliminary hearing?" "Count on force," the boy answers; and Socrates: "When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176c–d).

In this edition. "Use force"; "Count on force" for the future participle with ὡς.

A place to read. 176a–d.

Meaning

Βία is bodily strength, and then violence: the force that takes what it is not given. The middle verb is to do violence, to constrain, to carry a point by main strength. Its natural opposite is persuasion, πειθώ, and Plato returns to the pair more than once when he asks how a city should be ruled.

Use in the book

The ending passes from persuasion to command to force. The edition's note at 176b traces a "play on persuading and obeying begun at 156a and 157b–c", which "closes here, just as persuasion gives way to force". The boy, who does not know whether he has temperance, is not altogether persuaded by Socrates' suggestion that he may have it and need no charm, and asks for the charm (176a–b; see δέομαι; πείθω). Critias makes the charm a test of the boy's temperance, and the boy will obey his guardian, since it would be "something terrible" not to (176b–c; see δεινός; ἐπίτροπος; κελεύω). Then Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting, and the boy answers that the plotting is done (176c; see βουλεύομαι).

The force follows. Socrates asks, "So you'll use force ... and won't even give me a preliminary hearing?" (176c; see ἀνάκρισις). "Count on force," the boy answers, "since this man here gives the orders. You, for your part, take

counsel what you'll do about it" (176c; see ἐπιτάττω). Socrates answers that there is no counsel left, and that once the boy sets about anything and uses force no man alive will be able to oppose him; the dialogue closes on his promise not to oppose him either (176d; see βουλή; ἐναντιόομαι). On the surface it is a joke between friends: the force is the boy's resolve to be charmed every day, and Socrates yields to it gladly. The Greek marks the joke: "Count on force" is ὡς βιασομένου, the construction of the boy's promise a few lines earlier, ὡς ἀκολουθήσοντος, "Count on it" (176b; see ἀκολουθέω).

The joke has a second edge, and the edition names it. The note at 176c recalls that "some twenty-five years later these two ruled Athens by force in the oligarchy of 404–403 BC, Critias among the Thirty and Charmides among the Ten set over the Piraeus", and that both died fighting the democrats at Munychia, the hill above the harbour; "many readers hear the exchange as the dialogue's last and darkest irony." The Note on this Edition is exact about the history: the Thirty "were voted in, under Spartan pressure, and then ruled by force". Read with that in mind, the last exchange compresses the dialogue's failure into a scene. The inquiry into temperance ends without a definition (175b); the decision is then made by an order, without a hearing, by the guardian who had claimed temperance was knowing oneself and the ward who does not know whether he has it (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). Earlier Socrates had promised the boy an inquiry in which he would not be forced to say what he did not want to (158e; see ἀναγκάζω). At the end the force is applied to Socrates. "No man alive will be able to oppose you" can be read as the dialogue's prophecy, and "Then I won't oppose you" as the line Plato's readers knew Socrates had not kept.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

176c Socrates: so you will use force, and not even give me a preliminary hearing? The boy: count on force, since Critias gives the orders.

176d Socrates: there is no counsel left; when you set about anything and use force, no one will be able to oppose you.

Elsewhere in Plato

Under the Thirty, Socrates tells his jury in the *Apology*, he was summoned with four others to the Round House, the Tholos in the Agora, and ordered to fetch Leon from Salamis, the island off the Athenian coast, to be put to death. Strong as that regime was, it could not scare him into an unjust act: the other four went off to Salamis and fetched Leon, and Socrates went home, a refusal that might have cost him his life had the regime not been brought down soon after (32c–d). That refusal can be read as the opposition the end of the *Charmides* jokingly forswears.

The *Republic* opens with friendly force. Polemarchus stops Socrates on his way back from the Piraeus: "Then either show yourselves stronger than this crowd, or stay put." Socrates offers a third way, to persuade them to let him go; "And could you persuade people who will not listen?" (327c). There the joke leads to a night of conversation, as the boy's resolve in the *Charmides* leads to daily charming. In the *Crito* the Laws of Athens tell Socrates that a man must persuade his country or do what it bids, and that force is unholy against mother or father, and much more against one's country (51c). In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea asks what to call it when a man who has the art compels people to the better without persuading them: a doctor who forces a patient to a better treatment against the written rules has committed no error of medicine (296b–c). The picture of 171d–172a, a household and a city run by temperance, can be read as raising that question, and the ending as answering it with force and no knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's defence of Socrates meets the charge of violence head on. Socrates' accuser said that his mockery of choosing magistrates by lot made the young men violent (see ἁμαρτία); Xenophon answers that those who cultivate good sense are the least violent of men, since force brings enmity and danger, while persuasion brings about the same things without danger and in friendship: those who are forced hate, those who are persuaded love.[41]

[41] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.9–11.

The accuser's next charge used the same word of Critias, the most violent, βιαιότατος, of all the oligarchs, and Xenophon does not defend what he did.[42]

Translation in this edition

Βιάσῃ (176c7) is the second person of the future middle, "So you'll use force"; B and T write the same form as βιάσει, and a later hand in T has the active βιάσεις (apparatus, c7). Ὡς βιασομένου (176c8), a future participle with ὡς and its subject understood, is "Count on force", matching "Count on it" at 176b9. Βιαζομένῳ (176d2) is "use force". The English uses "forced" for ἀναγκάζεσθαι at 157c, 158e and 169c, and "use force" for βιάζεσθαι here (see ἀναγκάζω); the Glossary lists the verb under "force".

See also

ἀκολουθέω; ἁμαρτία; ἀναγκάζω; ἀνάκρισις; βουλεύομαι; βουλή; δεινός; δέομαι; ἐναντιόομαι; ἐπιτάττω; ἐπίτροπος; κελεύω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; πείθω.

βίος · life

The life a definition of temperance would make: fine, without error, of benefit · Charmides

βίος, *bios*, "life"; ἐν τῷ βίῳ, *en tōi biōi*, "in life"; τὸν βίον, *ton bion*, "our lives"

At a Glance

The word. Βίος is a life as it is lived, with a course and a character, as against ζωή, the bare fact of being alive.

In the *Charmides*. Five times, at three moments: in the refutation of quietness, where "the temperate life" must be fine (160b–d); in the picture of the life temperance would give if it were what Critias says, "we would live our lives without error" (171d); and in Socrates' lament that the boy's temperance may be "of no benefit to you in life" (175e).

In this edition. "Life"; "our lives" at 171d.

[42] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.12–13.

A place to read. 160b–d, with 171d–172a and 175d–176a.

Meaning

Βίος names the life one leads, the kind that can be described and chosen: the farmer's, the soldier's, the quiet life, the life of pleasure, the life of thought. Greek ethics puts its question in that form, which life is best, and Plato, and Aristotle after him, compare lives as wholes. Ζωή, "life" in the biological sense, is what animals and plants share; it is βίος that can be temperate or not. The dialogue uses the word at the points where a definition of temperance is made to show what life it would produce.

Use in the book

The first test is beauty. Charmides has said that temperance is a kind of quietness, and Socrates passes from quiet acts to the life made of them: "Then temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor would the temperate life be quiet, on this argument at any rate, since, being temperate, it has to be fine. For one of two things is true: quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places" (160b–c; see δεῖ; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἡσυχιότης; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ). Even granting that quiet actions are fine as often as quick ones, temperance would be no more quietness than quickness, "nor would the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet one" (160c–d). The argument works on a premise the boy has granted, that temperance is something fine (159c–d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι), and on a principle it does not state: a virtue is tested by the whole life it shapes.

The second test is error. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, and could examine others, "we would live our lives without error", the temperate and those they ruled alike (171d; see ἀναμάρτητος; διαζάω). The life is now a political one, a household and a city run by knowledge (171e–172a), and the verbs are in the form of what is not the case: Socrates has just shown that a knowledge of knowledge alone could not do it.

The third test is benefit, and it is personal. At the end Socrates tells the boy: "I am very aggrieved, if you ... are to get no profit from this temperance, and it is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you" (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; ὀνίνημι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; ὠφελέω). The life in question is the boy's own. The three passages can be read as a sequence: temperance must make a life fine, keep it from error, and do it good; the first definition fails the first test, Critias' fails the second, and the third is left open to Charmides, whose later life Plato's readers knew (see βιάζομαι).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

160b The temperate life would not be quiet, since being temperate it must be fine.

160c Quiet actions in life have seldom or never seemed finer than quick ones.

160c–d Even so, the quiet life would be no more temperate than the unquiet one.

171d If temperance were knowing what one knows and does not know, we would live our lives without error.

175e Socrates is aggrieved if the boy's temperance is to be of no benefit to him in life.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* sets two lives side by side. Socrates tries to persuade Callicles to choose, instead of the insatiable and unrestrained life, the orderly life, content with what it has at each moment, and then offers an image of "each of the two lives, the temperate and the unrestrained": two men with many jars, the one whose jars are sound and full, who need not keep pouring, and the other whose jars leak, who must fill them night and day (493c–494a). The orderly life the *Gorgias* recommends, whose owner, his jars full, "keeps quiet", ἡσυχίαν ἔχοι (493e), can be read as the life the boy described at 159b; there it is Callicles who makes the objection, that such a man lives "like a stone" (494a–b).

In the *Apology* Socrates tells his jury that to talk every day about virtue and the other things they have heard him discuss, examining himself and others, is the greatest good for a man, and that a life without examination is no life for a human being (38a). The *Philebus* builds its argument on a comparison of lives, the life of pleasure, the life of thought, and the mixed life (20e–22e),

and Socrates recalls that whoever chose the life of thought and wisdom was to feel no joy, great or small (33b).

The myth that ends the *Republic* puts the whole danger of a human life in the choice of one: each of us, Socrates tells Glaucon, should leave other studies and seek whoever can make him able and knowing enough to tell the good life from the bad and choose the better (618b–c; see διαγιγνώσκω).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle begins his inquiry into happiness from the lives men choose. The many, he says, judging by the lives they lead, take the good to be pleasure, and that is why they are fond of the life of indulgence; three lives stand out above the rest, this one, the political and, third, the contemplative.[43] Like Plato, he judges a conception of the good by the life it produces.

Translation in this edition

Βίος is "life" at four of its five places; τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν (171d7) is "we would live our lives", the English plural for the idiom (see διαζάω). Ἐν τῷ βίῳ (160c1, 175e2) is "in life". At 160c7 Burnet brackets κόσμιος, "orderly", after "the quiet life", on Heindorf's conjecture, and the English translates the text without it (apparatus, c7); the bracketed word is the adjective of the boy's own first word for temperance, κοσμίως, "in an orderly way" (159b; see κοσμίως).

See also

ἀγανακτέω; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀπολαύω; βιάζομαι; δεῖ; διαγιγνώσκω; διαζάω; διαλέγομαι; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἡσυχιότης; κοσμίως; ὀνίνημι; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; ὠφελέω.

[43] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.5, 1095b14–19.

βλαβερός · harmful

βλαβερά, *blabera*, "harmful"

Attested: βλαβερά (*blabera*; 163c). Harmful, damaging, from βλάβη, harm. It comes in Critias' reading of Hesiod. Things made "finely and beneficially" Hesiod called works, and such makings he called workings and doings; "And we must say that he regarded only such things as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others" (163c; see ἀλλότριος; Ἡσίοδος; οἰκεῖος). The word sorts the doings of a man into his own and not his own by their effect: what benefits belongs to him, what harms is someone else's business. Socrates restates it at once as Critias calling good what is one's own (163d; see ἀγαθός). The pair of benefit and harm then becomes the hinge of the next argument, when the doctor acts "beneficially or harmfully" without knowing which (164b–c; see βλαβερῶς). In the *Gorgias* the same pair decides what we wish (468c; see βούλησις).

See also ἀγαθός; ἀλλότριος; βλαβερῶς; βούλησις; Ἡσίοδος; οἰκεῖος; ὠφέλιμος.

βλαβερῶς · harmfully

βλαβερῶς, *blaberōs*, "harmfully"

Attested: βλαβερῶς (*blaberōs*; 164b). Harmfully, the adverb of βλαβερός. Socrates sets it beside ὠφελίμως, "beneficially", in the case of the doctor. Critias has granted that a doctor who makes a patient healthy does what he ought and is temperate, and, with a "Perhaps not", that a doctor need not know when his treatment benefits. Socrates concludes: "Then sometimes ... the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted" (164b–c; see οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; ὠφελίμως). Critias had placed harm outside a man's own doings (163c; see βλαβερός); here it is inside a doctor's practice, and he cannot tell it from benefit. The adverb names exactly what the doctor does not know, and the dialogue returns to that lack

at the end, when the knowledge that benefits turns out to be the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d).

See also ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; βλαβερός; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; ὠφελίμως.

βουλεύομαι · deliberate, plot, take counsel

Deliberation praised for its speed, and plotting already done · Charmides

τῷ βουλεύεσθαι, *tōi bouleuesthai*, "deliberation"; βουλευόμενος, *bouleuomenos*, "deliberates"; βουλεύεσθον, *bouleuesthon*, "are you plotting"; βεβουλεύμεθα, *bebouleumetha*, "We've finished plotting"; βουλεύου, *bouleuou*, "take counsel"

At a Glance

The word. Βουλεύεσθαι, to take counsel, deliberate about what to do; with an object, to plan or plot; in the perfect, to have resolved.

In the *Charmides*. In the argument against quietness, deliberation is praised in the one who does it "most easily and most quickly" (160a–b). In the last lines Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting, the boy answers, "We've finished plotting", and tells Socrates to take counsel himself (176c).

In this edition. "Deliberation", "deliberates" (160a); "plotting", "finished plotting", "take counsel" (176c).

A place to read. 176c–d.

Meaning

The middle of βουλεύω, a verb that belongs both to the council, the βουλή, which prepared business for the assembly, and to any man thinking out what to do. It is deliberation about action: what is up to us, and how to do it. Its range runs from honest counsel to conspiracy, and the dialogue uses both ends.

Use in the book

In the argument against quietness, deliberation stands with inquiry among the soul's activities: "And again, in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, it

is not the quietest person, I imagine, the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty, who is thought to deserve praise, but the one who does it most easily and most quickly" (160a–b; see ἀνευρίσκω; ζήτησις; μόγις). The boy agrees. The claim is the weakest in the sequence, for deliberation is the activity in which slowness is commonly praised: Aristotle reports the saying that one should act quickly on what has been deliberated but deliberate slowly (see ἀγχίνοια). The edition's note at 159b observes that the refutation may trade on the shift from "quietly" to "slowly" (see βραδέως).

At the end the verb returns in its other sense. Socrates asks, "You two ... what are you plotting to do?" "Nothing," said Charmides. "We've finished plotting" (176c). The question is in the dual, βουλεύεσθον, the two of them as one party; the answer in the perfect. The edition's note at 176c explains the range of the verb, "to deliberate, to take counsel, and so to plot", and the change of tense: "the plotting is done." Then the boy turns the verb on Socrates: "You, for your part, take counsel what you'll do about it," and Socrates answers with the noun: "There's no counsel left" (176c–d; see βιάζομαι; βουλή). The deliberation praised at 160a for its speed has become a resolution reached before anyone asked, and the man who is told to deliberate has nothing left to deliberate about. The family runs through the closing page: Socrates would sooner "advise" the boy to think himself happier the more temperate he is (176a; see συμβουλεύω), and earlier Critias had dismissed the later Delphic maxims as men's "useful advice" (165a; see συμβουλή).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs; the compound συμβουλεύω (176a) and the noun συμβουλή (165a) have their own entries.

160a–b In the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, praise goes to the one who deliberates most easily and quickly.

176c Socrates asks the pair what they are plotting; the boy: we have finished plotting; you take counsel what you will do about it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Crito* has the same turn from present to perfect. Crito comes to the prison with a plan of escape and urges him: "Deliberate—or rather it is no longer the time to deliberate but to have deliberated, and there is one plan": everything must be done the coming night (46a). Socrates answers by deliberating, at length, and decides to stay.

In the *Laches* Socrates insists that deliberation needs knowledge, not numbers: the question to ask first is whether any of them is expert in the matter they are deliberating about (184e–185a). In the *Protagoras* the sophist states what he teaches as good counsel, εὐβουλία, about one's own affairs, how best to manage one's household, and about the city's, how to be most able in its affairs in act and word; Socrates takes him to mean the art of politics (318e–319a). The *Charmides*' picture of a household and a city run by temperance (171e–172a) can be read as claiming the same field for a different knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's account of deliberation can be set beside Socrates' examples. We do not deliberate, he says, about the exact and self-sufficient sciences, such as writing, for we do not hesitate how to write a letter (copying out letters is Socrates' first example of what is finer done quickly, 159c); we deliberate about medicine, money-making and piloting, and call in counsellors on great matters, distrusting our own ability to judge. What we deliberate about is never the end itself but what leads to it, and the man who deliberates seems to inquire and analyse as a geometer analyses a figure: not all inquiry is deliberation, but all deliberation is inquiry.[44] Socrates' pairing at 160a, "in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation", can be read as the same one.

Translation in this edition

At 160a9–10 τῷ βουλεύεσθαι is "deliberation" and βουλευόμενος "the one who deliberates". At 176c the edition moves with the verb's sense: βουλεύεσθον (176c5) is "are you plotting", βεβουλεύμεθα (176c6) "We've

[44] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, 1112a34–b24.

finished plotting", and βουλεύου (176c9) "take counsel", which leads into "counsel" for the noun βουλή at 176d1. The English cannot keep one word through the passage without losing either the plot or the counsel.

See also

ἀγχίνοια; ἀνευρίσκω; βιάζομαι; βουλή; βραδέως; ζήτησις; μόγις; συμβουλεύω; συμβουλή.

βουλή · counsel

βουλή, *boulē*, "counsel"

Attested: βουλή (*boulē*; 176d). Counsel, a plan, a resolution; also the Council of Athens. The boy, having told Socrates to count on force, tells him to take counsel what he will do about it (176c; see βουλεύομαι), and Socrates replies: "There's no counsel left" (176d; see βιάζομαι). Counsel is what remains to a man who can still choose; Socrates says that he has none, and yields. In the *Crito* the noun stands at the same point of decision, but the other way round: Crito, urging escape, says that it is no longer the time to deliberate, and "there is one plan" (46a; see βουλεύομαι). In the *First Alcibiades* Socrates offers the young man "common counsel" on how they might both become as good as possible (124b), counsel shared where at the end of the *Charmides* it is closed off.

See also βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι; συμβουλή.

βούλησις · wish

The wish, whose object is the good · Charmides

βούλησις, *boulēsis*, "a wish"; βουλήσεις, *boulēseis*, "wishes"

At a Glance

The word. Βούλησις, the act of wishing or willing, the noun of βούλεσθαι.

In the *Charmides*. Twice in one sentence, in the procession of reflexive powers: Critias denies that there is "a wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes" (167e).

In this edition. "Wish".

A place to read. 167e, with the *Gorgias*, 466d–468e.

Meaning

In the *Charmides*, as in the argument of the *Gorgias*, wish is not any wanting but the wanting of the good. Plato does not always use the noun so strictly: in the *Laws* a man is to pray not that everything may follow his wish but that his wish may follow his wisdom (3.687e). Desire, ἐπιθυμία, may be for pleasure; wish is for the good. The distinction became a fixture of Greek ethics, and the *Charmides* assumes it without argument.

Use in the book

The procession of 167c–168a runs from sight, hearing and the senses to desire, wish and love, and on to fear and opinion (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). Each power is named with its proper object, and the object is what the reflexive version would lack: a desire "for no pleasure", a wish "for no good", a love "of nothing beautiful" (167e). The edition's note at 167e states the assumption: love is taken to be of the beautiful, "as desire is of pleasure and wish of the good in the lines just before." Critias grants the wish at once: "Of course not." The reflexive formula itself, a wish for wishes, is treated under βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων.

The object Critias grants without a thought is the one the dialogue ends by needing. When Socrates presses for the knowledge that makes us happy, Critias names it, the one "by which he knows good ... and bad" (174b), and Socrates adds that without it the doing of each thing "well and beneficially" will be gone (174c–d). A knowledge with no object but itself can be read as a wish with no good: Critias rejects the second at 167e and spends the rest of the argument defending the first.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

167e There is no wish which wishes for no good, but for itself and the other wishes.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* gives the doctrine its argument. Polus admires orators and tyrants because they can kill, exile and take property as they please. Socrates replies that they do what seems best to them, but not what they wish (466d–e), and argues the point: we do things for the sake of something, and what we wish is not what we do but that for the sake of which we do it; so "we do not wish to slaughter, or banish from cities, or take property, simply as such; if these are beneficial, we wish to do them, but if harmful, we do not. For we wish the good things" (468b–c). A tyrant who kills a man thinking it better for himself, when it is in fact worse, does what seems good to him; Polus himself concedes that he does not do what he wishes (468d). In the *Meno* Socrates leads Meno to agree that no one wishes to be wretched, and so that no one wishes for bad things (78a–b). The *Charmides*' one sentence about wish takes the result for granted.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines wish as desire of the good, "for no one wishes except when he thinks a thing good", and sets it apart from anger and appetite, which are desires without reason.[45] In the *Nicomachean Ethics* he takes up a question that can be read as the one the *Gorgias* raised: wish is for the end, and some say for the good, others for the apparent good; he answers that what is wished, simply and in truth, is the good, but for each man what appears good to him, and for the good man what is truly so.[46] The Stoics, according to Diogenes Laertius, counted wish among the three good states of feeling and set it against appetite, as a desire that accords with reason.[47] In the procession of 167e desire and wish stand side by side, and can be read as the pair the later schools set apart.

[45] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.10, 1369a2–4.

[46] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.4, 1113a15–b2.

[47] Diogenes Laertius 7.116.

Translation in this edition

"Wish" for βούλησις (167e4) and "wishes" for the plural βουλήσεις (167e5), with "wishes for" for the verb βούλεται, so that, as in the Greek, the wish wishes (see βούλομαι). B has ἀγαθῶν, "of good things", for ἀγαθόν at 167e4 (apparatus, e4), with no change of sense.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; βλαβερός; βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; βούλομαι; ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἔρως; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων · a wish for itself and for the other wishes

The wish that wishes only wishing · Charmides

αὐτὴν δὲ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας βουλήσεις βούλεται, *hautēn de kai tas allas boulēseis bouletai*, "but wishes for itself and for the other wishes"

At a Glance

The word. The headword states in the genitive, "a wish of itself and of the other wishes", what Plato says with a verb and its objects: a wish that "wishes for itself and for the other wishes".

In the *Charmides*. "Nor, I imagine, a wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes." "Of course not" (167e).

In this edition. "Wishes for itself and for the other wishes".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

The phrase is one of a series built on Critias' definition of temperance as a knowledge "of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). Each member takes a power, removes its proper object, and gives it instead itself and its fellows: a sight of sights, a desire of desires, a love of loves (see ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). In the wish the removed object is the good.

Use in the book

The wish stands at the centre of the procession, after desire and before love (167e), and the procession as a whole is told under αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς. What the wish adds is the plainest case of emptiness. A sight that saw no colour would at least be a sight; a wish that wished nothing good, on the assumption that wish is of the good (see βούλησις), would not be a wish at all. Critias answers at once: "Of course not."

The principle Socrates states a little later explains why. Whatever "has its own power in relation to itself" must "also have the character toward which its power was directed": a hearing that hears itself must have a sound (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Socrates does not apply the principle to the wish; applied, it would require a wish that wished itself to be itself a good. The dialogue's knowledge of knowledge, on the same principle, would have to be itself a subject of learning, and it was defined at 168a as "knowledge of no subject of learning" (see μάθημα). The case of the wish can be read as showing in small what the dialogue's whole argument shows: a power is made what it is by what it is for.

Places to read

The passage in which the wish is named, within the procession.
167e No wish which wishes for no good, but for itself and for the other wishes.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Lysis* follows a chain of things wanted for the sake of others to its end. Medicine is dear for the sake of health, and health for the sake of something dear; must we not either give up or arrive at a first principle that refers to no further dear thing, the first dear, for whose sake all the others are dear and of which they are like images (219c–d)? A wish that wished only wishes would be a chain with no first link.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle puts the same point at the head of his *Ethics*: if there is an end of action that we wish for its own sake, and the rest for its sake, and not everything is chosen for the sake of another thing, since otherwise the series runs on without end and our reaching after anything is hollow and pointless, that end will be the good.[48] The wish of 167e, which wishes only other wishes, can be read as a reaching of the kind Aristotle calls hollow.

Translation in this edition

"A wish which wishes for no good, but wishes for itself and for the other wishes" (167e4–5). The English adds "for" to mark the objects of the verb, and the sentence is built like its neighbour, "a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires", so that the series can be read across.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; βούλησις; βούλομαι; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; μάθημα; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων.

βούλομαι · wish, want

βούλομαι, *boulomai*, "I want"; βούλῃ, *boulēi*, βούλει, *boulei*, "you are willing", "you please", "you ... want", "you like"; βούλεται, *bouletai*, "wishes for"; βουλόμενος, *boulomenos*, βουλόμενον, *boulomenon*, "wanting", "whoever wants"; βούλωμαι, *boulōmai*, "I want"; βούλοιο, *bouloio*, "you like"

Attested: βούλομαι (*boulomai*; 155b), βούλῃ (*boulēi*; 157c, 163d), βούλει (*boulei*; 158e, 163e, 172c), βουλόμενος (*boulomenos*; 162c), βούλωμαι (*boulōmai*; 165b), βούλεται (*bouletai*; 167e, twice), βουλόμενον (*boulomenon*; 171a), βούλοιο (*bouloio*; 173c). To wish, to want, to will; the verb of considered wanting, beside ἐθέλειν, to be willing. Most uses are the courtesies of conversation: "if you are willing" (157c), "so that you won't be forced to

[48] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2, 1094a18–22.

say what you don't want to" (158e), "assign each word as you please" (163d), "whatever you like to call it" (163e), "if you like" (172c, 173c). Some carry character. Critias sends for the boy with a lie: "Tell him I want to introduce him to a doctor" (155b). Charmides, his definition in trouble, is "wanting not to answer for the definition himself" (162c). Socrates refuses the part Critias gives him: "you are treating me ... as though I will agree with you if only I want to" (165b). At 167e the verb takes its weight from the noun, in the wish that wishes for no good (see βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων). At 163d βούλῃ is W's reading; B has ἂν θέλῃ and T βούλει (apparatus, d5).

See also βούλησις; βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; διαλέγομαι.

βραδέως · slowly

βραδέως, *bradeōs*, "slowly"

Attested: βραδέως (*bradeōs*; 159c, twice; 159e, three times). Slowly. The word is Socrates', not the boy's, and it changes the argument. Charmides said that temperance was doing everything "quietly" (159b; see ἡσυχῇ); Socrates asks: "And reading? Quickly, or slowly?" "Quickly" (159c; see ἀναγιγνώσκω; ταχέως). Lyre-playing and wrestling done "quietly and slowly" are less fine (159c), and so are learning, teaching and recollecting done "quietly and slowly" (159e; see δυσμαθία). From then on "quietly" and "slowly" travel together. The edition's note at 159b observes that "slowly" is "a word Charmides never used", and that on one reading the refutation trades on the shift, while "others reply that the word can cover slowness." At 159d2 Burnet brackets the neuter adjective βραδέα, "slow", on Heindorf's conjecture (apparatus, d2; see αἰσχρός). The position Socrates refutes had an earlier defender: in Thucydides, Archidamus tells the Spartans not to be ashamed of the slowness and delay for which they are most blamed, since it may be, more than anything, a temperance with sense in it (see αἰδώς).[49] In the *Protagoras*, asked to keep pace with Protagoras' long speeches, Socrates

[49] Thucydides 1.84.1.

says that he cannot run with Crison of Himera, the runner, but Crison can run slowly: so Protagoras should shorten his answers (335e–336a; see διαλέγομαι).

See also αἰδώς; αἰσχρός; ἀναγιγνώσκω; βραδυτής; διαλέγομαι; δυσμαθία; ἡσυχῇ; ταχέως.

βραδυτής · slowness

τῆς βραδυτῆτος, *tēs bradytētos*, "slowness"

Attested: βραδυτῆτος (*bradytētos*; 160b). Slowness, the noun of βραδύς. It comes in Socrates' summary of the case against quietness: "So in everything, Charmides ... in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?" "It looks that way" (160b; see ἡσυχιότης; ὀξύτης; τάχος). The noun gathers the adverb of 159c–e (see βραδέως) into a quality and sets it beside the boy's own noun, ἡσυχιότης (159b). The pairing does the work of the refutation: once slowness and quietness are one side of a balance, every quick and sharp thing that is fine counts against the boy's definition.

See also βραδέως; ἡσυχιότης; ὀξύτης; τάχος.

Γ Gamma

γενναῖος · wellborn

γενναῖον, *gennaion*, "wellborn"

Attested: γενναῖον (*gennaion*; 157b). Wellborn, of good stock, from γέννα, "birth"; then noble in spirit, as a man of good birth was expected to be. Socrates reports the Thracian's last instruction: "And he charged me very strictly to let no one be so rich, or so wellborn, or so beautiful, as to persuade me to do otherwise" (157b–c; see ἐντέλλομαι; πείθω). The edition's note at 157c observes that "rich, or wellborn, or beautiful" happens to describe Charmides exactly, and the next pages bear it out: Socrates praises the two houses the boy is sprung from (157e–158a; see γεννάω; πατρῷος), and when the boy answers modestly, the narrator says it "did his breeding credit", οὐκ ἀγεννῶς (158c; see ἀγεννῶς). The family has sounded once before, in the narrator's address to his listener, ὦ γεννάδα, "my noble friend" (155d). The word names one of the advantages that must not persuade Socrates to use the remedy without the charm. Birth is the boy's advantage, and the Thracian's rule puts it, with wealth and beauty, below the treatment of the soul.

See also ἀγεννῶς; γεννάω; ἐντέλλομαι; πατρῷος; πείθω.

γεννάω · produce

γεννήσειαν, *gennēseian*, "would ... produce"

Attested: γεννήσειαν (*gennēseian*; 157e). To beget, to bring forth. Socrates tells the boy that it is only right that he should excel: "For I don't suppose anyone else here could easily point to two houses in Athens whose union would be likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two you are sprung from" (157e; see ἐπιδείκνυμι; οἰκία). The verb is T's reading; a marginal variant in W gives the same words with γενήσειαν, "would come to

be", and B and W in their text have καλλίων ... ἀμείνων γενήσεται, with "come to be" in place of "beget" (apparatus, e4), and in the line before, the participle "coming together", συνελθοῦσαι, is also T's (apparatus, e3). Burnet prints the reading that makes the two houses the parents, and the English follows him with "union" and "offspring". The praise is a pedigree, and the edition's notes at 157e and 158a name its persons: the house of Critias son of Dropides, celebrated by Anacreon and Solon, and Pyrilampes (see πατρῷος). In the *Symposium* Diotima tells Socrates that love is not of the beautiful, as he supposes, but of begetting and giving birth in the beautiful (206e); the *Charmides*' begetting is the ordinary one, of fine children from fine houses, and the dialogue goes on to ask whether the soul it produced is as fine as the body.

See also γενναῖος; ἐπιδείκνυμι; οἰκία; πατρῷος.

γεωμετρική · geometry

τῆς γεωμετρικῆς, *tēs geōmetrikēs*, "geometry"

Attested: γεωμετρικῆς (*geōmetrikēs*; 165e). Geometry, literally "the art of measuring land", the feminine adjective with τέχνη understood. Critias uses it against Socrates' demand for a product: "what work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving ...?" (165e; see δείκνυμι; ἔργον; λογιστική). Socrates grants the point and changes the question, from what a knowledge makes to what it is of: calculation is "of the even and the odd", weighing of the heavier and the lighter (166a–b; see ἄρτιος; στατική). Geometry, which Critias named, is left without an object; Socrates answers only for calculation. The edition's note at 166a compares the *Gorgias*, which counts arithmetic, calculation and geometry among arts that achieve everything through words (450d). In the *Republic* Socrates says that geometers speak very absurdly, as though they were doing something, "squaring" and "applying" and "adding", while the whole study is pursued for the sake of knowing; and Glaucon agrees that geometrical knowledge is of what always

is (527a–b). The *Republic* can be read as giving both men their due: whatever its uses in war (526d), the study is pursued for knowing and not for making, as Critias' point implies, and it has an object, as Socrates' method requires.

See also ἄρτιος; γνῶσις; δείκνυμι; διάνοια; ἔργον; λογιστική; στατική.

γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν · knowing oneself

Critias' last definition of temperance, and what becomes of it · Charmides

τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν, *to gignōskein heauton*, τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν, *to gignōskein auton heauton*, τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν, *to heauton auton gignōskein*, τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὑτόν, *to gignōskein hauton*, "knowing oneself"; ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται, *heauton gnōsetai*, αὑτὸν γνώσεται, *hauton gnōsetai*, "will know himself"; γιγνώσκων ... ἑαυτὸν ... ἔσται, *gignōskōn ... heauton ... estai*, "will be knowing himself"

At a Glance

The word. The infinitive with the article, "the knowing oneself": an act made into a thing that can be defined.

In the *Charmides*. Critias' third definition of temperance (164d), held at 165b, restated by Socrates as "knowing what one knows and what one does not know" (167a), and recalled at 169d–e. Between these points it becomes a knowledge of oneself (165c), and then a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge (166c–e).

In this edition. "Knowing oneself"; "know himself". The Key Words give it an entry of its own.

A place to read. 164c–167a.

Meaning

Γιγνώσκειν is to recognize, to come to know by acquaintance; with a reflexive object, to recognize oneself: who one is, what one is worth, what one can do. The phrase belonged first to the maxim at Delphi (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). Critias makes it a definition of a virtue, and the *Charmides* is the dialogue in which

Plato tests it as one. The edition's Glossary lists it at 164c–165b, 167a and 169d–e.

Use in the book

The definition is born of a refusal. Socrates has shown that a doctor may act beneficially, and so temperately, without knowing it (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). Critias would sooner take back some of his earlier agreements than concede a temperate man who does not know himself (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι), and goes on: "In fact I would almost say that this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself, and I agree with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi" (164d; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). He gives up everything said before and offers to give an account of the new definition "if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself" (165b; see ἀφίημι; διδόναι λόγον).

Socrates does not dispute it. He translates it. "If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn't it?" Critias answers, "It is ... knowledge of oneself" (165c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός). The step from the verb to the noun brings with it the questions asked of every knowledge, what it produces and what it is of (165c–166b), and Critias, to escape them, makes temperance unlike all the others: "this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself" (166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The Key Words describe what has happened: from 166c the argument shifts "from knowledge of oneself (the reflexive of a person, heautou) to knowledge of itself (the reflexive of a knowledge, heautēs)".

Socrates then draws the consequences in the old words. "Then only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not ... And this is being temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: knowing what one knows and what one does not know. Is that what you are saying?" "It is" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξετάζω). Knowing oneself is now knowing one's knowledge. When Socrates asks how knowledge of knowledge can give that, he recalls the phrase a last time: "this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself and being temperate is"

(169d), and Critias answers that whoever has a knowledge which knows itself "will be knowing himself" (169e; see *αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει*). Socrates grants it. What he denies is the next step, and the argument of 170a–d shows that knowledge of knowledge would let a man know only that he knows, not what (see *γιγνώσκω*).

After 169e the phrase does not return. The definition was never refuted in its own terms; it was restated three times, each time with Critias' consent, and the last restatement failed. The Key Words judge that "the difference between a man knowing himself and a knowledge knowing itself is one the dialogue never quite resolves." The dialogue can be read as showing elsewhere what it does not define. Socrates examines his own words "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166d), and the boy, asked at the end whether he has temperance, says that he does not know (176a; see *οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω*). Neither man claims to know himself; both do what the definition describes.

Places to read

Every passage in which knowing oneself is named, defined or restated; the doctor who "does not know himself" (164b–c) is under *ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ*, and the maxim "Know thyself" (164e–165a) under *Γνῶθι σαυτόν*.

164d Critias: temperance is knowing oneself, and he agrees with the dedicator of the inscription at Delphi.

165b Critias gives up his earlier positions and offers an account, if Socrates does not agree that temperance is knowing oneself.

165c If temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge of something: of oneself, says Critias.

167a Only the temperate man will know himself; knowing oneself is knowing what one knows and what one does not know.

169d Socrates recalls that this is what they said knowing oneself and being temperate is.

169e Critias: whoever has knowledge that is knowledge of itself will know himself; Socrates grants it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades* asks the question the *Charmides* passes over, what the self is that one is to know. Socrates asks whether knowing oneself is easy, and the man who set it up in the temple at Pytho, the old name of Delphi, a simpleton, or whether it is hard and not for everyone; Alcibiades answers that it has often seemed to him the one and often the other (129a). The argument identifies the self with the soul, which uses the body: Socrates is talking not to Alcibiades' face but to Alcibiades, and so "the one who bids us know ourselves bids us know the soul" (130e). The doctor and the craftsmen, who know the things of the body, do not know themselves (131a–b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ); and the soul knows itself best by looking at what is most divine in it, where knowing and wisdom are (133c).

In the *Timaeus* the speaker cites an old saying that joins two of the *Charmides*' definitions: "it has long been well said that to do and to know one's own affairs and oneself belongs to the temperate man alone" (72a; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). What Critias offered one after the other appears here as a single description.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates gives the phrase a practical sense. He asks the handsome young Euthydemus, who had collected the writings of the poets and sophists and thought himself wiser than his contemporaries, whether he has been to Delphi and noticed "Know thyself" written on the temple; Euthydemus says he has, and that he thought he knew himself already. Socrates asks whether a man knows himself who knows only his own name, or whether, as buyers of horses do not think they know a horse until they have looked into whether it is obedient or stubborn, strong or weak, fast or slow, he must examine what he is good for in human use and so know his own power; Euthydemus agrees that a man who does not know his own power does not know himself.[50] The conversation goes on to the benefits of such knowledge (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Xenophon's word for what one

[50] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.1 (Euthydemus) and 4.2.24–25.

knows in knowing oneself, δύναμις, "power", is the *Charmides*' word for what a knowledge has in relation to its object (168b; see δύναμις).

Translation in this edition

The four articular infinitives, τὸ γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν (164d4), τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν (165b4), τὸ ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν (167a6) and τὸ γιγνώσκειν αὐτόν (169d7), are all "knowing oneself", though the reflexive varies; at 167a6 αὐτόν is from later manuscripts, and B, T and W have αὐτό (apparatus, a6). The future ἑαυτὸν γνώσεται (167a1) and αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται (169e7) are "will know himself", and γιγνώσκων ... αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ... ἔσται (169e4–5) is "will be knowing himself". The English keeps the person's "oneself" apart from the knowledge's "itself", as the Key Words point out, so that the reader can see where the argument passes from one to the other.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; ἀφίημι; γιγνώσκω; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον; δύναμις; ἐξετάζω; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

γιγνώσκω · know

The verb of recognizing, and the limit of a knowledge that knows only knowledge · Charmides

γνῶναι, *gnōnai*, "to know"; γιγνώσκειν, *gignōskein*, "know", "knowing"; γιγνώσκει, *gignōskei*, "knows"; γιγνώσκων, *gignōskōn*, "knowing"; γιγνῶσκον, *gignōskon*, "what knows"; γιγνώσκοι, *gignōskoi*, "would know"; γιγνώσκῃ, *gignōskēi*, "knows"; γνώσεται, *gnōsetai*, "will know"

At a Glance

The word. Γιγνώσκω, to come to know, to recognize, to discern; in the aorist and perfect, to know.

In the *Charmides*. Twenty-five times, from the riddle of "doing one's own business" (162b) to the end of the argument (175b). Its weight falls on

knowing oneself (164c–169e) and on the limit drawn at 170b–d: knowledge of knowledge would let a man know "that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know" (170d).

In this edition. "Know", the word the Glossary keeps for εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι alike.

A place to read. 170b–d.

Meaning

Greek has three common verbs of knowing, and the dialogue uses all three. Γιγνώσκειν is the act of recognizing or discerning, knowledge by acquaintance with a person or a thing; εἰδέναι is knowing as a settled state, often knowing that; ἐπίστασθαι is knowing how, the knowledge of the expert, whose noun is ἐπιστήμη. Γιγνώσκω gives the family of γνῶσις, "knowledge", and γνώριμος, "known", and from the same root ἀγνοεῖν, "not to know", and with a prefix διαγιγνώσκειν, "to tell apart".

Use in the book

The verb first names a difficulty: the man who said that temperance is doing one's own business put it forward as a riddle, "on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one's own business is" (162b; see αἴνιγμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). It then names what the doctor may lack: "must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not?" (164b). From 164c to 169e it carries knowing oneself, and that use is told under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν. At 169e Critias builds his principle on it: whoever has knowledge, γνῶσις, is knowing, γιγνώσκων (see γνῶσις).

Its sharpest work is at 170b–d. A man who knows only knowledge, Socrates argues, "would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge, both about himself and about others" (170b). "But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows? For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance, and so on for everything" (170b–c; see ἁρμονικός; οἰκοδομική). Each thing is recognized by the knowledge whose object it is, and a

knowledge whose object is knowledge recognizes only that there is knowledge. So the temperate examiner "will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know" (170d), and "that the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know" (171a), but not whether he is a doctor. The argument has turned Critias' definition into a knowledge of "that" without "what" (see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν). At the end Socrates lists among the concessions that should never have been made "that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either" (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the simple verb occurs outside knowing oneself and the maxim, which are listed under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν and Γνῶθι σαυτόν.

162b The formula was put forward as a riddle, since it is hard to know what doing one's own business is.

164b Must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not?

164c The doctor who has acted beneficially or harmfully does not know himself, how he has acted (see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

165c If temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge of something.

169e Whoever has knowledge is knowing, as whoever has speed is fast.

170b Whoever knows only knowledge would know that he knows something; but how will he know what it is he knows?

170c He knows the healthy by medicine, not by temperance; by temperance, how will he know that he knows the healthy?

170d Temperance will let him know only that a man has some knowledge, not of what.

171a That the doctor has some knowledge, the temperate man will know.

175b–c They conceded that by knowledge of knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates puts the principle of 165c to the lover of sights. He asks, through Glaucon, whether the one who knows knows something or

nothing; "something," Glaucon answers for him, and something that is, "for how could what is not be known?" What fully is, is fully knowable, and what in no way is, is altogether unknowable (476e–477a). The *Charmides*' "knowledge of something" is the first step of that argument, and the note at 168b observes that the *Republic* later makes explicit the principle that a power is defined by what it is set over (477c–d; see δύναμις).

Translation in this edition

The Glossary renders εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι all by "know", "so that the formula 'knowing what one knows and what one does not know' keeps the same verb wherever it recurs". The policy hides a change of verb at the key place: in "But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows?" (170b12) the first "know" is εἴσεται and the second γιγνώσκει; and at 170d7–9 "He will know" is γνώσεται and "make him know" renders ποιήσει ... γιγνώσκειν. At 165c4 γιγνώσκειν is the reading of T and b, B having γιγνώσκει (apparatus, c4); at 170b7 Burnet prints γιγνώσκῃ from later manuscripts for γιγνώσκει in B, T and W (apparatus, b7).

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀγνοέω; αἴνιγμα; αἰνίττομαι; ἁρμονικός; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γνῶσις; διαγιγνώσκω; δύναμις; ἐπίσταμαι; οἶδα; οἰκοδομική; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

Γνῶθι σαυτόν · Know thyself

The maxim at Delphi, read by Critias as the god's greeting · Charmides

τὸ Γνῶθι σαυτόν, *to Gnōthi sauton*, "'Know thyself'"

At a Glance

The word. The maxim inscribed at the temple of Apollo at Delphi: γνῶθι, the aorist imperative of γιγνώσκω, with σαυτόν, the contracted form of σεαυτόν, "yourself".

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in Critias' reading of the inscription: "'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same, as the inscription says and as I say"; and those who set up the later inscriptions "thought 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter" (164e–165a).

In this edition. "Know thyself", the traditional English form.

A place to read. 164d–165b.

Meaning

The maxim stood at Delphi with "Nothing too much" and others, and Plato and later writers attributed it to the Seven Sages (*Protagoras* 343a–b; see ἀνατίθημι). Later writers gave it to one or another of them. Philosophy took the words as a command to examine oneself, and the *Charmides* shows a man trying to make the command a definition.

Use in the book

Critias introduces the inscription to support his new definition (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν), and his reading of it has three parts. The inscription is a greeting, not a piece of advice: "it seems to me that the inscription was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of 'Rejoice!', on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one, and that we ought not to urge this on one another, but 'Be temperate.' That is how the god addresses those who enter his temple, differently from men" (164d–e; see ἀνάκειμαι; πρόσρησις; χαίρω). The greeting means "Be temperate", but is riddling: the god says it "as a prophet would, rather riddlingly. For 'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same, as the inscription says and as I say; but one might think them different" (164e–165a; see αἰνιγματώδης; μάντις; Σωφρόνει). And the later dedicators misread it, taking it for advice and setting up advice of their own, "Nothing too much" and "Pledge, and ruin is near" (165a; see ἀνατίθημι; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν). The edition's note at 164e calls the reading Critias' "conceit ... that the god, greeting his visitors, corrects our manners".

The reading does more than decorate a definition. It turns a maxim into an identity, "Know thyself" equals "Be temperate", so that temperance

equals knowing oneself; and it gives the identity the god's authority while claiming to see through the god's riddle. The edition's note at 165a hears an echo: Socrates had three times called "doing one's own business" a riddle (161c–162b), "and now Critias makes riddling the god's own style." A man who reads riddles is claiming to know, and Socrates answers by declining that claim for himself: "you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask ... I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know" (165b–c). He does not dispute the reading of the inscription. He asks what temperance, as a knowledge, is of, and what it produces (165c–e), and Delphi does not come up again. The maxim, introduced as the god's word, leaves the dialogue as an unexamined premise, and the definition built on it fails without the reading ever being tested.

Places to read

The passage in which the inscription is introduced, Critias' reading of it as the god's greeting, and both passages in which the maxim is quoted.

164d Critias agrees with the one who dedicated the inscription at Delphi.

164d–e The inscription is the god's greeting in place of "Rejoice!": "Be temperate."

164e–165a The god speaks riddlingly; "Know thyself" and "Be temperate" are the same.

165a The later dedicators took "Know thyself" for advice, and set up advice of their own.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedrus*, asked whether he believes the story that the North Wind carried off the girl Oreithyia from the banks of the Ilissus, near where they are walking, Socrates says that he has no leisure for explaining away such tales. He is not yet able, "according to the Delphic inscription", to know himself, and it seems absurd to him, while still ignorant of that, to look into what does not concern him; so he examines not the monsters of myth but himself, whether he is a beast more intricate and more puffed up than the monster Typhon, or a gentler and simpler animal that has by nature some

divine portion, one without Typhon's swelling (229e–230a). There the maxim is advice, followed literally.

In the *First Alcibiades* Socrates urges the young man, "trust me and the inscription at Delphi: know yourself", by which he means that his real rivals are the kings of Sparta and Persia, not the Athenian politicians he has in mind (124a–b); the dialogue then asks what the self is (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The *Philebus* makes the opposite of the inscription the root of the ridiculous (48c–d; see ἀγνοέω). In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger imagines the lawgiver telling men about to die, who want to leave their property as they please, that it is hard for them to know their own possessions and themselves, "as the Pythia's inscription says" (923a), the Pythia being Apollo's prophetess at Delphi.

Other ancient sources

Diogenes Laertius gives "Know thyself" to Thales of Miletus, one of the Seven Sages, and adds that Antisthenes, the historian of the philosophers' *Successions* (not Socrates' pupil of that name), said it was Phemonoe's and that Chilon took it over as his own.[51] Pausanias records that the most widespread opinion about Phemonoe was that she was the god's first prophetess and the first to sing in hexameters.[52] Xenophon's Socrates asks a young man whether he has noticed the inscription on the temple, and turns it into an examination of one's powers (*Memorabilia* 4.2.24–25; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

Plutarch of Chaeronea, the Platonist of about AD 100 who held a priesthood at Delphi, wrote a dialogue on the letter E dedicated in the temple. In it his teacher Ammonius says that the inscriptions "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much" have stirred many philosophical inquiries, a crop of arguments springing from each as from a seed.[53] Later in the dialogue Ammonius reads the maxim as Critias does: the god, as though greeting each of us as we approach, addresses us with "Know thyself", which is no less a

[51] Diogenes Laertius 1.40.
[52] Pausanias 10.5.7.
[53] Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi* 385d.

greeting than "Rejoice", and we answer him with the E, "Thou art", the only address fitting a god who truly is.[54] The maxim, he adds, is in a way opposed to the E and in a way in harmony with it: one is spoken in awe to the god as always being, the other reminds the mortal of his nature and his weakness.[55] Plutarch knew his Plato, and the greeting can be read as Critias' conceit taken up by a priest of the god and turned to the god's honour.

Plotinus says that "Know thyself" is spoken to beings that are many, whose work is to reckon themselves over and learn how many things they are and of what kinds; what was simply one would be sufficient to itself and would not need it.[56]

Translation in this edition

"Know thyself" keeps the familiar English form, and the archaism sets it apart from the plain imperative "Be temperate" for Σωφρόνει (164e6), where Stobaeus, who quotes the passage, has the infinitive σωφρονεῖν (apparatus, e6). The maxim is quoted at 164e7 and 165a4–5. At 165a5 Burnet brackets ἕνεκεν, which Heindorf doubted and Cobet deleted, in the phrase "the god's greeting to those who enter" (apparatus, a5). "As the inscription says" renders ὡς τὰ γράμματά φησιν, literally "as the letters say" (see γράμμα).

See also

ἀγνοέω; αἰνιγματώδης; ἀνάκειμαι; ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γράμμα; Δελφοί; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; μάντις; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; πρόσρησις; Σωφρόνει; χαίρω.

γνώριμος · known, people one knows

γνωρίμους, *gnōrimous*, "people I knew"; τῶν γνωρίμων, *tōn gnōrimōn*, "people we know"

Attested: γνωρίμους (*gnōrimous*; 153a), γνωρίμων (*gnōrimōn*; 153c). Known, familiar; as a noun, an acquaintance. The word frames the

[54] Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi* 392a.
[55] Plutarch, *On the E at Delphi* 394c.
[56] Plotinus, *Enneads* 6.7.41.

homecoming. Socrates enters the wrestling-school and finds a great crowd, "some of them strangers to me but most of them people I knew" (153a–b; see ἀγνώς); a moment later Chaerephon reports the rumour from Potidaea, "that the fighting was very heavy, and that many people we know were killed in it" (153b–c; see Χαιρεφῶν). The same word marks the living who greet him and the dead he has come from. Xenophon uses it of Chaerephon himself, who with his brother Chaerecrates was among Socrates' acquaintances.[57]

See also ἀγνώς; διὰ χρόνου; στρατόπεδον; Χαιρεφῶν.

γνῶσις · knowledge

γνῶσιν, *gnōsin*, "knowledge"

Attested: γνῶσιν (*gnōsin*; 169e, twice). Knowledge, cognition, the act or the possession of knowing; the noun of γιγνώσκω. Critias opens his principle at 169e with ἐπιστήμη and switches to γνῶσις in the examples that support it: whoever has knowledge is "knowing", and whoever has "knowledge that is knowledge of itself" will be "knowing himself" (169e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; ταχύς). The edition's note at 169e points out that the examples are "pairs that share a root": speed and fast, beauty and beautiful, knowledge and knowing, γνῶσις and γιγνώσκων. With γνῶσις the last pair ends in γιγνώσκων, the verb of the definition, and the principle can be read as carrying Critias from having a knowledge to "knowing himself" by grammar alone. The Glossary records that "knowledge" renders γνῶσις twice, at 169e. In the *Republic* Glaucon agrees that geometrical knowledge, ἡ γεωμετρικὴ γνῶσις, is of what always is (527b; see γεωμετρική).

See also αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γεωμετρική; γιγνώσκω; ἐπιστήμη; ταχύς.

[57] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.3.1.

γράμμα · letter, inscription

γράμματα, *grammata*, "the letters", "the inscription", "inscriptions"; γράμμα, *gramma*, "the inscription"

Attested: γράμματα (*grammata*; 159c, 165a, twice), γράμμα (*gramma*; 164d, twice). A thing written: a letter of the alphabet; in the plural, writing, a text, an inscription. The dialogue uses it in its two places of learning. In the schoolroom Socrates asks "which is finest at the writing-master's: to copy out the letters quickly, or quietly?" (159c; see γραμματιστής; γράφω). At Delphi Critias agrees "with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect" and says that "the inscription was set up as the god's greeting" (164d; see ἀνάκειμαι; ἀνατίθημι), that "'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same, as the inscription says and as I say", and that "those who dedicated the later inscriptions" took it for advice (165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). At 165a1 the plural, τὰ γράμματα, literally "the letters", stands for the one inscription, and the English renders it "the inscription". Most of Plato's other references to the maxim use the same word: "the Delphic inscription" in the *Phaedrus* (229e), "the inscription at Delphi" in the *First Alcibiades* (124a, 132c) and the *Philebus* (48c), "the Pythia's inscription" in the *Laws* (923a).

See also ἀνάκειμαι; ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γραμματιστής; γράφω; Δελφοί.

γραμματιστής · writing-master

ἐν γραμματιστοῦ, *en grammatistou*, "at the writing-master's"; τὸν γραμματιστήν, *ton grammatistēn*, ὁ γραμματιστής, *ho grammatistēs*, "the writing-master"

Attested: γραμματιστοῦ (*grammatistou*; 159c, 160a), γραμματιστήν (*grammatistēn*; 161d), γραμματιστής (*grammatistēs*; 161d). The teacher of letters, who taught boys to read and write; ἐν γραμματιστοῦ, "at the writing-master's", leaves his school to be understood. The edition's note at 159c explains that he taught boys their letters, "tracing them for beginners to write over (Protagoras 326d)", and that with the lyre-master and the wrestling-trainer he made up an Athenian boy's schooling, so that "Socrates' examples march Charmides back through his own lessons." He serves two arguments.

Against quietness: to copy out the letters quickly is finer than quietly (159c), and understanding what is said, "at the writing-master's and the lyre-master's and everywhere else", is finest when quickest (160a). Against "doing one's own business": "do you think the writing-master does nothing when he writes or reads?" and does he write and read, or teach you boys, "only his own name? Or did you write your enemies' names just as much as your own and your friends'?" (161d; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The schoolmaster's plainest task, teaching boys to write any name at all, is enough to make the formula absurd.

See also ἀναγιγνώσκω; γράμμα; γράφω; κιθαρίζω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

γράφω · write

γράφειν, *graphein*, "to copy out", "writes", "writing"; γράφῃ, *graphēi*, "writes"; ἐγράφετε, *egraphete*, "did you write"; γράψαντες, *grapsantes*, "they wrote ... up"

Attested: γράφειν (*graphein*; 159c, 161d, 161e), γράφῃ (*graphēi*; 161d), ἐγράφετε (*egraphete*; 161d), γράψαντες (*grapsantes*; 165a). To scratch, to draw, to write. The verb runs from the schoolroom to the temple. In the argument against quietness the boy is asked whether it is finer "to copy out the letters quickly, or quietly" (159c; see γράμμα). In the argument against doing one's own business it is the proof that writing is doing something: the writing-master does not write only his own name, the boys wrote their enemies' names as much as their own, "And yet you were not doing your own business, if writing and reading are doing something" (161d–e; see γραμματιστής; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). At Delphi the later dedicators, mistaking the god's greeting for advice, "wrote these up and dedicated them" (165a; see ἀνατίθημι). The edition's note at 161e observes that the argument plays on "do": a boy who writes his enemy's name is, on Socrates' reading, doing his enemy's business. Aristotle takes writing as his example of a knowledge so exact and self-sufficient that no one deliberates about it, since no one

hesitates over how a word is to be written (see βουλεύομαι).[58] The compound ἀπογράφω, to copy down, is used once (156a; see ἀπογράφω).

See also ἀνατίθημι; ἀπογράφω; βουλεύομαι; γράμμα; γραμματιστής; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

[58] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, 1112b1–2.

Δ Delta

δεῖ · must, has to

δεῖ, *dei*, "must", "has to", "needs", "is far from"; δεῖν, *dein*, "must", "ought"; δέοι, *deoi*, "ought"; ἔδει, *edei*, "would have ... need"; δέον, *deon*, "has to"

Attested: δεῖ (*dei*; 156e, 160b, 166c, 169a), δέοι (*deoi*; 156e), δεῖν (*dein*; 157a, 164e), ἔδει (*edei*; 158b), δέον (*deon*; 171a). It is needful, one must; with a genitive, there is need of; πολλοῦ δεῖ, "it is far from". The verb carries the necessities of the doctors' principle: "one must not try to cure the eyes without the head" (156e), they neglect the whole, "which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e), "it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost" (157a). It carries Critias' god: "we ought not to urge this on one another" (164e; see χαίρω). At 160b it carries a premise: the temperate life would not be quiet, "since, being temperate, it has to be fine" (160b; see βίος; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). Everything in the refutation of quietness hangs on that "has to", granted at 159c. Other uses are need, "you would have no further need of charms" (158b), and reproach, "this is far from having escaped you" (166c). At 169a the need is for a man: "It needs a great man" to settle which things can have their power in relation to themselves (169a; see διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ). At 171a δέον, "when he has to test", is Goldbacher's conjecture; B has δεῖ δή and T δὲ δή (apparatus, a4). The participle in τὰ δέοντα, "what he ought" (164b), has its own entry.

See also βίος; διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; τὰ δέοντα; χαίρω.

δείκνυμι · point to, point out

δεῖξαι, *deixai*, "point to", "point out"

Attested: δεῖξαι (*deixai*; 166a, three times). To show, to point out. The simple verb comes three times in a few lines, at the turn of the argument

about what temperance produces. Critias challenges Socrates to name the work of calculation or geometry, as a house is the work of house-building, among "the many other works of the kind that one could point to for many crafts? Can you, for your part, point me to any such work of these? No, you can't" (165e–166a; see γεωμετρική; ἔργον). Socrates grants it and changes what is to be shown: "That's true. But I can point out to you what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of, which is something distinct from the knowledge itself" (166a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The verb moves from a product one can point to, a house or a cloak, to an object one can only point out, the odd and the even. The dialogue uses the compounds more often: ἐπιδείκνυμι, to show off or display (155a, 157e, 158d), and ἐνδείκνυμι, to show or make out (156b, 162d, 169b), have their own entries.

See also γεωμετρική; ἐνδείκνυμι; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἔργον.

δεινός · dreadful, terrible

τῶν δεινῶν, *tōn deinōn*, "the things that are dreadful"; δεινά, *deina*, "something terrible"

Attested: δεινῶν (*deinōn*; 168a), δεινά (*deina*; 176b). Fearful, dreadful, terrible; also, of a man, terribly able, clever. In the procession of reflexive powers the dreadful is the object of fear: "And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?" "I haven't come across one" (168a; see φοβέομαι; φόβος). At the end it is the boy's word for disobedience: "I'd be doing something terrible if I didn't obey you, my guardian, and didn't do what you order" (176b–c; see βιάζομαι; ἐπίτροπος). The first use asks what fear is of; the second shows what the boy fears. In the *Protagoras* Socrates complains that Prodicus scolds him whenever he praises Protagoras as wise and δεινός: is he not ashamed, Prodicus asks, to call good things δεινά, when no one speaks of dreadful wealth or dreadful health, but of dreadful disease, war and poverty (341a–b; see Πρόδικος)? In the *Laches* Nicias defines courage as "the knowledge of the dreadful and the confident" in war and in everything else,

and Laches, his fellow general, exclaims how strange that is (194e–195a; see ἄτοπος): the knowledge of the dreadful, which the *Laches* tries as courage, can be read as what a fear of no dreadful thing would lack.

See also ἄτοπος; βιάζομαι; ἐπίτροπος; Πρόδικος; φοβέομαι; φόβος.

Δελφοί · Delphi

ἐν Δελφοῖς, *en Delphois*, "at Delphi"

Attested: Δελφοῖς (*Delphois*; 164d). Delphi, the seat of Apollo's oracle on the slopes of Mount Parnassus, where the maxims of the sages were inscribed at the temple. Critias names it as the place of his authority: temperance is knowing oneself, "and I agree with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi" (164d; see ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γράμμα). The dialogue's other link with Delphi comes in its first lines: Chaerephon, who runs to greet Socrates (153b), is the man who, the edition's note at 153b recalls, "asked the Delphic oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates" (*Apology* 21a; see Χαιρεφῶν). The *Apology*'s oracle sent Socrates to examine men who thought they knew; the *Charmides*' inscription is used by Critias to define temperance as knowing oneself. Plato names the place also as Pytho, in the *First Alcibiades*, where the maxim stands "in the temple at Pytho" (129a), and its prophetess as the Pythia, in the *Laws* (923a).

See also ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; γράμμα; Χαιρεφῶν.

δέομαι · need

δέῃ, *deēi*, "have ... need"; δεῖσθαι, *deisthai*, "need"

Attested: δέῃ (*deēi*; 176a), δεῖσθαι (*deisthai*; 176b). To lack, to be in want of, with a genitive of what is lacked; to need. The two uses are a challenge and its answer. Socrates, having declared himself "a poor inquirer", tells the boy: "So see whether you have it and have no need of the charm" (176a; see ἐπῳδή). The condition repeats the logic of the opening, that if temperance is present, "you would have no further need of charms" (158b; see δεῖ). The

boy answers: “I’m not altogether persuaded by you, though, Socrates, and I think I very much need the charm. As far as I’m concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it’s enough” (176b; see ἐπᾴδω; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; πείθω). He does not know whether he has temperance (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω), and from not knowing he concludes need. The conclusion can be read as the most temperate thing said in the dialogue.

See also δεῖ; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπῳδή; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω; πείθω.

δηλόω · make clear

δήλου, *dēlou*, “make clear”

Attested: δήλου (*dēlou*; 163d), the present imperative. To make visible, to show, to make plain; from δῆλος, “clear”. Socrates answers Critias’ Prodicean distinctions between making, doing and working: he recognizes Prodicus’ habit of distinguishing words (163d; see διαιρέω; Πρόδικος), and lets it pass: “Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to. So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly” (163d; see ὁρίζω; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; φέρειν τοὔνομα). The rule is Socrates’ indifference to words when the thing is clear: let Critias name as he likes, so long as the name is shown to fit something. The adjective δῆλος marks the dialogue’s other claims to clarity: “it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it” (158e–159a), “then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge” (165c), and, against Critias’ hopes, “it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good” (172e–173a).

See also διαιρέω; ὁρίζω; Πρόδικος; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; φέρειν τοὔνομα.

δημιουργός · craftsman

The craftsman as the measure of knowledge, from the cobbler to the maker of health · Charmides

δημιουργούς, *dēmiourgous*, "craftsmen"; τῶν δημιουργῶν, *tōn dēmiourgōn*, "the craftsmen"; οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί, *hoi alloi dēmiourgoi*, "the other craftsmen"; ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς, *alēthinois dēmiourgois*, "genuine craftsmen"; δημιουργός, *dēmiourgos*, "the craftsman"

At a Glance

The word. Δημιουργός, "one who works for the people": the craftsman, the artisan, whose skill serves others; in Plato also the maker of the cosmos.

In the *Charmides*. Seven times: the craftsmen who make other people's things (162e–164b), the fellow craftsman who alone can judge a craftsman (171c), the "genuine craftsmen" of the dream (173c), and temperance as "the craftsman of health" and "the craftsman of no benefit" (174e–175a).

In this edition. "Craftsman" throughout.

A place to read. 162e–164b, with 174e–175a.

Meaning

The word joins δήμιος, "of the people", with the root of ἔργον, "work". In Homer the δημιοεργοί are the men who are sent for from elsewhere because their skill is wanted: Eumaeus names the seer, the healer of ills, the carpenter and the inspired singer.[59] Two of Eumaeus' four, the healer and the seer, are among the *Charmides*' examples of knowledge (173b–174a). In classical Athens it was the ordinary word for the artisan who worked for others, and the edition's note at 163b finds Critias' list of trades, the cobbler, the salt-fish seller and the prostitute, seemingly chosen "to shock", and the choice "an aristocrat's". Socrates made him the model of knowledge: a craftsman knows a definite thing and produces a definite work, and can say what it is.

Use in the book

[59] Homer, *Odyssey* 17.382–385.

The craftsmen enter with Critias. Socrates asks whether he agrees "that all craftsmen make something?" "I do." "And do you think they make only their own things, or other people's as well?" "Other people's as well." "Then are they temperate, even though they don't make only their own things?" "What's to stop them?" (162e–163a; see κωλύω; ποιέω). The craftsman who makes other people's shoes and houses refutes "doing one's own business" if making is doing, and Critias escapes by separating the two (163b–c; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). The craftsmen return at 164a–b, now to separate knowledge from benefit: a doctor makes his patient healthy, but "must each of the craftsmen know when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not?" "Perhaps not" (164b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). A craftsman knows his craft without knowing whether its exercise does good.

In the second half the craftsman is the judge of his kind. Knowledge of knowledge cannot tell a real doctor from a pretender, "nor anyone else who knows anything at all, except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can" (171c; see διακρίνω; ὁμότεχνος). Only a doctor can examine a doctor. In Socrates' dream, temperance ruling would give us goods expertly made "because we would be using genuine craftsmen" (173c; see ἀληθινός). And at the end the word is turned on temperance itself. If it is knowledge only of knowledge, it will not make us healthy: "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?" "Certainly not" (174e; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). Nor of benefit: "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The word measures the definition. Socrates asked of temperance what is asked of any craft, what it produces and what it is of (165c–166a); Critias answered that it is unlike all the others (166b–c). The last two uses can be read as the verdict on that answer: a knowledge that rules the crafts without sharing their objects is a craftsman of nothing. The edition's note at 173d observes that Socrates' lowly examples, cutting leather, working bronze, wool, are "his trademark", and that Critias, "who at 163b put cobblers beside prostitutes, is not amused."

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

162e Critias agrees that all craftsmen make something, other people's things as well as their own.

164a Nothing stops craftsmen from being temperate even when they make other people's things.

164b Must each craftsman know when he will profit from his work? Perhaps not.

171c Knowledge of knowledge cannot tell the expert from the pretender, except in the temperate man's own craft, as the other craftsmen can.

173c In the dream our goods would be expertly made, because we would use genuine craftsmen.

174e Temperance, knowledge only of knowledge, will not be the craftsman of health.

175a How will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* the craftsmen are the last of the classes Socrates examined after the oracle. He knew that he would find them knowing many fine things, and they did know what he did not; but the good craftsmen had the same fault as the poets: because each practised his craft well, he thought himself wisest in the other things too, the greatest ones (22c–d). The *Charmides*' craftsman who does not know whether his work benefits (164b) can be read as the same figure seen from the side of his limits.

In the *Gorgias* Socrates sums up Gorgias' claim for his art: rhetoric is "a craftsman of persuasion" (453a), the pattern of the phrase that ends the *Charmides*, a craftsman named by what he produces (see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). In the *Timaeus* the same word names the maker of the world: the craftsman who looks to what is always the same and uses it as his model makes his work beautiful, and the one who made and fathered this whole is a labour to discover, and, once discovered, cannot be told to everyone (28a–c). The *First Alcibiades* adds that farmers and the other craftsmen are far from knowing themselves (131a; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports the craftsmen in Critias' own mouth. When Critias, as one of the Thirty, and his colleague Charicles had forbidden Socrates to converse with the young (see διαλέγομαι), Critias added: "you will have to keep away from those cobblers and builders and smiths; for I think they are worn out already from being talked about by you." Socrates asked whether he must also keep away from what follows from them, the just and the holy and the rest; "Yes, by Zeus," said Charicles, "and from the cowherds too", a threat, for while the Thirty were putting many citizens to death Socrates had said that it would be strange if a herdsman who made his cattle fewer and worse did not admit he was a bad herdsman, and stranger still if a leader of a city who did the same to its citizens felt no shame; the remark had been reported to Critias and Charicles, and angered them.[60] The examples that Critias bears with in the *Charmides* he forbids in Xenophon.

Translation in this edition

"Craftsman" at all seven places, and "fellow craftsman" for ὁμότεχνος at 171c8. The Glossary lists δημιουργός at 162e, 164a–b, 171c and 173c, and the phrases "the craftsman of health", "of no benefit", at 174e–175a. At 173c2 B has the singular, ἀληθινὸν δημιουργόν, and Burnet prints the plural (see ἀληθινός). The English keeps "craft" for τέχνη and "craftsman" for δημιουργός, so that the reader can see when the argument speaks of the art and when of the man.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀληθινός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; διακρίνω; διαλέγομαι; κωλύω; ὁμότεχνος; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; ποιέω; σκυτῶν τομή; τέχνη.

[60] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.32 (the herdsman) and 1.2.37–38.

δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας · craftsman of health

Whether a knowledge of knowledge can produce health · Charmides

ὑγιείας ... δημιουργός, *hygieias ... dēmiourgos*, "the craftsman of health"

At a Glance

The word. A craftsman named by what he produces, with the product in the genitive: the maker of health.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?" "Certainly not" (174e). The question denies to temperance the work of medicine, and the next lines deny it benefit (175a).

In this edition. "The craftsman of health".

A place to read. 174d–175a, with 157a and 165c–d.

Meaning

The edition keeps two words apart: health, ὑγίεια, is the product of medicine, and the healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, its object; "medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health", as the Glossary puts it. The "craftsman of health" is the one who makes the product. The phrase asks whether temperance can be that craftsman, and the dialogue answers it from both ends.

Use in the book

Health is the dialogue's first good. The Thracian taught that temperance comes to be in souls through beautiful words, "and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b; see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). Temperance in the soul is the condition of health in the body. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates takes medicine as the model of a knowledge that produces: asked what use it is and what it produces, he would say, "No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us" (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Temperance, he says, ought to answer the same question.

The phrase comes at the end of Critias' last attempt. He has named the knowledge of good and bad as the one that makes us happy, and proposes to

set temperance over it: temperance "presides over the other kinds of knowledge too", and ruling over the knowledge of the good, it would benefit us (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). Socrates replies that to rule the crafts is not to do their work. Temperance was declared knowledge only of knowledge and of its lack (see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός); "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?" "Certainly not." "For health belonged to another craft, didn't it?" "To another" (174e–175a; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). Benefit too belongs to another craft, and temperance is "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The two ends of the dialogue can be read as speaking of two temperances. The charm's temperance, a good state of the soul, makes health easy; Critias' temperance, a knowledge whose only object is knowledge, can make nothing, health least of all. The question of 165c, what temperance produces, has had its answer.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, and the passages on the making of health that it answers.

157a–b Once temperance is present in the soul, it is easy to provide health for the head and the body.

165c–d Asked what medicine produces, Socrates would say health, a fine work.

174e Temperance, knowledge only of knowledge, will not be the craftsman of health.

175a Health belongs to another craft, and benefit too; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates imagines the craftsmen of the goods praised in a drinking song, health first, then beauty, then honest wealth, coming to dispute Gorgias' claim that his art concerns the greatest good. The doctor would say first, "Socrates, Gorgias is deceiving you", for it is his own art that concerns the greatest good, and its work is health, than which nothing is a greater good (451e–452b). In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates argues against Thrasymachus that each art differs from the others by having a

different power, and provides its own benefit, not a common one: medicine health, piloting safety at sea (346a). The *Charmides* asks what benefit a temperance that is no particular art could provide. The *Euthydemus* puts the same question to the kingly art (291e–292a), and the search goes round in a circle (291b–c, 292d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's master art can be read as what Critias proposed, given an end. Where a number of arts are subordinate to a single power, he writes, the ends of the directing arts are more to be chosen than those beneath them, since the lower are pursued for the sake of the higher; and the good, it seems, belongs to the art with the most authority, the one that most directs the rest, which is plainly politics, since it settles what kinds of knowledge a city must have, which of them each group must learn, and how far.[61] His master art rules the others for the sake of an end of its own, the human good; Critias' presiding temperance can be read as an architectonic art without one.

Translation in this edition

Οὐκ ἄρα ὑγιείας ἔσται δημιουργός; (174e9) is "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?", keeping the question; the Greek puts "health" first, against "medicine" in the lines before. The Glossary lists the phrase with "of no benefit" under "craftsman".

See also

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀπεργάζομαι; δημιουργός; ἐπιστατέω; καλὸν ἔργον; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον; ὑγίεια.

διὰ χρόνου · after so long away

διὰ χρόνου, *dia chronou*, "after so long away"

Attested: διὰ χρόνου (*dia chronou*; 153a). "After an interval", "after a long time": διά with the genitive of time, the time gone through. The phrase

[61] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1, 1094a9–16, and 1.2, 1094a26–b7.

opens Socrates' narration: "We had got back from the army at Potidaea the evening before, and after so long away I was glad to make for my old haunts" (153a; see ἀσμένως; στρατόπεδον). The length is left unstated. The edition's note at 153a dates the siege of Potidaea from 432 to the winter of 430/29 BC and adds that "whether the homecoming narrated here belongs to 432 or to 429 is disputed." The phrase does its work either way: Socrates has been away long enough for the young men to have grown up, and his first questions, after one about philosophy, are whether any of them has turned out outstanding in wisdom or in beauty (153d; see αὖθις). The time away is the reason Socrates knows Charmides only as a child: "he wasn't yet grown up when you went away" (154a–b).

See also ἀσμένως; αὖθις; γνώριμος; στρατόπεδον.

διαγιγνώσκω · tell apart

Telling the true doctor from the one who is not · Charmides

διαγνώσεσθαι, *diagnōsesthai*, "to tell ... from"

At a Glance

The word. Διαγιγνώσκω, to know apart, to distinguish, discern; to decide between. Its noun, διάγνωσις, is the source of English "diagnosis".

In the *Charmides*. Once: "If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won't he proceed like this?" (170e).

In this edition. "Tell ... from".

A place to read. 170d–171c.

Meaning

The prefix διά, "apart", gives γιγνώσκειν, "to know", the sense of knowing one thing from another: to tell apart, and so to judge between them. It is the knowing of the examiner, who must sort what is presented to him into the genuine and the false.

Use in the book

The verb names the test that the temperate man was promised he could pass. At 167a the temperate man was to be able to inspect others, to see what each knows and what he only thinks he knows (see ἐξετάζω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι). By 170d Socrates has shown that a knowledge of knowledge would know only that a man has some knowledge, not of what. He then sets out how the test would have to be done: "If the temperate man, or anyone else, is to tell the true doctor from the one who is not, won't he proceed like this?" He will not discuss medicine with the doctor, who understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased (170e; see διαλέγομαι; ἐπαΐω). The examiner must look into the doctor "in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός), and no one can do that without medicine; the full argument is told under ἀληθινός.

The verb's point is that telling apart is itself a knowledge of the thing. To distinguish the true doctor from the pretender one must know what a doctor knows, as a doctor distinguishes the healthy from the diseased. The temperate man, who has knowledge only of knowledge, cannot tell the pretender from the doctor (170e; see διακρίνω), and the dialogue concludes that only a "fellow craftsman" can (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). Socrates, who spends the dialogue telling the genuine from the pretended, can be read as the case the argument cannot account for; the edition's note at 170d calls the result "perhaps the result that tells most against Critias' definition", since examining others is "exactly what Socrates does in the Apology".

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs, with the argument it begins.

170e To tell the true doctor from the one who is not, the examiner will not discuss medicine with him, for the doctor knows only the healthy and the diseased.

171b–c The examiner must test the doctor in health and disease, which no one can do without medicine.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* stages the test before a bad judge: set before children, the cook would beat the doctor over which of them understands good and bad food

(464d–e; see ἀληθινός). The *Charmides*' examiner without medicine can be read as in the children's place. In the myth of the *Republic* the one study worth having is the knowledge that can tell the good life from the bad (618c; see βίος).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates uses the verb of self-knowledge: those who know themselves know what suits them and distinguish what they can do from what they cannot (*Memorabilia* 4.2.26; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Aristotle uses it of the judgment for which men call in advisers: on great matters, distrusting ourselves, we take counsellors, as not able to discern the case alone (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.3, 1112b10–11; see βουλεύομαι).

Translation in this edition

Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρὸν διαγνώσεσθαι καὶ τὸν μή (170e4–5) is "to tell the true doctor from the one who is not". The future middle infinitive depends on εἰ μέλλει, "if he is to". The English uses "distinguish ... from" for διακρίνειν at 170e2 and "tell ... from" for both διαγνώσεσθαι here and διακρῖναι at 171c5, so that one Greek verb has two renderings and two Greek verbs share one (see διακρίνω).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀληθινός; βίος; βουλεύομαι; γιγνώσκω; διακρίνω; διαλέγομαι; ἐξετάζω; ἐπαΐω; ᾗ ἰατρικός; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; ὁμότεχνος.

διαζάω · live our lives

τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν, *ton bion diezōmen*, "we would live our lives"

Attested: διεζῶμεν (*diezōmen*; 171d). To live through, to pass one's life; διά, "through", with ζῆν, "to live". It comes in the picture of what temperance would give if it were knowing what one knows and what one does not: "For we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us" (171d–e; see

ἀναμάρτητος; βίος). The compound makes the whole life the object: a life lived from end to end without a mistake. The word is T's reading; B, W and a later hand in T have the simple ἐζῶμεν, "we would live" (see ἁμαρτία). In the *Republic* Socrates uses the compound of the democratic man, who lives through his days gratifying whatever desire comes (561c); the life without error and the life of each day's desire can be read as standing at the two ends of Plato's range.

See also ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; βίος; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν.

διαιρέω · draw distinctions, determine, distinguish

Prodicus' distinctions between words, and the distinctions Critias cannot make · Charmides

διαιροῦντος, *diairountos*, "draw ... distinctions"; διαιρήσεται, *diairēsetai*, "to determine"; διελέσθαι, *dielesthai*, "making these distinctions", "make the distinctions"; διαιρεῖν, *diairein*, "to distinguish"

At a Glance

The word. Διαιρέω, to take apart, divide; in the middle, to distinguish, to define by dividing, to decide.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates has heard Prodicus "draw countless distinctions between words" (163d); "it needs a great man" to determine for all cases whether anything can have its power in relation to itself, and Socrates does not trust himself to make "these distinctions" (169a); Critias will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions he is challenged to make (169c); and knowledge of knowledge can "distinguish" only that this is knowledge and that is not (170a).

In this edition. "Draw ... distinctions", "determine", "making these distinctions", "make the distinctions", "distinguish".

A place to read. 168e–170a.

Meaning

The verb is αἱρεῖν, "to take", with διά, "apart": to take a thing to pieces, to divide a whole into its parts. It is the verb of analysis in every field, from dividing booty to dividing words by their senses, and in Plato's later dialogues the name of a method, the division of kinds by which a thing is defined. The *Charmides* uses it of words, of things, and of the one distinction knowledge of knowledge could make.

Use in the book

The first distinctions are verbal. When Critias sets making apart from doing and working, Socrates recognizes the school: "After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words", and he lets Critias assign each word as he pleases, so long as he makes clear what he applies it to (163d; see δηλόω; Πρόδικος). The edition's note at 163d suggests the joke that Critias, "aristocrat and poet, is splitting words like a paid sophist". Distinctions between words cost nothing; Socrates asks for the thing.

The next are distinctions in things, and they are hard. Having sorted the reflexive cases into the impossible and the doubted, Socrates says: "It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself ... I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ). Critias, caught by Socrates' perplexity, would not admit it; in Socrates' words, "he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; προκαλέομαι). The man who split words at 163b–d cannot divide things, and will not say so.

The last use measures his definition. "Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?" "No, only that much" (170a; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). The one division such a knowledge could make is the one that tells nothing about the thing known. The verb runs through the dialogue from the easy distinctions of names to the

impossible one Critias' temperance would need, between this knowledge and that.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

163d Socrates has heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words; let Critias name as he pleases, but make clear what he names.

169a It needs a great man to determine whether anything can have its power in relation to itself; Socrates does not trust himself to make these distinctions.

169c Critias will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions Socrates challenges him to make.

170a Knowledge of knowledge can distinguish only that this is knowledge and that is not.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedrus* Socrates describes the second of two procedures in speaking: to be able to cut a thing up again kind by kind, at the joints where it naturally divides, without trying to smash any part in the manner of a clumsy carver; he calls himself a lover of these divisions and collections, so as to be able to speak and to think (265e–266b). In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea gives the work to dialectic: to divide by kinds and not to take the same form for a different one or a different one for the same belongs to the knowledge of dialectic, and it belongs only to the man who does philosophy purely and justly (253d–e). The great man whom the *Charmides* says is needed can be read as drawn, in these later dialogues, as the dialectician.

Other ancient sources

Diogenes Laertius reports, on Aristotle's authority, that Plato divided things in a set manner, and gives the divisions: goods are in the soul, in the body or outside it, justice, wisdom, courage and temperance being in the soul.[62] Xenophon's Socrates derived the name of conversation itself from sorting things by kinds (*Memorabilia* 4.5.12; see διαλέγομαι).

[62] Diogenes Laertius 3.80.

Translation in this edition

"Draw ... distinctions" for διαιροῦντος (163d4), "determine" for διαιρήσεται (169a3), "making these distinctions" and "make the distinctions" for the aorist middle διελέσθαι (169a8, 169c8), and "distinguish" for διαιρεῖν (170a7). The English varies with the object: words are distinguished, a question determined. At 170a7 διαιρεῖν is a correction by a second hand in T; B, T and W have διευρεῖν, "to find out" (apparatus, a7). At 172a1 B has the participle διῃρημένης, "divided off", where Burnet prints ἐξῃρημένης with T and W (apparatus, a1; see ἁμαρτία). The perfect διεληλύθαμεν at 168e3, "we have gone through", belongs to διέρχομαι, not to this verb.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἁμαρτία; δηλόω; διακρίνω; διαλέγομαι; διέρχομαι; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; μέγας ἀνήρ; Πρόδικος; προκαλέομαι.

δίαιτα · regimen

διαίταις, *diaitais*, "on a regimen"

Attested: διαίταις (*diaitais*; 156c). A way of life, a mode of living; in medicine, a regimen, the ordering of food, drink, exercise and rest to bring the body to health. The good doctors, Socrates tells the boy, say that the eyes cannot be cured without the head, nor the head without the body: "On this principle they put the entire body on a regimen and try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c; see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος). The edition's note at 156c calls this "the medicine of the Hippocratic writers, who insisted that the part be treated with the whole". The regimen is the doctors' means of treating the whole body; the Thracian goes one step further, to the soul, which is treated not by regimen but by charms (156e–157a; see ἐπῳδή). In the *Republic* Socrates blames Herodicus, a trainer who fell ill and mixed training with medicine, for spinning out his own death, living his whole life under treatment and tormented whenever he departed from his accustomed

regimen (406a–b); in the *Timaeus* diseases that are not dangerous are to be guided by regimen rather than provoked with drugs (89b–c).

See also ἐπῳδή; θεραπεύω; ἰατρός; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; φάρμακον.

διακρίνω · distinguish, tell apart

διακρίνειν, *diakrinein*, "distinguish ... from"; διακρῖναι, *diakrinai*, "tell ... from"

Attested: διακρίνειν (*diakrinein*; 170e), διακρῖναι (*diakrinai*; 171c). To separate, to sift; to judge between, decide; from κρίνειν, "to judge", with διά, "apart". The verb opens and closes the argument about examining a doctor. At 170e: "Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not" (170e; see προσποιέομαι). At 171c, after the argument: temperance of this kind "will be able to tell neither a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does, nor anyone else who knows anything at all, except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman" (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). Between the two Socrates uses διαγιγνώσκειν for the same act (170e; see διαγιγνώσκω), and the argument itself is told under ἀληθινός. In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea makes the same verb the dialectician's, to know how to distinguish by kinds which things can combine and which cannot (253e; see διαιρέω).

See also ἀληθινός; διαγιγνώσκω; διαιρέω; ὁμότεχνος; προσποιέομαι.

διαλέγομαι · talk, have a conversation, discuss

Conversation, the form of the charm and the means of the inquiry · Charmides

διαλέγεσθαι, *dialegesthai*, "to have a conversation", "his talking with us", "talking"; διαλεξόμενος, *dialexomenos*, "that I would talk to him"; διαλέξεται, *dialexetai*, "will ... discuss"

At a Glance

The word. Διαλέγεσθαι, to talk with someone, to converse; to discuss a subject with him. From it comes the name of dialectic, the art of question and answer.

In the *Charmides*. Five times: the boy "must surely be willing to have a conversation" (154e); there would be nothing improper "in his talking with us" (155a); Socrates had been sure that he would talk to him "with the greatest of ease" (155c); the boy's first definition includes "walking in the streets and talking" (159b); and the examiner "will surely not discuss medicine" with a doctor (170e).

In this edition. "Have a conversation", "talking", "talk", "discuss".

A place to read. 154d–155c, with the edition's note at 157a.

Meaning

The middle of διαλέγειν, "to pick out, to sort": to talk things through with another, in turn. Plato's Socrates draws a line between this and the long speech made to a crowd, and his name for the highest study, ἡ διαλεκτική, means the art of conversing. The verb is the dialogues' name for what they themselves are.

Use in the book

Conversation is how the soul is stripped. Critias has praised the boy's beauty, and Socrates proposes to look at something else first: "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure? At his age he must surely be willing to have a conversation" (154e; see ἀποδύω; ψυχή). Critias assures him that the boy is "a philosopher and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (154e–155a), and

Socrates settles the proprieties: "Even if he were younger still, there would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a; see αἰσχρός; ἀνεψιός; ἐπίτροπος). Then the boy sits down beside him, and Socrates, as he tells it, was at a loss: "the boldness I'd had before, sure as I was that I would talk to him with the greatest of ease, had been knocked clean out of me" (155c; see ἀπορέω; θρασύτης). The charm he goes on to offer is made of "beautiful words", and the edition's note at 157a suggests that "the charm, it seems, is conversation of the right kind, perhaps the very conversation about to begin" (see λόγοι καλοί).

In the boy's first definition conversation is a manner. Temperance is "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: walking in the streets and talking" (159b; see βαδίζω; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ), the bearing of a well-brought-up boy, and in the refutation it becomes "talking", λέξις, beside walking (160c; see βαδισμός; λέξις). The definition describes how the boy conducts himself in conversation, and it is tested by a conversation.

In the second half conversation needs a subject the speakers share. The temperate examiner who would tell a real doctor from a pretender "will surely not discuss medicine with him—for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e; see διαγιγνώσκω; ἐπαΐω). To converse with an expert about his field one must know it. That examination of others is what Socrates does in the *Apology*, and what Critias' temperance could not do (170d; see διαγιγνώσκω). The dialogue can be read as answering in its own form: Socrates examines Critias by conversing with him about knowledge, the subject Critias claims to know and Socrates says he does not.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

154e Let us strip the boy's soul first; at his age he must be willing to have a conversation.

155a There would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of his guardian.

155c Socrates had been sure that he would talk to the boy with the greatest ease, and his boldness is knocked out of him.

159b The boy: temperance is doing everything in an orderly and quiet way, walking in the streets and talking.

170e The examiner will not discuss medicine with a doctor, since the doctor knows only the healthy and the diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates arrives too late for Gorgias' display and asks whether he would be willing to converse with them instead: he wants to learn what the power of his art is, and the display can wait for another time (447b–c). In the *Protagoras*, when Protagoras will not keep his answers short, Socrates tells Callias, the wealthy Athenian in whose house the sophists are staying, that he had thought conversing with one another a different thing from making speeches to the people (336b). In the *Republic* the dialectician is the man who grasps the account of the being of each thing, and whoever cannot give an account to himself and to another lacks understanding of it (534b). In the *Apology* to talk every day about virtue is the greatest good for a man (38a; see βίος), and in the *Theaetetus* thinking itself is a conversation the soul holds with itself (189e–190a; see αἴσθησις; διάνοια).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that when Critias was a lawgiver among the Thirty, with Charicles, he wrote into the laws a ban on teaching "the art of words", aimed at Socrates, out of a grudge from an old rebuke; then the two summoned Socrates, showed him the law and forbade him to converse with the young. Socrates asked them to define the terms, up to what age a man counts as young, and Charicles answered: "do not converse with anyone younger than thirty." Socrates asked whether he might at least ask a young shopkeeper the price of what he was buying.[63] Set beside the *Charmides*, where Critias brings his young ward to Socrates for conversation (155a–b), the law shows the same man forbidding what he once arranged.

Xenophon also gives an account of the word. Socrates said that only those who master themselves can look into what is best, and, sorting things by kinds in word and deed, choose the good and keep from the bad; and that

[63] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.29–31 (the grudge and the law) and 1.2.33–36.

conversation, διαλέγεσθαι, was named from people coming together to deliberate in common, sorting things by kinds.[64] The etymology joins the verb to deliberation and to division (see βουλεύομαι; διαιρέω).

Translation in this edition

"To have a conversation" for διαλέγεσθαι at 154e7, "his talking with us" at 155a5, "talk to him" for the future participle διαλεξόμενος at 155c7, "talking" at 159b4, and "discuss" for διαλέξεται at 170e6. "Talking" also renders λέξις at 160c6, so that Socrates' summary returns the boy's word to him (see λέξις).

See also

αἴσθησις; αἰσχρός; ἀνεψιός; ἀποδύω; ἀπορέω; αὖθις; βαδίζω; βαδισμός; βίος; βουλεύομαι; διαγιγνώσκω; διαιρέω; διάνοια; ἐπαΐω; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἐπίτροπος; θρασύτης; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; λέξις; λόγοι καλοί; ψυχή.

διαμαρτύρομαι · solemnly declare

διεμαρτυρόμεθα, *diemartyrometha*, "solemnly declare"

Attested: διεμαρτυρόμεθα (*diemartyrometha*; 174e). To call gods and men to witness, μάρτυρες; to protest or declare solemnly. Socrates uses it to hold Critias to his definition at its last trial. Critias proposes that temperance, presiding over the other kinds of knowledge, would rule the knowledge of the good and so benefit us; Socrates answers that temperance would not do the work of medicine and the other crafts: "Or didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?" (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). The declaration goes back to 166e–167c, where Critias agreed that temperance is knowledge of itself, of the other kinds of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else; the argument of 170a–171c held him to it, and Socrates now speaks of it as of a sworn statement that cannot be withdrawn. Critias, who at 164c–d could "take back" an agreement (see ἀνατίθημι), cannot take back this one.

[64] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.5.11–12.

See also ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀνατίθημι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας.

διάνοια · mind

The mind the charm would improve, and what the dedicator had in mind · Charmides

τὴν διάνοιαν, *tēn dianoian*, "his mind"

At a Glance

The word. Διάνοια, thought: the power and the act of thinking; a mind, an intention, the meaning of a saying.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' joke that the boy's headache will be a godsend "if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well" (157c–d). The verb of the same family, διανοεῖσθαι, comes once, also from Critias (164e).

In this edition. "Mind".

A place to read. 157a–d.

Meaning

The noun is formed from διανοεῖσθαι, "to think through", with διά and the root of νοῦς, "mind". In ordinary Greek it is the thinking part of a man, his understanding, and also what he means or intends. Plato uses it both ways, and the *Republic* gives it a narrower, technical sense.

Use in the book

Critias' joke is told under ἀναγκάζω (157c–d). What concerns the noun is the word he chose. Socrates had reported the Thracian's teaching about the soul: "the soul, my dear fellow ... is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words", and from them temperance comes to be in souls (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; ψυχή). Critias answers with "mind": the boy will be forced "to improve his mind as well", and he adds at once that Charmides is thought already to surpass his contemporaries in temperance (157d). The substitution can be read as Critias hearing the charm as an improvement of

the intellect, where Socrates had named a virtue of the soul. His own definitions, when they come, will make temperance a knowledge.

The verb of the same family comes in Critias' account of Delphi. The god addresses those who enter his temple differently from men, "and that, I think, is what the dedicator had in mind when he dedicated it" (164e; see ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν). Both uses are Critias', and both claim to see into a mind, the boy's that needs improving and the dedicator's that meant "Be temperate". The man who claims so readily to know other minds is the man whose definition, knowing oneself, the dialogue then examines.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, and the passage in which its verb does.

157c–d Critias: the headache will be a godsend if on account of his head the boy is forced to improve his mind as well.

164e The god greets those who enter differently from men, and that is what the dedicator had in mind.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea gets Theaetetus to agree that thought and speech are the same, except that the conversation the soul holds within itself with itself, without voice, has been given the name thought, διάνοια (263e). The *Theaetetus* says the same of thinking (189e–190a; see αἴσθησις). On this account a charm of beautiful words that improves the mind would work as thought itself works, by conversation (see διαλέγομαι).

In the *Republic* Glaucon, summing up the divided line, says that Socrates seems to give the name thought, not understanding, to the habit of mind of geometers and their like, since it stands between opinion and understanding; Socrates accepts this, and sets four conditions of the soul against the four sections of the line: insight, thought, conviction and likeness-making (511d–e).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes it that every διάνοια is either practical, or productive, or theoretical, and so places the study of nature among the theoretical.[65] The *Charmides*' argument about whether temperance must produce a work (165c–166a) can be read as asking which of these kinds of thought temperance is.

Translation in this edition

Τὴν διάνοιαν (157c9) is an accusative of respect, "better in his mind", and the English turns the phrase into "improve his mind". The participle διανοούμενος (164e4) is "had in mind".

See also

αἴσθησις; ἀναγκάζω; ἀνατίθημι; γεωμετρική; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διαλέγομαι; ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; ψυχή.

διασκέπτομαι · think it over

διασκεψάμενος, *diaskepsamenos*, "after thinking it over"

Attested: διασκεψάμενος (*diaskepsamenos*; 160e). To look about on every side, to consider a thing thoroughly; the compound of σκέπτεσθαι, "to look into", with διά, "through". Socrates has told the boy, "pay closer attention and look within yourself", and asked him to say, properly and like a man, what temperance seems to him to be (160d–e; see ἀνδρείως). Charmides "paused, and after thinking it over to himself very much like a man", said that temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and is the same thing as modesty (160e; see αἰδώς; ἀνδρικῶς). The words πρὸς ἑαυτόν, "to himself", make the look inward a consultation with oneself, and the answer it yields is about the boy as much as about the virtue (the edition's note at 160e; see αἰσχυντηλός). It is the one place in the dialogue where an answerer is shown examining himself before he speaks. Socrates claims the

[65] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 6.1, 1025b25.

same habit for his refutations at 166c–d (see διερευνάω), and the *Sophist* calls thought itself a conversation the soul holds with itself (263e; see διάνοια).

See also αἰδώς; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνδρείως; ἀνδρικῶς; διάνοια; διερευνάω.

διαφέρω · excel, differ

Standing out among the young, and the point in which temperance differs · Charmides

διαφέροντες, *diapherontes*, "outstanding"; διαφέρειν, *diapherein*, "surpass", "excel"; διαφέρουσα, *diapherousa*, "outstanding"; διαφέρει, *diapherei*, "what difference does it make", "differs from"; διαφέρον, *diapheron*, "differently from"

At a Glance

The word. Διαφέρω, to carry apart; intransitively, to differ, and so to stand out, to excel; impersonally διαφέρει, "it makes a difference". Its noun is διαφορά, "difference".

In the *Charmides*. Seven times. In the prologue it is the word for distinction, of the young (153d), of the boy (157d twice) and of his family (157e). Then it turns: Charmides asks "what difference does it make" who said the definition (161c), Critias says the god addresses those who enter "differently from men" (164e), and he tells Socrates that his search has brought him to "the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge" (166b).

In this edition. "Outstanding", "surpass", "excel", "what difference does it make", "differently from", "differs from".

A place to read. 165e–166c.

Meaning

The verb joins φέρειν, "to carry", with διά, "apart": what is carried apart from the rest differs from it. With a dative of respect it means to excel in something, as the boy excels his contemporaries in looks; with the genitive, to differ from something; and in the third person, διαφέρει, it asks whether a

thing matters. The noun gives the language of definition its word for what sets a thing apart from others of its kind.

Use in the book

The prologue uses the verb for rank. Socrates, back from Potidaea, asks "whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d; see ἐγγίγνομαι; σοφία ἢ κάλλος). Critias answers for his ward that Charmides is thought "to surpass those his age" in looks and in temperance alike (157d; see δοκέω; ἰδέα). Socrates agrees that it is only right that the boy "should excel all the others in all these things" (157d–e; see δίκαιος), for his father's house has come down celebrated by the poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue (157e; see ἐγκωμιάζω). In these four places to differ is to stand above, and the standing is a matter of birth and of what people say.

At 161c the verb is turned on the question of authority. Socrates guesses that the boy heard "doing one's own business" from Critias, and Charmides asks, "But what difference does it make, Socrates ... whom I heard it from?" Socrates answers, "None": what matters is whether what is said is true (161c; see ἀληθής). At 164e Critias uses the participle of the god at Delphi, who addresses those who enter "differently from men" (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν).

The last use is the weightiest. Socrates has shown that every craft-knowledge is of something other than itself, calculation of the odd and even, weighing of the heavy and light, and asks what temperance is knowledge of. Critias replies: "There it is, Socrates ... Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others. It isn't so" (166b–c; see ὁμοιότης).

Critias' difference is a difference in kind: the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, his alone is of itself and of the others (166c). The claim is a strong one, since it removes temperance from the comparisons by which Socrates has been testing it, and the rest of the argument can be read as testing whether a knowledge that differs so much from the others is still a knowledge of anything. The dialogue's first uses of the word praise a boy for

standing out; its last makes a virtue stand out so far that, by 175b, no one can find what it is.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

153d Socrates asks whether any of the young have turned out outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both.

157d Charmides is thought to surpass his contemporaries in looks and in temperance.

157d–e It is only right that he should excel the others; his father's house has come down celebrated for its outstanding beauty and virtue.

161c What difference does it make whom he heard it from? None; the question is whether it is true.

164e The god addresses those who enter his temple differently from men.

166b–c Critias: Socrates has come to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Theaetetus* the third account of λόγος that Socrates tries is the one most people would give: to be able to name some sign by which the thing asked about differs from all others, as the sun is the brightest of the bodies that move about the earth. Whoever adds to a correct opinion of a thing its difference from the rest, he says, will have become knowledgeable where before he only opined (208c–e). Then he finds the account empty: a correct opinion of a thing must already include how it differs from the others, so that the instruction to add the difference tells us to add what we have (209d–e). In the *Meno* knowledge differs from right opinion by the bond of reasoning that ties it down (98a; see δόξα), and the virtues, many as they are, do not differ in the one form they share (72c; see εἶδος).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in his book of distinctions, gives as the first sense of the term that things are called different which are other while being the same in something,

not in number only but in species, in genus or by analogy.[66] On that account Critias' temperance, if it differs from the other kinds of knowledge, must still share something with them, and Socrates' search for a likeness can be read as a search for that common ground.

Translation in this edition

Διαφέροντες (153d4) is "outstanding", διαφέρειν "surpass" at 157d2 and "excel" at 157d9, διαφέρουσα "outstanding" (157e7). Τί διαφέρει (161c3) is "what difference does it make", διαφέρον τι ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι (164e4) "differently from men", and τὸ ᾧ διαφέρει πασῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν (166b8) "the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge". The reading rests on a conjecture. Burnet prints τὸ ᾧ, H. Richards' correction, where B has ὅτῳ and T and W τῷ; and he prints T's πασῶν, "all", also a variant in W, where B and W have πλείω, "more" (apparatus, b8).

See also

ἀληθής; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; δίκαιος; δοκέω; δόξα; ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐγκωμιάζω; εἶδος; ἰδέα; ὁμοιότης; σοφία ἢ κάλλος.

διαφεύγω · elude

διαφεύγειν, *diapheugein*, "elude"

Attested: διαφεύγειν (*diapheugein*; 156e). To flee through, get clear away; of a thing pursued, to escape the pursuer. Zalmoxis, the Thracian reports, says that one must not try to cure the body without the soul, and that "this is the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors": they neglect the whole (156e; see ἀμελέω; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). The diseases are the subject of the verb and the doctors its object, so that the illness slips past the cure as a quarry slips past the hunter. The cause is a fault of attention, and the cure the Thracian proposes is to begin with the soul (157a; see ψυχή). The verb comes once, and the failure it names is the one the dialogue then tries to avoid, of treating a part without the whole.

[66] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.9, 1018a12–14.

See also ἀμελέω; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος; ψυχή.

διδάσκω · teach

διδάσκων, *didaskōn*, "teaching"; διδάσκειν, *didaskein*, "teaching", "teaches"; προσδίδαξον, *prosdidaxon*, "teach me ... more"

Attested: διδάσκων (*didaskōn*; 157b), διδάσκειν (*didaskein*; 159e, 161d), and the compound προσδίδαξον (*prosdidaxon*; 173d). To teach, instruct, show someone how. The Thracian taught Socrates the remedy and the charms, with a warning: "So, when he was teaching me the remedy and the charms, he said, 'Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm'" (157b; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). In the argument against quietness teaching comes among the activities of the soul, after learning and before recollecting, and it too is finer done "quickly and vigorously than quietly and slowly" (159e; see δυσμαθία); the writing-master "teaches you boys" to write names not his own (161d; see γραμματιστής). The last use is Socrates' request to Critias, who has said that nothing crowns doing well but living knowledgeably: "Then teach me one small thing more ... Knowledgeably about what?" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως). In the *Meno* Socrates, questioning the slave about the double square, turns to Meno: "do you see, Meno, that I teach him nothing, but ask him everything?" (82e; see διπλάσιος). In the *Apology* he says that he was never anyone's teacher, though he never grudged it to anyone, younger or older, who wished to hear him speak and do his own business (33a). The *Charmides* can be read in the same way: Socrates passes on what he was taught as a charm, and asks to be taught.

See also γραμματιστής; διπλάσιος; δυσμαθία; ἑαυτοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον.

διδόναι λόγον · give an account

Critias offers an account of knowing oneself · Charmides

διδόναι λόγον, *didonai logon*, "give you an account"

At a Glance

The word. Λόγον διδόναι, to give an account: of money, to render accounts; in argument, to give the reason for a claim and answer for it under questioning.

In the *Charmides*. Once. Critias gives up his earlier answers and offers instead: "but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself" (165b).

In this edition. "Give you an account".

A place to read. 164c–166c.

Meaning

Λόγος is speech, reckoning and reason; δίδωμι, "to give". To give a λόγος is to hand over a reckoning that another may check, and the phrase keeps something of the audit in all its uses: the account is given to someone, who receives it and may question it. In Plato the giving and receiving of accounts becomes the mark of knowledge, which can say why a thing is so, as against opinion, which cannot.

Use in the book

Critias' offer comes at the turn of his part in the dialogue. He has just said that he would sooner take back some of what he agreed than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι), read the Delphic inscription as the god's greeting (164d–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν), and given up everything said before, since none of it was clear (165b; see ἀφίημι). Then the offer: "but now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself" (165b).

Socrates corrects the assumption behind the offer. Critias is treating him, he says, as though he claimed to know the answers to what he asks and would agree if only he wished to; but he inquires with Critias, each time, into

whatever is proposed, because he himself does not know (165b–c; see ζητέω). Critias offers to defend a thesis to a man who, he supposes, has a thesis of his own; Socrates will say whether he agrees only when he has looked into it, and he begins at once with a question: if temperance is knowing something, it must be a kind of knowledge, and a knowledge of something (165c; see ἐπιστήμη).

The account Critias offered is then exacted by questions he did not foresee: what temperance produces (165c–e), what it is knowledge of (166a–b), whether such a knowledge is possible (167b–169a). When the questions bring him to a loss, he gives no account at all, but says nothing clear and covers up his perplexity (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι). The man who volunteered to give an account can be read as the dialogue's example of what the phrase does not mean: not a confident speech, but answering for one's words until they are shown to hold or to fail.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, Socrates' reply to it, and Critias' perplexity when the account is tested.

165b Critias gives up what was said before and is willing to give an account of "temperance is knowing oneself".

165b–c Socrates: he does not claim to know the answers, but inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed.

169c–d Critias, at a loss, says nothing clear and covers up his perplexity.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laches* Nicias warns Lysimachus what conversation with Socrates means: whoever comes close to him and talks with him, whatever subject he starts on, is led round by the argument until he has to give an account of himself, of how he lives now and how he has lived his past life; and once he is caught, Socrates will not let him go until he has tested all of it well and thoroughly (187e–188a). The account, there, is of a life.

In the *Phaedo* Socrates asks Simmias whether a man who knows about the things he knows can give an account of them. "He must, Socrates." Asked whether everyone seems able to give an account of the things they have been

discussing, Simmias wishes it were so, but fears that by this time tomorrow there will be no one left who can do it properly (76b). In the *Symposium* Diotima tells Socrates that to judge rightly without being able to give an account is neither knowledge, for how could a thing without an account be knowledge, nor ignorance, for how could what hits on the truth be ignorance; it is right opinion, between understanding and ignorance (202a). In the *Theaetetus* the last definition of knowledge is true opinion with an account (201c–d), and the account fails when it is taken as the thing's difference from all others (208c–209e; see διαφέρω). In the *Republic* Glaucon agrees that those who cannot give and receive an account will never know anything of what we say must be known (531e), and whoever cannot give an account of a thing to himself and to another lacks understanding of it (534b; see διαλέγομαι).

Translation in this edition

Τούτου σοι διδόναι λόγον (165b3) is "give you an account of this". The genitive τούτου is the thing accounted for, the formula "temperance is knowing oneself" that the εἰ μή clause names.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνατίθημι; ἀφίημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διαλέγομαι; διαφέρω; δίδωμι; δόξα; ἐπιστήμη; ζητέω.

δίδωμι · allow, grant, give

δίδωμι, *didōmi*, "I allow"; δῶμεν, *dōmen*, "grant"; δόντες, *dontes*, "having granted"; δώσεις, *dōseis*, "give"

Attested: δίδωμι (*didōmi*; 163d), δῶμεν (*dōmen*; 172d), δόντες (*dontes*; 172d), δώσεις (*dōseis*; 176c); and διδόναι in διδόναι λόγον (165b). To give; in argument, to grant, allow. Each use is a concession, and the last is one refused. Socrates allows Critias his words: "Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to" (163d; see δηλόω; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). At 172c–d, after the

benefit of temperance has failed to turn up, he grants Critias everything once more for the sake of the argument: as for what was laid down at the start, "let us not take that away from it, but grant it. And having granted all this, let us look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all" (172d; see συγχωρέω). Burnet prints T's ἀλλὰ δῶμεν, "but grant it", also a variant in W; B and W have ἀλλ' ἴδωμεν, "but let us see", though all three have the participle δόντες, "having granted", in the same line. The dialogue's last gift is the one Charmides will not make, and Socrates protests: "So you'll use force ... and won't even give me a preliminary hearing?" (176c; see ἀνάκρισις; βιάζομαι). Socrates' grants keep the argument going; the boy's refusal ends it.

See also ἀνάκρισις; βιάζομαι; δηλόω; διδόναι λόγον; συγχωρέω; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

διερευνάω · scrutinize

διερευνῴμην, *diereunōimēn*, "I would scrutinize"

Attested: διερευνῴμην (*diereunōimēn*; 166d). To search through, examine thoroughly; the compound of ἐρευνᾶν, "to seek, search", with διά, "through". Critias has accused Socrates of trying to refute him, and Socrates answers that he refutes for no other reason than the one, in his words, "for which I would scrutinize even myself": for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not (166c–d; see ἐλέγχω; λανθάνω). Burnet prints the middle optative διερευνῴμην from B and W; T has the active διερευνῴην (apparatus, d1). The edition's note at 166d calls the sentence, on one reading, "Socrates' fullest statement in the dialogue of what his refutations are for: the same examination turned first on himself", and compares the *Apology*. There Socrates says that he still goes about seeking and searching, ἐρευνῶ, at the god's bidding, among citizens and strangers alike, anyone he thinks wise, and when the man seems to him not to be, he comes to the god's help and shows him that he is not wise (23b). In the *Charmides* the simple verb is Critias': "Your search has brought you to the very point" (166b; see διαφέρω).

See also διαφέρω; ἐλέγχω; λανθάνω.

διέρχομαι · go through

διεληλύθαμεν, *dielēlythamen*, "we have gone through"

Attested: διεληλύθαμεν (*dielēlythamen*; 168e). To go through a place; of speech, to go through things in order, to review. Socrates uses it to sum up every case reviewed since 167c: "of the cases we have gone through", he says, some appear altogether impossible, and others are strongly doubted (168e; see ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). The perfect gathers the review into a result, and the sorting that follows depends on it. In the *Gorgias* Socrates closes his chain from temperance to happiness with the same verb, "as we went through" (507c; see δίκαιος), and in the *Republic* he says that the community of wives and children is not easy to go through, since it raises still more disbelief than the things they went through before (450c; see ἀπιστία).

See also ἀδύνατος; ἀπιστία; δίκαιος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό.

διηγέομαι · tell, give the news

διήγησαι, *diēgēsai*, "tell us all about it"; διηγούμην, *diēgoumēn*, "gave them the news"

Attested: διήγησαι (*diēgēsai*; 153c), διηγούμην (*diēgoumēn*; 153c). To lead through, and so to set out in detail, to narrate. Chaerephon, hearing that Socrates was in the battle, says, "Then come over here ... sit down, and tell us all about it. We still haven't got the whole story straight" (153c). Socrates sits by Critias and gives them "the news from the camp, whatever anyone asked" (153c–d). The narrative of war is the frame's first business, and when the company have had their fill of it Socrates asks his own questions, about philosophy and the young (153d; see ἄδην ἔχω; ἀνερωτάω). The dialogue is itself a narration: Socrates tells the whole conversation to a friend he never names, addressed as "my friend" (154b, 155c). In the *Republic* Socrates says that everything told by storytellers or poets is a narration, διήγησις, of things

past, present or to come, carried out by plain narration, by imitation, or by both (392d). On that division the *Charmides*, in which Socrates narrates and also speaks in the voices of the others, can be read as of the third kind.

See also ἄδην ἔχω; ἀνερωτάω.

διισχυρίζομαι · insist, say with confidence

διισχυριζώμεθα, *diischyrizōmetha*, "let's ... insist"; διισχυρίσασθαι, *diischyrisasthai*, "say with confidence"

Attested: διισχυριζώμεθα (*diischyrizōmetha*; 168a), διισχυρίσασθαι (*diischyrisasthai*; 169b). To rely on, and so to affirm stoutly, maintain. Both uses are refusals. After the procession of powers Socrates finds such a knowledge strange, but will not yet deny that it exists: "let's not yet insist that there isn't", he says, and they go on looking (168a; see ἄτοπος). After saying that it needs a great man to settle the matter, he will not affirm it either: he says that he cannot say with confidence, διισχυρίσασθαι, whether such a knowledge is possible, nor accept that it is temperance until he has looked into its benefit (169a–b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; μέγας ἀνήρ). Critias, who will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions (169c), can be read as the one who would insist. In the *Meno* Socrates says that he would not insist very strongly, in the argument's defence, on the rest of what he has said about recollection, but that thinking we must search for what we do not know makes us better, braver and less idle, and for this he would fight, if he could, in word and deed (86b–c); in the *Phaedo* he says that to insist that the other world is just as he has described it is not fitting for a man of sense (114d).

See also ἄτοπος; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; μέγας ἀνήρ.

δίκαιος · right, just

What is due to the boy, the just as the object of statesmanship, and a just self-reproach · Charmides

δίκαιον, *dikaion*, "only right"; δικαίου, *dikaiou*, "of the just"; δίκαιον, *dikaion*, "what is just"; δικαίως, *dikaiōs*, "I was right"

At a Glance

The word. Δίκαιος, observant of δίκη, custom and right: of men, just; of acts and claims, fair, due; in the neuter, δίκαιόν ἐστι, "it is right".

In the *Charmides*. Four times: what the boy's birth makes due (157d), the just as the object of statesmanship (170b twice), and Socrates' verdict on himself, δικαίως (175a).

In this edition. "Only right"; "the just", "what is just"; "I was right".

A place to read. 170a–c.

Meaning

Δίκη is first the way things are done, then the right that custom secures, and so a judgement and a penalty. The adjective covers all of it: the man who gives each his due, the claim that is fair, the act that conforms to law. In the neuter it states what is fitting or deserved, as English says "it is only right", and the adverb δικαίως is "justly", "with good reason".

Use in the book

The first use is the language of desert. Critias has said that Charmides is thought the most temperate of anyone, and Socrates replies, "And indeed ... it is only right, Charmides, that you should excel all the others in all these things" (157d–e), since no one could easily point to two houses in Athens likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two he is sprung from (157e; see ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων). What is right here is what birth makes due, the claim of a noble family to an excellent son.

The second is the just as a field of knowledge. Socrates asks whether knowledge of knowledge is the same as knowledge of the healthy and as "knowledge and lack of knowledge of the just"; Critias denies it, and Socrates

names the two: "the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge" (170a–b; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). A man who knows only knowledge, and does not "also know what is healthy and what is just", would know that he knows something, but not what (170b–c; see εἰκότως). The just is named beside the healthy as an object a temperate ruler would need to know, and the dialogue's picture of a household and city run by temperance (171d–172a; see διοίκησις) depends on it. The definition under test cannot supply it.

The third is Socrates' judgement on his own inquiry: Socrates asks Critias to see that his fear was reasonable and that "I was right to blame myself" for looking into temperance to no useful purpose (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; εἰκότως). The only sentence the dialogue passes with this word is passed by the narrator on himself, and the reason he gives is his own failing as an inquirer, since the finest of all things would not otherwise have turned out useless (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής). The boy's courtesy at 156a, that he would be doing Socrates an injustice not to know his name, is told under ἀδικέω.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective or its adverb occurs.

157d–e It is only right that Charmides should excel the others, given the two houses he comes from.

170a–b Knowledge of knowledge is not knowledge of the just, which is statesmanship, nor of the healthy, which is medicine.

170b A man who does not know what is healthy and what is just, but only knowledge, will know that he knows, not what.

175a Socrates was right to blame himself for inquiring into temperance to no purpose.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates draws justice out of temperance. The temperate man would do what is fitting towards gods and men; doing what is fitting towards men he would do just things, and towards gods pious things, so that he must be just and pious, and brave as well, since it belongs to a temperate man to pursue and avoid what he should. So the temperate man, being just, brave

and pious, is the completely good man, who does well and finely whatever he does, and the man who does well is blessed and happy (507a–c). The *Charmides*' definitions never reach that chain: none of them makes the temperate man know what is just. In the *Meno* Socrates gets Meno to agree that no one can manage a city or a household well without managing it temperately and justly (73a–b; see διοίκησις).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle distinguishes two senses of the just: the just is the lawful and the equal, and the unjust the lawless and the unequal.[67] The *Charmides*' uses can be read against the distinction: the just of 170b, the object of statesmanship, as the lawful; the just of 157d, what birth makes due, as nearer the equal, a matter of what each deserves.

Translation in this edition

Δίκαιον (157d9), with the infinitive, is "it is only right"; δικαίου (170b1) "of the just", and τὸ δίκαιον (170b7) "what is just". The adverb δικαίως (175a10) becomes a clause: "I was right to blame myself".

See also

ἀδικέω; αἰτιάομαι; ἀνωφελής; διαφέρω; διοίκησις; εἰκότως; ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης.

διοίκησις · management

διοικήσεως, *dioikēseōs*, "of the management"

Attested: διοικήσεως (*dioikēseōs*; 172d). The managing of a household or a city; from διοικεῖν, "to administer", built on οἶκος, "house". Socrates takes back an agreement: "For what we were saying just now, that temperance would be a great good if it were of that kind, as the guide of the management of household and of city, I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d; see ἀγαθός). The agreement he withdraws is the picture of 171d–172a,

[67] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.1, 1129a32–b1.

in which a household and a city run by temperance would be bound to be run well (171e; see ἀναμάρτητος), because each would do what he knew and hand over what he did not (172d; see ἕκαστος). The edition's note at 172d hears in that principle the founding rule of the city in the *Republic*, that each should do the one work he is suited for (369e–370c; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). In the *Meno* Socrates gets Meno to agree that no one can manage a city, a household or anything else well without managing it temperately and justly, so that a man and a woman alike need justice and temperance if they are to be good (73a–b). The *Charmides* grants that temperance would guide such management, and doubts that the guidance would make anyone happy.

See also ἀγαθός; ἀναμάρτητος; ἕκαστος; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

διορίζομαι · give a plain definition

Critias' plain definition · Charmides

διορίζομαι, *diorizomai*, "I give you a plain definition" (with σαφῶς)

At a Glance

The word. Διορίζω, to draw a boundary through, to divide off; to determine, distinguish; in the middle voice, to set out distinctly, to define.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the definition Critias gives after taking over the argument: "I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e).

In this edition. "I give you a plain definition".

A place to read. 163d–164a.

Meaning

A ὅρος is a boundary-stone, and ὁρίζειν is to mark a boundary, and so to define. The prefix διά, "through, between", makes the boundary one that separates: to διορίζειν is to set one thing off from what lies next to it. The middle voice makes the definition the speaker's own act: Critias does not report a definition, he lays one down.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked for one. Critias has explained his own business as the making of good things, and Socrates, recalling Prodicus' distinctions between words, allows him whatever names he likes (163d; see δίδωμι; Πρόδικος), and asks him to go back to the beginning and define it more plainly, ὅρισαι: is it the doing, or the making, of good things that he says temperance is (163d–e; see ὁρίζω)? Socrates' verb is the simple ὅρισαι; Critias answers with the compound and the adverb Socrates had asked for. The man who makes bad things is not temperate, he says, and the man who makes good things is: "I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see ἀγαθός; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; σαφής).

Between the request and the definition Critias tries to turn the question back: "And don't you think so, my good fellow?" Socrates will not let his own view be examined (163e; see ἐάω). The definition is Critias' alone, and plain in its words. Its trouble begins at once and is not in the words. A doctor who heals someone does what he ought, and so acts temperately by Critias' account, yet he need not know when his treatment benefits and when it does not; so a man could be temperate without knowing that he is (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). Critias would sooner take back some of what he has agreed than accept that consequence (164c–d), and at 165b gives up everything said before (see ἀφίημι).

The plainness Socrates asked for was plainness about what each word is applied to (163d; see δηλόω). The definition meets that request and still fails, which can be read as the dialogue's judgement on definitions made by drawing lines between words: a boundary drawn plainly does not yet show that the man inside it knows where he stands.

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs, with Socrates' request before it and the first objection after it.

163d–e Socrates allows Critias any names he likes, and asks him to go back to the beginning and define more plainly.

163e Critias: the man who makes good things is temperate; I give you a plain definition, temperance is the doing of good things.

164a–c A doctor acting beneficially does not always know that he has, and so would be temperate without knowing it.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates puts the same demand to Thrasymachus, who has accused him of arguing in bad faith: so that nothing of the kind happens to them again, let him define in which sense he speaks of the ruler and the stronger, the one so called in ordinary speech or the one in the strictest sense. Thrasymachus chooses the ruler in the strictest sense (341b). As with Critias, the definition is asked for to stop an argument from turning on a word, and in both dialogues the more precise definition is the one that is then refuted.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon says that Socrates thought those who knew what each thing is could also explain it to others, and never stopped examining with his companions what each of the things that are might be; to go through all the things he defined, διωρίζετο, would be a long task.[68]

Translation in this edition

Σαφῶς σοι διορίζομαι (163e11) is "I give you a plain definition": the English turns adverb and verb into adjective and noun, so that "plain" answers Socrates' "more plainly", σαφέστερον, of 163d7. His ὅρισαι there is "define it".

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀφίημι; δηλόω; δίδωμι; ἐάω; ὁρίζω; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; Πρόδικος; σαφής.

[68] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.6.1.

διπλάσιος · double

The double that would be double of itself · Charmides

διπλάσιον, *diplasion*, "double"; διπλασίων, *diplasiōn*, "of the other doubles"

At a Glance

The word. Διπλάσιος, twofold, double; in the neuter, "the double", a quantity twice another.

In the *Charmides*. In one sentence, the relative Socrates takes up next after the greater: "And again, if something is double both of the other doubles and of itself, then it would presumably be double of itself and of the others as of halves; for there is no double of anything but a half" (168c).

In this edition. "Double".

A place to read. 168b–e.

Meaning

The adjective is formed from δίς, "twice", with the ending of multiples that also gives τριπλάσιος, "triple", and πολλαπλάσιος, "manifold". It is a relative word in the strictest sense: nothing is double except of something, and what it is double of is fixed exactly, a half.

Use in the book

The double follows the greater. Socrates has argued that whatever is greater is greater than something smaller, so that a greater which was greater than itself would also be smaller than itself (168b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). He goes on: "And again, if something is double both of the other doubles and of itself, then it would presumably be double of itself and of the others as of halves; for there is no double of anything but a half." "True" (168c; see ἥμισυς). The conclusion is left unstated, and Critias only agrees: a double of itself would have to be its own half, and so both double and half of the same thing.

The case is the plainest of those Socrates lists, because the relation names its correlate exactly. Hearing and sight, by contrast, are bound to sound and colour, and whether they could hear or see themselves he leaves among the

cases that "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others" (168d–169a; see ἀκοή; ἀπιστία; ὄψις). With magnitudes and numbers he says the self-relation is "altogether impossible" (168e; see ἀδύνατος; πλῆθος), and the double is a relation of numbers. Its place in the argument is to show the principle at its clearest before Socrates states it, that whatever has its own power in relation to itself must have the character toward which that power is directed (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

Knowledge stands at the head of the list as one more relative: it is of something, and has a power such that it is of something (168b; see δύναμις), as the double is of a half. Whether knowledge is a relative of this kind, so that a knowledge of itself would be as impossible as a double of itself, Socrates leaves to "a great man" (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ); Critias had denied at 166b–c that it is like the others (see διαφέρω).

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with the greater before it, the principle after it, and the verdict on magnitudes and numbers.

168b–c A greater that is greater than itself would also be smaller than itself.

168c A double of itself and of the other doubles would be double of itself as of a half.

168c–d What is more than itself will be less; whatever has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at.

168e With magnitudes and numbers the self-relation is altogether impossible.

Elsewhere in Plato

The double gives the *Meno* its geometry lesson. Socrates draws a square of four square feet and asks Meno's slave for the side of the square twice its size. The boy says double the side, and finds that it makes not a double but a fourfold square, sixteen feet (82e–83c); then he tries three feet, which gives nine (83e); at last, led on, he finds that the double square is drawn on the line from corner to corner, which the experts call the diagonal (85b). Socrates turns to Meno in the middle of the lesson to say that he teaches the boy nothing but asks him everything (82e; see διδάσκω). In the *Republic* the doubles relate to the halves in the same list as the greater to the smaller, the

heavier to the lighter and knowledge to what is learned (438b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle opens his treatment of relatives with the same two examples as the *Charmides*: things are relative when what they are is said to be of or than something else, as the greater is greater than something and the double double of something; and state, condition, perception, knowledge and position are relatives too, since knowledge is called knowledge of something.[69] In his book of distinctions he lists the kinds of relatives: some as the double to the half and the triple to the third, or as what exceeds to what is exceeded; some as what can heat to what can be heated; and some as the measurable to the measure, the knowable to knowledge and the perceptible to perception.[70] Aristotle's list puts the *Charmides*' double and its knowledge in different classes, and can be read as an answer to the likeness the dialogue tests.

Translation in this edition

Διπλάσιον (168c4, 168c6) is "double", and τῶν τε ἄλλων διπλασίων (168c4–5) "of the other doubles". Ἡμίσεος (168c5, 168c7) is "of halves" and "a half", the English using the plural where the Greek has the singular genitive with ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

See also

ἀδύνατος; ἀκοή; ἀπιστία; διαφέρω; διδάσκω; δύναμις; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἥμισυς; μέγας ἀνήρ; ὄψις; πλῆθος.

δοκέω · be thought, seem, think

What the boy is thought to be, and what seems so to him · Charmides

[69] Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 6a36–b6.
[70] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.15, 1020b26–32.

δοκοῦντος, *dokountos*, "who is thought"; δοκεῖ, *dokei*, "in ... opinion", "is thought"; δόξαι, *doxai*, "was ... thought"; δοκῶ, *dokō*, "think I am"; ἐδόκει, *edokei*, "He was thought"; δοκεῖ μοι, *dokei moi*, "I think", "it seems to me"; τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν, *to emoi dokoun*, "what I think"

At a Glance

The word. Δοκέω, to seem; with a dative, "it seems to me", and so "I think"; of persons, to be thought, to be reputed, to have a name for something.

In the *Charmides*. About fifty times, most often in "I think" and "it seems". Eight times it is said of reputation: of the boy "who is thought the most beautiful" (154a) and thought the most temperate (157d), of his uncle (158a), of the author of a definition who "was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b).

In this edition. "Is thought", "in ... opinion", "think", "seem".

A place to read. 157c–158e.

Meaning

The verb has two directions. What seems to me is my opinion; what I seem to others is my reputation. Both are δόξα, the verb's noun (see δόξα), and Greek moves between them without a change of word. Οἱ δοκοῦντες, "those who are thought something", are men of standing; τὸ δοκοῦν μοι is what I think. Between the two lies the gap the Socratic dialogues work in, between being thought wise and being wise (see ἀλαζών).

Use in the book

The prologue speaks in the language of reputation. Critias tells Socrates that the young men coming in are "the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway" (154a; see πρόδρομος); that the boy is a philosopher "and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (154e–155a; see ποιητικός); that "Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for", and "that he is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d). Socrates adds that no man on the continent "was ever thought handsomer or bigger" than Pyrilampes

(158a; see πρεσβεύω). The boy himself fears to deny his temperance, since, he says, "I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account" (158d; see αἰσχυντηλός). The man who said that temperance is doing one's own business "was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b; see αἰνίττομαι).

Reputation is where the inquiry begins, and what it sets aside. Socrates does not ask the boy whether he is thought temperate, but what temperance seems to him to be (159a, 160d–e, with φαίνεσθαι), and the boy's answers are given with δοκεῖν: "in his view", οἱ δοκοῖ, temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly (159b), and he thinks, δοκεῖ μοι, that temperance makes a person feel shame (160e). When Critias tries to make Socrates state his own view, he refuses: "Let's not look yet at what I think", τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν, "but at what you are saying now" (163e; see ἐάω). The dialogue thus passes from what others think of Charmides to what Charmides thinks, and keeps Socrates' own opinion out of the examination.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb is said of reputation, what a person is thought to be.

154a The lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful.

154e–155a Charmides is a philosopher and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet.

157d He is thought to surpass his contemporaries in looks and in temperance; he is thought the most temperate of anyone.

158a No man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than Pyrilampes.

158d To deny his temperance would show up Critias and many others who think him temperate.

160a–b In deliberation it is not the quietest person who is thought to deserve praise.

162b The author of the definition was thought to be very wise indeed.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* Socrates tells how he tested the oracle on a politician: it seemed to him that this man seemed wise to many other people and most of

all to himself, but was not, and when he tried to show him so, he made himself hated (21c–d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Critias' phrase about his ward, "in other people's opinion as well as his own", has the same two parts, and can be read as setting up the boy for the test the *Apology* describes.

In the *Republic* Glaucon builds his challenge on the same gap. Injustice at its height is to be thought just while being nothing of the kind, so the perfectly unjust man must be granted the highest name for justice; and beside him is to be set the just man, plain and well-born, who in the words of the tragic poet Aeschylus wants to be good rather than to be thought so. His reputation must be stripped from him, Glaucon says, since a man held to be just will be paid in honours and presents, and no one could then tell whether his justice is for its own sake or for theirs (361a–c).

Other ancient sources

The line Glaucon has in mind is spoken in Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes* of the seer Amphiaraus, who carries no device on his shield: he does not wish to seem the best, but to be it.[71]

Translation in this edition

Of reputation the edition uses "is thought" (154a5, 157d2, 157d6, 160a10) and "was thought" (162b3) and, for ὡς δοκεῖ ἄλλοις τε καὶ ἑαυτῷ (155a1), "in other people's opinion as well as his own". Δόξαι (158a3) is "was ... thought", and οἷς δοκῶ εἶναι σώφρων (158d4) "who think I am temperate", turning the Greek's "to whom I seem" into "who think". In the first person δοκεῖ μοι is mostly "I think", and in questions δοκεῖ σοι is "do you think". Τὸ ἐμοὶ δοκοῦν (163e6) is "what I think". At 157d2 Burnet prints W's present δοκεῖ, "is thought", where B and T have the imperfect ἐδόκει; at 157d6 he prints T's reading, also a variant in W, where B has what the edition's note at 157d renders "thought the most sagacious (polyphrenestatos) of very many" (apparatus, d2, d6). At 158a3 he prints T's infinitive δόξαι, where B has the noun δόξα (apparatus, a3).

[71] Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes* 590–592.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; αἰνίττομαι; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀλαζών; δόξα; ἐάω; εὐδοκιμέω; ποιητικός; πρεσβεύω; πρόδρομος.

δόξα · opinion

The opinion temperance would give, and the opinion of opinions · Charmides

δόξα, *doxa*, "opinion"; δόξαν, *doxan*, "opinion"; δοξῶν, *doxōn*, "of opinions"

At a Glance

The word. Δόξα, what seems: an opinion, belief, judgement; and what others think of one, repute, glory.

In the *Charmides*. Five times, at two moments: twice at 159a, and three times in one phrase at 168a. Socrates tells the boy that if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to a sense "from which you would have some opinion about it" (159a), and asks him to say what temperance is "in your opinion" (159a). In the procession of powers, "an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself" (168a).

In this edition. "Opinion".

A place to read. 158e–159b.

Meaning

The noun of δοκέω, "to seem", δόξα is the seeming as it is held: what seems to me, my view; and what I seem to others, my good name. In Plato the first sense becomes a term of art. Opinion can be true or false, and so differs from knowledge, which cannot be false; and true opinion differs from knowledge in lacking the account that would tie it down.

Use in the book

Socrates founds the inquiry on the boy's opinion. If temperance is in him, Socrates tells him, it must give rise to some sense, "from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is" (158e–159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι). The chain runs from presence to

perception, from perception to opinion, and from opinion to speech, for the boy knows how to speak Greek and so can say what it seems to him to be (159a; see ἑλληνίζω). The edition's note at 159a says that on one reading the remark states an assumption the inquiry will lean on, that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words. The boy is not asked for knowledge, only for an opinion, "what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν), and the three definitions that follow are his opinions examined.

The noun returns at the end of the procession of powers, after sight, hearing, perception, desire, wish, love and fear: "Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about?" "Not at all" (168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; δοξάζω). Opinion is the last case before knowledge itself, and the nearest to it. Critias will not grant an opinion that opines nothing but opinions, and yet he holds that there is a knowledge of nothing but knowledge. Socrates' next words are that this is strange, "if there really is such a thing" (168a; see ἄτοπος).

The two uses can be read together. At 159a the boy's opinion was to be the trace that temperance leaves in him, and so evidence of something other than itself. At 168a an opinion that had no object but opinions would be evidence of nothing, and Critias cannot believe in it. The dialogue's method depends on the first kind of opinion; its argument tests whether temperance could be a knowledge of the second kind, with no object but knowledge.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

158e–159a If temperance is present in the boy, it gives rise to a sense from which he would have an opinion about it.

159a He is to say what temperance is, in his opinion.

168a An opinion of opinions and of itself, which has no opinion about the things other opinions are about.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Meno* Socrates compares true opinions to the statues of Daedalus, the legendary craftsman, which run away unless they are tied down. True opinions, for as long as they remain, are a fine thing to have and accomplish nothing but good; but they are unwilling to remain for long and slip out of a person's soul, so they are worth little until someone binds them with a reckoning of the cause. Once bound they turn first into knowledge and then into something lasting; this is why knowledge is valued above right opinion, and it is the binding that sets the two apart (97d–98a).

In the *Republic* Glaucon agrees that opinion is a power, since it is that by which we are able to opine, and that it is not the same as knowledge, since knowledge cannot err and opinion can; and since they are different powers, Socrates concludes, each is by nature set over something different: knowledge over what is, to know it as it is, and opinion, they agree, to opine; so what is known and what is opined cannot be the same (477e–478b). On that account an opinion would be defined by its object as the *Charmides* defines every power (168b; see δύναμις), and an opinion with no object of its own, like the one Critias rejects at 168a, would not be an opinion. In the *Symposium* Diotima places right opinion between understanding and ignorance (202a; see διδόναι λόγον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle distinguishes opinion from imagination by its tie to speech. Opinion may be true or false, and conviction follows on it, since one cannot opine without being convinced of what seems so; conviction comes from being persuaded, and persuasion from reasoned speech, which the beasts lack.[72] The *Charmides*' step from the boy's opinion to his speaking Greek can be read in the same way: an opinion is something its holder can say.

Translation in this edition

Δόξα (159a2) is "opinion" in "some opinion about it", and κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν (159a10) "in your opinion". At 168a3 δόξαν δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὐτῆς is

[72] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 3.3, 428a18–24.

"an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself", the relative clause supplying the verb the Greek leaves out. The verb of the family, δοξάζειν, is "have some opinion" at 159a1 and "have an opinion about", "be opinions about" at 168a (see δοξάζω).

See also

αἴσθησις; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἄτοπος; διδόναι λόγον; δοκέω; δοξάζω; δύναμις; ἑλληνίζω; ἔνειμι; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν.

δοξάζω · have an opinion

Having an opinion about temperance, and opining nothing but opinions · Charmides

δοξάζειν, *doxazein*, "have some opinion"; δοξάζουσιν, *doxazousin*, "are opinions about"; δοξάζουσαν, *doxazousan*, "has no opinion about" (with μηδέν)

At a Glance

The word. Δοξάζω, to have an opinion, to judge, to suppose; the verb of δόξα.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in two passages: "if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it" (159a), and the opinion of opinions that would opine none of the things other opinions are about (168a).

In this edition. "Have some opinion", "are opinions about", "has no opinion about".

A place to read. 167e–168a.

Use in the book

The verb, like the noun, marks the start of the inquiry and the procession of powers. At 158e–159a it is the boy's capacity: εἴ σοι πάρεστιν σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν, if temperance is present in him, Socrates tells him, "you have some opinion about it" (158e–159a; see δόξα; πάρειμι). The opinion has an object, περὶ αὐτῆς, "about it".

At 168a the verb is used twice to describe the opinion Critias will not allow, an opinion of opinions and of itself which "has no opinion about" any of the things the other opinions are about (168a; see δόξα). The plural δοξάζουσιν says what opinions do, the participle μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν what this one would not. An opining that opines none of the things that opinions are about would not be opining anything, and the verb shows the absurdity better than the noun: one cannot opine without opining something. The step from this to knowledge, which Critias says can be of nothing but knowledge, is the one the dialogue leaves to be tested (168a–169a).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

158e–159a If temperance is present, the boy can have some opinion about it.

168a An opinion of opinions that has no opinion about the things other opinions are about.

Elsewhere in Plato

The principle that opining is of something is stated in the *Theaetetus*. Whoever sees, sees some one thing, and a thing that is; whoever hears, hears some one thing; "and whoever opines, does he not opine some one thing?" "Necessarily." "And whoever opines one thing, something that is?" Theaetetus grants it, and Socrates concludes that one cannot opine what is not (188e–189b). The *Theaetetus* also makes opining a kind of speech, the statement the soul makes to itself when it has done questioning (189e–190a; see αἴσθησις). On both accounts an opinion must be of something and must say something, and the opinion the *Charmides* rejects at 168a, which opines none of the things the other opinions are about, can be read as failing that test.

Translation in this edition

Ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν (159a1) is "you have some opinion about it", the English rendering the Greek's "you are able to" by "you have". At 168a ὧν δὲ αἱ ἄλλαι δοξάζουσιν μηδὲν δοξάζουσαν becomes a relative clause, the participle rendered "has no opinion about" and the plural verb "are opinions about".

Περὶ αὐτῆς (159a1) is the reading of B and of a later hand in T; T has αὐτήν (apparatus, a1).

See also

αἴσθησις; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; δόξα; πάρειμι.

δόσις · is given

δόσεως, *doseōs*, "before ... is given" (with πρό)

Attested: δόσεως (*doseōs*; 158c). A giving; in medicine, the administering of a dose. Socrates sets out the second of two cases: "But if you seem still to be lacking in these things, the charm must be sung before the remedy is given" (158c; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). The Greek is πρὸ τῆς τοῦ φαρμάκου δόσεως, "before the giving of the remedy", which the English turns into a passive verb. The order is the Thracian's, who bade Socrates let no one persuade him to treat his head with the remedy unless he first handed over his soul to the charm (157b–c). The noun names the moment of administering that waits on the charm, and the dialogue never reaches it: the boy asks to be charmed "every day" (176b), and the leaf is not given.

See also δοτέος; ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον.

δοτέος · should be given

δοτέον, *doteon*, "should be given"

Attested: δοτέον (*doteon*; 158b). The verbal adjective of δίδωμι: "to be given", "one must give". It states the first of the two cases: if temperance is already present in the boy, he needs no charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris, and, Socrates tells him, "the remedy for the head itself should be given you straightaway" (158b–c; see Ἀβάρις; Ζάλμοξις). Its partner in the next clause is ἐπᾳστέον, "must be sung", if the boy lacks temperance (158c; see δόσις). The two verbal adjectives frame the choice that the questioning

must settle, and the choice is never settled: the boy does not know which case is his (176a).

See also Ἀβάρις; δίδωμι; δόσις; Ζάλμοξις.

δράω · do

δρῶν, *drōn*, "the one who does it"; δρῶντες, *drōntes*, "when you did that"; δράσουσιν, *drasousin*, "will do so"; δρᾷς, *drāis*, "you do this"

Attested: δρῶν (*drōn*; 160b), δρῶντες (*drōntes*; 161e), δράσουσιν (*drasousin*; 172b), δρᾷς (*drāis*; 176b). To do, act; the verb the Dorians, Aristotle reports, claimed as their word for doing where the Athenians said πράττειν,[73] and one that stands outside the distinctions Critias draws at 163b–c between doing, making and working (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). In deliberation it is not the quietest who is thought to deserve praise, "but the one who does it most easily and most quickly" (160b). In the argument against "doing one's own business" it stands beside the play the edition's note at 161e describes, "The argument plays on 'do'", the "do" of "doing one's own business": Socrates asks the boy, of writing his enemies' names, "Well, were you being busybodies, and not temperate, when you did that?" (161e; see πολυπραγμονέω). With temperance as a knowledge of knowledge, those who examine without it "will do so more feebly and poorly" (172b; see ἐξετάζω). The last use is Critias': "But Charmides, if you do this, it will be proof to me that you are temperate" (176b). Burnet supplies ἤν, "if", after Goldbacher, where later manuscripts add εἰ; Hermann deleted δρᾷς τοῦτο, and Madvig conjectured the imperative δρᾶ, "do it" (apparatus, b5). The thing to be done is to let Socrates charm him, and the doing ends in a plot (176c; see βουλεύομαι).

See also βουλεύομαι; ἐξετάζω; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πολυπραγμονέω.

[73] Aristotle, *Poetics* 3, 1448a35–b2.

δύναμις · power

The power of the charm, and the power that is of something · Charmides

δύναμιν, *dynamin*, "its power", "a certain power"; δύναμις, *dynamis*, "its power"

At a Glance

The word. Δύναμις, power, capacity, ability: what a thing can do or undergo; of a drug or a food, its potency; the noun of δύναμαι, "to be able".

In the *Charmides*. Seven times: once in the prologue, "Just now I was at a loss how to show you its power" (156b), and six times in the argument of 168b–169a, where knowledge, the greater, hearing and every other thing are asked whether they can have their power in relation to themselves.

In this edition. "Power".

A place to read. 168b–169a.

Meaning

Δύναμις is ability, whether to act or to be acted on, and the word covers the strength of a body, the potency of a drug and the might of a city. The edition's note at 168b defines it as "what a thing is able to do or undergo in relation to something else", and adds that the argument assumes "that each capacity is defined by its proper object".

Use in the book

The first use is the doctor's. Socrates has promised the boy a leaf with a charm, and begins to explain: "Just now I was at a loss how to show you its power": it is not the kind of charm that can make the head alone healthy (156b; see ἀπορέω; ἐπῳδή). The charm's power is described by its reach: it treats the part only with the whole, the body only with the soul (156b–157a; see τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος).

The second is the philosopher's. After the procession of perceptions and desires, Socrates gives knowledge "a certain power such that it is of something" (168b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). He applies the same word to the greater, whose power is to be greater than something smaller (168b; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον), and states the principle in it: whatever has its own

power in relation to itself must have the character toward which its power was directed (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). The cases are then sorted by whether their power can be so turned (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος).

The word thus covers a capacity to act, as sight sees and hearing hears, and a relation, as the greater is greater than the smaller and the double double of the half (168c; see διπλάσιος). Which of the two knowledge is like, Socrates does not decide (169a); what the principle yields for each is told under δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό.

The two halves of the dialogue can be read through the one word. Socrates begins unable to show the power of the charm; he ends with a temperance that, even if it existed, would have no power to benefit (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής). The charm was promised to cure by its power over the whole; the definition under test is a knowledge whose power would be turned only on itself.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

156b Socrates was at a loss how to show the boy the power of the charm.

168b Knowledge has a certain power such that it is of something; so has the greater.

168d Whatever has its own power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at.

168e Some cases are impossible, some strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves.

169a A great man is needed to decide whether anything has its own power in relation to itself.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* makes the note's principle explicit, telling powers apart by what they are set over and what they accomplish (477c–d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), and counts opinion among them (477e–478a; see δόξα).

In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea offers the materialists a mark of what is: whatever has any power at all, either to act on anything else of whatever kind or to be acted on even the least amount by the slightest thing, and even

once, really is; "for I lay it down as a mark to define the things that are, that they are nothing other than power" (247d–e). He then asks the friends of the forms whether knowing and being known are acting and being acted on. Theaetetus answers for them that they are neither, since if knowing were acting, what is known would have to be acted on, and being, in so far as it is known, would be moved, which they hold cannot happen to what is at rest (248d–e). On the visitor's mark, which they refuse, knowledge and its object can be read as both powers, one to act and one to be acted on, and a knowledge of itself would be both at once.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle calls every art and every productive knowledge a power, since each is a source of change in another or in the thing itself as other; and he distinguishes the powers that go with reason from those that do not. The rational ones are the same for contraries, as medicine is the power of disease and of health; the irrational are one of one, as heat is only of heating.[74] The *Charmides*' medicine, whose practitioner "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e), is a rational power in Aristotle's sense, and Critias' knowledge, of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge (166e), can be read as one too.

Translation in this edition

Τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς (156b2) is "its power", and τινὰ τοιαύτην δύναμιν ὥστε τινὸς εἶναι (168b3) "a certain power such that it is of something". At 168d1–2 τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτό is "its own power in relation to itself", and πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν "toward which its power was directed", keeping the imperfect ἦν as "was": the power was so directed all along.

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀνωφελής; ἀπορέω; διπλάσιος; δόξα; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπῳδή; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

[74] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9.2, 1046b2–7.

δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό · power in relation to itself

Whether anything can have its power in relation to itself · Charmides

τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτό, *tēn heautou dynamin pros heauto*, "its own power in relation to itself"; τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτά, *tēn heautōn dynamin pros heauta*, "their own power in relation to themselves"; τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό, *tēn hautou dynamin auto pros heauto*, "its own power in relation to itself"

At a Glance

The word. To have one's own power towards oneself: to act on, perceive or stand in relation to oneself by the very capacity one has towards other things.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: in the principle (168d), in the sorting of cases (168e), and in the question left to a great man (169a).

In this edition. "Its own power in relation to itself".

A place to read. 168b–169a.

Use in the book

The principle comes after the greater and the double. "Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?" (168d). The edition's note at 168d explains: "'Character' renders ousia, being or nature. The principle: if a thing's power is to be exercised on itself, the thing must itself have the property that power is directed at." Hearing, then, if it heard itself, would have to have a sound (168d; see ἀκοή), and sight, if it saw itself, would have to have some colour, since sight never sees what has none (168d–e; see ἄχρως; ὄψις).

The principle sorts the cases. Magnitudes and numbers cannot have their power in relation to themselves, since a greater than itself would be smaller than itself, and hearing, sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat are doubted (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; θερμότης; κίνησις). Then the question that the dialogue leaves open, for a great man to determine: "whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or

whether some are and some are not", and whether knowledge is among those that relate to themselves (169a; see διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ).

The principle can be read as having two strengths. For relatives like the greater and the double it yields a contradiction, since the thing would be both of two opposites to itself. For perceptions it yields only a condition, that a sight which saw itself be coloured, and the condition is strange rather than impossible: hence the doubt. For knowledge the condition would be that knowledge be itself a thing to be known, and that is no contradiction at all. The dialogue's refusal to decide is therefore exact. What it decides instead is that even a possible knowledge of knowledge would not know what the doctor knows (170a–171c; see ἀληθινός).

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs, with the cases they sum up.

168d Whatever has its own power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at; hearing would have a sound.

168d–e Sight, if it is to see itself, must have some colour.

168e–169a Magnitudes and numbers cannot; hearing, sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat are doubted.

169a A great man is needed to decide whether anything, and whether knowledge, has its own power in relation to itself.

Elsewhere in Plato

Two of the doubted cases are taken up elsewhere. Self-motion becomes the definition of soul in the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* (*Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* 895e–896a; see ἀδύνατος). Sight can be read as answered in the *First Alcibiades*. If an eye were told "see yourself", Socrates says, it would have to look at something in which it could see itself; and in the eye opposite, in the part called the pupil, the face of the one looking in appears as in a mirror. So an eye that would see itself must look into an eye, and at the part of it in which the eye's excellence, sight, comes to be; and a soul that would know itself must look into a soul, and at the part where wisdom comes to be (132d–133b; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The eye there does not see itself by its

own power turned on itself, as the *Charmides* imagines, but by looking at another eye.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines power as a source of change in another, or in the thing itself as other: the builder's art is not in the house being built, but the doctor's art may be in the man being healed, though not in him as healed.[75] The doctor who heals himself has his power in relation to himself only as to another, which can be read as Aristotle's way through the *Charmides*' doubt. On sight he asks whether we perceive that we see by sight itself, and concludes that it must be so (*On the Soul* 3.2; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς); on thought, that the divine mind thinks itself (*Metaphysics* 12.9; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει).

Translation in this edition

The phrase is "its own power in relation to itself" at 168d1 and 169a3–4, and "their own power in relation to themselves" at 168e5. At 168d2 τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν is "the character toward which its power was directed". At 169a3 B and T have αὑτοῦ, a later hand in T αὐτήν. Πέφυκεν (169a4) is "is by nature able". After "in relation to itself" the manuscripts add πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, "except knowledge", which Burnet deletes after Schleiermacher; the edition's note at 169a says that "the words would assume the answer to the question Socrates goes on to ask".

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀκοή; ἀληθινός; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; ἄχρως; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; διαιρέω; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; θερμότης; κίνησις; μέγας ἀνήρ; ὄψις.

δυνατός · able, possible

The able examiner, and the possibility granted for argument's sake · Charmides

[75] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.12, 1019a15–18.

δυνατός, *dynatos*, "able"; δυνατόν, *dynaton*, "possible"; δυνατῷ, *dynatōi*, "its being possible"

At a Glance

The word. Δυνατός, the adjective of δύναμις: of persons, able, capable, powerful; of things, possible.

In the *Charmides*. Nine times. Once of a person, the temperate man who will "be able to inspect others" (167a); eight times of the question whether knowledge of knowledge is possible, from Socrates' plan (167b) to the grants that keep the argument moving (169d, 172c).

In this edition. "Able"; "possible".

A place to read. 169b–d.

Use in the book

The personal sense comes in Socrates' summary of Critias' claim: only the temperate man will know himself and be able to examine what he knows and does not, "and he will likewise be able to inspect others" (167a; see ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω). The first "able" renders οἷός τε, the second δυνατός. The capacity promised the temperate man is the examiner's, and the argument of 170a–171c shows that he would not have it (see ἀληθινός).

The other eight uses are "possible". Socrates proposes to look first whether such a knowledge is possible (167b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν), and after the procession he challenges Critias: "first show this: that what I just mentioned is possible; and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too" (169b–c; see ὠφέλιμος). Critias cannot, and Socrates grants it for now, putting the question off to another time (169d; see αὖθις; συγχωρέω); then he asks how, "even if this is entirely possible", it makes one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not (169d). He grants it again at 172c, together with the definition itself (see δίδωμι).

The grants are withdrawn at the end. Socrates confesses that they conceded there was a knowledge of knowledge though the argument did not allow it (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν), and made the further grant without considering that it is impossible to know in any way what one does not know

at all (175c; see ἀδύνατος). The possibility on which the second half of the dialogue rests was never shown, only granted, and the able examiner of 167a was able only on that grant.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

167a The temperate man will be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and what he only thinks he knows.

167b First whether it is possible to know what one knows and does not, and then, even if it is entirely possible, what the benefit would be.

169a–b Socrates cannot say with confidence whether it is possible.

169b–c Critias is to show first that it is possible, and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial.

169d Let us grant for now that it is possible; even if it is entirely possible, how does it make one more able to know what one knows and does not?

172c Granting that it is possible to know knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates the two senses that the *Charmides* uses side by side. Of the able, he says that powers are sources of change; of the possible, that something is impossible when its contrary is necessarily true, as it is impossible that the diagonal of a square be commensurable with its side, and possible when its contrary is not necessarily false, as it is possible for a man to be sitting; and these possibles, he adds, are not so called by reference to a power.[76] The temperate man's ability at 167a is a power in the first sense; the possibility of knowledge of knowledge at 167b–169d is a question in the second.

Translation in this edition

Δυνατὸς ἔσται ἐπισκοπεῖν (167a3) is "will ... be able to inspect". Δυνατόν is "possible" elsewhere, and εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν (167b3, 169d5) "even if it is entirely possible". Πρὸς τῷ δυνατῷ (169b8) is "besides its being possible". Τοῦτο γενέσθαι (169a8) and δυνατὸν εἶναι γενέσθαι (169d3) are "possible for

[76] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.12, 1019a15–18, 1019b22–1020a6.

this to come about" and "possible for there to be". Burnet brackets ἀποδεῖξαί σε, "that you demonstrate", after Heindorf (apparatus, b8).

See also

ἀδύνατος; ἀληθινός; αὖθις; δίδωμι; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω; ὠφέλιμος.

δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα · one of two things

The dilemma that disposes of quietness · Charmides

δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα, *dyoin gar dē ta hetera*, "For one of two things is true"

At a Glance

The word. "Of two things, the one": one of two alternatives holds. Δυοῖν is the genitive of the dual, τὰ ἕτερα the plural of ἕτερος, "the one of two", and the verb is understood.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the last step against the boy's first definition (160b–c).

In this edition. "For one of two things is true".

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Use in the book

Socrates has run the boy through the doings of body and soul, writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, running, learning, teaching and remembering, and in each the quick has seemed finer than the quiet (159c–160b; see ταχύς). He concludes that temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor the temperate life quiet, "since, being temperate, it has to be fine" (160b; see δεῖ). Then the dilemma: "For one of two things is true": quiet actions in life have appeared finer than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places (160b–c; see οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ). And he adds a concession: "even supposing, my friend, at the very most", that the fine quiet actions are as many as the vigorous ones, temperance would still not be quietness any more than quickness (160c; see ἐλάττων).

The two horns are not opposites, as in most dilemmas, but two degrees of the same claim, "nowhere" and "in very few places"; and the concession grants more than either horn. The argument therefore does not depend on choosing between them. It wins on the weakest supposition the boy might make, that quiet and quick are equal, since even then quietness could not be what temperance is. The phrase that promises a choice delivers an argument that needs none, and the conclusion follows, that the quiet life would be no more temperate than the unquiet (160d; see βίος).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

160b–d One of two things is true: quiet actions are finer nowhere or in very few places; and even if as many, temperance would not be quietness.

Elsewhere in Plato

The same phrase, in the singular δυοῖν θάτερον, opens Socrates' last consolation in the *Apology*: "being dead is one of two things". Either the dead man is as nothing and perceives nothing at all, or, by what is told, it is a kind of change for the soul, a removal from this place to another. If it is like a sleep without dreams, death is an astonishing gain; if it is a journey to another place, and the story is true that all the dead are there, what greater good could there be (40c–e)? As in the *Charmides*, either horn leads to the same conclusion.

In the *Theaetetus* the phrase states what an inquiry can promise. When Theaetetus, after his first definition has failed, ventures a second, that true opinion is knowledge, Socrates encourages him: if we do this, "one of two things": either we shall come upon what we are looking for, or we shall suppose less often that we know what we in no way know, and that would be a wage no one could fairly despise (187b–c). The second horn can be read as the result the *Charmides* reaches.

Translation in this edition

Δυοῖν γὰρ δὴ τὰ ἕτερα (160b9) is "For one of two things is true", the English supplying the verb. The two horns follow with ἢ ... ἢ, "either ... or".

See also

βίος; δεῖ; ἐλάττων; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; ταχύς.

δυσμαθία · learning with difficulty

Slowness to learn, in the argument against quietness · Charmides

δυσμαθία, *dysmathia*, "learning with difficulty"

At a Glance

The word. Δυσμαθία, difficulty in learning, slowness of understanding; the opposite of εὐμαθία, ease in learning.

In the *Charmides*. Twice in one exchange: "Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?" and "learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?" (159e).

In this edition. "Learning with difficulty".

A place to read. 159c–160b.

Meaning

The noun joins δυσ-, "ill, hard", to the root of μανθάνειν, "to learn". It names a defect of nature rather than of effort: the δυσμαθής is the slow learner, as the εὐμαθής is the quick one. In Plato the pair belongs to the description of natures fit for philosophy.

Use in the book

The word comes in the second half of Socrates' case against quietness, when he passes from the body to the soul: "And what about this? ... Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?" "Learning easily." "And learning easily ... is learning quickly, isn't it, and learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly?" "Yes" (159e; see εὐμαθία). Teaching, recollecting and remembering follow, all finer done quickly (159e; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; διδάσκω), and then quick-wittedness, a sharpness of the soul and not a quietness (160a; see ἀγχίνοια; ὀξύτης).

The step from "with difficulty" to "quietly and slowly" is the one on which the argument turns. "Quietly", ἡσυχῇ, was the boy's own word for the bearing of temperance (159b; see ἡσυχῇ), and "slowly" is Socrates' addition: the edition's note at 159b calls it "a word Charmides never used", and reports that on one reading the refutation "trades on that shift" (see βραδέως). Joined to learning with difficulty, the boy's virtue becomes a defect of nature. On that reading the argument proves only that slowness of mind is not temperance, which the boy never claimed; others reply, as the note records, that his word can cover slowness.

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with the steps on each side of it.

159c–d In the body the quick and nimble are finer than the quiet.

159e Learning easily is finer than learning with difficulty; learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly; so with teaching, recollecting and remembering.

160a–b Quick-wittedness is a sharpness of the soul; the one who deliberates most easily and quickly is praised.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* finds in one boy what the *Charmides*' argument sets apart. Theodorus says that he has never met so wonderful a nature: a boy who learns with an ease few could match, and is at the same time gentle beyond the ordinary and brave besides. The sharp, quick-witted and retentive, he says, are mostly hasty in temper and rush headlong like unballasted boats, more manic than brave, while the steadier come to their studies somehow sluggish and full of forgetfulness; but Theaetetus comes to learning and inquiry evenly, without stumbling and to some purpose, with great mildness, like oil running without a sound (144a–b). The *Republic* draws the same division between quick and steady natures (503c–d; see ἀγχίνοια), and among the marks of the philosophic soul asks whether it is quick or slow to learn, since no one will love what he does with pain and little result (486c).

Socrates claims the defect for himself. In the *Theaetetus* he says he is vexed at his own slowness to learn and at what is truly idle talk, dragging arguments up and down through dullness, unable to be persuaded and hard to part

from any argument (195b–c); in the *Republic* he pleads that he is, it seems, a slow learner (358a). In the *Charmides* he says the same of himself in other words when Critias says that knowing oneself and knowing what one knows and what one does not are the same: he is his same old self, he says, and "again I don't understand" (170a). The slowness the argument of 159e treats as a defect can be read as the one Socrates professes when he needs an argument made clearer.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates what Socrates' list puts together. The same people, he says, are not good at remembering and at recollecting: for the most part the slow are better at remembering, the quick and those who learn easily better at recollecting.[77] At 159e both are "finer" done quickly.

Translation in this edition

Δυσμαθία (159e1, 159e4) is "learning with difficulty", and εὐμαθία "learning easily": the nouns become gerunds, so that the next step, "learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly", reads as the further claim it is.

See also

ἀγχίνοια; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; βραδέως; διδάσκω; εὐμαθία; ἡσυχῇ; ὀξύτης.

[77] Aristotle, *On Memory and Recollection* 1, 449b6–8.

E Epsilon

ἔα χαίρειν · say goodbye to

Socrates bids Critias let persons go and follow the argument · Charmides

ἔα χαίρειν, *ea chairein*, "say goodbye to"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐᾶν χαίρειν, "to let (a person or thing) rejoice": to bid it farewell, dismiss it, think no more of it.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the turn of the dialogue's method: "answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e).

In this edition. "Say goodbye to".

A place to read. 166b–e.

Meaning

Χαῖρε, "rejoice", was the ordinary Greek greeting at meeting and at parting, and χαίρειν its infinitive. With ἐᾶν, "to let", the parting sense prevails: to let something rejoice is to leave it to its own devices, and so to have done with it. Plato uses the phrase often for setting aside a person, a question or a story so that the argument may go on without it. The edition's note at 166e gives the literal sense: "'Say goodbye to' is ea chairein, literally 'let it rejoice': perhaps a smile at Critias, who has just banished 'rejoice' as a greeting."

Use in the book

Critias has claimed that temperance alone of the kinds of knowledge is knowledge of itself and of the others, and has accused Socrates of trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about (166c; see ἐάω; ἐλέγχω). Socrates answers that he refutes Critias for the same reason he scrutinizes himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166c–d;

see ἐλέγχω), and that it is a common good that each thing should become plain as it really is (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then the instruction: "Then take heart, my dear fellow ... answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e; see ἀποκρίνομαι).

The phrase answers Critias' complaint in his own verb. He had accused Socrates of letting go, ἐάσας, of the subject; Socrates tells him to let go, ἔα, of the persons. What is to be dismissed is the question of whose argument wins, and what is to be kept is the argument: "Just pay attention to the argument itself" (166e; see ἐκβαίνω). Critias agrees at once, "you seem to me to be talking sense", and gives his definition again (166e).

The note's smile is in the sequence. Two pages earlier Critias read the Delphic inscription as the god's greeting given "in place of 'Rejoice!'", on the view that "this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one" (164d–e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; χαίρω). Socrates now uses the word Critias banished to bid him part with his own standing in the argument. The dialogue can be read as testing whether Critias can take the advice: three pages later, unable to make the distinctions asked of him, he is "ashamed in front of the company" and covers up his perplexity rather than admit it (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the complaint it answers.

166c Critias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.

166c–d Socrates refutes others for the reason he scrutinizes himself; it is a common good that each thing should become plain.

166d–e Answer as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.

Elsewhere in Plato

The phrase sets persons aside for the argument in several dialogues. In the *Philebus*, having shown that no understanding or knowledge holds the truest truth about things that never stay the same, Socrates says that "you and I and Gorgias and Philebus" must be given a long farewell, and the following

solemnly declared to the argument: that what is stable, pure and true is found in the things that are always the same, or in what is most akin to them (59b–c; see διαμαρτύρομαι). In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea, having failed to speak correctly about what is not, and finding Theaetetus unwilling to try after him, proposes, "let us say goodbye to you and me", until they meet someone who can do it (239b–c). In the *Laches*, Laches advises Lysimachus and his friend Melesias to let Nicias and himself go as teachers of the young, and not to let Socrates go (200c). In the *Gorgias* Socrates recalls telling Gorgias that if he thought being refuted a gain, as Socrates does, it was worth talking, and if not, to let it be (461a; see ἐλέγχω).

The rhetoricians whose doctrine Socrates reports in the *Phaedrus* use a kindred phrase, πολλὰ χαίρειν εἰπεῖν, the other way: in pursuit of the likely they bid a long farewell to the truth (272e; see εἰκός). Socrates, in the *Phaedo*, asks his friends to think little of Socrates and much more of the truth (91c; see ἀλήθεια).

Translation in this edition

Ἔα χαίρειν (166d9) is "say goodbye to". The English keeps the parting, which lets the smile the note hears at 166e be felt, and governs the double question that follows, εἴτε Κριτίας ἐστὶν εἴτε Σωκράτης ὁ ἐλεγχόμενος, "whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted".

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἀλήθεια; ἀποκρίνομαι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διαμαρτύρομαι; διερευνάω; ἐάω; εἰκός; εἴτε ... εἴτε μή; ἐκβαίνω; ἐλέγχω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; χαίρω.

ἑαυτοῦ · one's own

ἑαυτοῦ, *heautou*, "one's own", "his own", "its own"; αὑτοῦ, *hautou*, "one's own", "his own", "its own", "his"; ἑαυτῶν, *heautōn*, "their own"; αὑτῆς, *hautēs*, "its own"

Attested: in the sense "one's own", with the article, τὰ ἑαυτοῦ (*ta heautou*; 161b, 162a, 162d twice, 163a), τὰ αὑτοῦ (*ta hautou*; 161d, 162a

twice, 162b twice, 163c, 163d), τὸ ἑαυτοῦ (*to heautou*; 161e), τὸ αὑτοῦ (*to hautou*; 161d), τὴν αὑτοῦ (*tēn hautou*; 157b, 169a), τὴν ἑαυτοῦ (*tēn heautou*; 168d), τὰ ἑαυτῶν (*ta heautōn*; 163a twice), τὴν ἑαυτῶν (*tēn heautōn*; 168e), τὸν αὑτοῦ (*ton hautou*; 171c) and τὸ αὑτῆς (*to hautēs*; 174e). The reflexive pronoun, "of himself", and with the article "one's own", what belongs to oneself; αὑτοῦ is its contracted form. Most of these uses carry the formula "doing one's own business", τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, which the boy offers at 161b and Critias defends until 163c (see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Socrates' refutation works by taking the formula literally: the writing-master does not write or teach "only his own name" (161d), and no city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash "his own cloak" (161e; see ἕκαστος). The edition's note at 162d hears the formula again in Socrates' simile for Critias' anger, a poet's at an actor who makes a mess of "the poet's own verses" (ta heautou poiēmata). Socrates sums up Critias' reply: what he calls good is "what is appropriate to one, and one's own" (163d; see οἰκεῖος). In the argument after 165c the reflexive turns from possession to self-relation, a knowledge "of itself" (see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ) and "its own power in relation to itself" (168d, 168e, 169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό); "one's own" returns in the temperate man's "own fellow craftsman" (171c; see ὁμότεχνος) and in each craft's "own work" (174e; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον).

See also διδάσκω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἕκαστος; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; οἰκεῖος; ὁμότεχνος; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον.

ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον · greater and smaller than itself

The greater that would be smaller than itself · Charmides

ἑαυτοῦ μείζον, *heautou meizon*, "greater than itself"; ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ, *elatton heautou*, "smaller than itself"; πλέον … αὑτοῦ, *pleon … hautou*, "more than itself"

At a Glance

The word. A comparative with the reflexive as its genitive of comparison: "greater than itself", "smaller than itself".

In the *Charmides*. In the first of the relatives that follow the procession of powers: "if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself" (168c), with "what is more than itself will also be less" after the double (168c).

In this edition. "Greater than itself", "smaller than itself", "more than itself".

A place to read. 168b–d.

Meaning

Μείζον, "greater", and ἔλαττον, "smaller", take a genitive of what they are compared with. A comparison needs two terms, and the phrase puts the same thing in both places.

Use in the book

After the procession, Socrates makes knowledge one of a class: it is knowledge of something, and has a power such that it is of something (168b; see δύναμις). Then: "For we say that the greater, too, has a certain power such that it is greater than something?" "It has." "Than something smaller, that is, if it is to be greater." "Necessarily." "So if we were to find something greater which is greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than none of the things than which the others are greater, then surely this would certainly be true of it: if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself. Wouldn't it?" "Absolutely necessary, Socrates," he said (168b–c). The double follows (168c; see διπλάσιος), then the more and the less, the

heavier and the lighter, the older and the younger (168c–d; see βαρύς), and the principle that whatever has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

The greater is built to match Critias' knowledge exactly. His temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of none of the things the others are of (166e–167c); Socrates' greater is greater than itself and the other greaters, and than none of the things the others are greater than. With magnitudes the result is "altogether impossible" (168e; see ἀδύνατος; μέγεθος), because nothing can be both greater and smaller than the same thing.

The analogy is the argument's strongest, and its weakness is its likeness. If knowledge were related to its object as the greater to the smaller, a knowledge of itself would be as impossible as a greater than itself. But Critias had already denied that temperance is like the other kinds of knowledge (166b–c; see διαφέρω), and Socrates himself leaves knowledge undecided (169a). The greater can be read as showing what a knowledge of knowledge would have to be if it were a relation of this kind, without showing that it is.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, from the greater to the impossibility it shows.

168b The greater has a power such that it is greater than something, a smaller.

168b–c A greater that is greater than itself would also be smaller than itself.

168c–d What is more than itself will be less; so with heavier and lighter, older and younger.

168e With magnitudes and numbers it is altogether impossible.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates states the class to which the greater belongs. Of things that are of something, he says, those of a certain kind are of something of a certain kind, and those that are themselves are only of something itself: the greater is such as to be greater than something, the smaller, and the much greater than the much smaller; so the more relate to the fewer, the doubles to the halves, the heavier to the lighter, the quicker to the slower, the hot to the

cold; and so with knowledge, which itself is of learning itself, while a particular kind of knowledge is of a particular kind of thing (438b–d). The list repeats the *Charmides*' greater, double and heavier, and counts knowledge among the relatives, as the *Charmides* does at 168b; but the *Republic*'s knowledge itself is of learning itself, and the question the *Charmides* left undecided, whether a knowledge can be of itself, is not raised.

In the *Theaetetus* the greater makes a puzzle of another kind. Six knucklebones set beside four are more, half as many again; beside twelve, fewer, half as many; can anything become greater or more except by being increased? Socrates, without growing or shrinking, is now bigger than the young Theaetetus and within a year will be smaller, though nothing of his bulk is taken away, because Theaetetus has grown. Theaetetus says he wonders at such things until he is dizzy (154c–155c). The *Theaetetus*' greater is greater and smaller than different things, or than the same person at different times, which raises a puzzle but no contradiction; the *Charmides*' greater would be greater and smaller than the same thing, itself.

Translation in this edition

Εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι (168c1–2) is "if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself". At 168c9 πλέον δὲ αὑτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται is "what is more than itself will also be less, will it not": the English uses "smaller" for ἔλαττον beside "greater", and "less" beside "more".

See also

ἀδύνατος; βαρύς; διαφέρω; διπλάσιος; δύναμις; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐλάττων; μέγεθος.

ἐάω · leave, let go

ἐᾶν, *ean*, "let's leave it"; Ἔα, *Ea*, "Never mind that"; ἐάσας, *easas*, "letting go of"; ἐᾷη, *eōiē*, "(would not) allow"; ἐῶντος, *eōntos*, "(did not) allow"

Attested: ἐᾶν (*ean*; 158e), Ἔα (*Ea*; 163e), ἐάσας (*easas*; 166c), ἔα in ἔα χαίρειν (166d), ἐᾷη (*eōiē*; 173d) and ἐῶντος (*eōntos*; 175b, 175c). To let, allow; to let alone, leave be. The first four uses set something aside. Socrates offers to examine the boy's temperance with him: "So if you'd like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let's leave it" (158e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). Critias asks whether Socrates does not think as he does, and Socrates sets aside his own opinion: "Never mind that ... Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now" (163e). Critias accuses Socrates of setting aside the subject, "letting go of what the argument is about" (166c; see ἐλέγχω), and Socrates answers by telling him to set aside the persons (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν). Socrates lets go of himself and of the persons; Critias charges him with letting go of the subject. The last three uses are the verb's other sense, to allow: temperance standing guard "would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in" (173d), and at the end the argument "did not allow" what they conceded (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). In the *Gorgias* Socrates says that if Gorgias were of the same kind as himself, he would gladly question him further, and if not, would let him be (458a; see ἐλέγχω).

See also δοκέω; ἔα χαίρειν; ἐλέγχω; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν.

ἐγγίγνομαι · come to be in

How temperance comes to be in souls · Charmides

ἐγγίγνεσθαι, *engignesthai*, "comes to be in"; ἐγγενομένης, *engenomenēs*, "once it has come to be"; ἐγγεγονότες, *engegonotes*, "had turned out to be"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐγγίγνομαι, to be born in, to arise in, to come about within; of a quality, to be engendered in someone.

In the *Charmides*. Twice in the Thracian's teaching that temperance comes to be in souls from beautiful words (157a), and once in Socrates' question whether any of the young "had turned out to be outstanding" (153d).

In this edition. "Comes to be in", "once it has come to be", "had turned out to be".

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

The verb joins ἐν, "in", to γίγνεσθαι, "to come to be". It is the verb for what is produced inside something else: a quality in a person, a disease in a body, a virtue in a soul. Unlike εἶναι, "to be", it names the coming and so asks how the thing came.

Use in the book

The Thracian's account of the charm turns on it. The soul, he said, is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words. "From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls; and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b; see λόγοι καλοί; πάρειμι). The sentence has three stages: the words act, temperance comes to be in the soul, and, once it has come and is present, health follows. The edition's note at 157a suggests that the charm is conversation, perhaps the conversation about to begin (see διαλέγομαι), and on that reading the verb names what the dialogue is meant to do to the boy.

The question Socrates then puts to Charmides is whether the second stage has already happened, whether temperance is already present in him, in which case he would need no charms (158b; see δοτέος). Presence, πάρεστιν, is the verb of the test; coming to be, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, the verb of the cure. The dialogue never settles the first, and at the end the boy, not knowing whether he has temperance, asks for the charm "every day" (176b).

The prologue had used the verb of the young. Socrates asked whether any of them "had turned out to be" outstanding in wisdom or in beauty or in

both (153d; see διαφέρω; σοφία ἢ κάλλος). There the verb is used of persons, not of qualities: Socrates asks whether any young men outstanding in wisdom or beauty have come up among them, as at 157a temperance comes to be in souls; Critias answers about beauty (154a), and the charm Socrates goes on to offer is for temperance, which the question did not name.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

153d Whether any of the young had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or beauty, or both.

157a From beautiful words temperance comes to be in souls; once it has come to be and is present, health is easy to provide.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates describes the good orator, the man of art, as one who speaks and acts with a single aim: how justice may come to be in the citizens' souls and injustice be removed, temperance be engendered, ἐγγίγνηται, and licentiousness removed, and the rest of virtue be engendered and vice depart (504d–e). The Thracian's charm of beautiful words and the Gorgias' true rhetoric do the same work with the same verb. In the *First Alcibiades* the verb marks the place in the eye where its excellence, sight, comes to be, and the place in the soul where wisdom does (133b; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Whether virtue can be taught, or comes by practice, or comes to men by nature or in some other way is the question Meno puts at the opening of the *Meno*, where the verb is παραγίγνεται (70a; see ἀρετή).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle can be read as answering that question, and with the headword's verb. None of the virtues of character, he says, arises in us by nature, since nothing that is by nature is changed by habit: a stone that moves downward by nature cannot be trained to move upward, though one throw it up ten thousand times. The virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature; we are by nature able to receive them, and are brought to completion by

habit.[78] The Thracian's temperance comes to be in souls from words, Aristotle's from habit.

Translation in this edition

Ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι (157a5–6), an infinitive in the Thracian's reported speech, is "temperance comes to be in souls"; the genitive absolute ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης (157a6) is "once it has come to be and is present". At 153d5 ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν is "had turned out to be".

See also

ἀρετή; διαλέγομαι; διαφέρω; δοτέος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; λόγοι καλοί; πάρειμι; σοφία ἢ κάλλος.

ἐγγύη · pledge

ἐγγύη, *engyē*, "Pledge"

Attested: ἐγγύη (*engyē*; 165a). A pledge, surety: a guarantee given for another, by which the giver answers for him; also the formal pledging of a bride by her guardian. The noun opens the third of the inscriptions Critias names, the later ones, "'Nothing too much' and 'Pledge, and ruin is near'" (165a; see Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν). The manuscripts spell it differently: Burnet prints T's ἐγγύη; B has ἐγγυῆ, a later hand in B ἐγγυίη, and a later hand in T and Stobaeus the Doric ἐγγύα, with ἄτα for ἄτη (apparatus, a3–4). The edition's note at 165a gives the usual reading, standing surety for another (see Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη). In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger puts surety under rule: whoever gives a pledge is to give it expressly, setting out the whole transaction in writing before no fewer than three witnesses for sums up to a thousand, and five for larger (12.953e–954a). The lawgiver does not forbid the pledge that the saying warns against; he makes it plain.

See also Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

[78] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.1, 1103a18–26.

Ἐγγύη πάρα δ᾽ ἄτη · Pledge, and ruin is near

The third Delphic saying in Critias' account · Charmides

Ἐγγύη πάρα δ᾽ ἄτη, *Engyē para d' atē*, "Pledge, and ruin is near"

At a Glance

The word. "A pledge, and ruin is at hand": four words, a noun, the preposition πάρα standing for πάρεστι, "is near", the particle δέ, and ἄτη, ruin.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' account of the inscriptions at Delphi: the later dedicators set up "'Nothing too much' and 'Pledge, and ruin is near'" (165a).

In this edition. "Pledge, and ruin is near".

A place to read. 164d–165b.

Meaning

The saying is a warning against standing surety: give a guarantee for another, and ruin stands beside you. Πάρα, the preposition accented on its first syllable, stands for πάρεστι, "is present", and the clipped syntax, a noun followed by a clause, is the form of a proverb. The edition's note at 165a gives the usual reading, records, citing Diodorus 9.10.4–5, that ancients applied it also to betrothal and to rash oaths, and says that it "too was given to one or another of the Seven Sages: to Thales in Demetrius of Phalerum's collection (Stobaeus 3.1.172), to Chilon by Diogenes Laertius (1.73)". Demetrius of Phalerum was the Athenian statesman and writer of the late fourth century BC who made a collection of the sayings of the Sages.

Use in the book

Critias has read "Know thyself" as the god's greeting to those who enter his temple, meaning "Be temperate" (164d–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). The later dedicators, he says, mistook it for a piece of advice, and set up their own sayings so that they too, "if you please", could dedicate useful advice (165a; see ἀνατίθημι; συμβουλή). In his account the first inscription is the god's and the other two are men's, and "if you please" marks his irony at their expense.

The saying he chooses to rank below "Know thyself" is the most practical of the three. "Nothing too much" is a rule for the whole of conduct (see Μηδὲν ἄγαν); "Pledge, and ruin is near" warns against one transaction. Critias' distinction between the god's greeting and men's advice can be read as the aristocrat's preference for the oracular over the useful, a preference the dialogue then tests, since Socrates asks at once what work temperance produces and what use it is (165c–e; see χρήσιμος). The ruin in the saying is ἄτη in its plain sense, told under ἄτη.

The saying can be heard again, as an echo, in the dialogue's last lines. Charmides, at his guardian's order, gives his word: "Count on it ... I'll follow him and not desert him" (176b), and the edition's note at 176c recalls that a quarter of a century later the two ruled Athens by force and died fighting the democrats (see βιάζομαι). The promise given in play can be read against the saying Critias dismissed.

Places to read

The passage in which the saying occurs.

164d–165a The inscription "Know thyself" is the god's greeting; the later dedicators of "Nothing too much" and "Pledge, and ruin is near" mistook it for advice and added advice of their own.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* Socrates says that the Seven Sages came together and dedicated to Apollo, in his temple at Delphi, the first fruits of their wisdom, the sayings "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much" (343a–b; see ἀνατίθημι); the pledge is not among them. The lawgiver of the *Laws* regulates surety (12.953e–954a; see ἐγγύη).

Other ancient sources

Diogenes Laertius records the saying in its Doric form, ἐγγύα, πάρα δ' ἄτα, as Chilon's, after the epigram on Chilon's statue.[79] The same Doric spelling is found in a later hand of T and in Stobaeus at 165a (apparatus, a3–4; see ἐγγύη). In his life of Pyrrho, the founder of the sceptics, Diogenes Laertius

[79] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.73.

reports that some counted the sayings of the Seven Sages as sceptical, among them "Nothing too much" and this one, which they took to show that ruin follows whoever gives his pledge firmly and with conviction.[80] Read in that way, the saying is a warning against the confident assent that Socrates withholds at 168a and 169a–b (see διισχυρίζομαι).

Translation in this edition

Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη (165a3–4) is "Pledge, and ruin is near". The English keeps the saying's shape, the bare noun and then a clause joined by "and", and renders πάρα by "is near".

See also

ἀνατίθημι; ἄτη; βιάζομαι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διισχυρίζομαι; ἐγγύη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; συμβουλή; χρήσιμος.

ἐγκωμιάζω · celebrate

ἐγκεκωμιασμένη, *enkekōmiasmenē*, "celebrated"

Attested: ἐγκεκωμιασμένη (*enkekōmiasmenē*; 157e). To praise, eulogize; from ἐγκώμιον, the song sung in the κῶμος, the band of revellers, as when one escorted a victor home. Socrates praises the boy's descent: his father's house, the house of Critias son of Dropides, "has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets" (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; Σόλων). The perfect participle makes the praise an inheritance, handed down and still in force. The edition's note at 157e cites Solon's verses bidding someone "tell fair-haired Critias to listen to his father", and says that Anacreon "was said to have celebrated a Critias of the same house". The boy refuses the same kind of praise for himself: "if I say I am, and praise myself, that will probably seem obnoxious" (158d; see αἰσχυντηλός). In the *Lysis* Socrates mocks Hippothales, who sings of the ancestors of Lysis, the boy he loves, their wealth, their horses and their victories with chariot and racehorse: "are you composing and singing an encomium to yourself before you have

[80] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 9.71.

won?" A lover who praises his beloved's family, Socrates explains, praises the prize he hopes to win (205d–e). Socrates' own praise of Charmides' house can be read as of that kind, and the edition's note at 158b says that he "is laying it on".

See also αἰσχυντηλός; ἀρετή; Σόλων.

εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν · whether it is possible

The first of Socrates' two questions about knowledge of knowledge · Charmides

εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, *ei dynaton estin*, "whether it is possible"; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι, *ei dynaton esti*, "whether it is possible"

At a Glance

The word. "Whether it is possible": the question of possibility, put before the question of benefit.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: in Socrates' plan, "first whether it is possible or not for this to be ... and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be" (167b), and in his confession, "I can neither say with confidence whether it is possible for this to come about" (169a–b).

In this edition. "Whether it is possible".

A place to read. 167a–169d.

Use in the book

Critias has given his final definition, that temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of the lack of knowledge, and Socrates sets the inquiry in order: "Then once more ... the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning, first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know, ⟨that one knows it and⟩ that one does not know it; and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167a–b; see τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι; ὠφελία).

The first question is pursued for two pages. The procession of powers makes such a knowledge look impossible by its likeness to a sight that sees no

colour and a love that loves nothing beautiful (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς); the greater and the double make the likeness strict (168b–d); the cases are sorted and the question handed to a great man (168e–169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ). Socrates then states his position: he can neither say with confidence "whether it is possible for this to come about, for there to be knowledge of knowledge", nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance until he has looked into whether it would benefit us (169a–b).

The order of the questions decides the shape of the dialogue. The first is never answered; it is granted, "for now" (169d; see δυνατός), so that the second can be asked; and the second is answered in the negative: a temperance of this kind would be of no benefit (175a; see ἀνωφελής). At the end Socrates counts the grant among the things conceded that the argument did not allow (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The phrase thus marks a question the dialogue leaves unanswered, and can be read as leaving it so on purpose.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs, with the grant that sets it aside.

167b First whether it is possible to know what one knows and does not know, and second what benefit there would be.

169a–b Socrates cannot say with confidence whether it is possible, nor accept that it is temperance until he has looked into its benefit.

169d Let us grant for now that it is possible, and look into it again another time.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* puts the same two questions in the same order and answers both. Socrates hesitates before the community of wives and children because it will be doubted both that it is possible and that, even if it came about, it would be best (450c; see ἀπιστία). On women guardians he says that the inquiry was whether what they proposed was possible and best; that it is possible has been agreed, and next it must be agreed that it is best (456c); and he concludes that the law they laid down is not only possible but best for the city (457a), and asks whether the argument agrees with itself that what it says

is possible and beneficial (457c). The *Republic*'s pair, possible and best, and at 457c possible and beneficial, is the *Charmides*' pair, and the difference between the dialogues is that the *Charmides* leaves the first open and gives the second a negative answer.

Translation in this edition

Εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ' εἶναι ἢ οὔ (167b1–2) is "whether it is possible or not for this to be", the English bringing "or not" forward; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι (169a8) "whether it is possible for this to come about". The companion phrase εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν (167b3) is "even if it is entirely possible". The words in angle brackets, the edition's note at 167b says, are supplied from later manuscripts.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀνωφελής; ἀπιστία; διισχυρίζομαι; δυνατός; μέγας ἀνήρ; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι; ὠφελία.

εἶδος · figure

The boy's figure, and the soul to be looked at first · Charmides

τὸ εἶδος, *to eidos*, "his figure"; τοῦ εἴδους, *tou eidous*, "his figure"

At a Glance

The word. Εἶδος, what is seen: the shape or build of a body, a person's looks; then a kind, sort, type; in Plato, from the dialogues of definition on, the form that the many things called by one name have in common.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in one exchange about the boy's body: Chaerephon says that if he stripped he would seem faceless, "his figure is so perfectly beautiful" (154d), and Socrates proposes to look at his soul "before we look at his figure" (154e).

In this edition. "His figure".

A place to read. 154c–155a.

Meaning

The noun comes from the root of ἰδεῖν, "to see", as does ἰδέα (see ἰδέα). In Homer and in ordinary speech it is how a person looks, form or figure, often set against worth or strength; at 154d it is the body's figure as against the face. From the visible shape it passes to the kind of thing that has a shape, and in Plato's inquiries into "what is X?" to the one form in virtue of which many things are X.

Use in the book

The word comes in the prologue's comedy of looking. The men in the wrestling-school are all in love with Charmides, and the boys, even the littlest, are gazing at him "as if he were a statue" (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα). Chaerephon asks whether the boy has not a lovely face, and adds that if he were willing to strip, Socrates would think him faceless, "his figure is so perfectly beautiful" (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εὐπρόσωπος). Socrates answers with a condition: the boy would be invincible if he has one small thing more, a soul that is well made (154d–e; see ἄμαχος). Critias assures him that he has, and Socrates proposes to strip that part of him "and take a look at it before we look at his figure", since at his age he must be willing to talk (154e; see ἀποδύω; διαλέγομαι).

The two uses set the order of the dialogue. The figure is what the company admires; the soul is what Socrates proposes to strip first, and the stripping is to be done by conversation. The same order, the soul before the body, is the Thracian's rule for the charm, which treats the soul first and foremost (157a; see ψυχή). The boy's figure returns only in Socrates' glimpse inside his cloak (155d; see φλέγομαι) and his brief compliment on "what can be seen of your looks" (158b; see ἰδέα).

The word that Plato would make the name of what a definition seeks appears in the *Charmides* only as the body's shape. Socrates asks the boy instead to say what, in his opinion, temperance is (159a; see δόξα), and the dialogue never calls the object of its question an εἶδος. The figure that is admired first and examined second can be read as the dialogue's counterpart to the form that, in later dialogues, is examined and not seen.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

154d If Charmides stripped, he would seem faceless, his figure is so perfectly beautiful.

154e Socrates proposes to strip the boy's soul and look at it before his figure.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* Diotima teaches the lover to pass beyond the beauty of one body: the beauty on any one body is sister to the beauty on another, and if beauty in the figure, τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν, is what he must pursue, it would be great folly not to hold the beauty on all bodies one and the same; after that he must think the beauty in souls more precious than that in the body (210b). Her ascent begins with the body and rises to the soul; the *Charmides*' order, the soul looked at before the figure, can be read as her ranking, the soul's beauty above the body's, put first.

The word becomes Plato's name for what definitions seek. In the *Euthyphro* Socrates reminds Euthyphro, the seer who is prosecuting his own father for murder, that he asked him not for one or two of the many pious things but for "that form itself" by which all pious things are pious, and asks to be taught what this character, ἰδέα, itself is, so that looking to it and using it as a pattern he may call pious whatever is like it (6d–e). In the *Meno*, however many and various the virtues are, they all have one and the same form through which they are virtues, and the answerer must look to it (72c). In the *Republic* Socrates states the custom: we are used to positing one form for each set of the many things to which we give the same name (10.596a).

Other ancient sources

Homer uses the word for looks set against worth. Hector rebukes his brother Paris as "Evil Paris, best in looks, mad for women, deceiver";[81] and the cry that rallies the Greeks calls them "base disgraces, admired for your looks".[82]

[81] Homer, *Iliad* 3.39.

[82] Homer, *Iliad* 5.787, 8.228.

Aristotle tells how the forms got their name, which in his telling is ἰδέα, with εἶδος beside it. Socrates, he says, worked on questions of conduct and let nature as a whole alone; within ethics he looked for what is common and was the first to set his mind on definitions. Plato took this up, but supposed that definitions concern something other than what we perceive, since no common account can be given of perceptible things, which are always changing; these other beings he named ideas, and the many things that share a name with the forms, τοῖς εἴδεσιν, are what they are by having a share in them.[83] Elsewhere Aristotle allows Socrates two things by right, arguments that lead up from particular cases and the defining of what is common, but says that he did not set the universals or the definitions apart; others did, and named such beings ideas.[84]

Translation in this edition

Τὸ εἶδος (154d5), an accusative of respect with πάγκαλος, is "his figure" in "his figure is so perfectly beautiful"; τοῦ εἴδους (154e6), a genitive with πρότερον, is "before we look at his figure". The edition keeps "figure" for εἶδος, and uses "looks" for ἰδέα (157d, 158b, 175d).

See also

ἄγαλμα; ἄμαχος; ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; διαλέγομαι; δόξα; εὐπρόσωπος; ἰδέα; φλέγομαι; ψυχή.

εἰκῇ · at random

εἰκῇ, *eikēi*, "at random"

Attested: εἰκῇ (*eikēi*; 173a). At random, without plan or purpose; heedlessly. Socrates is about to tell his dream, and apologizes for it: he thinks he is talking nonsense, but one must look into what comes to light "and not let it go by at random", if one cares for oneself even a little (173a; see ἀναγκαῖος; λῆρος). Burnet prints T's παριέναι, "let go by"; B has παρεῖναι,

[83] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b1–10.
[84] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 13.4, 1078b27–32.

which can be the aorist of the same verb (apparatus, a4). Looking with care is joined to care of oneself, and what follows is told under εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος. In the *Apology* the adverb describes Socrates' speech: the jury will hear him speaking at random, in whatever words come to hand, since he trusts that what he says is just (17c). In the *Gorgias* it describes what a craftsman's work is not: every craftsman, looking to his own work, does not choose at random what to apply to it, but so that what he makes may take on a certain form (503e). Socrates' words may come at random; his looking may not.

See also ἀναγκαῖος; εἶδος; εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος; λῆρος.

εἰκός · likely, reasonable

εἰκός, *eikos*, "likely", "reasonably"; εἰκότα, *eikota*, "sense"

Attested: εἰκός (*eikos*; 158a, 162e), εἰκότα (*eikota*; 158d). The neuter participle of ἔοικα, "to be like": what is like the truth, likely; what is fitting, reasonable. Socrates draws the expectation from the boy's descent: "Born of such people, you are likely to be first in everything" (158a; see ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων). After the boy's modest answer Socrates says, "You seem to me to be talking sense, Charmides" (158d): εἰκότα λέγειν, to say what is reasonable. To Critias, of what he ought to know: he "may reasonably be expected to know", because of his age and his study (162e; see ἀγνοέω). Burnet prints T's εἰκὸς εἰδέναι; B and W, he notes, in fact have εἰδέναι alone (apparatus, e1). Both expectations are tested and fail, since the boy cannot define the virtue he is likely to excel in, and Critias, who should know, is refuted. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates reports the rhetoricians' doctrine of the likely: in court one should sometimes not even tell what was done, if it was not likely, but the likely, and in every speech pursue the likely and bid a long farewell to the truth; and he asks whether Tisias, the Sicilian teacher of rhetoric, means by the likely anything other than what seems so to the many (272d–273b).

See also ἀγνοέω; ἔα χαίρειν; εἰκότως; ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων.

εἰκότως · reasonably

εἰκότως, *eikotōs*, "it stands to reason", "was reasonable"

Attested: εἰκότως (*eikotōs*; 170b, 175a). The adverb of εἰκός: with reason, fittingly. It marks two judgements of what is to be expected. Of the man who has knowledge only of knowledge, "it stands to reason" that he would know that he knows something, about himself and others, though not what (170b–c; see γιγνώσκω). Of Socrates himself, at the end, in a question that expects assent: "my fear long ago was reasonable" (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; δίκαιος). The fear was the one he voiced at 172e, that they were not looking into temperance correctly. The first use grants what knowledge of knowledge could reasonably do; the second confirms that the doubt about it was reasonable.

See also αἰτιάομαι; γιγνώσκω; δίκαιος; εἰκός.

εἴπερ · if really, if

εἴπερ, *eiper*, "if ... really", "if"

Attested: εἴπερ (*eiper*; 159a, 161a twice, 161e, 166e, 167a, 168b, 168c, 168d twice, 170c, 175e). "If indeed", "if really": εἰ, "if", strengthened by περ. It states a condition that the speaker takes to hold, or insists must hold, and so it carries the premises of arguments. It begins the inquiry: temperance, "if it really is in you", must give rise to some sense (159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι). It carries the steps against modesty, that temperance is good "if it makes good those it is present with" (161a), and against doing one's own business, "if writing and reading are doing something" (161e). In the argument about relatives it states the condition that makes each case absurd: a greater is greater than something smaller, "if it is to be greater" (168b); a greater than itself would be smaller than itself (168c); hearing, "if hearing is to hear itself", must have a sound (168d; see ἀκοή), and sight, "if it is to see itself, must have some color" (168d–e). Twice it carries Critias' definition itself, "if it is knowledge of knowledge" (166e) and "if it is only knowledge of kinds of

knowledge" (170c). At 167a it names the case in which the man examined knows what he thinks he knows, "if he does know it" (167a), and at the end Socrates' hope for the boy: "if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a; see μακάριος). The particle states conditions; those that concern temperance itself, at 159a, 166e, 170c and 175e, the dialogue leaves unsettled.

See also αἴσθησις; ἀκοή; ἔνειμι; μακάριος.

εἴσειμι · come in, enter

εἰσιόντα, *eisionta*, "come in", "enters"; εἰσιόντας, *eisiontas*, "coming in", "those who enter"; εἰσιόντες, *eisiontes*, "The fellows coming in"; εἰσῄει, *eisēiei*, "he came in"; εἰσιόντων, *eisiontōn*, "those who enter"

Attested: εἰσιόντα (*eisionta*; 153b, 164e), εἰσιόντας (*eisiontas*; 154a, 164e), εἰσιόντες (*eisiontes*; 154a), εἰσῄει (*eisēiei*; 154c), εἰσιόντων (*eisiontōn*; 164d, 165a). To go in, enter; εἶμι, "go", with εἰς. The verb divides between the wrestling-school and the temple. In the prologue it brings people in: the company see Socrates "come in so unexpectedly" (153b; see ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου); Critias sees "some young men coming in" and says "The fellows coming in are the advance guard and the lovers" of the boy thought most beautiful (154a; see πρόδρομος); the others were astounded and flustered "when he came in" (154c; see ἐκπλήσσω). In Critias' reading of Delphi the participle names the god's worshippers. The inscription was set up "as the god's greeting to those who enter" (164d); the god addresses "those who enter his temple" differently from men, and to everyone who enters says nothing other than "Be temperate!" (164e); the later dedicators took "Know thyself" for advice, "and not the god's greeting to those who enter" (165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). At 165a5 Burnet brackets ἕνεκεν, which B, T, W and Stobaeus have; Heindorf doubted it and Cobet deleted it. Socrates' own arrival at 153a and the boy's at 154b are told with the other verb of entering, εἰσέρχομαι.

See also Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐκπλήσσω; ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου; πρόδρομος.

εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος · through horn or through ivory

Socrates' dream, by the gate of horn or of ivory · Charmides

εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος, *eite dia keratōn eite di' elephantos*, "whether it has come through horn or through ivory"

At a Glance

The word. The two gates of dreams in the *Odyssey*: dreams that come through the gate of horn come true, those through the gate of ivory deceive.

In the *Charmides*. Once, as Socrates begins his dream of a life ruled by temperance: "Hear my dream, then ... whether it has come through horn or through ivory" (173a).

In this edition. "Whether it has come through horn or through ivory".

A place to read. 172e–174a.

Meaning

Κέρας is horn, ἐλέφας ivory, the elephant's tusk. The phrase assumes the reader knows the two gates of which Penelope, Odysseus' wife, speaks in the *Odyssey*, and says no more: the dream may be true or false, and the dreamer cannot tell which. The edition's note at 173a gives the source: "In the Odyssey (19.560–67) Penelope says that dreams come through two gates: those through the gate of horn come true, those through the gate of ivory deceive. Socrates does not know which kind his is."

Use in the book

Socrates has granted Critias everything, that knowledge of knowledge is possible and that temperance is knowing what one knows and does not know, and still doubts that it would benefit anyone (172c–173a). "I think I'm talking nonsense," he says, but one must not let what comes to light go by at random (173a; see εἰκῇ; λῆρος). "Hear my dream, then ... whether it has come through horn or through ivory" (173a; see ὄναρ). If temperance as now

defined ruled us as fully as could be, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge (173a–b).

The dream is of a world without impostors. No one claiming to be a pilot, doctor or general would deceive us; we would be healthier, safe at sea and in war; all our goods would be expertly made; and if prophecy is a knowledge, temperance would turn away the impostors and set up the true prophets (173b–c; see ἀλαζών; μάντις). The human race would then act and live knowledgeably, Socrates grants, with temperance standing guard against the lack of knowledge: "But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173c–d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν).

The phrase leaves open which gate the dream used, and the dream can be read as having used both. Its picture is true to the definition: if temperance were what Critias says, the world would be as Socrates describes. Its promise is false: such a world would not, on that account, be happy, since the knowledge that makes us happy is of good and bad, and that is not temperance as defined (174b–d). The dream comes true and still deceives.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the dream it introduces.

173a Socrates fears he talks nonsense, but one must not let what comes to light go by; hear my dream, whether through horn or through ivory.

173a–d If temperance ruled, everything would be done knowledgeably and no impostor would deceive us; but that we would do well and be happy, we cannot yet learn.

Other ancient sources

Penelope speaks the lines to the stranger who is her husband in disguise. Dreams, she says, are things past dealing with and muddled in their speech, and not every one of them is brought to pass for men; fleeting dreams have two gates, one made of horn and one of ivory. Those that come through the sawn ivory cheat, carrying words that come to nothing; those that come out by the smoothed horn bring true things about for the mortal who sees

them.[85] The lines can be heard as playing on the materials: the ivory dreams ἐλεφαίρονται, "cheat", the horn dreams κραίνουσι, "fulfil".

The Roman poet Virgil takes the gates into the sixth book of the *Aeneid*: there are two gates of Sleep, one said to be of horn, through which true shades pass out easily, the other shining, wrought of white ivory, through which the shades of the dead send false dreams up to the sky; and Anchises sends his son Aeneas and the Sibyl of Cumae, his guide through the underworld, out by the ivory gate.[86] Virgil follows Homer, not Plato.

Translation in this edition

Εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος ἐλήλυθεν (173a7–8) is "whether it has come through horn or through ivory". The perfect ἐλήλυθεν is "has come", and the plural κεράτων, "horns", is the material, "horn".

See also

ἀλαζών; εἰκῇ; εἴτε ... εἴτε μή; ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν; λῆρος; μάντις; ὄναρ.

εἴτε ... εἴτε μή · whether ... or not

Looking into whether what was said is true or not · Charmides

εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἴτε μή, *eit' alēthes eite mē*, "whether what was said is true or not"; εἴτε ... εἴτε μή, *eite ... eite mē*, "whether or not", "whether ... or not"

At a Glance

The word. Εἴτε ... εἴτε, "whether ... or", in an indirect question, with μή for the negative alternative: an open question that does not presume its answer.

In the *Charmides*. Eight pairs, six of them with μή. Its fullest form is Socrates' offer to look into Critias' definition with him, "to see whether what was said is true or not" (162e).

In this edition. "Whether or not", "whether ... or not"; "whether it is Critias or Socrates"; "whether ... or".

[85] Homer, *Odyssey* 19.560–567.
[86] Virgil, *Aeneid* 6.893–898.

A place to read. 162c–163a.

Use in the book

The construction gives the inquiry its form. Socrates proposes to look into the boy's temperance with him: "we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about" (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι), so that they can guess "whether it is in you or not" (159a; see τοπάζω). When Critias takes over the definition, Socrates would rather look into it with him, "to see whether what was said is true or not" (162e). He tells Critias, "So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not" (165c), and he cannot accept knowledge of knowledge as temperance until he has looked into whether it "would benefit us or not" (169b). The grant of 169d is made on the same terms: they will look again "whether it is so or not" (169d; see αὖθις).

In each place the second alternative is left standing. Socrates' εἴτε ... εἴτε μή refuses to presume the answer, and his partners keep presuming it: Critias answers the offer of 162e with "I agree entirely ... and I take it over" (162e), and at 165b offers to defend his thesis before it has been examined (see διδόναι λόγον). The open question repeats 161c, where Socrates put the same thought to the boy with another construction, πότερον ... ἢ οὔ (161c; see ἀληθής).

Two pairs name persons and things instead of yes and no. The question which of the two, Critias or Socrates, is being refuted is to be dismissed (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν), and the dream comes "through horn or through ivory" (173a; see εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος). The dialogue ends with the disjunction turned into perplexity: the boy does not know, he says, whether he has temperance or whether he does not (176a), οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

Places to read

Every passage in which the construction occurs.

158d–e To look together whether or not the boy possesses temperance.

159a To guess whether it is in him or not.

162e To look into whether what was said is true or not.

165c Socrates will say whether he agrees or not once he has looked.

166d–e Say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted.

169b Whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not.

169d To look again another time whether it is so or not.

173a Whether the dream has come through horn or through ivory.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates states the attitude the construction carries: all of us, he says, ought to be eager to know what is true about the things they are speaking of and what is false, since it is a common good for all that this should become plain (505e; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). In the *Republic* Glaucon uses the construction to state why the just man must be stripped of his reputation: if he seems just, it will be unclear whether he is so for justice's sake or for the honours and gifts (361c; see δοκέω).

Translation in this edition

Εἴτ' ἀληθὲς εἴτε μὴ τὸ λεχθέν (162e4–5) is "whether what was said is true or not". The English keeps the open "or not" for εἴτε μή at 158e1, 159a9, 165c1–2, 169b3 and 169d5, and uses "whether ... or" where both members are named (166d9–e1, 173a7–8). At 176a7 Burnet prints οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω from a later hand in T; T itself has εἴτ' εἰ ἔχω, and B εἴτι ἔχω (apparatus, a7).

See also

ἀληθής; αὖθις; διδόναι λόγον; δοκέω; ἔα χαίρειν; εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; τοπάζω.

ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων · likely

ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων, *ek tōn eikotōn*, "would be likely to"

Attested: ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων (*ek tōn eikotōn*; 157e). "From what is likely": by reasonable expectation, in all probability. Socrates says that it is only right that the boy should excel, since no one could easily point to two houses in

Athens whose union "would be likely to produce" finer and better offspring than his (157e; see γεννάω; οἰκία). The phrase turns the praise of descent into an argument from likelihood, the kind of argument that makes a reasonable guess about a particular from what usually happens. The same expectation follows in plainer words, "you are likely to be first in everything" (158a; see εἰκός), and the dialogue then tests the boy rather than his descent. Aristotle defines the likely as what happens for the most part, among things that can be otherwise, and makes it, with signs, one of the two sources of the orator's arguments.[87] The verb that follows the phrase at 157e4 is uncertain in the manuscripts, as told under γεννάω.

See also γεννάω; εἰκός; οἰκία.

ἕκαστος · each

ἕκαστος, *hekastos*, "every one"; ἕκαστον, *hekaston*, "each man", "each word", "each"; ἑκάστῳ, *hekastōi*, "each"; ἑκάστη, *hekastē*, "each"; ἕκαστοι, *hekastoi*, "each of us"; ἕκαστα, *hekasta*, "each of these things"

Attested: ἕκαστος (*hekastos*; 155c), ἕκαστον (*hekaston*; 161e, 162a, 163d, 166d), ἑκάστῳ (*hekastōi*; 164b, 172b), ἑκάστη (*hekastē*; 166a, 171a, 174e), ἕκαστοι (*hekastoi*; 172d), ἕκαστα (*hekasta*; 174c). Each, every one taken singly. In the bench comedy "Every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up" to make room for the boy (155c). Then the word carries two principles. The first is the division of labour: the law the boy is asked about would order "each man to weave and wash his own cloak" (161e–162a; see ἑαυτοῦ), and the benefit Critias and Socrates once agreed on would come "if each of us did what we knew" (172d; see διοίκησις). The second is the division of knowledge: Socrates can point out "what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of" (166a), and asks whether "each kind of knowledge" is not defined "by its being of particular things" (171a); each of the crafts does "its own work" (174e; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). The argument against Critias' temperance rests on the second principle, which a knowledge of knowledge

[87] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1357a32–b1.

would break. The common good of 166d is that each thing that is should become plain as it really is (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Socrates also allows Critias to assign "each word" as he pleases (163d; see δίδωμι), asks whether each of the craftsmen must know when he will profit from his work (164b), gives the temperate learner a view of the knowledge beside each thing he learns (172b), and says that each thing done well would be lost without the knowledge of good and bad (174c–d).

See also δίδωμι; διοίκησις; ἑαυτοῦ; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον.

ἐκβαίνω · become of

ἐκβήσεται, *ekbēsetai*, "what will become of it"

Attested: ἐκβήσεται (*ekbēsetai*; 166e). To step out, to come out of a ship; of events and arguments, to turn out, end. Socrates tells Critias to set aside whose argument it is: "Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166e; see ἔα χαίρειν; ἐλέγχω). The argument is the subject of the verb, and the refutation is something it undergoes, as though it had a course of its own that the speakers follow. The word asks the speakers to wait for the end and not to presume it, and in the *Charmides* the end is the confession that "we are beaten on every side" (175b).

See also ἔα χαίρειν; ἐλέγχω.

ἐκκόπτω · knock out

ἐξεκέκοπτο, *exekekopto*, "had been knocked clean out of me"

Attested: ἐξεκέκοπτο (*exekekopto*; 155c). To cut out, knock out, as of an eye or a tooth; to fell. The boy has sat down between Socrates and Critias, and Socrates is at a loss: "the boldness I'd had before ... had been knocked clean out of me" (155c; see ἀπορέω; θρασύτης). The pluperfect passive gives a state already reached at that moment, and the image is of a blow. The boldness returns when the boy accepts the doctors' principle, gathering itself

together little by little until Socrates is rekindled (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω).

See also ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω; ἀπορέω; θρασύτης.

ἐκπλήσσω · astound

ἐκπεπληγμένοι, *ekpeplēgmenoi*, "astounded"

Attested: ἐκπεπληγμένοι (*ekpeplēgmenoi*; 154c). To strike out of one's senses: to amaze, dismay, overwhelm; perfect passive, "struck with amazement". Socrates describes the men in the wrestling-school when the boy entered: "all the rest, it seemed to me, were in love with him, so astounded and flustered were they when he came in" (154c; see εἴσειμι; θορυβέω). The verb gives the cause of Socrates' inference: the men were in love, as he could tell from their amazement. A page later Socrates himself is struck, "on fire" and no longer in his own possession (155d; see φλέγομαι). In the *Symposium* Diotima sets the same amazement below the sight of beauty itself: beauty itself, if Socrates ever sees it, will not seem to him comparable to gold or clothing or the beautiful boys and youths at whose sight he is now astounded, ready, with many others, to go without food and drink if only he might look at them and be with them (211d).

See also εἴσειμι; θορυβέω; φλέγομαι.

ἐλάττων · fewer, smaller, less

The quiet actions no fewer, and the smaller than which the greater is greater · Charmides

ἐλάττους, *elattous*, "fewer"; ἐλάττονος, *elattonos*, "Than something smaller"; ἔλαττον, *elatton*, "smaller", "less"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐλάττων, the comparative used for μικρός and ὀλίγος: smaller, less, fewer; also inferior.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: in the concession that the fine quiet actions might be "no fewer" than the quick (160c), and in the argument about relatives, "Than something smaller" (168b), "smaller than itself" (168c) and "less" (168c).

In this edition. "Fewer", "smaller", "less".

A place to read. 160b–d and 168b–d.

Use in the book

The first use counts. Socrates has argued that quiet actions are finer than quick ones either nowhere or in very few places, and makes a concession: suppose that the quiet actions which turn out finer are "no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones"; even so temperance would not be quietness any more than quickness (160c; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα). The comparison is of numbers, how many actions of each kind turn out finer, and the argument wins by granting equality.

The other uses are the correlate of the greater. The greater is greater than something smaller, "if it is to be greater" (168b), so that a greater than itself would also be smaller than itself (168b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον); and what is more than itself will also be less (168c). Here the smaller is not counted but required: without it the greater is not greater.

The two halves of the dialogue's argument use the word in two ways. Against the boy, Socrates compares quantities and concedes as much as he can; against Critias, he uses the comparative itself, and the concession is not available, since a greater cannot be granted to be smaller than itself in any measure.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

160c Even if the quiet actions that turn out finer are no fewer than the quick ones, temperance would not be quietness.

168b The greater is greater than something smaller.

168b–c A greater than itself would be smaller than itself.

168c What is more than itself will also be less.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* Socrates takes the comparatives as his example of a safe answer. Cebes should not say that one man is bigger than another by a head, and the smaller smaller by the same head, for then the bigger would be bigger and the smaller smaller by the same thing, and the bigger bigger by a head, which is small, and that would be monstrous; he should say that the bigger is bigger only by bigness and the smaller smaller by smallness; and he should not say that ten is more than eight by two, but by number (100e–101b). He then applies it to persons: Simmias is bigger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, not because he is Simmias but by the bigness and smallness he happens to have, so that he has both names, small and big, standing between the two (102b–c). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates becomes smaller than Theaetetus without losing anything (155b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle denies that great and small are quantities at all. Nothing, he says, is called great or small in itself, but by reference to something else: a mountain is called small and a grain of millet large, because the one is smaller and the other larger than others of its kind.[88] On that account the *Charmides*' greater and smaller, the comparatives of great and small, can be read as relatives, as the argument of 168b–c assumes; in the next chapter Aristotle names the greater, with the double and knowledge, among the relatives (see διπλάσιος).

Translation in this edition

Μηδὲν ἐλάττους (160c3) is "no fewer than". At 168b8 ἐλάττονός τινος, "Than something smaller", continues Socrates' question after Critias' "It has", and the English begins the line with "Than". Ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ (168c2) is "smaller than itself", and ἔλαττον beside πλέον (168c9) "less".

See also

διπλάσιος; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον.

[88] Aristotle, *Categories* 6, 5b15–22.

ἐλέγχω · refute

Critias' charge of refutation, and what Socrates says refutation is for · Charmides

ἐλέγχειν, *elenchein*, "to refute"; ἐλέγχω, *elenchō*, "I refute"; ἐλεγχόμενος, *elenchomenos*, "who is being refuted", "under refutation"

At a Glance

The word. Ἐλέγχω, to put to shame; to cross-examine, test; to refute, to show a statement false. Its noun, ἔλεγχος, is a test or a refutation.

In the *Charmides*. Five times in one exchange (166c–e). Critias complains, "You are trying to refute me"; Socrates says he refutes for the reason he examines himself, and tells Critias to dismiss the question which of them is being refuted. The edition's Glossary also lists 162d, where the compound ἐξελέγχω stands.

In this edition. "Refute", "being refuted", "under refutation".

A place to read. 166b–167a.

Meaning

In Homer the neuter noun, τὸ ἔλεγχος (plural ἐλέγχεα), means a disgrace, and the verb to shame or put to scorn (see εἶδος); the masculine ὁ ἔλεγχος, a test or refutation, is the later word. In the courts and the assembly it came to mean the testing of a claim or a witness by questions, and so the proof that a claim is false. The older sense stays in the newer: a man refuted in public is shamed in public.

Use in the book

The word comes first in its compound. Charmides, wishing to make Critias answer for the definition he has borrowed, prods him and makes out that he has been refuted (162d; see ἐξελέγχω); the edition's note at 162d observes that the Greek leaves open whether Charmides or Critias is the one refuted.

Then Critias makes the charge himself. Socrates has asked what temperance is knowledge of, as calculation is of the odd and even; Critias answers that temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and accuses Socrates: "And this is far from having escaped you: I think you are

doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing. You are trying to refute me, and letting go of what the argument is about" (166c; see ἐάω; λανθάνω). In his mouth refutation is a contest between persons, and a man who refutes is out to win.

Socrates answers that it is not: "What a thing to do ... to suppose that, even if I refute you as hard as I can, I am doing it for any other reason than the one for which I would scrutinize even myself—what I am saying: for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166c–d). The refutation of another is the same act as the examination of oneself, and its object is the speaker's own ignorance. "And so now too," he adds, "this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends" (166d), and then tells Critias to dismiss the question of who is being refuted and attend to the argument itself (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; ἐκβαίνω). The participle is used twice in a row, of the person, "who is being refuted", and of the argument, "under refutation": the refuted thing is to be the argument, not the man.

Critias accepts the rule, and by 169c–d cannot keep it (see αἰσχύνομαι; ἔα χαίρειν). The shame the word once meant can be read as returning as the shame of the man who will not be refuted.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb or its compound occurs.

162d Charmides makes out that he has been refuted, to make Critias answer for the definition.

166c Critias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.

166c–d Socrates refutes others for the reason he scrutinizes himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not.

166d–e Say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted; look to what becomes of the argument under refutation.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* refutation begins with the oracle. Told that no one was wiser than he, Socrates went to one of those thought wise, to refute the oracle

there if anywhere and show it that this man was wiser than he (21b–c; see δοκέω). After the sentence he tells those who voted to condemn him that they have put him to death thinking to be rid of giving an account of their lives, but that more will come to refute them, younger and harsher (39c–d).

In the *Gorgias* Socrates describes himself as one of those who would gladly be refuted if he says something untrue, and gladly refute anyone else who does, and would be no less glad to be refuted than to refute; for he holds it the greater good to be rid of the greatest evil oneself than to rid another of it, and no evil is so great for a man as false opinion about the matters under discussion (458a–b). The *Charmides* states the same rule at 166c–d, without the gladness. In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea calls refutation the greatest of purifications (230b–d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines a refutation as a deduction that concludes the contradictory of the thesis,[89] and gives the reason why Socrates asked questions and did not answer them: he confessed that he did not know.[90]

Translation in this edition

Ἐλέγχειν (166c5) is "refute", and ἐλέγχω (166c8) "I refute"; the second ἐλέγχειν (166c8) is carried by "I am doing it". The participle ἐλεγχόμενος is "who is being refuted" at 166e1, of Critias or Socrates, and "under refutation" at 166e2, of the argument: the English varies the phrase so that the turn from the person to the argument can be felt.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; αἰσχύνομαι; διερευνάω; δοκέω; ἔα χαίρειν; ἐάω; εἶδος; ἐκβαίνω; ἐξελέγχω; λανθάνω.

[89] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 1, 165a2–3.
[90] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 34, 183b7–8.

ἑλληνίζω · speak Greek

ἑλληνίζειν, *hellēnizein*, "to speak Greek"

Attested: ἑλληνίζειν (*hellēnizein*; 159a). To speak Greek, to speak it correctly; from Ἕλλην, "a Greek". Socrates has said that temperance, if present, must give the boy a sense and from it an opinion, and asks: "Well then, this opinion of yours ... since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?" "Perhaps" (159a; see δόξα). The edition's note at 159a calls the remark "dry", and says that on one reading "it states an assumption the inquiry will lean on, that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words". In the *Meno* Socrates checks the same qualification before questioning Meno's slave about the double square: "He is Greek, and speaks Greek?" "Very much so; he was born in the house" (82b; see διπλάσιος). In the *First Alcibiades* Alcibiades says he learned to speak Greek from the many, and Socrates grants that they are good teachers of it, since they agree among themselves what a stone is and what wood is; but on the just and the unjust they disagree most of all, and so are no teachers of it (111a–112a). In the *Protagoras* Protagoras says that to look for a teacher of virtue is like looking for a teacher of Greek: everyone teaches it, and so no one appears to (327e–328a). Knowing Greek gives the boy the words for his opinion, and the dialogue then shows that the words are not yet a definition.

See also διπλάσιος; δόξα.

ἐμβλέπω · give a look, look within, fix one's eyes on

The boy's look, the look within, and Critias' stare · Charmides

ἐνέβλεψεν, *eneblepsen*, "gave (me) a look"; ἐμβλέψας, *emblepsas*, "look within" (160d), "fixed his eyes on" (162d)

At a Glance

The word. Ἐμβλέπειν, to look at, to look into: with a dative, to fix one's eyes on someone; with εἰς, to look at someone or into something.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, and each look goes a different way: the boy looks at Socrates (155c–d), Socrates tells the boy to look into himself (160d), and Critias stares at his ward (162d).

In this edition. "Gave me a look", "look within yourself", "fixed his eyes on him".

A place to read. 160d–e.

Meaning

The verb is βλέπειν, "to look", with ἐν, "in, at". Where ὁρᾶν is to see, βλέπειν is to direct the eyes, and the compound makes the look a thing aimed at someone: the look a person gives, which the other person receives. With εἰς and the accusative it can mean looking at a person or looking into a thing.

Use in the book

The first look is the boy's, and it undoes the narrator. Critias has told Charmides that Socrates is the man who knows the remedy, and the boy, as Socrates tells it, "gave me a look with those eyes of his, a look beyond words" (155c–d; see ἀμήχανος). Within the same sentence the crowd swirls round them, Socrates sees inside the cloak, and he is no longer in his own possession (155d; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἱμάτιον).

The second look is the one Socrates asks of the boy after his first definition has failed. "Then once more, Charmides ... pay closer attention and look within yourself", he tells the boy, who is to consider what sort of person temperance makes him by being present (160d; see ἐννοέω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). The boy pauses, thinks it over to himself (160e; see ἀνδρικῶς; διασκέπτομαι; ἐπέχω), and answers that temperance makes a man feel shame and is modesty (see αἰδώς). The third look is Critias', turned on the boy who has been teasing him over the definition: "So he fixed his eyes on him and said, 'Do you really think, Charmides, that if you don't know what the man meant ... then he doesn't know either?'" (162d; see ποιητής).

The three looks can be read as a small map of the dialogue. Two are looks between persons, the boy's that disarms and Critias' that rebukes. The one look inward is Socrates' request, and it is the dialogue's first exercise in

knowing oneself, made before anyone has said the words. What the boy finds when he looks within is a feeling that others see on his face: modesty, the blush of 158c (see αἰσχυντηλός). The *First Alcibiades* can be read as giving the reason: an eye that would see itself has to look into another eye, whose pupil holds an image of the one who looks in, τοῦ ἐμβλέποντος (132d–133a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό), and the boy, looking into himself, reports what others have seen in him.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155c–d Told that Socrates knows the remedy, the boy gives him a look beyond words.

160d Socrates asks the boy to look within himself and consider what sort of person temperance makes him.

162d Critias, angry as a poet with an actor, fixes his eyes on Charmides.

Elsewhere in Plato

The look of a young man at Socrates when a question is too big for him recurs in the *Euthydemus*. The sophist Euthydemus asks Clinias whether those who learn are the wise or the ignorant; the boy blushes, and at a loss looks at Socrates, who sees that he is flustered and tells him to take heart (275d). In the *Republic* the look is wonder. Asked whether he has not perceived that the soul is immortal and never perishes, Glaucon looks at Socrates in amazement and says, "By Zeus, I haven't" (608d).

Translation in this edition

The edition renders each look by its direction: "gave me a look with those eyes of his" for ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς (155c8–d1), "look within yourself" for εἰς σεαυτὸν ἐμβλέψας (160d6), "fixed his eyes on him" for ἐμβλέψας αὐτῷ (162d4). At 155c8 τέ μοι is T's reading, with ε written above the οι; B has δέ με. At 160d6 ἐμβλέψας is Burnet's own correction. B has ἀπεμβλέψας, with the letters λεψ written over an erasure, and T and W have ἀποβλέψας, "looking away (into yourself)", the verb of turning one's eyes from everything else to one thing; Burnet's reading makes the boy look in.

See also

αἰδώς; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀμήχανος; ἀνδρικῶς; διασκέπτομαι; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐννοέω; ἐπέχω; ἱμάτιον; ποιητής; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα.

ἐμμένω · hold to

ἐμμένομεν, *emmenomen*, "(no longer) holding to"

Attested: ἐμμένομεν (*emmenomen*; 173e). To remain in, abide by, keep to, with the dative of what one stands by: a place, an oath, an agreement, an argument. Critias has said that nothing crowns doing well but living knowledgeably, and Socrates has drawn from him that the cobbler and the bronze-worker, who live knowledgeably, are not happy: "Then we are no longer holding to the argument ... that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy" (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). At 173e6 εὐδαίμονα, "happy", is T's reading and a later hand's in B; B has εὐδαιμονία. The verb is the language of agreements kept, and the *Crito* makes it the test of a man: Socrates asks whether Crito still abides by what they said before (49e), and the Laws, speaking to Socrates, ask whether he will now not abide by what he has agreed (53a). In the *Charmides* it is the argument that has not been kept, and Socrates says "we", sharing the breach.

See also ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; λόγος; ὁμολογία.

ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι · be in my own possession

Socrates beside himself at the sight of the boy · Charmides

οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν, *ouket' en emautou ēn*, "was no longer in my own possession"

At a Glance

The word. To be "in one's own", master of oneself, in one's right mind; with a negative, to be beside oneself.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the moment Socrates sees inside the boy's cloak and is on fire (155d).

In this edition. "No longer in my own possession".

A place to read. 155c–156d.

Meaning

The phrase is ἐν with the genitive of the reflexive, ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ, "in (that) of myself", on the pattern of ἐν Ἅιδου, "in (the house) of Hades". A man who is in his own is at home in himself and has charge of himself; a man who is not has been carried out of himself, by passion, wine or a god. The edition's note at 155d puts it plainly: "'no longer in my own possession' is Greek for being beside oneself."

Use in the book

The phrase is the climax of a sentence that runs from the boy's look to Socrates' collapse. He was already at a loss, his boldness "knocked clean out" of him (155c; see ἀπορέω; ἐκκόπτω; θρασύτης); the boy looked at him (155c–d; see ἐμβλέπω); everyone in the wrestling-school came swirling round them; and then, he tells his friend, "I saw inside his cloak, and I was on fire, and was no longer in my own possession" (155d; see ἱμάτιον; περιρρέω; φλέγομαι). Socrates then quotes Cydias on the fawn that comes into the lion's presence, and says he felt he had been caught himself (155d–e; see ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας). He answers the boy's question "somehow" (155e; see μόγις). His recovery is told a page later: hearing the boy agree with the doctors' principle, he takes heart and is rekindled, little by little (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω; κατὰ σμικρόν).

The note at 155d goes on: "Many readers have seen a trial passed here: set on fire, Socrates recovers himself and talks philosophy, a wordless display of the virtue about to be discussed. That is an interpretation, but the dialogue invites it." The phrase gives the interpretation its ground. Σωφροσύνη is, by its make-up, soundness of mind (the note at 157a), and the narrator of a dialogue on it begins by being out of his. The self that will become the object of knowledge from 164d onwards (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ)

appears first as a self one can lose and regain, and the dialogue shows the regaining before it defines anything. Socrates regains himself not by looking inward but by turning to an argument the boy accepts.

Places to read

The one passage in which the phrase occurs, with its recovery.

155c–e At a loss, looked at, surrounded, Socrates sees inside the cloak, is on fire and is no longer in his own possession; he thinks of Cydias and feels caught.

156d Hearing the boy agree, he takes heart and is rekindled little by little.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato has the idiom itself in the *Phaedrus*, and for the same cause. The few souls that keep enough memory of what they once saw, when they see some likeness of it here, are struck and "are no longer in themselves", οὐκέτ' ἐν αὑτῶν γίγνονται, and do not know what is happening to them (250a); and of all those realities, beauty alone shines out to the eye (250b–d). The poet of the *Ion* is taken out of himself another way: an airy thing, winged and sacred, who cannot compose until the god has entered him and he has lost his wits, and reason dwells in him no longer (534b). In the *Symposium* Alcibiades says that whoever hears Socrates' words, woman, man or youth, is struck and possessed; when he hears them himself, his heart leaps more than a reveller's in the frenzied rites of the Corybants and his tears pour out, and he sees a great many others affected the same way (215d–e). In the *Charmides* it is beauty, as in the *Phaedrus*, that takes Socrates out of himself, and speech that brings him back.

Other ancient sources

Herodotus has a kindred phrase in the positive, at a moment of the worst trial. Harpagus, a Median noble, had been ordered by King Astyages to kill the infant Cyrus, the king's grandson and the future king of Persia; when the child was found alive, Astyages served Harpagus the flesh of his own son and then showed him the boy's head, hands and feet. Harpagus, says Herodotus, was not struck out of his wits but stayed within himself, and answered that

whatever a king does is pleasing.[91] The Greek is ἐντὸς ἑωυτοῦ, "inside himself"; Plato's ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ is the same picture of the self as a place one can be in or out of.

Translation in this edition

"Was no longer in my own possession" renders οὐκέτ' ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν (155d4), keeping the possessive that the Greek implies. The preposition is T's reading; B and W have ἐπ', οὐκέτ' ἐπ' ἐμαυτοῦ ἦν, a phrase that elsewhere means "on one's own, by oneself", which would not give the sense of self-possession that the sentence needs.

See also

ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω; ἀπορέω; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐκκόπτω; ἐμβλέπω; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; θρασύτης; ἱμάτιον; κατὰ σμικρόν; Κυδίας; μόγις; περιρρέω; φλέγομαι.

ἐν ἡλικίᾳ · grown up, of that age

ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, *en hēlikiāi*, "grown up"; οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ, *hoi en tēi hēlikiāi*, "everyone of that age"

Attested: ἐν ἡλικίᾳ (*en hēlikiāi*; 154a) and οἱ ἐν τῇ ἡλικίᾳ (*hoi en tēi hēlikiāi*; 154b). Ἡλικία is time of life, and above all the prime of it; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ, "in one's prime", is said of a youth come to the age of manhood. Socrates asks who the beautiful newcomer is, and Critias answers: "You know him ... but he wasn't yet grown up when you went away: Charmides, our uncle Glaucon's son" (154a–b). The boy has crossed the line in Socrates' absence. With the article the phrase means the age itself: "nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη). The noun returns without the phrase, always measuring what can be expected of someone at a given age: the boy is second to none "as far as his years allow" (157d), his bashfulness "was becoming at his age" (158c), and Critias may be expected to

[91] Herodotus 1.108.4 and 1.117–119, the scene at 1.119.6–7.

know because of his age and his study (162e; see ἐπιμέλεια). Age excuses the boy for not knowing what the definition meant; it does not excuse Critias.

See also ἐπιμέλεια; ἡλικιώτης; λευκὴ στάθμη; μειράκιον; παῖς.

ἐναντιόομαι · oppose

The dialogue's last word: Socrates will not oppose · Charmides

ἐναντιοῦσθαι, *enantiousthai*, "to oppose"; ἐναντιοῦ, *enantiou*, "(don't) oppose"; ἐναντιώσομαι, *enantiōsomai*, "I (won't) oppose"

At a Glance

The word. To set oneself against, oppose, resist; to stand in the way of someone.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in the last three lines: Socrates tells Charmides that no man alive will be able to oppose him once he uses force; Charmides tells him not to oppose him either; Socrates answers that he will not (176d).

In this edition. "Oppose" at each place.

A place to read. 176b–d.

Meaning

Ἐναντιοῦσθαι is the verb of ἐναντίος, "facing, opposite", said of an enemy who stands against one. It is used of men who resist a decision, of speakers who contradict, and of anything that comes in the way of an action.

Use in the book

The dialogue ends on the verb. Charmides has asked to be charmed every day, his guardian has ordered him to let Socrates charm him, and he has promised to obey; Socrates asks what the two are plotting, and whether Charmides will use force on him without even a preliminary hearing (176c; see βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι). Then Socrates: "There's no counsel left ... When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you." Charmides: "Then don't you oppose me either." Socrates:

"Then I won't oppose you" (176d; see βουλή). The verb is used three times in three lines, and the last time it is negated: the final words of the *Charmides* are a promise not to resist.

The promise is a joke, and the joke has two sides. On the surface Socrates yields to what he wants: the boy will come to him every day to be charmed (176b; see ἐπᾴδω). Underneath, the edition's note at 176c recalls what the two would later do with force, and the man who tells Charmides that no one alive can oppose him when he uses force is the man who, by his own account, did oppose the Thirty, when they ordered him to fetch Leon of Salamis and he went home instead (*Apology* 32c–d; see βιάζομαι). The last line can be read as Socrates' consent to a gentle force in the knowledge of a violent one.

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs.

176d No man alive will be able to oppose Charmides when he uses force; Charmides tells Socrates not to oppose him either; Socrates says he will not.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* the verb names both the sign and the citizen. The voice that has come to Socrates since boyhood only ever holds him back from what he means to do and never spurs him on, and it is this voice that stands against his entering politics, very properly, he thinks: no one who honestly sets himself against the Athenians, or any other crowd, and tries to stop the city from doing many unjust and lawless things will come out of it alive, and a man who means to fight for justice must keep to private life if he is to last even a little while (31d–32a). His one office bears it out: when the Assembly wished to try together, against the law, the ten generals who had not picked up the men from the sea battle, he alone of the presiding councillors opposed them, ἠναντιώθην, and voted against it (32b). After the verdict he tells the jurors who voted to acquit him that the sign, which all his life had checked him again and again, even over trifles, whenever he was about to do something amiss, gave him no check that day, neither as he left his house in the morning, nor as he went up to the court, nor anywhere in his speech; and

he takes its silence as strong proof that what has befallen him is good (40a–c). In the *Apology* opposition is the work of the good, the sign's and the just citizen's, and the sign's silence is its verdict that all is well.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon records the same character from outside. Presiding in the Assembly, Socrates would not let the people vote against the laws, but with the laws opposed an impulse of the people that Xenophon thinks no other man could have withstood; and when the Thirty ordered him to do anything against the laws, he did not obey.[92] When his companion Hermogenes urged him to think about his defence, Socrates answered that he had tried, and that the sign had opposed him.[93] The *Charmides* ends with Socrates' promise not to oppose, spoken to Charmides, later one of the Ten who held the Piraeus for the Thirty, with Critias, later one of the Thirty, at his side.

Translation in this edition

"Oppose" renders the verb at each of its three places (176d3, 176d4, 176d5), so that the English, like the Greek, closes on a repetition. At 176d4 Burnet prints the imperative ἐναντιοῦ from B and a later hand in T; T has ἐναντίου, the adjective "opposite", which makes no sense in the line.

See also

βιάζομαι; βουλεύομαι; βουλή; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπέχω; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιτάττω; κελεύω; πείθω.

ἐναργής · clear

ἐναργέστερα, *enargestera*, "more clearly"

Attested: ἐναργέστερα (*enargestera*; 172b). Visible, palpable, plain to see; the neuter plural comparative serves as an adverb, "more clearly". The word begins as the language of sight: in the *Iliad* gods are hard to face when they

[92] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.2.
[93] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.8.4–5.

show themselves plainly, ἐναργεῖς, in their own form.[94] Socrates uses it when he scales down what temperance might give. Perhaps its good is this, that whoever knows knowledge and the lack of knowledge learns more easily, and "everything will appear more clearly to him", since beside each thing he learns he sees his knowledge of it as well (172b; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; προσκαθοράω). The clarity is the clarity of seeing a thing together with one's knowledge of it. In the *Republic* thirst and hunger are the "clearest" of the desires, the plainest cases from which to learn what a desire is (437d; see ἐπιθυμία).

See also ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; προσκαθοράω; σαφής.

ἐνδείκνυμι · show, make out

Showing a power, a pretence, a possibility · Charmides

ἐνδειξαίμην, *endeixaimēn*, "(how) to show"; ἐνεδείκνυτο, *enedeiknyto*, "made out"; ἔνδειξαι, *endeixai*, "show"

At a Glance

The word. To point out, to show; in the middle, to make a thing plain, to declare it, or to give out that something is so.

In the *Charmides*. Three times. Socrates was at a loss "how to show you its power", the charm's (156b); Charmides "made out that he had been refuted" (162d); Socrates tells Critias, "first show this: that what I just mentioned is possible" (169b).

In this edition. "Show" at 156b and 169b, "made out" at 162d.

A place to read. 169b–d.

Meaning

The verb is δεικνύναι, "to show, point", with ἐν, "in": to show something in a thing or a person, to make it plain there. The middle voice, used at each place in the dialogue, makes the showing the speaker's own act: to point out on

[94] Homer, *Iliad* 20.131.

one's own behalf, to declare, to let it be seen that something is so. Where ἐπιδείκνυμι is to display, to put on show before an audience (see ἐπιδείκνυμι), ἐνδείκνυμι is to make plain, and so it can serve for proof as well as for pretence.

Use in the book

None of the three showings shows what it claims. Socrates has promised the boy a charm, and confesses, "Just now I was at a loss how to show you its power" (156b; see ἀπορέω; δύναμις). He explains it instead by the good doctors' principle, that the eyes cannot be cured without the head nor the head without the body (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός), and the charm itself is never sung, unless the conversation is the charm (see ἐπᾴδω). Charmides, prodding Critias, "made out that he had been refuted" (162c–d; see ἐξελέγχω): the showing here is a pretence. Socrates, at the end of his sorting of powers, puts the demand to Critias: "So you, son of Callaeschrus, since you lay it down that temperance is this, knowledge of knowledge and indeed of the lack of knowledge, first show this: that what I just mentioned is possible; and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too" (169b–c; see δυνατός; τίθημι). Critias cannot, and covers up his perplexity (169c–d; see ἐπικαλύπτω); Socrates grants the possibility "for now" to keep the argument moving (169d; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης).

The verb can be read as tracing the dialogue's debt. A power of the charm, a refutation (the boy's own or Critias'; the note at 162d leaves it open), a possibility of knowledge of knowledge: each is to be shown, and none is shown. What the dialogue shows in their place is the conversation in which the showing is attempted.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156b Socrates was at a loss how to show the boy the power of the charm.

162c–d Charmides, prodding Critias, makes out that he has been refuted.

169b–c Socrates tells Critias first to show that knowledge of knowledge is possible, then that it is beneficial.

Elsewhere in Plato

The verb names Socrates' mission in the *Apology*. He goes about, he says, at the god's bidding, seeking out anyone, citizen or stranger, whom he thinks wise, and when the man does not seem so to him, he takes the god's part and shows that he is not wise (23b; see διερευνάω); and he will not stop philosophising and exhorting and showing whomever he meets that he cares for money and reputation and not for his soul (29d; see ἐπιμέλεια). In the *Euthyphro* the two showings stand side by side. Socrates asks Euthyphro to show him clearly that all the gods think his prosecution right, and promises to praise his wisdom for ever; Euthyphro answers that it is no small task, though he could display it to him quite clearly, ἐπιδεῖξαι; Socrates replies that he must seem slower than the jurors, since to them Euthyphro will show it (9b). What Euthyphro would display, Socrates wants made plain.

Translation in this edition

"Show" for the optative ἐνδειξαίμην (156b2) and the imperative ἔνδειξαι (169b7), "made out" for the imperfect ἐνεδείκνυτο (162d1), where the middle carries the sense of giving out what is not so. At 169b8 the manuscripts add ἀποδεῖξαί σε, "that you demonstrate", after δυνατὸν, which Burnet brackets on Heindorf's conjecture; the English does not translate it.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀπορέω; διερευνάω; δύναμις; δυνατός; ἐξελέγχω; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἐπικαλύπτω; ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; τίθημι.

ἔνειμι · be in

ἐνοῦσαν … εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, *enousan … eiper enestin*, "if it really is in (you)" (159a1–2); ἔνεστιν, *enestin*, "(whether it) is in (you)" (159a9)

Attested: ἐνοῦσαν (*enousan*; 159a), ἔνεστιν (*enestin*; 159a twice). To be in, be present within. The verb carries the premise of the boy's inquiry. Socrates has asked whether temperance is present in Charmides, and proposes a way of looking into it: if temperance "really is in you", it must give rise to some

sense, and so to some opinion about it (159a; see αἴσθησις; δόξα; παρέχω). A few lines later he asks the boy, "so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me ... what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; τοπάζω). Socrates uses two verbs of presence, and the sentence that sets up the test has both: "if temperance is present in you" is πάρεστιν (158e), as in Critias' claim that the boy already has it (158b) and in "by being present" (160d; see πάρειμι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα); "if it really is in you" is ἔνεστιν (159a). The second adds the inwardness the test depends on: what is in a person leaves a trace he can sense and say.

See also αἴσθησις; δόξα; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; πάρειμι; παρέχω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; τοπάζω.

ἐνίοτε · sometimes

ἐνίοτε, *eniote*, "sometimes"

Attested: ἐνίοτε (*eniote*; 163c, 164b, 164c). Sometimes, at times. In Critias' reading of Hesiod, "a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but ... work is never any disgrace" (163c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ποίημα): "sometimes" against "never". Socrates uses the adverb twice for the doctor who benefits a patient without knowing it: "Then sometimes", the doctor does not know how he has acted, and "sometimes", having acted beneficially, he is temperate without knowing that he is (164b–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). The word is small and the argument turns on it. Socrates needs only that it happen sometimes; Critias answers that it "could never happen" (164c), and rather than grant a single case he would sooner take back some of what he had agreed (164c–d).

See also ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ποίημα.

ἐννοέω · consider

ἐννοήσας, *ennoēsas*, "consider"; ἐννόει, *ennoei*, "consider"

Attested: ἐννοήσας (*ennoēsas*; 160d) and ἐννόει (*ennoei*; 167c). To have in mind, to think of, to consider, to notice; the verb of νοῦς, "mind", with ἐν. Twice Socrates asks his partner to consider, and the two requests point in opposite directions. To the boy he says, "Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present" (160d; see ἐμβλέπω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν): the boy is to consider himself. To Critias, "Consider whether you think there is a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights" (167c–d; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων): Critias is to consider cases outside himself, and from them the strangeness of his own definition (see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).

See also αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἐμβλέπω; νοῦς; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν.

ἐντέλλομαι · charge

ἐνετέλλετο, *enetelleto*, "charged (me)"

Attested: ἐνετέλλετο (*enetelleto*; 157b). To enjoin, to command, to lay a charge on someone. The Thracian who taught Socrates the remedy and the charm told him to let no one persuade him to treat the head before the soul, and, as Socrates tells the boy, "he charged me very strictly to let no one be so rich, or so wellborn, or so beautiful, as to persuade me to do otherwise" (157b–c; see γενναῖος; πείθω). The imperfect is the usual tense of a reported order, and "very strictly" renders *πάνυ σφόδρα*. The edition's note at 157c observes that "rich, or wellborn, or beautiful" happens to describe Charmides exactly: the charge was laid long before the boy came in, and it fits him. Socrates has sworn him an oath and says he must obey (157c; see ὄμνυμι).

See also γενναῖος; ἐντολή; ξένος; ὄμνυμι; πείθω.

ἐντολή · instruction

ἐντολάς, *entolas*, "(as the stranger) instructed"

Attested: ἐντολάς (*entolas*; 157c). A command, an injunction, the thing enjoined; the noun of ἐντέλλομαι. Having sworn to obey the Thracian, Socrates turns to the boy: if he is willing, "as the stranger instructed", to hand over his soul first to be charmed, Socrates will apply the remedy to his head (157c; see ἐπᾴδω; ξένος; προσφέρω). The Greek is κατὰ τὰς τοῦ ξένου ἐντολάς, "according to the stranger's instructions", and the English turns the noun into a verb. The plural gathers what the Thracian said at 157b into a rule of practice: the soul first, then the head (see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα).

See also ἐντέλλομαι; ἐπᾴδω; ξένος; προσφέρω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα.

ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου · unexpectedly

ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου, *ex aprosdokētou*, "so unexpectedly"

Attested: ἐξ ἀπροσδοκήτου (*ex aprosdokētou*; 153b). "Out of the unexpected": without warning, suddenly. The adjective ἀπροσδόκητος, "unexpected", is the verbal adjective of προσδοκᾶν, "to expect", with the negative prefix. Socrates has come back from the army at Potidaea the evening before and gladly makes for his old haunts, and in the wrestling-school of Taureas the crowd sees him: "When they saw me come in so unexpectedly, they started greeting me at once from across the room, from every side" (153b; see συνήθης διατριβή). The news of a heavy battle had only just reached Athens, and Chaerephon's first question is how he came out of it alive (153b; see Χαιρεφῶν). Socrates' arrival can be read as unexpected because he might have been dead; the boy's arrival, a page later, is expected and announced in advance (154a; see πρόδρομος).

See also πρόδρομος; συνήθης διατριβή; Χαιρεφῶν.

ἐξ ἀρχῆς · from the beginning

πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, *palin ex archēs*, "go back to the beginning"; ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, *hōsper ex archēs*, "as though from the beginning"; ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, *ho ex archēs*, "as (we supposed) at the start"; ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς, *ho ge ex archēs*, "what (we laid down) at the start"

Attested: πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (*palin ex archēs*; 163d), ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (*hōsper ex archēs*; 167a–b), ὃ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (*ho ex archēs*; 171d) and ὅ γε ἐξ ἀρχῆς (*ho ge ex archēs*; 172c). "From the beginning": afresh, or from the first. The phrase marks the dialogue's new starts and its memory of them. Socrates sends Critias back after his distinctions: "So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly" (163d; see ὁρίζω; σαφής). He opens the examination of the formula "once more ... the third time, for the Savior ... as though from the beginning" (167a–b; see τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι). Then the phrase looks back: the great benefit would have come "if, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know" (171d; see ἀναμάρτητος), and Socrates grants for argument's sake "what we laid down at the start that temperance is, knowing what one knows and what one does not know" (172c; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The "start" in the last two is not the dialogue's beginning but the beginning of the third attempt, 167a.

See also ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀναμάρτητος; ὁρίζω; σαφής; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.

ἐξαιρέω · remove, take away

ἐξῃρημένης, *exēirēmenēs*, "(with error) removed"; ἐξελεῖν, *exelein*, "to take (this knowledge) away"

Attested: ἐξῃρημένης (*exēirēmenēs*; 172a) and ἐξελεῖν (*exelein*; 174c). To take out, to remove. The verb names two subtractions, and they can be read against each other. The first is in the picture of the city that temperance, as Critias defines it, would rule: where, "with error removed and rightness leading", all would do well and be happy (171e–172a; see ἁμαρτία; ἡγέομαι; ὀρθότης). Error is pictured as a thing that can be lifted out of a household and

a city, leaving rightness to lead. The second is Socrates' test of the knowledge of good and bad: "For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy ...?" (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Take error out, and the dialogue promised happiness; take this one knowledge out, and every craft still does its work, but nothing is done well and beneficially. At 172a1 Burnet prints ἐξῃρημένης from T and W; B has διῃρημένης, "divided" (apparatus, a1). The life without error is told under ἁμαρτία and ἀναμάρτητος.

See also ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἡγέομαι; ὀρθότης.

ἐξαπατάω · deceive

ἐξαπατῷ, *exapatōi*, "would deceive"

Attested: ἐξαπατῷ (*exapatōi*; 173b). To deceive thoroughly, to cheat, to lead astray; ἀπατᾶν, "to deceive", with ἐκ marking the act carried through. In Socrates' dream, if temperance ruled, "No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us", and no pretended doctor or general would escape notice (173b; see ἀλαζών; κυβερνήτης; λανθάνω; φάσκω). The deceiver of the dream is the man who claims a knowledge he lacks, the figure that the temperate man of 167a was to detect (see ἐπισκοπέω) and that 170e–171c showed he could not (see ἀληθινός). Burnet prints ἐξαπατῷ ἂν with T; B has ἐξαπατᾶν, and Stobaeus, who quotes the passage, omits the words from "but was not" to "us" (apparatus, b2).

See also ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; ἐπισκοπέω; κυβερνήτης; λανθάνω; φάσκω.

ἔξαρνος · deny

ἐξάρνῳ εἶναι, *exarnōi einai*, "to deny"

Attested: ἐξάρνῳ εἶναι (*exarnōi einai*; 158c). The adjective ἔξαρνος, "denying", from ἀρνεῖσθαι, "to say no"; ἔξαρνος εἶναι, "to be denying", is to deny. Asked whether he agrees with Critias that he is temperate enough,

Charmides blushes, and answers, in Socrates' report, "that it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny what he had been asked" (158c–d; see ἀγεννῶς; ἀνερυθριάω; ὁμολογέω). Then he gives his reasons: to deny would be odd and would show up Critias as a liar, to agree would be self-praise (158d; see ἐπιδείκνυμι; ψευδής). The adjective is in the dative, attracted to the understood dative of the person: "not easy (for him) to be denying". At 158c7 Burnet prints οὐ ῥᾴδιον, "not easy", with T and a variant in W; B and W have ἄλογον, "unreasonable".

See also ἀγεννῶς; ἀνερυθριάω; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ὁμολογέω; οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι; ψευδής.

ἐξελέγχω · refute

ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη, *exelēlegmenos eiē*, "(that) he had been refuted"

Attested: ἐξεληλεγμένος εἴη (*exelēlegmenos eiē*; 162d). To refute utterly, to convict; the compound of ἐλέγχειν with ἐκ, "out, thoroughly", and here in the perfect passive, the state of one who has been refuted. Charmides has been teasing Critias over the definition he borrowed: "So Charmides, wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it, kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted" (162c–d; see ἐνδείκνυμι). The edition's note at 162d: "Whether 'he had been refuted' means Charmides (playing beaten) or Critias is left open by the Greek, and by the English; translators divide." Either way the refutation is staged rather than suffered: the boy either pretends to be beaten or pretends that Critias, the author sitting beside him, is. It works. Critias, angry with the boy as a poet with an actor who spoils his verses (162d; see ποιητής; ὑποκριτής), takes the argument over. The simple verb and Socrates' account of what his refutations are for are told under ἐλέγχω.

See also ἐλέγχω; ἐνδείκνυμι; παραδέχομαι; ποιητής; ὑποκριτής.

ἐξετάζω · examine

The examination of oneself and others that temperance was to make possible · Charmides

ἐξετάσαι, *exetasai*, "to examine"; ἐξετάσει, *exetasei*, "will examine"; ἐξετάζοντες, *exetazontes*, "who examine"

At a Glance

The word. To examine closely, to test, to scrutinise; of an officer, to review troops.

In the *Charmides*. Four times in three passages: the temperate man will be "able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not" (167a); he will not after all "be able to examine someone else who claims to know something" (170d); perhaps "he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned, while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly" (172b).

In this edition. "Examine". The Glossary adds that "examine" also renders compounds of σκοπεῖν "where a person is examined, 171b, 171d" (see ἐπισκέπτομαι).

A place to read. 170d–171c.

Meaning

The verb is ἐτάζειν, "to test, to examine", with ἐκ, "out": to examine thoroughly, to try out. In Athenian life it was the word for reviewing troops under arms,[95] and in Plato it is the word Socrates uses for what he does to the people he questions.

Use in the book

The verb's three passages trace the shrinking of Critias' definition. At first the examination is universal and goes both ways. Once Critias has granted that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and of its lack, Socrates draws the consequence: the temperate man alone will know himself and "be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not", and inspect others as

[95] Thucydides 4.74.3 and 6.96.3.

well (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐπισκοπέω; μόνος). The edition's note there records the common reading of this as a portrait of Socrates (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη).

Then the examination of others is taken away. A knowledge of knowledge tells only that a man knows, not what (170c–d; see γιγνώσκω). "Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it. He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know" (170d; see φάσκω). To examine a doctor one must examine him in the healthy and the diseased, and that is medicine's work (171b; see ἀληθινός; ἐπισκέπτομαι).

At last the examination survives only as a better version of an ordinary skill. Perhaps the good of knowing knowledge is that its possessor learns more easily and "will examine others better about the things he himself has learned", while others examine more feebly (172b; see ἀσθένεια; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην). The examiner who was to judge everyone now judges only within what he has learned.

The verb can be read as the dialogue's question about Socrates himself. In the *Apology* he examines men who claim to know and finds that they do not, without claiming to know their crafts; the edition's note at 170d says that on the account the argument reaches, temperance could not do what Socrates does (see διαγιγνώσκω). The argument proves that a knowledge of knowledge cannot examine a doctor in medicine. It does not prove that no one can examine a man's claim to know by what he says when he is questioned, and that is the examination the *Apology* describes.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

167a The temperate man alone will be able to examine what he knows and does not know, and to inspect others.

170d He will not be able to examine someone else who claims to know, to see whether he knows what he says he knows.

172b Perhaps he will examine others better about what he has learned, while those who examine without it do so more feebly and poorly.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* examining is the life the god assigned. Socrates stayed where his commanders stationed him at Potidaea, at Amphipolis on the Thracian coast and at Delium in Boeotia; it would be a dreadful thing, he says, to desert his post when the god, as he understood it, stationed him to live philosophising and examining himself and others (28e–29a). The examination has imitators: the young men of leisure who follow him enjoy hearing people examined, imitate him, and try to examine others, and they come on plenty of people who believe they have some knowledge and have little or none, so that those they examine are angry with Socrates (23c). A life without examination, he tells the jury, is no life for a human being (38a; see βίος).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's account of examination can be read as an answer to the question of 170d–171c. He names a kind of argument, the examining, πειραστική, whose premises come from what the answerer believes and from what anyone who claims a knowledge must know, and he counts the art a part of dialectic.[96] Examination, he says, is not like geometry but an art that even someone without the knowledge can have: one who does not know a subject can test another who does not, if the other grants premises drawn not from what he knows or from the subject's own principles but from what follows on them, things a man may know without knowing the art but cannot fail to know without being ignorant of it. So examination is knowledge of nothing determinate and is concerned with everything, since all the arts use certain common things; and that is why everyone, even laymen, uses it up to a point, trying to put to the question those who profess to know.[97] Critias' examiner without medicine could not tell a doctor from a pretender. Aristotle's examiner can, up to a point, because he tests not medicine but the claim.

[96] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 2, 165b4–6, and 8, 169b25.
[97] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 11, 172a21–34.

Translation in this edition

"Examine" renders ἐξετάσαι (167a2, 170d5), ἐξετάσει (172b6) and ἐξετάζοντες (172b7), and also renders the compounds of σκοπεῖν at 171b and 171d. The neighbouring verb at 167a, ἐπισκοπεῖν, is "inspect".

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀληθινός; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἀσθένεια; βίος; γιγνώσκω; διαγιγνώσκω; ἐπακολουθέω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; μόνος; φάσκω.

ἐξευρίσκω · find, discover

ἐξευρίσκοντες, *exeuriskontes*, "(we would) find"; ἐξευρεῖν, *exeurein*, "to discover"

Attested: ἐξευρίσκοντες (*exeuriskontes*; 171e) and ἐξευρεῖν (*exeurein*; 176a). To find out, to discover; εὑρίσκειν, "to find", with ἐκ, "out". The two places put the verb to two objects, persons and a definition. In the life without error that temperance would make possible, "neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them" (171e; see ἁμαρτία; ἐπίσταμαι; παραδίδωμι). The finding of experts presupposes the examination that 170d–171c has just shown to be impossible (see ἐξετάζω). At the end Charmides cannot say whether he has temperance: "For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?" (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The boy draws the conclusion that the inquiry has not found what it sought, and so he cannot find it in himself either. In the *Meno* Socrates says that by numbing Meno's slave with perplexity they have done something useful towards the boy's finding out how the matter stands (84b; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην).

See also ἁμαρτία; ἀνευρίσκω; ἐξετάζω; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; παραδίδωμι.

ἔοικα · it seems, it looks like

ἔοικεν, *eoiken*, "it seems", "apparently", "it looks like"; ὡς ἔοικεν, *hōs eoiken*, "as it seems", "it seems"

Attested: Ἔοικεν alone (*eoiken*; 159d, 161c, 170c, 171b, 175a), αἰνίγματι … ἔοικεν (161c), and ὡς ἔοικεν (*hōs eoiken*; 161a, 162a, 164c, 168a, 170d twice, 171c, 174d): fourteen times. A perfect with present sense, "I am like"; impersonally, "it seems, it is likely". Once it keeps its first sense: the saying about doing one's own business "looks like a kind of riddle" (161c; see αἴνιγμα). Elsewhere it is the language of assent and of inference. As an answer, "It seems so", it is a guarded yes, and the dialogue gives it to the boy once (159d) and to Critias, first in an ironic disclaimer, "From someone else, apparently" (161c), then at the points where he concedes most: "It seems so" to the result that the temperate man knows only that he knows (170c) and to the examination of the doctor in his own field (171b), and finally, "It seems it can't be, Socrates, in any way" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). In Socrates' mouth ὡς ἔοικεν marks a step as drawn from what has been agreed, not asserted on his own: "But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind" (168a), "But this, it seems, is not temperance" (174d).

See also αἴνιγμα; ἀνάγκη; δοκέω; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; φαίνομαι.

ἐπᾴδω · sing a charm, charm

Singing the charm over the remedy, and over the boy every day · Charmides

ἐπᾴδοι, *epāidoi*, "(if one) sang the charm"; ἐπᾷσαι, *epāisai*, "to be charmed"; ἐπᾳστέον, *epāisteon*, "the charm must be sung"; ἐπᾴδεσθαι, *epāidesthai*, "being charmed"; ἐπᾴδειν, *epāidein*, "charm"

At a Glance

The word. To sing over someone or something, to chant a spell, to charm; the verb of ἐπῳδή, "charm".

In the *Charmides*. Five times, at the opening and the close. The charm is sung with the leaf (155e), the soul is to be charmed first (157c), the charm

must be sung before the remedy is given (158c); and at the end Charmides asks to be charmed every day, and Critias makes it a proof of his temperance that he lets Socrates charm him (176b).

In this edition. "Sang the charm", "to be charmed", "the charm must be sung", "being charmed", "charm".

A place to read. 175e–176b.

Meaning

Ἐπᾴδειν is ᾄδειν, "to sing", with ἐπί, "over, upon": to sing over a sufferer, a wound or a remedy. The edition's note at 155e explains the practice: "Greek healing could pair a herb with an incantation (epōidē, a song 'sung over' the sufferer) ... and Pindar's Asclepius heals some patients 'with soothing incantations' (Pythian 3.51)." Pindar is the lyric poet of the fifth century BC, Asclepius the god of healing. From healing the verb passed to any speech that soothes, persuades or binds.

Use in the book

The verb appears with Socrates' improvised doctoring. Asked what the remedy is, Socrates recalls: "I told him that the thing itself was a leaf, but that there was a charm to go with the remedy; if one sang the charm while using it, the remedy made one perfectly healthy, but without the charm the leaf was no use at all" (155e; see ὄφελος; φάρμακον; φύλλον). The Thracian's teaching gives the order, the soul first, and Socrates applies it to the boy: "And as for you, if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see ἐντολή; παρέχω; προσφέρω); and once Critias has praised the boy's temperance, the order becomes a condition: "But if you seem still to be lacking in these things, the charm must be sung before the remedy is given" (158c; see δόσις). The verbal adjective ἐπᾳστέον makes it a duty.

No charm is then sung, unless the conversation is the charm, as the note at 157a suggests (see λόγοι καλοί). The verb returns only when the conversation has failed. Socrates has said that he is still more aggrieved on

account of the charm, if he took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing (175e), and Charmides, who does not know whether he has temperance, answers: "I think I very much need the charm. As far as I'm concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it's enough" (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι). Critias approves: "if you do this, it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you and don't desert him, great or small" (176b; see ἀπολείπω; τεκμήριον).

The verb's course can be read as the dialogue's own. At first the charm is a rite sung once with a leaf; at the end it is a daily practice with no remedy at all, the headache forgotten (the note at 155b). At first Socrates is the singer and the boy the patient; at the end the passive is the boy's request and the active Critias' order, and the force that closes the dialogue is used to secure the charm (176c–d; see βιάζομαι). The boy who was said to be "far and away the most temperate" (157d) asks for the charm whose work is temperance, and Critias takes the asking as the proof.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155e Sung with the leaf, the charm makes the remedy work; without it the leaf is no use.

157c If the boy hands over his soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, Socrates will apply the remedy.

158c If the boy seems still to lack temperance, the charm must be sung before the remedy is given.

176b Charmides would be charmed every day until Socrates says it is enough; Critias will take it as proof of his temperance if he lets Socrates charm him.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* the charm is an argument repeated against fear. Cebes asks Socrates to talk round the child within them, who dreads death as children dread a bogey; Socrates replies that they must chant over the child daily until the spell has done its work; and when Cebes asks where they will get a good charmer once Socrates has left them, he answers that Greece is wide and the barbarian nations many, that they must hunt through them all for such a

charmer, grudging neither cost nor labour, and must hunt among themselves as well, since they may not readily find others more able to do it than they are (77e–78a). The *Charmides*' "every day" can be read as the *Phaedo*'s. After the myth of the earth, Socrates says that one should sing such things to oneself like a charm (114d), and in the *Republic* he proposes to listen to poetry while chanting to themselves, as a charm, the argument by which they banished it, so as not to fall back into the childish love of it that the many share (608a). In each the charm is words, and the patient sings them to himself.

Other ancient sources

The *Odyssey* has a healing charm in the story of the scar by which Odysseus is recognised. Wounded by a boar on Parnassus, he was tended by the sons of his grandfather Autolycus, who bound up the wound skilfully and stanched the dark blood with a charm.[98] The line can be read as putting side by side what the *Charmides* will put side by side: ἐπισταμένως, "skilfully", the adverb of ἐπίστασθαι (see ἐπίσταμαι), and ἐπαοιδῇ, "with a charm", knowledge and song in one treatment, as the leaf and the charm are in Socrates' remedy.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps "charm" for noun and verb alike (the Glossary: "charm, ἐπῳδή (epōidē); to charm, to sing a charm, ἐπᾴδειν"), with "sang the charm" for ἐπᾴδοι (155e6), "to be charmed" for ἐπᾷσαι (157c4), "the charm must be sung" for ἐπαστέον (158c2), "being charmed" for ἐπᾴδεσθαι (176b3) and "charm" for ἐπᾴδειν (176b6). At 157c4 ἐπᾷσαι is a later correction in B; B as first written (it seems) and T have ἀπάσαις, "with all (the Thracian's charms)", and H. Richards proposed the accusative τὰς ... ἐπῳδάς. At 176b3 "until" is W's ἕως; B and T have ἴσως, "perhaps".

See also

ἀπολείπω; βιάζομαι; δόσις; ἐντολή; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπῳδή; λόγοι καλοί; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; ὄφελος; παρέχω; προσφέρω; τεκμήριον; φάρμακον; φύλλον.

[98] Homer, *Odyssey* 19.393–394 and 428–454 (the boar on Parnassus) and 19.455–458 (the charm).

ἐπαΐω · understand

What the doctor understands, and what the expert is · Charmides

ἐπαΐει, *epaiei*, "understands"

At a Glance

The word. To have an expert's understanding of something; ὁ ἐπαΐων, the man who understands, the expert.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the test of the doctor: the temperate man "will surely not discuss medicine with him—for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e).

In this edition. "Understands".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

The verb is ἀΐειν, "to hear, to perceive", an old poetic verb, with ἐπί. In prose it became the word for the understanding of the man who knows a matter, the one whose judgement counts: the expert as against the many. It is a verb of competence more than of information, and Plato uses it of crafts.

Use in the book

The verb sets the boundary of a craft. Socrates asks how the temperate man, if temperance is knowledge of knowledge, could tell the true doctor from the pretender. He will not discuss medicine with him, "for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased", and about knowledge the doctor knows nothing, since that was assigned to temperance alone (170e; see διαλέγομαι; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). The step after is the joke the note at 171a calls deadpan: the doctor will not know about medicine either, since medicine is a knowledge (170e–171a). The whole test is told under ἀληθινός.

"Understands nothing but" is the hinge. The phrase restricts the doctor to his object, as the argument restricted temperance to knowledge of knowledge and its lack, "and of nothing else" (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός). Each expertise is shut in its field, so that the doctor understands only health and disease, and

the temperate man only knowledge. The verb can be read as naming what the temperate man lacks and the doctor has: an understanding of the thing itself, which no understanding of understanding can replace.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs.

170e The temperate man will not discuss medicine with the doctor, for the doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Crito* makes the man who understands the measure of whose opinion counts. A man in training heeds the praise and blame of the one man who is a doctor or a trainer, and must exercise and eat and drink as seems good to "the one, the overseer and the one who understands" rather than to all the rest; if he disobeys him and honours the words of the many who understand nothing, his body will suffer (47a–c); so too about just and unjust, where they must care not what the many will say of them, but what "the one who understands about the just and unjust" will say, the one, and the truth itself (48a). In the *Apology* Socrates denies the verb of himself: he understands nothing, great or small, of the things the comic stage has him talk about (19c). In the *Phaedrus* a man who has picked something up from a book or happened on a few drugs and thinks himself a doctor "understands nothing of the art" (268c). In the *Laches* the verb states the principle that the same knowledge understands the same things, future, present and past (199a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

Translation in this edition

"Understands" for ἐπαΐει (170e6), kept apart from "knows" (οἶδεν, 170e9) in Socrates' next sentence, so that the doctor's expertise and the knowledge he lacks are not confused in the English.

See also

ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; διαλέγομαι; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἰατρικός; ἰατρός; προσποιέομαι; τὸ νοσῶδες.

ἐπακολουθέω · follow

ἐπακολουθῆσαι, *epakolouthēsai*, "follow"

Attested: ἐπακολουθῆσαι (*epakolouthēsai*; 171b). To follow after, to keep up with; of words and deeds, to follow them with understanding, to be able to judge them. Critias has agreed with Socrates that whoever examines a doctor must examine him in the healthy and the diseased, "in what is said or done in this way, whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly". Then: "Could anyone, then, follow either of these without medicine?" "Certainly not" (171b; see ἀληθινός; ἐξετάζω; τὰ ἔξω). To follow here is to be able to keep pace with the doctor's reasoning and practice, and only a doctor can. At 171b11 ποτέροις, "either of these", is T's reading; B has προτέροις, "the former", and εἰ for ἢ. In the *Apology* the same verb is used in its plain sense, of the young men of leisure who follow Socrates about of their own accord and enjoy hearing people examined (23c; see ἐξετάζω).

See also ἀληθινός; ἐξετάζω; ἰατρική; λέγω; τὰ ἔξω.

ἐπέχω · pause, wait

ἐπισχών, *epischōn*, "paused"; ἐπίσχες, *episches*, "wait"

Attested: ἐπισχών (*epischōn*; 160e) and ἐπίσχες (*episches*; 165c). To hold back, to check; without an object, to stop, to pause, to wait. Twice someone holds back before answering. The boy, asked to look within himself, "paused", thought it over and said that temperance is modesty (160e; see ἀνδρικῶς; διασκέπτομαι; ἐμβλέπω). Socrates, pressed by Critias to agree that temperance is knowing oneself, refuses to agree before he has looked, since he

inquires because he himself does not know: "Just wait until I have" (165b–c; see σκέπτομαι; τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι). The pause is the boy's modesty and Socrates' method. In the *Apology* the sign that used to oppose Socrates often held him back in the middle of a speech (40b; see ἐναντιόομαι).

See also ἀνδρικῶς; διασκέπτομαι; ἐμβλέπω; ἐναντιόομαι; σκέπτομαι; τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι.

ἐπιδείκνυμι · show off, point to, show up

Displaying the boy, the family and Critias · Charmides

ἐπέδειξάς, *epedeixas*, "(why don't you) show (him) off"; ἐπιδεῖξαι, *epideixai*, "point to"; ἐπιδείξω, *epideixō*, "I shall be showing up"

At a Glance

The word. To display, to exhibit, to show off; to point out; to prove a person to be something.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in the opening scenes. Socrates asks Critias to "show him off to me" (155a); no one could easily "point to" two houses whose union would produce finer offspring than the boy's (157e); the boy fears that by denying his temperance he will be "showing up Critias here as a liar" (158d).

In this edition. "Show him off", "point to", "showing up ... as a liar".

A place to read. 154d–155a.

Meaning

The verb is δεικνύναι, "to show", with ἐπί: to show forth, to put on show before others. Its noun, ἐπίδειξις, was the name of the display piece with which a sophist exhibited his art to an audience. The verb can also mean to show someone up as something, to prove him so. Its neighbour ἐνδείκνυμι, "to make plain", is the verb of proof and of pretence (see ἐνδείκνυμι).

Use in the book

Every display in the *Charmides* is a display of persons. After Chaerephon has praised the boy's face and body and Socrates has asked to see his soul stripped first (154d–e; see ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος), Socrates asks Critias, "But why don't you call the youngster over and show him off to me?" (155a). The boy is to be shown as one shows a fine possession. Then Socrates displays the boy's family to him, as a rhetorician might: "For I don't suppose anyone else here could easily point to two houses in Athens whose union would be likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two you are sprung from" (157e; see οἰκία; πατρῷος). Last, the boy refuses to display himself: "For if I say I'm not temperate ... not only is it an odd thing to say such things against oneself, but at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate"; if he says he is, he will be praising himself (158c–d; see ἔξαρνος; ψευδής).

The three can be read as an exchange of displays. The guardian is asked to show off his ward, Socrates shows off the ward's pedigree, and the ward, the one person in the scene who will not put anyone on show, declines to show either himself or his guardian. The blush and the refusal are, on the edition's reading at 158c, a picture of temperance as modesty before anyone has defined it (see αἰσχυντηλός).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155a Socrates asks Critias why he does not call the boy over and show him off.

157e No one could easily point to two houses whose union would produce finer offspring.

158d The boy fears that denying his temperance would show up Critias as a liar.

Elsewhere in Plato

The display is the sophist's trade. In the *Hippias Major* Socrates reminds Hippias, the sophist of Elis, that Gorgias came to Athens as his city's ambassador, was thought to have spoken best in the Assembly, and in private gave displays and kept company with the young and made a great deal of

money, as did Prodicus; none of the wise men of old, he says, ever thought fit to charge money or give displays of their wisdom before all sorts of people, so simple were they (282b–d). In the *Protagoras* the sophist, asked to show that virtue can be taught, offers to show it either by telling a story, as an old man to younger men, or by going through an argument, and chooses the story as the more pleasing (320c). Socrates in the *Gorgias* arrives too late for a display and asks for conversation instead (447a–c; see διαλέγομαι). The *Charmides*, which puts persons on show and examines a definition, can be read as taking the display away from speeches and giving it back to the soul.

Translation in this edition

"Show him off" for τί οὐκ ἐπέδειξάς (155a3–4), literally "why have you not shown", an impatient aorist; "point to" for ἐπιδεῖξαι (157e2); "showing up Critias here as a liar" for Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω (158d3), where Stallbaum proposed ἀποδείξω, "prove".

See also

αἰσχυντηλός; ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; διαλέγομαι; ἐνδείκνυμι; ἔξαρνος; οἰκία; πατρῷος; Πρόδικος; ψευδής.

ἐπιεικῶς · reasonably

ἐπιεικῶς, *epieikōs*, "reasonably"

Attested: ἐπιεικῶς (*epieikōs*; 153c). Fittingly, reasonably, fairly: the adverb of ἐπιεικής, "seemly, reasonable", a word akin to εἰκός, "likely, fitting". Chaerephon reports what is said in Athens about the battle at Potidaea, that it was very heavy and that many men they knew were killed, and Socrates answers: "The word ... is reasonably accurate" (153c). The adverb qualifies the truth of a report. It is the first judgement in the dialogue on whether what is said is true, given by the one man present who was there, and it is measured: the rumour is fair, not exact. In the *Gorgias* the word is Gorgias' own for his short answers, which he thinks he gives "quite reasonably" (449d).

See also ἀληθής; Χαιρεφῶν.

ἐπιθυμία · desire

Desire, whose object is pleasure, in the procession of powers · Charmides

ἐπιθυμία, *epithymia*, "desire"; ἐπιθυμιῶν, *epithymiōn*, "(the other) desires"

At a Glance

The word. Desire, appetite, longing, of any kind, and often the bodily appetite for pleasure.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in one sentence, twice in the singular and once in the plural: "Well, do you think there is a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires?" "Certainly not" (167e).

In this edition. "Desire".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

Ἐπιθυμία is the noun of ἐπιθυμεῖν, "to set one's heart on", from θυμός, "spirit, heart", with ἐπί. In ordinary Greek it is any desire, for food, for honour, for a person, and Plato often uses it so: in the *Republic* each part of the soul has its own desires (580d), and the philosopher desires all wisdom (475b). The *Charmides* narrows it. Beside it stand βούλησις, "wish", whose object is the good, and ἔρως, "love", whose object is the beautiful, and the *Charmides* gives the three in a row, each with its object (see βούλησις; ἔρως). The edition's note at 167e: "Love (erōs) is assumed to be of the beautiful, as desire is of pleasure and wish of the good in the lines just before."

Use in the book

Desire is the first of the soul's states in the procession, after the senses (167e; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). Socrates gives it its object without argument, ἡδονή, "pleasure", and builds the case by taking it away: a desire that desires no pleasure. Critias answers, "Certainly not." The procession as a

whole and the case of desire for desires are told under their own headwords (see ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν).

What the noun itself contributes is the division of objects. Desire is of pleasure, wish of the good, love of the beautiful, fear of the dreadful, opinion of what opinions are about (167e–168a; see δόξα; φόβος). Each power is defined by what it is for, and the principle is stated a few lines on, that knowledge too is of something and has a power to be of something (168b; see δύναμις; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Desire can be read as the case in which the dependence on the object is plainest.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

167e There is no desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* takes desire as its model of a power defined by its object. Thirst and hunger are the clearest desires; thirst as such is a desire for drink, and hot or cold, much or little, are added to it only by something else, so that each desire itself is only of the thing it is by nature of (437d–e). Socrates forestalls an objection that touches the *Charmides*' triad: someone may say that no one desires drink but good drink, since everyone desires good things, and Glaucon allows that there may be something in it (438a). Socrates sets it aside: thirst itself is of drink itself, neither of good drink nor of bad (439a). The *Charmides* can be read as making the same separation by another route, giving desire pleasure and leaving the good to wish. In the *Symposium* Socrates gets Agathon to agree that what desires desires what it lacks, and does not desire if it does not lack (200a–b). In his first speech in the *Phaedrus* Socrates sets an inborn desire for pleasures against an acquired opinion that aims at the best (237d–238a; see σωφροσύνη).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle states as a definition what the *Charmides* assumes. Wherever there is perception there is pleasure and pain, and wherever these there is appetite,

"for this is desire for the pleasant".[99] In the *Rhetoric* he sets wish among the rational desires and appetite among the irrational ones (see βούλησις),[100] the same division as 167e, between a desire for pleasure and a wish for the good.

Translation in this edition

"Desire" for ἐπιθυμία (167e1, e2), and "desires" for the plural ἐπιθυμιῶν; "for" is added before each object, "desire for no pleasure, but for itself", as in the neighbouring sentence on wish.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; βούλησις; δόξα; δύναμις; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἔρως; ἡδονή; σωφροσύνη; φόβος.

ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν · desire for itself and for the other desires

The desire that desires only desiring · Charmides

ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν, *epithymia, hautēs de kai tōn allōn epithymiōn*, "desire ... but for itself and for the other desires"

At a Glance

The word. A desire whose objects are itself and the other desires, and not any pleasure.

In the *Charmides*. "Well, do you think there is a desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires?" "Certainly not" (167e).

In this edition. "For itself and for the other desires".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

[99] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.3, 414b4–6.
[100] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.10, 1369a1–4.

Meaning

The phrase is the second member, after the senses, of the series modelled on Critias' definition of temperance as knowledge "of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). As with the wish for wishes, the power keeps its name and loses its object (see βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων). Desire's object is pleasure; the phrase gives it instead itself and its fellows.

Use in the book

Critias answers "Certainly not", and the case is the one in which a reader is most tempted to disagree. A sight that sees no colour cannot be imagined; a desire for desires is familiar. Men want to want, and some desires live on their own renewal. Socrates' wording blocks the familiar case: the desire he asks about is a desire "for no pleasure". A desire to go on desiring still wants the pleasure of satisfying the desires it breeds, and so keeps pleasure as its object. What Critias denies is a desire that has dropped pleasure altogether and wants only wanting, and that is no desire.

The case can be read as the one in which the dialogue's method shows its edge. The principle of 168d, that what has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό), would require a desire that desired itself to be itself pleasant. The itch of the *Gorgias* comes close (494c), since its scratching is pleasant and renews it; but then it is the pleasure of the scratching, not the desire, that is wanted.

Places to read

The passage in which the case is put, within the procession.

167e No desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Callicles holds that the happy life is having all the other desires and being able to fill them and enjoy it; Socrates asks whether a man with an itch, who has scratching in abundance and goes through life scratching, lives happily (494c).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle describes the desire that feeds on itself. In the senseless man, he says, the appetite for the pleasant is insatiable and is drawn from every side, and the exercise of appetite increases what is akin to it; and if the appetites are great and violent, they drive out reasoning.[101] Appetite that increases appetite can be read as the nearest real case to 167e, and it still has pleasure for its object.

Translation in this edition

"A desire which is desire for no pleasure, but for itself and for the other desires" (167e1–2) renders ἥτις ἡδονῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἐπιθυμία, αὐτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν, keeping the μέν … δέ balance with "no … but".

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; βούλησις αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; ἡδονή.

ἐπικαλύπτω · cover up

Critias covering up his perplexity · Charmides

ἐπικαλύπτων, *epikalyptōn*, "kept covering up"

At a Glance

The word. To put a covering over, to veil, to hide.

In the *Charmides*. Once, of Critias: "he said nothing clear, but kept covering up his perplexity" (169d).

In this edition. "Kept covering up".

A place to read. 169c–d.

[101] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.12, 1119b8–10.

Meaning

Καλύπτειν is "to cover, to veil", as one covers a head or a body; ἐπί adds the covering laid on top. The verb is used of hiding what one would rather not have seen.

Use in the book

The sentence in which the verb stands is the dialogue's portrait of Critias at a loss. Socrates has said that he cannot decide whether a knowledge of knowledge is possible, and has asked Critias to show that it is (169a–b; see ἐνδείκνυμι). Critias catches Socrates' perplexity as one catches a yawn (169c; see ἀπορία; συμπάσχω); used to being admired, ashamed before the company and unwilling to concede that he cannot make the distinctions, "he said nothing clear, but kept covering up his perplexity" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; εὐδοκιμέω; προκαλέομαι; σαφής). The present participle makes the covering a thing he went on doing. Socrates does not uncover it. To keep the argument moving, he grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible (169d; see πρόειμι).

The verb can be read as the dramatic refutation of Critias' definition. The definition makes temperance the knowledge by which a man knows what he knows and what he does not. The man who holds it, at the moment he does not know, hides the fact. Socrates, who disclaims that knowledge, says openly where he finds no way through (167b; see εὔπορος). The one who would know his own ignorance conceals it, and the one who claims no such knowledge displays it.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs.

169c–d Ashamed before the company, unwilling to concede that he cannot make the distinctions, Critias says nothing clear and keeps covering up his perplexity.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* has the same scene told by an onlooker. Nicias has defined courage as a knowledge, and Laches, who says he cannot see what Nicias means, complains that he is unwilling to admit nobly that he is saying

nothing, but twists up and down concealing his perplexity; in a law court there might be some point in such twisting, but in a company like theirs, he asks, why should a man adorn himself with empty words? (196a–b). The verb there is ἐπικρύπτεσθαι, "to hide over", and the perplexity, ἀπορία, is the same. In the *Cratylus* the verb is used of a name: the name of Atreus, king of Mycenae and father of Agamemnon, is said to be slightly bent and veiled, so that it does not show the man's nature to everyone, though it shows it to those who understand names (395b).

Translation in this edition

"Kept covering up his perplexity" renders ἐπικαλύπτων τὴν ἀπορίαν (169d1), the continuous participle given its continuous English.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἀλαζών; ἀπορία; ἐνδείκνυμι; εὐδοκιμέω; εὔπορος; πρόειμι; προκαλέομαι; σαφής; συμπάσχω.

ἐπιμέλεια · caring for, study

The care the doctors owe the whole, and the study Critias has given his subject · Charmides

ἐπιμέλειαν, *epimeleian*, "caring for"; ἐπιμελείας, *epimeleias*, "(because of) the study (you have given it)"

At a Glance

The word. Care, attention, charge; the care given to a person or a thing, and the application given to a subject, study.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. The Greek doctors neglect the whole, "which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e); Socrates tells Critias that he may be expected to know what the definition means, "both because of your age and because of the study you have given it" (162e).

In this edition. "Caring for" (156e), "study" (162e).

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

Ἐπιμέλεια is the noun of ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, "to take care of, to see to", from the impersonal μέλει, "it is a concern". Its opposite is ἀμέλεια, neglect (see ἀμελέω). The phrase ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι, "to make care", is to take charge of something; ἐπιμέλεια with a subject in view is study, practice, cultivation.

Use in the book

The noun first states the doctors' fault. In the Thracian's teaching, most diseases elude the Greek doctors because they neglect "the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e; see ἀμελέω; ὅλος; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). Care and neglect are set against each other in one clause, and the whole that needs care is, in the Thracian's doctrine, a whole whose good and bad all start from the soul and flow from there into the body (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω). The charm is the care of that whole (157a; see ἐπῳδή).

The second use is Socrates' compliment to Critias, and it has a sting. The boy does not know what the man who said that temperance is doing one's own business meant, and Socrates excuses him: "it is no wonder that he doesn't know, at his age. You, though, may reasonably be expected to know, both because of your age and because of the study you have given it" (162e; see εἰκός; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ). Critias' study is the study of a definition Socrates is sure he made (162c), and he takes the argument over (see παραδέχομαι). What the next pages show of his study is a distinction between making and doing that he says he learned from Hesiod and that Socrates hears as the word-splitting of Prodicus (163b–d; see διαιρέω).

The two uses can be read together. The care that counts in the dialogue is care of the whole, which begins with the soul; the study Critias has given is study of words. Before he tells his dream, Socrates says that one must look into what comes to light "if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see κήδομαι). That care, of oneself, is the one the Thracian demanded and the one Critias' study did not give.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

156e The Greek doctors neglect the whole, which they ought to be caring for.

162e Critias may be expected to know because of his age and the study he has given the matter.

Elsewhere in Plato

The care of the soul is Socrates' charge in the *Apology*. While he breathes he will not stop philosophising and exhorting whomever he meets, asking him, as his custom is, whether he is not ashamed, a man of Athens, the greatest of cities and the most famous for wisdom and strength, to care for having as much money as possible, and reputation and honour, while he does not care for wisdom and truth and for his soul, how it will be best. And if anyone disputes it and says he does care, Socrates will not let him go, but will question him, examine him and refute him (29d–30a; see ἐξετάζω). The verb of care, ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, carries the whole exhortation.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon gives Socrates the same principle at the end of his life. Talking with Hermogenes before the trial, Socrates says that he thinks those live best who take the best care to become as good as possible, and those most pleasantly who most perceive that they are becoming better.[102]

Translation in this edition

"Caring for" renders τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι (156e5), so that the clause sets "neglect" and "caring" side by side as the Greek sets ἀμελοῖεν and ἐπιμέλειαν; "the study you have given it" renders ἐπιμελείας (162e2). On Burnet's ἀμελοῖεν and τοῦ ὅλου at 156e4 see ἀμελέω.

See also

ἀμελέω; διαιρέω; εἰκός; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; ἐξετάζω; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή; κήδομαι; ὅλος; παραδέχομαι; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος; ψυχή.

[102] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.8.6.

ἐπιρρέω · flow

Good and bad flowing from the soul into the body · Charmides

ἐπιρρεῖν, *epirrhein*, "flows (from there)"

At a Glance

The word. To flow on, to flow in upon; of a crowd, to stream in.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the Thracian's teaching: "For everything, he said, bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a).

In this edition. "Flows".

A place to read. 156d–157a.

Meaning

The verb is ῥεῖν, "to flow", with ἐπί, "upon, in addition": to flow onto something, to keep coming in a stream. It is used of water, of crowds, of anything that arrives in a continuous supply.

Use in the book

The verb carries the Thracian's doctrine of cause. The good doctors had said that the eyes cannot be cured without the head, nor the head without the body (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). Zalmoxis adds the soul, and the Thracian gives the reason: "For everything, he said, bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes. So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition" (156e–157a; see Ζάλμοξις; ὁρμάω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; τὰ ἀγαθά; τὰ κακά). Two verbs share the work: ὁρμᾶσθαι, "to start from", names the source, and ἐπιρρεῖν the flow from it.

The image fixes the order of treatment. If the goods and ills of the body run down from the soul as from a spring, treating the body is treating the lower course of a stream, and the cure must go to the source; hence the charm before the leaf (157a–c; see ἐπᾴδω). The comparison borrows the

doctors' own head and eyes and puts the soul above the head as the head is above the eyes. A page earlier the crowd in the wrestling-school had come "swirling round" the boy and Socrates (155d; see περιρρέω), and the image of one flow, outward from the soul, can be read as answering the other, of people and desire streaming round a beautiful body.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs.

156e–157a Everything good and bad for the body and the whole human being starts from the soul and flows from there, as from the head into the eyes; so the soul must be treated first.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Timaeus* the soul is given a physiology of the same kind. When the soul in a living creature is the stronger and its passions run high, it shakes the body through and through and fills it with disease; when it throws itself into study and inquiry it wastes the body, and when it teaches and disputes in public and in private it inflames and shakes it and brings on fluxes, misleading most of those called doctors into blaming the wrong cause (87e–88a). The Thracian charged the Greek doctors with neglecting the whole, so that most diseases elude them (156e), and Timaeus explains how they come to be deceived. In the *Phaedrus* the flow runs the other way, into the soul: the lover takes in the stream of beauty through his eyes, is warmed, and as the nourishment flows in, the stem of the soul's feather swells and begins to grow (251b). In the *Gorgias* Callicles places the pleasant life in having as much as possible flow in, and Socrates answers that if much flows in, much must flow out, and the holes must be large: the life of a plover, not of a corpse or a stone (494b).

Translation in this edition

"Starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" renders ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡρμῆσθαι … καὶ ἐκεῖθεν ἐπιρρεῖν ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα (156e6–157a1). The English repeats "flows" in the comparison, where the Greek lets the one verb serve both clauses.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἐπᾴδω; Ζάλμοξις; κεφαλή; ὄμμα; ὁρμάω; περιρρέω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; τὰ ἀγαθά; τὰ κακά; ψυχή.

ἐπισκέπτομαι · look into, examine, consider

The inquiry's own verb, promising and postponing its looking · Charmides

ἐπισκεψώμεθα, *episkepsōmetha*, "let us look"; ἐπισκέψωμαι, *episkepsōmai*, "I have looked into"; ἐπισκεψόμεθα, *episkepsometha*, "we shall look into it"; ἐπισκέψεται, *episkepsetai*, "will examine"; ἐπισκέψασθαι, *episkepsasthai*, "to examine"; ἐπισκεψάμενοι, *episkepsamenoi*, "considering"

At a Glance

The word. To look at, to look into, to examine, to consider.

In the *Charmides*. Six times, from the third attempt at the formula (167b) to the concessions at the end (175c): to look into whether it is possible (167b), whether it would benefit (169b), to look into it again another time (169d), to examine a doctor in his own field (171b), to examine another man (171d), and to concede "without even considering" (175c).

In this edition. "Look", "look into", "examine" (171b, 171d), "considering" (175c).

A place to read. 167a–b and 175b–c.

Meaning

Attic Greek used σκοπεῖν, "to look", for the present and the forms of σκέπτεσθαι for the future and aorist, and their compounds the same way: ἐπισκοπεῖν (see ἐπισκοπέω) and ἐπισκέψασθαι are one verb in two aspects. With ἐπί the looking is directed at something, an inspection or an inquiry. Every place in the *Charmides* has a future or aorist form.

Use in the book

The verb marks the stages of the inquiry, and what the inquiry puts off. It opens the third attempt, "let us look, as though from the beginning", at two

questions, whether the thing is possible and what benefit it would bring (167a–b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι). It postpones the second question: Socrates will not accept that knowledge of knowledge is temperance until he has looked into whether such a thing would benefit (169b; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). Then it postpones the first: possibility is granted for now, and "we shall look into it again another time, whether it is so or not" (169d; see αὖθις; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). That other time never comes within the dialogue.

In the middle the verb becomes the act of examining a person. Whoever wants to test a doctor "will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός), and the temperate man, as first supposed, would have been able "to examine another man in the same situation" (171d; see ἀναμάρτητος). At the end it names the inquirers' fault. They conceded lavishly that the temperate man knows what he knows and does not know, "without even considering" that one cannot know what one does not know at all (175c; see ἄλογος; μεγαλοπρεπῶς).

The verb's course can be read as the dialogue's judgement on itself. The inquiry that set out to look into two questions looked into the second and deferred the first, and at the close Socrates blames what was conceded without looking.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

167b Let us look, as though from the beginning, whether it is possible to know what one knows and does not know, and what the benefit would be.

169b Socrates will not accept the definition until he has looked into whether such a thing would benefit.

169d They grant for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible, and will look into it again another time.

171b Whoever tests a doctor will examine him in what is healthy and diseased.

171d The temperate man, as first supposed, would have been able to examine another man in the same situation.

175c They conceded without even considering that it is impossible to know what one does not know at all.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Crito*, in prison, Socrates wants to look into the old argument afresh, together with Crito, to see whether it will seem different to him now that he is in this position, or the same, and whether they will dismiss it or obey it (46d). In the *Phaedo*, when Simmias says he still has doubts about the argument for immortality, Socrates tells him that even their first hypotheses, trustworthy as they seem, must be looked into more clearly (107b). In the *Theaetetus* the verb names the test of a claim by the claimant's competence. If someone said that the lyres of two men were tuned alike, would they believe him at once, or look into whether he said it as a musician? They would look, and believe him if he was one, and not if he was not (144e). It can be read as the examination of 171b in small.

Translation in this edition

"Look" or "look into" where the object is a question (167b1, 169b3, 169d4), "examine" where a person is examined (171b4, 171d5), as the Glossary records, and "considering" at 175c4. At 167b1 Burnet prints ἐπισκεψώμεθα with T; B has ἐπισκοπώμεθα, the present of the same verb.

See also

ἄλογος; ἀναμάρτητος; αὖθις; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ἦ ἰατρικός; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; σκέπτομαι; συγχωρέω; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.

ἐπισκοπέω · inspect

The temperate man as inspector of other people's knowledge · Charmides

ἐπισκοπεῖν, *episkopein*, "to inspect"

At a Glance

The word. To look upon, to watch over, to inspect; ἐπίσκοπος is an overseer.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the second power that Critias' definition gives the temperate man: "he will likewise be able to inspect others, to see

what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not" (167a).

In this edition. "Inspect".

A place to read. 167a.

Meaning

The verb is σκοπεῖν, "to look at, to watch", with ἐπί, "over, upon": to look over something from above, as a watchman or an overseer does. In Attic the present ἐπισκοπεῖν and the aorist ἐπισκέψασθαι belong to one verb (see ἐπισκέπτομαι); the present is the steady look of supervision.

Use in the book

The one place is the sentence in which Socrates draws out what a knowledge of knowledge and of its lack would let its owner do. The temperate man alone will know himself and examine what he knows and does not, "and he will likewise be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not; and no one else will" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξετάζω; μόνος; οἴομαι). He examines himself and inspects others. The argument later removes the second power: he will not be able to examine anyone who claims to know (170d; see ἐξετάζω).

The verb can be read as putting the temperate man in a position the dialogue will give to temperance itself. The inspector stands over other men's knowledge as, in the dream, temperance stands over the crafts, "presiding over" prophecy and turning the impostors away (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω). In both places the overseer is to judge what he does not himself possess, and in both the argument asks how he could.

Places to read

The one passage in which the verb occurs.

167a The temperate man alone will examine what he knows and does not know, and inspect others to see what they know and what they think they know but do not.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Theaetetus* the inspector is Socrates as midwife. His art has all that the midwives' art has, but differs in delivering men, not women, and in inspecting their souls in labour, not their bodies; and its greatest work is to test by every means whether the young man's thought is giving birth to a phantom and a falsehood or to something fertile and true. He himself, like the midwives, is barren of wisdom, and asks others questions but declares nothing himself (150b–c). In the *Republic* the city will be perfectly ordered if a guardian who knows how just and fine things are good inspects it; a guardian ignorant of that would be worth little (506a–b). The *Theaetetus* inspector can be read as needing no wisdom of his own to test another's offspring; the *Republic*'s guardian needs the highest knowledge to oversee a city. The *Charmides*' temperate man is asked to do the first with only knowledge of knowledge.

Other ancient sources

In Homer an ἐπίσκοπος may be a scout sent against the enemy, or the guardian of a city, as Hector's wife Andromache calls him over his body; but the overseers of oaths are the gods. Before his duel with Achilles, Hector proposes that they call the gods to witness, for they will be the best witnesses and overseers, ἐπίσκοποι, of agreements.[103] The inspector of 167a can be read as given a god's office over other men's claims to know.

Translation in this edition

"Inspect" renders ἐπισκοπεῖν (167a3), kept apart from "examine", ἐξετάσαι, in the same sentence, so that the English keeps the two powers distinct. At 168a11 a later hand in T writes ἐπισκοπῶμεν, "let us inspect", for ἔτι σκοπῶμεν, "let us go on looking", which Burnet prints with B, T and W.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀλαζών; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπιστατέω; μόνος; οἶομαι.

[103] Homer, *Iliad* 22.254–255; for the scout and the guardian, 10.38 and 24.729.

ἐπίσταμαι · know, know how

The verb of expertise, from the pretended remedy to the knowing of knowledge · Charmides

ἐπίστασθαι, *epistasthai*, "(pretending) that you know", "to know"; ἐπιστάμενος, *epistamenos*, "the one who knew"; ἐπισταίμην, *epistaimēn*, "(whether) I knew", "(that) I did"; ἐπίστασαι, *epistasai*, "you know how (to speak Greek)"; ἐπίσταται, *epistatai*, "he knows"; ἐπιστάμενον, *epistamenon*, "who knows"; ἐπισταμένων, *epistamenōn*, "(anyone else) who knows"; ἠπιστάμεθα, *ēpistametha*, "we (did not) know"; ἐπισταμένους, *epistamenous*, "those who did know"; ἐπίσταιντο, *epistainto*, "(what) we (did not) know"; ἐπισταμένοις, *epistamenois*, "(others) who did know it"

At a Glance

The word. To know how to do something, to understand, to have a skill; with an object, to know a thing as one who has mastered it. The verb of ἐπιστήμη.

In the *Charmides*. Nineteen times. Five in the opening scenes, of knowing a remedy and of knowing how to speak Greek (155b–159a); the rest in the argument, from 170b to 172d, of the man who knows that he knows, of the doctor who knows the things of his craft, of those who know to whom we would hand things over, and of knowing knowledge itself.

In this edition. "Know"; "know how to speak Greek" (159a).

A place to read. 155b–e with 170d–171c.

Meaning

Ἐπίστασθαι is the Greek verb of competence. With an infinitive it is to know how to do something, as one knows how to swim or to speak Greek; with a noun, to know a thing as an expert knows it. Οἶδα is to know a fact, γιγνώσκω to recognise or come to know; ἐπίσταμαι is to have the skill. Its noun, ἐπιστήμη, carries the same sense into the argument (see ἐπιστήμη).

Use in the book

The verb's first use is a pretence. Critias suggests the ruse: "What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b; see προσποιέομαι; φάρμακον). Critias then introduces Socrates as "the one who knew the remedy" (155c), and when the boy asks him whether he knew the remedy for the head, Socrates tells us, "I did somehow manage to answer that I did" (155e; see μόγις). The dialogue that will ask whether temperance can tell a real doctor from a pretender opens with a pretended doctor whom no one present can test. Then Socrates asks the boy to say what temperance seems to him to be, "since you know how to speak Greek" (159a; see ἑλληνίζω).

In the argument the verb names the knowledge a man actually has, as it named the boy's Greek. A man who knows only knowledge would know "that he knows something and that he has some knowledge" (170b; see γιγνώσκω), but would not be able to examine anyone who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he claims (170d; see ἐξετάζω; φάσκω). So temperance will not be able to tell "a doctor who knows the things of his craft" from a pretender, "nor anyone else who knows anything at all", except in the temperate man's own craft (171c; see ἀληθινός; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ὁμότεχνος). The verb then carries the life without error, in which we would not try to do what we did not know but find those who did and hand things over to them (171e; see ἁμαρτία; ἐξευρίσκω; παραδίδωμι), the premise Socrates withdraws at 172d (see ἀναμάρτητος).

The verb can be read as the dialogue's measure of every claim. At the beginning Socrates says he knows a remedy he was taught on campaign, and the knowing is never tested; in the middle, a claim to know can be tested only by one who knows the same thing. Between the two stands Critias' temperance, which would test every claim without knowing anything but knowing. At 172b the verb takes its own noun for object, "knowing knowledge" (see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην), and the dialogue asks what good that could do.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155b Critias proposes that Socrates pretend to know a remedy for the head.

155c–e Socrates is introduced as the one who knew the remedy, and manages to answer that he does.

159a Since the boy knows how to speak Greek, he can say what temperance seems to be.

170b A man who knows only knowledge would know that he knows something.

170d He could not examine anyone who claims to know, to see whether he knows what he says he knows.

171c Temperance could not tell a doctor who knows the things of his craft from a pretender, nor anyone else who knows anything.

171e In the life without error we would not try to do what we did not know, but find those who did know.

172b–c Perhaps the good of knowing knowledge is easier learning; they grant that it is possible to know knowledge.

172d They agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to do what he knew and hand over what he did not know to those who did.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades* states the principle of 171e and the danger it guards against. If Alcibiades were at sea, would he decide for himself whether to move the tiller in or out, and go astray for not knowing, or hand it over to the pilot and keep still? To the pilot. Then he does not go wrong about what he does not know, if he knows that he does not know it. Errors in action, Socrates goes on, come from this ignorance, thinking one knows when one does not: those who know that they do not know hand things over to others and so live without error, and the ignorance of those who do not know but think they do is the cause of evils, and most disgraceful when it concerns the greatest things (117c–118a). The *Charmides* asks what knowledge would let a man know which kind he is.

Translation in this edition

"Know" at almost every place, "know how to speak Greek" for ἑλληνίζειν ἐπίστασαι (159a6–7), where the verb has its sense of a skill. At 172d8–9 the Greek uses two verbs for one thought, ἃ μὲν ἴσασιν, "what we knew", and ἃ δὲ μὴ ἐπίσταιντο, "what we did not know"; the English has "know" for both. The compound προσεπίστασθαι, "to know besides" (170b6), has its own headword (see προσεπίσταμαι).

See also

ἀληθινός; ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; γιγνώσκω; ἑλληνίζω; ἐξετάζω; ἐξευρίσκω; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; μόγις; οἶδα; ὁμότεχνος; παραδίδωμι; προσεπίσταμαι; προσποιέομαι; φάρμακον; φάσκω.

ἐπιστατέω · preside over

Temperance set over prophecy and over the kinds of knowledge · Charmides

ἐπιστατοῦσαν, *epistatousan*, "presiding over (it)"; ἐπιστατεῖ, *epistatei*, "presides over"

At a Glance

The word. To be set over, to preside, to superintend; ἐπιστάτης is the overseer, the master of a gang, the trainer, the chairman.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. In the dream temperance, "presiding over" prophecy, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets (173c); at the end Critias argues that temperance "presides over the other kinds of knowledge too" and so would rule over the knowledge of the good (174d–e).

In this edition. "Presiding over", "presides over".

A place to read. 173a–d and 174d–175a.

Meaning

The verb is formed from ἐπιστάτης, "one set over" (from ἐφίστημι, "to set over"): the overseer of works, the supervisor of an animal's training, the official who presided at Athens over the Council and the Assembly. To

ἐπιστατεῖν is to have charge of something without being the one who does it. Its sound is close to ἐπίσταμαι, "to know", and Critias' verb can be read as joining the overseer's charge to the knower's claim.

Use in the book

The verb first appears in the dream. Socrates grants, if Critias likes, that prophecy too is a knowledge, "and that temperance, presiding over it," turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἀποτρέπω; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; προφήτης). The overseer does not prophesy; it sorts prophets. The dream thus grants what the argument had denied at 170e–171c, the power to tell the expert from the pretender (see ἀληθινός).

The second use is Critias' last defence. Socrates has shown that the knowledge that benefits is the knowledge of good and bad, not temperance (174d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias answers: "Why couldn't it benefit us? ... For if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge, and presides over the other kinds of knowledge too, then surely, since it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well, it would benefit us" (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). Socrates replies with the restriction Critias himself accepted, that temperance is knowledge of knowledge "and of nothing else", and temperance is left the craftsman of no benefit (174e–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

The verb can be read as the dialogue's word for what Critias wanted temperance to be. A presiding knowledge would neither heal nor build nor foretell, but would stand over those who do, as an overseer stands over workmen. The argument asks what an overseer must know to oversee, and Critias' answer, knowledge of knowledge alone, is not enough.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

173c Presiding over prophecy, temperance turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets.

174d–e If temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, Critias argues, it would rule over the knowledge of the good and benefit us.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* Socrates asks Callias, who had spent more on sophists than everyone else together, what overseer he means to hire for his two sons. If they were colts or calves, one could hire an overseer to make them fine and good in their proper excellence, a horse-trainer or a farmer; but since they are human beings, who is the one who knows this excellence, the human and civic kind? Callias names Evenus of Paros, a wise man visiting Athens, who teaches it for five minae (20a–b). The overseer, on this account, must know the excellence he is to produce. In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea sets the master builder apart from his workmen: he is not himself a worker but a ruler of workers, contributing knowledge, not handiwork, and having judged he does not stop, as a calculator would, but gives each worker the orders fitted to him until they have finished the work (259e–260a). The *Crito* joins the overseer and the man who understands in one phrase (47b; see ἐπαΐω). Socrates himself once held the office the verb names, as Xenophon reports (*Memorabilia* 4.4.2; see ἐναντιόομαι).

Translation in this edition

"Presiding over" for the participle ἐπιστατοῦσαν with the genitive αὐτῆς (173c5), "presides over" for ἐπιστατεῖ with the dative (174d9). The ruling that follows, ἄρχουσα, is "rule over" (174e1; see ἄρχω).

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀποτρέπω; ἄρχω; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐναντιόομαι; ἐπαΐω; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; προφήτης.

ἐπιστήμη · knowledge

Knowledge as a craft with an object, and the knowledge the definition makes of it · Charmides

ἐπιστήμη, *epistēmē*, "knowledge"; ἐπιστήμης, *epistēmēs*, "(of) knowledge"; ἐπιστήμῃ, *epistēmēi*, "(by) knowledge"; ἐπιστήμην, *epistēmēn*, "knowledge"; ἐπιστῆμαι, *epistēmai*, "(all the others are) knowledge (of something else)"; ἐπιστημῶν, *epistēmōn*, "(of the) kinds of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμαις, *epistēmais*, "(the other) kinds of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμας, *epistēmas*, "(according to the) kinds of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. Knowledge, both the knowing and what is known: a science, a skill, an expertise. The noun of ἐπίσταμαι.

In the *Charmides*. Eighty-three times between 165c and 175b, the second half of the dialogue. It enters when Socrates turns Critias' "knowing oneself" into "a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something" (165c), and its plural, "kinds of knowledge", runs through the comparison of temperance with medicine, building, calculation and weighing (165c–166c), the formula (166c–170c), the dream (173a–174a) and the last argument (174a–175b).

In this edition. "Knowledge", and "kinds of knowledge" for the plural, except at 166c1.

A place to read. 165c–166c.

Meaning

Ἐπιστήμη is what the man who ἐπίσταται has: the mastery of a thing. In ordinary Greek it is close to τέχνη, "craft, art", and the *Charmides* uses the two words for the same things, medicine, house-building, weaving, calculation (165c–e). The edition's note at 165c: "Epistēmē, rendered 'knowledge' throughout. The word covers both knowing and a branch of knowledge, a science or an expertise; the argument treats crafts such as medicine and building as epistēmai, and the English speaks of 'kinds of knowledge' where the Greek is plural."

Use in the book

The noun arrives with a translation. Critias has said that temperance is knowing oneself, using the verb γιγνώσκειν; Socrates answers that if temperance is knowing something, it would be a kind of knowledge, and of something (165c; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη τινός). With the noun come the crafts, each a knowledge of something other than itself (165c–166b; see ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός), and the question for temperance is what its object is. Critias' answer makes it the one knowledge whose objects are knowledges, the others' and its own (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).

The plural then does the argument's work. Once knowledges are many, each defined by the particular things it is of (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι), a knowledge of knowledges can know of each only that it is a knowledge. Socrates pares it down until it is "nothing but knowledge" (170b; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης), and nothing but knowledge cannot tell what anyone knows (170c–d; see γιγνώσκω). The dream sets all things "according to the kinds of knowledge" (173a–b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας), and the last argument asks "which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy?" (174a). The answer is one knowledge among the others, whose object is good and bad, and which is not temperance (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The word can be read as the dialogue's premise and its difficulty at once. Every ἐπιστήμη in the *Charmides* is a craft with an object, and that is why the knowledge of knowledge fails: it is a knowledge with no field of its own, made to do a craft's work. Yet the knowledge that the end points to, of good and bad, is no ordinary craft either, since its object is what every craft is for. The dialogue leaves its reader with two knowledges that do not fit the model of medicine, and only one of them is shown to be of no benefit.

Places to read

The passages in which the noun's sense is set and tested; its many places within the formula are listed under the phrases.

165c–d If temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge, and of something; medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health, house-building produces houses.

165e–166b Critias: this knowledge is not like the others; Socrates: each knowledge is of something other than itself.

166c All the others are knowledge of something else; temperance alone is of the others and of itself.

170a–c Knowledge of knowledge can tell only that this is knowledge and that is not; medicine knows the healthy, temperance only knowledge.

171a Each knowledge is defined by its being of particular things.

173a–b In the dream everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge.

174a–d Which knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy? Not all of them together, but only the knowledge of good and bad.

175b They conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, and that by it one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* turns the *Charmides*' question round. Asked what knowledge is, Theaetetus answers with what can be learned from Theodorus, geometry and the rest, and cobbling and the other crafts. Socrates complains that he asked for one thing and was given many: when Theaetetus says cobbling, he means nothing but knowledge of making shoes, and what they asked was not what knowledge is of, nor how many kinds there are, but what knowledge itself is; a man who does not know what knowledge is does not understand "knowledge of shoes" either, so to answer with the name of a craft is ridiculous (146c–147c). The *Charmides* asks of temperance, as a knowledge, what it is of; the *Theaetetus* refuses that question for knowledge itself. In the *Meno* knowledge is true opinion tied down by reasoning (98a; see δόξα).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates what the *Charmides* runs together. Scientific knowledge, ἐπιστήμη in his strict sense, is of what cannot be otherwise; its object is

necessary and eternal, it can be taught, and it is a state that demonstrates.[104] Craft, τέχνη, is a state concerned with making, accompanied by true reasoning, and its objects can be otherwise.[105] On his account medicine and house-building are crafts, not sciences, and the *Charmides*' ἐπιστῆμαι are, almost all of them, τέχναι. Prudence, the state concerned with what is good and bad for a man, he makes neither (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge" at every place, and "kinds of knowledge" where the Greek is plural, as the note at 165c explains, except the predicate ἐπιστῆμαι at 166c1, "All the others are knowledge of something else"; the English never says "sciences" or "expertises", so that the reader can follow one word from 165c to 175b. The Glossary adds that "knowledge" also renders γνῶσις twice, at 169e (see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει). The count of eighty-three leaves out the bracketed ἐπιστήμης of 169a4, which Burnet deletes after Schleiermacher (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

See also

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἀπεργάζομαι; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γιγνώσκω; δόξα; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἐπιστήμων; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; τέχνη; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ · knowledge of good and bad

The one knowledge that makes us do well and be happy, which is not temperance · Charmides

[104] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3, 1139b19–31.
[105] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4, 1140a1–23.

ᾗ τὸ ἀγαθόν ... καὶ τὸ κακόν, *hēi to agathon ... kai to kakon*, "by which he knows good ... and bad"; τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν, *tēs peri to agathon te kai kakon*, "the knowledge of good and bad"; ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, *agathou te kai kakou*, "(knowledge ...) of good and bad"; τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης, *tēs peri tagathon epistēmēs*, "this knowledge of the good"

At a Glance

The word. The knowledge whose object is what is good and bad: the knowledge by which one knows what benefits and what harms.

In the *Charmides*. Named by Critias when Socrates asks which knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy (174b), shown by Socrates to be the knowledge without which nothing is done well and beneficially, and therefore not temperance (174c–d), and claimed by Critias for temperance's rule (174d–e).

In this edition. "The knowledge of good and bad"; "this knowledge of the good" (174e).

A place to read. 174a–175a.

Meaning

The pair ἀγαθός and κακός is the Greek pair for good and bad, beneficial and harmful (see ἀγαθός; κακός), and a knowledge "of" them is a knowledge whose object is not a product, as health is, but the value of products and actions. Plato's Socrates names it with a phrase, here and in the *Laches* and the *Protagoras*, and also calls it φρόνησις, wisdom: in the *Protagoras* itself, where wisdom is enough to help the man who knows good and bad (352c), and in the *Meno*, as the knowledge that leads the soul's other goods (88b–89a; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

Use in the book

The knowledge is found by elimination. Socrates has taken the happy man, on Critias' account, to be the one who lives knowledgeably about something, the prophet perhaps, or a man who knew all things past, present and to come (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). Which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Draughts? Critias is indignant.

Calculation? "Not at all." What is healthy? "More so." "And the one I mean, the one that does it most of all ... is the one by which he knows what?" "By which he knows good ... and bad" (174b; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν). Socrates' reply is a cry of discovery: "You rascal! ... All this time you've been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad" (174b–c; see ἀποκρύπτομαι; κύκλῳ; μιαρός; περιέλκω).

Then the test, by subtraction. "For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed, or will the pilot's art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?" "No less." "But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent" (174c–d; see ἀπολείπω; ἐξαιρέω; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The crafts keep their products; what goes is their being done well and to our benefit. So the conclusion: "But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose work is to benefit us. For it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad. So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us" (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). Critias tries to bring it under temperance's rule, and the restriction "of nothing else" defeats him (174d–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἐπιστατέω).

The edition's note at 174c calls this, "on one widely held reading ... the dialogue's positive hint", and notes that the pair is the one Critias built his own definition on at 163e. The test shows what kind of knowledge it is. It adds nothing to any craft's product and everything to its use, so its object is the good of what the crafts make and do. Temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, cannot be it, because Critias accepted that temperance was a knowledge "of nothing else" (167b–c, 174e). Nothing in the argument forbids temperance to be the knowledge of good and bad, if the definition is given up. The dialogue does not draw that conclusion; it can be read as leaving it for the reader to draw.

Places to read

Every passage in which the knowledge is named.

174b Asked which knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy, Critias names the one by which he knows good and bad.

174b–c Socrates: it was not living knowledgeably that made us happy, but only this one knowledge.

174c–d Take it away, and the crafts still do their work, but nothing is done well and beneficially; so this knowledge, not temperance, is the one that benefits.

174d–e Critias: if temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The knowledge of good and bad ends the *Laches* as it ends the *Charmides* (199c–e; see ἀγαθός; ἀρετή). In the *Protagoras* Socrates asks whether knowledge is, as most people think, something without strength or authority, dragged about by anger, pleasure, pain, love or fear like a slave, or something fine and able to rule a man, so that if someone knows what is good and bad nothing will overpower him into doing other than knowledge bids (352b–c); knowledge dragged about like a slave, περιελκομένης, is dragged by the verb Socrates uses of Critias at 174b, περιέλκεις. In the *Republic* the argument runs the same circle. Those who say that the good is wisdom cannot show which wisdom, and are forced in the end to say that it is wisdom of the good; Glaucon calls this ridiculous, and Socrates agrees, since they reproach us for not knowing the good and then speak to us as if we knew it (505b–c; for 505a–b see ἀγαθός).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle argues that prudence is neither science nor craft, since what is done can be otherwise and doing is not making, and concludes that it is a true state, accompanied by reasoning, concerned with action about what is good and bad for a human being.[106] The Stoics, as Diogenes Laertius reports, made prudence the knowledge of what is bad and good and neither, and set it first

[106] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5, 1140b1–6.

among the virtues, with courage, justice and temperance beside it.[107] Both can be read as keeping the *Charmides*' distinction: the knowledge of good and bad is prudence, not temperance. Xenophon's Socrates, by contrast, did not separate wisdom and temperance at all (*Memorabilia* 3.9.4; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Translation in this edition

"By which he knows good," he said, "and bad" renders ᾗ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν (174b10), with Critias' "he said" between the two words as in the Greek; "the knowledge of good and bad" renders τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν (174c2–3) and ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ (174d5–6); "this knowledge of the good" renders τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης (174e2), with τἀγαθόν joined by crasis. The Note on this Edition records a correction: "The knowledge that makes us happy was 'of good and evil' at 174b–d, while the same Greek pair was 'good and bad' at 156e and in Critias' definition at 163e." The edition now says "good and bad" throughout. At 174d7 Burnet brackets, after Madvig, ἡ ὠφελίμη, which B has after "something else" (T has ὠφελίμη, and Schleiermacher proposed ἢ ὠφελίμη, "something other than the beneficial one"); the English follows his text.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγαθός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀποκρύπτομαι; ἀπολείπω; ἀρετή; ἐξαιρέω; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; κακός; κύκλῳ; μιαρός; περιέλκω; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν.

ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν · knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge

The knowledge whose objects are the other knowledges · Charmides

[107] Diogenes Laertius 7.92.

τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, *tōn te allōn epistēmōn epistēmē*, "knowledge ... of the other kinds of knowledge"; ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, *epistēmōn epistēmē*, "knowledge of kinds of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge whose objects are the other kinds of knowledge, as medicine's object is the healthy.

In the *Charmides*. Critias' answer (166c) to Socrates' question "what is temperance knowledge of" (166b), restated in the formula (166e, 167c, 168a); stripped of its other half at 170c, "if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge"; and Critias' last claim, that temperance is "knowledge of kinds of knowledge" and presides over the others (174d).

In this edition. "Knowledge ... of the other kinds of knowledge", "knowledge of kinds of knowledge".

A place to read. 170a–c.

Meaning

The phrase gives knowledge a second-order object. Each of the crafts is of something, health or houses or the odd and the even; this one is of the crafts themselves, as knowledges. Critias joins it to a knowledge "of itself" (see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς), and the dialogue examines the two halves apart: what is said of a knowledge's knowing itself is left to a great man (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ), and the argument from 170a is about this half.

Use in the book

Critias introduces it at 166c to escape the question of an object, what temperance is knowledge of other than itself (166b–c; see διαφέρω; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Its objects are other than itself, as the question required, and yet they are knowledges, as it is.

The argument then asks what such a knowledge can tell, and Critias grants that it can distinguish only what is knowledge from what is not (170a; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). The healthy is known by medicine, the harmonious by music, what belongs to house-building by house-building; "But by temperance, if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, how will he know

that he knows the healthy, or what belongs to house-building?" "In no way" (170c; see γιγνώσκω). The knowledge of knowledges knows the knowledges only as knowledges, not as of health or of houses, and so it cannot judge any claim to a particular knowledge (170d–171c; see ἀληθινός).

At the end Critias returns to the phrase with a new verb: temperance, being knowledge of kinds of knowledge, presides over them, and so would rule the knowledge of the good (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). The phrase that was to give temperance its object now gives it authority. Socrates answers that to rule over the crafts is not to do their work (see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).

The phrase can be read as coherent and empty. A knowledge whose objects are knowledges is no contradiction, and it can say of anything that it is or is not a knowledge. What it cannot do is the one thing the definition promised, to tell who knows what.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs.

166c Critias: all other knowledges are of something else; temperance alone is of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.

166e Critias restates it: of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

167c Socrates: one single knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.

168a Knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and the other kinds of knowledge.

170c If temperance is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, the temperate man will not know that he knows the healthy.

174d Critias: temperance is knowledge of kinds of knowledge and presides over the others.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Statesman* gives the knowledge of knowledges an object of its own. The visitor from Elea asks whether, besides music and the handicrafts, there is a knowledge whether one ought to learn any of them or not, and whether it should rule them; the young Socrates, Socrates' namesake who answers him, agrees that the knowledge of whether one must learn should rule the

knowledge that is learned and taught, and the knowledge of whether one must persuade should rule the one that can persuade. Rhetoric, generalship and judging are found to be servants, and the truly kingly art is the one that does not itself act but rules those able to act, knowing the beginning and impulse of the greatest things in cities, when the time is right and when it is not; the others, ruling neither one another nor themselves, each concerned with some action of its own, have rightly taken their names from it (304b–305d). The *Statesman*'s ruling knowledge knows when and whether each craft should be used, which can be read as the knowledge of good and bad in another form (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The *Euthydemus* looks for the same kingly art and goes round in a circle (291b–292e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός), and Aristotle makes politics the master art, which settles what kinds of knowledge a city must have (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.2, 1094a26–b7; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge ... of the other kinds of knowledge" for τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (166c2–3) and its returns, "knowledge of kinds of knowledge" for ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη without "the others" (170c6, 174d9). At 174d4–5 the plural object is joined to its lack, "knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge", where the English coins the plural "lacks" to keep the pair (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη).

See also

ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; γιγνώσκω; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; διαφέρω; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος; μέγας ἀνήρ.

ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης · knowledge of the lack of knowledge

The step from knowing knowledge to knowing its absence · Charmides

ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη, *anepistēmosynēs epistēmē*, "knowledge of the lack of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge whose object is the absence of knowledge, in oneself or in others.

In the *Charmides*. Drawn by Socrates from Critias' definition: "Then ... if it is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge?" "Certainly" (166e). It stays in the definition to the end (167c, 169b, 171c, 174d, 174e).

In this edition. "Knowledge of the lack of knowledge".

A place to read. 166e–167a.

Meaning

The phrase depends on a principle that the dialogue uses without stating: a knowledge of something is also a knowledge of its opposite or of its absence. Medicine knows disease as well as health, and the doctor "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e; see ἐπαΐω). So, Socrates infers, a knowledge of knowledge would be a knowledge of the lack of knowledge too.

Use in the book

Critias grants the step at once, and it gives temperance its use: the temperate man alone will examine what he knows and does not, and inspect others (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκοπέω). Without the lack of knowledge among its objects, the knowledge of knowledge could not find out anyone who thinks he knows and does not. With it, temperance becomes a detector of ignorance. The course of the pair, knowledge and lack of knowledge, through the argument is told under ἀνεπιστημοσύνη.

The principle that licensed the step is also what ruins it. It holds for each craft: medicine knows the lack of medicine, and only a doctor can tell a doctor from a pretender (170e–171c; see ἀληθινός). It does not hold for knowledge in general. A knowledge of the lack of knowledge would know that something is lacking, not what; and at the end Socrates names the absurdity hidden in the formula, that one should know, of what one does not know at all, that one does not know it (175c; see ἄλογος). The step of 166e can be read as the one that most needed looking into and was granted with "Certainly".

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs.

166e If temperance is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

167c The one knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

169b Critias lays it down that temperance is knowledge of knowledge and indeed of the lack of knowledge.

171c If temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, it cannot tell a doctor from a pretender.

174d The knowledge that benefits is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad.

174e They declared it knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato states the principle elsewhere, and turns it to paradox. In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates leads Polemarchus to agree that the man cleverest at guarding against a disease is cleverest at producing it undetected, that the good guard of an army is the man who can steal the enemy's plans, and so that of whatever a man is a clever guard, he is a clever thief; the just man, who guards money, turns out a thief (333e–334a). In the *Hippias Minor* Hippias agrees that the man wise in calculation is the one best able to lie about numbers, since the ignorant man trying to lie may tell the truth by mistake (366e–367a). In the *Phaedo* Socrates recalls how, on hearing that the

philosopher Anaxagoras of Clazomenae made mind the cause that orders all things, he reasoned that a man should then look for nothing but what is best, and that the same man must also know the worse, since the same knowledge is of both; and so he thought he had found in Anaxagoras a teacher (97c–d). The *Charmides* applies the principle to knowledge itself.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the reason for the principle. Powers that go with reason are of contraries, as medicine is of disease and health (see δύναμις); the cause, he says, is that knowledge is an account, and the same account makes plain both the thing and its privation, though not in the same way, so that such knowledges are of contraries, but of the one in virtue of themselves and of the other not in virtue of themselves.[108] On this account the lack of knowledge would be known only incidentally, through the knowledge of which it is the lack; this can be read as the reason why only a doctor can tell whether another man lacks medicine (170e–171c).

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge of the lack of knowledge" for ἀνεπιστημοσύνης ἐπιστήμη (166e7), with "lack of knowledge" kept for ἀνεπιστημοσύνη at every place, as the Key Words explain (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη). At 171c5 Burnet prints ἀνεπιστημοσύνης with B and W; T adds ἐπιστήμη.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀληθινός; ἄλογος; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; δύναμις; ἐξετάζω; ἐπαΐω; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης.

[108] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 9.2, 1046b7–15.

ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν · knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge

Critias' definition in its agreed form, and the model of the procession of powers · Charmides

αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, *autē te hautēs estin kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē*, "it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge"; ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, *heautēs te kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē*, "knowledge of ... itself and the other kinds of knowledge"; αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, *hautēs de kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē*, "knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. The definition of temperance as Critias states it when asked to say it again: the one knowledge whose objects are itself and the other knowledges.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: in Critias' restatement (166e), in Socrates' summary before the procession of powers (167b–c), and in the conclusion of the procession, "knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (168a).

In this edition. "Knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge".

A place to read. 166e–168b.

Meaning

The formula has three parts: temperance is a knowledge of itself, of the other knowledges, and "alone of all the kinds of knowledge" (166e). Socrates adds a fourth at once, that it "would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge" (166e; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης), and in restating the whole a fifth, a restriction: "one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge" (167b–c; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; μία τις

ἐπιστήμη). The two halves of the formula are examined apart (see ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).

Use in the book

Critias has already given the formula once, in the other order, the other kinds of knowledge first and itself last (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς). When, after the exchange about refutation, Socrates asks him to say again what he says temperance is, he answers: "I say ... that alone of all the kinds of knowledge it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e). Now "itself" comes first. The change can be read as Critias' answer to the charge he made at 166c, that Socrates was looking for a likeness between temperance and the other crafts: what makes temperance unlike them is that it is of itself, and he leads with it.

The formula then becomes a pattern. Socrates calls it strange, since in other cases the same thing would seem impossible (167c; see ἄτοπος), and builds a series of cases on its model: a sight of itself and of the other sights, a hearing, a sense, a desire, a wish, a love, a fear, an opinion, each of itself and of its fellows and of none of the things its kind is of (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν). Critias denies them all. Then the formula comes back, with the proper object of knowledge removed in the same way: "But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?" "We are" (168a; see μάθημα). Socrates calls this strange too, if there is such a thing (see ἄτοπος).

The formula can be read as unstable in its own wording. Its genitives make knowledge an object, its own and the others', while the rest of the dialogue treats every knowledge as known by what it is of. The procession shows the cost: every other power, given itself as object, loses the thing that made it what it is. The argument after 168b tests whether knowledge is the one exception, and the dialogue leaves the test to a great man (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ).

Places to read

Every passage in which the full formula occurs.

166e Critias: temperance alone of all the kinds of knowledge is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

167b–c Socrates: one single knowledge, of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge, and also of the lack of knowledge.

168a After the procession: knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" renders αὐτή τε αὑτῆς … καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (166e6), the English "both … and" for τε … καί. At 166e6 Burnet prints αὐτή, "it itself", with T; B has αὕτη, "this one". At 167c1 the same words follow ἤ, "but", after "of nothing else", and at 168a7–8 they follow "of no subject of learning", μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός, in the μέν … δέ balance of the procession.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἄτοπος; βούλησις αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; μάθημα; μέγας ἀνήρ; μία τις ἐπιστήμη.

ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς · knowledge of itself

The knowledge that is its own object · Charmides

ἐπιστήμη … αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς, *epistēmē … autē heautēs*, "knowledge … of itself"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge whose object is itself: the reflexive of a knowledge, not of a person.

In the *Charmides*. Critias' answer at 166c: "All the others are knowledge of something else, not of themselves, but this alone is knowledge

both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself." The reflexive returns in every statement of the formula (166e, 167c, 168a).

In this edition. "Of itself".

A place to read. 166b–c.

Meaning

Ἑαυτῆς is the feminine reflexive genitive, agreeing with ἐπιστήμη: "of itself", the knowledge's own self. It is not ἑαυτοῦ, the reflexive of a person, which Critias used a page earlier when he said that temperance is knowledge "of oneself" (165c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ), and it is not the knowing knowledge of 169e1, where knowledge is the subject that knows itself, though at 169e4 Critias returns to the genitive, γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὐτῆς, "knowledge that is knowledge of itself" (see αὐτὴ αὐτὴν γιγνώσκει). Here knowledge is the object of knowledge. Burnet's text has the emphatic αὐτή beside it: "itself, of itself".

Use in the book

The reflexive enters as the answer to a question that seemed to require the opposite. Socrates had asked what temperance is knowledge of, other than itself (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος), as the odd and the even are other than calculation. Critias answers that this is precisely where temperance differs: the others are knowledge "of something else, not of themselves", and temperance alone is knowledge "of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself" (166c; see διαφέρω). The difference Socrates was looking for is located in the self-reference.

The dialogue never refutes this half. The procession of powers makes it strange (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς), and the principle of 168d says what it would require: what has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Applied to knowledge, the principle requires only that knowledge be itself something to be known, and that is no contradiction. Socrates says he does not trust himself to decide whether any knowledge relates to itself and leaves it to "a great man" (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ); the argument that defeats Critias proceeds on the other half of the formula (see ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν).

The reflexive can be read as the point at which the *Charmides* hands its question on. Plato does not return to a knowledge of itself by that name; Aristotle does, in more than one form.

Places to read

The passages in which the reflexive is said of knowledge.

166c The others are of something else, not of themselves; this alone is of the others and of itself.

166e Critias restates it, putting "itself" first.

167c One single knowledge, of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.

168a Knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

169e Critias: whoever has knowledge that is knowledge of itself will know himself.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes up the self-reference three ways. Of the divine mind he says that it thinks itself, since it is the best of things, and its thinking is a thinking of thinking (*Metaphysics* 12.9, 1074b33–35; see αὐτὴ αὐτὴν γιγνώσκει). Of perception he asks whether it is by sight that we perceive that we see (*On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). And in the *Ethics* he makes the awareness an accompaniment of every activity: the man who sees perceives that he sees, the man who hears that he hears, the man who walks that he walks, and in every case something in us perceives that we are active, so that we perceive that we perceive and think that we think; and to perceive this is to perceive that we exist.[109] The third is the nearest to Critias' claim and the furthest from it: an awareness of one's own knowing that goes with all knowing, not a separate knowledge set over the rest.

Translation in this edition

"Of itself" for αὐτὴ ἑαυτῆς (166c3), the English keeping the order of the Greek, the others first and itself last; at 166e6 Critias reverses it, and the English follows (see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The edition's

[109] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.9, 1170a29–b1.

Key Words record the shift from the reflexive of a person to the reflexive of a knowledge; it is told under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; διαφέρω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος; μέγας ἀνήρ.

ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ · knowledge of oneself

Knowing oneself turned into a knowledge, for one page · Charmides

ἑαυτοῦ γε, *heautou ge*, "(knowledge) of oneself"; ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην, *heautou epistēmēn*, "knowledge of oneself"; ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ, *epistēmē ousa heautou*, "being knowledge of oneself"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge whose object is the knower himself: the reflexive of a person.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in one exchange. Critias answers that temperance is knowledge "of oneself" (165c); Socrates twice puts the phrase into his question of what such a knowledge produces (165d, 165e).

In this edition. "Knowledge of oneself".

A place to read. 165b–166c.

Meaning

Ἑαυτοῦ is the masculine (or neuter) reflexive genitive, "of himself", which the English renders impersonally, "of oneself". The phrase is Critias' third definition, knowing oneself (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν), restated as a noun with an object: the self that knows is the self that is known.

Use in the book

The phrase is born of Socrates' translation and lasts a page. Asked whether temperance, if it is knowing something, is a knowledge of something, Critias answers: "It is ... knowledge of oneself" (165c; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The Greek

has no noun, only Ἔστιν ... ἑαυτοῦ γε, "It is ... of oneself, yes", a short answer that accepts the question's form. Socrates at once applies the craft model. Medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, produces health; house-building produces houses; so Critias, since he says it is knowledge of oneself, ought to say what fine work temperance produces, "being knowledge of oneself" (165d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias does not answer for the self. He answers for the knowledge: it is unlike the others, and is knowledge "of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself" (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).

What the person-phrase would have required the dialogue never examines: what the self is that a man would know in knowing himself. The person returns only as the owner of the knowledge. "Then only the temperate man will know himself" (167a), and at 169e Critias argues that whoever has a knowledge that knows itself will know himself, as whoever has speed is fast (see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει). The self of 155d, which Socrates lost at the sight of the boy and recovered in argument, and the self the boy was asked to look into at 160d (see ἐμβλέπω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι), drop out of the definition at the moment the definition names them.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

165c Critias: temperance is a knowledge, and of oneself.

165d–e Socrates: since Critias says it is knowledge of oneself, he should say what fine work it produces.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laws* names what stands in the way of a knowledge of oneself. The greatest evil inborn in most men, the Athenian stranger says, is the love of self that everyone excuses: the lover is blind about what he loves, and so judges the just, the good and the fine badly, thinking that he must always honour his own above the truth. From this same fault everyone takes his own ignorance for wisdom; and so, knowing practically nothing, we think we know everything, and will not hand over to others what we do not know how to do (731d–732b). The obstacle to knowing oneself, on this account, is not a logical one, as in the *Charmides*, but love. The *Philebus*' ridiculous

man, who does not know himself and thinks himself richer, handsomer and better than he is (48c–49a), is told under ἀγνοέω.

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge of oneself" at each place: for ἑαυτοῦ γε at 165c7, where the English supplies the noun, for ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμην at 165d7 and for ἐπιστήμη οὖσα ἑαυτοῦ at 165e1. The impersonal "oneself" keeps the person-reflexive of the Greek apart from the "itself" of 166c. On the reading at 165c4, γιγνώσκειν against B's γιγνώσκει, see γιγνώσκω.

See also

ἀγνοέω; ἀπεργάζομαι; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; γιγνώσκω; ἐμβλέπω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη τινός; καλὸν ἔργον.

ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης · knowledge of knowledge

The definition's short form, granted as possible and shown to be of no benefit · Charmides

ἐπιστήμης, *epistēmēs*, "(knowledge) of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην, *epistēmēs epistēmēn*, "knowledge of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης, *epistēmēn epistēmēs*, "knowledge of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμη ... ἐπιστήμης, *epistēmē ... epistēmēs*, "knowledge ... of knowledge"; ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη, *epistēmēs epistēmē*, "knowledge of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge whose object is knowledge: the edition's Key Words call it "a knowledge whose object is not health or number but knowledge itself, its own and that of the other kinds".

In the *Charmides*. The short name for Critias' definition from 166e to 175b. Socrates asks whether it is possible and whether it would benefit (169b), grants its possibility for the sake of argument (169d), shows that it could tell only that a man knows, not what (170a–d), that it could not tell a doctor from a pretender (171c), and that it would be the craftsman of no

benefit (174e–175a); at the end he counts it among the concessions the argument did not allow (175b).

In this edition. "Knowledge of knowledge".

A place to read. 169b–171c.

Meaning

The phrase compresses the formula, of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, into one genitive (see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The Key Words warn the reader: "A reader should notice how much this phrase is made to carry. Critias accepts that it is the same as knowing what one knows and what one does not know (167a, 170a) and as knowing oneself (169e), and the argument shows that it is not the same as the first: knowledge of knowledge would tell only that someone knows, not what he knows (170c–d)."

Use in the book

The phrase is put to two questions, and the dialogue answers them differently. The first is possibility. Socrates can neither say with confidence "whether it is possible for this to come about, for there to be knowledge of knowledge", nor accept, if it exists, that it is temperance until he has looked into whether it benefits (169a–b; see διισχυρίζομαι; ἐπισκέπτομαι). He asks Critias to show both (169b; see ἐνδείκνυμι), and when Critias cannot, he grants the first: "let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge", to be looked into again another time (169d; see αὖθις; συγχωρέω). The possibility is never refuted. It is conceded, and at the end Socrates says that it was conceded "though the argument did not allow it or say that there was" (175b; see ἄλογος; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν).

The second question is benefit, and here the argument is decisive. "Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?" "No, only that much" (170a). It knows that a man knows, not what (170b–d; see γιγνώσκω); so it cannot test a doctor, "if temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge"

(171c; see ἀληθινός); so the life without error that it promised does not follow (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία); its remaining good is easier learning (172b; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην); and since the knowledge that benefits is the knowledge of good and bad, and temperance was declared knowledge "only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else", it is the craftsman of no benefit (174d–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

It is easy to take the verdict for a refutation of the knowledge of knowledge. It is not one. It has refuted the claim that such a knowledge would make anyone able to know what he knows and does not, and the claim that it would benefit, on the premise that every knowledge is a craft with an object. The knowledge of knowledge fails because it has no field of its own to be a craft about. The knowledge the dialogue ends with, of good and bad, has an object, and it is what every other knowledge is for. The knowledge of knowledge can be read as the right ambition in the wrong form: a knowledge set above the others, but set above them by being about them, rather than by knowing what they are good for.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs.

166e If temperance is knowledge of knowledge, it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

169b Socrates cannot say whether knowledge of knowledge is possible, nor accept it as temperance until he knows whether it benefits; Critias lays it down that temperance is this.

169d They grant for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible.

170a Knowledge of knowledge can tell only that this is knowledge and that is not.

171c If temperance is only knowledge of knowledge and of its lack, it cannot tell a doctor from a pretender.

174e They declared long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else.

175b They conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* ends on the same knot from the other side. Its last definition of knowledge, true judgement together with an account, is refined until the account turns out to be knowledge of the thing's difference (208c–209e; see διαφέρω); then, Socrates says, a man asked what knowledge is will answer that it is correct opinion together with knowledge of the difference, and when knowledge is what we are looking for, it is simple-minded to call it correct opinion accompanied by knowledge, of a difference or of anything at all (209e–210a). A definition of knowledge that contains knowledge goes round in a circle; the *Charmides*' definition of temperance, a knowledge whose object is knowledge, can be read as meeting the same difficulty in another place. In the same dialogue the knowledges of knowledges in a second aviary are made a joke (200b–c; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη).

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge of knowledge" at every place: for the bare genitive ἐπιστήμης at 166e8, where "knowledge of" is understood from the line before; for ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμην (169b1), ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστήμης (169b6, 169d4, 175b6), ἐπιστήμη … ἐπιστήμης οὖσα (170a6) and ἐπιστήμης ἐπιστήμη (171c4); and with "only" for μόνον at 171c5 and 174e6. At 169b8 the manuscripts add ἀποδεῖξαί σε, "that you demonstrate", which Burnet brackets on Heindorf's conjecture (see ἐνδείκνυμι).

See also

ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἄλογος; ἁμαρτία; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; αὖθις; γιγνώσκω; διαφέρω; διισχυρίζομαι; ἐνδείκνυμι; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω.

ἐπιστήμη τινός · knowledge of something

The axiom that every knowledge has an object · Charmides

ἐπιστήμη τις ... καὶ τινός, *epistēmē tis ... kai tinos*, "a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something"; τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, *tinos estin epistēmē*, "what (each ...) is knowledge of"; τινὸς ἐπιστήμη, *tinos epistēmē*, "knowledge of something"

At a Glance

The word. A knowledge "of something": the genitive of the object that every knowledge must have.

In the *Charmides*. Socrates' first step when Critias makes temperance knowing oneself: "then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn't it?" (165c). The question returns as "what is temperance knowledge of?" (166a–b), and as the premise of the relatives: "this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something" (168b).

In this edition. "Knowledge of something".

A place to read. 165c–166c.

Meaning

The Greek states the axiom with the indefinite τις twice, ἐπιστήμη τις ... καὶ τινός, "a knowledge of some kind, and of something". The genitive is the genitive of the object, as in "knowledge of the healthy". Knowledge, on this axiom, is a relative: it is what it is in relation to what it is of.

Use in the book

Socrates introduces the axiom as obvious. "If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something, wouldn't it?" "It is ... knowledge of oneself" (165c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ). The axiom brings its examples with it: medicine is of the healthy and produces health (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι), and when Critias objects that calculation and geometry produce nothing one could point to, Socrates keeps the object and lets the product go: "But I can point out to you what

each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of, which is something distinct from the knowledge itself." Calculation is of the odd and the even, weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight, and then comes the question: "Tell me, then: what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?" (166a–b; see ἕτερος; λογιστική; στατική). The axiom has two clauses now: of something, and of something other than itself.

Critias' answer keeps the first clause and breaks the second: temperance is of the other knowledges, and of itself (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς). Socrates returns to the axiom as the premise of the relatives: "Come then: this knowledge is knowledge of something, and has a certain power such that it is of something, doesn't it?" "Certainly." The greater follows, as a power that is greater than something (168b; see δύναμις; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). At 171a it decides the test of the doctor: each knowledge is defined by the particular things it is of, medicine by the healthy and the diseased (see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ὁρίζω; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι).

The axiom can be read as doing the whole of the argument's work. Once knowledge must be of something, a knowledge of knowledge is a knowledge whose something is knowledge, and the question becomes what that something can give it. The answer, that it can give only the bare fact that a man knows, follows from the axiom applied twice: the knowledge of knowledge is of knowledges, and each of those is of its own objects, which the knowledge of knowledge does not reach.

Places to read

The passages in which the axiom is stated.

165c If temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge, and of something.

166a–b Each knowledge is of something distinct from itself; what is temperance knowledge of?

168b This knowledge is knowledge of something, with a power to be of something, as the greater is greater than something.

171a Each knowledge is defined by being of particular things.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* opens on the same question, asked of rhetoric. As weaving is concerned with the making of clothes and music with the making of songs, Socrates asks Gorgias, about which of the things that are is rhetoric a knowledge? "About speeches," says Gorgias. But medicine too makes people able to speak about the sick, and gymnastics about the good and bad condition of bodies, so every craft is about speeches of its own (449d–450b). The *Charmides* asks of temperance what the *Gorgias* asks of rhetoric, and can be read as getting an answer of the same kind: a knowledge whose object seems to be found in every other knowledge. The *Republic* states the axiom as a rule of relatives, knowledge itself being of learning itself and a particular knowledge of a particular thing (438c–e; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle counts knowledge among relatives, and adds an asymmetry the *Charmides* does not draw. Most relatives are by nature together, the double and the half; but the knowable seems prior to knowledge, since we mostly acquire knowledge of things that already exist, and if the knowable is taken away, knowledge is taken away with it, while knowledge taken away leaves the knowable.[110] A knowledge of knowledge would, on this account, depend on knowledges that depend in turn on things; the object of the *Charmides*' temperance is two steps from anything there is.

Translation in this edition

"A kind of knowledge, and knowledge of something" renders ἐπιστήμη τις ἂν εἴη καὶ τινός (165c5–6), the English repeating "knowledge" where the Greek lets one noun serve both genitives; "what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of" renders τίνος ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη ἑκάστη (166a4); "knowledge of something" renders τινὸς ἐπιστήμη (168b2).

[110] Aristotle, *Categories* 7, 7b15–35.

See also

ἀπεργάζομαι; δύναμις; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἕτερος; λογιστική; ὁρίζω; στατική; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος · knowledge of what is going to be

Prophecy granted as a knowledge in the dream · Charmides

ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι, *epistēmēn tou mellontos esesthai*, "knowledge of what is going to be"

At a Glance

The word. Knowledge of the future: the definition of prophecy, μαντική, that Socrates grants for the dream.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the dream, where Socrates grants "that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be" (173c).

In this edition. "Knowledge of what is going to be".

A place to read. 173c–174b.

Meaning

The phrase is a definition offered as a concession. Prophecy, which Greeks practised by birds, entrails, oracles and dreams, is counted among the knowledges, and its object is τὸ μέλλον ἔσεσθαι, "what is going to be". Granted that, prophecy becomes a craft like the others, with true practitioners and impostors.

Use in the book

Socrates grants the definition at the end of his dream, after the pilots, doctors and generals. "And if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be" (173c; see μαντική; συγχωρέω). The grant lets temperance, presiding over prophecy, sort its practitioners, turning away the impostors and setting up true prophets as foretellers of the future (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω; προφήτης). Prophecy is the last craft the dream sets in

order, and the boldest: the future is the hardest thing to claim to know, and the easiest to pretend to.

The prophet returns at once as Critias' candidate for the happy man. Socrates suggests that he may mean "the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet", and Critias accepts him "and another as well", and Socrates guesses who the other is: a man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now (173e–174a; see τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα). The question that follows passes over the prophet. Which of this man's kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Not the knowledge of the future, but the knowledge of good and bad (174a–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The phrase can be read as the dialogue's clearest case of a knowledge that does not make anyone happy. To know what will happen is not to know whether it will be good for us. The dream grants prophecy the rank of a knowledge in order to show that even a true prophet, set up by temperance, would leave that question open.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the prophet's return.

173c Prophecy is granted to be knowledge of what is going to be; temperance presides over it and sets up the true prophets.

173e–174a Critias' happy man may be the prophet, who knows all that is going to be, or one who knows past, present and future as well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* draws what can be read as the conclusion the *Charmides* implies. Nicias says that the prophet needs to know only the signs of what will be, whether death, illness or the loss of money awaits someone, or victory or defeat in war or in some other contest; but whether it is better for someone to suffer these things or not, why should the prophet be the judge of that, rather than anyone else? (195e–196a). Socrates then argues that there is not one knowledge of the past, another of the present and another of the future, but one knowledge of the same things at all times, as medicine oversees the healthy that is, was and will be; generalship provides best for what is going to

be, and does not think it should serve prophecy but rule it, and the law orders that the prophet shall not rule the general but the general the prophet (198d–199a). On that account there is no separate knowledge of the future, and prophecy is subordinate to the knowledge that judges what is better.

Other ancient sources

The Greek formula for complete knowledge joins the three times. In the *Iliad* Calchas, the best of the bird-readers, "knew what is, what is going to be, and what was before", and by the prophecy Apollo gave him he had led the Greek ships to Troy;[111] in Hesiod the Muses breathe a god-given voice into the poet, so that he may make famous what will be and what was before, and they themselves tell what is, what will be and what was before.[112] The all-knowing man of 174a, who knows the future, the past and the present, can be read as Calchas' formula turned into a hypothesis, and the question that follows as asking what such knowledge is worth.

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge of what is going to be" renders ἐπιστήμην τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι (173c4), keeping the future infinitive; "foretellers of the future" renders προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων (173c6). Μαντική is "prophecy" and μάντις "prophet".

See also

ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; μαντική; μάντις; προφήτης; συγχωρέω; τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα.

ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους · knowledge of the healthy and the diseased

Medicine defined by its objects · Charmides

[111] Homer, *Iliad* 1.68–72.
[112] Hesiod, *Theogony* 31–32 and 38.

ἐπιστήμη ... τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, *epistēmē ... tou hygieinou*, "knowledge of the healthy"; ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη, *hygieinou epistēmē*, "knowledge of the healthy"; τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη, *tōi tou hygieinou einai kai nosōdous epistēmē*, "by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased"

At a Glance

The word. Medicine as defined by its objects: the knowledge of what is healthy and what is diseased.

In the *Charmides*. Medicine is "knowledge of the healthy" when Socrates first sets it beside temperance (165c); the doctor "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e); and "medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" (171a).

In this edition. "Knowledge of the healthy and the diseased".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

The healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, and the diseased, τὸ νοσῶδες, are neuter adjectives: whatever makes or marks health or disease, foods and regimens and bodies and signs. They are medicine's objects, as health, ὑγίεια, is its product (see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The pair joins contraries in one knowledge, as the *Charmides* assumes a knowledge always does (see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).

Use in the book

The phrase is medicine's definition, and the dialogue uses it twice. First as the model of a knowledge with an object: "And medicine ... is knowledge of the healthy?" "Certainly" (165c), which lets Socrates ask what temperance is knowledge of (see ἐπιστήμη τινός). Then as the boundary that the knowledge of knowledge cannot cross. The doctor "understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e; see ἐπαΐω), so the temperate man who would test him must test him there: "Or isn't each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?" "By that, yes." "And medicine was defined as different

from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased." "Yes" (171a; see ὁρίζω; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι). Whoever would examine the doctor must examine him "in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ἐπισκέπτομαι), and that only a doctor can do (171b–c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος).

The phrase gains a word between its first use and its second. At 165c medicine is knowledge "of the healthy"; at 170e and 171a it is "of the healthy and the diseased". The addition can be read as what makes the test possible: a knowledge bounded by contraries can tell where its field ends and recognise a fellow practitioner and a pretender inside it. Knowledge of knowledge has no such contraries of its own except knowledge and its lack, and those, the argument shows, tell nothing about any field.

Places to read

The passages in which medicine is defined by its objects, and the one in which the knowledge of the healthy is weighed for happiness.

165c Medicine is knowledge of the healthy, and produces health.

170a–c Knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy is medicine; the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.

170e The doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.

171a–b Medicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased; the doctor must be examined in these.

174b Of the all-knowing man's knowledges, the one by which he knows what is healthy comes nearer to making him happy than calculation.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* the doctor Eryximachus gives medicine another object. Medicine, in sum, he says, is knowledge of the body's loves with respect to filling and emptying; the one who can tell in these the fine love from the shameful is the most medical, and the one who can make the body change one love for the other, and implant love where it is lacking and remove it where it is present, is a good craftsman (186c–d). The *Charmides*' medicine knows the healthy and the diseased, Eryximachus' the loves and hatreds of

opposites in the body; both make medicine a knowledge of contraries that can tell them apart.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle uses "healthy" as his example of a word said in many ways but with reference to one thing. Everything healthy is called so in relation to health: one thing because it preserves health, another because it produces it, another because it is a sign of it, another because it is capable of receiving it; and "medical" likewise is said in relation to medicine.[113] The *Charmides*' "the healthy" can be read as covering all these, so that its knowledge of the healthy is a knowledge of everything that bears on health.

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge of the healthy" at 165c8 and 165c10, "knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" for τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη at 171a9. The Note on this Edition records a correction: "Medicine was 'knowledge of health' at 165c but 'of the healthy' from 170a, although 171a refers back to the definition at 165c." The English now keeps "the healthy" throughout, so that 171a can be heard to recall 165c; on the distinction between the healthy and health see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας. At 171a9 τῷ τοῦ is B's reading; T has τῷ τό.

See also

ἀληθινός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπαΐω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἰατρική; ὁμότεχνος; ὁρίζω; τὸ νοσῶδες; τὸ ὑγιεινόν; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην · knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge

The lesser good left to temperance: easier learning and better examining · Charmides

[113] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.2, 1003a34–b4.

τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, *to epistēmēn epistasthai kai anepistēmosynēn*, "knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge"; ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην, *epistasthai epistēmēn*, "to know knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. To know knowledge and its lack: the definition with its verb, the verb taking its own noun for object.

In the *Charmides*. Twice. Socrates asks whether the good of temperance, "knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge", is only that its owner learns more easily and examines better (172b); then, to look again at its benefit, he grants "both that it is possible to know knowledge" and what was laid down at the start (172c).

In this edition. "Knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge", "to know knowledge".

A place to read. 172b–d.

Meaning

The phrase states the definition as an activity. The verb takes its own noun for its object, as if knowledge were one more thing to be known, like a remedy or the Greek language (see ἐπίσταμαι).

Use in the book

The phrase comes when the great benefit has been lost. The life without error (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία) has turned out to need a knowledge "of this kind" that has turned up nowhere (172a). Socrates offers a smaller good: "Well then ... is this the good that temperance has, as we are now finding it to be, knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge: that whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him, since in addition to each thing he learns he has a view of the knowledge as well; and that he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned, while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly?" (172b; see ἀσθένεια; ἐναργής; ἐξετάζω; προσκαθοράω). Then the comparison: "Is it some such things as these, my friend, that we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater,

and seeking for it to be greater than it is?" "Perhaps that is how it is" (172b–c).

Socrates then lets even this go: "Perhaps ... And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose" (172c; see χρηστός). Granting "both that it is possible to know knowledge, and, as for what we laid down at the start that temperance is, knowing what one knows and what one does not know", he asks whether, granted all this, it benefits at all (172c–d; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ὀνίνημι), and withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good for each to do what he knows (172d; see ἀναμάρτητος).

The lesser good can be read as the most plausible thing the dialogue says about a knowledge of knowledge, and it is dropped as too small. A learner who sees, beside each thing he learns, his own knowledge of it, and an examiner who knows within his own field what knowing is, are not fantasies; they describe a reflective habit of mind. The dialogue sets it aside because it is not great enough to be temperance, not because it is false.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

172b–c Perhaps the good of knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge is easier learning, clearer sight and better examining within what one has learned.

172c Socrates grants that it is possible to know knowledge, to ask again whether it benefits.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Meno* shows the lesser good at work. Meno's slave, questioned about the double square, at first thought he knew and answered boldly; now he is at a loss, and does not think he knows. Has he been harmed by being numbed like the torpedo-fish's victims? No: he is better off with regard to the thing he did not know, and has been helped towards finding out how it stands, for now he would search gladly, not knowing, whereas before he would have thought he spoke well about it to many people many times; he would not have tried to search for or learn what he thought he knew until he fell into perplexity and longed to know (84a–c; see ἀπορία). The knowledge that one does not know can be read as making the slave learn, as Socrates says at 172b

that knowing knowledge and its lack makes a man learn more easily. The end of the *Theaetetus*, where the young man, delivered of his false beliefs, will be gentler for not thinking he knows what he does not (210c), is told under ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν.

Translation in this edition

"Knowing knowledge and the lack of knowledge" renders τὸ ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην (172b2–3); "to know knowledge" renders ἐπίστασθαι ἐπιστήμην (172c7). In the second place the manuscripts add a second infinitive, εἰδέναι, "to know", after δυνατὸν εἶναι; Burnet brackets it on Heusde's conjecture, and the English does not translate it.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀπορία; ἀσθένεια; ἐναργής; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐξετάζω; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; ὀνίνημι; προσκαθοράω; χρηστός.

ἐπιστημόνως · knowledgeably

The adverb that has to say about what · Charmides

ἐπιστημόνως, *epistēmonōs*, "knowledgeably"; τὸ ἐπιστημόνως, *to epistēmonōs*, "'knowledgeably'"; ἐπιστημονέστερον, *epistēmonesteron*, "(still) more knowledgeably"

At a Glance

The word. In a knowing way, with expertise; the adverb of ἐπιστήμων, "one who knows".

In the *Charmides*. Nine times, all from the end of the dream to the naming of the knowledge of good and bad (173d–174b). The Key Words: "'Knowledgeably' (epistēmonōs), in the dream and after (173d–174b), is the adverb of the same word."

In this edition. "Knowledgeably"; "still more knowledgeably" for the comparative.

A place to read. 173c–e.

Meaning

An adverb of manner tells how something is done, and hides what it is done about. To act "knowledgeably" is to act as one who knows, and the adverb leaves open what is known. The *Charmides* uses that gap.

Use in the book

The adverb enters with the dream's conclusion, that the human race, with temperance standing guard, would act and live knowledgeably, though whether it would thereby do well and be happy cannot yet be learned (173c–d; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν; φυλάττω). Critias defends the adverb itself, and the English puts it in quotation marks as the Greek puts the article before it: "And yet ... you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d; see ἀτιμάζω; τέλος).

Socrates answers with a question about grammar: "Then teach me one small thing more ... Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?" (173d; see προσδιδάσκω; σκυτῶν τομή). The adverb must have an object, as knowledge must (see ἐπιστήμη τινός), and once it has one, the cobbler and the bronze-worker live knowledgeably too, and Critias will not call them happy (173e; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The comparative at 174a follows the adverb to its limit: of a man who knew all things past, present and future, Socrates says, "I don't think you would say that anyone lived still more knowledgeably than he" (174a). Still the question is which of his knowledges makes him happy (174a–b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The adverb can be read as the dialogue's sharpest lesson in grammar. "Knowledgeably" sounds like a manner of life, and is always a relation to an object. Critias, who accepted temperance as a knowledge of nothing but knowledge, defends a life that is knowledgeable without saying about what; Socrates' question is the same one he asked at 165c.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs.

173d The human race would act and live knowledgeably; whether acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, we cannot yet learn.

173d Critias: nothing else crowns doing well, if you slight "knowledgeably"; Socrates: knowledgeably about what?

173e The cobbler and the bronze-worker live knowledgeably and are not happy; Critias means one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.

174a No one could live more knowledgeably than one who knew past, present and future.

174b It was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus* states the claim Critias defends. In the working and use of wood, Socrates and Clinias agree, it is knowledge, the carpenter's, that brings about right use; and in the use of the goods named at the start, wealth, health and beauty, it was knowledge that led and set right the action; so knowledge gives men not only good fortune but doing well, in every possession and every action (281a–b). The *Euthydemus* goes on from there to look for the knowledge that makes happy and goes round in a circle (291b–292e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός); the *Charmides* asks Critias "about what", and gets the same circle.

Translation in this edition

"Knowledgeably" at every place; "'knowledgeably'", in quotation marks, for τὸ ἐπιστημόνως with the article (173d7); "still more knowledgeably" for ἐπιστημονέστερον (174a7). At 173d4 Burnet prints ἂν πράττοντες with T; B has τὰ πράττοντες.

See also

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἀτιμάζω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐπιστήμων; εὖ πράττειν; προσδιδάσκω; σκυτῶν τομή; τέλος; φυλάττω.

ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν · live knowledgeably

Critias' thesis that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy · Charmides

ἐπιστημόνως ... ζῴη, *epistēmonōs ... zōiē*, "would ... live knowledgeably"; τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα, *ton epistēmonōs zōnta*, "the man who lives knowledgeably"; ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντες, *epistēmonōs zōntes*, "(these people) live knowledgeably"; περί τινων ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα, *peri tinōn epistēmonōs zōnta*, "one who lives knowledgeably about certain things"; ἐπιστημονέστερον ζῶντα, *epistēmonesteron zōnta*, "lived (still) more knowledgeably"; τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ... ζῆν, *to epistēmonōs ... zēn*, "living knowledgeably"

At a Glance

The word. To live with knowledge, as one who knows; in Critias' thesis, the life that crowns doing well.

In the *Charmides*. From the dream's conclusion, "the human race would act and live knowledgeably" (173d), through Critias' thesis and its refutation (173d–174a), to Socrates' verdict that "it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy" (174b).

In this edition. "Live knowledgeably".

A place to read. 173d–174c.

Meaning

The phrase joins ζῆν, "to live", to the adverb of knowledge (see ἐπιστημόνως). In Critias' mouth it is a thesis about happiness: the life lived with knowledge is the happy life.

Use in the book

Socrates grants the phrase and questions the inference. If temperance presided over everything, the human race "would act and live knowledgeably"; but that by so acting "we would do well and be happy, this ... we cannot yet learn" (173d). Critias holds that nothing else crowns doing well (173d; see τέλος). The refutation is by examples. Asked knowledgeably about what, Critias denies that he means cutting leather, working bronze, wool, wood or anything of that sort (173d–e; see ἐπιστημόνως; σκυτῶν τομή;

χαλκοῦ ἐργασία). "Then we are no longer holding to the argument ... that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy. For these people live knowledgeably, and you do not admit that they are happy; rather, I think, you are marking off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things" (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐμμένω).

The thesis then narrows to a single knowledge. Socrates offers the prophet; Critias says he means him and another as well, and Socrates proposes the man who knows all things past, present and future (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος). Asked "which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?", Critias answers "Not alike at all" (174a), and the elimination ends in the knowledge of good and bad (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Socrates' verdict turns the phrase into its negation: "it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy" (174b–c).

The refutation can be read as aimed at a crude form of a thesis the reader associates with Socrates. Critias' "living knowledgeably" makes any knowledge a share in happiness; Socrates shows that the cobbler's does not, and that only one knowledge does. The thesis that virtue is knowledge survives, on this reading, in a narrower form: not knowledge of anything, but knowledge of good and bad.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

173d The human race would act and live knowledgeably; whether that would make us happy, we cannot yet learn.

173e The man who lives knowledgeably is not happy if his knowledge is of leather or bronze; Critias means one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.

174a No one would live more knowledgeably than one who knew past, present and future.

174b–c It was not living knowledgeably that made us happy, but only the knowledge of good and bad.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Meno* gives the thesis its better form. If virtue is something in the soul and must be beneficial, Socrates argues, it must be wisdom, since whatever the soul attempts or endures turns out happily under the lead of wisdom and the reverse under folly; and the things that are sometimes good and sometimes harmful, wealth and the like, are made beneficial by the soul when wisdom guides it, and harmful when folly does (88c–e). Wisdom there is not knowledge of leather but the leading power that makes everything else beneficial, and can be read as what the *Charmides* calls the knowledge of good and bad.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle reports as Socrates' the related view that the virtues are kinds of knowledge. Socrates was partly right and partly wrong, he says: wrong to hold that every virtue is a kind of prudence, right to hold that none is without it; Socrates thought the virtues were reasonings, for he thought they were all kinds of knowledge, while Aristotle holds that they go with reason.[114] Xenophon's Socrates said that justice and every other virtue is wisdom, since just things and everything done by virtue are fine and good, and those who know them would choose nothing else instead, while those who do not know them cannot do them.[115] The *Charmides* has Socrates refute the thesis in Critias' form and keep it in one knowledge's.

Translation in this edition

"Act and live knowledgeably" for ἐπιστημόνως ἂν πράττοι καὶ ζῴη (173d1), "the man who lives knowledgeably" for τὸν ἐπιστημόνως ζῶντα (173e7), "living knowledgeably" for τὸ ἐπιστημόνως ἦν ζῆν (174b12), where the imperfect ἦν, "was all along", gives Socrates' "it was not". The text of 173e9, "one who lives knowledgeably about certain things", rests on three corrections, told under ἀφορίζω.

[114] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.13, 1144b17–30.
[115] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.5.

See also

ἀφορίζω; ἐμμένω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως; εὐδαίμων; σκυτῶν τομή; τέλος; χαλκοῦ ἐργασία.

ἐπιστήμων · who has knowledge

The man who has knowledge, set against the pretender · Charmides

ἐπιστημόνων, *epistēmonōn*, "(anyone) who has knowledge"; ἐπιστημονέστερον, *epistēmonesteron*, "(still) more knowledgeably"; ἐπιστήμων, *epistēmōn*, "(turn out) to know"

At a Glance

The word. Knowing, skilled, expert; as a noun, the man who has knowledge of something.

In the *Charmides*. Three times. The man whose temperance knows only knowledge will be able to distinguish neither the pretended doctor from the true one "nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not" (170e); no one could live "still more knowledgeably" than the all-knowing man (174a); and the concessions of the argument were made so that "our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it" (175c).

In this edition. "Who has knowledge", "more knowledgeably", "know".

A place to read. 170d–171c.

Meaning

The adjective belongs to ἐπίσταμαι, "to know how, to understand" (see ἐπίσταμαι): the ἐπιστήμων is the man who has a skill and can be relied on for it, the trained pilot or doctor, and with a genitive he is knowledgeable "of" something. Its opposite is the man who lacks the knowledge, and, in the *Charmides*, the man who pretends to it (see ἀλαζών). Where ἐπιστήμη names the knowledge, ἐπιστήμων names the person who has it.

Use in the book

The word enters at the point where the argument turns against temperance. Socrates has shown that the knowledge of knowledge would know that a man knows, but not what (170b–d; see γιγνώσκω), and he draws the consequence: "Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not" (170e). The doctor is one case, and the adjective makes the case general. The test that follows, in which only a doctor can examine a doctor, is told under ἀληθινός (170e–171c).

The man who has knowledge is what the dream needs. If temperance could tell him from the pretender, no false pilot or doctor or general would deceive us, and all our things would be made by genuine craftsmen (173b–c; see ἀλαζών; δημιουργός). The comparative at 174a carries the same figure to its limit, the man who knows past, present and future, and no one would live "still more knowledgeably" than he (see ἐπιστημόνως).

The last use is in Socrates' review of what was conceded. The argument did not allow that by knowledge of knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, yet they granted it, "so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it" (175b–c; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἄλογος). The temperate man was to be the one knower who could recognise all the others. The adjective can be read as the dialogue's name for what temperance was meant to detect and could not.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

170e The temperate man will not distinguish the pretended doctor from the true, nor anyone who has knowledge from anyone who does not.

174a No one would live more knowledgeably than the man who knew past, present and future.

175c The concessions were made so that the temperate man might know, of what he knows, that he knows it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Statesman* states as a principle of rule what the *Charmides*' dream hoped temperance would secure. The visitor from Elea holds that the one right constitution is that in which the rulers prove to have real knowledge, ἐπιστήμονας, and not the mere reputation for it, whether they govern by laws or without them, with the consent of the governed or against it, and whether they are themselves poor or wealthy; for we go on calling doctors doctors whether they heal us with our consent or against it, by the knife or the cautery, so long as they take charge of us by their art for the good of our bodies (293a–d). The same passage allows such rulers to purge the city by killing or exiling some, for its good (293d). The *Charmides*' picture of a city governed without error (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία) can be read as the same hope, set before two men who would later govern Athens by force (see βιάζομαι). In the myth of Er, the soldier who came back from death to tell what he had seen, the study to be sought above all others is to learn who will make a man able and knowledgeable, ἐπιστήμονα, to tell a good life from a bad one (*Republic* 618c; see ζητητής).

Translation in this edition

"Anyone else who has knowledge" for ἄλλον οὐδένα τῶν ἐπιστημόνων, with "anyone who does not" for καὶ μή (170e2–3); "still more knowledgeably" for ἐπιστημονέστερον (174a7), which the edition takes as adverbial with ζῶντα (it could also agree with οὐδένα); and at 175c2 the adjective with its genitive, γένοιτο ὁ σώφρων ἐπιστήμων ὧν τε οἶδεν, is turned into a verb, "our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows". There γένοιτο is T's reading; B has γε οιτο, and W γε οἴοιτο.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; ἄλογος; ἁμαρτία; βιάζομαι; γιγνώσκω; δημιουργός; ἐπίσταμαι; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστημόνως; ζητητής.

ἐπιτάττω · give the orders

The guardian's order, and the end of persuasion · Charmides

ἐπιτάττει, *epitattei*, "gives the orders"

At a Glance

The word. To lay a command on someone, to enjoin; the verb of the master, the officer and the magistrate.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the dialogue's closing lines: "Count on force ... since this man here gives the orders" (176c).

In this edition. "Gives the orders".

A place to read. 176b–d.

Meaning

Τάττειν is to set in order, to post, to assign; ἐπιτάττειν, with ἐπί, is to set a task upon someone, and so to command. It is a stronger word than κελεύειν, "to bid, to tell", which can be a request: the ἐπίταγμα is an injunction, and the ἐπιτακτική is the art of commanding. The verb implies a relation of authority between the one who orders and the one who must do what he is told.

Use in the book

The verb closes a sequence of orders. Charmides has said that he very much needs the charm and will let Socrates charm him every day; Critias makes this the proof of the boy's temperance, and Charmides answers in the language of a ward, that he would be doing something terrible if he did not obey his guardian and do what he ordered; "Well, I do order it," says Critias (176b–c; see ἐπίτροπος; πείθω). Critias' verb there is κελεύειν. When Socrates asks Charmides whether he means to use force, Charmides answers with the stronger word: "Count on force ... since this man here gives the orders" (176c; see βιάζομαι). The joke is that Socrates is to be compelled to do what he would gladly do, and the boy hides behind his guardian's command.

The order also ends a theme that runs through the opening pages. The Thracian forbade Socrates to let anyone persuade him to treat a head without the soul, and Socrates, bound by his oath, will obey (157b–c; see

ἐντέλλομαι; πείθω). At the close Charmides is "not altogether persuaded" by Socrates (176b), and obeys his guardian instead. The edition's note at 176b records that the play on persuading and obeying closes here, "just as persuasion gives way to force". The last order of the dialogue can be read as the point at which command replaces argument.

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs.

176b–d Charmides will obey his guardian and do what he orders; Critias orders it; the boy will use force, since Critias gives the orders, and Socrates promises not to oppose him.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Statesman* divides the knowledge that does not work with its hands into a judging part and a commanding part, τὸ ἐπιτακτικόν, and places the king in the commanding art, as a master, not as a spectator who only judges; the commanding art is then divided again, as the retailer's art is divided from the art of the man who sells his own produce, into the art of the herald, who passes on another's orders, and the art of the one who gives his own orders, which the visitor calls "self-commanding" and assigns to kings (260b–e). In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates argues that no kind of knowledge looks to what profits the stronger or makes it the content of its orders, ἐπιτάττει, but looks to what profits the weaker, the party it governs: the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, looks to and orders what profits the sick man, not himself, and the true pilot what profits his sailors (342c–e; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). On that account a command is justified by the good of the one commanded. The command that ends the *Charmides* can be read as serving the one who gives it as much as the one who receives it.

Translation in this edition

"Since this man here gives the orders" for ἐπειδήπερ ὅδε γε ἐπιτάττει (176c8). Critias' verb a few lines earlier is κελεύειν, "what you order", "I do order it" (176c2–3).

See also

βιάζομαι; ἐντέλλομαι; ἐπίτροπος; ᾗ ἰατρικός; πείθω.

ἐπιτήδειος · friends

ἐπιτηδείων, *epitēdeiōn*, "friends"

Attested: τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων (*tōn allōn epitēdeiōn*; 166d). The adjective means "fit, suitable, useful for something"; as a noun, τὰ ἐπιτήδεια are the necessaries of life, and οἱ ἐπιτήδειοι the people close to one, friends and intimates. Critias has charged Socrates with trying to refute him, and Socrates answers, "this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends" (166d; see ἐλέγχω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν), and asks whether it is not a common good that each of the things that are should become plain. The word widens the circle step by step, from Socrates to his friends to all men. In the *Euthydemus* the neuter is used for a craftsman's equipment: craftsmen who had all the equipment for their own work ready and did not use it would not do well through the possession, any more than a carpenter with tools and timber who never built would be benefited by having them (280c–d; see εὐδαιμονέω).

See also ἐλέγχω; εὐδαιμονέω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.

ἐπιτρέπω · allow

ἐπετρέπομεν, *epetrepomen*, "(nor would) we allow"

Attested: ἐπετρέπομεν (*epetrepomen*; 171e). To turn something over to someone, to entrust; and so to permit, to allow. In Socrates' picture of a life governed by temperance, "neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them. Nor would we allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly, and that would be whatever they had knowledge of" (171e; see ἁμαρτία; παραδίδωμι). The verb gives the rulers the power to

permit, and with it the power to forbid: in the city of knowledge no one is allowed to act outside his knowledge. The *Republic* uses the verb for the other sense: to men of such a nature, once education and age have perfected them, and to them alone, one would entrust the city (487a; see εὐμαθία).

See also ἁμαρτία; εὐμαθία; παραδίδωμι.

ἐπίτροπος · guardian

Critias as the guardian of his ward Charmides · Charmides

ἐπιτρόπου, *epitropou*, "guardian"; ἐπιτρόπῳ, *epitropōi*, "guardian"

At a Glance

The word. One to whom something is entrusted: a steward, a regent, and above all the guardian of an orphan and his property.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, at the beginning and the end. There would be nothing improper in the boy's talking "in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a); and at the close Charmides would be doing something terrible "if I didn't obey you, my guardian" (176c).

In this edition. "Guardian".

A place to read. 154e–155b and 176b–d.

Meaning

The ἐπίτροπος is the man to whom something is turned over, ἐπιτρέπειν (see ἐπιτρέπω). In Athens the word named first of all the guardian appointed for a fatherless boy, usually a kinsman named in the father's will, who managed his property and answered for his upbringing until he came of age; in other places it named a steward of an estate or a governor ruling for an absent king. The guardian's duties were legal and financial, and his authority over the boy was a father's authority on loan.

Use in the book

The word places Critias: he is the boy's cousin and also his guardian, which implies that the boy's father, Glaucon, was no longer living. When Socrates

asks Critias to call the boy over, he reassures him that there could be nothing improper in it: "Even if he were younger still, there would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a; see αἰσχρός; ἀνεψιός; διαλέγομαι). Athenian custom was wary of men who sought the company of beautiful boys, and the guardian's presence makes the conversation respectable. Critias then uses his authority at once: he tells his attendant to fetch the boy on the pretext of a doctor for his headache (155b).

At the end the word returns as the ground of obedience. Critias makes the boy's submission to Socrates' charm the proof of his temperance, and Charmides answers, "Count on it ... I'll follow him and not desert him. I'd be doing something terrible if I didn't obey you, my guardian, and didn't do what you order" (176b–c; see ἐπιτάττω; πείθω). The guardian who brought the boy to Socrates now hands him over, and the ward's first act of temperance is obedience to his guardian. The edition's note at 176c recalls what the two would do together some twenty-five years later (see βιάζομαι). The guardian of 155a can be read as the man to whom the boy's education, as well as his property, was entrusted.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

155a The boy may talk with Socrates in front of Critias, his guardian and his cousin.

176c Charmides would do something terrible if he did not obey his guardian and do what he ordered.

Elsewhere in Plato

Pericles is Plato's other famous guardian. In the *First Alcibiades* Socrates reminds Alcibiades that his father left Pericles son of Xanthippus as guardian, ἐπίτροπον, to him and his brother, a man who can do what he likes not only in Athens but in all Greece (104b). In the *Protagoras* Socrates offers the same Pericles as proof that virtue cannot be taught: as guardian of Clinias, Alcibiades' younger brother, Pericles feared that Alcibiades would corrupt him, took him away, placed him in the house of Ariphron, Pericles' brother, to be educated, and before six months were out gave him back to

Alcibiades, not knowing what to do with him (320a–b). In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger gives the guardians of orphans a whole body of law, so that the orphan's misfortune may be as little pitiable as possible: the gods see his desolation, and the dead and the aged count him "the greatest and holiest trust" (11.924a–928d, especially 926e–927c).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon tells the same relation from the ward's side. Alcibiades, before he was twenty, is said to have asked Pericles, his guardian and the leading man of the city, to teach him what a law is, and to have brought him by questioning to agree that whatever anyone compels another to do without persuading him, whether a tyrant, the few or the many, is force rather than law.[116] Xenophon tells the story in his defence of Socrates against the charge that he taught Critias and Alcibiades. The guardian is examined by his ward, and the subject is the one on which the *Charmides* ends, persuasion and force (176b–d; see βιάζομαι).

Translation in this edition

"Guardian" at both places, ἐπιτρόπου (155a6) and ἐπιτρόπῳ (176c1). At 155a6 the genitive stands with ἀνεψιοῦ, "his guardian and his cousin", both titles of the one man.

See also

αἰσχρός; ἀνεψιός; βιάζομαι; διαλέγομαι; ἐπιτάττω; ἐπιτρέπω; πείθω.

[116] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.40–46, especially 1.2.45.

ἐπιχειρέω · try, undertake

ἐπιχειρεῖν, *epicheirein*, "undertake", "try"; ἐπιχειροῦσιν, *epicheirousin*, "try"; ἐπιχειρεῖς, *epicheireis*, "you are trying"; ἐπιχειροῦμεν, *epicheiroumen*, "we are trying"; ἐπεχειροῦμεν, *epecheiroumen*, "(would) try"; ἐπιχειροῦντι, *epicheirounti*, "(when you) set about"

Attested: ἐπιχειρεῖν (*epicheirein*; 156b, 156e), ἐπιχειροῦσιν (*epicheirousin*; 156c, 157b), ἐπιχειρεῖς (*epicheireis*; 166c), ἐπιχειροῦμεν (*epicheiroumen*; 167c), ἐπεχειροῦμεν (*epecheiroumen*; 171e), ἐπιχειροῦντι (*epicheirounti*; 176d). To put one's hand to something, χείρ: to attempt, undertake, set about. The first four uses belong to medicine: good doctors say "they cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own" (156b), and "try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c); Zalmoxis says that "one must not try to cure the eyes without the head" (156e); and the mistake of the day is that "some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; Ζάλμοξις). In the argument the verb marks an attempt that may fail: "You are trying to refute me" (166c; see ἐλέγχω), and "see what a strange thing we are trying to say" (167c; see ἄτοπος). In the temperate city "neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know" (171e; see ἐπιτρέπω). The last use is Socrates': "When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176d; see βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι).

See also ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἄτοπος; βιάζομαι; ἐλέγχω; ἐναντιόομαι; ἐπιτρέπω; Ζάλμοξις.

ἐπῳδή · charm

The Thracian's charm for the soul, from its invention to its return · Charmides

ἐπῳδή, *epōidē*, "charm"; ἐπῳδῆς, *epōidēs*, "(of the) charm"; ἐπῳδήν, *epōidēn*, "charm"; ἐπῳδῇ, *epōidēi*, "(with the) charm"; ἐπῳδαῖς, *epōidais*, "charms"; ἐπῳδάς, *epōidas*, "charms"; ἐπῳδῶν, *epōidōn*, "charms"

At a Glance

The word. A song sung over someone, an incantation; the healer's or the magician's spell, and then any speech that soothes, persuades or binds.

In the *Charmides*. Fifteen times, at the beginning and the end. Socrates improvises it: the remedy for the head is a leaf, "but ... there was a charm to go with the remedy" (155e); the Thracian explains it: "the soul ... is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words" (157a); and at the close Charmides says, "I think I very much need the charm" (176b).

In this edition. "Charm", singular and plural.

A place to read. 155e–158c and 175e–176b.

Meaning

Ἐπῳδή is ᾠδή, "song", with ἐπί, "over, upon": the song sung over the sufferer (see ἐπᾴδω). In Greek healing it went with herbs and drugs, and the edition's note at 155e explains that "Greek healing could pair a herb with an incantation (epōidē, a song 'sung over' the sufferer)". The word kept its two sides, the doctor's and the sorcerer's, and passed easily into speech: an ἐπῳδή could be a lullaby, a spell, a soothing story or a persuasive argument.

Use in the book

The charm begins as Socrates' improvisation on Critias' ruse. Asked for the remedy for the head, he says that it is a leaf, "but that there was a charm to go with the remedy", and that without the charm the leaf was no use (155e; see ἐπᾴδω; φάρμακον; φύλλον). When the boy offers to copy it down, Socrates tells him what kind of charm it is: one "that cannot make the head alone healthy" (156b), as good doctors cannot cure the eyes without the head (see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). It comes from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis

(156d; see Ζάλμοξις), and the doctrine goes further: the soul must be treated first, "and the soul, my dear fellow, ... is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words", from which temperance comes to be in souls (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί). The charm is thus the treatment of the soul, and its product is the very virtue the dialogue is about. The Thracian's instruction makes it a condition: no head is to be treated unless its owner "first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm" (157b).

The charm sets the terms of the conversation that follows. Critias says that the boy is already thought the most temperate of anyone, which is "the very thing you say you have the charm for" (157d; "most temperate" is T's reading, also a variant in W, where B has "most sagacious", πολυφρενέστατος, as the edition's note at 157d records), and Socrates draws the conclusion, telling the boy that if temperance is already present in him, "then you would have no further need of charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean" (158b; see Ἀβάρις); if not, the charm must first be sung (158c; see ἐπᾴδω). The question whether Charmides has temperance becomes the question whether he needs the charm, and the inquiry into what temperance is begins as the test.

The charm returns when the inquiry has failed. Socrates is "still more aggrieved", he says, "on account of the charm I learned from the Thracian, if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing" (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; ζητητής), and tells the boy to "see whether you have it and have no need of the charm" (176a). Charmides does not know, and answers, "I think I very much need the charm" (176b). The edition's note at 155b observes that at the close "the charm returns, though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again". The note at 157a puts the reading the text invites: "The charm, it seems, is conversation of the right kind, perhaps the very conversation about to begin." On that reading the dialogue is itself the charm, sung over a boy who will ask to hear it every day (176b; see ἐπᾴδω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

155e The remedy is a leaf, with a charm to go with it; without the charm the leaf is no use.

156a–b The boy will copy the charm down; Socrates will speak frankly about what this charm is like.

156d The charm is like good medicine; Socrates learned it from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis.

157a–b The soul is treated with charms, which are beautiful words; the Thracian taught Socrates the remedy and the charms, and forbade him to treat a head unless its owner hands over his soul to the charm.

157c If Charmides is willing to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, Socrates will apply the remedy.

157d Charmides is thought to excel in the very thing Socrates has the charm for.

158b If temperance is already present, the boy needs no charms of Zalmoxis or Abaris.

175e Socrates is aggrieved for the charm he learned from the Thracian, if it was for a thing worth nothing.

176a–b If Charmides has temperance he needs no charm; he says he very much needs it.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger gives the name to the songs of education. So that the child's soul may learn to feel pleasure and pain in agreement with the law, what we call songs, ᾠδαί, "have now in truth become charms for souls", ἐπῳδαί, seriously aimed at that concord; but because the souls of the young cannot bear seriousness, they are called and practised as games and songs, just as those who care for the sick try to give them wholesome food in pleasant dishes and drinks (659d–660a). A little later he proposes that all three choruses should sing charms over the young, ἐπᾴδειν, telling them that the most pleasant life and the best are the same (664b). The *Euthydemus* makes the speechwriter's art a part of the art of charms: the charmer's art soothes snakes, spiders, scorpions and diseases, the speechwriter's soothes and consoles jurymen, assemblies and other crowds (289e–290a). In the *Theaetetus* the midwives can bring on labour pains and ease them with drugs and charms (149c–d), as the Thracian doctor pairs the remedy with the

charm. The *Phaedo*'s charm against the fear of death is told under ἐπᾴδω (77e–78a, 114d).

Other ancient sources

Gorgias, in his speech in defence of Helen, whose flight to Troy began the Trojan War, calls speech a powerful lord, and says that inspired charms through words, αἱ ἔνθεοι διὰ λόγων ἐπῳδαί, bring on pleasure and take away pain, for the power of the charm, joining with the opinion of the soul, beguiles it and persuades it and changes it by enchantment.[117] He goes on to compare the power of speech over the order of the soul with the order of drugs over the nature of bodies.[118] The *Charmides*' charm of beautiful words, paired with a remedy for the body, can be read as Socrates' answer to the rhetorician's claim: a charm whose product is not persuasion but temperance.

Plotinus explains how charms work and on whom. Spells act by the sympathy of the parts of one living universe, whose love and strife are the true magic. The good man is untouched by them in his reasoning soul; but the irrational part in him, which belongs to the universe, can be worked on, even to sickness or death, and he undoes such charms with counter-charms of his own. Only contemplation cannot be bewitched at all.[119]

Translation in this edition

"Charm" for the noun throughout, singular and plural, and "to charm", "to sing the charm", for the verb, so that noun and verb are one word in English as in Greek (the Glossary: "charm, ἐπῳδή (epōidē); to charm, to sing a charm, ἐπᾴδειν"). "Charmed with the Thracian's charms" at 157c4 renders ἐπᾷσαι ταῖς τοῦ Θρᾳκὸς ἐπῳδαῖς; for the verb's reading see ἐπᾴδω; H. Richards proposed the accusative τὰς … ἐπῳδάς. At 175e3 Burnet prints ἐπῳδῆς with T and W; B has ἐπῳδίας, which W also records as a variant.

[117] Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* 8–10.
[118] Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* 14.
[119] Plotinus, *Enneads* 4.4.40 and 4.4.43–44.

See also

Ἀβάρις; ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀγανακτέω; ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐπᾴδω; Ζάλμοξις; ζητητής; λόγοι καλοί; φάρμακον; φύλλον.

ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι · sit in a brothel

ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος καθημένῳ, *ep᾽ oikēmatos kathēmenōi*, "to sit in a brothel"

Attested: ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος καθημένῳ (*ep᾽ oikēmatos kathēmenōi*; 163b). An οἴκημα is a room or a small building, and "to sit at a room" was the Athenian euphemism for selling oneself in a brothel. Critias uses it to end his list of trades that Hesiod could not have called works, after cobbling and selling salt fish: "or to sit in a brothel" (163b; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω). The edition's note at 163b says that Critias' trades "seem chosen to shock, and the choice is an aristocrat's". The participle is masculine. The orator Aeschines, prosecuting the politician Timarchus in 346/5 BC, uses the same phrase of men: "you see these men who sit in the rooms, who by their own admission practise the practice", and who even so shut their doors for shame.[120]

See also ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω.

ἐραστής · lover

The boy's lovers, and the lover Socrates turns out to be · Charmides

ἐρασταί, *erastai*, "lovers"

At a Glance

The word. The lover, in the Athenian sense: the older youth or man who courts a boy, the ἐρώμενος or παιδικά.

In the *Charmides*. Twice in the opening scene. The young men coming in are "the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most

[120] Aeschines, *Against Timarchus* 74.

beautiful" (154a), and as Charmides enters "many other lovers were following among the crowd behind" (154c).

In this edition. "Lovers".

A place to read. 154a–155a.

Meaning

The noun is formed from ἐρᾶν, "to love, to desire" (see ἐράω). In classical Athens it named one side of a recognised relation: the ἐραστής, a young man or older, courted a beautiful boy in his teens, the ἐρώμενος or τὰ παιδικά, with praise, gifts and company in the wrestling-schools, and the relation was expected to pass, as the boy grew up, into friendship. The edition's note at 154a explains that the lovers of the opening "are young men, older than the boy they court, as Athenian custom allowed". The custom was hedged with rules and suspicion, and the line between honourable and shameful courtship was a constant subject of talk.

Use in the book

The lovers arrive before the beloved. Critias sees young men coming in, trading insults, with a crowd behind them, and tells Socrates that he will soon know about the beautiful: "The fellows coming in are the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway" (154a; see πρόδρομος). Then Charmides enters, and all the rest, Socrates thought, were in love with him (154c; see ἐκπλήσσω; ἐράω); "and many other lovers were following among the crowd behind" (154c). Even the boys gaze at him "as if he were a statue" (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα).

Socrates places himself among them and apart from them. He calls himself "a white measuring-line on white stone" where the beautiful are concerned (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη), and he is undone when he sees inside the boy's cloak (155d; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι); but what he proposes to strip and look at is the boy's soul (154e; see ἀποδύω). The scene sets the lovers who gaze at Charmides' beauty beside a lover who asks whether he is temperate. The question whether a beautiful boy has the virtue his beauty seems to promise is the question the lovers never put.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

154a The young men coming in are the advance guard and the lovers of the boy thought most beautiful.

154c Many other lovers follow Charmides among the crowd behind.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Lysis* opens on the same scene with a lover who has not learned his part. Hippothales blushes when asked who his favourite is, and his friend complains that he deafens them with poems and songs in praise of the boy Lysis (204b–d). Socrates tells him that "whoever is wise in the ways of love", τὰ ἐρωτικά, does not praise his beloved before he has caught him, since praise makes the beautiful proud and harder to catch, like a hunter who scares his game (205e–206a; see ἁλίσκομαι); the *Charmides*' Cydias is "the wisest of men in the ways of love" in the same words (155d; see εὐλαβέομαι). In the *Symposium* Pausanias describes the Athenian custom as double: the city seems to honour lovers and allow them everything, yet fathers set attendants over their sons and forbid them to talk with their lovers, and the boys' agemates and companions reproach them if they see anything of the kind (182d–183d; see αἰσχρός).

Alcibiades names Charmides himself when he exposes Socrates' method at the end of the *Symposium*. Socrates has done this, he says, not only to him but also to Charmides son of Glaucon, Euthydemus son of Diocles and very many others: he deceives them as a lover, and then sets himself up as the beloved instead of the lover; and he warns Agathon to beware, and not, as the proverb has it, learn like a fool by suffering (222b; see εὐλαβέομαι). Beside this passage, the *Charmides* can be read as the scene of such a reversal: Socrates enters as one more admirer of the boy, and the dialogue ends with the boy asking to follow him every day (176b–c).

Translation in this edition

"Lovers" at both places (154a5, 154c4). In the Greek the lovers are joined with πρόδρομοι, "the advance guard", by τε καί, so that both words describe one group (154a4–5).

See also

ἄγαλμα; αἰσχρός; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀποδύω; ἐκπλήσσω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐράω; ἔρως; εὐλαβέομαι; λευκὴ στάθμη; πρόδρομος.

ἐράω · be in love with

ἐρᾶν, *eran*, "to be in love with"

Attested: ἐρᾶν (*eran*; 154c). To love with desire, to be in love; the verb of ἔρως, with the genitive of the one loved. As Charmides enters, "all the rest, it seemed to me, were in love with him, so astounded and flustered were they when he came in" (154c; see ἐκπλήσσω; θορυβέω). Socrates reports the lovers' state from its effects, as a spectator: the verb is governed by ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν, "they seemed to me" (rendered "it seemed to me"), and the sign of love is astonishment and confusion. The noun of the same verb, ἐραστής, is the lover of 154a and 154c (see ἐραστής), and the noun ἔρως returns in the argument as one of the powers defined by their objects, a love that would be "love of nothing beautiful" (167e; see ἔρως). In the *Symposium* Diotima turns the same verb from the beautiful to the good (204e; see εὐδαίμων).

See also ἐκπλήσσω; ἐραστής; ἔρως; εὐδαίμων; θορυβέω.

ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν · working and making

Critias' first distinction of words, taken from Hesiod · Charmides

τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν, *to ergazesthai kai to poiein*, "working and making"

At a Glance

The word. Two verbs of producing: ἐργάζεσθαι, to work, labour, do work on something, and ποιεῖν, to make.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' reply to Socrates' question whether making and doing are the same: "No indeed ... nor working and making either. I learned that from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace" (163b).

In this edition. "Working and making".

A place to read. 162e–163e.

Meaning

The two verbs overlap in ordinary Greek. Ποιεῖν is the general verb of making and doing anything, from making a shoe to making a poem; ἐργάζεσθαι, from ἔργον, is to work, especially at a trade or on the land, and to produce by labour. A cobbler can be said to make shoes or to work at shoes. Critias separates them by attaching value to one: what is worked is always a work, ἔργον, and so never a disgrace, while a thing made, ποίημα, may be shameful.

Use in the book

The distinction is Critias' escape from a refutation. He has accepted that craftsmen make other people's things and are still temperate (162e–163a), and Socrates has pointed out that this contradicts "doing one's own business" if making is doing. Asked whether he calls making and doing the same, Critias answers, "No indeed ... nor working and making either. I learned that from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace" (163b; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; Ἡσίοδος). He argues from the line: Hesiod could not have called cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel "works", and "working" and "doing", and still have said that they were no disgrace (see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι). "He too, I think, held making to be something other than doing

and working", and that a thing made may be a disgrace, when it is not made with what is fine, but work never (see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος); for "things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163b–c; see ἐργασία; ποίημα).

The verbs are thus sorted by worth. Making is the neutral word; working and doing are making done finely and beneficially. Socrates sees through it at once: "almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant: that it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings. After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words" (163d; see Πρόδικος). He allows Critias to assign the words as he pleases, so long as he makes clear what each is applied to, and asks him to define the thing more plainly (163d–e; see διορίζομαι). The distinction of verbs becomes a definition: temperance is "the doing of good things" (163e). "For the distinction to be visible", as the Key Words put it, the edition keeps the three verbs apart throughout the argument of 161b–164c: "make" for ποιεῖν, "do" for πράττειν and "work" for ἐργάζεσθαι (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

Places to read

The passage in which the pair occurs, with Socrates' answer.

163b–c Critias: making is not doing, nor working making; Hesiod called only what is made finely and beneficially works, workings and doings.

163d–e Socrates recalls Prodicus' distinctions of words, lets Critias name things as he likes, and asks for a plainer definition.

Elsewhere in Plato

Critias has heard Prodicus at work. In the *Protagoras*, when the conversation threatens to break up, Critias asks Prodicus and Hippias to help keep it going, and Prodicus, praising his words, gives a lesson in distinctions: the audience should be impartial but not equal, the speakers should dispute but not quarrel, and so be esteemed rather than praised, and the hearers would then be gladdened, as by learning, rather than pleased, as by eating (336d–337c; see εὐδοκιμέω; ἡδονή). In the *Laches* the joke is the same as in the *Charmides*: Socrates tells Laches that Nicias' distinctions come from

Damon, the music teacher and Socrates' companion, who spends much time with Prodicus, and Laches answers that such subtleties suit a sophist better than a man the city thinks fit to lead it (197d).

Other ancient sources

Hesiod's own verb is the farmer's. The *Works and Days* bids Hesiod's brother Perses "work", ἐργάζευ, so that hunger may hate him and Demeter love him, and to "work work upon work" if he wants wealth (see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος).[121] Critias' distinction gives the verb a meaning the poem does not need: in Hesiod working is honourable because it is labour on the land, in Critias because it is fine and beneficial.

Translation in this edition

"Nor working and making either" for οὐδέ γε τὸ ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν (163b3), the articular infinitives turned into English verbal nouns. The edition renders the family consistently through the passage: "make" and "making" for ποιεῖν and ποίησις, "work", "working", "workings" for ἐργάζεσθαι and ἐργασία, "works" for ἔργα, and "do", "doing", "doings" for πράττειν and πρᾶξις.

See also

διορίζομαι; ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐργάζομαι; ἐργασία; ἔργον; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; εὐδοκιμέω; ἡδονή; Ἡσίοδος; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; ποίημα; Πρόδικος.

[121] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 299–311 and 381–382.

ἐργάζομαι · work, work at

Working at one's own, Hesiod's verb, and the expertly made · Charmides

ἐργάζεσθαι, *ergazesthai*, "working at", "working"; εἰργασμένα, *eirgasmena*, "(expertly) made"

At a Glance

The word. To work, labour; to work at a trade or the land; to make or produce by work.

In the *Charmides*. Four times. The absurd law would have each man keep his hands off others' things and be "working at and doing his own" (162a); Critias separates "working and making" and argues that Hesiod could not have called the lowly trades "'works', and 'working' and 'doing'" and still said they were no disgrace (163b); in the dream all our possessions "would be expertly made for us" (173c).

In this edition. "Working at", "working", "made".

A place to read. 161e–163c.

Meaning

The verb belongs to ἔργον, "work" (see ἔργον). It is the ordinary word for the labour of the farmer and the craftsman, for working metal, wool or wood, and for working at a trade for pay; with an object it can mean to make, to produce. Its compound ἀπεργάζεσθαι, "to produce, to finish", names the product of a craft, and the dialogue uses both (see ἀπεργάζομαι).

Use in the book

Socrates introduces the verb. Testing the formula "doing one's own business", he asks whether a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to make his own cloak, shoes, oil-flask and strigil, "keeping his hands off what belongs to others and working at and doing his own" (162a; see ἀλλότριος; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The pairing of working with doing lets him treat every productive act as a doing, so that the craftsman who makes another's shoes does another's business.

Critias takes up Socrates' own pair and splits it. He refers back to it, "if he had called the sort of things you were mentioning just now 'works', and 'working' and 'doing'" (163b), and claims Hesiod's authority for holding that working, unlike making, is always good (see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). The Key Words point out that the Greek at 162a is "working and doing", so that Critias' distinction quotes Socrates' own words back to him.

The last use belongs to the dream. If temperance ruled, "our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us, and much else besides, because we would be using genuine craftsmen" (173b–c; see ἀληθινός; δημιουργός; τεχνικῶς). The working that Critias despised at 163b, the cobbler's, is what the dream promises to perfect, and Socrates' next questions, "About cutting leather?" ... "Working bronze, then?" (173d–e; see ἐπιστημόνως; ἐργασία), keep it in view.

Places to read

Every passage in which the simple verb occurs.

162a A law that made each man work at and do his own things would not make a city well managed.

163b Critias: working is not making; Hesiod would not have called the lowly trades works, working and doing.

173c Under temperance all our possessions would be expertly made for us.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* the city begins from the need of each for the work of others: one man cannot make his own house, food and shoes as well as another who does one thing by nature, so the farmer will not make his own plough, nor the builder his own tools (369e–370d). The founding principle is the opposite of the law Socrates imagines at 161e–162a, under which each man would work at everything that is his own. The edition's note at 172d points to the same passage for the principle "that each should do the one work for which he is suited by nature".

Other ancient sources

Hesiod ends the *Works and Days* with a blessing on the man who works with knowledge: happy and blessed is he who, knowing all these things, does his work, blameless before the immortals, judging the birds and avoiding transgressions.[122] The poem joins knowing, working and happiness in one sentence, which can be read as the order of questions in the *Charmides*' dream, where Socrates grants that knowledge would make us act and live knowledgeably, and asks whether it would make us happy (173d; see εὖ πράττειν).

Translation in this edition

"Working at and doing his own" for ἐργάζεσθαί τε καὶ πράττειν (162a2), and "working" at 163b3 and 163b6, so that Critias quotes Socrates' word; "expertly made" for τεχνικῶς ... εἰργασμένα (173c1), where the perfect passive participle is rendered as the made thing. At 163b6 "you were mentioning" is T and W's ἔλεγες; B has the present λέγεις.

See also

ἀληθινός; ἀλλότριος; ἀπεργάζομαι; δημιουργός; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἐργασία; ἔργον; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; εὖ πράττειν; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τεχνικῶς.

ἐργασία · working

Hesiod's "workings" in Critias' mouth, and the bronze-worker's trade · Charmides

ἐργασίας, *ergasias*, "working", "workings", "working (bronze)"

At a Glance

The word. Work, labour, the practice of a trade; a business, a craft, a workshop.

In the *Charmides*. Three times. Hesiod held "making to be something other than doing and working" (163b), and called makings of the fine and

[122] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 826–828.

beneficial kind "workings and doings" (163c); and Socrates, asking what the knowledgeable man knows about, offers "Working bronze, then?" (173e).

In this edition. "Working", "workings".

A place to read. 163b–c and 173d–e.

Meaning

Ἐργασία is the noun of ἐργάζεσθαι: the doing of work, and the work done (see ἐργάζομαι). It could mean the cultivation of land, the working of a material, a man's trade or business, or the profit from it. Where ἔργον is the work as a thing, ἐργασία is the work as an activity or occupation.

Use in the book

Critias uses the noun twice in his reading of Hesiod: Hesiod held making to be something other than doing and working, and called makings of the fine and beneficial kind "workings and doings" (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποίησις). The noun, which in common speech names a trade, has become a title of honour: a making counts as a working only if it is fine and beneficial. The trades Critias has just named, the cobbler's and the salt-fish seller's, are workings in ordinary Greek and are refused the name in his.

Socrates gives the word back its common sense. Asking what the man who lives knowledgeably must know about, he offers trades: Critias refuses cutting leather (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως), and then the noun's trade: "Working bronze, then?" "Not at all" (173e; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The edition's note at 173d observes that Socrates' lowly examples are "his trademark", and that Critias, "who at 163b put cobblers beside prostitutes, is not amused". The same noun that Critias used for honourable making now names the bronze-worker's craft, and Critias refuses to count it as the knowledge that makes men happy.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

163b–c Hesiod, says Critias, held making to be other than doing and working, and called fine and beneficial makings workings and doings.

173e Knowledgeably about working bronze? Critias says no.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Callicles complains of the same habit: Socrates is always talking of cobblers, fullers, cooks and doctors (491a), and, when Socrates asks him to say whom he does mean, Callicles names those who are wise in the affairs of the city, and brave (491a–b). In the *Apology* the craftsmen Socrates examined knew many fine things he did not, but each thought himself wisest in the greatest matters too (22c–e; see δημιουργός).

Other ancient sources

Critias' contempt had a long pedigree. Herodotus observes that the Thracians, Scythians, Persians, Lydians and nearly all the barbarians hold those who learn the crafts, and their descendants, in less honour than other citizens, and count as noble those freed from handiwork, especially those given to war; all the Greeks have learned this, he says, the Spartans most and the Corinthians least.[123] Xenophon's Socrates himself, in the *Oeconomicus*, calls the so-called mechanical crafts rightly despised, since they ruin the bodies of those who work at them, forcing them to sit indoors and in the shade, weaken their souls, and leave them no leisure for friends or city.[124] In the *Memorabilia*, on the other hand, Xenophon's Socrates persuades Aristarchus, whose free kinswomen have taken refuge in his house, that idleness harms them and working, ἐργασία, helps them, and that they should work wool for a living.[125]

Translation in this edition

"Working" for ἐργασίας (163b9), "workings" for the plural ἐργασίας (163c4), and "Working bronze" for χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας (173e2). At 163b9 the noun stands with πράξεως in Critias' ποίησιν πράξεως καὶ ἐργασίας ἄλλο, "making to be something other than doing and working".

[123] Herodotus 2.167.
[124] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 4.2–3.
[125] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.7.7–12.

See also

δημιουργός; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἐργάζομαι; ἔργον; ποίησις.

ἔργον · work

The work of a craft, from Hesiod's line to the work of benefiting us · Charmides

ἔργον, *ergon*, "work"; ἔργα, *erga*, "works", "actions"; ἔργων, *ergōn*, "works"; ἔργου, *ergou*, "work"

At a Glance

The word. Work: a deed, a task, a labour; the thing produced by labour; and the function proper to a thing.

In the *Charmides*. Seventeen times. Medicine produces health, "a fine work for us" (165d); temperance is asked "what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?" (165e); and the knowledge of good and bad is "the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d).

In this edition. "Work", "works"; "actions" once (159c).

A place to read. 165c–166a and 174c–175b.

Meaning

Ἔργον covers what English divides among "deed", "work" and "function". It is a thing done, as against a word spoken; a piece of labour, as in Homer's ἔργα, the tilled fields (*Iliad* 12.283); the product of a craft, a house or a cloak; and, in philosophy, the work proper to a thing, what it alone or best does. The craft model of the *Charmides* rests on the third sense and slides toward the fourth: every knowledge has a work, and the question is what temperance's is.

Use in the book

The word first gathers the activities on which the argument against quietness and "doing one's own business" rests: "all the actions of the body" are finer done quickly (159c), and "producing, by any craft whatever, any of the

works of craft" is doing something (161e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; τέχνη). Critias then makes it a word of honour, through Hesiod's line that "work is no disgrace": only what is made finely and beneficially is a work (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). Socrates then uses it of the craftsmen, asking whether each must know "when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not" (164b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

The word governs the comparison of 165c–166a. Medicine produces health, "a fine work for us", house-building houses, and temperance, as knowledge of oneself, is asked for its fine work (165d–e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias answers that calculation and geometry have no such work as "a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving" (165e–166a). Socrates concedes the point and moves the question from the work a knowledge produces to the object it is of (166a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός), and the word disappears from the argument for eight pages.

It returns to settle it. The knowledge that benefits is the one "whose work is to benefit us" (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν), and Critias' claim that temperance would benefit by ruling it meets the question whether temperance would then do "the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work" (174e). Health belongs to another craft, and benefit too, since that work had been assigned to another (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). The last use is in the review of concessions, that by knowledge of knowledge one knows "the works of the other kinds of knowledge too" (175b; see ἄλογος). The word that Critias set aside at 166a returns at the end as the question he could not answer.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

159c All the actions of the body are finer done quickly.

161e Producing any of the works of craft is doing something.

163b–c Hesiod's "work is no disgrace"; only what is made finely and beneficially is a work.

164b Must each craftsman know when he will profit from the work he is doing?

165d–166a Medicine produces health, a fine work, and house-building houses; what fine work does temperance produce? Calculation and geometry have no such work.

174d The knowledge of good and bad is the one whose work is to benefit us.

174e Would temperance do the crafts' work, and not each craft its own?

175a The work of benefit was assigned to another craft.

175b By knowledge of knowledge one was granted to know the works of the other kinds of knowledge.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* defines the word. Socrates asks Thrasymachus whether the work of a horse, or of anything, is not what one does with it alone, or best: we see only with eyes and hear only with ears, so these are their works, and a pruning knife does best the work of pruning (352d–353a). Each thing that has a work has a virtue by which it does it well; the soul's work is to manage, rule and deliberate, and to live (353b–d; see εὖ πράττειν). In the second book the city is built on the same idea, each man doing the one work for which he is fitted by nature (370a–c; see ἐργάζομαι).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the same question the hinge of his account of happiness. As the good of a flute-player or a sculptor or any craftsman lies in his work, so the good of man would lie in his, if he has one; and he asks whether the carpenter and the cobbler can have works and actions while man has none and is by nature idle.[126] He finds it in an activity of the soul in accordance with reason, and so with virtue. The *Charmides* asks temperance for its work as Aristotle asks man for his, and its answer, that the knowledge whose work is to benefit is not temperance, leaves the question open that Aristotle answers.

Translation in this edition

"Work" and "works" throughout, with "actions" once, for τὰ τοῦ σώματος ἅπαντα ἔργα, "all the actions of the body" (159c13). The Key Words keep

[126] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, 1097b24–1098a18.

"works" for ἔργα and "work" for ἐργάζεσθαι through 161b–164c, so that the noun and the verb stand together as in the Greek.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἄλογος; ἀπεργάζομαι; ἀποδίδωμι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐργάζομαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; εὖ πράττειν; καλὸν ἔργον; τέχνη.

ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος · work is no disgrace

Hesiod's line, Critias' reading, and the accuser's · Charmides

ἔργον [δ'] οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος, *ergon [d'] ouden einai oneidos*, "work is no disgrace"; ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, *ergon de oudepote ouden oneidos*, "work is never any disgrace"

At a Glance

The word. Hesiod's saying from the *Works and Days*: "Work is no disgrace; idleness is the disgrace."

In the *Charmides*. Twice in Critias' speech. He learned his distinction "from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace" (163b), and Hesiod held "that work is never any disgrace" (163c).

In this edition. "Work is no disgrace", "work is never any disgrace".

A place to read. 163a–d.

Meaning

The line is *Works and Days* 311, in Hesiod's exhortation to Perses to give up quarrelling and work his land. Its sense in the poem is plain: labour is no shame, and the idle man is the one disgraced. The edition's note at 163b gives the whole line. The word ἔργον in it is the farmer's labour, and ὄνειδος is reproach, the thing a man is taunted with.

Use in the book

Critias turns the line into an argument about words. If Hesiod had called every trade a work, he could not have said that it was "no disgrace to anyone

to cobble shoes, or to sell salt fish, or to sit in a brothel"; so Hesiod must have reserved the name: "a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but ... work is never any disgrace" (163b–c; see ἐνίοτε; ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). The saying, which in the poem praised labour, now excludes the labouring trades from the class of works. From it Critias draws his conclusion, that Hesiod regarded only fine and beneficial things as appropriate to one, everything harmful as belonging to others, and so called the man who does his own business temperate (163c; see ἀλλότριος; οἰκεῖος).

The reading is Critias' own, and the dialogue lets it stand only long enough to turn it into a definition. Socrates sets aside the distinction of words, as Prodicus' kind (163d; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν), and asks for the thing meant: the doing of good things (163e). The line has served to move the formula "doing one's own business" from what belongs to one to what is good.

Places to read

The passage in which the line is cited.

163b Critias learned from Hesiod that work is no disgrace; Hesiod would not have called the lowly trades works.

163c A thing made may become a disgrace, but work never; Hesiod called fine and beneficial makings works.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports the same line in the charges against Socrates. The accuser, he says, claimed that Socrates chose the worst passages of the most famous poets to teach his companions to be criminals and tyrants, among them Hesiod's "work is no disgrace, idleness is the disgrace", which, the accuser said, Socrates explained as meaning that the poet bids one refrain from no work, unjust or shameful, but do even these for gain. Xenophon answers that Socrates agreed that being a worker is beneficial and good and being idle harmful and bad, and said that those who do something good are working and are good workers, while those who gamble or do anything else wicked

and harmful he called idle; on that view the line is right.[127] The edition's note at 163b points out that this "reply gives Socrates Critias' reading, that only doing good counts as working". On Xenophon's account the reading the *Charmides* gives to Critias was Socrates' own defence, and the reading the accuser imputed to Socrates was the one Critias refused.

In the poem the line stands among others that the *Charmides* also knows. A few lines below it Hesiod says that modesty is no good escort for a man in need, a near twin of the Homeric line Socrates quotes at 161a (see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ), and that it is better to turn one's foolish heart from other men's possessions to work.[128]

Translation in this edition

"Work is no disgrace" for ἔργον [δ'] οὐδὲν εἶναι ὄνειδος (163b4–5), in indirect speech after ὃς ἔφη; "work is never any disgrace" for ἔργον δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν ὄνειδος (163c2). At 163b4 Burnet brackets the particle δ', which Hesiod's line has and Plato's indirect construction does not need, following Stephanus, who proposed deleting either the particle or εἶναι.

See also

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἀλλότριος; ἐνίοτε; ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον; Ἡσίοδος; οἰκεῖος.

ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν · the work of benefiting us

The work assigned to the knowledge of good and bad · Charmides

ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς, *ergon estin to ōphelein hēmas*, "whose work is to benefit us"

At a Glance

The word. A work defined not by a product but by an effect: to benefit.

[127] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.56–57.
[128] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 311–319.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d).

In this edition. "Whose work is to benefit us".

A place to read. 174b–175a.

Meaning

The phrase joins the craft model's word for a product, ἔργον, to the verb that the second half of the dialogue has made its question, ὠφελεῖν, "to benefit" (see ἔργον). Medicine's work is health, house-building's a house; the knowledge named here has as its work not a thing but the benefiting of us by all the others. The construction, an articular infinitive as subject, with ἔργον as predicate, is the normal way to say what a thing's business is.

Use in the book

The phrase comes at the end of the elimination of 174a–d. The knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy is the one by which he knows good and bad, and without it medicine still heals and weaving still clothes, but nothing is done well and beneficially (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Socrates draws the conclusion: "But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d), knowledge not of kinds of knowledge but of good and bad (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη). The benefit that temperance was supposed to bring, ever since the question of 169b whether such a knowledge would benefit us (see ὠφελέω), has been given a home of its own.

The assignment is then used against Critias. When he claims that temperance, presiding over the other kinds of knowledge, would benefit us by ruling this one (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω), Socrates answers that temperance would then do each craft's work, and that they had declared it knowledge of nothing else. Health belongs to another craft, and so does benefit: "Nor of benefit either, then, my friend; for we just now assigned this work in turn to another craft, didn't we?" (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι). The work of benefiting, once assigned, cannot be shared, and temperance is left the craftsman of no benefit (see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The phrase can be read as the place

where the craft model, refused by Critias at 165e, returns and decides the argument.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with its sequel.

174d The knowledge whose work is to benefit us is not temperance, but the knowledge of good and bad.

175a The work of benefit was assigned to another craft.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* uses the same form of argument for the just man. It is not the work of heat to cool, Socrates says, nor of dryness to moisten, but of their opposites; nor, then, of the good to harm, and so it is not the work of the just man to harm anyone, friend or other (335d). A work, on this account, follows from the nature of the thing whose work it is. In the *Hippias Major* Socrates and Hippias try the beautiful as the beneficial: the beneficial is what makes good, and what makes is the cause; but the cause is other than what it causes, so the beautiful would be the cause of the good and not itself good, which they cannot accept (296e–297c).

Translation in this edition

"The knowledge whose work is to benefit us" for ἧς ἔργον ἐστὶν τὸ ὠφελεῖν ἡμᾶς (174d3–4), the relative, which has no antecedent in the Greek, given one in "the knowledge". "This work" at 175a4 renders τοῦτο τὸ ἔργον, the work of benefit just named.

See also

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἀποδίδωμι; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἔργον; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ὠφελέω.

ἐρευνάω · search

ἐρευνῶν, *ereunōn*, "(your) search"; διερευνῴμην, *diereunōimēn*, "(I would) scrutinize"

Attested: ἐρευνῶν (*ereunōn*; 166b); the compound διερευνῴμην (*diereunōimēn*; 166d). To search, track, seek out, a word Homer uses of a lion and of hounds following a trail (*Iliad* 18.321; *Odyssey* 19.436). Critias uses it of Socrates: "There it is, Socrates ... Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others" (166b, on H. Richards' conjecture τὸ ᾧ and T's πασῶν, "all"; see διαφέρω; ζητέω). Socrates answers with the compound: he refutes Critias, he says, for the same reason as he scrutinizes himself (166c–d; see διερευνάω; ἐλέγχω; ἐπιτήδειος). The searching turns inward. In the *Apology* the verb stands beside ζητῶ for Socrates' service to the god (23b; see διερευνάω; ζητέω).

See also διαφέρω; διερευνάω; ἐλέγχω; ἐπιτήδειος; ζητέω.

ἕρμαιον · godsend

Ἕρμαιον, *hermaion*, "a godsend"

Attested: Ἕρμαιον (*hermaion*; 157c). A gift of Hermes, the god of luck and of lucky finds: anything found by chance on the road, and so a windfall. The edition's note at 157d explains: "A hermaion is a windfall, a lucky find sent by Hermes. Critias' joke is that a headache will drive the boy to improve his mind 'on account of his head'." Critias says it on hearing that the remedy will not be given without the charm: "Why, Socrates, this trouble with his head will turn out to be a godsend for the young man, if on account of his head he is going to be forced to improve his mind as well" (157c–d; see ἀναγκάζω; ἀσθένεια; διάνοια). In the *Symposium* Alcibiades uses the word of the chance he thought Socrates' interest in his beauty had given him, a godsend and a wonderful piece of luck (217a); in the *Phaedo* Socrates says

that if death were the end of everything it would be a godsend for the wicked, rid at once of the body and of their own wickedness (107c).

See also ἀναγκάζω; ἀσθένεια; διάνοια.

ἔρως · love

Love, whose object is the beautiful, in the procession of powers · Charmides

ἔρωτα, *erōta*, "love"; ἔρως, *erōs*, "love"; ἐρώτων, *erōtōn*, "(the other) loves"

At a Glance

The word. Love as desire: passionate longing, especially for a beautiful person; and the god Eros.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in one question, whether there is "a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful" (167e; see ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων).

In this edition. "Love", "loves".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

Ἔρως is the noun of ἐρᾶν, "to love, to desire" (see ἐράω), and names desire at its most intense, above all the desire roused by bodily beauty; personified, it is the god, the child or companion of Aphrodite. Xenophon's Socrates says that people call a strong desire love, as they call a great derangement madness.[129] In Plato the noun is the subject of the whole *Symposium* and of the three speeches of the *Phaedrus*, and in both its object is the beautiful.

Use in the book

The dialogue begins in love and only names it late. Its opening is full of lovers, gazing and burning (154a–155e; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐραστής), and Socrates calls Cydias "the wisest of men in the ways of love", τὰ ἐρωτικά (155d; see εὐλαβέομαι). The noun itself waits until the argument, where it is one of the powers that Socrates lines up beside knowledge to test whether

[129] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.7.

anything can be of itself and not of its proper object (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). Love comes third among the desires of the soul, after desire and wish, each with its object: "a desire which is desire for no pleasure", "a wish which wishes for no good", and "a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful" (167e; see βούλησις; ἐπιθυμία).

The object is assumed, not argued. The edition's note at 167e says so, and finds the *Symposium* starting from the same assumption; its remark that a love of no beautiful thing is a pointed joke after the prologue is taken up under τὸ καλόν.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

167e Is there a love which is love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves? Critias says no.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Symposium* argues from the *Charmides*' assumption to a conclusion the *Charmides* does not draw. Agathon has said that the affairs of the gods were set in order through love of beautiful things, "for there would be no love of ugly ones", and Socrates gets him to agree that love is of beauty, and that one desires what one lacks; so love lacks beauty and is not beautiful, and since good things are beautiful, it lacks good things too (201a–c; see ἐπιθυμία). Diotima then changes the question from the beautiful to the good, and so to happiness (204d–205a; see εὐδαίμων). In the *Phaedrus* Socrates begins his first speech from the agreement that love is a kind of desire (237d; see ἐπιθυμία). In the *Lysis* the boys are brought to the conclusion that love, friendship and desire are, it seems, of what is akin, οἰκεῖον (221e–222a).

Other ancient sources

Hesiod made Eros one of the first powers of the world: after Chaos came Earth, and Eros, the most beautiful among the immortal gods, who loosens the limbs and subdues the mind of all gods and men.[130] The *Charmides*

[130] Hesiod, *Theogony* 116–122.

assumes the opposite relation, love as of the beautiful rather than itself the most beautiful, and the *Symposium* makes the point against Agathon.

Aristotle gives love a cosmic place in another way. The first mover moves without being moved, as the object of desire and thought moves: it moves as being loved, ὡς ἐρώμενον, and the other things, moved, move the rest.[131] The beautiful, on this account, is not only what love is of; it is the cause of all motion. The *Charmides*' "love of nothing beautiful" can be read as the limit case that Aristotle's account excludes, a love with no object to move it.

Translation in this edition

"Love" for ἔρως and its accusative Ἔρωτα, and "the other loves" for τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων (167e7–8), so that the plural stands as strangely in English as in Greek. At 167e8 B has καλοῦμεν, "we call", for καλοῦ μέν, "of (nothing) beautiful", which Burnet prints from T and W; and the closing "he said" is Burnet's ἔφη, from later manuscripts, where B, T and W have ἔφην, "I said".

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀποδύω; βούλησις; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐπιθυμία; ἐραστής; ἐράω; ἔρως αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; εὐδαίμων; εὐλαβέομαι; καλός.

ἔρως αὑτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων · love of itself and of the other loves

A love with no beautiful object, refused at once · Charmides

ἔρως … αὑτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων, *erōs … hautou de kai tōn allōn erōtōn*, "love … of itself and of the other loves"

At a Glance

The word. A love whose objects would be itself and other loves, and no beautiful thing.

[131] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 12.7, 1072a26–b4.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?" "No," he said, "I wouldn't" (167e).

In this edition. "Love ... of itself and of the other loves".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

The phrase applies to love the formula that Critias gave knowledge, "of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e; compare 166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The reflexive αὑτοῦ is masculine because ἔρως is, and its genitive is the object, as in "love of the beautiful". The point of the construction is the trade it makes: love's proper object, the beautiful, is removed, and love itself and other loves are put in its place.

Use in the book

The case is the last of the soul's desires in Socrates' procession, after a desire for no pleasure and a wish for no good, and before fear and opinion (167e–168a); the procession as a whole is told under αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς. Critias refuses it without hesitation: "No ... I wouldn't." The refusal is as quick as the others, and the reason is plain: love without the beautiful is, as the edition's note at 167e puts it, "a contradiction as well as a joke".

The principle that Socrates puts as a question at 168d explains why. Whatever "has its own power in relation to itself" must "also have the character toward which its power was directed" (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Applied to love, a love that loved itself would have to be itself beautiful. Socrates does not draw this consequence. The *Symposium* draws it the other way: since love desires the beautiful, it lacks beauty and is not beautiful (201b; see ἔρως); a love of itself would then have to be the one thing that, on this account, love is not: beautiful. The case can be read as one where the *Charmides*' principle and the *Symposium*'s doctrine together make the reflexive impossible.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the cases on either side of it.

167e A desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful but of itself and of the other loves: Critias refuses each.

168a A fear of no dreadful thing, an opinion of no object of opinion; and yet knowledge of the same kind is claimed.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Phaedrus* finds a love turned back on itself, but only through another. When the beloved has been filled with the stream of beauty that flowed from him into the lover and back again, he loves, but does not know what; he neither knows what has happened to him nor can say; like a man who has caught an eye disease from another, he can give no reason for it, and he does not notice that he is seeing himself in his lover as in a mirror; what he has, Socrates says, is a counter-love, ἀντέρως, an image of love, which he calls and thinks friendship rather than love (255c–e). The love returns to the self only by way of the other, as the eye in the *First Alcibiades* sees itself only in another eye (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Self-love in the ordinary sense, the man who is his own friend, is told under ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ (*Laws* 731d–732b).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle asks whether one should love oneself most, and answers that the word "self-lover", φίλαυτος, is used as a reproach of those who grab the larger share of money, honours and bodily pleasures, but that the good man is a lover of self in another sense, since he assigns himself the finest things and gratifies the ruling part of himself.[132] On his account self-love has an object: the best in oneself.

Plotinus gives the reflexive love to the highest principle. The One, he says, is at once lovable and love, and love of himself, since he is beautiful from nothing but himself and in himself.[133] The *Charmides* refuses a love of itself because love must be of the beautiful; Plotinus grants it to the one being that

[132] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 9.8, 1168a28–1169b2.

[133] Plotinus, *Enneads* 6.8.15.

is itself the source of beauty. Read beside 168d, his answer meets the condition the principle sets: what loves itself must itself be lovely.

Translation in this edition

"Love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves" for ἔρως καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός, αὐτοῦ δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων (167e8), the μέν … δέ rendered by "but", as in the cases of desire and wish just before. For the readings at 167e8 and 167e9 see ἔρως.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; βούλησις αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων βουλήσεων; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτοῦ; ἔρως.

ἐρωτάω · ask

ἠρώτων, *ērōtōn*, "(everyone had a different) question", "(I was asking"; ἀνηρώτων, *anērōtōn*, "I asked"; ἐρωτήσων, *erōtēsōn*, "(with a) question"; ἐρωτήσαντος, *erōtēsantos*, "(when he) asked"; ἐρωτώμενα, *erōtōmena*, "what he had been asked"; ἐρωτᾷς, *erōtāis*, "you are asking"; ἐρωτῶ, *erōtō*, "I ask"; ἐρωτηθέντα, *erōtēthenta*, "(if you are) asked"; ἐρωτώμενον, *erōtōmenon*, "(answer) the question"

Attested: ἠρώτων (*ērōtōn*; 153d, 162e), ἐρωτήσων (*erōtēsōn*; 155d), ἐρωτήσαντος (*erōtēsantos*; 155e), ἐρωτώμενα (*erōtōmena*; 158d), ἐρωτᾷς (*erōtāis*; 159b), ἐρωτῶ (*erōtō*; 165b), ἐρωτηθέντα (*erōtēthenta*; 165d), ἐρωτώμενον (*erōtōmenon*; 166d); the compound ἀνηρώτων (*anērōtōn*; 153d; see ἀνερωτάω); and, from ἔρομαι, ἀνέροιτο (*aneroito*; 153d), "whatever anyone asked", T's reading, where B has ἂν ἔροιτο. To ask, to question; the second aorist ἠρόμην, from ἔρομαι, commonly serves as its aorist beside ἠρώτησα (ἐρωτήσαντος, 155e), as in ἔροιο, "if you were to ask" (165c, 165d). The dialogue opens with questions asked of Socrates about the battle, "and everyone had a different question", and with his own questions in turn about philosophy and the young (153d). The boy was "just getting under way with

a question" when Socrates saw inside his cloak and was on fire (155d), and Charmides found it not easy either to agree or to deny "what he had been asked" (158c–d; see ἔξαρνος). In the argument the verb marks the roles. Socrates protests, "you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask" (165b; see ζητέω); he says that Critias, if asked, ought to be able to answer on behalf of temperance what fine work it produces (165d–e; see ἀποκρίνομαι; καλὸν ἔργον); and he tells him to "answer the question as it seems to you" and let go of who is refuted (166d; see ἔα χαίρειν).

See also ἀνερωτάω; ἀποκρίνομαι; ἔα χαίρειν; ἔξαρνος; ζητέω; καλὸν ἔργον.

ἑταῖρος · friend

ὦ ἑταῖρε, *ō hetaire*, "my friend"

Attested: ὦ ἑταῖρε (*ō hetaire*; 154b, 161e, 167c, 175a). A companion, comrade, friend; in the vocative, the ordinary address between friends. The first use is the narrator's, to the unnamed friend to whom Socrates tells the story: "Now I, my friend, am no measure of anything" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη). Elsewhere the narrator addresses him as ὦ φίλε (155c) and ὦ γεννάδα, "my noble friend" (155d). In the dialogue Socrates uses ἑταῖρε once to Charmides, "Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving ... are surely doing something" (161e), and twice to Critias, at a turn in the argument, "Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend" (167c; see ἄτοπος), and at its end, "Nor of benefit either, then, my friend" (175a; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). The friend of the frame never speaks, and the dialogue is told to him from beginning to end. In the *Symposium* Pausanias names the boys' agemates and companions, ἑταῖροι, among those who reproach a boy seen talking with a lover (183c; see ἐραστής).

See also ἄτοπος; ἐραστής; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; λευκὴ στάθμη.

ἕτερος · other

ἕτερον, *heteron*, "something other"; ἑτέρου, *heterou*, "(something) other"; ἑτέρα, *hetera*, "different"; ἑτέρας, *heteras*, "the other (house)"

Attested: in the sense "other than", "different from", ἑτέρου (*heterou*; 166a), ἕτερον (*heteron*; 166b twice), ἑτέρα (*hetera*; 171a); also τῆς ἑτέρας, "the other (house)" (158a), and the idiom δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα, "one of two things" (160b; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα). Ἕτερος is "the other of two", and so "other than, different from". The word carries the axiom of 166a–b: the odd and the even, Critias agrees, are "something other than calculation itself", the heavy and the light "something other than weighing itself", and so Socrates asks, "Tell me, then: what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?" (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; λογιστική; στατική). Critias answers that here temperance differs from the rest: the others are knowledge of something else and not of themselves, but it alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself (166b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς). The word returns when the argument tests medicine: "medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). In Greek, as the axiom requires, a knowledge is set apart from the others by the other thing it is of.

See also δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; λογιστική; στατική.

εὖ ἔχω · be in good condition, be well

The healthy condition of the part, which depends on the whole · Charmides

εὖ ἔχειν, *eu echein*, "to be in good condition", "to be well"

At a Glance

The word. To be well, to be in a good state; the ordinary phrase for health, prosperity and anything in order.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in the doctrine of the whole. Doctors must treat the head "if the eyes too are to be in good condition" (156b–c); and when the whole is not in good condition "the part cannot possibly be well" (156e).

In this edition. "Be in good condition", "be well".

A place to read. 156b–157a.

Meaning

Ἔχειν with an adverb means "to be in a certain state": εὖ ἔχειν, "to be well", κακῶς ἔχειν, "to be ill", καλῶς ἔχειν, "to be in good order" (see ἔχειν καλῶς). It is the common phrase of medicine and of greetings, and it lies behind the noun εὐεξία, "good condition", the athlete's and the healthy man's state. The phrase names a condition rather than an act: one does not do well, one is well.

Use in the book

Socrates gives the phrase in the good doctors' principle. When someone comes to them with sore eyes, they say that they must treat the head as well, "if the eyes too are to be in good condition" (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ). The condition of the part depends on the treatment of a larger whole.

The Thracian's doctrine repeats it one step higher. Zalmoxis says that most diseases elude the Greek doctors because they neglect the whole (Burnet's text; see ἀμελέω), and when the whole is not in good condition "the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see ἐπιμέλεια; Ζάλμοξις). The first half of that clause uses καλῶς ἔχειν, the second εὖ ἔχειν, and the edition there renders the two by "be in good condition" and "be well" (see ἔχειν καλῶς). Everything bad and good flows from the soul (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω), so the part's being well can be read as depending, in the end, on the soul. The phrase is medicine's, and the doctrine extends it to virtue: temperance, coming to be in the soul, makes it easy to provide health for the head (157a).

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

156b–c The head must be treated with the eyes, if the eyes too are to be in good condition.

156e When the whole is not in good condition, the part cannot possibly be well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* gives the soul the vocabulary of the body's good state. Producing health, Socrates says, is establishing the parts of the body in their natural relation of ruling and being ruled, and producing justice is doing the same in the soul; so virtue would be a kind of health and beauty and good condition, εὐεξία, of the soul, and vice its disease, ugliness and weakness (444c–e). The *Charmides*' doctrine, that the body is well only if the soul is, is there turned into a definition of the soul's own wellness.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes the noun of the same verb, ἕξις, "state", from ἔχειν, and defines one of its senses as a disposition by which what is disposed is disposed well or badly, either in itself or in relation to something else; health, he says, is such a state.[134] The verb of the phrase at 156c and 156e, ἔχειν, is the root of ἕξις, the word Aristotle will use for virtue as a settled state (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.5, 1106a10–12).

Translation in this edition

"To be in good condition" for εὖ ἔχειν at 156c1 and "be well" at 156e6, where the phrase follows μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος, "when the whole is not in good condition", so that within that clause the English keeps the two adverbs apart; at 156c1, with no καλῶς beside it, εὖ ἔχειν is "be in good condition", as καλῶς ἔχειν is at 156e5 and 157a3.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀμελέω; ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιρρέω; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ; ἔχειν καλῶς; Ζάλμοξις.

[134] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.20, 1022b10–14.

εὖ πέφυκα · be well made by nature

The boy's nature, the question Socrates puts before the argument begins · Charmides

εὖ πεφυκώς, *eu pephykōs*, "(in fact) well made"; ἱκανῶς πέφυκας, *hikanōs pephykas*, "(you are) well enough endowed"; πέφυκεν, *pephyken*, "is by nature"

At a Glance

The word. To be well formed by nature, gifted, of good natural parts; the perfect of φύομαι, "to grow, to be born".

In the *Charmides*. Once with εὖ: Socrates calls the boy invincible "if where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made" (154e). The same perfect returns at 158b, "if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest".

In this edition. "Well made", "well enough endowed".

A place to read. 154d–155a and 157e–158c.

Meaning

Πέφυκα, the perfect of φύομαι, "to be born, to grow", means "to be by nature": what one has grown into, as against what one has been taught or has chosen. Εὖ πεφυκώς is "well grown, of a good nature", said of plants, bodies and minds; the adjective εὐφυής, "naturally gifted", is its companion. The perfect also serves as a plain "is by nature", as when Critias says that the knowledge he is defining "is not by nature like" the others (165e).

Use in the book

The phrase is Socrates' first question about Charmides' soul. Chaerephon has praised the boy's face and figure, and Socrates swears by Heracles that he would be invincible "if he has just one little thing more" (154d; see ἄμαχος; Ἡρακλῆς). Asked what, he answers: "If where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made. And he ought to be, Critias, coming from your family" (154e; see ψυχή). The one little thing is the soul, and the verb asks whether it was born good. Critias answers with the social formula, "he's thoroughly

beautiful and good ... in that respect too" (154e; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός), and Socrates proposes to strip the soul and look (see ἀποδύω).

The perfect returns when the praise of the family is complete. After recounting Charmides' ancestors, Socrates says that he falls short of none of them in looks (Madvig's conjecture, which Burnet prints, as the edition's note at 158b explains), and goes on: "And if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest, then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides ... your mother bore" (158b; see μακάριος). The natural gift is again assumed on Critias' word, and the charm is offered as a test of it (158b–c; see ἐπῳδή). The dialogue never settles whether the boy is well made in soul; Socrates' verdict at the end is conditional, that if he has temperance he is blessed (175e–176a). The phrase can be read as the question the whole dialogue is spent failing to answer about him.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the perfect's return at 158b; its other uses are told under φύω.

154e The boy would be invincible if his soul were also well made.

158b If the boy is well enough endowed for temperance, blessed is the child his mother bore.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* gives the gifted nature a warning. Every seed or plant that lacks its proper nourishment, the stronger it is, falls the further short; so the most gifted souls, badly brought up, become outstandingly bad, for the great wrongs and undiluted villainy come not from a paltry nature but from a spirited one spoiled in the rearing, and a weak nature will never cause anything great, either good or bad (491d–e). The parts of the philosophic nature themselves, when it meets with bad nurture, are in a way the cause of its falling away from philosophy, and so are the so-called goods, wealth and all such equipment; and from such men come those who do the greatest harm to cities and to private men, and the greatest good, if the current happens to carry them that way (495a–b). The reader of the *Charmides*, who knows what became of Critias and Charmides (see βιάζομαι), can read the

passage as their story. In the *Meno* Socrates argues that if the good were good by nature there would be people able to recognise the good natures among the young, and the city would keep them under guard on the acropolis, sealed up more carefully than gold, so that no one could corrupt them (89b). Theodorus' praise of Theaetetus as the best-natured boy he has met is told under δυσμαθία (*Theaetetus* 144a–b).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle sets out the phrase in an objection he means to answer. Someone may say that a man's aim at the end is not of his own choosing: he would have to be born with something like eyesight, to judge finely and pick out what is truly good, and the man so endowed would be well-natured, εὐφυής, since to be well and finely made by nature in this, εὖ καὶ καλῶς πεφυκέναι, would be the full and true good nature. Aristotle answers that on this view virtue would be no more voluntary than vice, and that we are ourselves in some way joint causes of our states.[135] The *Charmides* asks of the boy the question the objection would leave to birth alone, whether his soul was born well; Aristotle will not let birth settle it.

Translation in this edition

"If where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made" for Εἰ τὴν ψυχήν ... τυγχάνει εὖ πεφυκώς (154e1), with "in fact" for τυγχάνει; "well enough endowed" for ἱκανῶς πέφυκας (158b3), T's reading, where B has πεφυκυίας, with "for temperance and the rest" following T and W, where B has καὶ πόρρωθεν σωφροσύνην καὶ; "is not by nature like" for οὐ ... ὁμοία ... πέφυκεν (165e3–4); "is by nature able to have" for πέφυκεν ἔχειν (169a4). In that last line Burnet brackets πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, "except knowledge", after Schleiermacher.

See also

ἄμαχος; ἀποδύω; βιάζομαι; δυσμαθία; ἐπῳδή; Ἡρακλῆς; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; μακάριος; φύω; ψυχή.

[135] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 3.5, 1114a31–b25.

εὖ πράττειν · do well

Acting well and faring well, the step from knowledge to happiness · Charmides

καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, *kalōs kai eu prattein*, "do finely and well"; εὖ πράττοντας, *eu prattontas*, "those who do well"; εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν, *eu an prattoimen*, "we would do well"; τοῦ εὖ πράττειν, *tou eu prattein*, "doing well"; τὸ εὖ πράττειν, *to eu prattein*, "(made us) do well"

At a Glance

The word. To do well: both to act well and to fare well, to prosper; the common Greek for success and good fortune, and a greeting.

In the *Charmides*. Five times. With error removed, those so disposed "must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy" (172a); "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this ... we cannot yet learn" (173d); and the verdict, "it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy" (174b–c).

In this edition. "Do well", "doing well".

A place to read. 171d–172a and 173d–174c.

Meaning

Πράττειν is to do, to act, to bring about; with an adverb it also means to fare. The Key Words of the edition draw the consequence: "Eu prattein, 'to do well', means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper, as English 'do well' also can. The argument about the benefit of temperance rides on the double sense". The phrase was the ordinary word for success, and the letters that go under Plato's name use it as their greeting.

Use in the book

The phrase enters with the picture of a life without error. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, "we would live our lives without error", handing over what we do not know to those who do (171d–e; see ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος); and so "with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy" (172a; see ἡγέομαι). The sentence

makes two steps. The first, from acting without error to acting well, uses the phrase in its sense of acting; the second, from doing well to being happy, uses it in its sense of faring. The edition's note at 172a: "The step from doing well to being happy (eudaimōn) rides on it."

The dream separates the two steps. Socrates grants that under temperance the human race "would act and live knowledgeably", and goes on: "But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὐδαιμονέω). Critias answers, "And yet ... you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d; see ἀτιμάζω), and the question "knowledgeably about what?" leads to the knowledge of good and bad (173d–174b; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The verdict takes the phrase in its full sense: "it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad" (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

With both senses in view, the argument can be read as having a clear shape. The dream grants that knowledge of the crafts would make us act and live knowledgeably (173d); it does not grant that we would do well in either sense, and at 174c–d Socrates adds that without the knowledge of good and bad even each craft's work being "done well and beneficially" would be gone from us. The edition keeps the one English phrase at every place; the Note on this Edition records that "do well" is kept both times at 172a, "so that the reader can see the phrase slide from acting well to faring well".

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

172a With error removed, those so disposed must do finely and well, and those who do well must be happy.

173d That by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, we cannot yet learn; Critias: nothing else crowns doing well.

174b–c It was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, but only the knowledge of good and bad.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato's Socrates uses the same double step in several dialogues, and the edition's note at 172a points to one: in the *Gorgias* the good man does well and finely whatever he does, and the man who does well is blessed and happy (507c; see δίκαιος). In the *First Alcibiades* the steps are spelled out: whoever acts finely does well; those who do well are happy; they are happy through the possession of good things, which they get by doing well and finely; so doing well is good, and well-doing, εὐπραγία, is fine (116b). The *Euthydemus* begins its protreptic with the question whether all men wish to do well, a question too foolish to ask, since no one does not (278e–279a). At the end of the first book of the *Republic* the step is taken from the soul's work: a bad soul rules and cares for things badly and a good soul does all these things well; the just soul lives well, and the one who lives well is blessed and happy (353e–354a; see ἔργον).

In the third of the letters under Plato's name the writer asks whether he should greet Dionysius the younger, tyrant of Syracuse, with the usual "rejoice", χαίρειν, or with his own custom of writing εὖ πράττειν, as he greets his friends; Dionysius, he says, had flattered the god at Delphi with that very word, writing, it is said, "Rejoice, and preserve the tyrant's life of pleasure" (315a–b). The *Charmides* knows the same contrast of greetings at 164d–e, where Critias says the god's word was not "rejoice" but "be temperate" (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; χαίρω).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates parts well-doing from good fortune and keeps the phrase for the first. When someone asked him which pursuit he thought best for a man, his answer was εὐπραξία, well-doing; pressed on whether he counted good fortune, εὐτυχία, a pursuit as well, he said that chance and action were complete opposites: to light on something one needs without looking for it is good fortune, whereas well-doing is doing a thing well because one has learned it and worked at it, and those who make that their business are, in his view, the ones who do well. The best and dearest to the gods, he said, are those who do well in farming the work of farming, in

medicine the work of medicine, in politics the work of politics.[136] For Xenophon's Socrates the knowledgeable craftsman does well; the *Charmides* asks whether that is enough to fare well.

Aristotle reports that most people and the refined agree in calling the highest good happiness, and suppose that living well and doing well are the same as being happy, though they dispute what happiness is.[137] The identification that the *Charmides* questions was, on his account, common ground.

Translation in this edition

"Do finely and well" for καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν and "those who do well" for τοὺς ... εὖ πράττοντας (172a1–3); "do well" for εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν (173d4); "crowns doing well" for τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν (173d6–7), where τέλος is "end" or "crown"; and "made us do well" for τὸ εὖ πράττειν ... ποιοῦν (174b12–c1). At 172a1–2 Burnet prints καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον, an order found in neither family: T and W read ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν, and B repeats part of the phrase, καλῶς πράττειν ἀναγκαῖον καλῶς καὶ εὖ πράττειν; the sense is the same.

See also

ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀτιμάζω; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; δίκαιος; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἔργον; εὐδαιμονέω; εὐδαίμων; ἡγέομαι; χαίρω.

εὐδαιμονέω · be happy

Being happy, which knowledge of the crafts does not secure · Charmides

εὐδαιμονοῖμεν, *eudaimonoimen*, "(we would) be happy"; εὐδαιμονεῖν, *eudaimonein*, "be happy"

At a Glance

The word. To be happy, to prosper, to have a life that goes well as a whole.

[136] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.14–15.
[137] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4, 1095a17–20.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, each time joined to "do well": "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this … we cannot yet learn" (173d); "it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy" (174b–c).

In this edition. "Be happy".

A place to read. 173d–174d.

Meaning

The verb belongs to εὐδαίμων, "happy", and names the condition as an activity or state one is in. The edition's Key Words gloss the two together, εὐδαίμων as "happy" and εὐδαιμονεῖν as "to be happy" (see εὐδαίμων). In the *Charmides* it is always paired with εὖ πράττειν, "to do well", and the pairing shows the question: whether acting well makes a life go well (see εὖ πράττειν).

Use in the book

The verb marks the limit of what the dream can grant. Socrates allows that under temperance the human race would act and live knowledgeably, but not yet that by so acting "we would do well and be happy" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν). The verdict of 174b–c answers with the same pair: it was not living knowledgeably that "made us do well and be happy", but only the knowledge of good and bad (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The next sentences say what is lost without that knowledge: medicine still heals and weaving still clothes, but the doing of each well and beneficially is gone (174c–d; see ἀπολείπω). The passage can be read as separating the products of the crafts from their being done well and beneficially, and so as anticipating the distinction between having and using that the *Euthydemus* draws; only the knowledge of good and bad secures the second (see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

173d That by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, we cannot yet learn.

174b–c Not living knowledgeably, but only the knowledge of good and bad, made us do well and be happy.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus* gives the argument that 174c–d presupposes. Socrates reminds Clinias that they had agreed that if many goods were present to them they would be happy and do well; but would they be happy through the goods they have if these did not benefit them? If a man had plenty of food and did not eat, or a carpenter had all his tools and wood and did not work, would the having benefit him? No: one who is to be happy must not only possess such goods but use them, and use them rightly, since wrong use is worse than leaving them alone (280b–281a). The knowledge that directs right use is told under ἐπιστημόνως (281a–b).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the same distinction between having and using the centre of his account. Whether the best is taken to lie in having or in using, he says, in a settled state or in its exercise, matters a good deal: the state can be there and bring about nothing good, as in someone asleep, whereas the exercise cannot, since it must issue in action, and in good action. At the games at Olympia the crowns are won by those who enter the contests, not by the best-looking or the strongest who merely stand by; so too the fine and good things of life are won by those who act rightly.[138] The *Charmides* asks what makes the activity good; Aristotle's answer, activity of the soul in accordance with virtue, can be read as resting on the virtue whose definition the *Charmides* fails to find.

Translation in this edition

"Be happy" for εὐδαιμονοῖμεν (173d4) and for εὐδαιμονεῖν (174c1), each time after "do well", so that the English pair matches the Greek pair εὖ πράττειν καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν.

See also

ἀπολείπω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; εὖ πράττειν; εὐδαιμονία; εὐδαίμων.

[138] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8, 1098b31–1099a7.

εὐδαιμονία · happiness

What goes by the name of happiness in the praise of the boy's family · Charmides

εὐδαιμονίᾳ, *eudaimoniāi*, "happiness"

At a Glance

The word. Happiness, prosperity, a flourishing life; literally, the state of having a good δαίμων, a good guardian spirit or lot.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the praise of Charmides' ancestors: the house of Critias son of Dropides has come down "celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness" (157e–158a).

In this edition. "Happiness".

A place to read. 157d–158b.

Meaning

The noun is formed from εὐ-, "well", and δαίμων, the divine power that allots a man his portion: the εὐδαίμων is one whose lot is good. In ordinary Greek it meant prosperity and success, wealth, family, health and honour, the visible goods of a life; philosophy took over the word and asked what such a life really consisted in. The edition's Key Words gloss the adjective as naming a life that goes well as a whole (see εὐδαίμων).

Use in the book

The one use of the noun is conventional, and can be read as ironic. Socrates tells Charmides that it is only right he should excel the others, since no one could easily point to two houses in Athens likely to produce finer and better offspring than the two he is sprung from. His father's side has come down "celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness", and his mother's side is no different, with his uncle Pyrilampes, thought the handsomest and biggest man on the continent (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; ἤπειρος; κάλλος). The phrase "goes by the name of", λεγομένη, keeps

the word at arm's length: happiness here is what people call happiness, the reputation of a great house.

The praise ends with a condition. If the boy is also "well enough endowed for temperance and the rest", then blessed is the child his mother bore; if temperance is already present, he needs no charm (158b; see εὖ πέφυκα; μακάριος). The happiness of the house is beauty, virtue and repute as the poets sang them; the dialogue's question is whether the boy has temperance, which the argument fails to show beneficial and which Socrates, at the close, still calls "a great good" (175e). At 176a he says that, if Charmides has temperance, he should think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate (see εὐδαίμων). The noun of 158a can be read as the conventional happiness against which the dialogue sets the real one.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

157e–158a The boy's paternal house is celebrated by Anacreon, Solon and other poets for beauty, virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus* lists the goods that ordinary opinion counts as making a man happy: wealth, health, beauty and the body's other goods, good birth, power and honours in one's own city, and then temperance, justice, courage and wisdom; Socrates adds good fortune, and then shows that wisdom makes good fortune superfluous (279a–280b; see εὐδαιμονέω). In the *Gorgias* Socrates places all happiness in education and justice (470e; see εὐδαίμων).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus tells the founding story of the question, and its teller is the Solon whom 157e–158a names among the poets of the boy's house. When King Croesus of Lydia, showing his treasures, asked him whom he had seen as the most blessed of men, Solon named Tellus, an Athenian who lived in a prosperous city, saw his children and grandchildren grow up, and died gloriously in battle; then the Argive brothers Cleobis and Biton, to whom he gave second place in happiness, εὐδαιμονίη; and when Croesus angrily asked

whether his own happiness counted for nothing, Solon answered that no man should be called blessed before his death, but only fortunate.[139]

Aristotle grants that happiness also has need of goods from outside: fine actions are out of reach, or hard to manage, for a man without the means, since much is done through friends, wealth and political power as through instruments; and to be without certain goods, such as good birth, good children and beauty, tarnishes blessedness, for no one who is hideous to look at, or low-born, or living alone without children, is altogether happy.[140] Beauty and good birth, two of the goods of 158a, are on his list; the *Charmides* places them under "what goes by the name of happiness" and goes on to ask about the soul.

Translation in this edition

"Everything else that goes by the name of happiness" for καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ λεγομένῃ εὐδαιμονίᾳ (158a1), "goes by the name of" rendering the participle λεγομένῃ.

See also

ἀρετή; εὖ πέφυκα; εὐδαιμονέω; εὐδαίμων; ἤπειρος; κάλλος; μακάριος; Σόλων.

εὐδαίμων · happy

The happy man, whom knowledge was supposed to make, and the temperate boy · Charmides

εὐδαίμονας, *eudaimonas*, "happy"; εὐδαίμονα, *eudaimona*, "happy", "the happy man"; εὐδαίμονες, *eudaimones*, "happy"; εὐδαιμονέστερον, *eudaimonesteron*, "happier"

At a Glance

The word. Happy, prosperous, blessed with a good lot; the adjective of εὐδαιμονία.

[139] Herodotus 1.30–32.
[140] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.8, 1099a31–b8.

In the *Charmides*. Six times. "Those who do well must be happy" (172a); "we are no longer holding to the argument ... that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy" (173e); "which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy?" (174a); and Socrates' last advice to the boy: "For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard ... yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" (176a).

In this edition. "Happy", "the happy man", "happier".

A place to read. 173d–174b and 175e–176a.

Meaning

The adjective names the man whose lot is good (see εὐδαιμονία). The edition's Key Words: "Eudaimōn is 'happy' and eudaimonein 'to be happy', in the Greek sense of a life that goes well as a whole rather than a passing feeling." In argument the word is the end at which the others stop: no one asks why a man wants to be happy.

Use in the book

The adjective is the goal of the second half. In the life without error, "those who do well must be happy" (172a; see εὖ πράττειν), and the dream asks whether living knowledgeably would make us so (173d). Critias' answer leads to the question "Knowledgeably about what?", and when he will not count the cobbler or the bronze-worker, Socrates concludes that they no longer hold that "the man who lives knowledgeably is happy": Critias does not admit that these are happy, and marks off "the happy man" as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐμμένω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The all-knowing man follows, and the question becomes "which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?" (174a), answered with the knowledge of good and bad (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The last use turns the word from the argument to the boy: if Charmides has temperance, Socrates would have him think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate (175e–176a; see ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ). The

adjective at the end can be read as his own answer to the question the argument left open.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

172a Those who do well must be happy.

173e We no longer hold that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy; Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.

174a Which of the kinds of knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy?

176a Charmides should think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Symposium* makes happiness the end beyond which there is no asking. Diotima changes the question from the beautiful to the good: the lover of good things loves that they become his own; asked what he will have when they are his, Socrates finds that easier to answer, "he will be happy"; for the happy are happy by the possession of good things, and there is no need to ask further why one who wishes to be happy wishes it, since the answer seems to have reached its end (204e–205a; see ἐράω). In the *Gorgias* Polus thinks it obvious that Archelaus, ruler of Macedonia, whose crimes he goes on to tell (471a–d), is happy, and Socrates says he cannot tell, since he has not met him; he would not call even the Great King, the king of Persia, happy without knowing how he stands in education and justice, and, asked whether all happiness lies in that, says that the fine and good man and woman are happy, the unjust and base wretched (470d–e). In the *Apology* he sets himself against the Olympic victor: the victor makes the Athenians seem happy, Socrates makes them be so (36d).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the reason why the word ends an argument. Happiness, he says, is the one thing we want for itself alone and never as a means to anything further; honour, pleasure, intelligence and each of the virtues we want both for their own sake and because we expect them to make us happy;

and happiness is self-sufficient, enough by itself to make a life worth choosing and in want of nothing.[141] The *Charmides*' question "which knowledge makes him happy?" assumes, as Aristotle does, that happiness is the end by which the other goods are measured.

Translation in this edition

"Happy" at each place: εὐδαίμονας (172a3), εὐδαίμονα and εὐδαίμονες (173e6, 173e8), "the happy man" for τὸν εὐδαίμονα (173e10), εὐδαίμονα (174a11); and "happier" for εὐδαιμονέστερον (176a5). At 173e6 εὐδαίμονα is T's reading and a later hand's in B; B has εὐδαιμονία. At 176a4 the reading of ὅσῳπερ is told elsewhere (see ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ).

See also

ἀφορίζω; ἐμμένω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐράω; εὖ πράττειν; εὐδαιμονέω; εὐδαιμονία; ζητητής; λῆρος; μακάριος; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ.

εὐδοκιμέω · be admired

εὐδοκιμῶν, *eudokimōn*, "(used to) being admired"

Attested: εὐδοκιμῶν (*eudokimōn*; 169c). To be well thought of, to have a good name, to be admired; from εὖ and δόκιμος, "approved". It explains Critias' conduct when Socrates' perplexity catches him: "Since he was used to being admired on every occasion, he was ashamed in front of the company; he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἐπικαλύπτω). The verb names the habit that the argument threatens: a reputation held in public. In the *Protagoras* Prodicus, answering Critias, distinguishes being esteemed from being praised: to be esteemed, εὐδοκιμεῖν, lives in the souls of the hearers without deceit, while to be praised often comes in words from men speaking against their opinion (337b; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). By that distinction, what Critias feared to lose can be read as his esteem, not merely his praise.

[141] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.7, 1097a34–b21.

See also αἰσχύνομαι; ἐπικαλύπτω; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν.

εὐήθης · simpleton

εὐήθης, *euēthēs*, "simpleton"

Attested: εὐήθης (*euēthēs*; 162b). Literally "of good character", εὖ and ἦθος, but in ordinary use "simple, guileless", and so "silly". Socrates uses it of the author of "doing one's own business": the man who said it "was speaking in riddles ... for surely he was not such a simpleton" (162a–b; see αἴνιγμα), and the alternative is that the boy heard it from some fool (see ἠλίθιος). The denial is offered as a proof: the author cannot have meant something so silly, so he must have meant a riddle. In the *Republic* Socrates restores the word's literal sense. Good speech, harmony, grace and rhythm follow on simplicity, εὐήθεια, "not the folly we call by that pet name, but the mind truly well and finely furnished in its character" (400d–e). Thrasymachus uses the superlative of Socrates, "most simple Socrates", when he tells him that the just man everywhere gets less than the unjust (343d).

See also αἴνιγμα; εὐηθικός; ἠλίθιος.

εὐηθικός · simple-minded

εὐηθικῶν, *euēthikōn*, "simple-minded"

Attested: εὐηθικῶν (*euēthikōn*; 175c). An adjective of the same family as εὐήθης, "simple, good-natured, easily led" (see εὐήθης). Socrates uses it of himself and Critias at the end, personifying the inquiry: "Still, though it found us so simple-minded and so easy to deal with, our inquiry is no more able to find the truth. It has made such a mockery of the truth" (175c–d; see ἀλήθεια; ζήτησις). The edition's note at 175d explains: "finding its partners simple-minded (euēthikoi) and not hard to handle, it laughed at the truth and showed their definition to be of no benefit 'with the utmost insolence' (hybristikōs)." The simplicity was their readiness to concede what the argument did not allow (175b–c; see ἄλογος). At 175c8 a later hand in T has

the adverb εὐηθικῶς; Burnet asks in his apparatus whether Plato wrote εὐνοϊκῶν, "well-disposed".

See also ἀλήθεια; ἄλογος; εὐήθης; ζήτησις.

εὐλαβέομαι · beware

εὐλαβεῖσθαι, *eulabeisthai*, "to beware"

Attested: εὐλαβεῖσθαι (*eulabeisthai*; 155d). To take hold well, εὖ and λαβεῖν, and so to be careful, to take care, to beware. The word is Cydias' advice, which Socrates recalls when he sees inside the boy's cloak: Cydias told someone "to beware of coming, a fawn, into the lion's presence" (155d; see αἱρέω; ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας). The edition's note at 155e: "In the usual image the lover hunts the boy; in Cydias' the lover is the fawn and the beautiful boy the lion." In the *Symposium* Alcibiades, having named Charmides among those Socrates has deceived as a lover (222b; see ἐραστής), tells Agathon to learn from their experience and beware, εὐλαβηθῆναι.

See also αἱρέω; ἁλίσκομαι; ἐραστής; Κυδίας.

εὐμαθία · learning easily

Ease in learning, a gift of nature set against quietness · Charmides

εὐμαθία, *eumathia*, "learning easily"

At a Glance

The word. Readiness to learn, quickness of understanding; the gift of the εὐμαθής, the quick learner.

In the *Charmides*. Three times in one exchange: "Which is finer, learning easily, or learning with difficulty?" "Learning easily." "And learning easily … is learning quickly, isn't it?" (159e).

In this edition. "Learning easily".

A place to read. 159c–160b.

Meaning

The noun joins εὖ, "well", to the root of μανθάνειν, "to learn", and is the opposite of δυσμαθία (see δυσμαθία). It names a natural gift rather than an achievement, and in Plato it is a regular member of the lists of qualities that fit a young nature for philosophy, beside a good memory, courage and magnificence (*Republic* 487a, 490c, 494b).

Use in the book

The word is Socrates' instrument against the boy's first definition. Having shown that in the body quick actions are finer than quiet ones, he turns to the soul, and the boy agrees that learning easily is finer than learning with difficulty, and that "learning easily ... is learning quickly" (159e; see βραδέως; δυσμαθία; ταχέως). The definition of ease in learning as quickness is the step on which the case against quietness turns, and the step from difficulty to slowness is examined under δυσμαθία. Teaching, recollecting, remembering and understanding follow, all finer done quickly (159e–160a; see ἀγχίνοια).

The gift returns in other words when the argument has shrunk temperance to knowledge of knowledge. At 172b Socrates asks whether this is the good it has: that "whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him", and that he will examine others better (see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην). The quality the boy was asked to prefer to quietness at 159e can be read as returning among the modest benefits Socrates offers temperance at 172b.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

159e Learning easily is finer than learning with difficulty, and is learning quickly.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* sets the gift in the philosophic nature. Among the marks of such a nature Socrates asks whether it learns easily or with difficulty, and whether it remembers; and he sums up: no one could practise philosophy adequately unless he were by nature good at remembering, quick to learn,

magnificent, graceful, a friend and kinsman of truth, justice, courage and temperance, and to such men alone, perfected by education and age, the city should be entrusted (486c–487a; see δυσμαθία; ἐπιτρέπω). For the guardians who are to study dialectic the requirement is repeated: they need a sharp edge for their studies and must not find learning hard, since a soul loses heart in hard study far sooner than in physical training (535b–c). In the *Meno* ease in learning appears in the list of qualities of soul, with temperance, justice, courage, memory and magnificence, that can harm as well as benefit unless wisdom leads them (88a–c; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). On the *Meno*'s account, the gift the *Charmides* praises at 159e is good only in the hands of the knowledge it goes on to seek.

Translation in this edition

"Learning easily" for εὐμαθία (159e1, 159e2, 159e3), the noun turned into a gerund, as δυσμαθία is "learning with difficulty", so that the definition "learning easily … is learning quickly" reads as a further claim.

See also

ἀγχίνοια; βραδέως; δυσμαθία; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐπιτρέπω; ταχέως.

εὔπορος · better provided with a way through

εὐπορώτερος, *euporōteros*, "better provided with a way through"

Attested: εὐπορώτερος (*euporōteros*; 167b). Well provided with ways, πόροι, resourceful; the opposite of ἄπορος, "without a way". Socrates sets it against his own perplexity when he begins the inquiry again "the third time, for the Savior": "Come then, Critias … look into it, and see whether, on these matters, you turn out to be better provided with a way through than I am: for I can find no way through" (167b; see ἀπορέω; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι). The edition's note at 167b: "The Greek plays on poros, 'way through': euporos is 'well provided with ways', and aporein, 'to be at a loss', is to have none." Critias turns out no better provided, and covers his perplexity (169c–d; see

ἐπικαλύπτω). In the *Symposium* Diotima makes Poros the father of Love and Penia his mother (see ἀπορία): from his father Love has his scheming for the beautiful and good, and from his mother his want (203b–e); and Socrates finds the question of the good "easier" to answer, εὐπορώτερον, than the question of the beautiful (204e; see εὐδαίμων).

See also ἀπορέω; ἀπορία; ἐπικαλύπτω; εὐδαίμων; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.

εὐπρόσωπος · of a lovely face

εὐπρόσωπος, *euprosōpos*, "(has he not) a lovely face?"

Attested: εὐπρόσωπος (*euprosōpos*; 154d). Fair of face, handsome; πρόσωπον is the face. Chaerephon calls over to Socrates: "Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn't he a lovely face?" "Extraordinarily", Socrates answers (154d; see Χαιρεφῶν). The word sets up its opposite: if the boy would strip, says Chaerephon, "you'd think he had no face at all", ἀπρόσωπος, his figure is so perfectly beautiful (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος). The lovely face is praised so that the body may outshine it, and Socrates will ask to strip the soul instead (154e; see ἀποδύω).

See also ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος; Χαιρεφῶν.

ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ · on its own

The part treated on its own, the folly the good doctors deny · Charmides

ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς, *eph' heautēs*, "on its own"

At a Glance

The word. "By itself, on its own, alone": a thing taken apart from what it belongs to or depends on.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the good doctors' principle: "to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" (156c).

In this edition. "On its own".

A place to read. 156b–157a.

Meaning

Ἐπί with the genitive of the reflexive, ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ (feminine ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς), means "on its own, by itself", with the sense of being separate: a man who lives ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ lives alone, a thing considered ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ is considered apart. Plato uses the phrase, with αὐτό, for a thing taken as it is in itself, apart from its relations to anything else. In the *Charmides* it is the phrase of what cannot be done.

Use in the book

The phrase states the doctors' principle in its negative form. Socrates tells the boy that his charm cannot make the head alone healthy, any more than good doctors can cure the eyes without the head; they say too "that to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly", and so they treat the part along with the whole (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἄνοια; δίαιτα; εὖ ἔχω). The part "on its own" is set against the part "along with the whole", μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου, and the boy accepts the principle without reserve: "Absolutely" (156c).

The Thracian carries the principle up to the soul (156d–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; Ζάλμοξις), and the dialogue's argument then tests the opposite case: a knowledge that would be of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of nothing else (166c, 167b–c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The phrases differ. What the doctors deny is treatment of a part apart from its whole; what Critias asserts is a knowledge whose objects are itself and the other kinds of knowledge (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). But the opening principle that nothing in the body can be well on its own can be read as a first warning against a virtue that would know itself and the other kinds of knowledge and nothing else.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

156b–c Good doctors cannot cure the eyes without the head; to think one could treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is folly.

Elsewhere in Plato

The phrase is Plato's for a thing considered apart from what qualifies it. In the *Symposium* Pausanias says that every action is like this: done on its own, it is neither fine nor shameful, but becomes fine or shameful according to how it is done, finely and rightly or not (180e–181a). In the *Theaetetus* the doctrine Socrates draws out of Protagoras forbids anyone to say that a thing is or becomes anything itself by itself, αὐτὸ ἐφ' αὑτοῦ: whatever is, is for someone or of something or relative to something (160b–c). The *Timaeus* asks the opposite question of the forms: whether there is any fire itself by itself, and all the other things we speak of as each itself by itself, or whether only what we see is real (51b–c). In the *Charmides* the phrase can be read as standing on the side of the *Theaetetus*' relativity: the head, like the knowledge of 168b, cannot be dealt with apart from what it belongs to (see ἐπιστήμη τινός).

Translation in this edition

"To imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" for τὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν οἴεσθαι ἄν ποτε θεραπεῦσαι αὐτὴν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος πολλὴν ἄνοιαν εἶναι (156c1–3). At 156c2 "ever" renders ποτε, from T and W; B has ποθεν, "from anywhere".

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἄνοια; δίαιτα; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη τινός; εὖ ἔχω; Ζάλμοξις.

ἔχειν καλῶς · be in good condition

The good order of the whole, on which the part's health depends · Charmides

καλῶς ἔχοντος, *kalōs echontos*, "(when the whole is not) in good condition";
καλῶς ἔχειν, *kalōs echein*, "to be in good condition"

At a Glance

The word. To be in a fine or good state, in good order; with ἔχειν, "to be", and καλῶς, "finely".

In the *Charmides*. Twice in the Thracian's doctrine: "when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e); "it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition" (157a).

In this edition. "Be in good condition".

A place to read. 156d–157b.

Meaning

Καλῶς ἔχειν is the companion of εὖ ἔχειν (see εὖ ἔχω): both mean "to be in a good state", of health, of affairs, of an argument ("that is well said"). Καλῶς, the adverb of καλός, "fine, beautiful", gives the phrase a shade of good order and soundness, as of a thing well arranged. In the *Charmides* it is said first of the whole (156e) and then of the head and the rest of the body (157a), where εὖ ἔχειν is said of the part (156e) and of the eyes (156c).

Use in the book

The phrase belongs to the Thracian's extension of medicine to the soul. Zalmoxis says that just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul; most diseases elude the Greek doctors because they neglect the whole, and "when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see ἐπιμέλεια; εὖ ἔχω; Ζάλμοξις). The whole here can be read as the body together with the soul, and the soul as its source, for everything bad and good flows from it "as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω). "So it is the soul that must be treated first and

foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition" (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα).

What puts the soul right also has a name. It is treated with charms, which are beautiful words, and from such words temperance comes to be in souls, and once it is present health is easy to provide for the head and the rest of the body (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐπῳδή; λόγοι καλοί). The phrase can be read as preparing the dialogue's question: the soul in good condition would be the temperate soul, and Socrates asks next whether the boy's is (158b–c).

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

156e When the whole is not in good condition, the part cannot possibly be well.

157a The soul must be treated first, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* names the good condition of soul and body together. What order and arrangement produce in the body, Callicles agrees, is called health and strength; the orderings of the soul, Socrates says, are called lawful and law, through which men become law-abiding and orderly, and these are justice and temperance (504b–d); the good orator looks to them in all he says to souls (504d–e; see ἐγγίγνομαι). The *Republic* puts the soul even into the doctor's own work: doctors do not treat body with body, or their own bodies could never be allowed to be or to have been unhealthy, but body with soul, and a soul that has become and is bad cannot treat anything well (408e). In the *Timaeus* everything good is beautiful, and the beautiful is not without measure, and no proportion matters more for health and virtue than that of the soul itself to the body itself; a living creature in which a great soul rides a weak body, or the reverse, is not beautiful as a whole (87c–d; see ἐπιρρέω).

Translation in this edition

"When the whole is not in good condition" for οὗ μὴ καλῶς ἔχοντος (156e5), the relative pronoun referring to τοῦ ὅλου, "the whole", Burnet's own

emendation, as "neglect" is the reading of a variant in T and of Stobaeus (see ἀμελέω); "be in good condition" for καλῶς ἔχειν (157a3). At 157a2 "the rest of the body" renders τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος, from B and W and Stobaeus; T has τοῦ ὅλου σώματος, "the whole body".

See also

ἀμελέω; ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή; εὖ ἔχω; Ζάλμοξις; λόγοι καλοί; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα.

Z Zeta

Ζάλμοξις · Zalmoxis

The Thracian king and god behind Socrates' charm · Charmides

Ζάλμοξις, *Zalmoxis*, "Zalmoxis"; Ζαλμόξιδος, *Zalmoxidos*, "(of) Zalmoxis"

At a Glance

The word. Zalmoxis, the god of the Getae; in Greek report a former slave of Pythagoras, the philosopher of Samos and southern Italy in the late sixth century BC, who taught the Getae that they would not die.

In the *Charmides*. Three times. Socrates learned the charm "from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said even to make one immortal" (156d); "Zalmoxis, he said, our king, who is a god, says" that the body must not be cured without the soul (156d–e); and a temperate boy would need no "charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean" (158b).

In this edition. "Zalmoxis".

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

Zalmoxis was the god of the Getae (see ἀπαθανατίζω). The edition's note at 156d explains: Herodotus "calls the Getae 'the ones who make themselves immortal' (athanatizontes), because they believed that at death they went to Zalmoxis; the Greeks of the Hellespont and the Black Sea told him that Zalmoxis had once been a slave of Pythagoras, a story Herodotus doubts." The name is spelled in several ways in the sources: Herodotus has Salmoxis, Strabo, the geographer of the age of Augustus, and some manuscripts of Plato Zamolxis.

Use in the book

Socrates presents Zalmoxis through a witness. On campaign at Potidaea he learned the charm "from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said even to make one immortal" (156d; see ἀπαθανατίζω; Θρᾷξ), and the Thracian granted that the Greeks were right to say what Socrates had just told the boy. "But Zalmoxis, he said, our king, who is a god, says that just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either" (156d–e; see ἐπιχειρέω). The doctrine that follows, that everything good and bad flows from the soul and that the soul is treated with charms, which are beautiful words, is given as the Thracian's report ("he said"), and can be read as Zalmoxis' teaching (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή).

The authority is triple and distant: a god who is also a king, reported by a foreign doctor, reported by Socrates. It gives the charm a barbarian pedigree, and Socrates keeps his distance from the doctors' powers with "are said". When he names Zalmoxis again it is beside another northern healer: he tells the boy that if he is already temperate, "then you would have no further need of charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean; the remedy for the head itself should be given you straightaway" (158b–c; see Ἀβάρις; δοτέος). The two foreign names can be read as framing what follows: the Greek inquiry into temperance takes the place of the barbarian charm.

Places to read

Every passage in which the name occurs.

156d Socrates learned the charm from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said to make one immortal.

156d–e Zalmoxis, the Thracians' king and god, says that the body must not be cured without the soul.

158b A temperate boy would need no charms of Zalmoxis or of Abaris.

Other ancient sources

Herodotus gives the fullest account. The Getae, he says, the bravest and most just of the Thracians, think that they do not die but go at death to the god Salmoxis, whom some of them call Gebeleizis; every fourth year they choose

one of themselves by lot and send him to Salmoxis as a messenger, charged with their requests, by throwing him up onto three spears, and if he does not die they blame him as a bad man and send another; they also shoot arrows at the sky in thunder and lightning, threatening the god, since they think there is no other. The Greeks of the Hellespont and the Black Sea told him that Salmoxis had been a man, a slave of Pythagoras son of Mnesarchus in Samos; freed and grown rich, he returned home, built a hall where he entertained the leading men, and told them that death would take neither him nor his drinking-companions nor the generations born from them: they would pass instead to a place where they would go on living for ever in possession of every good thing; meanwhile he built an underground chamber, disappeared into it for three years while the Thracians mourned him as dead, and appeared again in the fourth, so that they believed him. Herodotus will neither reject the tale of the underground chamber nor put much faith in it; his own view is that Salmoxis was many years older than Pythagoras, and whether he was a man or a god of the Getae's own country he declines to decide.[142]

Strabo tells the story as the origin of a Getic office. Zamolxis, a Getan who had been Pythagoras' slave, picked up some lore of the heavens from his master and more from the Egyptians, having wandered as far as Egypt; back among his own people, his forecasts from the signs in the sky won him the favour of chiefs and commons alike, and in the end he talked the king into sharing power with him as the man who could make known what the gods wanted; appointed at first priest of the god they honoured most, he came later to be called a god himself, and lived in a cave on a sacred mountain, seen by few but the king; the custom lasted down to Strabo's day, and with it the Pythagorean abstinence from animal food.[143] Diogenes Laertius records that some made Zamolxis the founder of philosophy among the Thracians, and names him as Pythagoras' slave, to whom the Getae sacrifice.[144] The *Charmides*' Zalmoxis teaches a medicine of the soul whose product is

[142] Herodotus 4.93–96.
[143] Strabo, *Geography* 7.3.5.
[144] Diogenes Laertius 1.1 and 8.2.

temperance; the Greek tradition made him the slave and pupil of Pythagoras, who taught that the soul is immortal.

Translation in this edition

"Zalmoxis" at each place (156d5, 156d8, 158b7), the form Burnet prints from B; T, and at 156d a later hand in B, have Zamolxis (Ζαμόλξιδος, Ζάμολξις). At 156d5 Stobaeus, who quotes the passage, has "citizens", πολιτῶν, for "doctors", ἰατρῶν.

See also

Ἀβάρις; ἀπαθανατίζω; δοτέος; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιχειρέω; ἐπῳδή; Θρᾷξ.

ζητέω · inquire

Inquiring together, because Socrates does not know · Charmides

ζητῶ, *zētō*, "I inquire"; ζητεῖς, *zēteis*, "you are inquiring", "you are looking for"; ζητοῦμεν, *zētoumen*, "(we have been) seeking"; ἐζητήσαμεν, *ezētēsamen*, "(our) search"; ζητεῖν, *zētein*, "inquiring", "to inquire"

At a Glance

The word. To seek, look for, search; to inquire into a question.

In the *Charmides*. Seven times. "I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know" (165b); Critias: "you are not inquiring correctly" (165e); and Socrates' last word on himself, "unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a).

In this edition. "Inquire"; "looking for" (166b); "seeking", "search" (172c).

A place to read. 165b–166b and 175b–176a.

Meaning

Ζητεῖν is the plain verb for looking for something lost, and the philosophers' verb for inquiry: to look for what something is. In Plato it is often joint, "to inquire with" someone, and it presupposes, as the *Meno* shows, that the

inquirer does not yet know what he seeks. Its nouns are ζήτησις, "inquiry", and ζητητής, "inquirer" (see ζήτησις; ζητητής).

Use in the book

The verb defines Socrates' part. Critias, ready to give an account of "knowing oneself", treats Socrates as an opponent who knows the answers and will agree only if he wants to, and Socrates corrects him: "That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know" (165b; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐρωτάω). The inquiry is joint because the inquirer is ignorant.

Critias turns the verb against him: "you are not inquiring correctly", since this knowledge is not by nature like the others (165e; see ζήτησις); and a page later, "you are looking for some likeness between it and the others" (166b; see ἐρευνάω). Socrates' search for a product, and then for an object, is in Critias' eyes the wrong search.

At the end the verb measures the failure. In 172c Socrates wonders whether they have been "looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is", and adds, "And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose" (see χρηστός). At 175a–b he says, "surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (see ὄφελος), and at 176a he says that, if the boy has temperance, he would sooner advise him to regard Socrates as "a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (see ζητητής; λῆρος). The verb that began as Socrates' claim to joint inquiry ends as his confession of a poor one.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

165b Socrates inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed, because he does not know.

165e Critias: Socrates is not inquiring correctly.

166b Critias: Socrates is looking for a likeness between temperance and the other kinds of knowledge.

172c Perhaps they have been seeking for temperance to be greater than it is, and their search has been to no useful purpose.

175b Temperance would not have proved useless if Socrates were of any use at inquiring well.

176a If Charmides has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything by argument.

Elsewhere in Plato

The joint inquiry of 165b recurs in Plato in almost the same words. In the *Gorgias* Socrates says that he does not speak as one who knows, but inquires in common with them, so that if his opponent seems to be right he will be the first to agree (506a). In the *Meno*, having reduced Meno to perplexity, he says that he does not know what virtue is, but is willing to look into it with him and inquire together (80d); Meno answers by asking how one can look for what one does not know at all, and Socrates restates the puzzle as the argument that one can inquire neither into what one knows nor into what one does not know (80d–e; see ζήτησις). Socrates replies with the doctrine that inquiring and learning are wholly recollection, and that one should not be persuaded by the paradox, which would make us idle, but by the account that makes us active and inquiring, ζητητικούς, and he will therefore inquire with Meno what virtue is (81d–e). In the *Apology* inquiry is his service to the god: after the oracle he goes about even now inquiring and searching, ζητῶ καὶ ἐρευνῶ, among citizens and strangers he thinks wise, and when one is not, he shows him so (23b; see ἐνδείκνυμι; ἐρευνάω).

Translation in this edition

"Inquire" for ζητῶ (165b8), ζητεῖς (165e3) and ζητεῖν (175b2, 176a4); "you are looking for" for ζητεῖς at 166b9; "seeking" for ζητοῦμεν (172c2) and "our search" for ἐζητήσαμεν (172c5), as the Glossary records. At 165b7 "as though I will agree with you" renders ὁμολογήσοντός σοι, Heusde's conjecture; B and T have ὁμολογήσαντός σου.

See also

Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐνδείκνυμι; ἐρευνάω; ἐρωτάω; ζήτησις; ζητητής; λῆρος; ὄφελος; χρηστός.

ζήτησις · inquiry

The soul's inquiries, Critias' objection, and the inquiry that mocks the truth · Charmides

ζητήσεσιν, *zētēsesin*, "inquiries"; ζήτησιν, *zētēsin*, "inquiry"; ζήτησις, *zētēsis*, "inquiry"

At a Glance

The word. Inquiry, search, investigation; the noun of ζητεῖν.

In the *Charmides*. Three times. Speed is praised "in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation" (160a); Critias complains, "you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike" (165e); and at the end "our inquiry is no more able to find the truth" (175d).

In this edition. "Inquiry", "inquiries".

A place to read. 175b–d.

Meaning

The noun names the act of seeking and the process of an investigation (see ζητέω). In Plato it can mean a single search for an answer or the whole course of an argument, and, in the plural, the mind's inquiries in general. Aristotle uses it for deliberation, which he calls a kind of search (see βουλεύομαι).

Use in the book

The first use is general. In the argument against quietness Socrates says that "in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, it is not the quietest person ... who is thought to deserve praise, but the one who does it most easily and most quickly" (160a–b; see ἀνευρίσκω; βουλεύομαι). Inquiry is one of the soul's activities, and quickness is its virtue.

The second use is Critias' objection to the method. Temperance is not like the other kinds of knowledge, "and yet you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike" (165e; see ζητέω). The comparison with medicine and building, which Socrates thought the natural way to inquire, is to Critias the wrong one.

The third use personifies the inquiry. After listing the concessions they made without warrant, Socrates says that, though it found them simple-minded and easy to deal with, "our inquiry is no more able to find the truth", and that it has mocked the truth by showing their definition of no benefit (175c–d; see ἀλήθεια; εὐηθικός). The edition's note at 175d: "Socrates personifies the inquiry as an insolent mocker". The inquiry has become an agent that defeats those who conduct it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

160a In the soul's inquiries and in deliberation, the quickest is praised.

165e Critias: Socrates conducts his inquiry as though the kinds of knowledge were alike.

175c–d The inquiry, finding them simple-minded, mocked the truth and showed their temperance of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Meno* puts the problem of inquiry as a paradox. Meno asks how Socrates will look for something when he does not know at all what it is: what will he propose to look for, and if he finds it, how will he know that this is what he did not know? Socrates restates it as an eristic argument: a man can inquire neither into what he knows, since he knows it and has no need of inquiry, nor into what he does not know, since he does not even know what to inquire into (80d–e). The concession that Socrates at the end calls more absurd than anything is the reverse of this: that one could know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all (175c; see ἄλογος). Beside the *Meno*, the end of the *Charmides* can be read as the paradox of inquiry turned on knowledge of knowledge. Theaetetus' ease in learning and inquiry, which

Theodorus compares to a stream of oil flowing without a sound, is told under δυσμαθία (*Theaetetus* 144a–b).

Translation in this edition

"The soul's inquiries" for ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς (160a8), "conducting your inquiry" for ποιῇ τὴν ζήτησιν (165e5), and "our inquiry" for ἡ ζήτησις (175d1), as the Glossary records.

See also

ἀλήθεια; ἄλογος; ἀνευρίσκω; βουλεύομαι; δυσμαθία; εὐηθικός; ζητέω; ζητητής.

ζητητής · inquirer

Socrates' verdict on himself, "a poor inquirer" · Charmides

ζητητήν, *zētētēn*, "inquirer"

At a Glance

The word. One who seeks or inquires; an investigator.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer" (175e).

In this edition. "Inquirer".

A place to read. 175d–176a.

Meaning

The agent noun of ζητεῖν, "to inquire" (see ζητέω), names the person whose business is seeking. It is a rare word in Plato, and its rarity gives it weight when Socrates applies it to himself.

Use in the book

The word comes in Socrates' lament at the end. He is aggrieved on Charmides' account, if the boy is to get no benefit from his temperance, and still more on account of the charm, if he took pains to learn it for a thing worth nothing (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; ἀνωφελής; ἐπῳδή). "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance

is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a; see φαῦλος). The argument has shown temperance, as defined, to be of no benefit; Socrates refuses the conclusion and blames the inquirer instead of the thing inquired into.

The self-blame has a tone and a content. Its tone can be read as Socrates' usual irony, as when, a moment later, he says that if the boy has temperance he would sooner advise him to regard Socrates as a babbler, unable to inquire by argument (176a; see ζητέω; λῆρος). Its content is a judgement about method: the conclusion follows from premises they should not have granted (175b–c; see ἄλογος), so the fault lies in the conduct of the inquiry, not in temperance. The noun can be read as Socrates' way of keeping his conviction that temperance is a great good while admitting that he cannot prove it.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

175e Socrates thinks it is not that the charm was for a worthless thing, but that he is a poor inquirer.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the myth of Er, at the end of the *Republic*, Socrates tells Glaucon that the moment of choice is the whole danger for a man, and that each of us should neglect other studies and be a seeker and student, ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητής, of this one study: to learn and discover, if he can, who will make him able and knowledgeable to distinguish a good life from a bad, and always to choose the better among those possible (618b–c; see ἐπιστήμων). The inquirer of the *Republic* seeks the knowledge that the *Charmides* names at 174b, the knowledge of good and bad (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). In the fourth book Socrates and Glaucon, standing like hunters round the thicket where justice is hidden, find that it has been rolling at their feet from the start, and that they have been like people looking for what they hold in their hands (432b–e); the failure can be read, like Socrates' at 175e, as the inquirers' and not the thing's.

Translation in this edition

"A poor inquirer" for φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητήν (175e6): φαῦλος, "poor, of no account", is the word Socrates used of the boy at the start, who "was nothing to sniff at", οὐ … φαῦλος, even as a child (154b).

See also

ἀγανακτέω; ἄλογος; ἀνωφελής; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμων; ἐπῳδή; ζητέω; ζήτησις; λῆρος; φαῦλος.

H Eta

ᾗ ἰατρικός · in so far as he is a doctor

Examining the doctor as a doctor, in his own field · Charmides

ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν, *hēi iatrikos estin*, "in so far as he is a doctor"

At a Glance

The word. "In so far as he is medical": the doctor considered precisely as a doctor, and in nothing else.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Then the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased" (171b).

In this edition. "In so far as he is a doctor".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Ἧι, "where, in the way in which", with a noun or adjective, limits a statement to one aspect of its subject: a man ᾗ ἰατρικός is the man as having medical skill, not as father, citizen or patient. Ἰατρικός is the adjective of ἰατρός, "doctor": "medical, skilled in medicine", and with the article "the medical man". The phrase is a tool of precision. It lets an argument say what belongs to a man by virtue of his art, and set aside everything else that is true of him.

Use in the book

The phrase closes the test of the doctor. The temperate man, knowing only knowledge, will know that the doctor has some knowledge, but to test what knowledge it is he must look into what it is of; medicine is knowledge of the healthy and the diseased, and Socrates asks whether "whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found, and surely

not in the things outside it, in which it is not?", and Critias agrees (171a–b; see τὰ ἔξω). "Then the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκέπτομαι). Only a doctor can do that, "and so not the temperate man either; for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate" (171c). The test as a whole is told under ἀληθινός (170e–171c).

The phrase makes the conclusion exact. A doctor is examined not as a man but as a doctor, and the field of the examination is fixed by the field of the art; the examiner must share the art. The same precision produced the joke of 170e, which uses the adjective alone: since knowledge of knowledge was given to temperance alone, "the medical man doesn't know about medicine either, since medicine is in fact a knowledge" (170e–171a; see ἐπαΐω). The edition's note at 171a calls it "the deadpan conclusion". The phrase ᾗ ἰατρικός can be read as the instrument by which the argument confines each knowledge to its object and leaves temperance with none.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the use of the adjective just before.

170e–171a The medical man does not know about medicine, since medicine is a knowledge and knowledge of knowledge belongs to temperance alone.

171b The man who looks correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* makes the same precision the weapon of its first book. Thrasymachus, pressed, says that in the strict account no craftsman errs: we say that the doctor erred, but no one, in so far as he is what we call him, ever errs, since error comes when knowledge fails (340d–e). Socrates turns the strict account against him: the doctor in the strict sense tends the sick and does not make money (341c), and each art looks to the good of what it rules (342d; see ἐπιτάττω). He then separates the arts by their proper benefit: medicine gives health, piloting safety at sea, and the art of earning wages gives wages; if a pilot becomes healthy by sailing, that does not make his art

medicine (346a–b). Each art, on this account, is defined by its own work, as each knowledge in the *Charmides* is defined by its own object.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the same qualification the ground of a science. One science, he says, looks at what is in so far as it is, τὸ ὂν ᾗ ὄν, and at what belongs to it of itself; it is identical with none of the sciences that deal with a part, for none of them looks at what is universally, as being, but each takes a slice of it for its own and studies what holds of that slice, as mathematics does.[145] The *Charmides*' doctor examined "in so far as he is a doctor" can be read as a special science held to its part, and Aristotle's first philosophy as the knowledge of the whole that the *Charmides* could not find for temperance.

Translation in this edition

"In so far as he is a doctor" for ᾗ ἰατρικός ἐστιν (171b5), the English using the noun where the Greek uses the adjective; "the medical man" for ὁ ἰατρικός at 170e12. At 170e12 a later hand in T has ἰατρός, "the doctor", for ἰατρικός.

See also

ἀληθινός; ἐξετάζω; ἐπαΐω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπιτάττω; τὰ ἔξω.

ἡγέομαι · lead; think

Rightness leading, temperance as guide, and what each speaker thinks · Charmides

ἡγουμένης, *hēgoumenēs*, "leading"; ἡγουμένη, *hēgoumenē*, "as the guide"; ἡγῇ, *hēgēi*, "do you think"; ἡγοῦμαι, *hēgoumai*, "I think"; ἡγεῖσθαι, *hēgeisthai*, "regarded", "regard"; ἡγούμενος, *hēgoumenos*, "to suppose"

At a Glance

The word. To lead the way, guide, command; and, from leading the mind, to hold, think, consider.

[145] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.1, 1003a21–26.

In the *Charmides*. Nine times, in both senses. "With error removed and rightness leading" (172a); temperance "as the guide of the management of household and of city" (172d); and Socrates' last advice: "I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler" (176a).

In this edition. "Leading", "guide"; "think", "regard", "suppose".

A place to read. 171d–172d.

Meaning

Ἡγεῖσθαι is first to go before, to lead an army or a procession, to be the guide on a road; the ἡγεμών is the leader. From "leading" in thought it comes to mean "to hold, believe, consider", a sense as common in Attic prose as the first. In the *Charmides* both senses occur, and in the second half of the argument the first sense can be read as naming the question: what leads a life to happiness.

Use in the book

The common sense, "think", marks positions in the argument. Socrates asks the boy, "do you think the writing-master does nothing when he writes or reads?" "On the contrary, I think he does something" (161d; see γραμματιστής); Critias says that Hesiod regarded only fine and beneficial things as appropriate to one (163c; see οἰκεῖος); Socrates asks whether Critias thinks that the temperate do not know that they are temperate, and Critias says he does not (164a; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ); and Socrates answers Critias' charge of refuting him, "What a thing to do ... to suppose that, even if I refute you as hard as I can, I am doing it for any other reason" (166c; see ἐλέγχω). At the end Socrates tells Charmides, "For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler" (176a; see λῆρος).

The sense "lead" carries the argument. In the life of temperance as first imagined, "with error removed and rightness leading", those so disposed would do finely and well (172a; see ἁμαρτία; ἐξαιρέω; ὀρθότης). Socrates then doubts the picture: "what we were saying just now, that temperance would be a great good if it were of that kind, as the guide of the management of household and of city, I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to"

(172d; see διοίκησις). The dream that follows grants temperance the guiding place and shows that it leads to living knowledgeably but not to happiness (173a–174b; see εὖ πράττειν). What makes us do well and be happy, the argument concludes, is the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The verb can be read as asking which knowledge guides, and the dialogue as answering that it is not the one Critias defined.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

161d Does the writing-master do nothing when he writes? Charmides thinks he does something.

163c Hesiod, says Critias, regarded only fine and beneficial things as appropriate to one.

164a Does Critias think that the temperate do not know they are temperate? He does not.

166c Socrates: what a thing to suppose, that he refutes Critias for any other reason than the one for which he would scrutinize himself.

172a With error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed would do well.

172d Were they right to agree that temperance would be a great good as the guide of household and city?

176a If Charmides has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Meno* separates leading from knowing. A man who has a right opinion about the road to Larisa, in Thessaly, without having been there or knowing it, would lead rightly too, and while he has right opinion he will be no worse a guide than the man who knows; so true opinion is no worse a guide than wisdom to right action, and they had been wrong to say that wisdom alone leads it (97a–c). The *Charmides* asks what leads to happiness; the *Meno* adds that a guide need not know the way to lead well, though true opinion cannot be relied on until it is tied down by reasoning about the cause (98a; see δόξα). In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger ranks the goods by their leader: the human goods are led by health, with beauty second, strength third and wealth fourth, and the divine goods by wisdom, φρόνησις, with the temperate

disposition of the soul second; the human goods depend on the divine (631b–d).

Other ancient sources

The Stoics made a technical term from the verb's family. They called the commanding part of the soul τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, "the leading part", an adjective formed from ἡγεμών, "leader", the most authoritative part of the soul, in which impressions and impulses arise and from which speech is sent out, and which they placed in the heart; and they held that the whole cosmos, as a rational living being, has a leading part of its own.[146] The Stoics' commanding part can be read as holding the place the *Charmides* asked temperance to fill, the leader of the other knowledges.

Translation in this edition

"Leading" for ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης (172a1) and "as the guide of" for ἡγουμένη with the genitive (172d4); "think" for ἡγῇ and ἡγοῦμαι (161d3, 161d5, 164a3, 164a4), "regarded" for ἡγεῖσθαι (163c5), "to suppose" for ἡγούμενος (166c7) and "regard" for ἡγεῖσθαι (176a3).

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἁμαρτία; γραμματιστής; διοίκησις; δόξα; ἐλέγχω; ἐξαιρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; εὖ πράττειν; λῆρος; οἰκεῖος; ὀρθότης.

ἡδονή · pleasure

ἡδονῆς, *hēdonēs*, "pleasure"

Attested: ἡδονῆς (*hēdonēs*; 167e). Pleasure, delight, enjoyment, the noun of ἥδεσθαι, "to be pleased". It enters as the object of desire in Socrates' procession of powers, when he asks whether there is "a desire which is desire for no pleasure" (167e; see ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν). The edition's note at 167e records the assumption that desire is "of pleasure", as love is of the beautiful and wish of the good (see ἔρως). Pleasure

[146] Diogenes Laertius 7.139 and 7.159.

is the one object of the three that the dialogue never discusses. In the *Protagoras*, in the speech in which he answers Critias, Prodicus distinguishes being gladdened, εὐφραίνεσθαι, which comes to one learning something and sharing in wisdom with the mind itself, from being pleased, ἥδεσθαι, which comes to one eating or enjoying some other pleasant thing with the body itself (337c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν).

See also ἐπιθυμία; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔρως.

ἠλίθιος · fool

ἠλιθίου, *ēlithiou*, "(some) fool"

Attested: ἠλιθίου (*ēlithiou*; 162b). Idle, foolish, silly; as a noun, a simpleton. Socrates pairs it with εὐήθης: the author of "doing one's own business" was not such a simpleton (see εὐήθης); "Or was it some fool you heard saying this, Charmides?" "Far from it ... He was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b; see αἴνιγμα). The boy's answer turns the insult into a compliment to its unnamed author, whom Socrates is sure by 162c to be Critias (see ἐπιμέλεια). In the *Gorgias* the word is turned on temperance itself: when Socrates says that by the temperate man he means one who rules his own pleasures and desires, Callicles answers, "How sweet you are! You mean the fools, the temperate!" (491e).

See also αἴνιγμα; ἐπιμέλεια; εὐήθης.

ἡλικιώτης · of the same age

ἡλικιώταις, *hēlikiōtais*, "people my age"; ἡλικιωτῶν, *hēlikiōtōn*, "those his age"

Attested: ἡλικιώταις (*hēlikiōtais*; 156a), ἡλικιωτῶν (*hēlikiōtōn*; 157d). One of the same ἡλικία, "age, time of life" (see ἐν ἡλικίᾳ): an agemate, a contemporary. Charmides knows Socrates by name: "You're talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here" (156a; see ἀκριβόω). Critias uses the

word of the boy's standing: "Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for" (157d; see διαφέρω; ἐπῳδή). The agemates are the boy's measure: the circle in which Socrates is talked about (156a), and the field Charmides is thought to surpass in looks and in temperance (157d). At 157d2 "is thought" renders δοκεῖ, the reading of W; B and T have ἐδόκει, "was thought". In the *Symposium* Pausanias names agemates and companions among those who reproach a boy seen talking with his lover (183c; see ἐραστής).

See also ἀκριβόω; διαφέρω; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; ἐπῳδή; ἐραστής.

ἥμισυς · half

ἡμίσεος, *hēmiseos*, "(as of) halves", "a half"

Attested: ἡμίσεος (*hēmiseos*; 168c twice). Half; the neuter τὸ ἥμισυ is "the half". The word is the correlative of the double in the second of Socrates' relatives: a double of itself and of the other doubles would be double of them "as of halves; for there is no double of anything but a half" (168c). The case is told under διπλάσιος. The consequence, that a double of itself would have to be its own half, is drawn under διπλάσιος; it matches the greater of 168b–c that would be smaller than itself (see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). The half is what a double is of, as the healthy is what medicine is of (see ἐπιστήμη τινός); a double with no half would be double of nothing. The edition renders the singular genitive by the plural "halves" the first time, since it answers both "itself" and "the others", and by "a half" the second.

See also διπλάσιος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη τινός.

ἤπειρος · continent

ἠπείρῳ, *ēpeirōi*, "continent"

Attested: ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ (*en tēi ēpeirōi*; 158a twice). Dry land, the mainland, as against islands and sea; with the article, "the continent", the Greek name for Asia and so for the Persian empire. Socrates tells the boy: "it

is said that no man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than your uncle Pyrilampes, whenever he went as ambassador to the Great King or to anyone else on the continent" (158a). The edition's note at 158a explains: "'The continent' is Asia, the Persian empire"; Pyrilampes "was known for his embassies to Persia (and, says Plutarch, for his peacocks: Pericles 13)", and there may be "a smile in an envoy admired for being handsome and big". At 158a3 Burnet prints τῇ ἠπείρῳ with T and W, where B has τῇ πειρῷ; Schanz preferred the contracted τἠπείρῳ here and below, and Ast bracketed the second phrase, τῶν ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ, "on the continent" (158a5), leaving "or to anyone else". "No man" renders οὐδεὶς, T's reading, where B and W have οὐδέ; and "your uncle" renders τοῦ σοῦ θείου, W's reading, where T has τοῦδε σοῦ δὲ θείου and B τοῦδε λέγουσιν (158a2).

See also εὐδαιμονία.

Ἡρακλῆς · Heracles

Ἡράκλεις, *Hērakleis*, "Heracles!"

Attested: Ἡράκλεις (*Hērakleis*; 154d). The vocative of Heracles, used as an oath of surprise. Socrates exclaims it when Chaerephon praises the boy's figure: "Heracles! What an invincible man you are describing, if he has just one little thing more" (154d; see ἄμαχος; ἀπρόσωπος). The oath by the strongest of the heroes suits a praise of the body and of a man called "invincible". The oath is common in Plato as a cry of astonishment: Socrates uses it on hearing that Euthyphro is prosecuting his own father for murder (*Euthyphro* 4a), and Thrasymachus, laughing sardonically, at Socrates' "usual irony" (*Republic* 337a). In the *Theaetetus* Theodorus compares Socrates to Sciron, the robber of the Isthmus road, and then to Antaeus for forcing every comer to wrestle with him in argument (169a–b; see ἀποδύω), and Socrates takes the part and outdoes it: countless Heracleses and Theseuses (Theseus, the hero of Athens), strong in speech, have already given him a good beating, and still he does not give up (169b).

See also ἄμαχος; ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; εὖ πέφυκα.

Ἡσίοδος · Hesiod

Ἡσιόδου, *Hēsiodou*, "(from) Hesiod"; Ἡσίοδον, *Hēsiodon*, "Hesiod"

Attested: Ἡσιόδου (*Hēsiodou*; 163b), Ἡσίοδον (*Hēsiodon*; 163c). The poet of Ascra in Boeotia, about 700 BC, whose *Works and Days* exhorts Perses to justice and labour. Critias makes him the authority for his distinction: "I learned that from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace" (163b), and closes his speech on the same name: "So we must suppose that Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate" (163c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). The poet who told Perses to work becomes the warrant for a definition of temperance he never gave. At 163b4 Burnet brackets, after Stephanus, a particle, δ', that Hesiod's line has and Plato's indirect quotation does not need, as the edition's note at 163b explains. In the *Protagoras* Socrates calls Hesiod in with Prodicus too: Prodicus and many others, he says, would hold with Hesiod that becoming good is hard, since "before virtue the gods have set sweat", but that once one reaches the top it is easy to keep, hard though it is (340c–d).

See also ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; Πρόδικος.

ἡσυχῇ · quietly

The boy's adverb, and how the argument slows it down · Charmides

ἡσυχῇ, *hēsychēi*, "quietly"; ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα, *hōs hēsychaitata*, "as quietly as possible"

At a Glance

The word. Quietly, gently, at a calm pace; an adverb from the old dative of ἥσυχος, "quiet".

In the *Charmides*. Eight times, all in the first definition and its refutation, with the superlative once: the boy's "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly" (159b); Socrates' question, "to copy out the letters

quickly, or quietly?" (159c); and his conclusion that temperance would be no more acting quietly than acting quickly (160c).

In this edition. "Quietly"; "as quietly as possible" (160a).

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Meaning

Ἡσυχῇ describes a manner: without noise, haste or disturbance. Said of a boy in the street it means sedately, with a measured step; said of an action it can also mean slowly, and Greek has the idiom ἔχ' ἡσυχῇ, "keep still", "wait a moment", as Socrates says it to Hippias (*Hippias Major* 298c). The edition's note at 159b takes the boy's word in the first sense: it "most naturally means calmly, sedately: the bearing of a well-brought-up boy in the street". The adjectives ἥσυχος and ἡσύχιος, the noun ἡσυχία and the rarer ἡσυχιότης belong to the same family (see ἡσυχία; ἡσύχιος; ἡσυχιότης).

Use in the book

The adverb is the boy's own word, and the refutation can be followed as an account of what Socrates does with it. Charmides offers it in a phrase about conduct, with "orderly" beside it and the streets as its scene (159b; see κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ). Socrates keeps the adverb and changes its setting: "Well then, which is finest at the writing-master's: to copy out the letters quickly, or quietly?" (159c; see γραμματιστής). Set against "quickly", the word can only mean slowly, and in the next question Socrates says so, "Quickly, or slowly?" (see βραδέως). From then on the adverb travels with "slowly": lyre-playing and wrestling done "quietly and slowly" (159c; see κιθαρίζω), and learning, teaching, recollecting and remembering done "quietly and slowly" (159e; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; δυσμαθία); in between, the ugly movements of the body are done "laboriously and quietly" (159d; see αἰσχρός), where Burnet brackets the word for slow. In the soul it is set against speed, as the noun is set against sharpness: understanding is finest done "not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible" (160a; see ἡσυχία; ὀξύτης).

The last use gives the adverb back its range. Even supposing that quiet actions are fine as often as quick ones, temperance would be no more acting

quietly than acting quickly, "whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else" (160c; see βαδισμός; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν). Walking and talking are the boy's own examples, and Socrates ends where Charmides began. The edition's note at 159b states the difficulty: on one reading the refutation trades on the shift from "quietly" to "slowly"; "others reply that the word can cover slowness". The adverb can be read as doing both things at once: it lets the refutation run, and in the boy's mouth it keeps the sense of bearing that the argument about speed never meets.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs, with its superlative.

159b The boy: temperance is doing everything in an orderly way and quietly, walking in the streets and talking.

159c Copying out letters quickly or quietly; playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are finer than doing them quietly and slowly.

159d In the body, actions done laboriously and quietly are the ugly ones.

159e Learning with difficulty is learning quietly and slowly; so with teaching, recollecting and remembering.

160a Understanding what is said is finest done not as quietly but as quickly as possible.

160c Temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly.

Elsewhere in Plato

The adverb keeps the boy's sense at the end of the *Phaedo*. When Crito asks how they are to bury him, Socrates answers, "however you like, if you can catch me", and then, laughing quietly, ἡσυχῇ, and looking round at them, says that he cannot persuade Crito that he is this Socrates who is now conversing (115c).

The *Philebus* puts the family among the things that have no limit. Socrates tells Protarchus that "vehemently" and "gently" have the same power as the more and the less: wherever they are present they do not let anything be a definite quantity, but always make each action more vehement than a quieter one, ἡσυχαιτέρου, or the reverse, and so abolish quantity (24b–

d). On that account quick and quiet can be read as fine only when a measure is set on them, which is the conclusion the *Statesman* draws about the quick and the quiet natures (see ἡσυχιότης).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's account of the Spartan education describes the street manners of the boy's definition. Lycurgus, the lawgiver of Sparta, wishing to plant modesty firmly in the young, ordered them in the streets to keep both hands inside their cloaks, to walk in silence, and to look not about them but at what was before their feet; you would hear their voice less than that of stone statues, Xenophon says, and turn their eyes less than bronze ones, and think them more modest even than the maidens in their eyes, the pupils (so Longinus and Stobaeus quote the sentence; the manuscripts have "than the maidens in the bridal chambers"). He takes this as a proof that the male sex is the stronger in being temperate, σωφρονεῖν.[147] The edition's note compares the old education of Aristophanes' *Clouds* (see βαδίζω).

Translation in this edition

"Quietly" for ἡσυχῇ at each place (159b3, 159c4, 159c9, 159d2, 159e4, 159e7, 159e9, 160c5), and "as quietly as possible" for ὡς ἡσυχαίτατα (160a5). At 159d2 Burnet brackets βραδέα, "slow", the neuter plural adjective, before μόγις τε καὶ ἡσυχῇ, after Heindorf, and the English has "laboriously and quietly" without it. At 160c5–6 Burnet prints the readings of the grammarian Priscian (see λέξις; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν).

See also

αἰσχρός; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; βαδίζω; βαδισμός; βραδέως; γραμματιστής; δυσμαθία; ἡσυχία; ἡσύχιος; ἡσυχιότης; κιθαρίζω; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; λέξις; ὀξύτης; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν.

[147] Xenophon, *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 3.4–5.

ἡσυχία · quietness

ἡσυχία, *hēsychia*, "a quietness"

Attested: ἡσυχία (*hēsychia*; 160a). Quiet, rest, stillness; in a city, peace and the absence of strife. Socrates sets it against sharpness when the refutation first names the soul: "And isn't quick-wittedness a kind of sharpness of the soul, and not a quietness?" "True" (160a; see ἀγχίνοια; ὀξύτης). In the soul, quietness can only look like slowness of mind. In politics the word had both praise and blame. Pindar opens an ode for Aristomenes of Aegina, the island off Attica, a winner in the wrestling at the Pythian games, with a hymn to "Quiet of the friendly mind, daughter of Justice, you who raise cities to their greatest", keeper of the topmost keys of councils and of wars, who understands how to do a gentle thing and to suffer one alike, with the moment exactly hit.[148] In Thucydides the Corinthians, urging Sparta to war, say that the Athenians count untroubled quiet, ἡσυχίαν ἀπράγμονα, no less a misfortune than toilsome business, so that, to put it in a word, they are made by nature never to keep quiet themselves and never to leave the rest of mankind in quiet.[149] Archidamus' defence of Spartan slowness is told elsewhere (Thucydides 1.84.1; see βραδέως).

See also ἀγχίνοια; βραδέως; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχιότης; ὀξύτης.

ἡσύχιος · quiet

τοὺς ἡσυχίους, *tous hēsychious*, "quiet people"; τὸ ἡσύχιον, *to hēsychion*, "the quiet"; ἡσυχιώτατος, *hēsychiōtatos*, "the quietest person"; ἡσύχιος, *hēsychios*, "quiet"; ἡσύχιοι, *hēsychioi*, "quiet"; μὴ ἡσυχίου, *mē hēsychiou*, "the unquiet one"; ἡσυχίων, *hēsychiōn*, "quiet ones"

Attested: τοὺς ἡσυχίους (*tous hēsychious*; 159b); τὸ ἡσύχιον, "the quiet" (159d); the superlative ἡσυχιώτατος (160a); οὐδ' ἡσύχιος ὁ σώφρων βίος, "nor would the temperate life be quiet" (160b); αἱ ἡσύχιοι πράξεις, "quiet actions" (160b–c), and αἱ ἡσύχιοι, "the quiet actions" (160c); ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος, "the quiet

[148] Pindar, *Pythian* 8.1–7.
[149] Thucydides 1.70.8–9.

life" (160c–d); and "quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones" (160d; "fine" is T's καλά, where B has καὶ ἄλλα; see καλός). A by-form of ἥσυχος: quiet, still, sedate. Socrates takes up the boy's definition by appealing to what people say: "People do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate" (159b). The conclusion turns the adjective on actions and on the life (160b–d; see βίος). At 160a9 Burnet prints Cobet's ἡσυχιώτατος, "the quietest person", the superlative of ἡσύχιος; B and T have ἡσυχώτατος, from ἥσυχος. In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea describes what becomes of quiet people whose love of quiet is untimely: the especially orderly are always ready to live the quiet life, doing their own business by themselves, and to keep the peace with foreign cities on any terms; and so, without noticing it, they become unwarlike and make the young the same, and are always at the mercy of attackers, so that within a few years they, their children and their whole city often find that they have become slaves instead of free (307e–308a; see ἡσυχιότης). The passage can be read as joining the boy's first answer to the formula Critias defends next (see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

See also βίος; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχιότης; καλός; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ἡσυχιότης · quietness

The boy's word for temperance, a trait tested as a speed · Charmides

ἡσυχιότης, *hēsychiotēs*, "quietness"; ἡσυχιότητος, *hēsychiotētos*, "(of) quietness"

At a Glance

The word. Quietness, calm of manner; the abstract noun of ἡσύχιος.

In the *Charmides*. Four times. The boy's summary, "I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness" (159b); the body's quietness set against quickness (159d); "slowness and quietness" set against quickness and sharpness (160b); and the conclusion, "Then temperance would not be a kind of quietness" (160b).

In this edition. "Quietness", "a kind of quietness".

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Meaning

Ἡσυχιότης is made from ἡσύχιος, "quiet", with the suffix that forms nouns of quality, as ταχυτής, "quickness", is made from ταχύς. It names quietness as a settled trait of a person, where ἡσυχία more often means a state of rest or the peace of a city (see ἡσυχία). Plato uses it nowhere else. In a boy of good family the trait was the visible form of σωφροσύνη: the edition's note at 157a gives the virtue of "the well-brought-up youth who blushes, keeps quiet and knows his place".

Use in the book

The noun is the boy's summary of his own description. Having said that temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly, walking and talking in the streets, he gathers it into one word: "And in short ... I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness" (159b; see κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; συλλήβδην). The phrase turns a way of behaving into a quality one could have, and the refutation tests that quality.

The test rests on a premise the boy grants at once, that temperance is one of the fine things (159c; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι), and it runs in two stages. In the body, quick and nimble actions are the fine ones, and so, "as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine" (159d; see αἰσχρός). In the soul, learning, teaching, remembering, understanding and deliberation are finer done quickly (159e–160b; see ἀγχίνοια; βουλεύομαι; δυσμαθία). The summary sets "what belongs to quickness and sharpness" against "what belongs to slowness and quietness" (160b; see βραδυτής), and the conclusion follows: "Then temperance would not be a kind of quietness, nor would the temperate life be quiet, on this argument at any rate" (160b; see βίος). Socrates then covers the other flank: even if quiet actions were as often fine as quick ones, temperance would be no more quietness than quickness (160c–d; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα).

The noun named a trait of character; the argument treats it as a speed, measured in acts. The edition's note at 160d leaves open "whether the argument is fair to what Charmides meant". The boy's next answer,

modesty, is again what his own conduct shows (160e; see αἰδώς), and the dialogue can be read as letting the first answer fail on the ground where it is weakest, while keeping it, in the boy's blush and bearing, as true of him.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs, with the close of the refutation (160c–d).

159b The boy sums up: temperance is a kind of quietness.

159d In the body it would not be quietness but quickness that was more temperate.

160b Quickness and sharpness appear finer than slowness and quietness; so temperance would not be a kind of quietness.

160c–d Even if quiet actions were as often fine, temperance would be no more quietness than quickness.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Statesman* takes up the same contrast and draws a different conclusion. The visitor from Elea asks young Socrates whether he has not praised sharpness and speed, in bodies, in souls and in the voice, calling all of it by one name, courage; and the quiet kind of thing too, praised as quiet and temperate, ἡσυχαῖα καὶ σωφρονικά, in thought, slow and soft in actions, smooth and deep in voices, to which we give not the name of courage but of orderliness; and when either comes at the wrong time we blame it, calling the quick and hard insolent and mad, and the slow and soft cowardly and sluggish (306c–307c). Quietness there is a nature that temperance grows from, fine when timely and blameworthy when not, and the statesman's art ends as the weaving of the temperate characters with the brave, since without both not everything in a city, private or public, can go well (311b–c; see ὑφαντική).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon tells of a young man who hoped his silence would win him a reputation for the virtue. His Euthydemus (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν), once he had begun to attend to what Socrates said, still guarded against uttering a word himself, thinking that by his silence he was clothing himself in a

reputation for temperance, until Socrates set out to cure him of it.[150] Archidamus' defence of Spartan slowness as a temperance with sense in it is told elsewhere (Thucydides 1.84.1; see βραδέως).

Translation in this edition

"A kind of quietness" for ἡσυχιότης τις (159b5, 160b7); "quietness" for ἡ ἡσυχιότης (159d10) and for ἡσυχιότητος in "slowness and quietness" (160b5). At 159d10 the article before the noun is T's reading; B omits it.

See also

ἀγχίνοια; αἰδώς; αἰσχρός; βίος; βουλεύομαι; βραδέως; βραδυτής; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; δυσμαθία; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχία; ἡσύχιος; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; συλλήβδην; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; ὑφαντική.

ἡττάομαι · be beaten

ἡττώμεθα, *hēttōmetha*, "we are beaten"

Attested: ἡττώμεθα (*hēttōmetha*; 175b). To be less, to be weaker, to be worsted; the verb of ἧττων, "less", "weaker". Socrates sums up the defeat: "As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see *πανταχῇ* ἡττώμεθα); "discover" renders εὑρεῖν, recorded as a variant in T and printed by Burnet, where B and T have ἔχειν in the text. The word belongs to temperance's own vocabulary. In the *Republic* Socrates finds it laughable that the temperate man should be called "stronger than himself", since whoever is stronger than himself would also be weaker, ἧττων, than himself; the phrase means, he explains, that the better part of the soul rules the worse, and the man in whom the worse prevails is called, as a reproach, "weaker than himself" and licentious (430e–431b). In the *Laws* the Cretan Clinias, one of the Athenian stranger's two partners, says that to conquer oneself is the first and best of all victories, and to be beaten by oneself, ἡττᾶσθαι αὐτὸν

[150] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.6.

ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, the most shameful and worst (1.626e). At 175b the beaten party can be read as the inquirers and the victor as the inquiry (see ζήτησις).

See also ζήτησις; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα.

Θ Theta

θαρρέω · take heart

θαρρῶν, *tharrōn*, "take heart"

Attested: θαρρῶν (*tharrōn*; 166d). To be of good courage, to be confident. Socrates, having told Critias that he refutes him for his own sake and for what may be a common good, ends with encouragement: "Then take heart, my dear fellow ... answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). The Greek participle, "taking heart", becomes an imperative in the English. The compound is Socrates' own word at 156d, when the boy's agreement lets him take heart again (see ἀναθαρρέω); the confidence he recovered for himself in the prologue he now hands to Critias. In the *Phaedo* Socrates sets out why a man who has truly spent his life in philosophy is reasonably of good courage, θαρρεῖν, when he is about to die (63e–64a).

See also ἀναθαρρέω; ἔα χαίρειν; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.

θαυμάζω · wonder

θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν, *thaumazoim' an*, "I'd be surprised"; θαυμάζω, *thaumazō*, "I do wonder at"

Attested: θαυμάζοιμ' ἄν (*thaumazoim' an*; 161c), θαυμάζω (*thaumazō*; 164a); the adjective θαυμαστός at 154c (twice) and 162e. To wonder, marvel, be surprised. The adjective comes first, at the boy's entrance: "at that moment he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty" (154c; see κάλλος), and the general passion of the grown men "was less surprising" than the boys' (154c). At 162e it is "no wonder" that Charmides, at his age, does not know what his formula means. The verb belongs to the argument. Of the

boy's formula Socrates says, "I'd be surprised if we even find out how it stands: it looks like a kind of riddle" (161c; see αἴνιγμα); and to Critias: "But this I do wonder at ... whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate" (164a; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). The wonder passes from the boy's body to the argument. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates says that wonder is the philosopher's feeling and that philosophy has no other beginning, so that whoever made Iris, the messenger of the gods, the daughter of Thaumas, whose name sounds like θαῦμα, "wonder", seems to have been no bad genealogist (155d); Aristotle agrees that it was through wonder that men began to philosophize, and still begin (see ἀπορία).[151]

See also ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; αἴνιγμα; ἀπορία; κάλλος.

θεάομαι · gaze, look at

ἐθεῶντο, *etheōnto*, "(they were) gazing"; ἐθεασάμεθα, *etheasametha*, "take a look"

Attested: ἐθεῶντο (*etheōnto*; 154c), ἐθεασάμεθα (*etheasametha*; 154e). To look at as at a sight, to gaze at, to view; the verb of θέα, "sight", and of θέατρον, the place for seeing. The boys "were all gazing at him as if he were a statue" (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα), and Socrates proposes: "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure?" (154e; see ἀποδύω; εἶδος). The boys' gazing and the looking Socrates proposes are the same verb; only the object changes. In the *Republic* Glaucon objects that on Socrates' account the lovers of sights, φιλοθεάμονες, would count as philosophers, since they delight in learning, and so would the lovers of hearing, who run round the Dionysia, the festivals of Dionysus, in town and village, to hear every chorus; Socrates answers that such men are only like philosophers, and that the true ones are the lovers of the sight of the truth (475d–e).

See also ἄγαλμα; ἀποδύω; εἶδος.

[151] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982b12–13.

θεραπεύω · treat

To treat and care for: the eyes, the head, the body, and the soul first · Charmides

θεραπεύειν, *therapeuein*, "treat"; θεραπεῦσαι, *therapeusai*, "treat"; θεραπεύεσθαι, *therapeuesthai*, "is treated"; θεραπευθῆναι, *therapeuthēnai*, "to be treated"

At a Glance

The word. To wait on, attend to, take care of; in medicine, to treat a patient or a part of the body.

In the *Charmides*. Seven times, all in Socrates' account of the charm (156b–157b): the good doctors "must treat the head at the same time" as the eyes (156b); the soul "is treated with certain charms" (157a); and no one is to persuade Socrates to treat his head unless he first hands over his soul to be treated with the charm (157b).

In this edition. "Treat".

A place to read. 156b–157c.

Meaning

Θεραπεύω is the verb of θεράπων, the attendant or squire, and of θεραπεία, service. It means first to wait on a person, a master or a god, and so also to court or flatter; then to look after a thing, a horse or a field; and in medicine to treat, to care for a sick body over time. Its partner ἰᾶσθαι, "to cure", names the end that the treatment aims at (see ἰάομαι), and the good doctors set the two side by side, treating and healing the part along with the whole (156c).

Use in the book

The verb belongs to the charm's account and to nothing else in the dialogue. Its objects move outward and then inward: the eyes, the head, the whole body (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), and then, in the Thracian's teaching, the soul: "So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition. And the soul, my dear fellow … is treated with certain charms" (157a; see ἐπῳδή; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). The order of treatment follows the order of causes, since everything bad and good flows from the soul (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω).

The verb also carries the Thracian's command, which binds Socrates by an oath: "Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm" (157b; see ἐντολή). The rule makes the patient's consent the first step of the cure. Socrates then makes the remedy wait on the boy's consent: "if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see παρέχω), and the treatment, once he agrees, is the conversation itself, as the edition's note at 157a suggests. The verb can be read as dropping out of the dialogue at the point where the treatment it describes begins.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156b The good doctors say they cannot cure the eyes alone but must treat the head as well.

156c To treat the head on its own, apart from the body, is folly; they try to treat and heal the part along with the whole.

157a The soul must be treated first and foremost; it is treated with charms, which are beautiful words.

157b No one is to have his head treated with the remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated with the charm.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* divides the care of the two things, body and soul. Socrates tells Gorgias that the care, θεραπεία, of the body has two parts, gymnastics and medicine, and that the art of the soul is politics, whose parts are legislation and justice, justice answering to medicine; all four always treat, θεραπευουσῶν, for the best, the one the body and the other the soul, and flattery, which guesses rather than knows, slips in under each (464b–c; see ἰατρική).

The *Republic*'s Asclepius treats only one kind of patient. Asclepius, Socrates suggests, showed medicine to bodies healthy by nature and regimen that had some localized disease, driving it out with drugs and the knife and prescribing their usual regimen, so as not to harm their public life; bodies

diseased through and through he would not undertake, draining off and pouring in by regimens little by little, to give a man a long and bad life, and the man who could not live in his established round he did not think he should treat, θεραπεύειν (407c–e; see κεφαλή). The Thracian's rule refuses the part without the whole; Asclepius refuses the whole that cannot be made sound.

Translation in this edition

"Treat" for every form: θεραπεύειν (156b8, 157a1, 157b3), θεραπεῦσαι (156c2), θεραπεύειν in "treat and heal" (156c5), θεραπεύεσθαι (157a3), θεραπευθῆναι (157b4). At 157a1 the active infinitive, "one must treat that", becomes the English passive, "it is the soul that must be treated". At 157a2 "the rest of the body" follows B, W and Stobaeus; T has τοῦ ὅλου σώματος, "the whole body" (see ἔχειν καλῶς). At 157b3 the future πείσει, "persuades", is the reading of a later manuscript; B, T and W have the subjunctive πείσῃ.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἐντολή; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ; ἔχειν καλῶς; ἰάομαι; ἰατρική; κεφαλή; παρέχω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα.

θερμότης · heat

θερμότης, *thermotēs*, "heat"

Attested: θερμότης (*thermotēs*; 168e). Heat, warmth. It comes in Socrates' list of powers whose relation to themselves is in doubt, beside "motion moving itself": "heat burning itself" (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; ἀπιστία; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; καίω; κίνησις). Heat that burns itself would be the burning turned on the burner. In the *Phaedo* Socrates gives the noun as the safe and ignorant answer to the question what, coming into a body, will make it hot: he will not say "heat", he tells Cebes, but, more subtly, "fire" (105b–c). The safe answer can be read as the pattern of Critias' principle at 169e, where whoever has speed is fast and whoever has beauty beautiful (see κάλλος).

See also ἀδύνατος; ἀπιστία; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; καίω; κάλλος; κίνησις.

θέω · run

ἔθει, *ethei*, "came running"; θεῖν, *thein*, "running"

Attested: ἔθει (*ethei*; 153b), θεῖν (*thein*; 159c). To run. In the opening scene it is Chaerephon's verb: Socrates tells how he "jumped up from the middle of them all, came running over to me, and seized me by the hand" (153b; see μανικός), and the edition's note at 153b calls him "a man who did everything at a run". In the argument it is one of the schoolboy's exercises: "And running and jumping, and all the actions of the body: aren't the ones done nimbly and quickly the fine ones, and the ones done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones?" (159c–d; see αἰσχρός). Running is the plainest case of the argument's premise, an action whose excellence is its speed. Xenophon's Socrates, independently of Plato, uses the example the other way: what is fine for running is often ugly for wrestling, and what is fine for wrestling ugly for running (see καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως).[152]

See also αἰσχρός; καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως; μανικός.

θορυβέω · fluster

τεθορυβημένοι, *tethorybēmenoi*, "flustered"

Attested: τεθορυβημένοι (*tethorybēmenoi*; 154c). To make an uproar; in the passive, to be thrown into confusion, flustered. Θόρυβος is the noise of a crowd. When Charmides comes in, Socrates says, "all the rest, it seemed to me, were in love with him, so astounded and flustered were they when he came in" (154c; see ἐκπλήσσω). In the *Protagoras* the same noise greets a pretender. In the Assembly, Socrates says, when the question is building the Athenians send for builders, and if anyone else tries to advise them whom they do not think a craftsman, even if he is very beautiful and rich and wellborn, they will not hear him but laugh and shout him down, θορυβοῦσιν,

[152] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.8.7.

until he gives up or the archers drag him away (319b–c). The three gifts are the ones the Thracian charged Socrates not to yield to: "he charged me very strictly to let no one be so rich, or so wellborn, or so beautiful, as to persuade me to do otherwise" (157b–c; see γενναῖος).

See also γενναῖος; ἐκπλήσσω.

Θρᾷξ · Thracian

Θρᾳκῶν, *Thrāikōn*, "Thracian"; Θρᾲξ, *Thrāix*, "Thracian"; Θρᾳκός, *Thrāikos*, "Thracian's", "(from the) Thracian"

Attested: Θρᾳκῶν (*Thrāikōn*; 156d), Θρᾲξ (*Thrāix*; 156d), Θρᾳκός (*Thrāikos*; 157c, 175e). Thracian; the Thracians were the peoples north of the Aegean, between Macedonia and the Black Sea. Socrates learned the charm "out there on campaign from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis" (156d; see Ζάλμοξις), and the charms are "the Thracian's charms" (157c) and, at the end, Socrates speaks of "the charm I learned from the Thracian" (175e; see ἐπῳδή). The Thracian is given no name, and his teaching is reported as his king's (156d–e). Herodotus calls the Thracians the most numerous people after the Indians, and says that if they were ruled by one man or of one mind they would be invincible, ἄμαχον, and much the strongest of all nations; but that cannot happen, and so they are weak.[153] The word is the one Socrates uses of the boy at 154d (see ἄμαχος).

See also ἄμαχος; ἐπῳδή; Ζάλμοξις.

θρασύτης · boldness

θρασύτης, *thrasytēs*, "boldness"

Attested: θρασύτης (*thrasytēs*; 155c, 156d). Boldness, confidence; in a bad sense, rashness. Socrates uses it of himself twice. When the boy sits down beside him, he says, "the boldness I'd had before, sure as I was that I would talk to him with the greatest of ease, had been knocked clean out of me"

[153] Herodotus 5.3.1.

(155c; see ἐκκόπτω); when the boy accepts the doctors' principle, Socrates' boldness gathers itself together again, little by little (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω; κατὰ σμικρόν). At 156d2 "began to gather itself together" renders συνηγείρετο, from συναγείρω, "gather", the reading of T and of a later hand in B; B as first written has ξυνεγείρετο, from another verb, "was roused". The noun that names his recovered confidence also names rashness. In the *Laches* Nicias draws the line: courage and forethought belong to very few, but boldness, θρασύτης, daring and fearlessness without forethought to very many, men, women, children and beasts; what Laches and the many call courageous he calls bold (197b–c).

See also ἀναζωπυρέω; ἐκκόπτω; κατὰ σμικρόν.

θρέμμα · creature

θρέμματος, *thremmatos*, "(by) a creature"

Attested: θρέμματος (*thremmatos*; 155e). A creature, a nursling, an animal reared; from τρέφω, "rear". Socrates closes his recollection of Cydias: "for I felt I had been caught by just such a creature myself" (155e; see ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας). The creature is the lion of Cydias' line, and in it, as the edition's note at 155e explains, "the lover is the fawn and the beautiful boy the lion". In the *Republic* Socrates compares the paid teachers who sell the opinions of the many to a man who has learned the tempers and desires of a great and strong creature he is rearing, θρέμματος μεγάλου καὶ ἰσχυροῦ, how to approach and handle it and what makes it fierce or gentle, and gives the name of wisdom to what he has learned, though he knows nothing of what in it is fine or shameful (493a–b). Plato's creature there is the crowd.

See also ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας.

I Iota

ἰάομαι · cure, heal

To cure: the doctors' aim, and the work that may not know its benefit · Charmides

ἰᾶσθαι, *iāsthai*, "cure", "heal"; τὸ ἰᾶσθαι, *to iāsthai*, "healing"; ἰᾶτο, *iātο*, "(he) is treating"; ἰᾶται, *iātai*, "(his) treatment"

At a Glance

The word. To heal, cure, remedy; the verb from which ἰατρός, "doctor", and ἰατρική, "medicine", are formed.

In the *Charmides*. Six times: the good doctors cannot "cure the eyes on their own" (156b) and "try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c); Zalmoxis forbids trying "to cure the body without the soul" (156e); "healing" is a kind of doing (161e); and Socrates asks whether a doctor must know "when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not" (164b).

In this edition. "Cure", "heal", "healing"; "treating", "treatment" at 164b.

A place to read. 156b–e and 164a–c.

Meaning

Ἰᾶσθαι is to make well what is sick or wounded: to heal a wound, cure a disease, remedy an evil. It names the end of the doctor's work, where θεραπεύειν names the care that aims at it (see θεραπεύω), and in Plato it can be said of any remedy, of the soul as well as the body. The dialogue calls the result health, ὑγίεια, and keeps the healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, for medicine's object (see ὑγίεια).

Use in the book

The verb has two settings. In the account of the charm it states the doctors' aim and its limits: they cannot undertake "to cure the eyes on their own"

(156b), they "try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός), and Zalmoxis extends the rule: "just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either" (156e; see Ζάλμοξις; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς). Each time the verb is governed by "try" or "undertake", ἐπιχειρεῖν: curing is what the doctor attempts (see ἐπιχειρέω).

In the argument the verb becomes an example of action. Against the boy's formula Socrates says, "Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Then the doctor returns as Critias' craftsman: Socrates asks whether a doctor, "in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating", and then, "Now must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not? ..." "Perhaps not" (164a–b; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). The healing can succeed without the healer's knowing that it has; the gap between curing and knowing that one has cured is the one Critias closes, in his next answer, with self-knowledge (164c–d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156b The good doctors say they cannot cure the eyes on their own.

156c They try to treat and heal the part along with the whole.

156e Zalmoxis: one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, the head without the body, or the body without the soul.

161e Healing, building and weaving are all doing something.

164b A doctor makes something beneficial for himself and for the patient he treats; must he know when his treatment is beneficial?

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* Aristophanes, beginning his speech, says that men have wholly failed to perceive the power of love, or they would have built him the greatest temples and altars; for love is the most philanthropic of the gods, the helper of men "and a doctor of those things whose healing would be the

greatest happiness for the human race" (189c–d). Love is cast as the doctor and the human condition as the patient, and Aristophanes' myth of the halved beings that follows can be read as the diagnosis.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle uses the noun of the family for punishment. That virtue is concerned with pleasures and pains, he says, is shown by punishments, which are inflicted by means of them, "for they are a kind of cure, and cures naturally work by contraries".[154]

Translation in this edition

"Cure" for ἰᾶσθαι at 156b7 and 156e1; "heal" in "treat and heal" at 156c5, and "healing" for τὸ ἰᾶσθαι at 161e6. At 164b1 the optative ἰῷτο becomes "the patient he is treating", and at 164b8 ἰᾶται becomes "his treatment": the English moves to "treat" where the question is whether the doctor knows the effect of what he does.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιχειρέω; Ζάλμοξις; θεραπεύω; ἰατρική; ἰατρός; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑγίεια.

ἰατρική · medicine

Medicine, the dialogue's model of a knowledge with an object and a work · Charmides

ἰατρική, *iatrikē*, "medicine"; ἰατρικῆς, *iatrikēs*, "(about, without) medicine"; ἰατρικῇ, *iatrikēi*, "(by) medicine"; ἰατρικήν, *iatrikēn*, "medicine", "doctoring"

At a Glance

The word. The medical art, ἡ ἰατρικὴ τέχνη: the craft that belongs to the ἰατρός, the doctor.

[154] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.3, 1104b16–18.

In the *Charmides*. Thirteen times. Socrates' pretended "doctoring" (158e); "And medicine ... is knowledge of the healthy?" (165c); "he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance" (170c); "Then the medical man doesn't know about medicine either" (170e); and at the end, "will medicine make us any less healthy ...?" (174c).

In this edition. "Medicine"; "doctoring" once (158e), as the Glossary records.

A place to read. 165c–166a and 170b–171c.

Meaning

Ἰατρική is an adjective made into a noun, with τέχνη, "craft", or ἐπιστήμη, "knowledge", understood: the art of the doctor. For Plato's Socrates it is a favourite craft to argue with. It has a subject, the body; an object, the healthy and the diseased; and a product, health. Its practitioners can be told apart, and it can be taught. The edition's Glossary records how the dialogue keeps object and product distinct: "medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health" (Glossary, "health").

Use in the book

The word enters as a joke. Socrates is playing the doctor at Critias' suggestion (155b), and he proposes to look into the boy's temperance with him, so that, as he puts it, "I ... won't set about my doctoring without looking into things" (158e; see ἀσκέπτως; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The doctoring is the inquiry.

Then medicine becomes the model. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates asks for its object and its work on medicine's pattern: "And medicine ... is knowledge of the healthy?" "Certainly" (165c), and its work is health (165c–d; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias objects that temperance is not like the other kinds of knowledge (165e; see ζήτησις).

In the long examination of 170a–171c medicine becomes the rival. If temperance is knowledge of knowledge alone, the temperate man "knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance" (170c; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). The consequence is drawn with a straight face: since knowledge

of knowledge was assigned to temperance alone, the medical man does not know about medicine either, "since medicine is in fact a knowledge" (170e–171a; see ἰατρικός). The edition's note at 171a explains the joke: the conclusion follows "because medicine has just been classed as a knowledge, and knowledge of knowledge was given to temperance alone". Medicine is defined by its object, and whoever would look into it must look into it there (171a–b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός), so that no one could follow what a doctor says and does "without medicine" (171b; see ἐπακολουθέω).

At the end medicine is the standard. If the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, Socrates asks, "will medicine make us any less healthy ...?" "No less" (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ); and temperance, set over the crafts, would not make us healthy in medicine's place (174e; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). The last three uses can be read as a measure of the definitions: medicine goes on doing its work through all of them, and the temperance of knowledge of knowledge is shown to do none.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

158e Socrates will not set about his doctoring without looking into things.

165c Medicine is knowledge of the healthy; what use is it and what does it produce?

170b–c The knowledge of the healthy is medicine; the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.

170e–171a One will not discuss medicine with the doctor; the medical man does not know about medicine, since medicine is a knowledge.

171a–b Medicine is defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased, and must be looked into there; no one can follow a doctor without medicine.

174c Without the knowledge of good and bad, medicine will still make us healthy.

174e Would temperance make us healthy, and not medicine?

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* medicine is the art that flattery imitates. Socrates tells Gorgias and Polus that cookery has slipped in under medicine and pretends to know the best foods for the body, so that before children the doctor would die of hunger (464d–e; see ἀληθινός); cookery he will not call a craft, only

experience, since it can give no reasoned account of the things it serves up, of what they are by nature (465a; see ἄλογος). Later Socrates makes justice the medicine of the soul. As money-making frees us from poverty and medicine from disease, so the penalty frees us from licentiousness and injustice; being treated is not pleasant but beneficial; and the penalty "makes men temperate and more just, and becomes a medicine of wickedness" (478a–d).

Other ancient sources

The Hippocratic treatise *On Ancient Medicine*, of the late fifth century BC, argues for medicine's claim to be a craft from the differences between its practitioners. Its craftsmen, the writer says, are some poor and some far superior, which could not be so if there were no medicine at all; all would be equally inexperienced and without knowledge of it, and chance would govern everything for the sick.[155] The test the *Charmides* cannot perform, telling the good doctor from the bad, can be read as the treatise's proof that there is something to know.

Aristotle uses medicine to separate experience from craft. To judge that a certain remedy helped Callias, sick with this disease, and Socrates, and many others one by one, Callias and Socrates standing for any patients, belongs to experience; to judge that it helps all of one kind, marked off as a class, when they are sick with this disease, the phlegmatic, say, or the bilious when they burn with fever, belongs to craft.[156]

Translation in this edition

"Medicine" throughout, and "doctoring" for ἐπὶ τὴν ἰατρικήν at 158e2, of Socrates' pretence, as the Glossary records. At 170e12 "the medical man" renders ὁ ἰατρικός (see ἰατρικός).

See also

ἀληθινός; ἄλογος; ἀσκέπτως; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπακολουθέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ζήτησις; ἦ ἰατρικός; θεραπεύω; ἰάομαι; ἰατρικός; ἰατρός; καλὸν ἔργον; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι.

[155] Hippocrates, *On Ancient Medicine* 1.
[156] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1, 981a5–12.

ἰατρικός · medical man

ὁ ἰατρικός, *ho iatrikos*, "the medical man"; ἰατρικός ἐστιν, *iatrikos estin*, "he is a doctor"

Attested: ὁ ἰατρικός (*ho iatrikos*; 170e); also in the phrase ᾗ ἰατρικός, "in so far as he is a doctor" (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). Medical, skilled in medicine; with the article, the man who has the medical art. It comes in the argument's deadpan conclusion, as the edition's note at 171a calls it: "But about knowledge the doctor knows nothing; that, we assigned to temperance alone." "Yes." "Then the medical man doesn't know about medicine either, since medicine is in fact a knowledge" (170e–171a; see ἰατρική). The adjective names the doctor by his art, so that the conclusion denies the art's knowledge of itself to the very man named for having it. At 170e12 Burnet prints ἰατρικός with B and T; a later hand in T has ἰατρός, "the doctor". The *Symposium*'s "most medical" man, the one who can tell the fine love of the body from the shameful, is told elsewhere (*Symposium* 186c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους).

See also ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ᾗ ἰατρικός; ἰατρική.

ἰατρός · doctor

The doctor: Socrates' disguise, the model craftsman, the expert no one else can check · Charmides

ἰατρῷ, *iatrōi*, "(to a) doctor"; ἰατρῶν, *iatrōn*, "(of the) doctors"; ἰατροί, *iatroi*, "doctors"; ἰατρούς, *iatrous*, "doctors"; ἰατρός, *iatros*, "doctor"; ἰατρόν, *iatron*, "doctor"

At a Glance

The word. Healer, physician; the noun of ἰάομαι, "heal".

In the *Charmides*. Seventeen times: Critias' errand, to "introduce him to a doctor" (155b); the "good doctors" and the "Greek doctors" (156b, 156e); "a doctor, in making someone healthy" (164a); "the true doctor from

the one who is not" (170e); and the dream, in which no pretended doctor would escape our notice (173b).

In this edition. "Doctor".

A place to read. 170d–171c.

Meaning

Ἰατρός is the healer. In Homer he is a healer of wounds; by Plato's time his craft could be learned from a master for a fee (*Protagoras* 311b–c), and he might practise privately or in the city's service (*Gorgias* 514d–e). In Socratic argument the doctor is the standard case of a man who knows, the craftsman whose knowledge has a clear object and a visible result, and for the same reason the standard case of a man who can be impersonated.

Use in the book

The doctor has three parts in the dialogue. The first is a disguise. Critias sends for the boy: "Tell him I want to introduce him to a doctor about the complaint he was telling me about the other day" (155b; see ἀσθένεια). The edition's note at 155b: "Critias' ruse casts Socrates as a doctor." Socrates plays the part and then outbids it, moving from the good doctors (156b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός) to "the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said even to make one immortal" (156d; see ἀπαθανατίζω; Ζάλμοξις), and to the Thracian's charge that most diseases elude "the Greek doctors" because they neglect the whole (156e; see ἀμελέω). The Thracian's word for the error of the age makes the noun a title of the soul's healer too: "some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b; see χωρὶς ἑκατέρου).

The second part is the model craftsman. Testing Critias' "doing of good things", Socrates asks whether a doctor who makes someone healthy makes something beneficial for himself and for his patient (164a–b), and finds that the doctor may act beneficially and yet not know "himself—how he has acted" (164c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἰάομαι).

The third part is the expert whom no one else can check. If temperance is knowledge of knowledge alone, the temperate man "will be able to

distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is" (170e; see ἀληθινός; ἐπιστήμων); the doctor must be examined "in so far as he is a doctor" (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός); and only a doctor could do it: "Nor could anyone else, it seems, except a doctor, and so not the temperate man either; for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate" (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). In the dream of a city ruled by such a temperance, no doctor who pretended to know what he did not know would escape notice (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας). The pretended doctor of the prologue can be read as the problem of the argument: only another doctor could have told whether Socrates was one.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

155b Critias will introduce the boy to a doctor about his complaint.

156b The good doctors' rule for sore eyes.

156d The Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are said to make one immortal.

156e Most diseases elude the Greek doctors, because they neglect the whole.

157b The mistake of the age: some try to be doctors of temperance and of health separately.

164a–c A doctor who heals makes something beneficial, but need not know when his treatment is beneficial.

170e The temperate man could not tell the pretended doctor from the true one; the doctor understands only the healthy and the diseased.

171a–c The doctor must be examined in so far as he is a doctor, and only a doctor could do it.

173b In the dream, no pretended doctor would escape our notice.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laches* Nicias marks the limit of the doctor's knowledge. Laches objects that doctors know what is to be feared in disease; Nicias answers that doctors know no more about the sick than to say what is healthy and diseased, and asks whether Laches thinks the doctors know whether health is more to be feared than sickness for a given man, when for many it would be

better not to rise from their illness than to rise (195b–d). The *Charmides* assigns the doctor the same object, "the healthy and the diseased" (170e).

In the *Republic* the doctor's licence passes to the rulers: the lie that is useful to men as a remedy belongs to them alone (389b; see φάρμακον), and for a private citizen to lie to them is as great a fault as, or greater than, for a sick man not to tell his doctor the truth about his body (389c).

Other ancient sources

Homer gives the doctor's worth in a line. When Machaon, the son of Asclepius and one of the Greeks' two healers, is wounded, the Cretan king Idomeneus urges Nestor to take him back to the ships, "for a healer is a man worth many others, to cut out arrows and spread soothing drugs".[157]

Xenophon's Socrates mocks the man who would be a doctor without learning. Those who want a doctor's post from the city, he says, might begin their speech: "Men of Athens, I have never learned the art of medicine from anyone, nor sought any doctor to be my teacher; I have guarded not only against learning anything from the doctors but even against seeming to have learned it; all the same, give me the post, for I will try to learn by taking risks on you." Everyone present laughed.[158]

Translation in this edition

"Doctor" throughout. At 156d7 Burnet brackets ἰατροί, "doctors", after Cobet, so that the Thracian says that "the Greeks" were right (see Ζάλμοξις).

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀληθινός; ἀμελέω; ἀπαθανατίζω; ἀσθένεια; ἐπιστήμων; Ζάλμοξις; ᾗ ἰατρικός; ἰάομαι; ἰατρική; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; ὁμότεχνος; φάρμακον; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου.

[157] Homer, *Iliad* 11.514–515.
[158] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.2.5.

ἰδέα · looks

The boy's looks, always named beside something that cannot be seen · Charmides

τῇ ἰδέᾳ, *tēi ideāi*, "(in his) looks"; τῆς ἰδέας, *tēs ideas*, "(of your) looks"; τὴν ἰδέαν, *tēn idean*, "(in your) looks"

At a Glance

The word. The look of a thing: appearance, form, shape; of a person, looks and figure.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, each of the boy's looks: Critias says that "Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks" (157d); Socrates, "As for what can be seen of your looks" (158b); and at the end, "being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul" (175d–e).

In this edition. "Looks".

A place to read. 157d–158c.

Meaning

Ἰδέα comes from ἰδεῖν, "to see": the look that a thing presents, its appearance or form, and from there its kind or type. Greek poets and historians use it of a person's looks and of the general character of a thing, as Thucydides does of the plague. Plato uses it, with εἶδος beside it, for the form that a definition seeks (see εἶδος).

Use in the book

Each use of the word sets the boy's looks beside something else. Critias pairs them with the virtue Socrates' charm is for: "Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for" (157d; see ἡλικιώτης). Socrates pairs them with the soul's endowment. "As for what can be seen of your looks, dear son of Glaucon, you seem to me to fall short of none of your forebears in any respect"; and then: "if, as Critias here says, you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest, then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides ... your mother bore" (158b; see εὖ πέφυκα; μακάριος). At the end Socrates' grief joins

looks and soul in one phrase: "But on your account, Charmides ... I am very aggrieved, if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance" (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω).

The phrase of 158a–b, τὰ ὁρώμενα τῆς ἰδέας, "what can be seen of your looks", divides the look itself into what is seen and what is not. The dialogue keeps the word for the seen part and asks its question about the other. The boy's ἰδέα is never doubted; it is the one thing in the dialogue on which everyone agrees at sight.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

157d Critias: Charmides surpasses those his age in looks and in temperance.

158b What can be seen of the boy's looks falls short of none of his forebears.

175d–e Socrates is aggrieved for the boy, being such in looks and most temperate in soul, if temperance is of no benefit to him.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedrus* the look of a body is what recalls the beauty seen before birth. The newly initiated soul, which saw much of what was there, when it sees a godlike face that imitates beauty well, or some form of a body, σώματος ἰδέαν, first shudders, then reverences the beloved as a god, and, if it did not fear to be thought quite mad, would sacrifice to him as to a statue and a god (251a; see ἄγαλμα).

The *Republic* can be read as reversing the *Charmides*' usage. We speak of many beautiful and many good things, Socrates says, and again of the beautiful itself and the good itself, setting each under one ἰδέα; and "the many things, we say, are seen and not grasped by thought, and the ideas in turn are grasped by thought and not seen" (507b).

Other ancient sources

Pindar uses the word of a young athlete. Closing an ode for Hagesidamus of Western Locri, a boy boxer, he says that he praised Archestratus' "beloved boy", whom he saw prevail by the might of his hand beside the altar at

Olympia, "handsome in his looks", ἰδέᾳ τε καλόν, "and tempered with the ripeness of youth that once warded off an unpitying doom from Ganymede", the Trojan prince whom Zeus carried off for his beauty, "together with the Cyprus-born", Aphrodite.[159]

Thucydides uses it of the plague at Athens. Passing over many other strange features, in which it struck one man differently from another, he says, "such was the disease in its general form".[160]

Translation in this edition

"Looks" at each place: τῇ ἰδέᾳ (157d2), "what can be seen of your looks" for τὰ ὁρώμενα τῆς ἰδέας (158a7–b1), and τὴν ἰδέαν (175d7), an accusative of respect, "in your looks". On the reading δοκεῖ at 157d2 see ἡλικιώτης. At 158b1 "fall short" renders ὑποβεβηκέναι, a conjecture of Madvig's that Burnet prints; B and W have ὑπερβεβληκέναι, "surpassed", and T, with a variant in W, τῶν προγόνων καταισχύνειν, "to disgrace none of your forebears", as the edition's note at 158b explains.

See also

ἄγαλμα; ἀγανακτέω; εἶδος; εὖ πέφυκα; ἡλικιώτης; κάλλος; μακάριος.

ἱερόν · shrine, temple

τοῦ ἱεροῦ, *tou hierou*, "(the) shrine"; τὸ ἱερόν, *to hieron*, "(his) temple"

Attested: τοῦ τῆς Βασίλης ἱεροῦ (*tou tēs Basilēs hierou*; 153a), εἰς τὸ ἱερόν (*eis to hieron*; 164e). A sacred place, a sanctuary or temple; the neuter of ἱερός, "holy". The dialogue's first sentence places the wrestling-school opposite "the shrine of Basile" (153a; see Βασίλη; καταντικρύ). The second use is Critias' reading of the Delphic inscription: "That is how the god addresses those who enter his temple, differently from men" (164e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; εἶσειμι). The second temple is Apollo's at Delphi, whose inscriptions Critias

[159] Pindar, *Olympian* 10.99–105.
[160] Thucydides 2.51.1.

reads as the god's greeting. The conversation is held opposite one sanctuary and turns, at its middle, on the inscription of another.

See also Βασίλη; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; εἶσειμι; καταντικρύ.

ἱκανός · capable, enough

ἱκανὸς εἶναι, *hikanos einai*, "to be capable"; ἱκανῶς, *hikanōs*, "well enough", "enough", "sufficient", "adequately"

Attested: ἱκανὸς εἶναι (*hikanos einai*; 169a); the adverb ἱκανῶς at 158b (twice), 158c, 169a and 176b. Sufficient, enough; of a person, competent, able. The adverb measures the boy: if he is "well enough endowed for temperance and the rest" (158b; see εὖ πέφυκα), and if he is "temperate enough" (158b), he needs no charm; so Socrates asks whether he has "a sufficient share of temperance" (158c). When the question becomes hard, Socrates denies the measure to himself: "It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases ... I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a; see διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ). At the end the boy hands the measure back to Socrates: "nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it's enough" (176b; see ἐπᾴδω).

See also διαιρέω; ἐπᾴδω; εὖ πέφυκα; μέγας ἀνήρ.

ἱμάτιον · cloak

τοῦ ἱματίου, *tou himatiou*, "his cloak"; ἱμάτιον, *himation*, "cloak"

Attested: ἱματίου (*himatiou*; 155d), ἱμάτιον (*himation*; 161e, 165e). The cloak, the oblong outer garment worn over the tunic. It appears three times, each in a different register. In the prologue it is the boy's: "then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak, and I was on fire" (155d; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; φλέγομαι). In the refutation of "doing one's own business" it is the citizen's: Socrates imagines a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak (161e; see ἀλλότριος; κελεύω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). And in Critias'

objection it is a product: "a cloak of weaving", among the works one can point to for the crafts (165e; see ἔργον; ὑφαντική). The cloak passes from the boy's body to the argument's examples. Xenophon's Spartan boys kept both hands inside their cloaks as they walked the streets in silence (see ἡσυχῇ).[161]

See also ἀλλότριος; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἔργον; ἡσυχῇ; κελεύω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑφαντική; φλέγομαι.

ἰσχυρός · strong, heavy

ἰσχυρά, *ischyra*, "(very) heavy"; ἰσχυραί, *ischyrai*, "strong"

Attested: ἰσχυρά (*ischyra*; 153b), ἰσχυραί (*ischyrai*; 160c). Strong, mighty, vehement; of a battle, hard-fought. The first use is the news from Potidaea, as Chaerephon has heard it: "the word here ... is that the fighting was very heavy, and that many people we know were killed in it" (153b–c). The second is in the refutation of quietness: "quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places" (160b–c; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἡσυχῇ). The strength the argument praises in actions can be read as the strength of the battle Socrates has just come from. In the *Republic* the crowd is "a great and strong creature" whose tempers the sophist studies (493a–b; see θρέμμα).

See also δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἡσυχῇ; θρέμμα.

[161] Xenophon, *Constitution of the Lacedaemonians* 3.4.

K Kappa

καίω · burn

κάειν, *kaein*, "burning"

Attested: κάειν (*kaein*; 168e). To burn, kindle, set on fire. It comes in Socrates' list of powers that might or might not be directed at themselves, as "heat burning itself" (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; θερμότης; κίνησις). Fire's work is to burn other things, and heat that burned itself would be a power whose object is itself, like the knowledge of itself under examination. The prologue's burning is another verb: Socrates, seeing inside the boy's cloak, is "on fire" (155d; see φλέγομαι). The fire he felt there was directed at the boy. Burning is also the surgeon's word: in the *Gorgias* Socrates bids the wrongdoer present himself for punishment bravely, with his eyes shut, as to a doctor for cutting and burning, τέμνειν καὶ κάειν (480c).

See also ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; θερμότης; κίνησις; φλέγομαι.

κακός · bad

Bad, never evil: the word at the three joints of the argument · Charmides

κακά, *kaka*, "bad (things)"; κακόν, *kakon*, "bad"; κακούς, *kakous*, "bad"; κακοῦ, *kakou*, "bad"; κακῶς, *kakōs*, "makes a mess of"

At a Glance

The word. Bad in every sense: of low birth, cowardly, worthless, harmful, wretched; the opposite of ἀγαθός.

In the *Charmides*. Nine times, with the adverb once: everything "bad and good alike" flows from the soul (156e); modesty is "no more good than bad" (161b); the man who makes "not good things but bad ones is not

temperate" (163e); and the knowledge "By which he knows good ... and bad" (174b).

In this edition. "Bad", never "evil"; "makes a mess of" for the adverb (162d).

A place to read. 163d–e and 174b–d.

Meaning

Κακός is the general Greek word for what is not as it should be. In Homer the κακός is the worthless man, the coward or the low-born, set against the ἐσθλός, the brave and noble; in classical prose it covers the bad in conduct, the harmful in things and the wretched in fortune. The edition renders it "bad" and never "evil", as the Glossary records (Glossary, "bad"), and the Key Words give the reason: the context of 174b–d "is benefit and harm", and "evil" would bring in "a narrowly moral sense and a biblical echo that the Greek does not have".

Use in the book

The edition's Key Words name three joints of the argument where the pair "good and bad" appears: the Thracian doctrine, the definition Critias offers, and the knowledge he names at the end (Key Words, "Good and bad"). In the Thracian doctrine everything, "bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul" (156e; see ἐπιρρέω). In Critias' definition, the man who makes "not good things but bad ones is not temperate", and "the one who makes good things and not bad ones is" (163e; see τὰ κακά). At the end, the knowledge that makes us happy is the one "By which he knows good ... and bad" (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The English keeps "good and bad" all three times, the Key Words say, "so that the reader can see Critias' last answer return to his first".

Between the joints the word does smaller work. Temperance is good "if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad", whereas modesty "is no more good than bad" (161a–b; see αἰδώς). Critias is as angry with Charmides "as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses" (162d; see ὑποκριτής). The first joint puts the bad before the

good, as the source of disease; the last can be read as giving the word its full weight: at 174b–d bad is what harms, and the knowledge of good and bad is the knowledge that benefits.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective or the adverb occurs.

156e Everything bad and good alike, for the body and the whole human being, starts from the soul.

161a–b Temperance makes good and not bad; modesty is no more good than bad.

162d Critias is as angry as a poet with an actor who makes a mess of his verses.

163e The man who does or makes bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things.

174b–d The knowledge of good and bad makes us do well; without it each thing would not be done well and beneficially.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* Socrates claims Simonides for his own doctrine. The poet was not so uneducated, he says, as to praise those who willingly do nothing bad, as though some did bad things willingly; for Socrates is fairly sure that "no one of the wise men thinks that any human being errs willingly or willingly does shameful and bad things, but they know well that all who do shameful and bad things do them unwillingly" (345d–e). The doctrine can be read as the ground of 174b: if no one does bad things willingly, the knowledge of good and bad is the knowledge that would put an end to them.

Other ancient sources

Homer uses the word of the worthless soldier. Nestor advises Agamemnon to array the army by tribes and clans, for then "you will know which of the leaders is bad, κακός, and which of the men, and which is good".[162]

Aristotle ties the bad to the unlimited. Error, he says, is possible in many ways, "for the bad is of the boundless, as the Pythagoreans pictured it, and

[162] Homer, *Iliad* 2.362–366.

the good of the bounded", while success is possible in one way only; and he quotes a verse: "men are good in one way, but bad in all sorts of ways".[163]

Translation in this edition

"Bad" for κακός throughout: κακά (156e7, 163e4, 163e8, 163e9), κακόν (161b2, 174b10, 174c3), κακούς (161a9) and κακοῦ (174d6). The adverb κακῶς at 162d3, in κακῶς διατιθέντι, is "makes a mess of". At 161b1 Burnet, following Ast, brackets μή before οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ἀγαθόν (see αἰδώς).

See also

αἰδώς; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὰ κακά; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; ὑποκριτής.

κάλλιστος · most beautiful, finest

καλλίστου, *kallistou*, "the most beautiful"; κάλλιστον, *kalliston*, "finest"; κάλλιστα, *kallista*, "finest"

Attested: καλλίστου (*kallistou*; 154a), κάλλιστον (*kalliston*; 159c, 159d, 175a), κάλλιστα (*kallista*; 160a). The superlative of καλός. The word moves through the dialogue's two senses of its root (see καλός). It begins with the boy, the lovers' object, "the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway" (154a; see δοκέω); it becomes the schoolroom's measure, "which is finest at the writing-master's" (159c; see ἡσυχῇ), "not the quiet that is finest, but the quickest and the nimblest" (159d), understanding "finest when it is done ... as quickly as possible" (160a); and it ends with temperance, when Socrates says: "surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής; ὄφελος). In the first place and the last the superlative rests on opinion: the boy "is thought" most beautiful, temperance "is agreed" finest. At 159c3 Stephanus would read the comparative κάλλιον, "finer", and Schanz κάλλιόν ἐστιν; Burnet keeps the superlative.

[163] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6, 1106b28–35.

See also ἀνωφελής; δοκέω; ἡσυχῇ; καλός; ὄφελος.

κάλλος · beauty

Beauty: the young men's distinction, the boy's stature, the plainest case of having and being · Charmides

κάλλει, *kallei*, "(in, for its) beauty"; κάλλος, *kallos*, "beauty"

At a Glance

The word. Beauty, chiefly of body and face; the noun of καλός.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: Socrates asks whether any of the young men are "outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d); the boy is "a marvel of stature and beauty" (154c); his father's house is celebrated "for its outstanding beauty and virtue" (157e–158a); and Critias' principle, "when he has beauty, beautiful" (169e).

In this edition. "Beauty".

A place to read. 153d–154d.

Meaning

Κάλλος is beauty: the beauty of a body or a face first, then the loveliness of things, of a horse, a garment or a city; in Plato also the beauty of souls, of ways of life and of kinds of knowledge (*Symposium* 210b–d), and beauty itself (*Phaedrus* 250e). Where the adjective καλός is shared between bodies and acts (see καλός), the noun stays for the most part with looks, and the *Charmides* uses it so.

Use in the book

The noun frames the prologue. Socrates' question about the young men of Athens sets the terms of the scene: whether any of the young men "had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος). Critias answers about beauty at once (154a), and the question about wisdom has to wait for the boy to talk. The boy's entrance gives the noun its sight: "All the same, at that moment he struck me as a

marvel of stature and beauty" (154c; see θαυμάζω), the size of a body with its beauty. Socrates' praise of the boy's house then joins beauty to virtue in the poets' manner: celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon "for its outstanding beauty and virtue and everything else that goes by the name of happiness" (157e–158a; see ἐγκωμιάζω; εὐδαιμονία).

In the argument the noun is an example. Critias, defending the step from knowledge of itself to knowledge of oneself, appeals to the principle that "when he has beauty", a man is "beautiful", and so whoever has knowledge of itself will know himself (169e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γνῶσις). The noun that named the boy's distinction becomes the plainest case of having and being: beauty is seen in whoever has it, and Critias assumes that knowledge of itself would be the same.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

153d Socrates asks whether any of the young men are outstanding in wisdom, or beauty, or both.

154c The boy strikes Socrates as a marvel of stature and beauty.

157e–158a The father's house, celebrated by poets for its beauty and virtue.

169e Critias: whoever has beauty is beautiful, as whoever has knowledge of itself will know himself.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Phaedo* can be read as turning Critias' principle into a theory of cause. If anything besides the beautiful itself is beautiful, Socrates tells Cebes, it is so through nothing but its share in that beautiful; and if anyone explains a thing's beauty by its bright colour or its shape, he bids such explanations goodbye and keeps, plainly and perhaps naively, to this alone: what makes the thing beautiful is the presence of that beautiful, or its communion, or however it comes to be there, for on the manner he no longer insists, only that it is by the beautiful that all beautiful things become beautiful (100c–d).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle puts beauty in magnitude. Greatness of soul, he says, is a matter of greatness, "as beauty needs a large body: the small may be pretty and shapely, but they are not beautiful";[164] and in the *Poetics*, "beauty lies in magnitude and order", so that neither a tiny creature nor one of vast size could be beautiful.[165] The boy's "stature and beauty" (154c), τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος, can be read as Aristotle's pair.

Translation in this edition

"Beauty" at each place. The dative κάλλει is "in beauty" at 153d4 and "for its outstanding beauty" at 157e7, with διαφέρουσα. At 169e3 the English keeps the pair κάλλος, καλός as "beauty, beautiful".

See also

αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; γνῶσις; ἐγκωμιάζω; εὐδαιμονία; θαυμάζω; ἰδέα; καλός; σοφία ἢ κάλλος.

καλὸν ἔργον · fine work

Health, "a fine work for us", and the work temperance was asked to show · Charmides

καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον, *kalon hēmin ergon*, "a fine work for us"; τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον, *ti kalon hēmin ergon*, "what fine work ... for us"

At a Glance

The word. A fine work: the fine product or achievement of a craft.

In the *Charmides*. Twice in one exchange: medicine "produces health, a fine work for us" (165d), and "Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?" (165e).

In this edition. "A fine work for us"; "what fine work ... for us".

A place to read. 165c–166a.

[164] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3, 1123b6–8.
[165] Aristotle, *Poetics* 7, 1450b34–1451a4.

Meaning

Ἔργον is the work, product or achievement of a craft (see ἔργον), and καλόν adds that it is fine, worth praising. A καλὸν ἔργον is a fine deed or a handsome product; with the verb ἀπεργάζεσθαι, "produce", it is what a craft makes (see ἀπεργάζομαι). The dative ἡμῖν, "for us", makes the work a good to its users.

Use in the book

The phrase sets the standard that Critias' definition is asked to meet. Medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, would be asked what use it is and what it produces, and Socrates answers for it, "No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us" (165c–d; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). Asked "what work" house-building produces, Socrates would say "Houses", and the adjective is not used (165d). It returns when the question is put to temperance, with a further demand: "Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?" (165e; see ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος). The adjective can be read as marking the two works that matter in the dialogue, the health it began with and the work of temperance it is looking for.

Critias refuses the comparison: calculation and geometry have no work in the way that a house is the work of house-building or a cloak of weaving (165e–166a; see γεωμετρική; ζήτησις). Socrates concedes and asks instead what each knowledge is of (166a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The question of the work returns at the end, when temperance, asked again what it produces, is found to be "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

165c–e Medicine produces health, a fine work for us; house-building, houses; what fine work does temperance produce, worthy of its name?

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthyphro* puts the same question to piety. Euthyphro has called piety a service to the gods, like the service slaves give their masters, and Socrates asks

what work that service helps to produce: the servants of doctors help to produce health, those of shipbuilders a ship, those of builders a house; "what is that all-fine work, *πάγκαλον ἔργον*, which the gods produce using us as servants?" "Many fine things, Socrates." So do generals, Socrates answers, but their chief work is victory in war, and farmers' food from the earth; what is the chief of the many fine things the gods produce (13d–14a)? Euthyphro answers that it would be a long task to learn all this exactly, and turns to prayer and sacrifice (14a–b). The kingly art of the *Euthydemus*, asked what work it produces, is told elsewhere (*Euthydemus* 291d–292a; see ἀπεργάζομαι).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates says that a very short time was enough for him to go round the good carpenters, smiths, painters and sculptors and view the works of theirs approved as fine, *καλὰ ἔργα*; but he longed to meet one of the men who bore the solemn name of beautiful and good, to learn what they did to earn it.[166]

Translation in this edition

"A fine work for us" for καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον (165d1–2), and "what fine work does it produce for us" for τί καλὸν ἡμῖν ἔργον ἀπεργάζεται (165e1). At 165d5 "knowledge of how to build" renders ἐπιστήμην ... τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, the reading of T and W, where B has οἰκοδομικοῦ.

See also

ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; ἀπεργάζομαι; γεωμετρική; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἔργον; ζήτησις; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός.

[166] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 6.13–14; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός.

καλός · beautiful, fine

One word for the beautiful boy and the fine act: the flirtation and the argument · Charmides

καλός, *kalos*, "beautiful"; καλοί, *kaloi*, "beautiful"; τῶν καλῶν, *tōn kalōn*, "the beautiful ones", "the fine things"; τοὺς καλούς, *tous kalous*, "the beautiful", "beautiful (words)"; καλόν, *kalon*, "fine", "beautiful"; καλοῦ, *kalou*, "(a) beautiful (boy)", "(of the) fine"; καλά, *kala*, "fine"; κάλλιον, *kallion*, "finer", "better"; καλλίω, *kalliō*, "finer"; καλλίων, *kalliōn*, "handsomer", "more beautiful"; καλλίους, *kallious*, "finer"

At a Glance

The word. Beautiful, of persons and bodies; fine or noble, of acts and things; the opposite of αἰσχρός, "ugly" and "shameful".

In the *Charmides*. With ἀγαθός, the dialogue's commonest word of value, in both senses: "As for the beautiful ones, Socrates" (154a); "these charms are beautiful words" (157a); "temperance is one of the fine things, isn't it?" (159c); and "a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful" (167e).

In this edition. "Beautiful" of persons, of the object of love and of the charm's words; "fine" of acts, works and things, as the Glossary records.

A place to read. 154a–155a and 159c–160e.

Meaning

Καλός is the ordinary Greek word of admiration. Of a body or a face it is "beautiful", of a deed or a work "fine" or "noble", of a thing well made "handsome" or "good of its kind", and its opposite αἰσχρός covers both the ugly and the shameful (see αἰσχρός). The edition's Key Words state the problem for a translator: "Kalos is the ordinary word for a beautiful body and for a fine or noble act, and the dialogue uses both senses, one after the other"; and the consequence for a reader: "A reader who hears only one sense will miss that the argument begins with the same word as the flirtation" (Key Words, "Fine, beautiful"). The English divides the word between "beautiful" and "fine", and the two English words should be heard as one.

Use in the book

The first sense fills the prologue. Seeing young men at the door, Critias answers Socrates' question about the young men: "As for the beautiful ones, Socrates ... I think you'll know in a moment" (154a). Socrates confesses his weakness in the same word: "Where the beautiful are concerned I am simply a white measuring-line on white stone: nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη). Cydias' advice is given "speaking of a beautiful boy" (155d; see Κυδίας), the Thracian forbids anyone "so beautiful" to persuade Socrates to skip the soul (157b–c; see γενναῖος), and when the boy blushes "he looked even more beautiful" (158c; see αἰσχυντηλός). Between these the word reaches the charm itself: the charms with which the soul is treated "are beautiful words" (157a; see λόγοι καλοί). The edition's note at 157a points out that καλοί "is the word for the beautiful youth".

The second sense begins the argument. Socrates' first question to the boy's definition is a premise in the same word: "Tell me: temperance is one of the fine things, isn't it?" "Certainly" (159c; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). The comparatives of 159c–160d, "far finer", "finer", carry the refutation of quietness (see ἡσυχιότης; κάλλιστος), and the next answer is caught by the same premise, since temperance must be good as well as fine (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός). Critias' Hesiod holds that a thing made may become a disgrace "when it does not come about with what is fine" (163c; see μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ); medicine produces health, "a fine work for us" (165d; see καλὸν ἔργον); and the list of powers directed at themselves includes "a love ... of nothing beautiful" (167e; see ἔρως), which the edition's note at 167e calls "a contradiction as well as a joke; after the prologue, perhaps a pointed one". At 169e beauty is Critias' example of a quality that makes its possessor such (see κάλλος).

The two senses meet in the boy. He is himself the beautiful one of the prologue, and the first thing he grants against his own definition is that temperance is among the fine things. The refutation of quietness then tests his definition by the fine of acts, while his blush (158c) is the beautiful of the person. The dialogue can be read as asking, with one word, whether the boy's

beauty and the virtue that would make his acts fine belong together, as Critias' stock phrase assumed (154e; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός).

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective or its comparative occurs, except 154e (see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός); the superlative is listed under κάλλιστος.

154a–b The beautiful ones at the door; nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to Socrates.

155a The fine gift of poetry in Critias' family.

155d Cydias, speaking of a beautiful boy.

157a The charms are beautiful words.

157b–c No one so rich, so wellborn or so beautiful is to persuade Socrates.

157e–158a Two houses likely to produce finer and better offspring; Pyrilampes, said to have been thought the handsomest man on the continent.

158c The blushing boy looks even more beautiful.

159c–160d Temperance is one of the fine things; quick actions are finer than quiet ones, or at least no less fine.

160e Temperance is not only fine but good.

163c A thing made may become a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine.

165d–e Health, a fine work; what fine work does temperance produce?

167e A love of nothing beautiful.

169e Whoever has beauty is beautiful.

172b Whoever has knowledge of knowledge will examine others better.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Hippias Major* asks the question that the *Charmides* only presupposes. Asked what the beautiful is, Hippias answers that "a beautiful maiden is a beautiful thing". Socrates, speaking for a rude questioner he says will follow, asks whether a beautiful mare, a beautiful lyre and a beautiful pot are not beautiful too. Hippias allows the pot a lesser beauty, and Socrates answers on his behalf with Heraclitus' saying that the most beautiful of apes is ugly compared with the race of men, so that the most beautiful pot is ugly beside the race of maidens; but the questioner turns the saying round, and the most

beautiful maiden proves ugly compared with the race of gods. Reminded that he was asked for "the beautiful itself", Socrates must admit that he has answered with something no more beautiful than ugly (287e–289c).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the word two definitions in the *Rhetoric*: the fine is what, being worth choosing for its own sake, is praiseworthy, or what, being good, is pleasant because it is good; and if that is the fine, virtue must be fine, since it is good and praiseworthy.[167] In the *Metaphysics* he separates the fine from the good: the good is always in action, while the fine is found also in things that do not move, and its greatest kinds are order, proportion and the determinate, which the mathematical sciences above all display.[168]

Translation in this edition

"Beautiful" for καλός of persons and of the charm's words (154a3, 154b9, 154b10, 155d5, 157a5, 157b8), "handsomer" for καλλίων of Pyrilampes (158a3) and "more beautiful" of the blushing boy (158c5); "fine" of acts, works and things (155a3, 159c1–160e13, 163c2, 165d1, 165e1), "finer" for the comparatives, and "better" for κάλλιον at 172b6; "beautiful" again at 167e8, "love of nothing beautiful", and 169e3. At 160d2 "no less fine" renders καλά, T's reading, where B has καὶ ἄλλα; Burnet adds τά from the corrector of the Coislin manuscript.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰσχρός; αἰσχυντηλός; γενναῖος; ἔρως; ἡσυχιότης; κάλλιστος; κάλλος; καλὸν ἔργον; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; Κυδίας; λευκὴ στάθμη; λόγοι καλοί; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; τὸ καλόν.

[167] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.9, 1366a33–36.
[168] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 13.3, 1078a31–b2.

καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός · beautiful and good

The gentleman's phrase, said of the boy's soul, and taken apart word by word · Charmides

καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός, *kalos kai agathos*, "beautiful and good"

At a Glance

The word. The stock phrase for a gentleman of the proper sort, usually contracted to καλὸς κἀγαθός.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in its full form, in Critias' answer about the boy's soul: "Oh, he's thoroughly beautiful and good ... in that respect too" (154e).

In this edition. "Beautiful and good", kept literal.

A place to read. 154d–155a.

Meaning

Καλὸς κἀγαθός, "beautiful and good", was the Athenian phrase for the gentleman: well born, well brought up, well spoken of, the kind of man the best families produced. The noun καλοκἀγαθία named the quality, and Aristotle calls it complete virtue (*Eudemian Ethics* 8.3, 1249a16). The edition's note at 154e explains the choice of rendering: "Kalos kagathos, literally 'beautiful and good', was the stock phrase for a gentleman of the proper sort. Critias means the social compliment, but the word 'beautiful' in it keeps the conversation where it has been all along, and the English keeps the literal words so that the joke shows." The Glossary notes that Critias uses the phrase "in its full form".

Use in the book

Socrates has set a condition on the boy's invincibility: "If where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made" (154e; see ἄμαχος; εὖ πέφυκα). Critias answers the condition about the soul with the class phrase: "Oh, he's thoroughly beautiful and good ... in that respect too" (154e). The phrase answers for the boy's soul in the vocabulary of his breeding, and its first word

repeats the praise the company has just been giving his body. Socrates takes the answer as an invitation to strip the soul and look at it (154e; see ἀποδύω).

The phrase's two words are later taken apart. Socrates' praise of the boy's family speaks of two houses likely to produce "finer and better" offspring, καλλίω καὶ ἀμείνω, T's reading (157e; see γεννάω; ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων), and the argument against modesty separates them as two steps: "Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well" (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). The dialogue can be read as testing Critias' phrase one word at a time: temperance is agreed to be fine (159c–160d), then good (160e–161b), and in the end is asked to be beneficial (see ὠφέλιμος).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the two places where its words are taken apart.

154e Critias: the boy is thoroughly beautiful and good where his soul is concerned too.

157e Two houses likely to produce finer and better offspring.

160e Temperance is not only fine but good as well.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Lysis* Socrates first sees Lysis among the others, crowned, and standing out by his looks, "worth hearing of not only for being beautiful, but because he is beautiful and good", καλός τε κἀγαθός (207a). The phrase there, as in the *Charmides*, can be read as said of a boy whose beauty everyone can see and whose goodness has yet to be examined.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates tells Critobulus, Crito's son, how he went looking for a man to whom the solemn name belonged. Since "beautiful" was joined to "good", he went up to every beautiful man he saw, to learn whether the good was attached to the beautiful; but he found some beautiful in form who were wretched in soul, and so he let beauty of appearance go and went to one of those called beautiful and good, the landowner Ischomachus.[169]

[169] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 6.12–17.

Thucydides records the phrase as a taunt. After the Spartans on the island of Sphacteria surrendered to the Athenians in 425 BC, one of the Athenians' allies asked a prisoner, in spite, whether their dead had been beautiful and good; he answered that the spindle, meaning the arrow, would be a precious thing if it could tell the good apart, since whoever happened in the way of the stones and arrows was killed.[170]

Aristotle doubts that words can produce the quality. Arguments, he says, can urge on and stir the generous among the young, and can make a well-born character, one truly in love with the fine, open to possession by virtue; but they cannot turn the many towards καλοκἀγαθία, for the many are not made to obey shame, only fear.[171] The *Charmides* can be read as trying its own beautiful words on a boy of the first kind.

Translation in this edition

"Beautiful and good" for καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός (154e4), with "thoroughly" for πάνυ and "in that respect too" for καὶ ταῦτα.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; ἄμαχος; ἀποδύω; γεννάω; ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων; εὖ πέφυκα; καλός; λόγοι καλοί; ὠφέλιμος.

καλῶς · well, finely

Well, finely, rightly: the word of assent, of good condition, of a household run well · Charmides

καλῶς, *kalōs*, "well", "finely", "right", "(in) good condition"; καλῶς λέγεις, *kalōs legeis*, "you're right"; καλῶς ποιῶν, *kalōs poiōn*, "good for you"

At a Glance

The word. Finely, well, rightly; the adverb of καλός.

[170] Thucydides 4.40.2.

[171] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.9, 1179b4–11.

In the *Charmides*. Fifteen times: "And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?" (156c); "a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well" (171e); "those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well" (172a); "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d); and "if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175b).

In this edition. "Well", "finely", "right"; "Good for you" for the formula of thanks.

A place to read. 171d–172e.

Meaning

Καλῶς is the adverb of καλός and shares its range: finely, handsomely, well, rightly. In conversation it makes two everyday Attic formulas, of assent and of thanks, καλῶς λέγεις, "you're right", and καλῶς ποιεῖς, "good for you", "thank you". With ἔχειν it means to be in good condition (see ἔχειν καλῶς); with πράττειν, to act finely and to fare well (see εὖ πράττειν).

Use in the book

The adverb has three kinds of use. The first is conversational. Critias agrees to call the boy, "You're right ... We'll call him", where the Greek chimes καλῶς with καλοῦμεν, "we call" (155a); Socrates thanks the boy for remembering him, "Good for you" (156a), and thanks Critias in the same words for taking the argument over (162e); Critias assents when Socrates says that one must look into what comes to light, "if one cares for oneself even a little": "Yes, you're right" (173a). Between these the adverb carries agreements of substance: the boy thinks the doctors' principle "well said" (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι), the Thracian grants that the Greeks "were right to say" it (156d; see Ζάλμοξις), and Charmides believes that Homer "is right" about modesty (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ).

The second use is of condition: the part cannot be well "when the whole is not in good condition" (156e–157a; see ἔχειν καλῶς).

The third use belongs to the picture of temperance as knowledge of what one knows. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, "a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city

governed by it too" (171e; see ἄρχω; διοίκησις), and, with error removed, those so disposed would "do finely and well in every action" (172a; see εὖ πράττειν). Then Socrates withdraws the agreement in the same adverb: "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d), and Critias protests, "Then weren't we right to agree to that?" (172e; see ὁμολογέω). The formula of easy assent that runs through the conversation can be read as the thing examined at 172d: what they were "right to agree" to turns out to have been agreed too easily. At the end Socrates blames his own inquiring: temperance would not have proved of no use, "if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175b; see ζητέω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs.

155a Critias: "You're right ... We'll call him."

156a Socrates thanks the boy: "Good for you."

156c–d The boy thinks the doctors' principle well said; the Thracian grants that the Greeks were right.

156e–157a The part cannot be well when the whole is not in good condition.

161a Homer is right about modesty.

162e Socrates thanks Critias for taking the argument over.

163c Things made finely and beneficially Hesiod called works.

171e A household and a city run by temperance would be run well.

172a Those so disposed would do finely and well in every action.

172d–e Socrates: they were not right to agree; Critias: were they not?

173a Critias: "Yes, you're right."

175b Temperance would not have proved useless if Socrates were any good at inquiring well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades* can be read as drawing the reverse of 171e. Socrates leads Alcibiades to agree that whoever does not know his own things will not know those of others, nor the city's; such a man would be neither a statesman nor a household manager; he will not know what he is doing, and not knowing he will err, and erring he will fare badly in private and in public,

and be wretched, and so will those for whom he acts: "so it is not possible, unless one is temperate and good, to be happy" (133e–134a).

Translation in this edition

"You're right" for καλῶς λέγεις (155a8, 173a6), "Good for you" for καλῶς ποιῶν (156a9, 162e7), "well said" (156c8), "were right" (156d7), "is right" (161a2), "in good condition" with ἔχειν (156e5, 157a3), "finely" (163c3, 172a1), "run well" (171e6), "right to agree" (172d5, 172e1) and "well" (175b2). At 171e6 "would be bound to be run well" renders οἰκουμένη ἔμελλεν καλῶς οἰκεῖσθαι, the reading of B and W; T has οἰκονομουμένη, "managed", and puts καλῶς before ἔμελλεν.

See also

αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἀποδέχομαι; ἄρχω; διοίκησις; εὖ πράττειν; ἔχειν καλῶς; Ζάλμοξις; ζητέω; καλός; καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως; ὁμολογέω.

καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως · finely and beneficially

Critias' two marks of a true work, which the argument pulls apart · Charmides

καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως, *kalōs te kai ōphelimōs*, "finely and beneficially"

At a Glance

The word. Finely and beneficially: well made of its kind, and of profit to its user.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' reading of Hesiod: "For things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163c).

In this edition. "Finely and beneficially".

A place to read. 163b–164c.

Meaning

The two adverbs name the two standards by which a Greek judged a product. Καλῶς says that it is finely made, a good thing of its kind; ὠφελίμως,

that it profits whoever uses it. Greek usage often lets the two coincide, since a thing is called fine for being fit for its use, but they can come apart: a thing may be well made and do harm. The edition's Key Words list the phrase among the family of "benefit", rendered so throughout "so that the verdict answers the question in its own terms" (Key Words, "Benefit").

Use in the book

The phrase is Critias' standard for what deserves the name of work. Defending the definition "doing one's own business" with Hesiod's line, he says that a thing made may become a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine, but that work never does (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ): "For things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). What is made in this way is one's own, and "everything harmful" belongs to others (163c; see ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός). Socrates restates the pair as a single word, good: what Critias calls doings are the makings of good things (163d; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The argument then pulls the adverbs apart. Socrates takes the second alone: a doctor who has acted "beneficially or harmfully" may not know how he has acted (164b–c; see ὠφελίμως). At the end the pair returns in another form, "each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us", if the knowledge of good and bad is absent (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias' two marks can be read as going together there: the crafts still produce health, shoes and clothing, but the "well and beneficially" belongs to another knowledge.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the place that takes it apart and the place where it returns.

163c Critias' Hesiod: things made finely and beneficially are works.

164b–c A doctor who acts beneficially or harmfully may not know how he has acted.

174c–d Without the knowledge of good and bad, things will not be done well and beneficially.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Hippias Major* tries the pair as a definition of the beautiful. Socrates proposes that the beautiful is the useful: we call eyes beautiful that can see, and a body beautiful for running or for wrestling, and so with animals, utensils, ships, instruments, practices and laws, looking to how and for what each is useful; the powerful is therefore beautiful and impotence ugly. But men do far more bad than good, and power useful for doing bad is not beautiful; so the beautiful would be the useful and powerful for doing some good, and that is the beneficial (295c–296e). What becomes of the definition is told elsewhere (296e–297c; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates makes fine and good the same, relative to use. Aristippus of Cyrene, a companion of Socrates who later taught that pleasure is the good, asks whether a dung-basket is then a fine thing. "Yes, by Zeus," Socrates answers, "and a golden shield an ugly one, if for their own work the one is finely made and the other badly"; things are fine and good for what they serve well, and bad and ugly for what they serve badly, so that what is fine for running is often ugly for wrestling.[172] Critias' Hesiod can be read as judging works by the same two standards.

Translation in this edition

"Finely and beneficially" for καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως (163c3). At 174c9–d1 the pair εὖ ... καὶ ὠφελίμως, with εὖ in place of καλῶς, is "well and beneficially".

See also

ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; καλῶς; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ὠφελίμως.

[172] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.8.5–7.

κατὰ σμικρόν · little by little

κατὰ σμικρόν, *kata smikron*, "little by little"

Attested: κατὰ σμικρόν (*kata smikron*; 156d). Little by little, by small degrees; σμικρός is the older Attic form of μικρός, "small". When the boy accepts the doctors' principle, Socrates recovers: "When I heard his approval I took heart again; little by little my boldness began to gather itself together, and I was rekindled" (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω; θρασύτης). The recovery is told as a fire caught again by degrees. The phrase belongs to slow processes. In the *Republic* Asclepius would not try, with bodies diseased through and through, to drain off and pour in by regimens little by little, κατὰ σμικρόν, and so give a man a long and bad life (407d; see θεραπεύω); and Aristotle says that men, beginning from wonder at the puzzles nearest to hand, went on little by little, κατὰ μικρόν, to raise questions about greater things, the moon, the sun and the stars (see ἀπορία; θαυμάζω).[173]

See also ἀναζωπυρέω; ἀναθαρρέω; ἀπορία; θαυμάζω; θεραπεύω; θρασύτης.

κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας · according to the kinds of knowledge

The rule of Socrates' dream: everything done by those who know · Charmides

κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας, *kata tas epistēmas*, "according to the kinds of knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. In accordance with the kinds of knowledge: by the rule of the crafts and sciences, each in its own field.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the start of Socrates' dream: "If temperance ruled us as fully as could be, being such as we are now defining it, wouldn't everything be done according to the kinds of knowledge?" (173a–b).

In this edition. "According to the kinds of knowledge".

A place to read. 173a–d.

[173] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.2, 982b12–17.

Meaning

Κατά with the accusative is "in accordance with", "by the rule of". The plural ἐπιστῆμαι is the separate kinds of knowledge, the crafts and sciences, each defined by its object (see ἐπιστήμη); the Key Words explain that the English says "kinds of knowledge" where the Greek is plural. A life κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας is one in which each thing is done by whoever knows how to do it.

Use in the book

The phrase opens the picture Socrates calls his dream, "whether it has come through horn or through ivory" (173a; see εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος; ὄναρ). Temperance, as they are now defining it, would rule as fully as could be, and its rule would be the rule of the kinds of knowledge: "No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know" (173b; see ἀλαζών; ἐξαπατάω; ἰατρός). The consequences follow: healthier bodies, safety at sea and in war, equipment and clothing and footwear "expertly made for us ... because we would be using genuine craftsmen" (173b–c; see ἀληθινός; ἀμπεχόνη), and, if prophecy is granted to be knowledge, true prophets set up for us (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική). Socrates grants that "the human race would act and live knowledgeably", but not that by acting knowledgeably "we would do well and be happy" (173c–d; see ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν).

The plural carries the point. The dream is ruled by many kinds of knowledge, each kept to its own field by temperance, and Socrates' next questions show that none of them, singly or together, is the one that makes us do well: that is the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The phrase can be read as naming the city of experts that the dream promises and the argument finds wanting.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the dream it opens.

173a–b If temperance ruled, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge; no pretended pilot, doctor or general would escape our notice.

173b–c We would be healthier, safe at sea and in war, and well equipped by genuine craftsmen; true prophets would be set up.

173c–d The human race would act and live knowledgeably, but whether it would do well and be happy cannot yet be learned.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* the many kinds of knowledge do not make a city wise. The city they have founded is wise, Socrates says, because it is of good counsel, and good counsel is a knowledge; there are many and various kinds of knowledge in the city, but it is not called wise for its carpenters' knowledge, nor for its bronze-workers' nor its farmers', but for the knowledge of guardianship, held by the rulers they have just named complete guardians, which deliberates not about some one thing in the city but about the city as a whole, how it may best deal with itself and with other cities (428b–d).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates holds the dream's rule as a plain fact: rule belongs to those who know how to rule, not to the holders of sceptres or the choice of chance comers (see ἄρχω). He carried it beyond the ship, where owner and crew obey the one who knows: the landowner in farming, the sick man in sickness, the athlete in training, and anyone with something in his charge that needs care, looks after it himself if he thinks he knows how, and if not, obeys those who know, and sends for them if they are absent.[174]

Translation in this edition

"According to the kinds of knowledge" for κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας (173a9–b1), the plural rendered as the Key Words direct. At 173b1 "everything be done" renders πάντ' ἂν πράττοιτο, Burnet's own reading; B and T have ἄν without πάντα, and Stobaeus πάντα without ἄν. At 173c2 "genuine craftsmen" renders ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς, the reading of T, W and Stobaeus; B has the singular ἀληθινὸν δημιουργόν.

[174] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.9.10–11.

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; ἀμπεχόνη; ἄρχω; εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος; ἐξαπατάω; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως; εὖ πράττειν; ἰατρός; μαντική; ὄναρ.

κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν · in your opinion

The rule of the examination: say what you yourself think · Charmides

κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν, *kata tēn sēn doxan*, "in your opinion"

At a Glance

The word. In accordance with your opinion: what you yourself think.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the start of the examination: "Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me ... what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a).

In this edition. "In your opinion".

A place to read. 158e–159b.

Meaning

Δόξα is what seems to one, an opinion or belief (see δόξα); with the possessive, the view that is one's own. In Socratic conversation the phrase expresses a rule: the answerer is to say what he himself thinks, so that what is examined is his belief and not a position taken up for the sake of argument.

Use in the book

The phrase makes the boy's own opinion the evidence for his temperance. Socrates reasons that if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, and from it he would have some opinion about what it is (159a; see αἴσθησις; δόξα; ἔνειμι); since he knows how to speak Greek, he could tell them what it seems to him to be (159a; see ἑλληνίζω). "Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me," Socrates says, "what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a). The test is twofold: what the boy thinks temperance is, and, from that, whether he has it.

The rule returns at the turns of the conversation. After quietness fails, Socrates sends the boy to look within himself: "tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be" (160d–e; see ἀνδρικῶς; ἐμβλέπω). When the boy offers a formula he has heard, Socrates catches it at once as someone else's (161b–c; see ἀκούω), and the boy soon wants Critias to answer for it (162c–d). When Critias asks for Socrates' view, Socrates refuses the exchange: "Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now" (163e; see ἐάω). And when Critias fears being refuted, Socrates tells him: "answer the question as it seems to you" (166d–e; see θαρρέω). The first two answers the dialogue examines are the boy's own, and the second, modesty, can be read as what his blush had already shown (158c, 160e; see αἰσχυντηλός); the third is a formula he has heard (161b).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

159a If temperance is in the boy, he has an opinion of it; let him say what temperance is, in his opinion.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Crito* makes the rule a condition of common counsel. Having led Crito to agree that one must never do wrong, nor return wrong for wrong, Socrates warns him: "see, Crito, that in agreeing to this you do not agree contrary to your opinion", since few believe it, and between those who do and those who do not there is no common counsel (49c–d).

In the *Gorgias* Callicles says that pleasure and the good are the same, so that his argument will not be inconsistent, and Socrates answers that Callicles is ruining their first arguments, and that they could no longer examine the truth adequately together if he is going to speak contrary to what he thinks (495a). In the *Protagoras*, when Protagoras offers to grant a point "if you like", Socrates refuses: he does not need "if you like" and "if you think so" to be examined, but "you and me" (331c). The rule is given to Thrasymachus in the *Republic* too (346a; see ἀποκρίνομαι).

Translation in this edition

"In your opinion" for κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν (159a10). Δόξα is "opinion" at 159a2 too, "from which you would have some opinion about it"; the English also says "opinion" for the verbs, "you have some opinion about it" for ἔχεις τι περὶ αὐτῆς δοξάζειν (159a1) and "this opinion of yours" for ὃ οἴει (159a6).

See also

αἴσθησις; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀκούω; ἀνδρικῶς; ἀποκρίνομαι; δόξα; ἐάω; ἑλληνίζω; ἐμβλέπω; ἔνειμι; θαρρέω.

καταβάλλω · tip off, throw

κατεβάλομεν, *katebalomen*, "(we) tipped off"

Attested: κατεβάλομεν (*katebalomen*; 155c). To throw down; in wrestling, to throw an opponent. When the boy comes in, everyone on the bench squeezes up to make room for him beside himself, Socrates says, "until, of those sitting at the end, we made one stand up and tipped the other off sideways" (155c; see ἕκαστος). The scramble for a seat is told with the wrestler's verb, in a wrestling-school. At 155c4 κατεβάλομεν is T's reading; B has κατελάβομεν, "we caught". In the *Euthydemus* the verb passes to argument: Euthydemus presses on with his questions, ready to throw the young Clinias a third time as if in wrestling, and Socrates steps in to rescue the boy (277d).

See also ἕκαστος; παλαίστρα.

καταγελάω · make a mockery of

κατεγέλασεν, *kategelasen*, "(it) made a mockery of"

Attested: κατεγέλασεν (*kategelasen*; 175d). To laugh at, mock, deride. The verb belongs to the inquiry personified at the end: though it found them so simple-minded and easy to deal with, Socrates says, "our inquiry is no more able to find the truth. It has made such a mockery of the truth that

what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175c–d; see ἀλήθεια; εὐηθικός; ζήτησις; ὑβριστικῶς). In the *Protagoras* Socrates observes that the Assembly laughs at, καταγελῶσι, and shouts down anyone it does not take for a craftsman who tries to advise it on a craft (319c; see θορυβέω). In the *Charmides* the laughter is turned not on a pretender by a crowd but on the truth, by the inquirers' own argument.

See also ἀλήθεια; εὐηθικός; ζήτησις; θορυβέω; ὑβριστικῶς.

κατανοέω · come across, notice

κατανενόηκας, *katanenoēkas*, "(have you) come across"; κατανενόηκα, *katanenoēka*, "(I have) come across"

Attested: κατανενόηκας (*katanenoēkas*; 167e), κατανενόηκα (*katanenoēka*; 168a). To observe well, notice, take note of; the perfect, "to have noticed", "to know of". Both forms come in a single exchange: "And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?" "I haven't come across one" (167e–168a; see δεινός; φόβος). The verb tests the reflexive powers by experience: Socrates asks not whether such a fear is possible but whether Critias has ever met one, and the answer is no. In the *Laches*, after Nicias has said that doctors know only what is healthy and diseased, Socrates asks Laches whether he notices, κατανοεῖς, what Nicias means (195d; see ἰατρός).

See also δεινός; ἰατρός; φόβος.

καταντικρύ · opposite

καταντικρύ, *katantikry*, "opposite"

Attested: καταντικρύ (*katantikry*; 153a, 169c). Opposite, right across from, face to face. The first use places the conversation: "the wrestling-school of Taureas, the one opposite the shrine of Basile" (153a; see Βασίλη; ἱερόν). The second places a simile, when Critias sees Socrates at a loss, and Socrates

says: "it was like people who catch a yawn from those they see yawning opposite them: he too seemed to me to be forced by my perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself" (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; συμπάσχω; χασμάομαι). Burnet's doubt about "forced" at 169c6 is told elsewhere (see ἀναγκάζω). The adverb sets the dialogue's scenes face to face: a building opposite a shrine, and, in the simile, yawners opposite those who catch the yawn. In the *Lysis* Socrates and his companions withdraw to the place opposite, καταντικρύ, and sit down, since it was quiet there (207a; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός).

See also ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναγκάζω; Βασίλη; ἱερόν; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; συμπάσχω; χασμάομαι.

καταφανής · plain

καταφανές, *kataphanes*, "plain"

Attested: καταφανές (*kataphanes*; 166d). Plain, evident, clearly visible. Socrates gives Critias the reason for refuting him: "Or is it not a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?" "Very much so, Socrates" (166d; see ἕκαστος; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). What the refutation aims at is a showing: each thing made plain as it is, whoever's argument falls in the process. At 166d4 κοινόν, "common", is the reading of T and of a later hand in B; B as first written has κοινων. The Hippocratic writer of *On Ancient Medicine* makes the same promise for his account of the craft: by showing what medicine is, he says, "it will become plain", καταφανές, that discoveries cannot be made by any other way than the one it has followed (see ἰατρική).[175]

See also ἕκαστος; ἰατρική; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν.

[175] Hippocrates, *On Ancient Medicine* 2.

κελεύω · order

κελεύοντος, *keleuontos*, "(that) ordered"; κελεύεις, *keleueis*, "(you) order"; κελεύω, *keleuō*, "(I do) order"

Attested: κελεύοντος (*keleuontos*; 161e), κελεύεις (*keleueis*; 176c), κελεύω (*keleuō*; 176c). To order, bid, urge. In the refutation of "doing one's own business" the verb belongs to an imagined law: would a city be well managed "under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil" (161e; see ἱμάτιον; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν)? At the end it belongs to Critias. The boy promises to follow Socrates: "I'd be doing something terrible if I didn't obey you, my guardian, and didn't do what you order." "Well, I do order it" (176c; see ἐπιτάττω; ἐπίτροπος). The compound παρακελεύεσθαι, "urge ... on one another", comes in Critias' reading of the Delphic greeting (164e; see παρακελεύομαι). The imagined law of 161e would have ordered every man to do his own business; the real order at the end is a guardian's, given to the boy he answers for.

See also ἐπιτάττω; ἐπίτροπος; ἱμάτιον; παρακελεύομαι; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

κεφαλή · head

The boy's heavy head: Critias' pretext, the doctors' example, the part that waits on the soul · Charmides

κεφαλήν, *kephalēn*, "head"; κεφαλῆς, *kephalēs*, "(for, of, without the) head"; κεφαλῇ, *kephalēi*, "(to the, for the) head"

At a Glance

The word. The head; in medicine the seat of headache and heaviness.

In the *Charmides*. Sixteen times, all in the prologue (155b–158c): the boy's "head feels rather heavy when he gets up in the morning" (155b); "a remedy for the head" (155b), "the remedy for the head" (155e, 158c); "cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body" (156e); and Critias' "this trouble with his head" (157c).

In this edition. "Head"; "remedy for the head".

A place to read. 155b–157d.

Meaning

Κεφαλή is the head, of a man or an animal, and by extension the top or chief of anything. In medicine it is the seat of headache, heaviness and dizziness (compare *Republic* 407c). A κεφαλῆς φάρμακον is a remedy for the head, a cure for headache.

Use in the book

The head starts the plot. Critias, needing a pretext to call his ward over, remembers a complaint: "You know, only lately he was saying that his head feels rather heavy when he gets up in the morning. What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b; see βαρύνω; φάρμακον). The boy's first question, Socrates says, was "whether I knew the remedy for the head" (155e; see ἐπίσταμαι).

The head then becomes the middle term of the doctors' series. The good doctors cannot cure the eyes without treating the head, nor the head without the whole body (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός), and the Thracian adds the last step, that the body must not be cured without the soul (156e; see Ζάλμοξις; ἰάομαι). In his teaching the head also supplies the image for the soul's relation to the body: everything bad and good "starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω). The head is to the eyes what the soul is to the whole human being.

The remedy is then put off. Socrates will apply it to the boy's head only when his soul has been charmed (157c), and Critias makes a joke of the delay: the trouble with the boy's head will be "a godsend", if "on account of his head" he is forced to improve his mind (157c–d; see ἀναγκάζω; ἀσθένεια; ἕρμαιον). If the boy is already temperate, Socrates tells him, "the remedy for the head itself should be given you straightaway" (158b–c; see δοτέος). After 158c the head is never mentioned again. The edition's note at 155b: "the charm returns, though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again." The headache can be read as the pretext by which the soul is reached;

once the conversation has begun, the complaint that brought the boy over has done its work.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

155b The boy's head feels heavy in the mornings; Socrates is to pretend to know a remedy for the head.

155e The boy asks whether Socrates knows the remedy for the head.

156b–c The charm cannot make the head alone healthy; the doctors treat the head with the eyes, and the body with the head.

156e–157a The eyes not without the head, nor the head without the body, nor the body without the soul; everything flows from the soul as from the head into the eyes; the head and body will be in good condition when the soul is treated.

157b–c No one is to have his head treated unless he first hands over his soul; then the remedy will be applied to the head.

157c–d Critias: the trouble with the boy's head will be a godsend, if on account of his head he improves his mind.

158b–c If the boy is temperate, the remedy for the head should be given at once; if not, the charm must come first.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Timaeus* the head is the body's ruler. The gods, Timaeus says, imitating the round shape of the universe, bound the two divine circuits of the soul into a spherical body, the one we now call the head, the most divine part and master of everything in us; and they gave it the whole body as its servant, so that it would not roll along the ground unable to climb over heights and out of hollows, but have the body as its vehicle (44d–e).

In the *Republic* the head is where too much care of the body is felt. The excessive care of the body beyond what training requires, Socrates says, is a hindrance to every kind of learning and thought, "always suspecting some tensions of the head and dizziness, and blaming philosophy for them" (407b–c; see θεραπεύω).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus describes a medicine that divides what the good doctors join. In Egypt, he says, medicine is parcelled out: each doctor treats a single disease and not several, and the land teems with doctors, some for the eyes, some for the head, others for the teeth or for complaints of the belly, and others for diseases hidden from sight.[176]

Translation in this edition

"Head" at every place. "A remedy for the head" and "the remedy for the head" render κεφαλῆς φάρμακον (155b6, 155e3) and τὸ τῆς κεφαλῆς φάρμακον (158c1); "this trouble with his head" renders ἡ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀσθένεια (157c8); "on account of his head" renders διὰ τὴν κεφαλήν (157d1). At 158b8 "itself ... you" renders αὐτό σοι, as T has it (written αὐτοσοι); W has αὐτός σοι and B αὐτὸς οἷου.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀναγκάζω; ἀσθένεια; βαρύνω; δοτέος; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπίσταμαι; ἕρμαιον; Ζάλμοξις; θεραπεύω; ἰάομαι; ἰατρός; φάρμακον.

κήδομαι · care for

κήδεται, *kēdetai*, "(one) cares for"

Attested: κήδεται (*kēdetai*; 173a). To care for, be concerned for, take thought for; a word of feeling as well as of attention. Socrates, about to tell his dream, apologizes for it: one must look into what comes to light, he says, "if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see ἀναγκαῖος; εἰκῇ; ἐπιμέλεια; ληρέω). Care for oneself is the reason for examining even what looks like nonsense. At 173a4 "let it go by" renders παριέναι, T's reading; B has παρεῖναι, "be present". Homer uses the verb of a goddess's concern: when the god's arrows struck the Danaans, as he calls the Greeks before Troy, Hera put it into Achilles' mind to call the assembly, "for she cared for the

[176] Herodotus 2.84.

Danaans, because she saw them dying".[177] Socrates' care is turned on himself, and on what the argument shows.

See also ἀναγκαῖος; εἰκῇ; ἐπιμέλεια; ληρέω.

κιθαρίζω · play the lyre

τὸ κιθαρίζειν, *to kitharizein*, "playing the lyre"

Attested: κιθαρίζειν (*kitharizein*; 159c); the noun κιθαριστής, "lyre-master", at 160a. To play the cithara, the lyre. It comes in the schoolboy's list against quietness: "And again, playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are far finer than doing them quietly and slowly?" "Yes" (159c; see ἡσυχῇ; παλαίω), and the lyre-master's school appears beside the writing-master's at 160a (see γραμματιστής). The edition's note at 159c explains that the writing-master, the lyre-master and the wrestling-trainer made up an Athenian boy's schooling. In the *Protagoras* Protagoras describes what the lyre-masters teach: they take care of the boys' temperance and see that they do no wrong; once the boys can play, they teach them the works of good lyric poets set to the lyre, and make the rhythms and harmonies at home in their souls, so that they become gentler (326a–b). The *Charmides* judges lyre-playing for temperance by its speed; the *Protagoras*, by its rhythm.

See also γραμματιστής; ἡσυχῇ; παλαίω.

κινδυνεύω · look likely, be in danger

κινδυνεύει, *kindyneuei*, "it looks that way"; κινδυνεύω, *kindyneuō*, "I'm afraid"; κινδυνεύοντας, *kindyneuontas*, "in danger"

Attested: Κινδυνεύει (*kindyneuei*; 160b, 170d), κινδυνεύω (*kindyneuō*; 170a), κινδυνεύοντας (*kindyneuontas*; 173b). To run a risk, be in danger; with an infinitive, to be likely to, so that the impersonal κινδυνεύει means "it looks that way", "probably". The idiom is one of Plato's common softened assents. The boy gives it to the summary of the case against quietness (160b; see

[177] Homer, *Iliad* 1.55–56.

ἡσυχιότης), and Critias to the conclusion that temperance would know only that one knows (170d). Socrates uses it of himself: "but I'm afraid I'm my same old self" (170a; see ὅμοιος). In the dream the literal sense returns: we would "come through safe when in danger at sea and in war" (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; σῴζω). In the *Phaedo* Socrates uses the idiom of philosophy itself: those who rightly practise philosophy are likely, κινδυνεύουσι, to have kept it hidden from others that they practise nothing but dying and being dead (64a).

See also ἡσυχιότης; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; ὅμοιος; σῴζω.

κινέω · move, prod

κινεῖν, *kinein*, "moving"; ὑπεκίνει, *hypekinei*, "kept prodding"

Attested: κινεῖν (*kinein*; 168e); the compound ὑπεκίνει (*hypekinei*; 162d). To move, set in motion, stir, provoke. The simple verb comes in Socrates' list of doubtful reflexive powers: "motion moving itself and heat burning itself" (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; κίνησις). The compound ὑποκινεῖν, "to stir a little", "to provoke", is the boy's: wanting Critias to answer for the formula, he "kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted" (162d; see ἐνδείκνυμι). The boy's prodding is what sets Critias in motion, and he takes over the argument (162e). The question of 168e, whether anything can move itself, can be read as answered in practice by the boy's prodding: Critias is moved by another.

See also ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐνδείκνυμι; κίνησις.

κίνησις · motion

κίνησις, *kinēsis*, "motion"

Attested: κίνησις (*kinēsis*; 168e). Motion, movement, change. It is one of Socrates' doubtful cases, "motion moving itself" (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; θερμότης). At 168e9 "and indeed" renders ἔτι γε, γε being the reading of a later hand in T; B and T as first written have τε. The edition's

note at 169a: "Socrates leaves self-motion open; in later dialogues Plato defines the soul precisely as the motion that moves itself"; the passages are told elsewhere (*Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* 895e–896a; see ἀδύνατος). Aristotle denies it. In *On the Soul* he says that perhaps it is not only false that the soul's essence is to move itself, but impossible that motion belong to it at all;[178] and in the *Physics* that whatever moves itself cannot move itself as a whole, for then the whole would carry and be carried with the same motion, and alter and be altered, so that it would teach and learn at once, and heal and be healed with the same health; one part of it must move and another be moved.[179] The healer healing himself can be read as the doctor of the *Charmides* turned on himself.

See also ἀδύνατος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; θερμότης; κινέω.

κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι · look into it together

The joint examination that spares the boy from boasting or denying · Charmides

κοινῇ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον, *koinēi an eiē skepteon*, "we ought to look into it together"; σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ, *skopein meta sou*, "to look into it with you"

At a Glance

The word. To look into a question together, in common.

In the *Charmides*. Once, with its partner phrase following: "we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about", and "I am willing to look into it with you" (158d–e).

In this edition. "Look into it together"; "look into it with you".

A place to read. 158c–159a.

Meaning

Κοινῇ, the dative of κοινός, "common", means jointly, in common. Σκέπτεσθαι and σκοπεῖν are the dialogue's verbs for examining, "to look into" (see σκέπτομαι; σκοπέω); the Key Words say that the English keeps the same

[178] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 1.3, 405b31–406a2.
[179] Aristotle, *Physics* 8.5, 257a33–b13.

phrase "wherever the repetition can be heard" (Key Words, "Look into, and at a loss"). The verbal adjective *σκεπτέον*, "it must be looked into", makes the joint examination a necessity of the situation.

Use in the book

The phrase answers the boy's dilemma. Asked whether he has temperance, Charmides can neither affirm it without boasting nor deny it without calling Critias a liar (158c–d; see *αἰσχυντηλός*; *ἔξαρνος*). Socrates offers a third way: "You seem to me to be talking sense, Charmides. And it seems to me ... that we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about, so that you won't be forced to say what you don't want to, and I in turn won't set about my doctoring without looking into things. So if you'd like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let's leave it" (158d–e; see *ἀναγκάζω*; *ἀσκέπτως*; *εἴτε ... εἴτε μή*). The joint looking removes force from the boy and haste from Socrates, and it makes the boy's consent the condition of the inquiry, as handing over his soul was the condition of the charm (157b–c; see *θεραπεύω*). He accepts: "Why, I'd like nothing better" (158e).

The same joint looking returns when Critias takes the argument over: "I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not" (162e; see *ἀληθής*). Socrates states it as his practice when Critias treats him as one who claims to know the answers: "I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed" (165b; see *ζητέω*); and when Critias accuses him of trying only to refute him, he gives the reason, that it is "a common good" for things to become plain (166c–d; see *κοινὸν ἀγαθόν*). The ending is shared as well: "we are beaten on every side" (175b; see *πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα*), and the boy draws the conclusion that "not even you two are able to discover what it is" (176a).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the places where the joint looking returns.

158d–e We ought to look into it together, whether the boy has temperance; Socrates is willing to look into it with him.

162e Socrates would rather look into it with Critias.

165b Socrates inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed.

166d It is a common good that each thing should become plain.

175b They are beaten on every side.

176a Not even the two of them can discover what temperance is.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* Socrates gives the reason in Homer's words. He converses, he tells Protagoras, only to examine what he himself is at a loss about, for Homer is right in the line "when two go together, one notices before the other": going so, all of us are somehow better provided for every deed, word and thought, while a man alone, if he notices something, goes about at once looking for someone to show it to and to confirm it with (348c–d).

In the *Crito* the joint look is the condition of persuasion. When Crito agrees that Socrates seems to speak well, but asks what they are to do, Socrates answers: "Let us look into it together, good friend, and if at any point you can speak against what I say, speak against it, and I will be persuaded by you" (48d–e).

Other ancient sources

The line is spoken in the *Iliad* by Diomedes, one of the foremost Greek fighters at Troy. Volunteering to steal into the Trojan camp by night, he asks for a companion: with another man there will be more comfort and more boldness, for "when two go together, one notices before the other how there may be gain; a man alone, even if he notices, has a shorter mind and a thinner wit".[180] Aristotle quotes the half-line in praise of friendship: friends help the young to avoid error, the old in their care and in what their weakness leaves undone, and those in their prime to fine actions, for "when two go together" they are more able to think and to act.[181]

[180] Homer, *Iliad* 10.222–226.

[181] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 8.1, 1155a12–16.

Translation in this edition

"We ought to look into it together" for κοινῇ ἂν εἴη σκεπτέον (158d8), and "I am willing to look into it with you" for ἐθέλω σκοπεῖν μετὰ σοῦ (158e3). At 158d8 Burnet prints ἂν εἴη from a Venice manuscript; B and T have εἴη ἂν εἶναι, from which Stephanus would remove εἶναι and Salvini εἴη.

See also

αἰσχυντηλός; ἀληθής; ἀναγκάζω; ἀσκέπτως; εἴτε … εἴτε μή; ἔξαρνος; ζητέω; θεραπεύω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα; σκέπτομαι; σκοπέω.

κοινὸν ἀγαθόν · common good

A common good: the reason Socrates gives for refuting himself and others · Charmides

κοινὸν … ἀγαθόν, *koinon … agathon*, "a common good"

At a Glance

The word. Κοινός is common, shared, public; with ἀγαθόν, a good that belongs to everyone alike.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' answer to the charge that he only wants to refute Critias: "Or is it not a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?" (166d).

In this edition. "A common good".

A place to read. 166c–e.

Meaning

Κοινός is what several people share, as opposed to ἴδιος, what is one's own; τὸ κοινόν can be the public treasury or the city itself. A common good in this sense is a good of the city, the common that the *Laws* sets against the private (9.875a–b). Socrates' common good at 166d is of another kind. It is not a thing that can be divided or held, but an event: each of the things that are coming to light as it really is. Such a good is not lessened by being shared, and

it makes no difference to whom it comes first, the man who refutes or the man refuted.

Use in the book

Critias has been pressed to say what temperance is knowledge of, and he turns on Socrates: he is trying to refute Critias, and letting go of what the argument is about (166c; see ἐλέγχω). Socrates answers that he refutes Critias for the reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not (166c–d; see διερευνάω; λανθάνω), and that he is examining the argument for his own sake above all, but perhaps also for his friends' (166d; see ἐπιτήδειος; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον). Then comes the question, and Critias grants it: "Very much so, Socrates."

The answer widens in three steps, from himself to his friends to practically all men, and the third step changes the terms of the quarrel. If what is gained is that each thing becomes plain (see ἕκαστος; καταφανής), the refuted man gains as much as the refuter, and it no longer matters which of them is which. So Socrates draws the consequence at once: Critias is to take heart, answer as it seems to him, and "say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; θαρρέω). The edition's note at 166d calls the passage, "on one reading", "Socrates' fullest statement in the dialogue of what his refutations are for".

Critias agrees with the principle in three words and does not keep to it. Three pages later, caught in Socrates' perplexity, he is "ashamed in front of the company", will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions asked of him, and "kept covering up his perplexity" (169c–d; see ἐπικαλύπτω). The common good of 166d can be read as the measure by which that scene is judged: a man who counted the truth's coming plain as his own good would have had nothing to hide.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the exchange around it.

166c Critias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.

166c–d Socrates refutes for the reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not.

166d It is a common good for practically all men that each of the things that are should become plain as it really is.

166d–e Then Critias should answer as it seems to him and say goodbye to who is being refuted.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* uses the same words. Left to carry the argument on by himself, Socrates says that all of them ought to be eager rivals in knowing what is true and what is false about the things they are discussing, "for it is a common good for all that this should become plain" (505e), and he asks to be refuted wherever he seems to agree with himself about what is not so (506a; see ζητέω). Earlier in the same dialogue he counts himself among those glad to be refuted if they say something untrue (458a; see ἐλέγχω), and in the *Phaedo* he asks his friends to care little for Socrates and much more for the truth (91c; see ἀλήθεια).

The *Laws* gives the political common good. It is hard, the Athenian stranger says, first to know that the true art of politics must care not for what is private but for what is common, since the common binds cities together and the private tears them apart, and that it profits both to put the common first; and second, that a man who had grasped this and then ruled a city unaccountable and absolute could never keep to it, for mortal nature will always drive him towards getting more and towards his own business (*Laws* 9.875a–b). The *Charmides* can be read as setting the two side by side: its argument hopes for a temperance that would rule households and cities without error (171d–172a; see ἄρχω), and its conversation puts the first common good where Socrates puts it here, in the truth coming plain between two speakers.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, about to criticise the doctrine of the Forms in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, says that the inquiry is a hard climb, since it was friends of his who introduced them, but that it would seem better, and even a duty, to give up

what is one's own to save the truth, above all for philosophers: where both are friends, it is a holy thing to put the truth first.[182] It can be read beside Socrates' rule at 166d–e, to say goodbye to who is being refuted: the truth before the persons.

Translation in this edition

"A common good" renders κοινὸν ... ἀγαθόν (166d4–5), where the verb οἴει, "do you think", stands between adjective and noun; the English sets it after the phrase. "For practically all men" is σχεδόν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις, and "should become plain, as it really is" γίγνεσθαι καταφανὲς ... ὅπῃ ἔχει. At 166d4 κοινόν is the reading of T and of a later hand in B; B first wrote κοινων.

See also

ἀλήθεια; ἄρχω; διερευνάω; ἔα χαίρειν; ἕκαστος; ἐλέγχω; ἐπικαλύπτω; ἐπιτήδειος; ζητέω; θαρρέω; καταφανής; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; λανθάνω; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

κοσμίως · in an orderly way

In an orderly way: the first word of the boy's first definition · Charmides

κοσμίως, *kosmiōs*, "in an orderly way"

At a Glance

The word. The adverb of κόσμιος, orderly, well-behaved, seemly; from κόσμος, order or ornament.

In the *Charmides*. Once, as the boy's first word for temperance: "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly" (159b).

In this edition. "In an orderly way".

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Meaning

Κόσμος is order of every kind: the ranks of an army, the constitution of a city, the ornaments a woman wears, and, in the philosophers, the ordered whole

[182] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.6, 1096a11–17.

of the world. The adjective κόσμιος describes a person whose conduct keeps its proper arrangement, and it stood very near σώφρων: Plato pairs the nouns κοσμιότης and σωφροσύνη (*First Alcibiades* 122c; *Gorgias* 508a). The adverb names the manner of an action, not its kind.

Use in the book

The boy puts this word first. Asked what temperance seems to him to be, he says that it is "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly", and then gathers the whole into one word, "a kind of quietness" (159b; see ἡσυχιότης; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ). From that moment order drops out. Socrates' refutation (159b–160d) sets quietness against speed in writing, reading, wrestling, learning and deliberating, and never touches this adverb, only the other (see ἡσυχῇ). The manuscripts give its adjective once more, at the end of the refutation, after "the quiet life", ὁ ἡσύχιος βίος κόσμιος, and Burnet brackets it after Heindorf, so that the English has no orderliness there either (160c7; see βίος).

So the refutation disposes of half a definition. Speed can be fine and quietness ugly, but nothing Socrates says shows that order is ever anything but fine, and the half that survives is the half the dialogue never returns to. The boy's own first summary can be read as the cause: by folding order into quietness he gave Socrates the weaker half to attack.

Places to read

The passage in which the adverb occurs.

159b The boy says that temperance is doing everything in an orderly way and quietly; in short, a kind of quietness.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* the word Charmides let go becomes Socrates' own. The goodness of each thing, he argues, comes from arrangement and order: a certain order, its own, arising in each thing makes it good; a soul that has its own order is better than a disordered one; the soul that has order is orderly, κοσμία, and the orderly soul is temperate (506d–507a). The wise, he adds, say that community and friendship, orderliness, temperance and justice hold

heaven and earth, gods and men together, and that this is why they call the whole a κόσμος, an order, not a disorder or licence (507e–508a). In the *Phaedo* the word stands in the temperance of the many: not to be excited by the desires, but to hold them cheap and behave in an orderly way, κοσμίως, which Socrates says belongs properly only to those who care least for the body and live in philosophy (68c).

Translation in this edition

"In an orderly way" renders κοσμίως (159b3). The adjective κόσμιος, bracketed by Burnet at 160c7, is not translated.

See also

βίος; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχιότης; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; σωφροσύνη.

κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ · doing everything in an orderly way and quietly

Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: the boy's first definition of temperance, a description of how a well-brought-up boy behaves · Charmides

τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, *to kosmiōs panta prattein kai hēsychēi*, "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly"

At a Glance

The word. An articular infinitive: temperance is defined as an activity, "the doing of everything", qualified by two adverbs of manner.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 159b: after hanging back, the boy "said that in his view temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly: walking in the streets and talking, and doing everything else, in the same manner."

In this edition. "Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly".

A place to read. 158e–159b.

Meaning

The definition names no state of soul and no object of knowledge. It says how things are to be done, and its examples are the public life of an Athenian boy: walking in the streets, talking. What it describes is decorum, the virtue the young were taught before they were taught anything else, and the two adverbs between them cover the whole of it: keeping one's place and keeping one's calm.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked for the boy's opinion, not for a formula: "if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it", and so he asks: "tell me ... what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The boy is slow to answer, "At first he hung back, and was not at all willing to answer" (159b), and the hesitation suits the answer he gives. A page earlier his blush and his refusal either to praise himself or to call Critias a liar had shown the virtue before anyone defined it; the edition's note at 158c calls them, "on a natural reading", "a picture of sōphrosynē in its commonest sense, modesty, before anyone has tried to define it". The first definition can be read as the boy describing what he has been taught to do, and the second, modesty, as what he has just done (see αἰδώς).

He then sums the definition up himself, "And in short ... I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness" (159b; see ἡσυχιότης; συλλήβδην), and Socrates takes up the summary, not the definition. "Well, are you right? ... People do say, you know, Charmides, that quiet people are temperate" (159b; see ἡσύχιος). The refutation that follows tests quietness against quickness and leaves order alone (159b–160d; see ἡσυχῇ; κοσμίως). It ends by sending the boy inward: he is to look within himself and consider what sort of person temperance makes him by being present (160d; see ἐμβλέπω). The fault Socrates states is that quick things have turned out no less fine than quiet ones (160d); his next request, to look within, can be read as a further fault, that the definition describes behaviour from outside.

Places to read

The passage in which the definition is given, with Socrates' request for it.

159a Socrates asks the boy to say what temperance is in his opinion.

159b The boy hangs back, then says that temperance is doing everything in an orderly way and quietly, walking in the streets and talking; in short, a kind of quietness.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras*, Protagoras describes the schooling the boy has had. When parents send their sons to teachers, he says, they charge them to take much more care for the children's good order, εὐκοσμία, than for their letters and lyre-playing (325d–e): the very lessons, at the writing-master's and the lyre-master's, through which Socrates leads the boy in the refutation (159c–160a; see γραμματιστής; κιθαρίζω). In the *Republic* Socrates lists the small customs that good education rediscovers without law: the silence fitting for the young in the presence of their elders, giving up their seats and standing up for them, care of parents, the cut of the hair, clothes and shoes, and the whole bearing of the body; to legislate for them, he says, would be foolish, for such things neither come about nor last by being written down (425a–b). The boy's definition names customs of the same kind, and the *Republic*'s point can be read as the *Charmides*' as well: they follow from education, and do not define what it produces.

Translation in this edition

"Doing everything in an orderly way and quietly" renders τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ (159b3), keeping the word order, in which the second adverb comes after the verb, as an afterthought. "In his view" renders οἳ δοκοῖ (159b2): οἳ is the reading of T and of a later hand in B, where W has οὖν, and δοκοῖ, the optative of reported speech, that of B and W, where T has δοκεῖ (see δοκέω).

See also

αἰδώς; βαδίζω; γραμματιστής; δοκέω; ἐμβλέπω; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσύχιος; ἡσυχιότης; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; κιθαρίζω; κοσμίως; συλλήβδην.

κοῦφος · light

κουφοτέρου, *kouphoterou*, "the lighter"; κοῦφον, *kouphon*, "the light"; κουφότερον, *kouphoteron*, "lighter"

Attested: κουφοτέρου (*kouphoterou*; 166b), κοῦφον (*kouphon*; 166b), κουφότερον (*kouphoteron*; 168c). Light in weight, and by extension nimble or light-minded. The word always comes paired with its opposite: in Socrates' example of weighing, a knowledge "of the heavier and the lighter weight" whose objects are something other than itself (166b), and among the relatives that would have to be their own opposites, "what is heavier lighter" (166b, 168c–d; see βαρύς). In the *Euthyphro* Socrates uses the same pair to divide disputes: a quarrel over which of two sets of things is the more in number is settled by reckoning, about larger and smaller by measuring, and about heavier and lighter by going to the scales; the disputes that make men enemies are about the just and the unjust, the fine and the shameful, the good and the bad, for which there is no such measure (7b–d). Weighing in the *Charmides* can be read in the same light: it is a knowledge with a settled object, like the draughts, calculation and medicine that the argument later sets against the one knowledge, of good and bad, that turns out to matter most (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

See also βαρύς; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; σταθμός; στατική.

Κριτίας · Critias

Κριτίαν, *Kritian*, "Critias"; Κριτίας, *Kritias*, "Critias"; Κριτίου, *Kritiou*, "(of) Critias"; Κριτίᾳ, *Kritiāi*, "(with) Critias"; Κριτία, *Kritia*, "Critias" (in address)

Attested: Κριτίαν (*Kritian*; 153c twice, 158d, 162b), Κριτίας (*Kritias*; 153d, 154d, 154e, 155b, 157c, 158b, 161c, 162c, 166d, 169c, 176b), Κριτίου (*Kritiou*; 155c twice, 161b, 162c, and 157e of an ancestor), Κριτίᾳ (*Kritiāi*; 156a), Κριτία (*Kritia*; 154e, 155a, 162d, 163d, 165b, 165d, 167b, 168e, 169d, 171d, 172a, 172d, 173d, 174c twice, 175a). Critias son of Callaeschrus

(153c), the cousin of Plato's mother and Charmides' guardian and cousin (155a; see ἐπίτροπος), is the dialogue's second respondent. He sets Socrates up as a doctor with a remedy for the boy's head (155b), and enters the argument when the boy, refuted on the formula "doing one's own business", keeps prodding him (162c–d; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Having taken over the boy's formula (162e), he defines temperance three times in his own words: as the doing of good things (163e), as knowing oneself (164d), and as knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge (166c, 166e). His name is in the dialogue's ancestry too: the boy's father's house is "the house of Critias son of Dropides" (157e), on the usual modern reconstruction, as the note at 157e says, the great-great-grandfather of Charmides and Critias. The note at 153c recalls that a quarter of a century later Critias led the Thirty and fell fighting the democrats in 403; as the Introduction says, the dialogue mentions none of this, and its last lines, in which Critias gives the order and the boy answers that he will use force, were written for readers who knew how the story ended (176c–d; see βιάζομαι).

See also βιάζομαι; ἐπίτροπος; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; Χαρμίδης.

κτάομαι · possess

κέκτησαι, *kektēsai*, "(whether or not) you possess"

Attested: κέκτησαι (*kektēsai*; 158d), the perfect, which means not "acquire" but "have acquired", and so "possess". Socrates proposes: "it seems to me ... that we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about" (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The verb treats temperance as a thing one might own without knowing it, and the dialogue keeps the question in that form to the end, when the boy says, with a different verb, "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates draws the line between the two verbs: possessing, κεκτῆσθαι, is not the same as having, ἔχειν, as a man who has bought a cloak and has it in his power but does not wear it possesses it without having it on; so a man may possess knowledge, like birds

kept in an aviary, and yet not have it in hand when he needs it (197b–d). The distinction can be read as describing the boy exactly: he may possess temperance and be unable to lay hold of it in words.

See also κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

κυβερνήτης · pilot

κυβερνήτης, *kybernētēs*, "a pilot"

Attested: κυβερνήτης (*kybernētēs*; 173b). The steersman of a ship, who commanded its course; the word gives Latin *gubernator* and English "govern". He heads the list of experts in Socrates' dream of a city ruled by temperance: "No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us" (173b; see ἐξαπατάω; φάσκω), and those who "come through safe when in danger at sea" are his passengers (173b; see σῴζω). His art returns at 174c (see κυβερνητική). In the *Republic* the pilot becomes Socrates' image of the philosopher in a city that does not know him: the sailors quarrel over the helm, each claiming to steer though he has never learned, and praise as a seaman whoever helps them seize the ship, while they do not understand that the true pilot must attend to the year and the seasons, the sky and the stars and the winds and everything that belongs to the art, if he is really to command a ship (488a–e). The impostor whom temperance would unmask at 173b can be read as the *Republic*'s mutinous sailor; what the *Charmides* questions is whether unmasking him is enough to make us happy (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως).

See also ἐξαπατάω; ἐπιστημόνως; κυβερνητική; σῴζω; φάσκω.

κυβερνητική · the pilot's art

ἡ … κυβερνητική, *hē … kybernētikē*, "the pilot's art"

Attested: κυβερνητική (*kybernētikē*; 174c). The art of steering a ship. It comes in the passage that turns the argument: if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away from the others, Socrates asks: "will medicine make us any

less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed, or will the pilot's art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?" Critias answers, "No less" (174c), and Socrates replies that their being done well and beneficially will be gone (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The *Gorgias* can be read as giving the reason. The pilot's art, Socrates says, saves lives, and bodies and goods with them, from the extremes of danger, yet it is modest and orderly, and charges two obols for the passage from Aegina and at most two drachmas from Egypt or the Black Sea; the pilot steps ashore and walks about by his ship unassumingly, for he knows how to reckon that it is unclear which of his passengers he has benefited by not letting them drown and which he has harmed, knowing that he has landed them no better than they embarked, in body or in soul (511d–512b). The pilot of 174c can be read in its light: he saves life without knowing whether the life saved is worth having, which is what the knowledge of good and bad would have to supply.

See also ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κυβερνήτης; σκυτική; στρατηγική; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὑφαντική.

Κυδίας · Cydias

τὸν Κυδίαν, *ton Kydian*, "Cydias"

Attested: Κυδίαν (*Kydian*; 155d). A lyric poet of whom almost nothing is known beyond the words Socrates quotes. At the moment of seeing inside the boy's cloak, Socrates says, "I thought Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love, who, speaking of a beautiful boy and advising someone else, told him to beware of coming, a fawn, into the lion's presence, to be caught as a portion of meat; for I felt I had been caught by just such a creature myself" (155d–e; see ἁλίσκομαι; εὐλαβέομαι; νεβρός; τὰ ἐρωτικά). The edition's note at 155e calls these words "his only secure fragment (PMG 714)", adds that a scholiast on Aristophanes' *Clouds* 967 credits a Cydias of Hermione with a lyric opening, and observes that the image reverses the usual one, in which the lover hunts the boy (see θρέμμα). The line rests on T:

at 155d6 Burnet prints κατέναντα with T, where B and W have κατ᾽ ἐναντία, and at 155d7 μοῖραν with T (W accents it μοίραν), while B garbles the line into ἀθανατώσηι θεία μοίρα; for Cobet's conjecture on the verb see αἱρέω.

See also ἁλίσκομαι; εὐλαβέομαι; θρέμμα; νεβρός; τὰ ἐρωτικά.

κύκλῳ · in a circle

κύκλῳ, *kyklōi*, "in a ring", "in a circle"

Attested: κύκλῳ (*kyklōi*; 155d, 174b), the dative of κύκλος, "circle", used as an adverb, "round about", "in a circle". The word frames the dialogue's two circles. In the prologue the crowd closes round Socrates and the boy: "everyone in the wrestling-school came swirling round us in a ring" (155d; see περιρρέω). At the end of the argument Socrates turns on Critias, who has at last named the knowledge of good and bad: "All this time you've been dragging me round in a circle" (174b; see ἀποκρύπτομαι; μιαρός; περιέλκω). The second circle can be read as an argument that has come back near its start, for the doing of good things was Critias' own definition at 163e (see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). In the *Euthyphro* Socrates makes the same complaint, with the same word: Euthyphro, more skilled than Daedalus, makes the arguments go round in a circle, for "the argument has gone round and come back to the same place", and the pious has again become the god-loved, which they had already found to differ from it (15b–c).

See also ἀποκρύπτομαι; μιαρός; περιέλκω; περιρρέω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν.

κωλύω · prevent, stop

κωλύει, *kōlyei*, "(what's) to stop", "stops"; κωλύειν, *kōlyein*, "(there is nothing) to stop"; κωλύσει, *kōlysei*, "(will) prevent"

Attested: κωλύει (*kōlyei*; 155b, 162b, 163a twice, 164a twice, 176b), κωλύειν (*kōlyein*; 163a), κωλύσει (*kōlysei*; 174c). To hinder, stop, prevent. Most of the uses are the idiom "nothing stops", τί κωλύει, οὐδὲν κωλύει, which grants a possibility without arguing for it. Critias uses it first, when he

suggests the ruse of the remedy for the head, "What's to stop you pretending ...?" (155b; see προσποιέομαι). The boy uses it to tease his guardian: "perhaps there is nothing to stop even the man who said it from not knowing what he meant" (162b; see ὑπογελάω). Then Critias uses it to let craftsmen who make other people's things be temperate, "What's to stop them?", and Socrates turns the shrug into an objection: "Nothing stops me ... But see whether it doesn't stop the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one's own business, and then says there is nothing to stop those who do other people's business from being temperate too" (163a; see δημιουργός; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες). Socrates uses it twice more at 164a. At 174c the verb has its full sense: the pilot's art will "prevent us from dying at sea" (see κυβερνητική). The last use is the boy's, and the idiom has become a resolve: "As far as I'm concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it's enough" (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

See also δημιουργός; κυβερνητική; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; προσποιέομαι; ὑπογελάω.

Λ Lambda

λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός · seize by the hand

λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός, *labomenos tēs cheiros*, "seized (me) by the hand"

Attested: λαβόμενος τῆς χειρός (*labomenos tēs cheiros*; 153b). The middle of λαμβάνω, "take", with the genitive of what is grasped: to lay hold of, take by. The phrase belongs to Chaerephon's welcome. When Socrates comes into the wrestling-school, Chaerephon, as Socrates tells it, "jumped up from the middle of them all, came running over to me, and seized me by the hand" (153b; see θέω; μανικός; Χαιρεφῶν), and his first words are a question about the battle. Taking a man by the hand was the gesture of greeting and of claiming his company; and once he has heard the news, he leads Socrates across the room as he invites him to sit and tell it: "And with that he takes me over and sits me down beside Critias" (153c). In the *Cratylus* the gesture belongs to Socrates' example of a false greeting: if someone met Cratylus, the follower of Heraclitus who gives the dialogue its name, abroad and, taking him by the hand, said "Greetings, Athenian stranger, Hermogenes son of Smicrion", would he be uttering these words, or asserting them, or addressing them to Hermogenes and not to Cratylus, or to no one (429e)? The *Charmides*' greeting is the opposite case: most of the room knows Socrates, and the first thing the room wants from him is news.

See also θέω; μανικός; Χαιρεφῶν.

λανθάνω · escape notice

To escape notice: the danger Socrates fears in himself, and the impostor a temperate city would catch · Charmides

λελῃθέναι, *lelēthenai*, "(far from) having escaped (you)"; λάθω, *lathō*, "(that I might ever) without noticing"; λανθάνοι, *lanthanoi*, "(would) escape our notice"

At a Glance

The word. To be hidden, to escape the notice of someone; with a participle, to do something unawares.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, in two places: Critias' "And this is far from having escaped you" (166c); Socrates' fear "that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166d); and the impostor who would not "escape our notice" in a city ruled by temperance (173b).

In this edition. "Escape", "escape our notice", and "without noticing" for the construction with a participle.

A place to read. 166c–d.

Meaning

Λανθάνω is the verb of the root of λήθη, forgetting: what λανθάνει is out of sight or out of mind. It takes as its object the person who fails to notice, and with a participle it says that something is done without the doer's or the onlooker's knowledge: λάθω οἰόμενος, "I may think without noticing". The construction allows a man to escape his own notice, and that is the use on which the dialogue turns.

Use in the book

The two uses at 166c–d answer each other. Critias, charging Socrates with trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about, makes the charge sharper with the verb: "And this is far from having escaped you: I think you are doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing" (166c; see ἐλέγχω). On Critias' account the point has not escaped Socrates at all: he is passing over it in order to refute. Socrates answers by naming the

one thing he fears does escape him: he would refute Critias, he says, for the reason he would scrutinize himself, "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166c–d; see διερευνάω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι). The error he fears can be read as one he could not catch by attention, since its whole character is to go unnoticed; only another's questioning, or his own turned on himself as if by another, can bring it to light. This is the knowledge of what one does not know that Critias is about to make temperance (166e–167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

The third use moves from the self to the city. In Socrates' dream of temperance ruling, no false pilot would deceive us, "nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know" (173b; see ἐξαπατάω; κυβερνήτης). The fear of 166d has been turned outward and solved: no one's false claim would go unnoticed. The dream then asks whether a life so purged of impostors would make us happy, and finds that it would not unless the knowledge of good and bad were added (173d–174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The two passages can be read together: the dream of 173b imagines the fear of 166d answered, in oneself as in others, for its temperate rulers would neither attempt what they did not know nor let others do so (171d–e).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

166c Critias: the difference between temperance and the other kinds of knowledge has not escaped Socrates; he is trying to refute him.

166c–d Socrates refutes for fear that he might, without noticing, think he knows what he does not.

173b In a city ruled by temperance no impostor would escape notice.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates calls what can be read as the thing he fears at 166d the true falsehood, a deceived soul's ignorance of the things that are (2.382a–c; see ψευδής). The *Philebus* makes the same condition, not knowing oneself, the root of the laughable (48c–49a; see ἀγνοέω). In the *Gorgias* Socrates tells

Callicles, with the same verb, λέληθέν σε, that geometrical equality, which has great power among gods and men, has escaped his notice (508a; see κοσμίως).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates puts the condition next to madness (*Memorabilia* 3.9.6; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Translation in this edition

"Escaped (you)" renders λεληθέναι (166c4), "without noticing" the participial construction μή ποτε λάθω οἰόμενος (166d1–2), and "escape our notice" λανθάνοι ἄν (173b4).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγνοέω; διερευνάω; ἐλέγχω; ἐξαπατάω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; κοσμίως; κυβερνήτης; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; ψευδής.

λέγω · say

λεγομένη, *legomenēi*, "(that) goes by the name of"; τὰ λεγόμενα, *ta legomena*, "what is said", "the things said"; λεγομένοις, *legomenois*, "(in) what is said"; λέγεται, *legetai*, "(is) said"; λέγεσθαι, *legesthai*, "(well, rightly) said"; λέγονται, *legontai*, "(who) are said"; λεχθέν, *lechthen*, "what was said"

Attested: in the passive, λεγομένῃ (*legomenēi*; 158a), λεγόμενα (*legomena*; 160a, 171b), λεγομένοις (*legomenois*; 171b), λέγεται (*legetai*; 158a, 161c, 171b), λέγεσθαι (*legesthai*; 156c, 161b), λέγονται (*legontai*; 156d), λεχθέν (*lechthen*; 162e), among the many forms of the commonest verb of speech. The passive participle carries three things in the dialogue. It is a name: the boy's father's house is celebrated for its beauty and virtue "and everything else that goes by the name of happiness" (158a; see εὐδαιμονία). It is what a learner must take in: "understanding what is said, at the writing-master's and the lyre-master's and everywhere else" is finest when done quickly (160a; see συνίημι). And it is what an examiner must test: the man who looks into medicine correctly will examine the doctor "in what is said or done in this

way, whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly" (171b; see ἐπακολουθέω; ᾗ ἰατρικός). Socrates' rule for the inquiry puts the said above the sayer, whether it is true and not who said it (161c; see ἀληθής; σκοπέω); Socrates repeats it to Critias, to see "whether what was said is true or not" (162e).

See also ἀληθής; ἐπακολουθέω; εὐδαιμονία; ᾗ ἰατρικός; σκοπέω; συνίημι.

λέξις · talking

ἐν λέξει, *en lexei*, "in talking"

Attested: λέξει (*lexei*; 160c). The noun of λέγω: speaking, the way something is said, and in the rhetoricians diction or style. It comes once, at the close of the refutation of the first definition: temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly, "whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else" (160c; see βαδισμός); Burnet prints οὔτε ἐν βαδισμῷ οὔτε ἐν λέξει as Priscian quotes it, where B, T and W have οὐ τὸ ... οὐ τὸ (160c6). The boy had said "walking in the streets and talking" with verbs, βαδίζειν καὶ διαλέγεσθαι (159b; see βαδίζω; διαλέγομαι); Socrates returns the pair as nouns of manner, and λέξις, the manner of speaking, fits a definition that was about how things are done. In the *Republic* Socrates sets λέξις against λόγοι: having said what must be said about the gods and heroes, the λόγοι, he turns to λέξις, so that they will have looked into both what is to be said and how it is to be said, and Adeimantus answers that he does not understand (392c). Aristotle opens the third book of the *Rhetoric* with the same division: it is not enough to have what one must say, but it is necessary to say it as one must, and much depends on it.[183]

See also βαδίζω; βαδισμός; διαλέγομαι; λόγος.

[183] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.1, 1403b15–18.

λευκὴ στάθμη · white measuring-line

A white measuring-line on white stone: Socrates' joke about his eye for beauty · Charmides

λευκὴ στάθμη, *leukē stathmē*, "a white measuring-line (on white stone)"

At a Glance

The word. Στάθμη is the builder's line, a cord coloured and snapped against stone or timber to mark a straight cut; λευκή, white.

In the *Charmides*. Once, as Charmides comes in: "Now I, my friend, am no measure of anything. Where the beautiful are concerned I am simply a white measuring-line on white stone: nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b).

In this edition. "A white measuring-line on white stone", the proverb completed.

A place to read. 154b–c.

Meaning

The edition's note at 154b explains the joke: "a builder's line was rubbed with red ochre (or black), and a white one on white marble marks nothing." The proverb, as the note gives it, "ran 'a white line on white stone'": an instrument of exactness that cannot distinguish anything, said of a judge who approves of everything alike.

Use in the book

Socrates is telling the story to a friend he addresses as ἑταῖρε (see ἑταῖρος), and the line comes at the moment of Charmides' entrance. The note observes that "Plato writes only 'a white line'" and that "The English completes it so that the joke arrives"; it adds that "The chime of 'measure' and 'measuring-line' is Plato's", between σταθμητόν, "measurable", and στάθμη (see σταθμητός). The joke is at his own expense: he is useless as a measure of beauty because nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to him (see ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; καλός). Then the sentence turns: "All the same, at that moment he

struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty" (154c; see κάλλος; μέγεθος). Even an instrument that marks nothing marked Charmides.

The Introduction quotes the line first among the prologue's comic touches, "openly erotic and self-mocking". It can also be read as the first appearance of the dialogue's question in comic dress. A man who announces that he is no measure of anything has made the confession the argument will later demand, to know what one does not know (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν); and the virtue under inquiry, in its ordinary sense, is a sense of measure.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the sentence it introduces.

154b Socrates is no measure of anything; where the beautiful are concerned he is a white measuring-line on white stone.

154c All the same, Charmides strikes him as a marvel of stature and beauty.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Philebus* the builder's line is Plato's example of precision. Carpentry, Socrates says, is more of an art than most kinds of knowledge because it uses the most measures and instruments, which give it great exactness, in shipbuilding and housebuilding and much other woodwork: the rule, the lathe, the compass, the line, στάθμη, and an ingenious straightening tool; the arts that follow music, working by practised guesswork, have less exactness (56b–c). Socrates' white line is that instrument made useless, and the joke depends on the instrument's reputation.

Other ancient sources

Homer gives the line its oldest praise. In the *Iliad* the battle at the ships stands evenly stretched as a ship's timber is made straight by the line in the hands of a skilled carpenter who knows all wisdom by Athena's promptings;[184] in the *Odyssey* Odysseus, building his raft, planes the timbers skilfully and straightens them to the line, and the same formula is used of the carpenter who made Odysseus' doorposts and threshold and of Odysseus

[184] Homer, *Iliad* 15.410–413.

making his own bed.[185] Aristotle, independently of Plato, has a measure with no fixed shape of its own: where no law can be laid down a decree is needed, and the rule of what is indefinite is itself indefinite, like the leaden rule used in building on Lesbos, the island off the coast of Asia Minor, which shifts to the shape of the stone and does not stay fixed, as the decree shifts to the facts.[186]

Translation in this edition

"A white measuring-line on white stone" renders λευκὴ στάθμη (154b9), with "on white stone" supplied from the proverb, as the note explains; "no measure of anything" renders οὐδὲν σταθμητόν (154b8), the reading of B and T, where a later hand in B has ἀστάθμητον.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; ἑταῖρος; κάλλος; καλός; μέγεθος; σταθμητός.

λήκυθος · oil-flask

λήκυθον, *lēkython*, "oil-flask"

Attested: λήκυθον (*lēkython*; 161e). The small flask for oil. In Socrates' imagined law it is one of the things each man must make for himself, with his cloak and his shoes: he is to "make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle" (161e; see ἱμάτιον; σκυτοτομέω; στλεγγίς; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The edition's note at 162a explains the pair: "The lēkythos held the olive oil with which men anointed themselves for exercise, and the strigil (stlengis) was the curved scraper used afterwards to clean off oil and dust: the very kit of the wrestling-school they are sitting in." In the *Hippias Minor* the law has a real subscriber. Socrates recalls hearing Hippias boast in the market-place that he once came to Olympia with everything he had on his body his own work: a ring and a seal he had engraved, a strigil and an oil-flask he had made himself, shoes he had cobbled, a cloak and tunic he had woven, and a

[185] Homer, *Odyssey* 5.245; compare 17.341, 21.44 and 23.197.
[186] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.10, 1137b27–32.

Persian-style girdle he had plaited, not to mention his poems (368b–d). The *Charmides*' law can be read as Hippias' boast turned into a constitution, and so as absurd. At 161e12 B and T have λήκυθον, a later hand in T λίκυθον.

See also ἱμάτιον; παλαίστρα; σκυτοτομέω; στλεγγίς; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ληρέω · talk nonsense

ληρεῖν, *lērein*, "(I'm) talking nonsense"

Attested: ληρεῖν (*lērein*; 173a). To talk idly, to say silly things. Socrates uses it of himself as he prepares the dream that will undo the claim that temperance benefits: "I think I'm talking nonsense", he says, but what comes to light must still be looked into (173a; see ἀναγκαῖος; εἰκῇ; κήδομαι; ὄναρ). The disclaimer is the form, not the measure, of what follows: the "nonsense" is the argument that temperance as now defined would not make anyone happy, and it can be read as the most consequential thing he says. In the *Gorgias* the verb is turned on someone else: when Callicles says he does not know what clever things Socrates is saying, Socrates answers that he knows well enough and is being coy, and that he keeps on talking nonsense, ἔχων ληρεῖς (497a). Socrates calls his own argument nonsense and his opponent's evasion the same, and the difference is that his own goes on being examined.

See also ἀναγκαῖος; εἰκῇ; κήδομαι; λῆρος; ὄναρ.

λῆρος · babbler

λῆρον, *lēron*, "a babbler"

Attested: λῆρον (*lēron*; 176a). The noun means silly talk, trash, nonsense; said of a person, as here, a mere babbler. It is Socrates' last judgement of himself in the argument: if the boy already has temperance, Socrates says, "I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a; see ἀδύνατος; εὐδαίμων; ζητητής; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ). The word turns his usual work round. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates the midwife says that many have been so disposed towards him that

they are ready to bite when he takes some piece of nonsense, λῆρον, away from them, and do not believe he does it out of goodwill (151c). The man whose office is to remove other people's nonsense ends the *Charmides* by inviting the boy to count him as nonsense himself; the boy declines, and asks to be charmed every day (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

See also ἀδύνατος; εὐδαίμων; ζητητής; ληρέω; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ.

λογιστική · the art of calculation

τῆς λογιστικῆς τέχνης, *tēs logistikēs technēs*, "the art of calculation"; ἡ λογιστική, *hē logistikē*, "calculation"; τῆς λογιστικῆς, *tēs logistikēs*, "(than) calculation (itself)"

Attested: λογιστικῆς (*logistikēs*; 165e, 166a), λογιστική (*logistikē*; 166a). The art of reckoning with numbers, from λογίζομαι, "count", "reckon". It is Critias' counter-example: the art of calculation, like geometry, has no work to show as a house is the work of house-building (165e–166a; see ἀπεργάζομαι; γεωμετρική). Socrates grants that it has no product and points instead to its object, the even and the odd and how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other (166a; see ἄρτιος; περιττός; πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα), a definition the edition's note finds almost word for word in the *Gorgias* (see ἄρτιος). Calculation returns once more, as one of the knowledges that do not make a man happy (174b; see τὸ λογιστικόν). The Note on this Edition warns that "the contrast between practical reckoning and the theory of number is later than Plato." Plato's own account of the subject is in the *Republic*, where the contrast is between two ways of studying the one art: Socrates wants calculation studied not as a private man studies it, for buying and selling like merchants and retailers, but until thought itself reaches a vision of the nature of numbers, for the sake of war and of the soul's turning from becoming to truth and being (525b–d). At 165e6 T and W have λογιστικῆς; B has λογικῆς.

See also ἀπεργάζομαι; ἄρτιος; γεωμετρική; περιττός; πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα; τὸ λογιστικόν.

λόγοι καλοί · beautiful words

Beautiful words: the charm with which the soul is treated · Charmides

τοὺς λόγους ... τοὺς καλούς, *tous logous ... tous kalous*, "beautiful words"; τῶν τοιούτων λόγων, *tōn toioutōn logōn*, "words like these"

At a Glance

The word. Λόγοι are words, speeches, arguments; καλοί, beautiful or fine, the word used throughout the prologue of the boy.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the Thracian's teaching as Socrates reports it: "And the soul, my dear fellow ... is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words. From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls" (157a).

In this edition. "Beautiful words".

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

The edition's note at 157a gives both halves of the phrase: "logoi are words, speeches and arguments, and kaloi is the word for the beautiful youth." Λόγοι καλοί can be fine speeches of the rhetorician's kind, or noble talk, or sound arguments; set beside ἐπῳδαί, charms sung over a patient, they name a remedy made of speech. The note draws the consequence: "The charm, it seems, is conversation of the right kind, perhaps the very conversation about to begin."

Use in the book

The phrase is the hinge of Socrates' improvisation. Critias had cast him as a doctor with a remedy for the boy's head (155b), and Socrates had added a charm to go with the leaf (155e; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). Now he says what the charm is. The Thracian taught him that everything good and bad for the

body flows from the soul, so that the soul must be treated "first and foremost" (157a; see θεραπεύω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα); the soul is treated with charms; the charms are beautiful words; from such words temperance comes to be in souls, and once it is present health is easy to provide for the head and the rest of the body (157a–b; see ἐγγίγνομαι; Ζάλμοξις). The pretext has turned into its opposite: the remedy for the head, which brought the boy over, becomes the lesser thing, and the conversation that follows can be read as the cure.

The word καλοί carries the prologue into the argument. Until now it has been the word for the boy (154a–155a; see καλός); here it is the word for the speech that, on this reading, is to make his soul as beautiful as his body, and Socrates has already proposed to strip "that very part of him" and look at it first (154e; see ἀποδύω). The argument that follows can be read as the charm being sung. It does not succeed by its own measure, for it ends without finding what temperance is; but the boy, at the end, does not ask for the remedy. He asks for the words, to be charmed every day (176b; see ἐπᾴδω; κωλύω).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

157a The soul is treated with charms; the charms are beautiful words; from such words temperance comes to be in souls.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* Diotima gives beautiful words their place in love. A man pregnant in soul, she says, welcomes beautiful bodies rather than ugly ones, and if he meets in one of them a soul that is beautiful and noble and well-born, he welcomes the two together, and is at once full of words about virtue and about what a good man ought to be and practise, and he tries to educate him (209b–c). On the ascent the lover begins by loving one beautiful body and begetting beautiful words there, λόγους καλούς (210a); next he sees that the beauty of all bodies is one and becomes the lover of them all; then, valuing beauty of soul above beauty of body, he is content to love and care for a decent soul even with little bloom and to beget words that will make

young men better (210b–c); and after the beauty of practices, laws and kinds of knowledge, turned towards the wide sea of beauty, he begets many beautiful and magnificent words and thoughts in abundant philosophy, until he catches sight of a single knowledge whose object is the beautiful (210c–d). The prologue of the *Charmides* can be read as following the first steps: a beautiful body, then the question whether the soul is beautiful too, then words. In the *Phaedrus* Socrates makes the same comparison as the Thracian between medicine and speech: in both one must distinguish a nature, of the body in one, of the soul in the other, if one is to proceed by art and not by mere knack and experience, applying drugs and food to produce health and strength, or words and lawful practices to hand on whatever persuasion and virtue one wishes (270b).

Other ancient sources

Gorgias' claim that charms sung through words can change the soul is told elsewhere (*Encomium of Helen* 8–10; see ἐπῳδή).

Translation in this edition

"Beautiful words" renders τοὺς λόγους ... τοὺς καλούς (157a4–5), where the repeated article puts the adjective in the attributive position with emphasis, and εἶναι splits the phrase: the charms are words, the beautiful ones. "Words like these" renders τῶν τοιούτων λόγων (157a5). The same Greek is "argument", "account" and "principle" elsewhere (see λόγος).

See also

ἀποδύω; ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπῳδή; Ζάλμοξις; θεραπεύω; καλός; κωλύω; λόγος; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; φάρμακον.

λόγος · word, account, argument

Word, account, principle and argument: the conversation itself, treated as a party to it · Charmides

λόγος, *logos*, "(you're) talked about", "account", "the argument"; λόγου, *logou*, "principle", "argument"; λόγῳ, *logōi*, "argument"; λόγον, *logon*, "principle", "says", "answer for", "the argument", "what you meant", "account"; λόγους, *logous*, "words"; λόγων, *logōn*, "words"

At a Glance

The word. What is said: a word, a report, an account, a reason or principle, an argument, and the discussion in which arguments are given.

In the *Charmides*. Twenty-four times, from the boy's "You're talked about a good deal among people my age" (156a) to Socrates' "unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a); at the centre, "Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166e); near the end, "we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument" (175b).

In this edition. The Glossary: "argument, λόγος (logos), where it means the discussion itself: 160b–d, 162e, 166c–e, 169d, 173e, 175b–c, 176a. Elsewhere 'account' (158d, 164c, 165b), 'principle' (156c, 161e) and 'words' (157a, 'beautiful words')."

A place to read. 175b–c.

Meaning

Λόγος is the noun of λέγω, "say", and no English word covers it. It is what is said about someone, his reputation; the account a man gives, of himself or of a matter; the reckoning that lies behind a practice, its principle or ratio; the argument that moves from premises to a conclusion; and, by an easy step, the discussion in which such arguments are put forward and tested. Greek uses one word where English needs five, and the dialogue moves through all of them.

Use in the book

The early uses are of what people say. The boy knows Socrates because he is much talked about, οὐ ... ὀλίγος λόγος (156a); the boy is temperate "as Critias here says" and "by his account" (158b, 158d); the doctor acts temperately "by your account" (164c). Then the word becomes a principle: the doctors put the whole body on a regimen "On this principle", and the boy says he accepts "the principle" (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι); the imagined law would have each man make everything "on the same principle" (161e). At 157a λόγοι are the beautiful words of the charm (see λόγοι καλοί), and at 163d Socrates tells Critias, "almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant", ἐμάνθανον τὸν λόγον (see μανθάνω).

From 160b the word is the argument, and the argument is given a life of its own. Its conclusions hold "on this argument at any rate" (160b), and its premises were laid down "in our argument" (160d; see ὑποτίθημι). Critias takes it over from the boy (162e; see παραδέχομαι). When he complains that Socrates is "letting go of what the argument is about" (166c), Socrates answers that he is examining the argument for his own sake above all (166d; see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον), and tells Critias to forget which of them is being refuted: "Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166e; see ἐκβαίνω). The argument has a course of its own; Socrates grants a premise "to keep our argument moving" (169d; see πρόειμι), and later finds that "we are no longer holding to the argument" that the man who lives knowledgeably is happy (173e; see ἐμμένω).

At the end the argument speaks against those who conducted it. "And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument. For we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was; and we conceded, again, that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either" (175b–c; see ἐάω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; φάσκω). The λόγος is the third party in a conversation of two: it allows and refuses, says and does not say, and the speakers have overridden it. The failure Socrates blames is theirs, not the argument's, and the last use of

the word shows what he thinks he has proved about himself: if the boy has temperance, he should regard Socrates as a babbler, "unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument" (176a; see λῆρος). The charm made of λόγοι and the argument that refused its consent are the same word, and the dialogue can be read as asking whether the first can work without the second.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

156a Socrates is much talked about among the boy's age-group.

156c The doctors treat the whole on this principle; the boy accepts the principle.

157a The charms are beautiful words; from such words temperance comes to be.

158b The boy is well endowed for temperance, as Critias says.

158d Many think the boy temperate, by Critias' account.

160b On this argument the temperate life would not be quiet.

160d In the argument temperance was laid down as one of the fine things.

161e A law would order each man to make everything on the same principle.

162c The boy wants Critias, not himself, to answer for the definition.

162e Critias agrees and takes the argument over.

163d Socrates understood what Critias meant almost as soon as he began.

164c The doctor acted temperately, by Critias' account.

165b Critias is willing to give an account of knowing oneself.

166c Critias: Socrates is letting go of what the argument is about.

166d Socrates examines the argument for his own sake above all.

166e Pay attention to the argument itself and see what becomes of it under refutation.

169d Socrates grants a premise to keep the argument moving.

173e They are no longer holding to the argument that the knowledgeable man is happy.

175b–c They conceded many things that did not follow in the argument, though the argument did not allow them.

176a Socrates should be regarded as a babbler, unable to inquire by argument.

Elsewhere in Plato

The argument as a third party is a Platonic habit. At the end of the *Protagoras* Socrates says that the outcome of their arguments seems, like a human being, to accuse and mock them, and if it found a voice it would say, "You are absurd, Socrates and Protagoras", since each has ended by arguing the other's case (361a–c). In the *Crito* he describes himself as the kind of man who, not for the first time now but always, obeys nothing of his own except the λόγος that seems best to him when he reasons (46b). In the *Republic*, when Adeimantus guesses that he is considering whether to admit tragedy and comedy into the city, he answers that perhaps it is that and perhaps more, for he does not yet know, "but wherever the argument, like a wind, carries us, there we must go" (394d). In the *Phaedo*, after his friends have lost faith in the arguments for the soul's immortality (88c–89e; see ἀπιστία), he warns them that it would be a pitiable fate if, when there is an argument that is true and sound and can be grasped, a man who has met arguments that seem now true and now false were to blame not himself and his own lack of skill but in the end, in his distress, gladly push the blame off onto the arguments, and spend the rest of his life hating and abusing them, deprived of the truth and knowledge of the things that are (90c–d). The *Charmides* ends on the right side of that warning: at 175b–c the blame falls on the speakers.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes λόγος the mark of the human being. Nature does nothing in vain, he says, and man alone of animals has λόγος; voice is a sign of pain and pleasure, and so other animals have it too, but λόγος is there to make plain what is beneficial and what harmful, and so what is just and what unjust; for this is proper to men as against the other animals, that they alone perceive good and bad, just and unjust, and the rest, and it is sharing in these that makes a household and a city.[187] The knowledge the *Charmides* looks for at the end, of good and bad, can be read as standing where Aristotle puts the work of speech.

[187] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2, 1253a9–18.

Translation in this edition

The English follows the Glossary's division: "talked about" (156a6), "principle" (156c3, 156c8, 161e13), "words" (157a4–5), "says" (158b3), "account" (158d4, 164c2, 165b3), "argument" (160b8, 160d1, 162e3, 166c5, 166d3, 166e2, 169d2, 173e6, 175b5, 175b7, 175c1, 176a3), "answer for the definition" for ὑπέχειν λόγον (162c7; see ὑπέχειν λόγον) and "what you meant" (163d2). Its opposite, ἄλογος, gives "more absurd", ἀλογώτερον, at 175c (see ἄλογος).

See also

ἄλογος; ἀπιστία; ἀποδέχομαι; διδόναι λόγον; ἐάω; ἐκβαίνω; ἐμμένω; λέξις; λῆρος; λόγοι καλοί; λοιδορέω; μανθάνω; παραδέχομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; πρόειμι; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον; ὑπέχειν λόγον; ὑποτίθημι; φάσκω.

λοιδορέω · trade insults

λοιδορουμένους, *loidoroumenous*, "trading insults"

Attested: λοιδορουμένους (*loidoroumenous*; 154a). To abuse, rail at; in the middle with ἀλλήλοις, to abuse one another. The word belongs to the boy's entrance. Critias "glanced toward the door and saw some young men coming in, trading insults with one another, with another crowd following on behind" (154a); they are, he says, "the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway" (see ἐραστής; πρόδρομος). The rivals for Charmides come in quarrelling, and the noise is the prologue's first sign of what his beauty does to a room; when he arrives the whole company is "astounded and flustered" (154c; see ἐκπλήσσω; θορυβέω). In the *Phaedo* the verb names the end of the man who has lost faith in arguments: he spends the rest of his life hating and abusing them (90d; see λόγος).

See also ἐκπλήσσω; ἐραστής; θορυβέω; λόγος; πρόδρομος.

M Mu

μὰ Δία · by Zeus

μὰ Δία, *ma Dia*, "by Zeus"; μὰ Δί', *ma Di'*, "by Zeus"

Attested: μὰ Δία (*ma Dia*; 162b), μὰ Δί' (*ma Di'*; 167d, 173e, 176a). The particle μά with the accusative of a god makes an oath, and in Attic it goes with a denial; the oath of affirmation is νή, as when Socrates says "Of course I know him, by Zeus" (154b) and "By Zeus, I am" (161c; see νὴ Δία). Each of the four uses here comes with a "no". Two are Critias', refusing Socrates' suggestions: asked whether there is a sight that sees itself and no colour, "By Zeus, I don't" (167d; see μὴ ὄψεις); asked whether living knowledgeably means knowing about cutting leather, "By Zeus, not I" (173e; see σκυτῶν τομή). Two are the boy's, and they close his two parts in the conversation with the same words. When the formula of doing one's own business is in trouble, he says, "By Zeus, I don't know" (162b), with a sly glance at Critias; and at the end, asked whether he has temperance, "But by Zeus, Socrates, I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The first "I don't know" is a tease; the second can be read as the one lesson the conversation has taught him.

See also μὴ ὄψεις; νὴ Δία; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; σκυτῶν τομή.

μάθημα · subject of learning

A subject of learning: what the knowledge of knowledge would be knowledge of none of · Charmides

μαθήματος, *mathēmatos*, "(no) subject of learning"

At a Glance

The word. What is learned, from μανθάνω: a lesson, a subject, a branch of study; in the plural, studies, and especially the mathematical ones.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?" (168a).

In this edition. "Subject of learning".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

The ending -μα makes a noun of what an action produces: μάθημα is the thing learned, as πάθημα is the thing suffered. From the lesson the word passes to the subject taught, and τὰ μαθήματα can be the mathematical sciences in particular: the *Laws* gives free men three of them (7.817e–818a), and Aristotle complains that for the thinkers of his day τὰ μαθήματα have become philosophy.[188] In the *Charmides* it is the object proper to knowledge, as colour is to sight.

Use in the book

The word ends Socrates' catalogue of capacities that would take themselves for object. Each is paired with what it is properly of: a sight that sees no colour, a hearing that hears no sound, a desire for no pleasure, a wish for no good, a love of nothing beautiful, a fear of nothing dreadful, an opinion about nothing that opinions are about, and finally the knowledge Critias proposes, "knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (168a; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The proper object of knowledge is named from learning: what

[188] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.9, 992a32–33.

one knows is what could be learned. Put so, Critias' knowledge is a knowledge of nothing that could be learned, and the catalogue makes it absurd by putting it last in a line of absurdities (see ἄτοπος).

The word can be read as preparing the one benefit later proposed for the knowledge of knowledge: if it is of no subject, it can at best help with the learning of others (172b; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; μανθάνω).

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the catalogue it ends.

167c–168a Sight, hearing, sense, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion that would be of themselves and of others of their kind, but of none of their proper objects; then knowledge of no subject of learning.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* the sophist names his own subject of learning. Other sophists, he says, drag young men who have escaped the arts back into them, teaching calculations, astronomy, geometry and music, and he glances at Hippias as he says it; but a young man who comes to him will learn only what he came for, and his own subject of learning is good counsel about household and city (318d–319a; see βουλεύομαι). It can be read as the management of household and city that the *Charmides* hopes temperance might guide (171d–172d; see διοίκησις), offered as a subject in its own right. In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger assigns free men three subjects of learning, calculation and number, the measurement of length, surface and depth, and the revolutions of the stars, which the many need only so far as is necessary and a few must pursue with exactness (7.817e–818a). The *Republic* calls the form of the good the greatest subject of learning (505a; see ἀγαθός).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus' Croesus, defeated and advising Cyrus, speaks from experience: "my sufferings, unpleasant as they were, have become my lessons", τὰ δέ μοι παθήματα ἐόντα ἀχάριτα μαθήματα γέγονε.[189]

[189] Herodotus 1.207.1.

Translation in this edition

"Subject of learning" renders μαθήματος (168a7), the genitive depending on "knowledge", so that the English keeps the parallel with "sees no color" and "hears no sound".

See also

ἀγαθός; ἄτοπος; βουλεύομαι; διοίκησις; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; εὐμαθία; μανθάνω; προσκαθοράω.

μακάριος · blessed

ὦ μακάριε, *ō makarie*, "my dear fellow"; μακάριον, *makarion*, "blessed"

Attested: ὦ μακάριε (*ō makarie*; 157a, 166d), μακάριον (*makarion*; 158b, 176a). Blessed, happy; in Homer the word of the gods, the μάκαρες, and of men whose fortune is like theirs. In address, ὦ μακάριε is a warm, half-ironic "my good friend", and the English renders it "my dear fellow": it stands inside Socrates' report of the Thracian's teaching about the soul, as his own address to the boy or the Thracian's to him (157a; see λόγοι καλοί), and to Critias, "Then take heart, my dear fellow" (166d; see θαρρέω). The adjective proper comes twice, at the beginning and the end. After praising the boy's two family houses Socrates says, "then blessed is the child, my dear Charmides ... your mother bore" (158b; see εὖ πέφυκα); the edition's note at 158b calls it "the old formula of blessing, as when Odysseus tells Nausicaa 'thrice blessed are your father and your lady mother' (Odyssey 6.154–55)", and adds, "Socrates is laying it on." Nausicaa is the Phaeacian princess who finds the shipwrecked Odysseus. Both blessings are conditional. The first hangs on the boy's nature, "if ... you are also well enough endowed for temperance and the rest" (158b); the last on his having the virtue: "I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a; see εἴπερ; εὐδαίμων), and the boy at once says he does not know whether he has it (176a).

See also εἴπερ; εὖ πέφυκα; εὐδαίμων; θαρρέω; λόγοι καλοί.

μᾶλλον · more, rather

μᾶλλον, *mallon*, "more", "any more than", "sooner"

Attested: μᾶλλον (*mallon*; 156a, 159e, 160c, 160d, 161b, 162b, 162c, 164d twice, 169d, 171c, 173b, 174b, 175d, 175e, 176a). The comparative of μάλα, "very": more, rather, sooner. Its idioms carry two refutations. The first definition falls on "no more ... than": even if quiet actions were as often fine as quick ones, "temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly", μᾶλλόν τι ... ἢ (160c; see ἡσυχῇ); and the second falls on the same form, since "modesty is no more good than bad", οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ... ἤ, where Burnet, after Ast, brackets μή before οὐδέν (161b; see αἰδώς). In both, an indifference between opposites ends the definition: temperance turns out no more quiet than quick, and modesty no more good than bad. With *παντός* the word makes a strong assurance, "I am quite certain" (162b), "entirely true" (162c), "Most certainly" (171c); it also makes a preference: with ἤ when Critias would "sooner take back" some of what he has agreed than grant that a man ignorant of himself is temperate (164d; see ἀνατίθημι), and with the alternative left unstated when Socrates would "sooner advise" the boy to think him a babbler (176a). At 174b μᾶλλον alone, "More so", is Critias' answer when Socrates asks whether the knowledge of the healthy makes a man happy, the first step towards naming the knowledge of good and bad.

See also αἰδώς; ἀνατίθημι; ἡσυχῇ; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ.

μανθάνω · learn, understand

Learn and understand: how Socrates came by his charm, and the benefit left to the knowledge of knowledge · Charmides

ἔμαθον, *emathon*, "I learned"; μανθάνειν, *manthanein*, "learning"; ἐμάνθανον, *emanthanon*, "I understood", "(took great pains) to learn"; μανθάνω, *manthanō*, "I (don't) understand"; μανθάνῃ, *manthanēi*, "(whatever else) he learns", "(each thing) he learns"; μαθήσεται, *mathēsetai*, "(will) learn"; μάθῃ, *mathēi*, "(has) learned"; μαθεῖν, *mathein*, "(cannot yet) learn"

At a Glance

The word. To learn, to come to know; and, of what is said, to understand.

In the *Charmides*. Twelve times: "I learned it out there on campaign from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis" (156d); "I learned that from Hesiod" (163b); "again I don't understand how it is the same thing" (170a); "this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173d); "if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing" (175e).

In this edition. "Learn", and "understand" where the object is something said.

A place to read. 172b–173d.

Meaning

Μανθάνειν covers two things that English keeps apart: acquiring a knowledge one did not have, and understanding something said by means of a knowledge one has. A Greek who says μανθάνω in conversation usually means "I follow you"; a teacher's pupils μανθάνουσι because they are learning. The *Euthydemus* makes a sophistical game of the double sense, and the *Charmides* uses both without comment.

Use in the book

The verb first names how authority is acquired. Socrates "learned" his charm from a Thracian doctor (156d; see Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ), Critias "learned" his distinction from Hesiod (163b; see Ἡσίοδος), one a foreign healer at the opening of the cure, the other a poet where Critias takes over the argument.

At the end Socrates returns to his own: he is still more aggrieved on account of the charm he learned from the Thracian, if he took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; σπουδή). The inquiry has been, among other things, a test of whether what he learned was worth learning, and he refuses its apparent verdict: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer" (175e; see ζητητής).

In conversation the verb means understanding, and its two uses can be read as measuring the two halves of Critias' performance. When Critias distinguishes making from doing, Socrates says, "almost as soon as you began I understood what you meant" (163d; see Πρόδικος): the distinctions are easy to follow because they are only distinctions of words. When Critias claims that knowing oneself is the same as knowing what one knows and does not know, Socrates says, "I'm afraid I'm my same old self: again I don't understand how it is the same thing" (170a; see κινδυνεύω). What he does not understand is the point on which the definition fails.

The verb is also the benefit left to the knowledge of knowledge. Learning easily was finer than learning with difficulty, and learning easily was learning quickly (159e; see δυσμαθία; εὐμαθία). Later Socrates proposes that the good temperance has may be that "whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns", seeing the knowledge as well as each thing learned, and will examine others better about what he has learned (172b; see ἐναργής; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; προσκαθοράω). In the dream the verb marks the limit of what they have found: that acting knowledgeably would make us do well and be happy, "this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως). The noun of the verb names what the knowledge of knowledge was knowledge of none of (168a; see μάθημα).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156d Socrates learned the charm from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis.

159e Learning easily is learning quickly.

163b Critias learned his distinction from Hesiod.

163d Socrates understood what Critias meant as soon as he began.

170a Socrates does not understand how it is the same thing, to know what one knows and to know what one does not know.

172b Whoever has knowledge of knowledge will learn more easily whatever else he learns.

173d That acting knowledgeably makes us happy they cannot yet learn.

175e Socrates is aggrieved for the charm he learned from the Thracian, if he took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthydemus* Socrates explains the trick of the two sophists who have just made young Clinias say first that the wise learn and then that the ignorant learn. As Prodicus says, he tells the boy, one must first learn about the correctness of names: people use "learning" both when someone who has no knowledge of a thing afterwards acquires it, and when someone who already has the knowledge uses it to examine the same thing being done or said, though they then call it understanding, συνιέναι, rather than learning, but sometimes learning too; and the sophists have shown him that the same name is applied to men in opposite states, the one who knows and the one who does not (277e–278a).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle lists the same double sense among the fallacies that arise from a word with more than one meaning: "those who know learn, since what is dictated is learned by the literate"; for "learning" is used both of understanding while using knowledge and of acquiring knowledge.[190]

Translation in this edition

"Learn" wherever the verb means acquiring (156d4, 159e3, 163b4, 172b3–7, 173d5, 175e3, 175e5); "understand" at 163d2 and 170a3, where the object is what someone has said. "Learning easily" renders εὐμαθία (159e1–3; see εὐμαθία).

[190] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 4, 165b32–34.

See also

ἀγανακτέω; δυσμαθία; ἐναργής; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ἐπιστημόνως; εὐμαθία; Ζάλμοξις; ζητέω; ζητητής; Ἡσίοδος; Θρᾷξ; κινδυνεύω; μάθημα; Πρόδικος; προσκαθοράω; σπουδή; συνίημι.

μανικός · madman

μανικὸς ὤν, *manikos ōn*, "madman that he is"

Attested: μανικός (*manikos*; 153b). Mad, crazy, frenzied; from μανία, madness. The word is Socrates' description of Chaerephon in the first lines, "Chaerephon, madman that he is", who jumps up and runs across the room to him (153b; see θέω; λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; Χαιρεφῶν). The edition's note at 153b reads it kindly: "Manikos, 'crazy', is an affectionate label for a man who did everything at a run", and recalls that in the *Apology* Socrates calls him "vehement in whatever he set about" (21a). The madness in question is enthusiasm, and the action that proves it is a run across the room. Plato's Socrates makes the word the root of another in the *Phaedrus*, where the art of foretelling the future was, he says, called μανική by the ancients and μαντική by their tasteless successors (244c; see μαντική).

See also θέω; λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; μαντική; Χαιρεφῶν.

μαντεύομαι · have a prophetic hunch

μαντεύομαι, *manteuomai*, "I have a prophetic hunch"

Attested: μαντεύομαι (*manteuomai*; 169b). To divine, to prophesy; in ordinary speech, to guess at what one cannot yet prove. Socrates uses it of the one thing he will not give up about temperance: he cannot accept knowledge of knowledge as temperance "until I have looked into whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not. For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good" (169b; see ἀγαθός; ὠφέλιμος). The edition's note at 169b calls the verb "Plato's usual word for a hunch (Republic 506a, Phaedrus 278e)", and adds that after Critias' god who speaks "as a prophet

would" (164e) "it may be heard as an echo; that is an interpretation" (see μάντις). In the *Republic* the verb has the same object. Every soul, Socrates says, pursues the good and does everything for its sake, divining, ἀπομαντευομένη, that it is something but at a loss to grasp what it is (505d–e); and he divines that no one will know the just and the fine adequately until he knows in what way they are good, and Adeimantus answers, "You divine well" (506a). The hunch of 169b can be read as the standard by which the argument is judged: knowledge of knowledge fails because it cannot be shown to benefit (175a), and Socrates ends by repeating the hunch as a conviction, "I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e; see ἀνωφελής).

See also ἀγαθός; ἀνωφελής; μάντις; ὠφέλιμος.

μαντική · prophecy

Prophecy, granted in Socrates' dream to be knowledge of the future and set under temperance · Charmides

τὴν μαντικήν, *tēn mantikēn*, "prophecy"

At a Glance

The word. The art of the μάντις: divination from birds, sacrifices and dreams, and inspired utterance.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' dream: "And if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be, and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future" (173c).

In this edition. "Prophecy".

A place to read. 173c–174b.

Meaning

Μαντική, with τέχνη understood, was an established expertise. Seers marched with armies and read the sacrifices before battle; cities and private men consulted oracles and diviners before marriages, voyages and wars. The

Phaedrus sets the art practised by reasoning from signs, such as birds, against the inspired speech of the prophetess at Delphi, and gives the distinction its own etymology (244a–d). Its claim to knowledge was hard to test, since its object had not yet happened.

Use in the book

Socrates grants prophecy last and most freely. The dream has pictured temperance ruling so that everything is done according to the kinds of knowledge, with pilots, doctors and generals unmasked if they are impostors (173a–c; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας); then, "if you like", he adds prophecy to the list, as "knowledge of what is going to be" (173c; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; συγχωρέω), with temperance "presiding over it" (see ἐπιστατέω), turning away the impostors (see ἀλαζών; ἀποτρέπω) and setting up the true prophets (see προφήτης). A few lines later Socrates suggests that Critias' happy man may be the prophet himself, and Critias accepts him (173e–174a; see μάντις).

The concession is a large one, and the dialogue has already shown why. At 170e–171c the knowledge of knowledge could not tell a true doctor from a pretender without itself being medicine, so that the temperate man would need to be a doctor too (see ἀληθινός; ᾗ ἰατρικός; ὁμότεχνος). By the same reasoning it can be read as needing to be prophecy to tell true prophets from impostors. The dream grants all this for the sake of the argument and still cannot say that the result would make anyone happy: the human race so equipped would act and live knowledgeably, but "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως). Even perfect foreknowledge leaves open whether what is foreseen is good, and that question belongs to the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the step it prepares.

173c Prophecy is granted to be knowledge of what is going to be; temperance, presiding over it, would turn away impostors and set up true prophets.

173e–174a Critias' happy man may be the prophet, who knows all that is going to be.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Timaeus* gives temperance the office the dream gives it, and names it with the dialogue's own definitions. God gave prophecy to human folly, Timaeus says: no one in his right mind attains true and inspired prophecy, but only when the power of his understanding is fettered in sleep, or altered by disease or divine possession; it belongs to the man in his right mind to recall and consider what was said, in dream or waking, by the prophetic nature, and to sort out by reasoning what the visions signify and for whom, of bad or good, past, present or future; it is not the work of the man who has been mad and is still so to judge what he saw and said, for, as the old saying has it, doing and knowing one's own and oneself belong to the temperate man alone (71e–72a; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

The *Phaedrus* sets the two against each other. The greatest goods come to us through madness, Socrates says, when it is given by divine gift: the prophetess at Delphi and the priestesses at Dodona have done Greece much good when mad, and little or nothing when in their right minds, σωφρονοῦσαι. The ancients who gave names thought madness no disgrace, or they would not have called the finest art, by which the future is judged, μανική; their successors tastelessly put in the τ and called it μαντική. The inquiry into the future made by men in their right minds, through birds and other signs, they called οἰονοιστική, which the young now dignify as οἰωνιστική; and by as much as prophecy is more perfect than augury, the ancients testify, madness from a god is finer than the temperance that comes from men (244a–d; see μανικός). The *Laches*, in which the general is said to rule the prophet and not the prophet the general, is told elsewhere (195e–196a, 198e–199a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates draws the line the dream erases. He told his friends to do what had to be done in the way he judged it would best be done, but where the outcome was unclear he sent them to ask an oracle whether to act at all; those who meant to run households and cities well, he said, needed prophecy besides, for carpentry, smithing, farming, ruling men, examining

such works, calculation, household management and generalship can all be learned and chosen by human judgement, but the greatest of their outcomes the gods keep for themselves. What the gods let men do once they have learned it, men should learn; what lies beyond human sight they should try to discover from the gods through prophecy.[191] The *Charmides*' dream imagines prophecy turned into one more of the learnable arts, and finds that the greatest outcome, whether the life so ordered is good, is still unaccounted for.

Translation in this edition

"Prophecy" renders τὴν μαντικήν (173c3); μάντις is "prophet" and προφήτης "foreteller" (see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; ἀποτρέπω; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως; ἦ ἰατρικός; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; μανικός; μάντις; ὁμότεχνος; προφήτης; συγχωρέω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

μάντις · prophet

The prophet: the god at Delphi speaks like one, and the happy man of the dream might be one · Charmides

μάντις, *mantis*, "a prophet"; μάντεις, *manteis*, "prophets"; τὸν μάντιν, *ton mantin*, "the prophet"

At a Glance

The word. A seer, diviner, prophet; the word is related to μαίνομαι, "be mad".

In the *Charmides*. Three times: the god greets those who enter "as a prophet would, rather riddlingly" (164e); temperance sets up "the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future" (173c); and Critias' happy man may be "the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet" (174a).

[191] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.6–9.

In this edition. "Prophet".
A place to read. 164d–165a.

Meaning

The μάντις read the signs the gods sent, in the flight of birds, in sacrifices and in dreams, or spoke under inspiration, and his speech was characteristically dark. Oracles came in riddles that needed interpreting, and an interpreter might be a different person from the one inspired. The *Charmides* uses both sides of the figure: the prophet who speaks obscurely, and the prophet who knows the future.

Use in the book

The first use is Critias'. The inscription "Know thyself", he says, is the god's greeting to those who enter his temple, and means "Be temperate": "But he says it, as a prophet would, rather riddlingly" (164e; see αἰνιγματώδης; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Σωφρόνει). The later dedicators, who took the maxim for advice and set up "Nothing too much" beside it, can be read as the hearers who misread the prophet (165a; see Μηδὲν ἄγαν). Critias puts himself in the interpreter's place and claims to know what the god meant.

At the end the prophet returns as a knower. Temperance in the dream sets up "the true prophets" (173c; see μαντική), and Socrates asks whether the man Critias calls happy is "the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet. Do you mean him, or someone else?" Critias answers, "Him ... and another as well" (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; τὰ μέλλοντα). The prophet, whose riddling speech at 164e called for an interpreter, is at 174a a candidate for the happiest of men, and the argument shows that his knowledge would not make him so without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The two figures can be read as one judgement: Critias is willing to interpret the god's riddle and to call the foreknower happy, and in neither case does he ask what the knowledge is good for.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

164e The god speaks as a prophet would, rather riddlingly.

173c Temperance would set up the true prophets as foretellers of the future.

174a Critias' happy man may be the prophet, who knows all that is going to be.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Timaeus* separates the prophet from the interpreter. Having said that judging prophecy belongs to the temperate (71e–72a; see μαντική), Timaeus explains why the law sets up the class of foretellers, προφῆται, as judges over inspired prophecies: some call these men prophets, μάντεις, not knowing that they are interpreters of what is spoken and shown in riddles, and not prophets at all; they would most rightly be called foretellers for those who prophesy (72a–b; see προφήτης). In the *Apology* Socrates says that the poets make what they make not by wisdom but by a kind of nature and inspiration, like the god-inspired seers and the oracle-singers, who say many fine things but know nothing of what they say (22b–c), and the *Ion* adds that the god takes away their minds and uses them as his servants, so that we who hear may know that it is the god himself who speaks through them (534c–d). The *Charmides*' "true prophets", with knowledge of the future, are a hypothesis of the dream; the inspired seers of the *Apology*, the *Ion* and the *Timaeus* speak without knowing, and even the *Laches* allows the seer only a knowledge of signs (195e–196a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus gives the classic case of a riddling oracle and its misreading. Croesus, having lost his kingdom, sends to Delphi to complain, and is answered that he blames the oracle wrongly: Loxias, as the Pythia calls Apollo, foretold that if he marched against the Persians he would destroy a great empire, and he should, if he meant to deliberate well, have sent again to ask whether his own empire or Cyrus' was meant; not having grasped what was said or asked again, let him declare himself to blame.[192]

[192] Herodotus 1.90.4–91.4.

Translation in this edition

"Prophet" renders μάντις (164e7) and τὸν μάντιν (174a1), and "prophets" μάντεις (173c6); "as a prophet would" is ὡς μάντις (164e6–7), where the Greek is the comparison alone.

See also

αἰνιγματώδης; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντεύομαι; μαντική; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; προφήτης; Σωφρόνει; τὰ μέλλοντα.

μεγαλοπρεπῶς · with magnificence

παντάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς, *pantapasi megaloprepōs*, "with the utmost magnificence"

Attested: μεγαλοπρεπῶς (*megaloprepōs*; 175c). Magnificently, in a grand style; the adverb of μεγαλοπρεπής, "befitting a great man". Socrates uses it of the last and largest concession he and Critias made, that the temperate man would know of what he knows that he knows it and of what he does not know that he does not: "This we conceded with the utmost magnificence, without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all" (175c; see ἀμῶς γέ πως; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The edition's note at 175d reads it as irony: "they gave away lavishly what the argument did not allow." Aristotle reads the virtue off the word: magnificence, like liberality, has to do with money, but only with spending, and it outdoes liberality in size, being, as the name itself hints, the outlay that befits greatness.[193] The concession can be read as such an outlay, made with what was not theirs to give, for the argument had not allowed it (175b–c; see λόγος). The adverb is used without irony in the *Statesman*, where the visitor from Elea says that an argument "helps us magnificently" (284d; see μέτριος).

See also ἀμῶς γέ πως; λόγος; μέτριος; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν.

[193] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.2, 1122a19–23.

μεγαλωστί · enormously

μεγαλωστί, *megalōsti*, "enormous(ly)"

Attested: μεγαλωστί (*megalōsti*; 171d). Greatly, on a grand scale. It comes in Socrates' summary of what temperance would be worth if the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not and could examine others: "then, we say, it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate" (171d; see ἀναμάρτητος; ὠφέλιμος). The edition's note at 171d explains the word: "a rare epic and Ionic adverb: Homer uses it of a great warrior lying 'at his full length' in the dust (Iliad 16.776, 18.26), Herodotus simply for 'greatly' (6.70)." In Homer the formula is "great in his greatness", said of Hector's charioteer Cebriones fallen in the whirling dust, of Achilles lying stretched in the dust in his grief for his friend Patroclus, and in the *Odyssey* of Achilles dead;[194] in Herodotus Darius, king of Persia, receives Demaratus, the deposed king of Sparta, "in grand style".[195] The word is Stephanus' conjecture, where B and T have μεγάλως τι, "greatly, in a way"; the note adds that "if it is right, the Homeric ring may be Socrates waxing mock-heroic, which is an interpretation." The benefit so grandly described is the one Socrates withdraws a page later, when he says that they were not right to agree that temperance would be a great good (172d; see καλῶς).

See also ἀναμάρτητος; καλῶς; ὠφέλιμος.

μέγας ἀνήρ · a great man

μεγάλου ... τινος ... ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, *megalou ... tinos ... andros dei*, "It needs a great man"

Attested: μεγάλου ... ἀνδρός (*megalou ... andros*; 169a). After the catalogue of capacities that might or might not relate to themselves, Socrates gives up the general question: "It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to

[194] Homer, *Iliad* 16.775–776 and 18.26–27; *Odyssey* 24.39–40.

[195] Herodotus 6.70.2.

something else; or whether some are and some are not" (169a; see δεῖ; διαιρέω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἱκανός). He does not claim to be the man: "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a; see πιστεύω). The phrase lays the large question aside so that the argument can turn to the smaller one, whether such a knowledge would benefit (169b; see ὠφέλιμος). In the *Phaedrus* Socrates declines another large task in the same form. Explaining away the myths, he says, is the work of a very clever and laborious and not very fortunate man (229d–e); he has no leisure for it, because he cannot yet know himself, as the Delphic inscription bids (229e–230a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). In both places Socrates sets the great man's work aside, in the *Phaedrus* to know himself first, in the *Charmides* because he does not trust himself with it, though there the work postponed is the question on which the definition of temperance depends.

See also Γνῶθι σαυτόν; δεῖ; διαιρέω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἱκανός; πιστεύω; ὠφέλιμος.

μέγας βασιλεύς · the Great King

παρὰ μέγαν βασιλέα, *para megan basilea*, "to the Great King"

Attested: μέγαν βασιλέα (*megan basilea*; 158a). The Greek title of the king of Persia, ruler of "the continent", Asia. It comes in Socrates' praise of the boy's mother's family: "it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than your uncle Pyrilampes, whenever he went as ambassador to the Great King or to anyone else on the continent" (158a; see ἤπειρος; πρεσβεύω). The edition's note at 158a explains that Pyrilampes "was known for his embassies to Persia (and, says Plutarch, for his peacocks: Pericles 13)" (see μείζων). The Great King was the Greeks' standard of wealth and good fortune, and the measure of Pyrilampes' looks is taken at his court. In the *Apology* Socrates uses the same standard for the opposite purpose: if death is a dreamless sleep, he says, not only a private man but the Great King himself would find few days and nights of his life better and pleasanter than that night (40d–e).

See also ἤπειρος; μείζων; πρεσβεύω.

μέγεθος · stature, magnitude

τὸ μέγεθος, *to megethos*, "stature"; μεγέθη, *megethē*, "magnitudes"

Attested: μέγεθος (*megethos*; 154c), μεγέθη (*megethē*; 168e). Size, greatness; of a person, stature; in mathematics, magnitude. The word has one sense in each half of the dialogue. In the prologue it goes with beauty: Charmides "struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty" (154b–c; see κάλλος; λευκὴ στάθμη), and it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought "handsomer or bigger" than the boy's uncle (158a; see μείζων). Greek admiration joined the two, and Aristotle's judgement that beauty requires size is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 4.3; *Poetics* 7; see κάλλος). In the argument the plural names the things that could never relate to themselves: "For with magnitudes and numbers and such things it is altogether impossible, isn't it?" (168e; see ἀδύνατος; πλῆθος), since a magnitude greater than itself would also be smaller than itself (168b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). The word that described the boy's body describes, a few pages later, the class of things for which it is plainly impossible to have their own power in relation to themselves.

See also ἀδύνατος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; κάλλος; λευκὴ στάθμη; μείζων; πλῆθος.

μείζων · greater, bigger

μείζων, *meizōn*, "bigger"; τὸ μεῖζον, *to meizon*, "the greater"; μειζόνων, *meizonōn*, "(than the) greater things"; μείζω, *meizō*, "greater"; μεῖζόν τι, *meizon ti*, "something greater"

Attested: μείζων (*meizōn*; 158a), μεῖζον (*meizon*; 168b–c, 172c), μειζόνων (*meizonōn*; 168b), μείζω (*meizō*; 168b). The comparative of μέγας, "great": greater, bigger, taller. It has three uses. Of a body: it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought "handsomer or bigger" than Pyrilampes

(158a), and the edition's note at 158a observes that "Meizōn, 'bigger', can mean taller or greater, and there may be a smile in an envoy admired for being handsome and big" (see μέγας βασιλεύς). Of a relation: "the greater, too, has a certain power such that it is greater than something", namely "Than something smaller", so that a greater that was greater than itself would also be smaller than itself (168b–c, where T has μείζω and B μείζων at 168b11; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐλάττων). And of ambition: perhaps the modest benefits of temperance are all there is, "while we have been looking at something greater, and seeking for it to be greater than it is" (172c; see ζητέω). In the *Theaetetus* Socrates, without growing, will within a year be smaller than the young Theaetetus (155b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). The *Charmides* uses the comparative to show that nothing can be greater than itself, and then, it can be read, catches its inquirers seeking for temperance "to be greater than it is".

See also ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐλάττων; ζητέω; μέγας βασιλεύς; μέγεθος.

μειράκιον · young man

μειράκιον, *meirakion*, "(quite) the young man"

Attested: μειράκιον (*meirakion*; 154b). A boy grown into youth, past childhood and not yet a man; the word is a diminutive of μεῖραξ. Socrates uses it on hearing that Charmides is on his way in: "He was nothing to sniff at even then, when he was still a child; by now, I should think, he must be quite the young man" (154b; see παῖς; φαῦλος). The sentence marks the stage the boy has reached since Socrates went away to Potidaea: a child, παῖς, when Socrates left, when, in Critias' phrase a moment earlier, he "wasn't yet grown up" (154a; see ἐν ἡλικίᾳ); a μειράκιον now. In the *Apology* Socrates gives the same stage to one of his own sons: he has three, "one already a young man, the other two small children" (34d).

See also ἐν ἡλικίᾳ; παῖς; φαῦλος.

μέμνημαι · remember

μεμνῆσθαι, *memnēsthai*, "remembering"; μέμνημαι, *memnēmai*, "I remember"

Attested: μεμνῆσθαι (*memnēsthai*; 159e); μέμνημαι (*memnēmai*; 156a), for which see μιμνήσκομαι. The perfect of μιμνήσκομαι, "call to mind": to have in mind, to remember. It comes, beside "recollecting", ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, in the list of the soul's activities that Socrates uses against quietness: "And what about recollecting and remembering? Is it finer to do them quietly and slowly, or vigorously and quickly?" and the boy answers, "Vigorously ... and quickly" (159e; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἡσυχῇ). The pair is the act and the state: recollecting is the getting back of what was forgotten, remembering the holding of it. The boy has shown both. He remembers Socrates from childhood, "I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here" (156a; see μιμνήσκομαι), and a few pages later he has "just remembered" the formula about doing one's own business (161b; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι). His ready memory can be read as the means by which the formula he did not understand came into the conversation.

See also ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἡσυχῇ; μιμνήσκομαι.

μέρος · part

The part, which the doctors treat along with the whole, and which cannot be well unless the whole is · Charmides

τὸ μέρος, *to meros*, "the part"

At a Glance

The word. A share, a portion; a part of a whole.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in the medical teaching that opens the cure: the good doctors "try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c), and "when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e).

In this edition. "The part".

A place to read. 156b–157a.

Meaning

Μέρος is first a share, what falls to someone, and so a part of anything that can be divided; Plato often uses μόριον, a diminutive from the same root, in the same sense. Aristotle distinguishes four senses of the word: what a quantity can be divided into, or what measures it exactly; what a kind can be divided into, so that species are called parts of a genus; what a whole is divided into or composed of, as the bronze is part of a bronze sphere; and what goes into the definition of a thing, so that the genus is in turn called part of the species.[196] The *Charmides* uses the third, the part of a living body.

Use in the book

The word marks a chain whose links keep changing their names. The doctors cannot cure the eyes without treating the head, nor the head without the whole body (156b–c; see κεφαλή; ὀφθαλμός); so the head is the whole when the eyes are treated, and a part when the body is. Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, carries the chain one link further, from the body to the soul, so that the body itself becomes a part: "when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see ἀμελέω; ἔχειν καλῶς; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος), and the goods and ills of the whole human being flow from the soul as from the head into the eyes (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω).

The boy came to be cured of a headache, and the word places his complaint: his head is a part, and a part cannot be well while the whole is not. The cure that follows is of the whole, and after 158c the head is not mentioned again. The argument later looks for a knowledge that would stand to the other kinds of knowledge as the whole stands to its parts, presiding over them and knowing them all (173c, 174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω); it can be read as the doctors' principle carried into the theory of knowledge, and the argument finds that such a knowledge could not make any part of life go well unless it were also the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d).

[196] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.25, 1023b12–25.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

156c The doctors try to treat and heal the part along with the whole.

156e When the whole is not in good condition, the part cannot possibly be well.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* Socrates uses the eyes again to make the part serve the whole. To the objection that the guardians are not being made happy, he answers that if they were painting a statue and someone blamed them for not putting the finest colours on the finest parts, since the eyes, the finest part, were painted not with purple but with black, they would reasonably reply that one must not paint eyes so beautiful that they no longer look like eyes, nor the other parts either, but see whether, by giving each part what belongs to it, they make the whole beautiful (420c–d). In the *Protagoras* Socrates asks whether the virtues are parts of virtue as mouth, nose, eyes and ears are parts of a face, or as the pieces of gold are parts of gold, differing only in size, and Protagoras chooses the face (329d–e).

Translation in this edition

"The part" renders τὸ μέρος at 156c5 and 156e6. In the second passage "the whole" is Burnet's own reading τοῦ ὅλου (156e4), where B and T have τὸ ὅλον and Stobaeus τοῦ ἄλλου, "the rest"; it goes with ἀμελοῖεν, "they neglect", the variant recorded in T and read by Stobaeus, where B and T have ἀγνοοῖεν, "they do not know" (see ἀμελέω).

See also

ἀμελέω; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστατέω; ἔχειν καλῶς; κεφαλή; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; ὅλος; ὀφθαλμός; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ · with what is fine

With what is fine: the condition Critias sets on a making that is no disgrace · Charmides

μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ, *meta tou kalou*, "with what is fine"

At a Glance

The word. Μετά with the genitive, "together with", and τὸ καλόν, "the fine": a making accompanied by the fine.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' reading of Hesiod: Hesiod "held that a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but that work is never any disgrace" (163c).

In this edition. "With what is fine".

A place to read. 163b–e.

Meaning

The phrase states a condition, not a kind. A thing made, ποίημα, is not fine or shameful in itself: it becomes a disgrace "when it does not come about with what is fine", and a work, ἔργον, is a making that does. The same product, on this account, may be made with the fine or without it, and the difference lies in something that accompanies the making rather than in what is made.

Use in the book

Critias needs the condition to rescue his formula. He has granted that craftsmen make other people's things and may still be temperate, and Socrates has asked how that squares with doing one's own business (162e–163a; see δημιουργός). Critias answers that making is not doing, and that he learned this from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace; Hesiod could not have meant that cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel are "works" (163b; see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ταριχοπωλέω). So he distinguishes: a thing made may be a disgrace "when it does not come about with what is fine"; "things made finely and beneficially he called works" (163c; see καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως); and only such things are one's own, while everything harmful belongs to others (163c; see ἀλλότριος;

οἰκεῖος). Socrates translates the condition at once into his own terms, calling the appropriate and one's own good and the makings of good things doings (163d; see ἀγαθός; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν), and Critias accepts the result, "temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The phrase can be read as the first statement of the dialogue's last result. At 174c–d Socrates argues that if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, medicine will still make us healthy and cobbling shod, but "each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us" (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). That is Critias' condition again: the crafts make their products, and something else must accompany the making if it is to come about with what is fine. Critias named the condition at 163c, and the argument ends by showing that the temperance he defined could not supply it.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Critias' distinction around it.

163b Critias: making is not doing or working; Hesiod said work is no disgrace.

163c A thing made may be a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine; things made finely and beneficially Hesiod called works.

163d–e Socrates restates it: Critias calls the makings of good things doings; temperance is the doing of good things.

Elsewhere in Plato

The doctrine that an action is neither fine nor shameful in itself, but becomes one or the other according to how it is done, is Pausanias' in the *Symposium* (180e–181a; see ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ), and the *Euthydemus*' argument that health, wealth and the rest are neither good nor bad in themselves, but good when wisdom leads them, is told elsewhere (281d–e; see ἀγαθός). Both make the fine or the good something that accompanies the thing, as Critias' phrase does.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle puts the fine at the end rather than beside the act. Actions in accordance with virtue, he says, are fine and done for the sake of the fine, and

so the liberal man will give for the sake of the fine and rightly: to the right people, in the right amounts, at the right time.[197] Critias' "with" and Aristotle's "for the sake of" can be read as two answers to the same question, what makes a making fine: Critias attaches the fine to the making, Aristotle to the agent's aim.

Translation in this edition

"With what is fine" renders μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ (163c2), with "come about" for γίγνηται; the English keeps "fine" for the neuter καλόν, as the Glossary does for acts, works and things.

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀλλότριος; δημιουργός; ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ; καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως; οἰκεῖος; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; ταριχοπωλέω; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ καλόν.

μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος · the part along with the whole

The part along with the whole: the good doctors' rule, on which Socrates builds his cure · Charmides

μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος, *meta tou holou to meros*, "the part along with the whole"

At a Glance

The word. Μετά with the genitive, "together with": the part treated not apart from the whole but with it.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "On this principle they put the entire body on a regimen and try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c).

In this edition. "The part along with the whole".

A place to read. 156b–d.

[197] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.1, 1120a23–26.

Meaning

The phrase states a method of treatment: a local complaint is cured through a regimen applied to the whole body, and the part is healed together with it. The edition's note at 156c places it: "This is the medicine of the Hippocratic writers, who insisted that the part be treated with the whole." The rule does not abolish the part's cure; it says how the part is to be reached.

Use in the book

Socrates offers the rule as common medical knowledge, something the boy has "probably heard good doctors say" (156b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός): the eyes cannot be cured on their own, but only with the head, and "to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" (156c; see ἄνοια; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ). Then comes the phrase, and the question: "Haven't you noticed that this is what they say, and that it is so?" "Certainly," he said. "And you think it well said, and you accept the principle?" "Absolutely," he said (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι; δίαιτα; καλῶς). The boy's assent is what restores Socrates' nerve after the glimpse inside the cloak: "When I heard his approval," Socrates says, "I took heart again" (156d; see ἀναθαρρέω). On the agreed principle the Thracian reports Zalmoxis' own, that the body is not to be cured without the soul (156e; see μέρος; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς).

The dialogue can be read as applying the rule to itself, and changing its emphasis in doing so. The boy was brought over for his head; the conversation treats his soul; and the edition's note at 155b observes that "at its close (175e–176b) the charm returns, though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again." What began as the part along with the whole ends as the whole instead of the part.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the exchange around it.

156b–c Good doctors cannot cure the eyes without the head, nor the head apart from the whole body.

156c They put the whole body on a regimen and treat the part along with the whole; the boy accepts the principle.

156d At the boy's approval Socrates takes heart.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Phaedrus*' appeal to Hippocrates, that not even the body can be understood apart from the nature of the whole, is told elsewhere (270c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός). The *Laws* turns the rule into theology. Arguing against a young man who thinks the gods neglect small things, the Athenian stranger asks whether a doctor charged with treating some whole, who cared for the large parts and neglected the small, would ever have the whole in good condition; nor would pilots, generals, household managers or statesmen, for even masons say the big stones do not lie well without the small (10.902d–e). The young man still needs, he says, some myths as charms (903b); and the myth is that the one who cares for the universe has ordered everything for the preservation and excellence of the whole, so that each part does and suffers what befits it, and the young man's own part, small as it is, strains towards the whole: "it has escaped you that all coming to be is for the sake of the whole, so that the life of the universe may be happy; it does not come to be for your sake, but you for its sake. For every doctor and every skilled craftsman does everything for the sake of the whole, ... making the part for the sake of the whole and not the whole for the sake of the part" (10.903b–d). There the rule of the *Charmides*' doctors, charms and all, has become the order of the world.

Translation in this edition

"The part along with the whole" renders μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος (156c4–5), reversing the Greek order, which puts the whole first; "try to treat and heal" renders ἐπιχειροῦσιν θεραπεύειν τε καὶ ἰᾶσθαι (see ἐπιχειρέω; θεραπεύω; ἰάομαι).

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀναθαρρέω; ἄνοια; ἀποδέχομαι; δίαιτα; ἐπιχειρέω; ἐπῳδή; ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ; θεραπεύω; ἰάομαι; καλῶς; μέρος; ὅλος; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς.

μετέχω · have a share in

μετέχειν, *metechein*, "(to) have a (sufficient) share (of)"

Attested: μετέχειν (*metechein*; 158c). To have a share in, partake of, with the genitive. Socrates puts the question of the boy's temperance in these terms: "So tell me yourself: do you agree with Critias here, and say that you already have a sufficient share of temperance, or that you are lacking in it?" (158c; see ἱκανός). The verb makes temperance something that comes in portions, of which one may have enough or too little, and the boy's blush and refusal to answer either way follow at once (158c–d; see ἀνερυθριάω; ἔξαρνος). In the *Protagoras* Protagoras uses the same verb of the virtues of the citizen: Zeus orders that all men share in modesty and justice, and so the Athenians rightly take advice on the citizen's virtue from everyone, since that virtue goes by way of justice and temperance and all must share in it or there would be no cities; everyone, indeed, must have some share of justice, in some way or other, or not be among men at all (322d–323c; see αἰδώς). The *Phaedo*'s account of how a beautiful thing is beautiful by sharing in the beautiful itself is told elsewhere (100c; see κάλλος). The question put to the boy can be read as the *Protagoras*' in small: not whether temperance exists, but whether he has enough of it.

See also αἰδώς; ἀνερυθριάω; ἔξαρνος; ἱκανός; κάλλος.

μέτριος · talking sense

μέτρια λέγειν, *metria legein*, "(to be) talking sense"

Attested: μέτρια (*metria*; 166e). In measure, moderate, reasonable; from μέτρον, "measure". Μέτρια λέγειν, "to speak within measure", is to say what is reasonable. Critias uses it to accept Socrates' answer about the common good: "All right ... I'll do that; you seem to me to be talking sense" (166e; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). The concession is the measure of the moment: Critias agrees to attend to the argument and forget who is refuted, and the next exchange produces his fullest definition (166e). In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea

divides the art of measurement in two: one part measures numbers, lengths, depths, breadths and speeds against their opposites, the greater against the less; the other measures against the due measure, τὸ μέτριον, and the fitting, the timely and the needful, everything that has moved away from the extremes into the middle (284d–e). On this division the *Charmides*' argument about the greater and the less (168b–c; see μείζων) can be read as belonging to the first kind; the word Critias uses for Socrates' good sense belongs to the second, and to the maxim "Nothing too much" (see Μηδὲν ἄγαν).

See also κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; μείζων; Μηδὲν ἄγαν.

μὴ ἀκοαί · non-hearings

Non-hearings: what a hearing of hearings would also have to hear · Charmides

τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν, *tōn mē akoōn*, "the non-hearings"

At a Glance

The word. The plural of ἀκοή, "hearing", negated by μή: hearings that are not hearings, cases of not hearing.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "And a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings?" "Not that either" (167d).

In this edition. "Non-hearings".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

Ἀκοή is the sense of hearing, an act of hearing, and what is heard, a report. Greek forms a negative of any noun by putting μή before it with the article, and "the non-hearings" is made on the pattern of the word Critias has just accepted, ἀνεπιστημοσύνη, "lack of knowledge" (166e; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη). If temperance is a knowledge of the other kinds of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, a hearing of the same kind would hear the other hearings and the cases where there is no hearing.

Use in the book

The example is the second of Socrates' parallels, after sight, and it is built on the same plan: a capacity that hears no sound, its proper object, but hears itself, the other hearings and the non-hearings (167d; see ἀκοή; φωνή). Critias' answer is short, "Not that either". With hearing the negative member ends: the senses taken together, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion are all put to Critias as of themselves and of the others, but none as of its own absence (167d–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The negative member was the strangest part of Critias' claim, a knowledge of where knowledge is not, and Socrates puts it only to the two senses he will use again. At 168d hearing returns to state the principle, that a hearing which heard itself would have to hear itself as having a sound (see ἀκοή; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). A hearing of non-hearings would have to hear what has no sound at all.

As the note at 167d says, the problem underneath the comedy is "serious and long-lived". The non-hearings are its sharpest point: the examiner of 167a was to find out what another man thinks he knows but does not, and his knowledge would have to hear the silence where knowledge is missing (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the principle that returns to it.

167d A hearing which hears no sound, but itself, the other hearings and the non-hearings.

168d Hearing, to hear itself, would have to have a sound.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives hearing the object Socrates' question implies: it is of sound and of silence, as sight is of the visible and of darkness (*On the Soul* 2.10, 422a20–24; see μὴ ὄψεις). His further question, whether it is by sight that we perceive that we see, is told elsewhere (*On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).

Translation in this edition

"The non-hearings" renders τῶν μὴ ἀκοῶν (167d5), with "hears no sound" for φωνῆς μὲν οὐδεμιᾶς ἀκούει (167d4).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἀκοή; ἀκούω; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μὴ ὄψεις; φωνή.

μὴ ὄψεις · non-sights

Non-sights: what a sight of sights would also have to see · Charmides

μὴ ὄψεων, *mē opseōn*, "(of) non-sights"

At a Glance

The word. The plural of ὄψις, "sight", negated by μή: sights that are not sights, cases of not seeing.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the first of Socrates' parallels: a sight "of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise" (167c–d).

In this edition. "Non-sights".

A place to read. 167b–d.

Meaning

Ὄψις is the power of sight and an act of seeing. A "non-sight" is any case in which there is no seeing: not blindness as a condition, but the absence of sight where sight might be. The phrase gives the sense of sight the counterpart of the lack of knowledge, so that the parallel with Critias' temperance can be complete.

Use in the book

Socrates has just put Critias' claim in a single formula, one knowledge of itself, of the other kinds of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge (167b–c; see μία τις ἐπιστήμη). The first parallel copies it term for term: "Consider whether you think there is a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the

other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise; and which, though it is sight, sees no color, but sees itself and the other sights. Do you think there is such a thing?" "By Zeus, I don't" (167c–d; see μὰ Δία; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; χρῶμα). The knowledge becomes sight, the other kinds of knowledge the other sights, the subjects of learning colour (see μάθημα), and the lack of knowledge the non-sights.

The parallel makes visible what the claim requires. A sight of non-sights would see where there is nothing seen; the knowledge it models would know, of another man, the places where he knows nothing. That was the power credited to temperance at 167a, to examine others and find what a man "thinks he knows but does not" (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and it is the power the argument later denies: the temperate man could know only that another has some knowledge, not of what, and so could not tell the true doctor from the pretender (170d–171c; see ἀληθινός; γιγνώσκω; ἦ ἰατρικός). The principle that tells against it is stated at 168d–e: sight, to see itself, "must have some color" (see ἄχρως; ὄψις); even so, Socrates grants that with sight and hearing it would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others (169a).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the principle that returns to it.
167c–d A sight of itself, of the other sights and of non-sights, which sees no colour.
168d–e Sight, to see itself, would have to have a colour.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes each sense the judge of its object's absence. Sight, he says, is of the visible and of the invisible, for darkness is invisible and sight discerns it too, and of what is too bright to be seen; and hearing likewise is of sound and of silence, one audible and the other not, and of sound too loud to be heard.[198] Socrates' "non-sights" can be set beside what Aristotle calls the invisible, though they are not the same: his invisible is darkness, an absence in what is seen, where a non-sight is an absence of seeing. On Aristotle's

[198] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.10, 422a20–24.

account sight perceives darkness only as the absence of its proper object, colour, and is never a sight of other sights.

Translation in this edition

"Non-sights" renders μὴ ὄψεων (167c10), the reading of B and W; T has the singular μὴ ὄψεως, "non-sight". "Sees no color" is χρῶμα μὲν ὁρᾷ οὐδέν (167d1).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀληθινός; ἄχρως; γιγνώσκω; ᾗ ἰατρικός; μὰ Δία; μάθημα; μὴ ἀκοαί; μία τις ἐπιστήμη; ὄψις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; χρῶμα.

Μηδὲν ἄγαν · Nothing too much

Nothing too much: the Delphic maxim Critias ranks below "Know thyself" · Charmides

τό τε Μηδὲν ἄγαν, *to te Mēden agan*, "'Nothing too much'"

At a Glance

The word. Literally "nothing very much": μηδέν with the adverb ἄγαν, "very", "too much", the verb left to be supplied.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' account of the inscriptions at Delphi: "That, I think, is what happened to those who dedicated the later inscriptions, 'Nothing too much' and 'Pledge, and ruin is near'" (165a).

In this edition. "Nothing too much".

A place to read. 164d–165b.

Meaning

The maxim stood at Apollo's temple at Delphi beside "Know thyself", and Greek tradition gave it to one or another of the Seven Sages. It is the rule of measure in everything, and in ordinary speech it was close to what σωφροσύνη meant for most Greeks: moderation, keeping within limits.

Use in the book

Critias reads the first inscription, "Know thyself", as the god's greeting to those who enter, meaning "Be temperate", and spoken "as a prophet would, rather riddlingly" (164d–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; μάντις; Σωφρόνει). The later dedicators, he says, misread it: "they thought 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter; and then, so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less, they wrote these up and dedicated them" (165a; see ἀνατίθημι; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; συμβουλή). "Nothing too much" is thus demoted to advice, the kind of thing men give one another, beneath the god's own word.

The demotion is of a piece with Critias' temperance. He wants it to be knowledge, and the maxim of measure, he treats as an afterthought. The argument that follows can be read as taking revenge for the maxim. The knowledge Critias proposes is of nothing but itself, the other kinds of knowledge and the lack of knowledge, "knowledge of no subject of learning" (167b–168a); at the end Socrates says they conceded it "with the utmost magnificence" (175c; see μεγαλοπρεπῶς); and the knowledge that would be useful turns out to be of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ), which can be read as what tells a man how much is too much.

Places to read

The passage in which the maxim is named, with Critias' account of the inscriptions.

164d–165a "Know thyself" is the god's greeting, meaning "Be temperate", spoken riddlingly as a prophet would.

165a The later dedicators took it for advice and set up "Nothing too much" and "Pledge, and ruin is near".

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Protagoras*' story that the Seven Sages dedicated "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much" together at Delphi is told elsewhere (343a–b; see ἀνατίθημι). In the *Menexenus* the maxim defines the temperate man. In the funeral speech Socrates recites there, the fallen soldiers, in the message they leave for their parents, say that the old saying "Nothing too much" seems

well said, and is: the man for whom everything that leads to happiness depends on himself, or nearly so, and not on others whose fortunes force his own to wander, is best prepared for life; he is the temperate, the brave and the wise; when wealth and children come and go he will obey the proverb most, for he will be seen neither rejoicing too much nor grieving too much, since he trusts himself (247e–248a). The *Menexenus* makes the maxim the mark of the temperate man, where Critias made it the mark of those who misread Delphi; and its "neither rejoicing too much" can be read beside Critias' god, who will not say "Rejoice!" (164d–e; see χαίρω).

Other ancient sources

The later tradition is divided over its author. Diogenes Laertius quotes a verse, "There was a Spartan, Chilon, wise, who said this: Nothing too much; all fine things come in due season", as an example of the disagreements, and elsewhere records that Solon is said to have uttered it; he also reports that Socrates, asked what a young man's virtue was, answered "Nothing too much".[199] Aristotle uses the maxim to describe the young: they err in everything on the side of excess, against Chilon's saying, loving too much and hating too much, and they think they know everything and insist on it, which is the cause of their doing everything too much.[200] On that account the two maxims Critias separates can be read as failing together, since doing everything too much comes from not knowing what one does not know.

Translation in this edition

"Nothing too much" renders τό τε Μηδὲν ἄγαν (165a3), set in quotation marks as an inscription. The edition's note at 164e gives the *Protagoras*' ascription of the maxims to the Seven Sages.

See also

ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; μάντις; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; μέτριος; συμβουλή; Σωφρόνει; χαίρω.

[199] Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Philosophers* 1.41, 1.63 and 2.32.
[200] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.12, 1389b2–7.

μία τις ἐπιστήμη · one single knowledge

One single knowledge: Socrates' restatement of Critias' temperance as one knowledge with three objects · Charmides

μία τις ἐπιστήμη, *mia tis epistēmē*, "one single knowledge"

At a Glance

The word. The numeral "one" with the indefinite τις: a single knowledge of a certain kind.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Well, wouldn't all this amount to the following ... if what you were just saying is right: that there is one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge, and that this same knowledge is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge?" (167b–c).

In this edition. "One single knowledge".

A place to read. 167b–c.

Meaning

The emphasis falls on "one". Critias had said that temperance alone of the kinds of knowledge is knowledge both of itself and of the others (166c, 166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν), and Socrates had added, with his assent, that it would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge (166e; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης). Socrates now gathers the three objects into one knowledge, and says that "this same knowledge", ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη, is also knowledge of the lack of knowledge.

Use in the book

The formula comes just after Socrates has confessed that he can find no way through (167b; see ἀπορέω; εὔπορος), and it is his statement of where he is stuck. What makes it strange can be read as its unity: "Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend" (167c; see ἄτοπος). The parallels that follow test it piece by piece, a sight of itself and the other sights and the non-sights (see μὴ ὄψεις), a hearing of the same kind (see μὴ ἀκοαί), and so on

to opinion (167c–168a), and each parallel is one capacity turned on itself and on its kind.

The word "one" returns at the end with another object. When Critias at last names the knowledge that makes men happy, Socrates says that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well, "not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad" (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The argument has two candidates for the single knowledge that would stand above the rest: Critias' knowledge of knowledge, which it shows to be of no benefit, and the knowledge of good and bad, which is beneficial but is not temperance as Critias defined it (174d).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs.

167b–c One single knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and the same knowledge also of the lack of knowledge.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea finds one knowledge where the *Charmides* hoped to find temperance. The true king's art, the statesman's and the household manager's differ only in the size of what they rule, for a large house and a small city differ in nothing that matters to ruling; and so, he concludes, it is plain that there is one knowledge concerned with all these, and whether one calls it kingly or statesmanlike or the art of household management, there is no need to quarrel about the name (259b–c). That can be read as the knowledge the *Charmides* imagined guiding the management of household and city (172d; see διοίκησις). In the *Symposium* Diotima's lover, near the top of the ascent, catches sight of "a single knowledge" whose object is the beautiful itself (210d; see λόγοι καλοί). The doctrine that one knowledge is of contraries is told elsewhere (*Republic* 333e–334a; *Phaedo* 97c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle states the rule that makes a single knowledge possible: of each one kind there is one perception and one knowledge, as grammar, being one, studies all the spoken sounds; and he adds in the same chapter that opposites, negation and privation included, fall to one knowledge.[201] On those rules the lack of knowledge can be read as falling to the knowledge it is the lack of; what the *Charmides* finds strange is a knowledge that is also its own object (167c–169a).

Translation in this edition

"One single knowledge" renders μία τις ἐπιστήμη (167b11), and "this same knowledge" ἡ αὐτὴ αὕτη (167c2). "If what you were just saying is right" renders εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σὺ νυνδὴ ἔλεγες (167b10–11), where εἰ ἔστιν ὅπερ σύ is the reading of a later hand in T; T has it without σύ, and B has εἴη ἔστιν ὃ σύ.

See also

ἀπορέω; ἄτοπος; διοίκησις; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; εὔπορος; λόγοι καλοί; μὴ ἀκοαί; μὴ ὄψεις.

μιαρός · rascal

ὦ μιαρέ, *ō miare*, "You rascal!"

Attested: ὦ μιαρέ (*ō miare*; 161b, 174b). Polluted, defiled, and so abominable; in address, a term of affectionate abuse. The edition's note at 161c explains: "Ō miare, literally 'you polluted creature', is affectionate abuse; Socrates turns it on Critias at 174b." Socrates uses it twice, and both times he has caught someone hiding something: the boy, where his formula came from; Critias, the answer he has been keeping back. To the boy, who offers the formula about doing one's own business as something he "once heard someone say": "You rascal! You've heard that from Critias here, or from one of the other wise men" (161b–c; see ἀκούω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). To

[201] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 4.2, 1003b19–21 and 1004a9–16.

Critias, who at last names the knowledge of good and bad, the same exclamation, and the charge that he has been dragging Socrates round in a circle and hiding the answer from him (174b; see ἀποκρύπτομαι; κύκλῳ). The Introduction counts the exclamation as Socrates' "open teasing". In the *Phaedrus* Socrates uses it in the same spirit: when Phaedrus swears not to recite or report any other speech unless Socrates gives his own, Socrates answers, "Bah, you rascal, how well you have found the means to compel a lover of speeches to do whatever you order!" (236e).

See also ἀκούω; ἀποκρύπτομαι; κύκλῳ; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

μιμνῄσκομαι · remember

μέμνημαι, *memnēmai*, "I remember"

Attested: μέμνημαι (*memnēmai*; 156a), the perfect of μιμνῄσκομαι, "call to mind", used as a present: I have in mind, I remember. It is the boy's word for how he knows Socrates. Asked whether he has Socrates' name right, he answers, "I'd be doing you an injustice if I didn't ... You're talked about a good deal among people my age, and I remember you from when I was a boy, keeping company with Critias here" (156a; see ἀδικέω; ἡλικιώτης). Socrates' reply, "Good for you", turns the memory into licence: "Then I can speak to you more frankly" (156a–b; see παρρησιάζομαι). The boy knows Socrates twice over, by report and by his own memory, and the memory is of Socrates beside Critias, the man who will take the argument over from the boy (162c–e). The infinitive of the same perfect, "remembering", comes among the activities of the soul in the refutation of quietness (159e; see μέμνημαι).

See also ἀδικέω; ἡλικιώτης; μέμνημαι; παρρησιάζομαι.

μόγις · with difficulty

μόγις, *mogis*, "somehow (manage)", "laboriously", "with difficulty"

Attested: μόγις (*mogis*; 155e, 159d, 160a, 162c). Hardly, with toil, barely. Four times, and each time the difficulty belongs to the scene. Socrates, caught by the boy's look, "did somehow manage to answer" that he knew the remedy, μόγις πως ἀπεκρινάμην (155e; see ἀποκρίνομαι; ἐπίσταμαι). In the refutation the word goes with quietness and is made ugly: "the ones done laboriously and quietly" are the ugly ones (159d; see αἰσχρός; ἡσυχῇ), and in deliberation it is not "the one who deliberates and finds things out with difficulty" who deserves praise (160a–b; see βουλεύομαι). Then it describes Critias, who "had held himself back with difficulty until then" before he took the argument over (162c; see φιλοτίμως). The word that Socrates' argument counts against quietness describes the restraint of the man who could not keep quiet.

See also αἰσχρός; ἀποκρίνομαι; βουλεύομαι; ἐπίσταμαι; ἡσυχῇ; φιλοτίμως.

μόνον · only

μόνον, *monon*, "only", "alone", "just"

Attested: μόνον (*monon*; 154d, 155b, 156b, 157d, 160e, 161d, 163a, 163d, 170b, 170c, 170d, 171a, 171c, 174c, 174e). The adverb of μόνος: only, alone, merely. It marks the exclusions on which the argument turns. The writing-master does not write, read or teach boys "only his own name" (161d; see ὄνομα); craftsmen do not make "only their own things" (163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες); the charm "cannot make the head alone healthy" (156b). In the second half the word measures how little the knowledge of knowledge can do: the man who has it "knows only knowledge, since that is all he has knowledge of" (170b); the man who has it knows "only that he knows" (170c; see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν), and "only that one knows and that one does not know" (170d; see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν); and Socrates reminds Critias that they declared it "knowledge only of

knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else" (174e). At 174c the same word picks out the one knowledge that does matter, "only this one, the knowledge of good and bad" (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

See also ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; ὄνομα; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν.

μόνος · alone

μόνους, *monous*, "on their own"; μόνα, *mona*, "only"; μόνη, *monē*, "alone"; μόνος, *monos*, "only (the temperate man)"; μόνῃ, *monēi*, "(to temperance) alone"

Attested: μόνους (*monous*; 156b), μόνα (*mona*; 163c), μόνη (*monē*; 166c, 166e), μόνος (*monos*; 167a), μόνῃ (*monēi*; 170e). Alone, only. Twice in passing, the good doctors cannot cure the eyes "on their own" (156b), and Critias says that Hesiod "regarded only such things as appropriate to one" (163c; see οἰκεῖος); then the adjective carries Critias' claim for temperance, that it differs from every other knowledge: "this alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself" (166c), and "alone of all the kinds of knowledge it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge" (166e; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). Socrates passes the uniqueness from the knowledge to its possessor: "Then only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not ... and no one else will" (167a; see ἐξετάζω; οἷός τε εἰμί). The uniqueness then becomes the difficulty. Since knowledge about knowledge was given "to temperance alone" (170e), the doctor knows nothing about knowledge, and so, "since medicine is in fact a knowledge", does not know about medicine either (170e–171a; see ᾗ ἰατρικός; ἰατρικός). What was claimed as temperance's distinction leaves the temperate man no better placed than any other expert: he can judge no one who knows anything except his own fellow craftsman (171c; see ὁμότεχνος).

See also ἐξετάζω; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ᾗ ἰατρικός; ἰατρικός; οἰκεῖος; οἷός τε εἰμί; ὁμότεχνος.

μουσική · music

μουσικῇ, *mousikēi*, "by music"

Attested: μουσικῇ (*mousikēi*; 170c). The art of the Muses, which for a Greek covered melody and rhythm, poetry and the lyre. It comes once, in the list of kinds of knowledge by which a man knows what temperance cannot tell him: he knows the healthy by medicine, what belongs to house-building by house-building, and "the harmonious by music and not by temperance" (170c; see ἁρμονικός; ἰατρική; οἰκοδομική). Music had been in the dialogue already in its schoolroom form, in "playing the lyre" and the lyre-master's lessons (159c, 160a; see κιθαρίζω). At 170c it stands for any knowledge with a subject of its own, which temperance, as knowledge only of knowledge, cannot replace.

See also ἁρμονικός; ἰατρική; κιθαρίζω; οἰκοδομική.

N Nu

νεβρός · fawn

νεβρόν, *nebron*, "a fawn"

Attested: νεβρόν (*nebron*; 155d). A fawn, a young deer. In the line of Cydias that Socrates recalls, the lover is warned against "coming, a fawn, into the lion's presence, to be caught as a portion of meat" (155d–e; see ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας); Burnet prints the line as T has it, B's text being garbled. Set against the lion, the fawn makes the lover the prey of the beloved, the reverse of the usual picture in which the lover hunts (see θρέμμα). Socrates applies it to himself, "for I felt I had been caught by just such a creature myself": Socrates is the fawn, the boy the lion.

See also ἁλίσκομαι; θρέμμα; Κυδίας.

νέος · young, younger

τῶν νέων, *tōn neōn*, "the young men"; νεώτερος, *neōteros*, "younger"; νεώτερον, *neōteron*, "younger"

Attested: νέων (*neōn*; 153d), νεώτερος (*neōteros*; 155a), νεώτερον (*neōteron*; 168c). Young; in the comparative, younger. Socrates' second question on his return is "about the young men, whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος); the dialogue is the answer. The comparative first supports Socrates' request that the boy be called over, "Even if he were younger still, there would be nothing improper in his talking with us in front of you, his guardian and his cousin" (155a; see ἐπίτροπος), and then serves as an example of a relative that could not apply to itself: "what is older younger" (168c–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; πρέσβυς).

See also ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπίτροπος; πρέσβυς; σοφία ἢ κάλλος.

νὴ Δία · by Zeus

νὴ Δία, *nē Dia*, "by Zeus"

Attested: νὴ Δία (*nē Dia*; 154b, 161c). The particle νή with the accusative of a god makes an oath of affirmation, as μά makes one of denial (see μὰ Δία). Both of the dialogue's affirmative oaths by Zeus are Socrates'. He swears to knowing the boy: "Of course I know him, by Zeus" (154b), and to the rule of the inquiry, when the boy tells him "Now you are talking sense" for saying that what matters is not who said a thing but whether it is true: "By Zeus, I am" (161c; see ἀληθής). Socrates' oath by the dog also affirms (172e; see νὴ τὸν κύνα), while every oath by Zeus from the boy and Critias comes with a denial.

See also ἀληθής; μὰ Δία; νὴ τὸν κύνα.

νὴ τὸν κύνα · by the dog

By the dog: Socrates' oath, sworn when he agrees that the argument has turned strange · Charmides

Νὴ τὸν κύνα, *Nē ton kyna*, "By the dog"

At a Glance

The word. An oath of affirmation, νή with the accusative, sworn by the dog instead of by a god.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates," he said. "By the dog," I said, "I think so too" (172e).

In this edition. "By the dog".

A place to read. 172d–173a.

Meaning

Greeks swore by gods; the oath by the dog keeps the form of an oath, and ancient scholars explained it as a way of sparing the gods' names. The edition's note at 172e gathers what is known of it: "'By the dog' was Socrates' favorite oath: he swears it at Gorgias 482b, calling the dog 'the god of the

Egyptians', and before his jury (Apology 22a). Ancient scholars called it the 'oath of Rhadamanthys', who had men swear by dog, goose or ram rather than by the gods (Suda ρ 13); Porphyry insists that Socrates was not joking (On Abstinence 3.16)." Rhadamanthys, Minos' brother, was remembered as the just lawgiver of Crete and, in Plato's myths, one of the judges of the dead (*Gorgias* 523e–524a); Porphyry was the third-century Platonist, Plotinus' pupil and editor.

Use in the book

The oath comes at the turn of the second half. Socrates has just withdrawn the agreement that temperance, as the guide of household and city, would be a great good: "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d; see καλῶς; ὁμολογέω). Critias protests, "Then weren't we right to agree to that?", and, when Socrates insists, "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates." Socrates swears to it: "By the dog ... I think so too; and it was with my eye on this very point that I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me, and that I was afraid we were not looking into it correctly" (172e; see ἄτοπος; ὀρθῶς). What he swears to is a strangeness he does not yet understand, and what follows, the dream, is introduced with "I think I'm talking nonsense" (173a; see ληρέω; ὄναρ). The oath can be read as Socrates' seal on a conclusion he dislikes: he will not unsay the strange thing because it is strange.

The note ends, "Whether he swore it with a smile is a matter of reading." In the *Charmides* the oath has a function whatever its tone: it is Socrates' only affirming oath by anything but Zeus, and it marks the moment when he sides with the argument against the agreement both speakers had made.

Places to read

The passage in which the oath occurs, with the exchange that leads to it.

172d Socrates withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good as guide of household and city.

172e Critias: "You're saying some truly strange things, Socrates"; Socrates: "By the dog ... I think so too."

Elsewhere in Plato

The oath goes with hard truths elsewhere too. In the *Gorgias* it takes its negative form, μὰ τὸν κύνα, since what it backs is a denial: Socrates tells Callicles that if he leaves unrefuted the claim that doing wrong and escaping punishment is the worst of evils, then, by the dog, the god of the Egyptians, Callicles will not agree with Callicles but be at odds with himself all his life (482b; see ὁμολογέω). Before his jury in the *Apology* he swears it as he admits what his search on the god's behalf found: "by the dog, men of Athens, since it is the truth I owe you", the men of highest repute seemed to him to come close to lacking most, while men thought meaner seemed better off in good sense (22a). In the *Phaedo* he swears it to dismiss a false account of why he is sitting in prison: by the dog, these sinews and bones would have been off long since to Megara, Athens' neighbour on the Isthmus, or to the Boeotians, swept along by a belief about what was best, had he not judged it juster and finer to stay and take whatever penalty the city set than to slip away (98e–99a). In each place the oath backs something that runs against what another man has said or would like to hear.

Translation in this edition

"By the dog" renders νὴ τὸν κύνα (172e4). The words he swears to rest on several readings: δοκεῖ is T's (B δοκεῖν); "and it was with my eye on this very point" renders Hermann's κἀνταῦθα (B οὕτως εἰ ἐνταῦθα, T οὕτως ἐνταῦθα, W οὑτωσὶ ἐνταῦθα); "some strange things" Badham's ἄτοπ' ἄττ' (B and T ἄτοπά γ'); and "I said" T's ἔφην, where B has ἔφη, "he said" (172e4–5).

See also

ἄτοπος; καλῶς; ληρέω; μὰ Δία; νὴ Δία; ὁμολογέω; ὄναρ; ὀρθῶς.

νοέω · mean

ἐνόει, *enoei*, "meant", "did ... mean"

Attested: ἐνόει (*enoei*; 161d, 162b, 162d). To perceive with the mind; of a speaker, to have something in mind, to mean. Three times, all about the man

who said that temperance is doing one's own business. Socrates is sure he "surely did not mean it the way the words sound" (161d; see ῥῆμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The boy, teasing, suggests that "there is nothing to stop even the man who said it from not knowing what he meant" (162b; see κωλύω; ὑπογελάω). Critias, stung, turns on him: "Do you really think, Charmides, that if you don't know what the man meant who said that temperance was doing one's own business, then he doesn't know either?" (162d). The verb opens the gap between words and meaning on which the whole middle of the dialogue works: the formula is treated as a riddle (see αἴνιγμα), its author is made to explain what he meant, and Socrates, at 163d, tells Critias that he understood what he meant almost as soon as he began (see μανθάνω).

See also αἴνιγμα; κωλύω; μανθάνω; ῥῆμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑπογελάω.

νομοθέτης · lawgiver

The lawgiver: the imagined first giver of names, whose meaning for "temperance" the inquiry fails to find · Charmides

ὁ νομοθέτης, *ho nomothetēs*, "the lawgiver"

At a Glance

The word. One who lays down laws, from νόμος and τίθημι; in Plato, also the one who first laid down names.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' last summary: "As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b).

In this edition. "The lawgiver".

A place to read. 175a–b.

Meaning

The νομοθέτης of Athenian history was a man like Solon (see Σόλων). Νόμος covers custom and convention as well as statute, and Greek speculation about language asked whether names belong to things by nature or by convention, νόμος. In the *Cratylus* Socrates answers it by imagining a

νομοθέτης of names, a craftsman who set them down in the beginning. The edition's note at 175b explains the *Charmides*' word: "The 'lawgiver' (nomothetēs) is the imagined first giver of names, a figure the Cratylus develops at length (388e–390a); later manuscripts read 'name-giver' here."

Use in the book

The lawgiver appears only at the end, but the inquiry has been asking for him from the start. Socrates told the boy that the man who first said "doing one's own business" "surely did not mean it the way the words sound" (161d; see νοέω); he allowed Critias to assign each word as he pleased, provided he made clear what he applied it to (163d; see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων); he asked what "fine work" temperance produces "worthy of its name" (165e; see ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος). At 175b the search for the meaning of a formula becomes the search for the meaning of the name itself: some one of the things that are was named "temperance" by whoever first gave the name, and they cannot discover which (see πανταχῇ ἠττώμεθα; ὄνομα). The failure is put as a failure to recover an intention, as if the name had been given by someone who knew what it named.

The figure can be read as Socrates' last irony at Critias' expense. Critias had treated words as his to distribute, Prodicus-fashion (163d; see Πρόδικος); Socrates ends by supposing a namer whose distribution was not arbitrary, and confessing that neither of them has found it.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs.

175b They are beaten on every side and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave the name temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Cratylus* Socrates gets Hermogenes to grant that it is law, νόμος, that hands down the names we use, so that whoever teaches with a name is handling a lawgiver's product; that the lawgiver is not any man at all but the man with the art; and so that giving names is not everyone's business but a name-maker's, and this, it seems, is the lawgiver, of all craftsmen the one

most seldom found among men. Then he asks where the lawgiver looks when he sets names down, as a carpenter making a shuttle looks to the thing whose nature is to weave (388d–389a). The *Charmides*' lawgiver can be read as this rare craftsman, and the inquiry's failure as a failure to see what he looked to.

Translation in this edition

"The lawgiver" renders ὁ νομοθέτης (175b4), the reading of B, T and W; some later manuscripts have ὀνοματοθέτης, "name-giver", which says outright what the note says the lawgiver here is; "gave this name" renders τοῦτο τοὔνομα ἔθετο, with τίθημι, the verb that makes the second half of νομοθέτης. "Cannot discover" renders εὑρεῖν (175b3), a variant noted in T; B and T have ἔχειν.

See also

ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; νοέω; νόμος; ὄνομα; πανταχῇ ἠττώμεθα; Πρόδικος; Σόλων; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

νόμος · law

Law: the imagined law that would make every man his own craftsman · Charmides

ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου, *hypo toutou tou nomou*, "under a law"

At a Glance

The word. Custom, convention, law; what is held and observed, and what a city lays down.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' argument against "doing one's own business": "do you think a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle ...?" (161e–162a).

In this edition. "Law".

A place to read. 161d–162b.

Meaning

Νόμος is what is customary and therefore binding: the usages of a people, the rules of a city, and, in classical Athens, written statute. It is set against φύσις, nature, in fifth-century argument, and against ψήφισμα, the decree of a single assembly, in Athenian practice. A νόμος that "orders" (κελεύει) is the legal formula: the law commands, and citizens obey.

Use in the book

Socrates invents the law to take the boy's formula at its word. If temperance is doing one's own business, and making anything is doing something, then a temperate city would need a law that "ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle, keeping his hands off what belongs to others and working at and doing his own" (161e–162a; see ἀλλότριος; κελεύω; λήκυθος; σκυτοτομέω). The boy does not think such a city would be well managed, and the formula, read so, falls (162a; see οἰκέω). The law is the shape of a reductio: it shows what the formula would require if "doing" meant "making", and its absurdity sends the inquiry back to ask what the formula's author meant (162a–b; see αἴνιγμα; νοέω).

The imagined law is the opposite of the ordinary Athenian life Socrates' hearers knew, in which cobblers, weavers and makers of oil-flasks sold to everyone else. Its absurdity rests on the division of labour, and the dialogue can be read as holding that principle in reserve: it returns, transformed, in the picture of a city where each does what he knows and hands the rest over to those who know (171d–172a; see παραδίδωμι).

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the argument it ends.

161e A law ordering each man to make everything for himself.

162a Such a city would not be well managed; so doing one's own business in this way is not temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laws* writes the opposite law. In the Magnesians' city, the Cretan colony the *Laws* founds in speech, no citizen is to work at a craft, nor any citizen's slave, since the citizen already has an art that asks much practice and much learning, preserving and adding to the city's common order; and scarcely any human nature is able to practise two pursuits or two arts with precision, or to practise one and supervise another man practising a second. So no smith shall also be a carpenter, nor a carpenter supervise smiths rather than his own art; each shall have one art in the city and make his living from it. The wardens of the town are to enforce the law, punishing a citizen who turns to a craft rather than to the care of virtue with reproaches and loss of honour until he is back on his own course, and a foreigner who practises two crafts with imprisonment, fines and banishment (8.846d–847b). The founding principle of the *Republic*'s first city, that each should do the one work for which he is fitted by nature, is told elsewhere (369e–370d; see ἐργάζομαι), and so is Hippias' boast at Olympia that he had made everything he wore (*Hippias Minor* 368b–d; see λήκυθος).

Translation in this edition

"Under a law that ordered" renders ὑπὸ τούτου τοῦ νόμου τοῦ κελεύοντος (161e10–11), the participle κελεύοντος being the formula of statute.

See also

αἴνιγμα; ἀλλότριος; ἐργάζομαι; κελεύω; λήκυθος; νοέω; νομοθέτης; οἰκέω; παραδίδωμι; σκυτοτομέω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

νόσημα · disease

τὰ πολλὰ νοσήματα, *ta polla nosēmata*, "most diseases"

Attested: νοσήματα (*nosēmata*; 156e). A disease, a malady; the noun of νοσέω, "be sick". It comes once, in the Thracian's report of Zalmoxis' teaching: one must not try to cure the body without the soul, "and that this is the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: they neglect the

whole, which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e; see ἀμελέω; διαφεύγω; ὅλος). They escape because the doctors neglect the whole, whose source is the soul, from which "everything ... bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being" flows (156e; see ἐπιρρέω; ὁρμάω). The adjective of the same family, νοσώδης, "diseased", belongs to the definition of medicine as knowledge of the healthy and the diseased (170e–171b; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; τὸ νοσῶδες).

See also ἀμελέω; διαφεύγω; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ὅλος; ὁρμάω; τὸ νοσῶδες.

νοῦς · mind, attention

Mind, in the dialogue only as attention turned on something: the boys, oneself, the argument · Charmides

τὸν νοῦν, *ton noun*, "(I watched)", "(pay) attention"

At a Glance

The word. Mind, intelligence, understanding; in the idiom προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν, "to turn the mind to", to pay attention.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, always in that idiom: "I watched the boys too" (154c); "pay closer attention and look within yourself" (160d); "Just pay attention to the argument itself" (166e).

In this edition. The idiom is rendered by its sense, "watched", "pay attention".

A place to read. 160d.

Meaning

Νοῦς is the faculty that grasps: the mind that perceives and understands, and, in the philosophers, the intelligence that orders things. In ordinary speech it is most often met in idioms, "to have in mind", "to turn the mind to", and in the adjective ἄνους, "mindless", whose noun ἄνοια the dialogue uses of the notion that one could treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body

(156c; see ἄνοια). The *Charmides* never speaks of mind as a power that orders; it uses the noun only for the act of directing it.

Use in the book

The three uses follow the dialogue's movement. In the prologue Socrates turns his mind to the crowd: "I watched the boys too, and not one of them was looking anywhere else" (154c; see θεάομαι). In the refutation he asks the boy to turn it on himself: "pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present" (160d; see ἐμβλέπω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). In the argument with Critias he asks for it to be turned on the argument, away from the persons: "Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166e; see λόγος). Attention to the onlookers, to the self, to the argument: the three objects can be read as the dialogue's own order, from the gaze of the prologue to the inward look the boy is asked for and the impersonal scrutiny Socrates asks of Critias.

The idiom itself is told elsewhere (see προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν). What belongs to the noun is that mind in the *Charmides* is never a possession that settles anything; it is always something to be directed: Socrates turns his own on the boys, and twice he asks another to turn it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

154c Socrates watches the boys, all gazing at Charmides.

160d The boy is to pay closer attention and look within himself.

166e Critias is to pay attention to the argument itself.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* Socrates tells how he once heard a man reading from a book, by Anaxagoras as he said, that mind is what sets all things in order and is responsible for them all; he was pleased, and reasoned that if mind did the ordering it would place each thing wherever it was best placed, so that anyone seeking the cause of a thing need look for nothing but what was best for it (97b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης). The book disappointed him,

since Anaxagoras put mind to no work and gave as causes airs, aethers, waters and much else that was strange (98b–c). Mind as the orderer of the whole is a doctrine the *Charmides* does not touch; its νοῦς can be read as the human act that the *Phaedo*'s seeker after the best would need first.

Translation in this edition

"I watched" renders προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν (154c6), "pay closer attention" μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (160d5–6), where "look within yourself" renders Burnet's own ἐμβλέψας (B ἀπεμβλέψας, T and W ἀποβλέψας), and "pay attention" προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (166e1–2).

See also

ἄνοια; ἐμβλέπω; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; θεάομαι; λόγος; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα.

Ξ Xi

ξένος · stranger

τοῦ ξένου, *tou xenou*, "the stranger"

Attested: ξένου (*xenou*; 157c). A stranger, foreigner; also a guest-friend, bound by hospitality. It names the Thracian doctor who taught Socrates the charm: "And as for you, if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see ἐντολή; Θρᾷξ). The word keeps the source of the teaching outside Athens: what the Greeks' doctors neglect, a Thracian, one of the doctors of Zalmoxis, knows (156d–e; see Ζάλμοξις). Socrates obeys the stranger because he has sworn him an oath (157c; see ὄμνυμι), and the boy must accept the stranger's order before the cure can begin.

See also ἐντολή; Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; ὄμνυμι.

O Omicron

ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν · what he knows and that he knows

What one knows, and that one knows: the distinction that reduces the knowledge of knowledge to knowing that, not what · Charmides

ὃ οἶδεν ... ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι οἶδεν μόνον, *ho oiden ... all' hoti oiden monon*, "what he knows, but only that he knows"

At a Glance

The word. Two clauses after the same verb: ὅ, the relative, "what" he knows; ὅτι, the conjunction, "that" he knows.

In the *Charmides*. At 170c: "Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows."

In this edition. "What he knows", "that he knows".

A place to read. 170a–d.

Meaning

Greek can make the object of "know" a thing (ὅ, "what") or a fact (ὅτι, "that"), and the two clauses differ by a syllable. To know what one knows is to know the content of one's knowledge, that it is medicine and of the healthy; to know that one knows is to know only that there is some knowledge in one. The distinction is the instrument by which Socrates takes the knowledge of knowledge apart.

Use in the book

Socrates first asks what a knowledge that is of knowledge alone could distinguish: "will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?" "No, only that much" (170a; see διαιρέω). Then the consequence: a man who knows only knowledge "would know that he knows something and that he has some

knowledge", but "how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows?" (170b). For he knows the healthy by medicine, the harmonious by music, and so on (170c; see μουσική; οἰκοδομική). "Then the man who is ignorant of these will not know what he knows, but only that he knows" (170c). The formula Critias accepted at 167a, "knowing what one knows and what one does not know", has lost its object: temperance would be, "it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know" (170d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν).

The distinction has a practical consequence at once. The temperate man could not examine another who claims to know: "He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know" (170d; see ἐξετάζω). At the end Socrates lists the ὅτι-clause among the concessions they made against the argument, so that "our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it" (175c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The single syllable between ὅ and ὅτι is where the claim for temperance as self-knowledge breaks: a man may know that he knows without knowing what.

Places to read

The passage in which the distinction is drawn, with its consequence and its return.

170a–b Knowledge of knowledge can distinguish only that this is knowledge and that is not; its possessor knows that he knows something.

170c Without medicine or the other kinds of knowledge he will not know what he knows, but only that he knows.

170d So temperance would be knowing only that one knows and does not know, and could not examine another.

175b–c They conceded that this knowledge knows the works of the other kinds, so that the temperate man would know, of what he knows, that he knows it.

Translation in this edition

"What he knows" renders ὃ οἶδεν and "that he knows" ὅτι οἶδεν (170c9–10), with "only" for μόνον. At 170a the English keeps the formula "to know what

one knows and to know what one does not know" with the same verb throughout, as the Glossary explains under "know".

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; διαιρέω; ἐξετάζω; μουσική; οἰκοδομική; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν.

οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες · those who do other people's business

Those who do other people's business: the consequence Critias will not accept · Charmides

τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας, *tous ta tōn allōn prattontas*, "those who do other people's business"; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες, *hoi ta tōn allōn prattontes*, "those who do other people's business"

At a Glance

The word. The opposite of the formula τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν: those who do, or busy themselves with, what belongs to others.

In the *Charmides*. At 163a, twice: in Socrates' objection, that Critias "says there is nothing to stop those who do other people's business from being temperate too", and in Critias' sarcastic reply.

In this edition. "Those who do other people's business".

A place to read. 162e–163c.

Meaning

"Doing other people's business" is what the Athenians called meddling, πολυπραγμοσύνη, the vice that the ordinary sense of "doing one's own business" excluded (see πολυπραγμονέω). Socrates' argument has made it something else: if doing is making, every craftsman who makes things for others does their business, and Critias has just granted that such craftsmen may be temperate.

Use in the book

Critias has agreed that all craftsmen make something, that they make other people's things as well as their own, and, with "What's to stop them?", that they may be temperate even so (162e–163a; see δημιουργός; κωλύω). Socrates draws the conclusion: "Nothing stops me ... But see whether it doesn't stop the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one's own business, and then says there is nothing to stop those who do other people's business from being temperate too" (163a). Critias answers with scorn: "Oh yes ... I suppose I agreed that those who do other people's business are temperate, just because I agreed that those who make other people's things are!" (163a). The edition's note at 163a explains: "Critias' answer is sarcastic: he had agreed about making (poiein), and never about doing (prattein), and he is about to explain the difference."

So the phrase forces the distinction on which Critias' part of the argument begins. To save the formula he must separate making from doing (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν), and the separation turns "doing one's own business" into "the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The meddlers whom the formula was meant to exclude never appear again; the phrase served only to make Critias say what he meant by "doing".

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the distinction it provokes.

163a Socrates: the formula's author says that nothing stops those who do other people's business from being temperate; Critias denies having agreed to that.

163b–c Critias distinguishes making from doing and working, citing Hesiod.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* draws the line the *Charmides*' craftsmen blur. If a carpenter sets his hand to a cobbler's work, or a cobbler to a carpenter's, or one man tries to do both, the city takes no great harm; but when a man who is by nature a craftsman or some other money-maker, swollen with wealth or a following or strength, tries to pass into the class of warriors, or a warrior,

unfit for it, into that of the counsellors and guardians, or one man tries to do all these at once, this exchange and meddling, Socrates says, is the city's ruin (434a–c). The doing of other people's business that matters in the *Republic* is the exchange of offices, not of crafts, and the judges' rule that each should hold what is his own is told elsewhere (433e–434a; see ἀλλότριος).

Translation in this edition

"Those who do other people's business" renders τοὺς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντας (163a8) and οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες (163a10–11). Critias' reply is a statement, not a question, as Burnet punctuates it, keeping the manuscripts' που, "I suppose", where Cobet proposed ποῦ, "where?"; and "just because I agreed" renders εἰ, Heindorf's conjecture, where B has ᾗ, T ᾖ and W ᾗ (163a11).

See also

ἀλλότριος; δημιουργός; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; κωλύω; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πολυπραγμονέω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

οἶδα · know

To know: the verb of the formula "knowing what one knows and what one does not know", and of the boy's last answer · Charmides

εἴσεσθαι, *eisesthai*, "(you'll) know"; οἴσθα, *oistha*, "you know"; οἶδα, *oida*, "I know"; εἴσῃ, *eisēi*, "you'll know"; ἴσθι, *isthi*, "rest assured"; εἰδέναι, *eidenai*, "to know", "knowing"; εἰδώς, *eidōs*, "(when I) don't", "(what he in fact) knows"; οἶδεν, οἶδε, *oiden, oide*, "(he) knows"; εἰδόσιν, *eidosin*, "(in) knowing (it)"; εἴσεται, *eisetai*, "will (he) know"; ᾔδει, *ēidei*, "(he) knew"; ἴσασιν, *isasin*, "(what) we knew"; εἰδῶμεν, *eidōmen*, "(may) know"; εἰδότα, *eidota*, "(the one) who knows"; εἰδείη, *eideiē*, "knew"; εἰδείην, *eideiēn*, "(could I) know"

At a Glance

The word. A perfect with present sense, "I have seen", so "I know": the commonest Greek verb of knowing a fact or a thing.

In the *Charmides*. Some seventy-five times, from Critias' "I think you'll know in a moment" (154a) to the boy's "But by Zeus, Socrates, I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a); at the centre, in the formula "knowing what one knows and what one does not know" (167a).

In this edition. "Know"; the Glossary explains that εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι "all 'know', so that the formula 'knowing what one knows and what one does not know' keeps the same verb wherever it recurs (167a–b, 169d–170a, 170d, 171d, 172a, 172c)."

A place to read. 167a–b.

Meaning

Οἶδα is the perfect of the root that gives ἰδεῖν, "see": to know is to have seen. It is the plain word for knowing that something is so, or knowing a person or a thing, and it makes no claim to expertise, as ἐπίσταμαι does, or to recognition, as γιγνώσκω does. Its negative, οὐκ οἶδα, is the ordinary "I don't know", and Socrates' profession of ignorance is made in it (*Apology* 21d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).

Use in the book

The verb runs through the conversation at three levels. In the prologue it is acquaintance: Critias tells Socrates he knows the boy, and Socrates swears that he does (154a–b; see νὴ Δία). In the boy's exchanges it is the honest "I don't know": asked what doing one's own business could be, he answers, "By Zeus, I don't know" (162b; see μὰ Δία), and at the end he does not know whether he has temperance (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). And in the argument with Critias it becomes the object of knowledge itself. Critias defines temperance as knowing oneself; Socrates turns that into knowing "what one knows and what one does not know" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and the formula is worked over until it yields only knowing "that one knows and that one does not know" (170d; see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν), and at last the absurdity that one should know, in some way, what one does not know at all (175c; see ἀδύνατος).

The boy's two answers frame Critias' formula. At 162b he says he does not know what the formula means; at 176a he says he does not know whether he has temperance, "For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?" The argument has been about whether anyone could know what he knows and does not know; the boy, at the end, knows exactly what he does not know, and can be read as the one person in the room who has done what Critias' definition demanded.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its uses in ordinary speech are not listed.

162b The boy: "By Zeus, I don't know"; perhaps the formula's author did not know what he meant.

165b–c Socrates inquires with Critias because he himself does not know.

166d Socrates fears thinking he knows what he does not.

167a–b The temperate man alone will know what he knows and what he does not; is it possible to know this?

169d–170a How does knowledge of knowledge make one able to know what one knows and does not know?

170c–d The temperate man will know only that he knows, not what.

170e The doctor knows nothing about knowledge, and so not about medicine either.

171d–172a If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, we would live without error.

172c Socrates proposes to grant that one can know knowledge, and that temperance is knowing what one knows and does not know.

173b No one who pretended to know what he did not know would escape notice.

174a The prophet, who knows all that is going to be.

175c It is impossible to know, in some way, what one does not know at all.

176a The boy: "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't."

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus* plays the same logic for comedy, though with ἐπίσταμαι and its adjective ἐπιστήμων, not οἶδα. Euthydemus asks Socrates whether he knows anything; yes, many things, small ones; then he is knowing,

ἐπιστήμων, and if knowing, he must know everything, for a man who did not know something would be not-knowing, and cannot be knowing and not-knowing at once (293b–d). The sophist's argument and Critias' formula can be read as sharing a fault the *Charmides* exposes at 170c: they treat "knowing" as a state one has or lacks without asking what it is knowledge of.

Translation in this edition

"Know" throughout, except Critias' εὖ ... ἴσθι, "rest assured" (157d6), for οἶδα and its forms as for γιγνώσκω and ἐπίσταμαι (see γιγνώσκω; ἐπίσταμαι), so that the English formula is the same wherever the Greek varies the verb.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀδύνατος; γιγνώσκω; ἐπίσταμαι; μὰ Δία; νὴ Δία; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι · think one knows

To think one knows: the ignorance Socrates fears in himself and the temperate man was to detect in others · Charmides

οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή, *oiomenos men ti eidenai, eidōs de mē*, "think I know something when I don't"; οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, *oietai men eidenai*, "(what) he thinks he knows"

At a Glance

The word. Οἴομαι, "think", with εἰδέναι, "to know": to suppose that one knows.

In the *Charmides*. At 166d, Socrates' fear that he might "think I know something when I don't"; at 167a, the temperate man would see in others "what he thinks he knows but does not"; at 171c, a doctor who "pretends or thinks he does".

In this edition. "Think I know", "thinks he knows".

A place to read. 166c–167a.

Meaning

The phrase names the condition that the Socratic examination exists to expose: a belief about one's own knowledge that is false. It is not ignorance simply, which may know itself, but ignorance that takes itself for knowledge.

Use in the book

The phrase passes from Socrates to the temperate man and back. First it is Socrates' own fear, the reason he gives for refuting Critias as he would refute himself (166c–d; see λανθάνω; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then Socrates gives it to temperance as its task: the temperate man alone "will likewise be able to inspect others, to see what a person knows and thinks he knows, if he does know it, and again what he thinks he knows but does not" (167a; see διαγιγνώσκω; ἐπισκοπέω). The edition's note at 167a observes: "Many readers see in 'knowledge of the lack of knowledge' a portrait of Socrates as the Apology draws him: the man who examines others to find who thinks he knows and does not, and who does not think he knows what he does not know (21d; compare 21b, 22c–d)."

The argument then denies temperance this power. Knowing only that another has some knowledge, not of what, the temperate man could not tell the true doctor from one who "pretends or thinks he does" (171c; see ἀληθινός; προσποιέομαι). The note at 170d calls this "perhaps the result that tells most against Critias' definition", since the power it removes "is exactly what Socrates does in the Apology". The dialogue's refutation of temperance as knowledge of knowledge is, on this reading, a refutation of the claim that Socrates' own activity could be a single knowledge with no subject of its own.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

166d Socrates refutes for fear that he might, without noticing, think he knows what he does not.

167a The temperate man would see in others what they think they know but do not.

171c Temperance could not tell the doctor who knows from one who pretends or thinks he does.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Apology* gives the phrase its classic form. After examining one of the politicians, a man thought wise, Socrates reckons that probably neither of them knows anything fine and good, "but he supposes he knows something though he does not, whereas I, not knowing, do not suppose that I know either; by this one small point, then, I seem to be the wiser of the two, that what I do not know I do not even suppose I know" (21d). In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea marks off one large and troublesome kind of ignorance, a counterweight to all the rest together: "to think one knows something without knowing it", the source, it seems, of every slip our thinking makes, and the only kind of ignorance to which the name ἀμαθία, want of learning, has been given (229c); his verb is δοκεῖν, where the *Apology* has οἴεσθαι. The *First Alcibiades*' account of the same ignorance as the cause of all errors is told elsewhere (117c–118a; see ἐπίσταμαι).

Translation in this edition

"Think I know something when I don't" renders οἰόμενος μέν τι εἰδέναι, εἰδὼς δὲ μή (166d2), "what he thinks he knows but does not" τί αὖ οἴεται μὲν εἰδέναι, οἶδεν δ' οὔ (167a4–5), where αὖ is Bekker's and B and T have αὐτὸς, and "pretends or thinks he does" προσποιούμενον δὲ ἢ οἰόμενον (171c7).

See also

ἀληθινός; διαγιγνώσκω; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπίσταμαι; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; λανθάνω; οἶδα; οἴομαι; προσποιέομαι.

οἰκεῖος · appropriate, one's own

οἰκεῖα, *oikeia*, "appropriate (to one)"

Attested: οἰκεῖα (*oikeia*; 163c, 163d). Belonging to the household, οἶκος; so one's own, akin, proper, fitting. The Glossary describes it as "Critias'

word, paired with ‘one’s own’ and opposed to ‘belonging to others’: 163c–d.” Critias says that Hesiod “regarded only such things as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others” (163c; see ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός), and Socrates restates him: “it is what is appropriate to one, and one’s own, that you call good” (163d; see ἀγαθός; ἑαυτοῦ). The adjective lets Critias move the formula “doing one’s own business” from possession to value: what is one’s own is now what is good for one, and what is harmful is another’s, whoever owns it. In the English of 163d the two words, “appropriate” and “one’s own”, echo each other as they do in the Greek.

See also ἀγαθός; ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός; ἑαυτοῦ; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

οἰκέω · be managed, be run

To be run, of a city or a household: the verb of the well-managed city that two of the dialogue’s arguments imagine · Charmides

οἰκεῖσθαι, *oikeisthai*, “be managed”, “be run”; οἰκοῦσα, *oikousa*, “managed”; οἰκοῖτο, *oikoito*, “would be managed”; οἰκουμένη, *oikoumenē*, “run”

At a Glance

The word. To dwell, to inhabit; of a city, to be administered, and in the passive, to be run.

In the *Charmides*. Five times, in two passages: the city that would be well managed under a law (161e–162a), and the household and city run by temperance (171e).

In this edition. “Be managed”, “be run”.

A place to read. 171d–172a.

Meaning

Οἰκέω is first to live in a house, οἶκος. A city that “dwells well” is one whose affairs go well, and the passive εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι, “to be well run”, was the ordinary phrase for a well-governed city. The verb carries the household into the city: a city is run, as a house is lived in, well or badly; the visitor from Elea’s

argument that one knowledge rules a large household and a small city alike is told elsewhere (*Statesman* 259b–c; see μία τις ἐπιστήμη).

Use in the book

The verb carries the same premise into both halves of the dialogue: whatever temperance is, a city run by it would be run well. In the first, it refutes a definition. Socrates asks the boy whether "a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak" and make everything for himself (161e; see νόμος); the boy thinks not. "And yet … a city that is temperately managed would be well managed" (162a). So doing one's own business, in that sense, would not be temperance. The Greek has the active participle and the passive optative side by side, σωφρόνως γε οἰκοῦσα εὖ ἂν οἰκοῖτο, "dwelling temperately, it would be well run", so that the city's temperance and its good management are one phrase.

In the second, the premise becomes a promise. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, "a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too, and everything else that temperance ruled" (171e; see ἀναμάρτητος; οἰκία), and from there the chain runs on to rightness, doing well and happiness (172a; see ὀρθότης). Socrates then withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good "as the guide of the management of household and of city" (172d; see διοίκησις), and the dream asks whether a human race that acted and lived knowledgeably would also do well and be happy, which "we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ὄναρ). The verb can be read as naming the dialogue's first idea of what temperance is for, a city that is well run, and the dream as asking whether that is the same as a people that is happy.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

161e Would a city be well managed under a law ordering each man to make everything for himself?

162a A city that is temperately managed would be well managed; so doing one's own business in this way is not temperance.

171e A household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laws* the Athenian stranger tells of a rule and a habitation said to have existed under Cronus, the father of Zeus, in whose reign, Hesiod says, the golden race of men lived,[202] far earlier than the cities whose foundings the speakers have traced; the best-run city of the present holds an imitation of it. Cronus, the story goes, knew that no human nature, having absolute control of human affairs, could avoid being filled with insolence and injustice; so he set over cities as kings and rulers not men but spirits, δαίμονες, of a more divine and better kind, as men now set no ox over oxen but rule the herd themselves. The spirits gave peace, reverence, good order and justice in abundance, and made the races of men free of faction and happy. The account still holds, the Athenian says: cities ruled not by a god but by a mortal have no respite from evils and toils, and we must imitate the life under Cronus by every means, obeying whatever of immortality there is in us, in public and private, in managing our houses and cities, and giving the name of law to the distribution of mind (4.713b–714a). The stranger's best-run city can be read as governed by mind as the *Charmides*' household and city of 171e would be by knowledge; the *Republic*'s city governed waking, not in a dream, is told elsewhere (520c; see ὄναρ).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's report that Socrates thought those who would run households and cities well needed prophecy as well as the arts that can be learned is told elsewhere (*Memorabilia* 1.1.7; see μαντική).

Translation in this edition

"Be managed" renders οἰκεῖσθαι at 161e10 and the pair οἰκοῦσα ... οἰκοῖτο at 162a4–5, "temperately managed ... well managed"; "run" renders οἰκουμένη and οἰκεῖσθαι at 171e6, "a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well", with "governed" for the city's participle πολιτευομένη.

[202] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 109–111.

Οἰκεῖσθαι at 161e10 is the reading of T and W, where B has ἀρκεῖσθαι, "be self-sufficient"; γε at 162a4 is a later correction in B, where B and T have τε; and οἰκουμένη at 171e6 is the reading of B and W, where T has οἰκονομουμένη, "managed".

See also

ἀναμάρτητος; διοίκησις; μαντική; μία τις ἐπιστήμη; νόμος; οἰκία; ὄναρ; ὀρθότης; σωφρόνως.

οἴκημα · brothel

οἰκήματος, *oikēmatos*, "brothel"

Attested: οἰκήματος (*oikēmatos*; 163b). A room, a chamber, any small building: a shop, a store, a cell, and, in the Athenian euphemism, the room where a prostitute sat for hire. It comes once, at the end of Critias' list of trades that Hesiod could not have called works, since he would then have been saying that it was no disgrace "to cobble shoes, or to sell salt fish, or to sit in a brothel" (163b; see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω). The edition's note at 163b glosses the word as "a brothel room" (see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι). The word belongs to the family of οἶκος, house, which elsewhere in the dialogue gives the household run by temperance (171e; see οἰκία).

See also ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; οἰκία; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω.

οἴκησις · houses

οἰκήσεις, *oikēseis*, "houses"

Attested: οἰκήσεις (*oikēseis*; 165d). A dwelling, a house to live in; also the act of dwelling. It names the product of a craft: "And if you asked me about house-building, which is knowledge of how to build, what work I say it produces, I would say, 'Houses'; and the same with the other crafts" (165d; see ἔργον; οἰκοδομική). A moment later Critias names the same product with

οἰκία, "in the way that a house is the work of house-building" (165e). Οἴκησις can be read as the house as a place to live in, the work judged by its use. In the *Laws* the life under Cronus, of which the best-run city now holds an imitation, is called "a rule and a habitation" (4.713b; see οἰκέω).

See also ἔργον; οἰκέω; οἰκία; οἰκοδομική.

οἰκία · household

House, family, household: the word that joins the boy's descent, the work of a craft and the city run by knowledge · Charmides

οἰκίας, *oikias*, "family", "household"; οἰκίαι, *oikiai*, "houses"; οἰκία, *oikia*, "family", "house", "household"

At a Glance

The word. A house; the people of a house, a family; the household with its property and management.

In the *Charmides*. Seven times, in three senses: of the boy's family (154e, 157e, 158a), of a house as the work of house-building (165e), and of the household run by temperance (171e, 172d).

In this edition. "Family", "house", "household".

A place to read. 171d–172a.

Meaning

Οἰκία and οἶκος overlap. Οἰκία is first the building; then the family that lives in it and its line of descent, as in English "the house of"; then the household as a unit of property and management, the sphere of οἰκονομία, "household management". A great family was a house, and its standing was a matter of the house's fame.

Use in the book

The three senses follow the dialogue's course. In the prologue the word is the boy's descent. Socrates says he ought to be well made in his soul, "coming from your family" (154e; see εὖ πέφυκα), and praises the "two houses in

Athens" the boy is sprung from, his father's, the house of Critias son of Dropides, and his mother's, of which "that whole house is in no way inferior to the other" (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; πατρῷος). Here οἰκία is a lineage and a reputation, the beauty and virtue of a house praised by poets.

In the argument with Critias it becomes a thing made: "a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving" (165e; see ἔργον; οἰκοδομική), the visible product of a craft, against which Critias sets the kinds of knowledge with no such product. And at the end of that argument it is the household, managed: a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city too (171e; see οἰκέω), and at 172d Socrates withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good as the guide of the management of both (see διοίκησις). The household stands beside the city as the two fields a ruling knowledge would govern.

The movement can be read as a change in what makes a house good. The house praised at 157e–158a is good by birth, and the boy is expected to be good because of it (see γεννάω); the household of 171e would be good because knowledge ran it. Between them is the house as a craftsman's work, good if it is well built. The dialogue begins by praising a house for what it has inherited, and ends by asking what knowledge could make any house well run.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

154e The boy ought to be well made in his soul, coming from Critias' family.

157e No two houses in Athens could produce finer offspring; the father's side is the house of Critias son of Dropides.

158a The mother's house, for which the boy's uncle Pyrilampes stands, is in no way inferior.

165e A house is the work of house-building, as a cloak is of weaving.

171e A household run by temperance would be bound to be run well.

172d Socrates withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good as guide of the management of household and city.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, a Socratic conversation on running a household, begins by asking what household management is, and then what the household is. Socrates and Critobulus agree that household management is a knowledge like carpentry, and that a man who had it could manage another's household for pay, as a builder builds for others. Then Socrates asks whether the household, οἶκος, is the same as the house, οἰκία, or whether everything a man owns outside the house belongs to the household too. Critobulus says it includes all he owns, even in another city. But some men own enemies: are they part of a man's possessions? That would be absurd. So the household is possession, and possession only what is good for its owner; what harms him, Critobulus says, he reckons damage, not wealth.[203] The argument can be read as drawing, independently of Plato, the same line as Critias at 163c–d, where what is one's own is what is good for one and the harmful belongs to others (see οἰκεῖος).

Aristotle makes the household the first of human communities. Out of the partnerships of man and woman and of master and slave the household comes first, and Hesiod spoke rightly, "A house first of all, a woman, and a plough-ox", since for the poor the ox stands in for a servant. The household is the community formed by nature for the needs of every day, whose members Charondas, the lawgiver of Catana in Sicily, calls "sharers of the bread-bin", and Epimenides the Cretan, the seer, "sharers of the manger"; the village is the first community of several households, for more than daily needs, and the city is formed from villages.[204]

Translation in this edition

"Family" renders οἰκίας at 154e3 and οἰκία at 157e5, where the English adds "the house of Critias son of Dropides" for the apposition ἡ Κριτίου τοῦ Δρωπίδου; "houses" renders οἰκίαι (157e2), and "house" οἰκία at 158a6 and 165e7; "household" renders οἰκία at 171e5 and οἰκίας at 172d4. At 157e5 οἰκία is the reading of T and W; B has οὐσία, "property". At 157e2 Burnet

[203] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus* 1.1–7.

[204] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2, 1252b9–16, 27–28; Hesiod, *Works and Days* 405.

prints δύο from the Aldine, the first printed edition of Plato (Venice, 1513), (B, T and W δυοῖν), and "whose union would be likely to produce" follows T's συνελθοῦσαι and γεννήσειαν (B καὶ νῦν ἐλθοῦσαι, B and W γενήσεται).

See also

ἀρετή; γεννάω; διοίκησις; ἔργον; εὖ πέφυκα; οἰκεῖος; οἰκέω; οἰκοδομική; πατρῷος.

οἰκοδομέω · build houses

τὸ οἰκοδομεῖν, *to oikodomein*, "building houses"; τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν, *tou oikodomein*, "how to build"

Attested: οἰκοδομεῖν (*oikodomein*; 161e, 165d). To build a house; to build. Both times the infinitive with the article, naming an activity. In the first, building is one of the doings that are makings: "Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e). The step lets Socrates turn "doing one's own business" into making everything for oneself, and so into the absurd law (see νόμος). In the second, building gives a knowledge its object: house-building is "knowledge of how to build", and its work is houses (165d; see οἰκοδομική; οἴκησις). The same activity first serves to show what doing one's own business cannot mean, and then the shape of a knowledge with a work of its own, which Critias' self-knowledge is asked to match.

See also ἀπεργάζομαι; νόμος; οἴκησις; οἰκοδομική.

οἰκοδομική · house-building

House-building: the craft known by its product, and the knowledge temperance cannot stand in for · Charmides

τὴν οἰκοδομικήν, *tēn oikodomikēn*, "house-building"; οἰκοδομικῆς, *oikodomikēs*, "of house-building"; οἰκοδομικῇ, *oikodomikēi*, "by house-building"

At a Glance

The word. The art of building houses; an adjective in -ική, like ἰατρική and μουσική, with τέχνη or ἐπιστήμη understood.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: house-building is "knowledge of how to build" (165d); "a house is the work of house-building" (165e); a man knows "what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance" (170c).

In this edition. "House-building".

A place to read. 170b–d.

Meaning

Greek named an art by the feminine of an adjective: the medical, the musical, the house-building art. Building was the plainest of crafts, with a product anyone could see and live in, and it had a hierarchy: the master builder, ἀρχιτέκτων, directed the workmen, and the city let its contracts for walls, docks and temples. For a philosopher looking for a knowledge with a work of its own, house-building was the obvious example.

Use in the book

The art comes in two passages, and does a different work in each. At 165d–e it is the model of a knowledge known by its product. Medicine produces health, house-building houses; so Critias, since he calls temperance knowledge of oneself, should say what fine work it produces (see ἔργον; οἴκησις). Critias refuses the model: calculation and geometry have no work "in the way that a house is the work of house-building" (165e; see λογιστική), and temperance is not like the other kinds of knowledge.

At 170c the art returns, not as a maker of houses but as the knower of what belongs to houses. The man who has knowledge only of knowledge knows that he knows something; but each thing is known by its own art, "the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance" (170c; see μουσική; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). By temperance, "how will he know that he knows the healthy, or what belongs to house-building?" "In no way" (170c; see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν). Critias escaped the first use by saying that a knowledge need not have a product; the second use is the one he cannot escape, since every knowledge, product or not, has an object, and the knowledge of knowledge has none but the other kinds. The house-builder, who knows houses, could judge a house; temperance, on Critias' account, has no house of its own and cannot judge one.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

165d House-building, knowledge of how to build, produces houses; what fine work does temperance produce?

165e Critias: calculation and geometry have no work in the way that a house is the work of house-building.

170c What belongs to house-building is known by house-building, not by temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates proposes to Callicles the test for any man who would take on the city's business. If they were urging each other to undertake public building, walls or dockyards or temples, the greatest of buildings, they would first have to examine themselves, whether they knew the art of house-building or not, and from whom they had learned it; then whether they had ever built anything privately, for a friend or for themselves, and whether it was fine or ugly. With good and notable teachers, and many fine buildings put up with them and many on their own, it would be sensible to go on to the public works; with no teacher to show, and no buildings, or many worth nothing, it would be mindless to attempt them (514a–c). The test asks for

teachers and works, and it is the builders who apply it to themselves. The *Charmides* can be read as asking who else could apply it: at 171c only a fellow craftsman can judge a craftsman (see ὁμότεχνος).

Translation in this edition

"House-building" renders τὴν οἰκοδομικήν (165d4), οἰκοδομικῆς (165e7) and οἰκοδομικῇ (170c3); "knowledge of how to build" renders ἐπιστήμην οὖσαν τοῦ οἰκοδομεῖν (165d4–5), and "what belongs to house-building" the neuter adjective τὸ οἰκοδομικόν (170c3, 170c7; see οἰκοδομικός).

See also

ἔργον; λογιστική; μουσική; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἴκησις; οἰκοδομέω; οἰκοδομικός; ὁμότεχνος; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

οἰκοδομικός · what belongs to house-building

τὸ οἰκοδομικόν, *to oikodomikon*, "what belongs to house-building"

Attested: οἰκοδομικόν (*oikodomikon*; 170c twice). Of or for house-building; with the article, what belongs to house-building, its subject matter. What belongs to house-building is known "by house-building and not by temperance", so the man who has only knowledge of knowledge cannot know by it that he knows it (170c; see οἰκοδομική; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν). The Greek sets the object beside the art that knows it, οἰκοδομικὸν οἰκοδομικῇ, "what belongs to house-building by house-building", as it does τὸ ἁρμονικὸν μουσικῇ, and the English keeps the echo. The neuter adjective is the dialogue's way of naming what each knowledge is about, and its pairing with the art says that the two cannot be had apart (see ἁρμονικός; τὸ ὑγιεινόν).

See also ἁρμονικός; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; οἰκοδομική; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

οἴομαι · think, suppose

To think, suppose: the verb of opinion, in which the inquiry ends · Charmides

οἴομαι, *oiomai*, "I think"; οἶμαι, *oimai*, "I think", "I suppose", "I should think", "I imagine"; ἐγῷμαι, *egōimai*, "I think", "I imagine"; οἴει, *oiei*, "you think", "do you suppose", "opinion"; οἴεται, *oietai*, "thinks"; οἴεσθαι, *oiesthai*, "suppose", "imagine"; οἰηθείη, *oiētheiē*, "might think"; ᾠήθησαν, *ōiēthēsan*, "thought"; οἰόμενος, *oiomenos*, "think"; οἰόμενον, *oiomenon*, "thinks"

At a Glance

The word. To think, to suppose, to believe: of what one holds without claiming to know it; often parenthetic, οἶμαι, "I think".

In the *Charmides*. Thirty times, from Socrates' "by now, I should think, he must be quite the young man" (154b) to the boy's "I think I very much need the charm" (176b).

In this edition. "Think", "suppose"; "imagine" at 156c, 160a and 167e; "this opinion of yours" at 159a.

A place to read. 175e–176b.

Meaning

Οἴομαι is the commonest Greek verb of opinion: to think a thing so, rightly or wrongly. It makes no claim to knowledge, and its parenthetic form, οἶμαι, softens an assertion as English "I think" does. The *Charmides* puts it beside the verbs of knowing, and the gap between thinking one knows and knowing is one of its subjects (see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).

Use in the book

The examination of the boy begins with his opinion. If temperance is present in him, Socrates says, he must have some opinion of it: "Don't you think so?" "I do." "Well then, this opinion of yours ... since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?" (159a; see δόξα; ἑλληνίζω). What the boy thinks is the material the rest of his part works on.

Critias uses the verb to prescribe. Hesiod could not have called the base trades works: "One must not suppose so, Socrates"; and "So we must suppose that Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate" (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). A reading of a poet is offered as what one must think. Critias uses it, too, to accuse: "I think you are doing the very thing you said just now you were not doing" (166c; see λανθάνω), and Socrates answers that he refutes him as he would himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι).

The verb ends the inquiry. Socrates, having found temperance of no benefit on the argument's terms, refuses the result: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a; see ζητητής); the Greek has the verb once, and the English repeats it. The boy answers that he does not know whether he has it, and adds, "I'm not altogether persuaded by you, though, Socrates, and I think I very much need the charm" (176b; see πείθω). The dialogue that set out to find what temperance is ends with two opinions, and the boy acts on his. It can be read as Socrates' last lesson that opinion examined and held is not the same as opinion unexamined: both have been shown that they do not know, the boy in his first definitions and Socrates in the last, and both still think.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its parenthetic uses in ordinary speech are not listed.

156c To imagine one could treat the head apart from the whole body is sheer folly.

159a The boy's opinion of temperance, which he can surely put into Greek.

163b–c Critias: one must not suppose that Hesiod called base trades works; one must suppose that he called the man who does his own business temperate.

164c Critias: if Socrates thinks his conclusion follows from what was agreed, Critias would sooner take something back.

165a One might think "Know thyself" and "Be temperate" different.

166c–d Critias thinks Socrates is only trying to refute him; Socrates fears thinking he knows what he does not.

167a The temperate man would see what others think they know but do not.

171c Temperance could not tell a doctor who knows his craft from one who does not know it but pretends or thinks he does.

173a Socrates: "I think I'm talking nonsense."

175e–176a Socrates: "I don't at all think it is so"; he thinks temperance a great good.

176b The boy thinks he very much needs the charm.

Translation in this edition

"Think" is the usual rendering, "I should think" at 154b4; "suppose" renders οἶμαι at 157e1, οἴει at 163b5, οὐκ οἴεσθαί γε χρή at 163b8 and χρὴ οἴεσθαι at 163c6; "imagine" renders οἴεσθαι at 156c2, where the doctors call the supposition folly, οἶμαι at 160a9 and ἐγῷμαι at 167e4; and "this opinion of yours" renders ὃ οἴει (159a6), the boy's thought taken as a thing he has.

See also

δόξα; ἑλληνίζω; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ζητητής; λανθάνω; ληρέω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; πείθω.

οἷός τε εἰμί · be able

To be able: the phrase in which the argument measures what temperance could do, and finds it cannot · Charmides

οὐχ οἷόν τε, *ouch hoion te*, "cannot"; οἷόν τέ ἐστιν, *hoion te estin*, "make ... able"; οἷός τε ἔσται, *hoios te estai*, "will be able"; οἷός τ' ἔσται, *hoios t' estai*, "will be able"; οἵα τ' ἔσται, *hoia t' estai*, "will it be able"; οἵα τε ἔσται, *hoia te estai*, "it will be able"; οἷός τ' ἦν, *hoios t' ēn*, "were able"; οἷοί τέ ἐστε, *hoioi te este*, "are able"; οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο, *ouch hoios te egeneto*, "could contain himself no longer"

At a Glance

The word. Οἷος, "such as", with τε and the verb "to be": to be such as to do something, to be able; impersonal, οἷόν τε, "it is possible".

In the *Charmides*. Eleven times, from the doctors who "cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own" (156b) to Socrates' surrender: "no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176d).

In this edition. "Be able", "can"; at 162c "could contain himself no longer".

A place to read. 170d–171c.

Meaning

The phrase is ordinary Greek idiom for capacity, and covers both ability and possibility: a man is οἷός τε, "the kind to", when he can do a thing, and a thing is οἷόν τε when it can be done. It says nothing about knowledge or art; it measures only what is in one's power.

Use in the book

Before Critias takes over the argument, the phrase marks his own incapacity: he had held himself back with difficulty, "but now he could contain himself no longer" (162c; see μόγις; φιλοτίμως), and he took the argument over. The phrase then measures the claims made for temperance and takes them back. At 167a Socrates states Critias' position: "only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not" (see ἐξετάζω; μόνος). Two pages later he asks of knowledge of knowledge, "how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not?" (169d), and then, "Knowledge that is knowledge of knowledge: will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?" (170a; see διαιρέω). The answer reverses 167a point by point: "Nor, then, will this man be able to examine someone else who claims to know something" (170d), and "Then he will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is" (170e; see ἀληθινός; διακρίνω), and temperance, if it is only knowledge of knowledge, "will be able to tell" no knower from a pretender except a fellow craftsman (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). At 171d the power of examination survives only in a counterfactual: if the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, "and were able to examine another man in the same situation", it would be of enormous benefit (see ἐπισκοπέω).

At the end the phrase turns on the speakers. The boy cannot say whether he has temperance, "For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?" (176a–b; see ἐξευρίσκω), and Socrates, outvoted, says, "When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176d; see βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι). The dialogue that began with what doctors cannot do ends with a run of incapacities: Critias cannot contain himself, the temperate man cannot examine, the inquirers cannot discover, and Socrates cannot resist.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

156b Good doctors say they cannot cure the eyes on their own.

162c Critias could contain himself no longer.

167a The temperate man alone will be able to examine what he knows and does not know.

169d How does knowledge of knowledge make one any more able to know what one knows and does not?

170a Can knowledge of knowledge distinguish anything more than that this is knowledge and that is not?

170d The temperate man will not be able to examine another who claims to know.

170e He will not be able to distinguish the pretended doctor from the true.

171c Temperance will be able to tell no knower from a pretender, except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can.

171d If the temperate man were able to examine another, it would be of enormous benefit.

176a The boy: not even Socrates and Critias are able to discover what temperance is.

176d Socrates: no man alive will be able to oppose Charmides when he uses force.

Translation in this edition

"Cannot" renders οὐχ οἷόν τε (156b6–7), and "make one any more able to know" the impersonal τί μᾶλλον οἷόν τέ ἐστιν εἰδέναι (169d6), literally "what more is it possible to know"; elsewhere "be able", with "will it be able" for the feminine οἵα τ' ἔσται (170a7), whose subject is the knowledge itself, as is that of οἵα τε ἔσται at 171c5, "it will be able to tell"; "could contain himself

no longer" renders οὐχ οἷός τε ἐγένετο (162c3–4), the reflexive supplied from the preceding ἑαυτὸν ... κατέχων.

See also

ἀληθινός; βιάζομαι; διαιρέω; διακρίνω; ἐναντιόομαι; ἐξετάζω; ἐξευρίσκω; ἐπισκοπέω; μόγις; μόνος; ὁμότεχνος; φιλοτίμως.

ὅλος · whole

Whole: the body the doctors treat, and the whole that Zalmoxis says includes the soul · Charmides

ὅλου, *holou*, "whole", "the whole"

At a Glance

The word. Whole, entire, complete in its parts; with the article, τὸ ὅλον, "the whole".

In the *Charmides*. Three times, all in the account of the charm: "apart from the whole body" (156c), "the part along with the whole" (156c), and "they neglect the whole" (156e).

In this edition. "Whole".

A place to read. 156b–157a.

Meaning

Ὅλος is the whole as complete, with nothing missing; πᾶς is "all", "every", and with the article can also mean the whole of a thing. Greek used both of the body, and the passage at 156c has both: ἄνευ ὅλου τοῦ σώματος, "apart from the whole body", and ἐπὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα, "the entire body". The difference between them became a question for the philosophers.

Use in the book

The word takes three steps in a page, and its extent grows at each. First the whole is the body: the good doctors say that "to imagine one could ever treat the head on its own, apart from the whole body, is sheer folly" (156c; see ἄνοια). Then it becomes a principle of treatment, "the part along with the

whole" (156c; see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος). Then Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, uses it to accuse the Greek doctors: "they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e; see ἀμελέω; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). The whole is now no longer the body, since everything bad and good, "for the body and for the whole human being", starts from the soul (156e; see ὁρμάω). The Greek doctors' word is kept, and its reach is enlarged to include what no regimen touches.

The enlargement is what lets Socrates turn a cure for a headache into an examination of the boy's soul. The boy accepted the principle when the whole was the body (156c; see ἀποδέχομαι); he is held to it when the whole includes the soul, and the charm, words that put temperance into souls, becomes the first treatment (157a; see ἐπῳδή).

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

156c To treat the head apart from the whole body is folly; the doctors treat the part along with the whole.

156e The Greek doctors neglect the whole, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot be well.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Theaetetus* the difference between the two words becomes a question. Socrates asks Theaetetus whether the whole is a single form arising out of the parts and different from all the parts together, and Theaetetus says it is; then whether the whole, τὸ ὅλον, and the all, τὸ πᾶν, are the same or different, and Theaetetus, though he has nothing clear to say, ventures that they differ. Socrates presses: in whatever is made of number the all is all the parts; the all is that from which nothing is missing, and is not the whole the same, that from which nothing at all is absent, so that when anything is absent the thing is neither whole nor all? Theaetetus concedes that all and whole now seem to him not to differ at all (204a–205a). The *Charmides* uses the two words of the same body without remark.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's dictionary of terms in the *Metaphysics* sets out the senses of "whole". A thing is whole when it lacks none of the parts that make it, by nature, the whole it is called; and what holds things together so that they are one is whole too. Among quantities with a beginning, a middle and an end, Aristotle says "all" where rearranging the parts changes nothing and "whole" where it does; so water and number are "all", and no one speaks of a whole water or a whole number except by metaphor.[205]

Translation in this edition

"Whole" renders ὅλου at 156c2, 156c4 and 156e4. At 156e4 τοῦ ὅλου is Burnet's own reading: B and T have τὸ ὅλον, and Stobaeus τοῦ ἄλλου, "the rest" (see ἀμελέω). A few lines later, at 157a2, the confusion runs the other way: Burnet prints τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος, "the rest of the body", with B, W and Stobaeus, where T has ὅλου, "the whole body". The two words were easily confused in copying.

See also

ἀμελέω; ἄνοια; ἀποδέχομαι; ἐπῳδή; μέρος; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; ὁρμάω; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος.

ὄμμα · eye

τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων, *ta tōn ommatōn*, "the eyes"; τὰ ὄμματα, *ta ommata*, "the eyes"

Attested: ὀμμάτων (*ommatōn*; 156c), ὄμματα (*ommata*; 157a). The eye; a word of poetry and of the higher style, beside the everyday ὀφθαλμός. In the account of the charm the two words alternate. The good doctors say they cannot cure the eyes, ὀφθαλμούς, on their own, but must treat the head as well, "if the eyes too are to be in good condition", τὰ τῶν ὀμμάτων (156b–c; see ὀφθαλμός); Zalmoxis says one must not cure the eyes, ὀφθαλμούς, without the head (156e); and everything good and bad starts from the soul and flows from there, "as it flows from the head into the eyes", ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα (156e–

[205] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.26, 1023b26–1024a8.

157a; see ἐπιρρέω). The eyes are the smallest part in the chain of parts and wholes, eyes, head, body, soul (see μέρος). The English has "eyes" for both words, so that the chain reads as one.

See also ἐπιρρέω; κεφαλή; μέρος; ὀφθαλμός.

ὄμνυμι · swear an oath

ὀμώμοκα, *omōmoka*, "I have sworn"

Attested: ὀμώμοκα (*omōmoka*; 157c). To swear, to take an oath. The perfect means "I have sworn and am bound"; it is T's reading, noted also in W, where B and W have the aorist ὤμοσα, "I swore". When Socrates learned the charm, the Thracian made him promise to let no one persuade him to treat the head before the soul, however rich, wellborn or beautiful (157b; see ἐντολή). Socrates now binds himself to it before the boy: "So I—for I have sworn him an oath, and I must obey—I shall obey" (157c; see ἀνάγκη; ξένος). The oath makes the cure conditional: the boy may have the remedy for his head only if he first hands over his soul to the charm. It is the one oath in the dialogue that binds the swearer to someone; the others are spoken in conversation to affirm or deny (see μὰ Δία; νὴ Δία; νὴ τὸν κύνα), and the dialogue ends with its condition met, when the boy asks to be charmed "every day" (176b; see ἐπᾴδω).

See also ἀνάγκη; ἐντολή; ἐπᾴδω; μὰ Δία; νὴ Δία; νὴ τὸν κύνα; ξένος.

ὅμοιος · like, alike

ὁμοία, *homoia*, "like"; ὡς ὁμοίων οὐσῶν, *hōs homoiōn ousōn*, "as though they were alike"; ὅμοιος, *homoios*, "same old (self)"; τὰ ὅμοια, *ta homoia*, "(copy out) the letters"; ὁμοίως, *homoiōs*, "alike"

Attested: ὅμοια (*homoia*; 159c), ὁμοία (*homoia*; 165e), ὁμοίων (*homoiōn*; 165e), ὅμοιος (*homoios*; 170a), ὁμοίως (*homoiōs*; 174a twice). Like, similar, the same. Its weightiest use is Critias' protest at 165e. Socrates has asked what fine work temperance produces, as medicine produces health and house-

building houses; Critias replies, "you are not inquiring correctly. This knowledge is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge, any more than they are like each other; and yet you are conducting your inquiry as though they were alike" (165e; see ζητέω; ὁμοιότης). The objection is to the method of argument by likeness, which Socrates uses throughout. The other uses are lighter: the writing-master's pupil is to "copy out the letters", τὰ ὅμοια γράμματα γράφειν, literally to write letters like the model (159c; see γραμματιστής); Socrates fears that he is his "same old self" and still does not understand (170a); and Critias says the kinds of knowledge do not make a man happy "alike" (174a).

See also γραμματιστής; ζητέω; οἰκοδομική; ὁμοιότης.

ὁμοιότης · likeness

ὁμοιότητά τινα, *homoiotēta tina*, "some likeness"

Attested: ὁμοιότητα (*homoiotēta*; 166b). Likeness, resemblance. Critias uses it to name what Socrates is wrongly looking for. Calculation is of the odd and even, weighing of the heavy and light, each distinct from the knowledge itself; Socrates asks what temperance is knowledge of, "that is something other than temperance itself". Critias: "Your search has brought you to the very point in which temperance differs from all the other kinds of knowledge, and yet you are looking for some likeness between it and the others. It isn't so" (166b–c; see διαφέρω; ὅμοιος). The noun repeats his objection of 165e in a single word, and the argument that follows tests whether there can be a knowledge without the likeness: Socrates' procession of senses and desires, none of which is of itself, is an argument by likeness once more (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).

See also αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; διαφέρω; ὅμοιος.

ὁμολογέω · agree

To agree: the partners' steps in the argument, refused, given, defended and withdrawn · Charmides

ὁμολογεῖς, *homologeis*, "do you agree"; ὁμολογεῖν, *homologein*, "to agree"; ὡμολόγεις, *hōmologeis*, "were you agreeing"; ὡμολόγηκα, *hōmologēka*, "I agreed"; ὡμολόγησα, *hōmologēsa*, "I agreed"; ὁμολογῶ, *homologō*, "I agree"; ὡμολογήσαμεν, *hōmologēsamen*, "we agreed"; ὁμολογοῦνται, *homologountai*, "(you) admit"; ὡμολογημένων, *hōmologēmenōn*, "I agreed to"; ὁμολογήσοντος, *homologēsontos*, "will agree"; ὡμολογηκέναι, *hōmologēkenai*, "to agree to"; ὁμολογεῖται, *homologeitai*, "is agreed"; συνομολογοῦντες, *synomologountes*, "agreed on"

At a Glance

The word. To say the same as another: to agree, to admit, to concede.

In the *Charmides*. Some fifteen times, the Glossary's "partners' steps in the argument", from the boy's difficulty "either to agree or to deny" (158c) to Socrates' withdrawal, "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d), and his last word for their definition, "what we long ago agreed on" (175d).

In this edition. "Agree"; "admit" at 173e.

A place to read. 165b–c.

Meaning

Ὁμολογέω, from ὁμός, "same", and λέγω, "say", is to say the same thing as someone: to agree with him, to grant his point, to confess a fact. In a Socratic conversation it is the answerer's act: each step stands because he has said yes to it, and a refutation shows that his agreements cannot all stand together.

Use in the book

Three kinds of agreement meet in the dialogue. The boy's is refused. Asked whether he agrees with Critias that he already has enough temperance, he answers that it is not easy, in the circumstances, "either to agree or to deny" (158c): to deny would make Critias a liar, to agree would be self-praise (158d;

see αἰσχυντηλός). The edition's note at 158c reads the blush and the refusal as a picture of temperance in its commonest sense, modesty (see ἀνερυθριάω). When the boy does agree, his agreements are used against him: "Weren't you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?" (160e; see καλός), and the definition by modesty falls.

Critias' agreements are positions to defend or retract. He denies having agreed to what Socrates draws from him (163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες), and rather than concede that a man could be temperate without knowing himself he would take back what he had agreed: "If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I would sooner take back some of it" (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι). When he offers Socrates his own account, he offers it on condition that Socrates does not agree: "now I am willing to give you an account of this, if you do not agree that temperance is knowing oneself" (165b).

Socrates' agreement follows inquiry. "You are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to. That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not" (165b–c; see ζητέω). He holds to this when the agreement is his own: "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" the claim that temperance would be a great good as the guide of household and city, because "we too easily agreed" (172d–e; see διοίκησις). The dialogue can be read as teaching through the verb that agreement is earned by examination and may be withdrawn by it, which is why its last agreements, the concessions of 175b–c, are disowned (see ὁμολογία).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

158c Does the boy agree with Critias that he is temperate? It is not easy to agree or deny.

160e The boy agreed that temperance is fine.

163a Critias denies having agreed that those who do other people's business are temperate.

164c Critias would sooner take back what he agreed than concede a temperate man who does not know himself.

165b–c Critias' account, if Socrates does not agree; Socrates will agree or not only after looking into it.

172d–e They agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to do what he knew and hand over what he did not know to those who knew.

173e Critias does not admit that those who live knowledgeably about crafts are happy.

175a–b What is agreed to be the finest of all things has turned out to be of no use to them.

175d What they long ago agreed on and made up between them has proved of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates distinguishes his kind of proof from the law court's. Polus can bring almost everyone, Athenians and foreigners alike, to testify against him: Nicias and his brothers, Aristocrates son of Scellias, an Athenian general whose fine offering stands in the shrine of Pythian Apollo, the whole house of Pericles; "but I, being one, do not agree with you; for you do not compel me". Unless Socrates can produce Polus himself as his single witness, agreeing with what he says, he thinks he has accomplished nothing worth speaking of; nor has Polus, unless Socrates alone bears witness for him and he lets all the others go (472a–c). The *Crito*'s warning that Crito should not agree, against his own opinion, to the principle that one must never do wrong is told elsewhere (49c–d; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν).

Translation in this edition

"Agree" renders the verb throughout, "admit" at 173e8 (ὁμολογοῦνται παρὰ σοῦ, "are admitted by you"), and "agreed on" the compound συνομολογοῦντες at 175d3. At 165b7 "as though I will agree with you" renders ὁμολογήσοντός σοι, Heusde's conjecture, the future participle; B and T have ὁμολογήσαντός σου, "as though I had agreed with you". The Glossary

notes that at 162e and 166b "agree" renders *συγχωρεῖν*, "concede" (see συγχωρέω).

See also

αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνατίθημι; ἀνερυθριάω; διοίκησις; ζητέω; καλός; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; ὁμολογία; συγχωρέω.

ὁμολογία · agreement

Agreement: the result of the partners' concessions, which at the end says something absurd · Charmides

ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία, *hē hēmetera homologia*, "our agreement"

At a Glance

The word. Agreement, the thing agreed; in law, a compact; in argument, the admitted result.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' review of what they conceded: "for our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them" (175c).

In this edition. "Our agreement".

A place to read. 175a–d.

Meaning

The noun of ὁμολογέω, "say the same": a joint statement, what two parties have both said. In a dialogue it is the sum of the answerer's assents, the position both speakers are committed to, and the Glossary pairs it with the verb (see ὁμολογέω).

Use in the book

At the close Socrates reviews the concessions they made, which the argument did not allow: that there is knowledge of knowledge, that it knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, and, "with the utmost magnificence", that the temperate man might know, of what he does not know, that he does not know it (175b–c; see μεγαλοπρεπῶς; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). Then the noun names

their sum, and makes it speak: they did not even consider "that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all; for our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them. And yet, I think, nothing could appear more absurd than this" (175c; see ἀδύνατος).

The agreement is given a voice, φησίν, "says", as the inquiry a moment later is made an insolent mocker that laughed at the truth (175d; see ὑβριστικῶς). The concessions were made one by one, each to let the argument go on; summed up, they commit the partners to a contradiction neither would assert. Socrates speaks of the result as something they made: "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance" (175d; see συμπλάττω). The noun can be read as the dialogue's judgement on an agreement reached too easily: it is the partners' own, and it is absurd.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the review of concessions it sums up and the verdict that follows.

175b–c They conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, and that it knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge, though the argument allowed neither.

175c Their agreement says that the temperate man knows what he does not know; nothing could be more absurd.

175d The inquiry has shown that what they agreed on and made up between them is of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates tells Callicles what makes an agreement between them worth having. If his soul were gold, he says, he would be glad to find the best of the stones on which gold is tested; and Callicles has the three things needed to test a soul, knowledge, goodwill and frankness: so whatever Callicles agrees to with him in their argument will already have been sufficiently tested by them both, and need not be taken to another touchstone. Callicles would never concede it from lack of wisdom or excess of shame, nor to deceive him, since he is his friend. "So in truth my

agreement and yours will already have reached the goal of truth" (486d–487e). The agreement of the *Charmides*' partners was reached by concessions that the argument did not allow, and Socrates disowns it.

Translation in this edition

"Our agreement says" renders φησὶν ... ἡ ἡμετέρα ὁμολογία (175c6–7), keeping the personification.

See also

ἀδύνατος; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογέω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω; συμπλάττω; ὑβριστικῶς.

ὁμότεχνος · fellow craftsman

Fellow craftsman: the only judge of a craftsman, which leaves temperance able to judge none but its own · Charmides

τὸν αὑτοῦ ὁμότεχνον, *ton hautou homotechnon*, "his own fellow craftsman"

At a Glance

The word. Practising the same art; as a noun, a fellow craftsman.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the end of the argument about the doctor: temperance will be able to tell no one who knows from one who pretends, "except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can" (171c).

In this edition. "Fellow craftsman".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Ὁμότεχνος joins ὁμός, "same", and τέχνη, "art": one of the same trade. In Greek experience the fellow craftsman was one's rival, the man who knew enough to find fault.

Use in the book

The word ends the argument that removes temperance's power to examine. To test a doctor one must look into medicine where it is found, in the healthy and the diseased, and no one can do that but a doctor, and so not the temperate man, "for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate" (171a–c; see ἦ ἰατρικός; ἰατρικός; ὀρθῶς). So temperance, if it is only knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, will tell neither the doctor who knows from one who "pretends or thinks he does, nor anyone else who knows anything at all, except the temperate man's own fellow craftsman, as the other craftsmen can" (171c; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; προσποιέομαι).

The exception can be read precisely. Every craftsman can judge his fellows, the doctor doctors and the builder builders; if the temperate man is a craftsman too, he can judge his, and his fellow craftsmen are those who have knowledge of knowledge, in whom he can recognise exactly what he has, that a man knows that he knows. The examiner who was to test every man's claim to knowledge (167a; see ἐξετάζω) is left with the competence of any tradesman, inside his own trade. The phrase can be read as the dialogue's sharpest statement of the problem: a knowledge whose only object is knowledge can judge only knowers of knowledge.

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with the argument it concludes.

171a–b Medicine is defined by its objects, so the doctor must be examined in the healthy and the diseased.

171c Only a doctor could do that; temperance can tell no knower from a pretender, except its own fellow craftsman.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Lysis* Socrates recalls hearing someone say, calling Hesiod as witness, that like is most hostile to like, and the good to the good: "potter is angry with potter, singer with singer, beggar with beggar". Things most alike, the speaker said, are necessarily full of envy, rivalry and hatred towards one another, and the most unlike full of friendship: the poor man must be a

friend to the rich, and the weak to the strong, for the sake of help; the sick man to the doctor, and everyone who does not know must love and cherish the one who knows (215c–d). The *Charmides*' picture of a city whose rulers hand over what they do not know to those who know (171e; see παραδίδωμι) can be read as asking the second half of that thought to govern a city.

Other ancient sources

The line comes from Hesiod's account of the good Strife, who rouses even the idle to work: a man short of work looks at a rich man eager to plough and plant and keep his household well, and one neighbour emulates another as he presses on to wealth; "and potter bears potter a grudge, and carpenter carpenter, and beggar begrudges beggar, and singer singer".[206] Aristotle uses it to explain why people who share a pursuit are friends only up to a point: people warm to those who resemble them and pursue what they pursue, provided these do not crowd them or live by the same trade, for that is how "potter and potter" comes about.[207] Read beside the *Charmides*, the fellow craftsman is a rival because he knows the trade, and for the same reason the one man able to judge it.

Translation in this edition

"His own fellow craftsman" renders τὸν αὑτοῦ ὁμότεχνον (171c8), and "as the other craftsmen can" ὥσπερ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί (171c8–9), where the Greek has no verb.

See also

δημιουργός; ἐξετάζω; ᾖ ἰατρικός; ἰατρικός; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; οἰκοδομική; ὀρθῶς; παραδίδωμι; προσποιέομαι.

[206] Hesiod, *Works and Days* 20–26.
[207] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.4, 1381b15–18.

ὄναρ · dream

Dream: Socrates' name for his picture of a life ruled by knowledge, which he can neither trust nor let go · Charmides

τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ, *to emon onar*, "my dream"

At a Glance

The word. A dream, a vision in sleep; as an adverb, "in a dream", opposed to ὕπαρ, "awake", "in reality".

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Hear my dream, then ... whether it has come through horn or through ivory" (173a).

In this edition. "Dream".

A place to read. 172e–173d.

Meaning

Ὄναρ is the old word for a dream, used only in the nominative and accusative, and often adverbially: a thing seen ὄναρ is seen in sleep, a thing seen ὕπαρ in waking life. The pair became proverbial for the difference between seeming and being, and Plato uses it for the difference between seeming to know and knowing.

Use in the book

Socrates calls his picture a dream because he can neither vouch for it nor dismiss it. He has granted Critias everything, and still doubts that temperance so defined would do us any good; "I think I'm talking nonsense," he says, but "one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see εἰκῇ; ληρέω). Then: "Hear my dream, then". The dream itself, with its gates of horn and ivory, its world without impostors and its ending in "we cannot yet learn", is told elsewhere (173a–d; see εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος).

What belongs to the word is the status it gives the picture. The dream is the life of 171d–172a, a household and city run by knowledge, told again; but there it was what the argument had promised, and had just failed to find, and here it is a vision in which, by Socrates' own account, no impostor could

deceive us and everything would be done knowledgeably. The life Critias' definition promised is something Socrates can see only asleep. A knowledge that knows only that it knows has, on the dialogue's argument, the condition of a dreamer who seems to know: the word can be read as Socrates' diagnosis of the definition as much as his modesty about his vision.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the exchange that leads to it.

172e–173a Socrates fears they are not looking into it correctly; he thinks he is talking nonsense, but one must not let what comes to light go by.

173a "Hear my dream, then", whether through horn or through ivory.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* introduces a theory the same way. Socrates says, "Hear, then, a dream to set against your dream", and tells what he seemed to hear from some people: that the first elements, of which we and everything else are composed, have no account, and can only be named, while the things composed of them can be known through the weaving of their names (201d–202b). In the *Statesman* the visitor from Elea says that it is hard to show anything of the greater matters without examples, since each of us is likely to know everything as in a dream and then, as when awake, to be ignorant of everything again (277d).

The *Republic* sets waking against dreaming in a city. The philosophers who have seen the truth about beautiful, just and good things must each go down in turn to live with the others and grow used to the dark; once used to it they will see ten thousand times better than those there, and know what each image is and of what. "And so the city will be run, for us and for you, awake and not in a dream, as most cities are run now by men who spar with shadows and split into factions over office, as though it were some great good"; the city in which those who are to rule are least eager to rule will necessarily be governed best (520c–d). The *Charmides*' city governed by knowledge of knowledge is, on Socrates' own word, dreamed.

Translation in this edition

"Hear my dream, then" renders Ἄκουε δή ... τὸ ἐμὸν ὄναρ (173a7), the same imperative with which the *Theaetetus* introduces its dream.

See also

εἰκῇ; εἴτε διὰ κεράτων εἴτε δι' ἐλέφαντος; ἐπιστημόνως; ληρέω; νὴ τὸν κύνα; οἰκέω.

ὄνειδος · disgrace

Disgrace: the reproach of others, by which Critias decides which makings count as works · Charmides

ὄνειδος, *oneidos*, "disgrace"

At a Glance

The word. Reproach, the taunt one man throws at another; so a disgrace, a thing to be reproached with.

In the *Charmides*. Four times, all in Critias' reading of Hesiod: "work is no disgrace" (163b), "no disgrace to anyone to cobble shoes" (163b), "a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace", and "work is never any disgrace" (163c).

In this edition. "Disgrace".

A place to read. 163b–c.

Meaning

Ὄνειδος is first spoken: the insult, the reproach, the thing said against a man. From that it becomes the condition of being reproached, a disgrace. It belongs to a society of reputation, in which what a man does is judged by what others say of it, and its opposite is the good report that a man earns among his peers.

Use in the book

The word enters with Hesiod's line, whose use by Critias is told elsewhere (163b–c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). What belongs to the noun is the test it

supplies. Critias decides what counts as a work by asking what would be a disgrace: Hesiod could not have called cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel works, since then he would have said they were no disgrace (163b; see ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω). So a thing made "may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but … work is never any disgrace" (163c; see μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ). The reproach that a gentleman would throw at a fishmonger becomes the line between making and working, and then between what is one's own and what belongs to others (163c–d; see οἰκεῖος).

The dialogue's other words for shame are felt by the one ashamed: the boy's modesty, αἰδώς, which Socrates refutes with a line of Homer (160e–161a; see αἰδώς), and Critias' shame before the company, which keeps him from admitting his perplexity (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Ὄνειδος is the reproach itself, shame as other people's spoken judgement, and Critias makes it a criterion of value. The noun can be read as marking where his definition comes from: what is good, for Critias, is first of all what no one of his standing could reproach.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

163b Hesiod said work is no disgrace; he would not have said it of cobbling, selling salt fish or sitting in a brothel.

163c A thing made may become a disgrace when it does not come about with what is fine; work never is.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates takes up the reproach Callicles has thrown at him. Let us look, he says, at what you reproach me with, whether it is well said: that I am not able to help myself or any of my friends or kin, or save them from the greatest dangers, but am at the mercy of anyone who pleases, like a man stripped of his rights, whether he wants to strike me on the jaw, as your vigorous phrase had it, or take my money, or drive me from the city, or at the last kill me; and that to be in that state is the most shameful of all. His own account is otherwise: to be struck on the jaw unjustly is not the most

shameful thing, nor to have my body or my purse cut, but to strike or cut me and mine unjustly is more shameful and worse, and worse and more shameful for the one who does the wrong than for the one who suffers it (508c–e). Callicles' reproach, like Critias', can be read as measuring disgrace by standing; Socrates' measures it by injustice.

Translation in this edition

"Disgrace" renders ὄνειδος at all four places (163b5, 163b7, 163c1, 163c2).

See also

αἰδώς; αἰσχύνομαι; ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ; οἰκεῖος; σκυτοτομέω; ταριχοπωλέω.

ὀνίνημι · profit, benefit

To benefit, to profit: the question whether temperance does anyone any good · Charmides

ὀνήσεσθαι, *onēsesthai*, "profit"; ὀνήσει, *onēsei*, "will benefit"; ὀνήσῃ, *onēsēi*, "get ... profit"

At a Glance

The word. Active, to benefit, to help; middle, to have profit, to get good from something.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: whether each craftsman must know "when he is going to profit from the work he is doing" (164b); whether temperance, if it is of that kind, "will benefit us at all" (172d); and the boy is "to get no profit from this temperance" (175e).

In this edition. "Profit", "benefit".

A place to read. 172c–d.

Meaning

Ὀνίνημι is an old verb, frequent in epic, of help and its enjoyment; in Attic prose it stands beside ὠφελέω, the dialogue's ordinary word for benefit, and has a plainer, more personal ring: what does a man get out of it?

Use in the book

The three uses mark the three points at which the dialogue asks what temperance is good for. At 164b the middle voice asks about the craftsman's own profit. The doctor who heals a patient makes something beneficial for himself and for the patient; but must he know when his treatment is beneficial, and must each craftsman know "when he is going to profit from the work he is doing, and when he is not?" "Perhaps not" (164b; see δημιουργός; ὠφελίμως). If not, a man could act temperately without knowing it, and Critias, rather than concede that, turns to self-knowledge (164c–d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

At 172d the active asks the question of the whole second half. Having granted that temperance is knowing what one knows and does not know, Socrates proposes to "look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all" (172d; see δίδωμι), and the answer, through the dream, is that it will not, since the knowledge that benefits is of good and bad (174d–175a; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). At 175e the middle returns, and the profit is the boy's: Socrates tells the boy that he is very aggrieved on his account, "if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance, and it is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you" (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω). The two verbs stand side by side there, ὀνήσῃ and ὠφελήσει, as if Socrates needed both to say how little the argument had left.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

164b Must each craftsman know when he will profit from his work? Perhaps not.

172d Granting that temperance is knowing what one knows, will it benefit us at all?

175e The boy, being temperate, is to get no profit from this temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthydemus* Socrates and the young Clinias, having agreed that one must love wisdom, ask which knowledge they should rightly acquire, and answer simply: the one that will benefit us. Would it benefit us to know how

to go about the earth and find where the most gold is buried? Not even the power to turn stones into gold would be worth anything without knowing how to use the gold; nor is there any use in money-making or medicine or any other knowledge that knows how to make a thing and not how to use what it makes, nor even in a knowledge that could make men immortal without knowing how to use immortality. So they need a knowledge in which making and knowing how to use what is made coincide (288d–289b). The *Charmides* asks at 172d, with the same verb, ὀνήσει, whether temperance will benefit us at all, the question the *Euthydemus* takes as its first step; its answer at 174b–d, that only the knowledge of good and bad benefits, can be read as where the *Euthydemus*' search for a knowledge that both makes and uses is heading.

Translation in this edition

"Profit" renders the middle at 164b9, ὀνήσεσθαι, and 175e1, ὀνήσῃ, "get no profit"; "benefit" renders the active ὀνήσει at 172d2, the one place where "benefit" does not render ὠφελέω and its family, as the Glossary notes under "beneficial".

See also

ἀγανακτέω; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; δημιουργός; δίδωμι; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ὠφελέω; ὠφελίμως.

ὄνομα · name, word

τοὔνομα, *tounoma*, "my name", "whatever word", "this name"; ὄνομα, *onoma*, "name"; ὀνόματα, *onomata*, "names"; περὶ ὀνομάτων, *peri onomatōn*, "between words"; τῶν ὀνομάτων, *tōn onomatōn*, "each word"; ὀνόματος, *onomatos*, "name"

Attested: τοὔνομα (*tounoma*; 156a, 163d, 175b), ὄνομα (*onoma*; 161d), ὀνόματα (*onomata*; 161d), ὀνομάτων (*onomatōn*; 163d twice), ὀνόματος (*onomatos*; 165e). A name; a word. The noun follows the dialogue from a man's name to a word's meaning. Socrates asks the boy, "And you are sure

you have my name right?" (156a; see μιμνήσκομαι). The writing-master does not teach a boy to write only his own name, but his enemies' names as well as his friends' (161d; see γραμματιστής; μόνον). Critias' distinction between making and doing reminds Socrates of Prodicus drawing "countless distinctions between words", and he tells Critias, "I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to" (163d; see Πρόδικος; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). Temperance is asked for a fine work "worthy of its name" (165e; see ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος), and at the end the inquirers cannot discover "to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης). The boy knows a man by his name; the inquirers have the name of a virtue and cannot find what it names.

See also ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; γραμματιστής; μιμνήσκομαι; μόνον; νομοθέτης; ὀνομάζω; Πρόδικος; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ὀνομάζω · call

ὀνομάζειν, *onomazein*, "to call (it)"

Attested: ὀνομάζειν (*onomazein*; 163e). To name, to call by a name. Once, in Socrates' question after he has set aside Critias' distinctions of words: "Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The phrase "or whatever you like to call it" carries out the permission Socrates has just given, to assign each word as one pleases provided one makes clear what it applies to (163d; see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). Critias had made everything turn on the difference between making and doing; Socrates lets the names go and keeps the thing, the good things done or made, and Critias accepts, defining temperance as the doing of good things (163e; see διορίζομαι).

See also διορίζομαι; ὄνομα; ὁρίζω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ὀξέως · nimbly

ὀξέως, *oxeōs*, "nimbly"

Attested: ὀξέως (*oxeōs*; 159c, 159d). Sharply, keenly; of movement, nimbly, briskly. It is the adverb of ὀξύς, "sharp", and in the refutation of temperance as quietness it is set against ἡσυχῇ, "quietly". Socrates asks the boy whether "playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are far finer than doing them quietly and slowly" (159c; see κιθαρίζω; παλαίω), and draws the rule: "aren't the ones done nimbly and quickly the fine ones, and the ones done laboriously and quietly the ugly ones?" (159d; see μόγις). The superlative of the adjective follows at once, "the quickest and the nimblest", τὸ τάχιστον καὶ ὀξύτατον (159d). The argument passes from the body to the soul by the same word, whose noun is the soul's "sharpness" (160a; see ὀξύτης).

See also ἡσυχῇ; κιθαρίζω; μόγις; ὀξύτης; παλαίω; ταχύς.

ὀξύτης · sharpness

ὀξύτης, *oxytēs*, "sharpness"; ὀξύτητος, *oxytētos*, "sharpness"

Attested: ὀξύτης (*oxytēs*; 160a), ὀξύτητος (*oxytētos*; 160b). Sharpness, keenness; of the mind, quickness. The noun carries the refutation of quietness from the body to the soul. Having shown that in the body the quick and nimble are finer than the quiet, Socrates asks, "And isn't quick-wittedness a kind of sharpness of the soul, and not a quietness?" (160a; see ἀγχίνοια). Understanding at school, inquiry and deliberation are finest when done most quickly, and the conclusion follows: "So in everything, Charmides ... in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?" (160b; see ἡσυχιότης). The word that made the wrestler fine (see ὀξέως) now makes the mind fine, and with it the boy's first definition, that temperance is a kind of quietness, falls.

See also ἀγχίνοια; ἡσυχιότης; ὀξέως; ταχύς.

ὁράω · see

εἶδον, *eidon*, "they saw", "I saw"; ὁρᾷς, *horāis*, "you see"; ἰδών, *idōn*, "saw"; ὁρώμενα, *horōmena*, "what can be seen"; ἴδωμεν, *idōmen*, "let us see"; ὅρα, *hora*, "see"; ἰδέ, *ide*, "see"; ὁρᾷ, *horāi*, "sees"; ὄψεται, *opsetai*, "is to see"; ἴδῃ, *idēi*, "will see"; ὁρῶντες, *horōntes*, "see"; ὁρῶ, *horō*, "I see"

Attested: εἶδον (*eidon*; 153b, 155d), ὁρᾷς (*horāis*; 153b, 168e, 172a, 175a), ἰδών (*idōn*; 154a, 169c), ὁρώμενα (*horōmena*; 158a), ἴδωμεν (*idōmen*; 159b, 172c), ὅρα (*hora*; 163a, 176a), ἰδέ (*ide*; 167c), ὁρᾷ (*horāi*; 167d), ὄψεται (*opsetai*; 168d), ἴδῃ (*idēi*; 168e), ὁρῶντες (*horōntes*; 169c), ὁρῶ (*horō*; 172a). To see; the present stem ὁρα-, the aorist from ἰδ-, the future ὄψομαι. The verb runs from the eyes of the prologue to the argument about sight. In the prologue it is looking: the company "saw me come in" (153b), Socrates "saw inside his cloak" (155d; see ἱμάτιον), and praises "what can be seen of your looks" (158a–b). In the argument it becomes the test case of a power directed at itself. Socrates asks whether there is a sight that, "though it is sight, sees no color, but sees itself and the other sights" (167c–d; see μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων), and concludes that sight, "if it is to see itself, must have some color; for sight will never see anything that has no color" (168d–e; see χρῶμα). From there on, "you see" becomes Socrates' way of setting a conclusion before Critias: "So you see, Critias" (168e, 175a), and "you see that no knowledge of this kind has turned up anywhere" (172a).

See also ἱμάτιον; μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; χρῶμα.

ὀρθότης · rightness

Rightness: what would lead in a life without error, and whether it is the same as doing well · Charmides

ὀρθότητος, *orthotētos*, "rightness"

At a Glance

The word. Straightness; so correctness, rightness, of a road, a name, an opinion or an action.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the picture of the life temperance would give: "For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy" (172a).

In this edition. "Rightness".

A place to read. 171d–172a.

Meaning

Ὀρθός is straight, upright, and so correct: a straight road is the right one, a straight answer the true one. Ὀρθότης, the abstract noun, is the quality of being right, and Plato's speakers ask after the rightness of names (*Cratylus* 383a), of opinion (*Philebus* 37d) and of action (*Meno* 97b). Its opposite in the dialogue's sentence is ἁμαρτία, error, from the verb for missing the mark: the straight line and the missed target belong to the same picture.

Use in the book

The noun comes at the end of a chain. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, and could examine others, we would live without error; we would do only what we knew and hand over the rest to those who knew; a household and a city run by temperance would be run well; "For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy" (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; ἐξαιρέω; ἡγέομαι). The genitive absolute pairs the two nouns, ἁμαρτίας ... ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης: error taken away, rightness at the head.

The chain moves in steps, and the one the dialogue questions runs from rightness to doing well. Rightness is what knowledge of a craft secures: the doctor's acts are judged by whether they are done rightly (171b), and the ruled would do only what they would do correctly, that is, what they had knowledge of (171e; see ὀρθῶς). The dream grants all of this, everything done according to the kinds of knowledge and no impostor anywhere, and still Socrates cannot learn "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy" (173d; see εὖ πράττειν; ὄναρ). The edition's note at 172a observes

that the step from doing well to being happy "rides on" the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, to act well and to fare well. Rightness can be read as the most that the knowledge of what one knows could give, a life of correct performances, and the dialogue's question as whether a life of correct performances is a good one.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the chain it ends.

171d–e If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, we would live without error, and a household and a city run by temperance would be run well.

172a With error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed would do well and be happy.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Meno*'s judgement that true opinion is no worse a guide than wisdom to rightness of action, ὀρθότης πράξεως, is told elsewhere (97a–c; see ἡγέομαι). The *Charmides* puts knowledge at the head of right action without asking, as the *Meno* does, whether something less than knowledge might lead as well; it asks instead whether rightness is enough.

Translation in this edition

"With error removed and rightness leading" renders ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης, ὀρθότητος δὲ ἡγουμένης (171e7–172a1), keeping the two genitives absolute.

See also

ἁμαρτία; ἀναμάρτητος; ἐξαιρέω; εὖ πράττειν; ἡγέομαι; οἰκέω; ὄναρ; ὀρθῶς.

ὀρθῶς · correctly

Correctly, rightly: the adverb by which the dialogue measures speech, inquiry and action · Charmides

ὀρθῶς, *orthōs*, "right", "rightly", "correctly"; ὀρθοῦ, *orthou*, "the right one"; ὀρθότερον, *orthoteron*, "more correct"

At a Glance

The word. Straight, so correctly, rightly; with "say", ὀρθῶς λέγεις, "you're right".

In the *Charmides*. Fourteen times: the adverb thirteen times, once in the comparative (165b), and the adjective once (164e): of speech, "I think what you have said is right" (160d); of inquiry, "you are not inquiring correctly" (165e); of action, "whether the things done are done rightly" (171b).

In this edition. "Right", "rightly", "correctly"; "talking sense" at 161c.

A place to read. 171a–c.

Meaning

The adverb of ὀρθός, "straight": a thing done ὀρθῶς is done as it ought to be, on the straight line to its end. In conversation ὀρθῶς λέγεις is the ordinary "you are right"; in a craft it marks work done according to the art; in philosophy it measures a definition or an inquiry against what it is about.

Use in the book

The adverb applies one standard to three things. Speech is correct if it is true. The boy says, "I think what you have said is right" (160d) and "Well, I think that is rightly said" (161b), and says, "So look into whether you think the man who said it was right" (161b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). When Socrates answers that what matters is not who said it "but whether what is said is true or not", the boy says, "Now you are talking sense" (161c; see ἀληθής; νὴ Δία). Critias says, "I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know

himself is temperate" (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι), and he finds the greeting "Rejoice!" not "the right one" (164e; see πρόσρημα).

Inquiry is correct if it looks where its object is. Critias tells Socrates, "you are not inquiring correctly", for treating temperance as like the other kinds of knowledge (165e; see ὅμοιος; ζητέω). Socrates' own principle is that medicine must be looked into where it is found, and "the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). And at the turn of the second half he fears that he and Critias "were not looking into it correctly" (172e; see νὴ τὸν κύνα).

Action is correct if it is done with knowledge. The examiner of a doctor asks "whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly" (171b), and in the city run by temperance no one would be allowed "to do anything except what they would do correctly, and that would be whatever they had knowledge of" (171e; see ἐπιστήμη; ὀρθότης).

The standard is the same in all three, and the dialogue applies it to itself. Critias accuses Socrates of inquiring incorrectly; Socrates accuses both of them; and the correct inquiry into medicine, which looks at medicine where it is found, is the one that shows temperance cannot judge it. The adverb can be read as the dialogue's quiet claim that correctness always has an object, the true for speech, the thing for inquiry, the craft for action, and that a knowledge without an object cannot be correct about anything.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb or the adjective occurs; the noun has its own entry (see ὀρθότης).

160d The boy thinks Socrates' argument against quietness right.

161b The boy thinks the refutation of modesty rightly said, and asks whether the man who said "doing one's own business" was right.

161c The boy: "Now you are talking sense."

164d Critias would not be ashamed to say he had spoken wrongly.

164e The greeting "Rejoice!" is not the right one.

165b Perhaps Socrates spoke more correctly about what went before, perhaps Critias.

165e Critias: Socrates is not inquiring correctly.

168b Critias: "You're right."

169c Socrates: show that knowledge of knowledge is possible and beneficial, and perhaps you will satisfy me that you are right.

171b The man who looks into medicine correctly examines the doctor in the healthy and diseased, and whether what is done is done rightly.

171e In the city run by temperance each would do only what he would do correctly.

172e Socrates feared they were not looking into it correctly.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus*' argument that in every work and use of things it is knowledge that brings about right use is told elsewhere (281a–b; see ἐπιστημόνως).

Translation in this edition

"Right" and "rightly" render the adverb with verbs of saying (160d4, 161b3, 161b7, 168b1, 169c1), "correctly" with verbs of inquiring and doing (165e3, 171b5, 171e4, 172e6), and "rightly" at 171b9, "done rightly"; "talking sense" renders ὀρθῶς λέγεις at 161c7, and "spoken wrongly" μὴ οὐχὶ ὀρθῶς φάναι εἰρηκέναι at 164d1. The adjective ὀρθοῦ is "the right one" (164e1), and the comparative ὀρθότερον "more correct" (165b2).

See also

ἀληθής; ἀνατίθημι; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστημόνως; ζητέω; ᾖ ἰατρικός; νὴ Δία; νὴ τὸν κύνα; ὅμοιος; ὀρθότης; πρόσρημα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

ὁρίζω · define

To define: to mark the bounds of a word or of a knowledge, which the inquiry asks of Critias and cannot do for temperance · Charmides

ὅρισαι, *horisai*, "define"; διορίζομαι, *diorizomai*, "I give ... a definition"; ὥρισται, *hōristai*, "is defined"; ὡρίσθη, *hōristhē*, "was defined"; ὁριζόμεθα, *horizometha*, "we are ... defining"; ἀφορίζεσθαι, *aphorizesthai*, "marking off"

At a Glance

The word. To bound, to mark out by a boundary, ὅρος; to determine, to define.

In the *Charmides*. Six times, with two compounds: "define it more plainly" (163d); "I give you a plain definition" (163e); each kind of knowledge "defined ... by its being of particular things" (171a); temperance "being such as we are now defining it" (173a); and Critias "marking off the happy man" (173e).

In this edition. "Define", "definition"; "marking off" at 173e.

A place to read. 170e–171b.

Meaning

An ὅρος was a boundary stone, set up to mark where one man's land ended and another's began. Ὁρίζω is to set such bounds, and from that to determine a thing's limits in speech: to define it, saying what it is and so what it is not. Διορίζω is to draw a line between, to distinguish; ἀφορίζω to mark off a part from the rest.

Use in the book

The verb marks two kinds of boundary. The first is the boundary of a word. Socrates has let Critias assign words as he pleases, provided he makes clear what each applies to (see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; ὄνομα), and asks: "So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly" (163d). Critias answers with the compound, and defines temperance as the doing of good things (163e; see διορίζομαι; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). A definition here is a word fixed to a thing.

The second is the boundary of a knowledge. To test what knowledge a doctor has, the temperate man must ask what it is of: "isn't each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?" "By that, yes." "And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Every knowledge is bounded by its object, and this principle is what defeats temperance as Critias defines it: a knowledge of knowledge has no field of its own, and so cannot enter the fields of the others (171b–c; see ὁμότεχνος).

The last two uses look back on the definition. The dream supposes temperance "being such as we are now defining it" (173a; see ὄναρ), and when Critias denies that the cobbler and the bronze-worker, who live knowledgeably, are happy, Socrates says that he seems to be "marking off the happy man" as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν), and asks which. The inquiry that began by asking Critias to define a word ends by asking him where, within knowledge, the boundary of happiness lies, and the answer, the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c), is one that the definition did not contain.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb or its compounds occur.

163d Socrates asks Critias to go back to the beginning and define it more plainly.

163e Critias gives a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things.

171a Each knowledge is defined by its being of particular things; medicine was defined by the healthy and diseased.

173a The dream supposes temperance as they are now defining it.

173e Critias seems to Socrates to mark off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first speech Socrates makes in the *Phaedrus*, spoken in the person of a crafty lover who pretends not to be in love, the speaker begins with method. About everything, my boy, there is one starting point for those who mean to

deliberate well: they must know what the deliberation is about, or they will miss it altogether. Most people fail to notice that they do not know the essence of each thing; as if they knew, they do not agree on it at the start of the inquiry, and as they go on they pay the price one would expect, agreeing neither with themselves nor with each other. So let us not suffer what we blame in others, but agree on a definition, ὅρος, of love, what it is and what power it has, and look to it and refer to it as we inquire whether it brings benefit or harm (237b–d). The *Charmides* starts without such a definition, and the inquiry is its search.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's judgement that Socrates was the first to fix thought on definitions, and that he did not set the definitions apart from things, is told elsewhere (*Metaphysics* 1.6, 987b1–10; 13.4, 1078b27–32; see εἶδος).

Translation in this edition

"Define it more plainly" renders σαφέστερον ὅρισαι (163d7), whose echo in Critias' answer is told elsewhere (see διορίζομαι); "defined" renders ὥρισται (171a5) and ὡρίσθη (171a9), "defining" ὁριζόμεθα (173a9), and "marking off" ἀφορίζεσθαι (173e9).

See also

διορίζομαι; εἶδος; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ὁμότεχνος; ὄναρ; ὄνομα; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

ὁρμάω · start from

ὡρμῆσθαι, *hōrmēsthai*, "starts from"

Attested: ὡρμῆσθαι (*hōrmēsthai*; 156e). To set in motion, to start; in the passive and middle, to rush, to set out from a place. The perfect infinitive comes once, in Zalmoxis' teaching: "For everything, he said, bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see

ἐπιρρέω; ὅλος). The soul is where the body's goods and ills set out from, and the two verbs, "starts from" and "flows", make a single picture: a source and the stream that runs from it. On that picture the cure must begin where everything begins, and the soul is to be treated first (157a; see ἐπῳδή).

See also ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή; ὅλος; ὅμμα.

ὅσαι ἡμέραι · every day

ὅσαι ἡμέραι, *hosai hēmerai*, "every day"

Attested: ὅσαι ἡμέραι (*hosai hēmerai*; 176b). Literally "as many days as there are": daily, every day. The idiom comes in the boy's last answer. He does not know whether he has temperance, and he is not altogether persuaded by Socrates, but he says, "I think I very much need the charm. As far as I'm concerned, nothing stops me from being charmed by you every day, until you say it's enough" (176b; "until" is W's ἕως, where B and T have ἴσως, "perhaps"; see ἐπᾴδω; οἴομαι). The charm Socrates brought for a headache becomes a daily practice with no end fixed but the charmer's word. The phrase can be read as the boy's answer to the inquiry's failure: what could not be defined may still be practised, day by day, in Socrates' company (see ἀκολουθέω).

See also ἀκολουθέω; ἐπᾴδω; κωλύω; οἴομαι.

ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ · just in proportion as

In just that proportion: the measure Socrates sets between the boy's temperance and his happiness · Charmides

ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ, *hosōiper ... tosoutōi*, "just in proportion as"

At a Glance

The word. A correlative of measure: ὅσῳ, "by as much as", with the intensive -περ, answered by τοσούτῳ, "by so much"; with two comparatives, "the more ... the more".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' last advice to the boy: "I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler ... and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" (176a).

In this edition. "Just in proportion as".

A place to read. 175d–176a.

Meaning

The datives ὅσῳ and τοσούτῳ are datives of the measure of difference, used with comparatives: by how much one thing exceeds, by so much the other. The pair makes one quantity the measure of another, and the strengthened ὅσῳπερ insists on the exactness of the match.

Use in the book

The phrase comes in Socrates' answer to his own failure. The argument has made temperance, as defined, of no benefit (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής); Socrates refuses the result, blames himself as a poor inquirer, and declares that temperance is a great good and that if the boy has it he is blessed (175e–176a; see μακάριος; ζητητής). Then the advice: "For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument, and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" (176a; see λῆρος). The sentence sets the two comparatives, σωφρονέστερος and εὐδαιμονέστερον (see εὐδαίμων), in exact proportion, as if temperance and happiness rose together.

That proportion is what the dialogue's argument could not establish. The dream ended in "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this ... we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ὄναρ), and the inquiry found that only the knowledge of good and bad makes us happy (174b–c). The phrase can be read as Socrates' conviction outrunning his argument: what he could not prove, he states as a measure, and he offers it to the one person present who might show it true by living it.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Socrates' refusal that leads to it.

175e Socrates does not think temperance worthless; he is a poor inquirer, and temperance a great good.

176a If the boy has temperance, he should think himself happier just in proportion as he is more temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* can be read as making the proportion its verdict. When the five kinds of men have been described, Socrates asks Glaucon to give his verdict, as the judge who decides among all the competitors gives his, on which comes first in happiness and which second; Glaucon answers that he judges them as one judges choruses, in the order in which they came on, for virtue and vice and for happiness and its opposite. Socrates proposes to hire a herald, or to make the announcement himself: Ariston's son, Glaucon, has found the best and justest man the happiest, and that man the most kingly, who reigns over himself, and the worst and most unjust the most wretched, and that man the one who, being most tyrannical, is most a tyrant over himself and over his city (9.580b–c). The *Charmides*' proportion between temperance and happiness is a single sentence of advice; the *Republic* argues for its own over a book.

Translation in this edition

"Yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" renders σεαυτὸν δέ, ὅσῳπερ σωφρονέστερος εἶ, τοσούτῳ εἶναι καὶ εὐδαιμονέστερον (176a4–5), where "just" renders the *-περ* of ὅσῳπερ and καί, "also", is left unexpressed. Ὅσῳπερ is the reading of T and W; B has ὃς ὥσπερ.

See also

ἀνωφελής; εὐδαίμων; ζητητής; λῆρος; μακάριος; ὄναρ.

ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι · what it is, and what sort of thing

What it is, and what sort of thing: the two questions the boy's opinion of temperance is to answer · Charmides

ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι, *hoti estin kai hopoion ti*, "what it is, and what sort of thing"

At a Glance

The word. Two indirect questions: ὅτι ἐστίν, "what it is", and ὁποῖόν τι, "of what sort", the question of a thing's being and the question of its qualities.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at the start of the boy's examination: if temperance is in him, it must give rise to some sense, "from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is" (159a).

In this edition. "What it is, and what sort of thing".

A place to read. 158e–159a.

Meaning

Plato's Socrates separates the question τί ἐστι, "what is it?", from ποῖόν τι, "what is it like?". The first asks for the thing itself, the second for its qualities: whether it is fine, teachable, beneficial. He holds that the first comes before the second.

Use in the book

Socrates proposes to look into whether the boy has temperance by asking what he thinks it is. The reasoning is in steps: if temperance is present in him, "it must give rise to some sense, from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is" (159a; see αἴσθησις; δόξα; ἔνειμι). The boy, who knows how to speak Greek, should be able to say it (see ἑλληνίζω). The two questions, put together here, come apart in what follows. The boy answers the first, what temperance is: a kind of quietness, then modesty, then a definition he once heard, doing one's own business (159b, 160e, 161b). Socrates tests the answers by the second, what sort of thing temperance is: it is one of the fine things (159c), and it is good as well as fine (160e; see οὐ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καί); and when Critias has taken over, it must

also be beneficial (169b). Each definition falls because the thing it names lacks the qualities temperance must have.

The order of the questions can be read as the dialogue's method in small. The boy is not asked to prove that temperance is fine; that is agreed. He is asked what it is, and what he says is measured against what all agree it is like. The method assumes that the second question can be answered without the first, and the dialogue does not say outright whether that assumption is sound, though the boy's last word on temperance comes near it (176a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the proposal it serves.

158e–159a If temperance is present, it gives rise to some sense, and from it an opinion of what temperance is and what sort of thing it is; the boy should say what he thinks.

Elsewhere in Plato

Socrates faults Polus, asked what Gorgias' art is, for saying what sort it is (*Gorgias* 448e), and the first book of the *Republic* closes with his admission that, not knowing what justice is, he can hardly know whether it is a virtue or whether its possessor is happy (1.354b–c). In the *Meno* Socrates makes the order a rule. Meno asks whether virtue can be taught; Socrates answers that far from knowing whether it can be taught, he does not know at all what virtue is, "and what I do not know the what of, how could I know what sort of thing it is?" Could a man with no idea at all who Meno is tell whether he is good-looking, wealthy or nobly born, or the contrary of these? Meno thinks not (70a, 71a–b). The *Charmides* puts the two questions side by side as things an opinion would contain; the *Meno* makes the first the condition of the second.

Translation in this edition

"What it is, and what sort of thing temperance is" renders ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη (159a3), the subject held back to the end as in the Greek.

See also

αἴσθησις; δόξα; ἑλληνίζω; ἔνειμι; οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

ὅτι μάλιστα · at the very most

As much as possible: the formula of concession by which Socrates grants an opponent the most and still finds against him · Charmides

ὅτι μάλιστα, *hoti malista*, "at the very most", "as hard as I can", "entirely", "as fully as could be", "in the fullest sense"

At a Glance

The word. Ὅτι with a superlative, "as … as possible": ὅτι μάλιστα, "as much as possible", "to the fullest degree".

In the *Charmides*. Seven times, from "even supposing, my friend, at the very most, that the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer" (160c) to Critias' "if temperance really is, in the fullest sense, knowledge of kinds of knowledge" (174d).

In this edition. "At the very most", "as hard as I can", "entirely", "as fully as could be", "in the fullest sense".

A place to read. 172c–173a.

Meaning

Ὅτι, the neuter of ὅστις, strengthens a superlative to mean the highest degree possible, as ὡς does: ὅτι τάχιστα, "as fast as possible". With εἰ, "if", it makes a concession at its widest: "even if it is so to the fullest extent".

Use in the book

The phrase is the hinge of Socrates' concessions. Five of its seven uses grant a position as fully as it could be held and then ask what follows. In the refutation of quietness: even supposing, "at the very most", that quiet actions are no fewer among the fine ones than quick ones, temperance would still not be quietness (160c; see οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ). In the argument with

Critias the formula returns at each stage. Socrates will look into whether knowing what one knows is possible, and then, "even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b); having granted knowledge of knowledge for now, he asks, "even if this is entirely possible, how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not?" (169d); and, with everything granted, "even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a; see *νὴ τὸν κύνα*). The dream supposes temperance ruling us "as fully as could be" (173a; see *ὄναρ*), and Critias, in his last stand, appeals to temperance "in the fullest sense" as knowledge presiding over all the others (174d–e).

Once the phrase turns on Socrates himself: "What a thing to do," he says, "to suppose that, even if I refute you as hard as I can, I am doing it for any other reason than the one for which I would scrutinize even myself" (166c–d; see *λανθάνω*). The formula can be read as the dialogue's way of arguing: Socrates gives the definition everything it asks for, and shows that even then it does not deliver what temperance must.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

160c Even supposing at the very most that quiet actions are no fewer among the fine, temperance is not quietness.

166c Socrates refutes Critias, even as hard as he can, only as he would examine himself.

167b Even if knowing what one knows is entirely possible, what benefit would it bring?

169d Even if knowledge of knowledge is entirely possible, how does it make one able to know what one knows?

172e Even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it is not clear that it does us any good.

173a The dream supposes temperance ruling us as fully as could be.

174d Critias: if temperance is knowledge of knowledge in the fullest sense, it would rule the knowledge of good and benefit us.

Translation in this edition

The English renders the phrase by its sense in each place: “at the very most” (160c3), “as hard as I can” (166c7), “entirely” (167b3, 169d5, 172e7), “as fully as could be” (173a8) and “in the fullest sense” (174d8).

See also

λανθάνω; νὴ τὸν κύνα; ὄναρ; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ.

ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν · that one knows and that one does not know

That one knows and that one does not know: what is left of temperance once its objects are taken away · Charmides

⟨ὅτι οἶδε καὶ⟩ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, *hoti oide kai hoti ouk oiden*, “that one knows it and that one does not know it”; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, *hoti oiden kai hoti ouk oiden*, “that one knows and that one does not know”; τὰ μὲν ὅτι οἶδεν, τὰ δ’ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, *ta men hoti oiden, ta d’ hoti ouk oiden*, “of some things that he knows them, of others that he does not”; ὧν τε οἶδεν ὅτι οἶδεν, καὶ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, *hōn te oiden hoti oiden, kai hōn mē oiden hoti ouk oiden*, “of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it”

At a Glance

The word. Two clauses with ὅτι, “that”: knowing the fact of one’s knowledge and the fact of one’s ignorance, as against knowing their content.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: at 167b, in the formula Socrates proposes to examine; at 170d, in its reduced form, where temperance would be “only that one knows and that one does not know”; at 171d, in the supposition of its great benefit; and at 175c, among the concessions Socrates regrets.

In this edition. “That one knows and that one does not know”.

A place to read. 170c–d.

Meaning

The ὅτι-clauses state facts about the knower: that he knows, that he does not. They make no reference to what is known, and that is their point in the argument. The phrase is the counterpart of ὃ οἶδεν, "what he knows" (see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν).

Use in the book

At 167b the phrase is part of the full formula, set out as the first thing to be examined: whether it is possible "to know what one knows and what one does not know, ⟨that one knows it and⟩ that one does not know it" (167b; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). There the ὅτι-clauses gloss the relative ones: to know what one knows is to know, of each thing, that one knows it. By 170d they have come apart. Since the healthy is known by medicine and the rest by the other kinds of knowledge, temperance, if it is knowledge of knowledge alone, "would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know" (170c–d). The gloss has become the whole: what was the form of self-knowledge is now all of it, and the content has gone to the crafts.

The reduction has its consequence at once. A man who knows only that he knows cannot examine someone else who claims to know: "He will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know" (170d; see ἐξετάζω). And at the end the same pair of clauses reappears among the concessions Socrates regrets, that the temperate man might know "of what he does not know, that he does not know it" (175c; see ἀδύνατος; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The phrase can be read as the dialogue's name for an empty self-knowledge: a man may know that he knows, and not know whether what he knows is worth anything.

Places to read

Every passage in which the pair of clauses occurs.

167b Is it possible to know what one knows and does not know, that one knows it and that one does not know it?

170c–d Temperance would be only knowing that one knows and that one does not know.

171d If, as they supposed at the start, the temperate man knew of some things that he knows them, of others that he does not, temperance would be of enormous benefit.

175c They conceded that the temperate man might know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it.

Translation in this edition

"That one knows and that one does not know" renders ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν μόνον (170d2–3), with "only" for μόνον. At 167b2 the words ὅτι οἶδε καὶ, "that one knows it and", are found only in later manuscripts; Burnet prints them in angle brackets, and the English keeps the brackets, the one place where the edition marks a supplied phrase (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀδύνατος; ἐξετάζω; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν.

οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν · does not know himself

Does not know himself: the doctor who has acted well without knowing it, and Critias' turn to "know thyself" · Charmides

οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν, *ou gignōskei heauton hōs epraxen*, "does not know himself—how he has acted"

At a Glance

The word. Γιγνώσκω, "know", "recognise", with the reflexive ἑαυτόν and a dependent clause: not to know oneself, how one has acted.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Then sometimes … the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted" (164b–c).

In this edition. "Does not know himself—how he has acted".

A place to read. 164a–d.

Meaning

Greek can make a person the object of a verb of knowing and add a clause saying what about him is known: "I know you, who you are". Here the object is the doctor himself, and the clause, ὡς ἔπραξεν, says what he does not know: how he acted. The construction lets the sentence say both "he does not know how he acted" and "he does not know himself".

Use in the book

Critias has said that craftsmen may be temperate while making other people's things, and that the man who does what he ought is temperate (163a, 164b). Socrates asks whether a doctor must know when his treatment is beneficial and when not, and whether each craftsman must know when he will profit from his work; "Perhaps not" (164b; see ὀνίνημι). Then: "Then sometimes ... the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted. And yet, having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, by your account" (164b–c). The step that follows asks, in another verb, whether such a man "acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself—that he is temperate?" (164c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).

The phrase is what Critias cannot accept, and his refusal changes the dialogue. Rather than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate, he would take back what he agreed, and he would almost say that "this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself" (164d; see ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν). The negative comes first: the dialogue arrives at self-knowledge by way of a man who lacks it and does good all the same. It can be read as the strongest objection to Critias' definition, made before he gives it.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with Critias' answer.

164b–c The doctor who acted beneficially or harmfully may not know himself, how he has acted; yet he acted temperately.

164c–d Critias would sooner take back an agreement than concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate; temperance is knowing oneself.

Translation in this edition

"Does not know himself—how he has acted" renders οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἔπραξεν (164c1), keeping the reflexive as the verb's object so that the phrase prepares "know thyself". At 164c the same dash introduces the parallel ἀγνοεῖ δ' ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ, "does not know himself—that he is temperate" (164c6).

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ὀνίνημι.

οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί · not only … but … as well

Not only fine but good as well: the step that adds a second quality to temperance, and with it a second test · Charmides

οὐ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί, *ou monon … alla kai*, "not only … but … as well", "not only … but"; μὴ μόνον … ἀλλὰ καί, *mē monon … alla kai*, "not just … but"

At a Glance

The word. "Not only … but also": a construction that grants one thing and adds another.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: of the boy, thought to surpass his fellows "not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for" (157d), of temperance: "Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well" (160e); and, with μή, of each kind of knowledge, defined "not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge" (171a).

In this edition. "Not only … but … as well", "not only … but".

A place to read. 160d–161b.

Meaning

The construction adds without taking away: the first member is kept, and the second goes beyond it. In an argument it marks an escalation: a thing already granted to be one sort is shown to be a further sort too.

Use in the book

The phrase does its work at 160e. The boy has offered his second definition, that temperance is modesty. Socrates asks whether he agreed that temperance is fine, and that temperate men are good; nothing could be good that does not make men good; "Then temperance is not only fine, but good as well" (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; καλός). The first definition fell because quietness is not always fine; the second will fall because modesty is not always good, and Homer is brought in to show it (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ). The phrase raises the standard between the two refutations: fine was enough to test the first answer, and the second must meet a second quality as well.

Of the other two uses, the first belongs to the frame. Critias says that Charmides is thought to surpass those his age "not only in his looks, but in the very thing you say you have the charm for" (157d; see διαφέρω). Each time the construction moves beyond what is first granted: from looks to temperance, from fine to good, from knowledge in general to a knowledge of something (171a; see ὁρίζω). It can be read as the grammar of the dialogue's ascent, from the beauty everyone can see to the goodness that has to be examined.

Places to read

Every passage in which the construction occurs.

157d Charmides is thought to surpass those his age not only in looks but in temperance.

160e Temperance is not only fine but good as well.

171a Each kind of knowledge is defined not just as knowledge but as a particular knowledge, by being of particular things.

Translation in this edition

"Not only fine, but good as well" renders Οὐ μόνον οὖν ἄρα καλόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν (160e13), with "as well" for καί; at 157d2 the construction is "not only ... but", without "as well", and μὴ μόνον ... ἀλλὰ καί at 171a5–6 is "not just ... but".

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; διαφέρω; καλός; ὁρίζω.

οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ · nowhere or in very few places

Nowhere or in very few places: the count of cases on which the refutation of quietness rests · Charmides

ἢ οὐδαμοῦ … ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ, *ē oudamou … ē panu pou oligachou*, "either nowhere or in very few places"

At a Glance

The word. Two adverbs of place: οὐδαμοῦ, "nowhere", and ὀλιγαχοῦ, "in few places", here qualified by πάνυ που, "very few, I suppose", πάνυ strengthening and που softening.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places" (160b–c).

In this edition. "Either nowhere or in very few places".

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Meaning

Ὀλιγαχοῦ, from ὀλίγος, "few", is a rare word: "in few places", "in few cases". Set beside οὐδαμοῦ it makes a statement about a count: the cases have been surveyed, and the exceptions are none or almost none. It is the language of an argument from instances, not of a proof.

Use in the book

The phrase sums up the survey that refutes the boy's first definition. Socrates has run through writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running and jumping, learning, teaching, remembering, understanding and deliberating, and in each the quick and vigorous has seemed finer than the quiet (159c–160b; see ὀξέως; ὀξύτης; ταχύς). The phrase is his count: quiet actions have appeared finer "either nowhere or in very few places" (160b–c). The

dilemma it opens and the concession that follows are told elsewhere (160b–d; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ὅτι μάλιστα).

What belongs to the phrase is its modesty. Socrates does not claim that quiet actions are never finer; the hedge πάνυ που, "very few, I suppose", admits that a case may have been missed, and the concession that follows grants even that the quiet may be as often finer as the quick (160c). The argument does not need the count to be exact, since either horn of the dilemma leaves quietness short of temperance (160c–d; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα). The same adverb returns in the refutation's last clause, where temperance would not be quietness "whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else" (160c), and later in the argument with Critias, when "no knowledge of this kind has turned up anywhere" (172a). The phrase can be read as the dialogue's first use of a habit it keeps: a definition is tested by looking for its cases, and found wanting where none, or too few, turn up.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the concession that follows.

160b–c Quiet actions have appeared finer than quick ones either nowhere or in very few places.

160c–d Even if they were no fewer, temperance would not be quietness.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's judgement that Socrates was owed two things, arguments that lead up from particular cases and the defining of what is common, is told elsewhere (*Metaphysics* 13.4, 1078b27–30; see εἶδος).

Translation in this edition

"Either nowhere or in very few places" renders ἢ οὐδαμοῦ ... ἢ πάνυ που ὀλιγαχοῦ (160b9–c1), with "very" for πάνυ and the tentative που left unexpressed. At 160c6 "whether in walking or in talking" follows Priscian (see λέξις).

See also

δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; εἶδος; λέξις; ὀξέως; ὀξύτης; ὅτι μάλιστα; ταχύς.

οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός · craftsman of no benefit

The craftsman of no benefit: the verdict on temperance as knowledge of knowledge · Charmides

οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός, *oudemias ōphelias ousa dēmiourgos*, "when it is the craftsman of no benefit"

At a Glance

The word. Δημιουργός, "craftsman", with the genitive of its product, ὠφελία, "benefit", negated: a maker who makes no benefit.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a).

In this edition. "The craftsman of no benefit".

A place to read. 174b–175a.

Meaning

A δημιουργός is a man who works for the people, a craftsman, and the word with a genitive names what he makes: a craftsman of shoes, of health. Ὠφελία is benefit, the help one thing gives another. To call temperance the craftsman of no benefit is to describe a knowledge as a trade and find that its product is nothing.

Use in the book

The phrase ends the last argument. Socrates has shown that the knowledge which makes us happy is the knowledge of good and bad, and that its work is to benefit us (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). Critias holds that temperance, ruling over all knowledge, would rule this too and so benefit us (174d–e). Socrates answers by distributing the works: health belongs to medicine, and temperance is not "the craftsman of health" (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας); benefit belongs to the knowledge of good and bad, assigned "to another craft" (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι). So: "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" And Critias answers, "It seems it can't be, Socrates, in any way" (175a).

The phrase is built on a word Socrates had already used against Critias. At 165d medicine produced health, "No small benefit", οὐ σμικρὰν ὠφελίαν, and temperance was asked for its work (see ἔργον); at 167b and 171d the question was what benefit a knowledge of knowledge would bring (see ὅτι μάλιστα). The answer, at the end, is the inverted craftsman's title. Socrates' own hunch at 169b, that temperance is "something beneficial and good" (see μαντεύομαι), is the one the argument fails to honour, and he says at once that he blames himself (175a–b; see αἰτιάομαι). The phrase can be read as the argument's verdict on Critias' temperance, not on temperance itself.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the distribution of works before it.

174e–175a Health belongs to medicine, not to temperance.

175a Benefit was assigned to another craft; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic*'s argument that each art provides a benefit of its own, medicine health and piloting safety, is told elsewhere (1.346a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

Translation in this edition

"When it is the craftsman of no benefit" renders οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας οὖσα δημιουργός (175a6–7), the participle οὖσα giving the reason: temperance cannot be beneficial since it is the maker of none.

See also

αἰτιάομαι; ἀποδίδωμι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἔργον; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; μαντεύομαι; ὅτι μάλιστα.

οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι · I don't know what answer to give

οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι, *ouk echō hoti soi apokrinōmai*, "I don't know what answer to give you"

At a Glance

The word. Ἔχω, "have", with an indirect deliberative question: "I do not have what to answer", I do not know what to say.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "So I don't know what answer to give you" (158d).

In this edition. "I don't know what answer to give you".

A place to read. 158b–e.

Meaning

Οὐκ ἔχω with an interrogative and the subjunctive is the ordinary Greek for being at a loss: "I have no way to ...". It reports a want of means, not of information: the speaker has nothing he can say, whether because the argument has left him nothing, as when Socrates, near the end of the *Lysis*, says, "I have nothing more to say" (222e), or, as here, because every answer open to him is bad.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked the boy whether he agrees with Critias that he already has enough temperance, or whether he lacks it (158c; see ὁμολογέω). The boy blushes, and gives an answer that, Socrates says, did his breeding credit (see ἀνερυθριάω). If he says he is not temperate, it is an odd thing to say against oneself, and he will be showing up Critias and many others as liars; if he says he is, and praises himself, that will probably seem obnoxious. "So I don't know what answer to give you" (158d). Socrates replies that he seems to be talking sense, and proposes that they look into it together (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι).

The phrase is the boy's first word on temperance, and it is not ignorance but tact: both answers are open to him, and both offend. The edition's note

at 158c reads the blush and the refusal as a picture of temperance in its commonest sense, modesty, before anyone has defined it. Near its close the dialogue gives another refusal by the same boy, "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the question and the answer.

158c Does the boy agree with Critias that he is temperate? He blushes.

158d To deny would make Critias a liar, to affirm would be self-praise: he does not know what answer to give.

158d–e Socrates: he is talking sense; they should look into it together.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthyphro* the same idiom marks a perplexity of another kind. Asked once more what the holy is, Euthyphro answers, "But Socrates, I don't know how to put to you what I think; whatever we propose somehow keeps walking round on us and will not stay where we have set it up" (11b). Euthyphro's loss comes from the argument; the boy's comes from his company, and his answer, unlike Euthyphro's, is complete in itself. Socrates answers that Euthyphro's statements look like the work of Daedalus, whom Socrates calls his own ancestor, which run off and will not stay where they are put (11b–d); the argument that later comes round again to the same place is told elsewhere (15b–c; see κύκλῳ).

Translation in this edition

"So I don't know what answer to give you" renders ὥστε οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι σοι ἀποκρίνωμαι (158d5–6), the English "don't know" for οὐκ ἔχω.

See also

ἀνερυθριάω; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; κύκλῳ; ὁμολογέω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω · I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't

I don't know whether I have it or not: the boy's last answer about temperance, and the dialogue's verdict on itself · Charmides

οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω, *ouk oida out' ei echō out' ei mē echō*, "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't"

At a Glance

The word. Οὐκ οἶδα, "I don't know", with two indirect questions joined by οὔτε ... οὔτε: neither whether I have it nor whether I do not.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "But by Zeus, Socrates, I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't. For how could I know, when not even you two are able to discover what it is, as you say?" (176a–b).

In this edition. "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't".

A place to read. 175d–176b.

Meaning

The double negative construction refuses both alternatives: the speaker cannot affirm that he has the thing, nor that he lacks it. It is the form of a suspended judgement, given with a reason.

Use in the book

Socrates has ended the inquiry by telling the boy to see whether he has temperance and so needs no charm; if he has it, he should think Socrates a babbler and himself the happier the more temperate he is (176a; see ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ). The boy answers with an oath and a reason: he cannot know whether he has temperance, since not even Socrates and Critias "are able to discover what it is" (176a–b; see ἐξευρίσκω; μὰ Δία). Then he adds that he is not altogether persuaded by Socrates, and thinks he very much needs the charm (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

The answer takes the dialogue's question at its word. Socrates had begun by asking the boy whether he had temperance, and proposed to find out by

asking what he thought it was (158e–159a; see ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι). The boy now reverses the order: he cannot know whether he has it until he knows what it is. His "I don't know" can be read as the knowledge Critias' definition demanded and the argument could not supply, a man who knows what he does not know (see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν): he answered at 158d that he could not say, from modesty (see οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι), and he answers at 176a that he cannot know, from understanding.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the advice it answers and the request it leads to.

176a Socrates: if the boy has temperance, he should think himself the happier for it.

176a–b The boy does not know whether he has it, since not even Socrates and Critias can discover what it is.

176b He is not altogether persuaded, and thinks he very much needs the charm.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Lysis* ends in the same place. As the boys' attendants, like spirits, come to call Lysis and his closest friend Menexenus home, and the company, beaten by them, breaks up, Socrates says to the two boys: "Lysis and Menexenus, we have turned out laughable just now, I an old man and you as well. For as they leave, these people will say that we suppose ourselves friends to each other, since I put myself among you, and yet we have not proved able to discover what the friend is" (223a–b). The *Lysis* ends with Socrates owning the ignorance; the *Charmides* gives it to the boy.

Translation in this edition

"I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" renders οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω (176a7), the English "whether ... or whether" for the Greek's two clauses with οὔτε. The first οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω is the reading of a later hand in T; B has εἴτι ἔχω and T εἴτ' εἰ ἔχω.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξευρίσκω; μὰ Δία; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ; ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι; οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι.

οὐσία · character

Character, being: what a power directed at itself must itself possess · Charmides

τὴν οὐσίαν, *tēn ousian*, "the character"

At a Glance

The word. Being, essence, nature; in ordinary speech, property, substance, what one has.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the principle of 168d: "Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?"

In this edition. "Character".

A place to read. 168b–e.

Meaning

Οὐσία is the noun of the participle of "to be": that which is one's own, first in the sense of property, a man's substance, and in the philosophers the being or nature of a thing, what it is. The edition's note at 168d explains: "'Character' renders ousia, being or nature."

Use in the book

The word gives the principle by which the parallel cases are judged: "Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?" (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό), so that hearing would need a sound and sight a colour (168d–e; see ἄχρως; ὄψις).

The word is where the argument becomes metaphysical. Up to 168d the cases are things that do something to something else; οὐσία asks what a thing must be to do it to itself, and it turns the question of temperance into a

question about being. Socrates says that "It needs a great man" to settle the question (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ), and the word does not return.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the cases it judges.

168d A power related to itself must have the character its power is directed at; hearing would have to have a sound.

168d–e Sight, to see itself, would have to have some colour.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthyphro* the word marks the difference between saying what a thing is and saying something true of it. Euthyphro has offered "loved by all the gods" as an account of the holy, and Socrates shows that the holy is loved because it is holy, while the god-loved is god-loved because it is loved, so that the two are not the same. Asked what the holy is, then, Euthyphro seems not to want to show its being, οὐσία, and names instead something the holy undergoes, a πάθος, that all the gods love it; what it is, he has still not told (10d–11b). The *Charmides*' οὐσία is the being a power must have; the *Euthyphro*'s is the being a definition must state.

Translation in this edition

"The character" renders τὴν οὐσίαν (168d2); B, at 157e5, has οὐσία, "property" (W has it written above the line), where Burnet prints οἰκία with T and W (see οἰκία).

See also

ἄχρως; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; μέγας ἀνήρ; οἰκία; ὄψις.

οὐχ ἧττον · no less

No less: the understatement by which the quick are shown at least as fine as the quiet · Charmides

οὐχ ἧττον, *ouch hētton*, "no less"; οὐδὲν ἧττον, *ouden hētton*, "just as much", "no less"; μηδὲν ἧττον, *mēden hētton*, "no less"

At a Glance

The word. The comparative adverb ἧττον, "less", negated: "not less", "no less", an understatement that means at least as much.

In the *Charmides*. At 160d: "quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones"; and οὐδὲν ἧττον, "just as much", "no less", three times (161d twice, 174c), with μηδὲν ἧττον, "no less", once (165a).

In this edition. "No less", "just as much".

A place to read. 160b–d.

Meaning

The figure is litotes, saying more by denying its opposite. "No less fine" claims equality and invites the hearer to suspect more. In an argument it lets the speaker take the weaker claim, which is easier to establish, while keeping the stronger in view.

Use in the book

The phrase states what the refutation of quietness needs. Socrates has shown that quiet actions have appeared finer than quick ones "either nowhere or in very few places" (160b–c; see οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ), and has granted that quiet and quick might be fine as often as each other (160c; see ὅτι μάλιστα). The conclusion takes only the weaker claim: "For in our argument we laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones" (160d). Equality is enough, since temperance cannot be quietness if quickness is as often fine, and the boy agrees: "I think what you have said is right, Socrates" (160d; see ὀρθῶς).

The fuller form, οὐδὲν ἧττον (μηδὲν ἧττον at 165a), "just as much", returns in three other places, each time to deny a difference. The boys at school

wrote their enemies' names "just as much" as their own (161d; see ὄνομα); the later dedicators at Delphi, taking "Know thyself" for a piece of advice, wanted to dedicate useful advice "no less" themselves (165a; see Μηδὲν ἄγαν); and when Socrates asks whether, if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, medicine will make us "any less healthy", Critias answers, "No less" (174c). The phrase can be read as one of the dialogue's instruments of levelling: it denies a superiority that a definition needed.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

160d Quick things have turned out no less fine than quiet ones.

161d The boys wrote their enemies' names just as much as their own and their friends'.

165a The later dedicators, taking "Know thyself" for advice, wanted to dedicate useful advice no less themselves.

174c Without the knowledge of good and bad, medicine will make us healthy no less.

Translation in this edition

"No less fine" renders καλὰ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ⟨τὰ⟩ ταχέα (160d2), whose readings are told elsewhere (see καλός); "just as much" renders οὐδὲν ἧττον at 161d8 and 161d10, "no less" renders οὐδὲν ἧττον at 174c8 and μηδὲν ἧττον at 165a6.

See also

καλός; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; ὄνομα; ὀρθῶς; ὅτι μάλιστα; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ.

ὄφελος · use

Use: the leaf of no use without the charm, and the inquirer of no use at inquiring · Charmides

οὐδὲν ὄφελος, *ouden ophelos*, "no use at all"; εἴ τι … ὄφελος, *ei ti … ophelos*, "if I were of any use"

At a Glance

The word. Use, help, advantage; a noun found only in the nominative and accusative singular, mostly in the phrases "of no use", "of any use".

In the *Charmides*. Twice, at the dialogue's two ends: "without the charm the leaf was no use at all" (155e), and "if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175b).

In this edition. "Use".

A place to read. 155e–157c and 175a–b.

Meaning

Ὄφελος belongs with the verb ὠφελέω, "to benefit", and the noun ὠφελία, "benefit", but is plainer: the practical use of a thing or a person. It is common in the idiom "of no use", said of tools, allies and men.

Use in the book

The two uses frame the dialogue. At the start Socrates, improvising on Critias' ruse, tells the boy that the remedy for the head is a leaf, "but that there was a charm to go with the remedy; if one sang the charm while using it, the remedy made one perfectly healthy, but without the charm the leaf was no use at all" (155e; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). The leaf is the body's medicine, the charm the soul's, and the first is useless without the second, as the Thracian's teaching goes on to explain (156b–157a).

At the end the word is turned on Socrates. Temperance has turned out the craftsman of no benefit, and Socrates blames himself: what is agreed to be the finest of all things "would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The noun can be read as linking the two ends: the remedy was

useless without the charm, and the inquiry has proved useless as a charm. Near its close the boy asks for the charm anyway (176b; see ἐπᾴδω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

155e Without the charm the leaf was no use at all.

175b Temperance would not have been of no use to us, if Socrates were of any use at inquiring well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus*' argument that possessions are of no use, οὐδὲν ὄφελος (280d), unless they are used, and used rightly, is told elsewhere (280b–281a; see εὐδαιμονέω).

Translation in this edition

"No use at all" renders οὐδὲν ὄφελος (155e8), and "if I were of any use" εἴ τι ἐμοῦ ὄφελος ἦν (175b1–2; B has ὄφελος), so that "use" answers "of no use", ἀνωφελές, in the same sentence.

See also

ἀνωφελής; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπῳδή; εὐδαιμονέω; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; φάρμακον.

ὀφθαλμός · eye

τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, *tois ophthalmois*, "those eyes of his"; τοὺς ὀφθαλμούς, *tous ophthalmous*, "the eyes"; ὀφθαλμούς, *ophthalmous*, "the eyes"

Attested: ὀφθαλμοῖς (*ophthalmois*; 155d), ὀφθαλμούς (*ophthalmous*; 156b twice, 156e). The eye, the everyday word, beside the poetic ὄμμα (see ὄμμα). The boy first looks at Socrates "with those eyes of his" (155d; see ἀμήχανος; ἐμβλέπω); then the word begins the chain of parts and wholes in the account of the charm. When a man comes to good doctors "with sore eyes", they tell him "that they cannot undertake to cure the eyes on their own, but must treat the head at the same time" (156b; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; κεφαλή); and Zalmoxis, reported by the Thracian, extends the chain: "just as one must not

try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either" (156e; see σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς). The eyes are the smallest part, and the argument climbs from them to the soul; by the end of the passage the soul is the source from which good and bad flow into the body, "as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω), where the poetic word, already used at 156c, returns.

See also ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἀμήχανος; ἐμβλέπω; ἐπιρρέω; κεφαλή; ὄμμα; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς.

ὄψις · sight

Sight: the first of the powers Socrates sets beside a knowledge of itself, and the one whose object is clearest · Charmides

ὄψις, *opsis*, "sight"; ὄψεις, *opseis*, "sights"; ὄψεων, *opseōn*, "sights"

At a Glance

The word. Sight, the power of seeing; also a look, an appearance, a thing seen.

In the *Charmides*. Eleven times, all in the argument about knowledge of knowledge: the sight "of itself and of the other sights" that sees no colour (167c–d), and the sight that, to see itself, "must have some color" (168d–e).

In this edition. "Sight".

A place to read. 167c–169a.

Meaning

Ὄψις, from the root of ὄψομαι, "I shall see", is the faculty of sight and also what sight presents. Aristotle opens the *Metaphysics* by saying that we love sight above the other senses because it most makes us know and shows us many differences (1.1, 980a21–27), and in *On the Soul* he gives colour as the example of an object proper to one sense, perceived by sight and by no other (2.6, 418a11–13).

Use in the book

Sight is the first test case for Critias' claim that temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge. Socrates' first parallel is a sight of itself and of the other sights that sees no colour, which Critias denies on oath (167c–d; see μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων). What sight sees is colour, and a sight that saw no colour would not be sight; why Socrates begins with it is told elsewhere (see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων).

The second use draws the principle. If a power directed at itself must have the character its power is directed at (168d; see οὐσία), then "sight too, my excellent friend, if it is to see itself, must have some color; for sight will never see anything that has no color" (168d–e; see ἄχρως). Sight and hearing are put among the doubtful cases, where a self-relation would raise disbelief in some people though not in others (168e–169a). The noun gives the argument its sense of what an object is: the colour that sight cannot do without is what a knowledge of knowledge seems to lack.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

167c–d Is there a sight of itself and of the other sights, which sees no colour?

168d–e Sight, to see itself, would have to have some colour.

168e Hearing and sight are among the cases doubted.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* sight differs from the other senses by needing a third thing. Socrates asks Glaucon whether he has noticed that the craftsman of the senses made the power of seeing and being seen the costliest of his works. Hearing and sound need nothing further for the one to hear and the other to be heard; but though sight is in the eyes and its owner tries to use it, and colour is present in things, unless a third kind arrives, suited by its nature to just this, sight will see nothing and the colours will go unseen. That third thing is light, and its lord is the sun, which is not sight but sight's cause (6.507c–508b). The *Charmides*' sight needs colour to see itself; the *Republic*'s needs light to see anything.

Translation in this edition

"Sight" renders ὄψις throughout (167c8–d2, 168d9–10, 168e9), and "non-sights" μὴ ὄψεων (167c10), the reading of B and W, where T has the singular.

See also

ἄχρως; μὴ ὄψεις; οὐσία; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων.

ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων · sight of itself and of the other sights

A sight of itself and of the other sights: the first of the parallels Socrates builds on Critias' formula · Charmides

ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις, *heautēs de kai tōn allōn opseōn opsis*, "sight of itself and of the other sights"

At a Glance

The word. Ὄψις with two genitives of object: of itself, ἑαυτῆς, and of the other sights.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "a kind of sight which is not sight of the things the other sights are of, but is sight of itself and of the other sights, and of non-sights likewise" (167c).

In this edition. "Sight of itself and of the other sights".

A place to read. 166e–168a.

Meaning

The phrase copies a formula. Critias had said that temperance "alone is knowledge both of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself" (166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν), and Socrates, having added that it would also be knowledge "of the lack of knowledge" (166e), makes the same shape out of sight: a sight of itself, of the other sights and of non-sights. The genitives are objective: they name what the sight is a sight of.

Use in the book

The phrase opens the procession of parallels by which Socrates tests whether such a knowledge is possible. "Then see what a strange thing we are trying to say, my friend. For if you look at this same thing in other cases, it will seem to you, I think, to be impossible" (167c; see ἄτοπος). Sight comes first, then hearing, the senses together, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each built on the same formula and each denied by Critias (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; μὴ ὄψεις). The negative part of the formula carries the absurdity, a sight that sees no colour (167d; see μὴ ὄψεις).

The order can be read as deliberate: Socrates begins with the sense whose object is most obvious, and so with the case in which the formula is most plainly absurd; by the end of the procession he reaches opinion and knowledge, where the object is hardest to point to. The phrase can be read as the dialogue's way of making Critias' abstraction visible: what sounds possible when said of knowledge sounds impossible when said of the eye.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the procession it begins.

167c A sight of itself and of the other sights and of non-sights.

167d–168a Hearing, the senses, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion, each of itself and of the others.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades*' eye that sees itself in the pupil of another's eye is told elsewhere (132d–133b; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's question whether we perceive that we see by sight itself or by another sense is told elsewhere (*On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).

Translation in this edition

"Sight of itself and of the other sights" renders ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων ὄψις (167c9–10), the English putting the noun first.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἄτοπος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις.

Π Pi

πάγκαλος · perfectly beautiful

πάγκαλος, *pankalos*, "perfectly beautiful"

Attested: πάγκαλος (*pankalos*; 154d). All-beautiful, beautiful in every part; πᾶν, "all", with καλός. Chaerephon uses it of the boy's body: "And yet if he were willing to strip … you'd think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful" (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος). The compound is the prologue's highest word for the beauty everyone sees, and Socrates answers it with an exclamation, "Heracles! What an invincible man you are describing" (154d; see ἄμαχος; Ἡρακλῆς), and a condition: if he has just one little thing more, a soul well made (154d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα). The figure that is beautiful in every part can be read as the whole that Socrates sets aside for the part that is not seen.

See also ἄμαχος; ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος; εὖ πέφυκα; Ἡρακλῆς.

παγκρατιάζω · compete in the pancration

παγκρατιάζειν, *pankratiazein*, "the pancration"

Attested: παγκρατιάζειν (*pankratiazein*; 159c). To compete in the pancration, the all-in contest of the Greek games in which boxing and wrestling were combined and almost any hold or blow allowed. It comes in the list of bodily actions by which Socrates refutes the boy's first definition: "And boxing and the pancration? Isn't it the same?" (159c; see πυκτεύω). In these, as in writing, reading, the lyre and wrestling, the quick and vigorous is finer than the quiet (159c–d; see ὀξέως; ταχύς). The most violent of the examples makes plainest that quietness cannot be what is fine in every action; why the examples are athletic is told elsewhere (see παλαίστρα).

See also ὀξέως; παλαίστρα; πυκτεύω; ταχύς.

παῖς · boy

παῖς, *pais*, "child", "boy"; παισί, *paisi*, "the boys"; παῖ, *pai*, "boy", "son"; παιδός, *paidos*, "boy"; παῖδας, *paidas*, "boys"

Attested: παῖς (*pais*; 154b, 156a), παισί (*paisi*; 154c), παῖ (*pai*; 155b, 158b, 169b), παιδός (*paidos*; 155d), παῖδας (*paidas*; 161d). A child, a boy; also a slave or attendant, addressed as "boy" at any age; with a father's name, a son. The word marks the stages of the boy's age. Socrates knew Charmides when "he was still a child", and by now "he must be quite the young man" (154b; see μειράκιον); the boy remembers Socrates "from when I was a boy" (156a; see μιμνήσκομαι); and Socrates watches the boys, τοῖς παισί, who are all gazing at him (154c; see νοῦς). It is the beloved in the line of Cydias, "speaking of a beautiful boy" (155d; see Κυδίας), and the pupils of the writing-master, "you boys" (161d; see γραμματιστής). Critias calls his attendant "Boy" (155b), and Socrates addresses Charmides as "dear son of Glaucon" (158b) and Critias as "son of Callaeschrus" (169b), the formal address by the father's name, which in Critias' case comes as Socrates challenges him to make good his definition.

See also γραμματιστής; Κυδίας; μειράκιον; μιμνήσκομαι; νοῦς.

παλαίστρα · wrestling-school

παλαίστραν, *palaistran*, "wrestling-school"; παλαίστρᾳ, *palaistrāi*, "wrestling-school"

Attested: παλαίστραν (*palaistran*; 153a), παλαίστρᾳ (*palaistrāi*; 155d). A wrestling-school, from παλαίω, "wrestle": an open court with rooms around it, where boys and young men exercised and their elders came to watch and talk. The dialogue is set in one. Socrates, back from Potidaea, went "into the wrestling-school of Taureas, the one opposite the shrine of Basile" (153a; see Βασίλη; καταντικρύ), and found a great crowd there. When the boy sat down beside him and looked at him, "everyone in the wrestling-school came swirling round us in a ring" (155d; see κύκλῳ; περιρρέω). The place explains the company, the athletic examples of the first argument (159c; see

παγκρατιάζω; παλαίω) and the gaze of the prologue, since in the palaestra the young exercised naked and were looked at (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος).

See also ἀπρόσωπος; Βασίλη; καταντικρύ; κύκλῳ; παγκρατιάζω; παλαίω; περιρρέω.

παλαίω · wrestle

τὸ παλαίειν, *to palaiein*, "wrestling"

Attested: παλαίειν (*palaiein*; 159c). To wrestle. It comes once, in Socrates' question to the boy: "And again, playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are far finer than doing them quietly and slowly?" (159c; see κιθαρίζω; ὀξέως). The example pairs the schoolroom's lyre with the yard's wrestling, so that the refutation of quietness covers the whole of a boy's education, music and gymnastics together. It is the dialogue's only use of the verb, though its scene is a wrestling-school (see παλαίστρα), and the contest that takes its place there is the argument.

See also κιθαρίζω; ὀξέως; παλαίστρα.

πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα · we are beaten on every side

Beaten on every side: Socrates' figure for the inquiry's defeat · Charmides

πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα, *pantachēi gar hēttōmetha*, "we are beaten on every side"

At a Glance

The word. Πανταχῇ, "on every side", "in every way", with ἡττώμεθα, "we are worsted", from ἡττάομαι, a verb passive in form, "be the lesser", "be defeated".

In the *Charmides*. Once: "As it is, we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b).

In this edition. "We are beaten on every side".

A place to read. 175a–d.

Meaning

Ἡττάομαι is the verb of losing: in battle, in a lawsuit, in a contest, to a desire. Πανταχῇ extends the defeat to every quarter, as of an army routed on all its fronts. The phrase belongs to the language of combat that Greek used for argument, in which a speaker who cannot answer is beaten.

Use in the book

The phrase is Socrates' summary of the end. Temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, has turned out the craftsman of no benefit, and Socrates says he was right to fear that he was looking into it to no purpose (175a–b; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). "As it is, we are beaten on every side": the inquirers cannot discover what the name "temperance" was given to (175b; see νομοθέτης), though they conceded many things the argument did not allow (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The victor, a few sentences later, is the inquiry itself, which "has made such a mockery of the truth" that what they agreed on proved of no benefit (175d; see ζήτησις; ἡττάομαι; ὑβριστικῶς).

What the phrase adds is its scope. Every attempt has failed: quietness, modesty, doing one's own business, the doing of good things, knowing oneself, knowledge of knowledge. The "every side" of the defeat can be read as the six definitions, each a front on which the inquirers were beaten. The dialogue began with Socrates back from a battle at Potidaea, where, Chaerephon had heard, the fighting was very heavy and many people they knew were killed (153b–c); it ends with him admitting a defeat of another kind. The phrase can be read as making the two campaigns one.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the verdict that follows.

175b We are beaten on every side and cannot discover what the lawgiver named temperance.

175d The inquiry has made a mockery of the truth and shown their definition of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* the defeat of an argument is mourned like a death. On the day he is to die, Socrates strokes Phaedo's head, gathers up the hair at his neck, and says that tomorrow, perhaps, Phaedo will cut off those fine locks in mourning. Phaedo supposes so. Not if he takes his advice, Socrates replies: they should both cut theirs today, if their argument dies and they cannot bring it back to life; and were he in Phaedo's place, with the argument slipping away from him, he would bind himself by oath, as the Argives did, to keep his hair short until he had fought the argument of Simmias and Cebes again and won. Phaedo objects that against two, as the saying goes, not even Heracles can hold out; then Phaedo should call on him as his Iolaus, Socrates says, while it is still light, as Heracles called on his nephew and helper (89b–c). The ending of the *Lysis*, where the company breaks up beaten by the boys' attendants, is told elsewhere (223a–b; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Other ancient sources

Herodotus tells the story Socrates alludes to. The Spartans had cut off Thyrea, a district belonging to the Argolid, and when the Argives lost the battle to win it back, they cropped their heads, though custom had till then obliged them to wear their hair long, and laid down a law sealed with a curse: no man of Argos was to let his hair grow, and their women were to wear no gold, until Thyrea was recovered.[208]

Translation in this edition

"We are beaten on every side" renders πανταχῇ γὰρ ἡττώμεθα (175b2–3), with "As it is" for νῦν δέ. "Cannot discover" follows εὑρεῖν, a variant recorded in T; B and T have ἔχειν.

See also

ζήτησις; ἡττάομαι; νομοθέτης; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; ὑβριστικῶς.

[208] Herodotus 1.82 (the law at 1.82.7).

παραδέχομαι · take the argument over

παραδέχῃ τὸν λόγον, *paradechēi ton logon*, "take the argument over"; παραδέχομαι, *paradechomai*, "I take it over"

Attested: παραδέχῃ (*paradechēi*; 162e), παραδέχομαι (*paradechomai*; 162e). To receive from another, to take over; of an argument, to take up the defence of what another has said. Critias has been on edge, and the boy has hinted that the definition is his (162b–d; see φιλοτίμως). Socrates invites him in: "So if you agree that temperance is what this young man says, and take the argument over, I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not." "I agree entirely ... and I take it over" (162e; see λόγος; συγχωρέω). The verb marks the handover of the dialogue from the boy to his guardian, and the agreement it seals binds Critias to a formula he did not choose to state himself (see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The boy, released, says nothing more until the end.

See also λόγος; συγχωρέω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; φιλοτίμως.

παραδίδωμι · hand over

To hand over: a tradition handed down, and the work handed over to those who know · Charmides

παραδέδοται, *paradedotai*, "has come down"; παρεδίδομεν, *paredidomen*, "(we would) hand things over"; παραδιδοῖεν, *paradidoien*, "handed over"

At a Glance

The word. To give over, to hand on: to pass a thing to someone else, or down to those who come after.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: the boy's house "has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon" (157e); in the life without error we would find those who knew "and hand things over to them" (171e); and each would hand over what he did not know "to others who did know it" (172d).

In this edition. "Come down", "hand over".

A place to read. 171d–172d.

Meaning

Παραδίδωμι covers two kinds of transmission: handing a thing across to a contemporary who will take charge of it, and handing it down to a later generation. In Athenian usage it was the word for surrendering a city, for passing on a teaching, and for entrusting a task.

Use in the book

The two senses mark the two halves of the dialogue. In the prologue the word is tradition: the boy's father's house "has come down to us" celebrated by the poets (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; ἐγκωμιάζω; ποιητής). The praise is handed down, and the boy is expected to be worthy of it.

In the argument with Critias the word is delegation. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, "neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them" (171e; see ἐξευρίσκω; ἀναμάρτητος), and so a household and a city run by temperance would be run well (see οἰκέω). Socrates then withdraws the agreement: "we too easily agreed that it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew, and handed over what we did not know to others who did know it" (172d; see διοίκησις). The handover can be read as the institution the dialogue tests, a city run by delegation to experts, with temperance as the knowledge that knows whom to trust; and it fails twice: temperance, as knowledge of knowledge, could not tell the expert from the impostor (170e–171c; see ὁμότεχνος), and even granted, a life run by knowledge is not shown to make us happy (173a–d; see ὄναρ).

The two senses can be read as meeting in the boy, who has received a tradition and at the end, unable to know whether he has temperance, gives himself up to Socrates' charming (176b; see ἐπᾴδω; παρέχω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

157e The boy's house has come down celebrated by Anacreon, Solon and other poets.

171e In the life without error we would find those who knew and hand things over to them.

172d They agreed too easily that it would be a great good for each to hand over what he did not know to those who did.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Philebus* a tradition handed down opens Socrates' account of the way of inquiry by one and many. Socrates calls it a gift of the gods to men, thrown down from the gods by some Prometheus, the Titan who brought men fire, together with a most brilliant fire; and the men of old, stronger than we and dwelling closer to the gods, handed down this saying: that whatever is at any time said to be is made of one and many, and has limit and unlimitedness inborn in it (16c). The *Protagoras*' Assembly, which sends for builders to advise it on building and shouts down anyone else who tries, is told elsewhere (319b–c; see θορυβέω).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates, for whom the one who knows rules and the shipowner and the rest obey him, is told elsewhere (*Memorabilia* 3.9.10–11; see ἄρχω).

Translation in this edition

"Has come down to us" renders παραδέδοται ἡμῖν (157e7), the perfect passive; "hand things over" renders ἂν παρεδίδομεν (171e2), and "handed over" παραδιδοῖεν (172d9).

See also

ἀναμάρτητος; ἀρετή; ἄρχω; διοίκησις; ἐγκωμιάζω; ἐξευρίσκω; ἐπᾴδω; θορυβέω; οἰκέω; ὁμότεχνος; ὄναρ; παρέχω; ποιητής.

παρακελεύομαι · urge

παρακελεύεσθαι, *parakeleuesthai*, "urge"

Attested: παρακελεύεσθαι (*parakeleuesthai*; 164e). To call on, to urge, to exhort. Critias uses it in his reading of the inscription at Delphi: the god's

greeting to those who enter is "Be temperate", "on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one, and that we ought not to urge this on one another, but 'Be temperate'" (164e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; πρόσρημα). The verb turns a greeting into an exhortation: the ordinary χαῖρε, "rejoice", is something men urge on one another, and the god urges something better. Critias then denies that "Know thyself" is advice at all (165a; see Μηδὲν ἄγαν), so that his own reading turns on the difference between a greeting and an urging.

See also Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; πρόσρημα.

πάρειμι · be present

To be present: temperance as something present in a person, and the company present at the conversation · Charmides

παρούσης, *parousēs*, "(once it) is present"; πάρεστιν, *parestin*, "is present"; παρόντι, *paronti*, "circumstances"; παροῦσα, *parousa*, "by being present"; παρεῖναι, *pareinai*, "(to) be present"; παρῇ, *parēi*, "(it) is present with"; παρόντας, *parontas*, "the company"

At a Glance

The word. To be beside, to be present; of a quality, to be in someone; as a participle, the present company, the present moment.

In the *Charmides*. Ten times: of temperance present in a soul (157a, 158b, 158e, 160d, 161a, 175e), of modesty present with a man in need in Homer's line (161a), of the circumstances (158c), and of the company (162c, 169c).

In this edition. "Be present", "the company", "the circumstances".

A place to read. 158b–159a.

Meaning

Πάρειμι is εἰμί, "be", with παρά, "beside": to be at hand. Greek spoke of a virtue or a disease as present in a person, and Plato asked what it is for a

quality to be present in a thing, παρουσία, "presence" (*Lysis* 217b–e; *Gorgias* 497e).

Use in the book

The verb carries the dialogue's first assumption: that temperance, if one has it, is present in one and can be found there. The Thracian teaches that from the charms temperance comes to be in souls, "and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health" (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; ἐπῳδή). Socrates tells the boy that if temperance "is already present in you", he needs no charm (158b), and proposes to find out by asking: "if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it" (158e–159a; see ἔνειμι; ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι). At 160d he asks the boy to look within and consider "what sort of person temperance makes you by being present" (160d; see σωφροσύνη παροῦσα), and at the end he grieves that temperance is to be of no benefit to the boy "by being present in you" (175e; see ὀνίνημι).

The same verb names the audience, and the two uses can be read together. Critias is eager to shine before Charmides "and the company" (162c; see φιλοτίμως), and later, ashamed before "the company", he will not admit his perplexity (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). The temperance that is present in a soul is to be found by looking inward; the company that is present is what Critias looks to. The boy, asked whether temperance is present in him, says it is not easy to answer "in the circumstances" (158c; see οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι), and the circumstances are that same company.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

157a Once temperance is present, health is easy to provide.

158b If temperance is already present, no charm is needed.

158c The boy cannot easily answer in the circumstances.

158e–159a If temperance is present, the boy has an opinion of it.

160d What sort of person does temperance make him by being present?

161a Homer: modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need; temperance makes good those it is present with.

162c Critias is eager to shine before Charmides and the company.

169c Critias is ashamed in front of the company.

175e Temperance is to be of no benefit to the boy by being present in him.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* presence is Socrates' word for the cause of beauty. He sets aside anyone who tells him that a thing is beautiful because of a vivid colour or a shape, since all such explanations confuse him; his own answer, plain, artless and perhaps simple-minded, is that what makes a thing beautiful is nothing other than the beautiful itself, whether by its presence, παρουσία, or by sharing, or by whatever route it arrives; he does not press that point, only this, that it is by the beautiful that all beautiful things are beautiful (100c–d). The *Charmides* uses the language of presence without raising, as the *Phaedo* does, the question how a quality comes to be present in a thing.

Translation in this edition

"Is present" renders πάρεστιν (158b5, 158e7), "once it ... is present" παρούσης (157a6), "by being present" παροῦσα (160d7, 175e2), "to be present" παρεῖναι (161a4) and "is present with" παρῇ (161a9); "in the circumstances" renders ἐν τῷ παρόντι (158c8), and "the company" τοὺς παρόντας (162c2, 169c7). At 158c7 "not easy" is the reading of T, with a variant in W; B and W have ἄλογον, "unreasonable".

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἐγγίγνομαι; ἔνειμι; ἐπῳδή; ὀνίνημι; ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι; οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; φιλοτίμως.

παρεμπίπτω · slip in

παρεμπίπτουσαν, *parempiptousan*, "slip in"

Attested: παρεμπίπτουσαν (*parempiptousan*; 173d). To fall in beside, to slip in unnoticed. It comes in the dream: the human race would act and live knowledgeably, "since temperance, standing guard, would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us" (173d; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη;

φυλάττω). The picture is of a guard at a gate and an intruder trying to pass: ignorance would get into our work if it could, and temperance keeps it out. The verb gives the knowledge of knowledge its one plain function in the dream, that of a watchman, and the same sentence goes on to doubt that a life so guarded would be happy (173d; see ὄναρ).

See also ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ὄναρ; φυλάττω.

παρέχω · hand over, give rise to

To furnish, to offer: the soul offered to the charm, and the sense temperance would give of itself · Charmides

παράσχῃ, *paraschēi*, "hands over"; παρασχεῖν, *paraschein*, "hand over"; παρέχειν, *parechein*, "give rise to"; παράσχοι, *paraschoi*, "raise"; παρέχῃς, *parechēis*, "let (Socrates charm you)"

At a Glance

The word. To hold out, to furnish, to provide; with oneself or a part of oneself as object, to offer it up, to submit it.

In the *Charmides*. Five times: the soul handed over to be charmed (157b, 157c), the sense that temperance would give rise to (159a), the disbelief some cases would raise (169a), and the boy letting Socrates charm him (176b).

In this edition. "Hand over", "give rise to", "raise", "let".

A place to read. 157b–c and 176b–c.

Meaning

Παρέχω, "hold beside", is to make available: to supply goods, to cause a feeling, to present oneself. With the soul or the body as object it was the word for submitting to treatment: a patient offers himself to the doctor.

Use in the book

The verb frames the dialogue in its sense of submitting. The Thracian's order was: "Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy

unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm" (157b; see ἐντολή; θεραπεύω), and Socrates puts the condition to the boy: "if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see ξένος). At the end Critias makes the same submission the test of temperance: "if you do this, it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you and don't desert him, great or small" (176b; see ἀπολείπω; τεκμήριον). The verb that opened the cure closes it, and the boy, unable to say whether he has temperance, does what the Thracian required.

In the argument the verb has its other sense, to cause. Temperance present in a soul "must give rise to some sense" of itself (159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι), and hearing and sight, motion moving itself and heat burning itself, "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others" (168e–169a; see ἀπιστία). The two senses can be read as one: temperance, if it is there, offers some sense of itself; the boy, unsure whether it is there, offers himself.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

157b No one may have the remedy who does not first hand over his soul to the charm.

157c If the boy is willing to hand over his soul first, Socrates will apply the remedy.

159a Temperance, if present, must give rise to some sense of itself.

169a Self-related powers would raise disbelief in some people.

176b Critias: if the boy lets Socrates charm him, it will be proof that he is temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* the submission of a patient becomes the attitude of an answerer. Socrates asks Polus whether he would choose the worse and the more shameful over the less, and adds: don't hold back from answering, Polus, it will do you no harm; offer yourself to the argument with a good grace, as you would to a doctor, and say yes or no to what I ask (475d). The boy of the *Charmides* offers himself to Socrates' charm; Polus is asked to offer himself to the argument, which here plays the doctor.

Translation in this edition

"Hands over" renders παράσχῃ (157b4) and "hand over" παρασχεῖν (157c4), where "to be charmed" is ἐπᾷσαι, a later correction in B; B (apparently) and T have ἀπάσαις, "with all (the Thracian's charms)"; "give rise to" renders παρέχειν (159a2); "raise" renders ἂν παράσχοι (169a1), where the particle ἄν is Heindorf's addition, printed in angle brackets; and "if you let Socrates charm you" renders ἢν ἐπᾴδειν παρέχῃς Σωκράτει (176b6–7), literally "offer yourself to Socrates to charm", with ἢν from B and W (T has ἵν'); the earlier "if you do this" rests on a supplement told elsewhere (176b5; see δράω).

See also

αἴσθησις; ἀπιστία; ἀπολείπω; δράω; ἔνειμι; ἐντολή; θεραπεύω; ξένος; τεκμήριον.

παρίημι · let pass

παριέναι, *parienai*, "let it go by"

Attested: παριέναι (*parienai*; 173a). To let fall beside, to let pass, to pass over. Socrates uses it to justify telling his dream: "I think I'm talking nonsense ... All the same, one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see εἰκῇ; ληρέω). The verb names the opposite of examination: to let a thought pass unexamined. Socrates will not, even when the thought looks like nonsense, and his reason is care for oneself, a theme of the dialogue stated in passing. Burnet prints the present παριέναι, "let pass", with T; B has παρεῖναι, the aorist infinitive of the same verb, spelt like the infinitive of πάρειμι, "be present" (see πάρειμι).

See also εἰκῇ; ληρέω; ὄναρ; πάρειμι.

παρρησιάζομαι · speak frankly

To speak frankly: the licence Socrates takes with the boy, and the condition of a true examination · Charmides

παρρησιάσομαι, *parrēsiasomai*, "I can speak ... more frankly"

At a Glance

The word. To speak freely, to say everything; from παρρησία, πᾶν, "all", and ῥῆσις, "speaking".

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Good for you ... Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm and what it is like" (156a–b).

In this edition. "Speak ... more frankly".

A place to read. 155e–156c.

Meaning

Παρρησία was counted a mark of the free man in a democracy (the democratic city, Socrates says in the *Republic*, is "full of freedom and of frank speech", 8.557b), and in private it was the frankness of a friend who says what others will not. To speak with παρρησία is to hold nothing back, whether out of fear or out of politeness.

Use in the book

Socrates claims the licence when the boy says he knows who Socrates is: he is talked about among the boy's age-mates, and the boy remembers him from childhood, keeping company with Critias (156a; see μιμνήσκομαι). "Good for you," Socrates says. "Then I can speak to you more frankly about this charm and what it is like" (156a–b). The acquaintance permits the frankness, and what Socrates says frankly is what the charm really is: the Thracian's teaching, that the soul must be treated before the body (156b–157c), which is not what the boy came over for.

The frankness the verb promises is the dialogue's condition. Socrates speaks frankly to the boy about his soul, and asks the boy in turn to answer as it seems to him (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The verb can be read as the opening of that exchange: Socrates gives frankness first and asks for it back.

Places to read

The passage in which the verb occurs, with the recognition that permits it.
156a The boy knows Socrates by report and remembers him from childhood.
156a–b Socrates: then he can speak more frankly about the charm.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laches* frankness opens the conversation. Lysimachus tells Nicias and Laches that he and Melesias think they should speak frankly to them (178a), and when he comes to it he repeats the verb in the future the *Charmides* uses, παρρησιασόμεθα, "we shall speak frankly" (179c). Each has a long record of his father's achievements to recount to the young men, Lysimachus those of Aristides the Just, the Athenian statesman of the Persian Wars, Melesias those of Thucydides the statesman, in war and in peace, in running the business of the allies and of Athens; of his own, neither has a single achievement to report. They are ashamed of this before their sons, and they blame their fathers for letting them live softly once they were grown lads, while the fathers saw to other people's business (179c–d). Callicles' frankness, which Socrates names as one of the three things a tester of souls needs, is told elsewhere (*Gorgias* 487a–b; see αἰσχύνομαι; ὁμολογία).

Translation in this edition

"Then I can speak to you more frankly" renders μᾶλλον γάρ σοι παρρησιάσομαι (156a9–b1), the future "I shall speak frankly" given as permission.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; μιμνήσκομαι; ὁμολογία.

πατρῷος · on the father's side

πατρῴα, *patrōia*, "on your father's side"

Attested: πατρῴα (*patrōia*; 157e). Of a father, inherited from a father, ancestral. Socrates uses it in his praise of the boy's descent: "your family on

your father's side, the house of Critias son of Dropides", has come down celebrated by the poets (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; οἰκία; παραδίδωμι). The adjective sets the father's house first, as Greek custom did, and the mother's side follows, "no different" and "in no way inferior" (158a). The edition's note at 158a observes that Pyrilampes later married his niece Perictione, Plato's mother: "Plato is praising his own family." What the father's side gives the boy is a reputation to live up to, and the conversation turns at once to whether he has the temperance that his ancestry is said to promise (158b; see πάρειμι).

See also ἀρετή; οἰκία; παραδίδωμι; πάρειμι.

πείθω · persuade, obey

To persuade, and in the middle to obey: the alternative to force that the dialogue begins with and abandons at the end · Charmides

πείθης, *peithēis*, "persuade"; πείθω, *peithō*, "I persuade"; πείσει, *peisei*, "persuades", "persuade"; πείθεσθαι, *peithesthai*, "obey"; πείσομαι, *peisomai*, "I shall obey"; πέίθομαι, *peithomai*, "I'm ... persuaded"; πειθοίμην, *peithoimēn*, "obey"

At a Glance

The word. Active, to persuade, to win over; middle and passive, to be persuaded, to obey, to trust.

In the *Charmides*. Eight times: at the start, in the bargain over the charm (156a), the Thracian's order (157b–c) and Socrates' oath to obey it (157c); at the end, in the boy's "I'm not altogether persuaded by you" (176b) and his obedience to his guardian (176c).

In this edition. "Persuade"; in the middle, "obey" and "be persuaded".

A place to read. 155e–157c and 176a–d.

Meaning

The active and middle of πείθω make one idea seen from both sides: to persuade someone is to bring him to obey, and to obey is to be persuaded. Greek therefore set persuasion against force, βία, as the two ways of getting

what one wants from another, and the contrast ran through its thinking about rhetoric, law and rule.

Use in the book

The verb opens with a joke about consent. The boy wants to copy the charm down from Socrates; "If you persuade me," Socrates asks, "or even if you don't?" The boy laughs: "If I persuade you, Socrates" (156a). The charm will be given by persuasion, not taken. Then the Thracian's order reverses the direction. He told Socrates, "Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm", and charged him to let no one be so rich, so wellborn or so beautiful as to persuade him to do otherwise; and Socrates goes on, "So I—for I have sworn him an oath, and I must obey—I shall obey" (157b–c; see ὄμνυμι; ἐντολή). Socrates is bound to obey, and so cannot be persuaded; the boy must be persuaded to offer his soul (see παρέχω).

At the end the verb returns in its middle and loses to force. The boy, not knowing whether he has temperance, says, "I'm not altogether persuaded by you, though, Socrates, and I think I very much need the charm" (176b; see οἴομαι). Critias makes it the proof of the boy's temperance that he should let Socrates charm him; the boy answers, "I'd be doing something terrible if I didn't obey you, my guardian, and didn't do what you order", and Critias gives the order (176b–c; see ἐπίτροπος; κελεύω). Socrates asks whether they will use force without even a preliminary hearing, and they will (176c–d; see βιάζομαι). The dialogue that began by asking whether the charm would pass by persuasion ends with the boy obeying an order and Socrates yielding to force. It can be read as a playful scene with a shadow over it: Socrates submits to the two men who would later rule Athens by force.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

156a "If you persuade me ... or even if you don't?" "If I persuade you."

157b The Thracian: let no one persuade you to treat his head unless he first hands over his soul.

157c No one shall persuade Socrates otherwise; he has sworn an oath and must obey.

176b The boy is not altogether persuaded, and thinks he needs the charm.
176c The boy would do something terrible if he did not obey his guardian.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Crito*'s Socrates, always the kind to be persuaded by nothing of his own but the argument that seems best to him when he reasons, is told elsewhere (46b; see λόγος), and so is the opening of the *Republic*, where Polemarchus and his friends offer Socrates the choice of proving stronger or staying, and Socrates asks about a third way, persuasion (1.327c; see βιάζομαι).

Translation in this edition

"Persuade" renders the active (156a3, 156a4, 157b3, 157c1); "obey" renders πείθεσθαι and πείσομαι (157c2) and πειθοίμην (176c1); and "I'm not altogether persuaded by you" renders *οὐ πάνυ σοι πείθομαι* (176b1), where the middle can mean both "I am not persuaded by you" and "I do not obey you". At 157b3 πείσει is the reading of a later Paris manuscript; B, T and W have πείσῃ.

See also

βιάζομαι; ἐντολή; ἐπίτροπος; κελεύω; λόγος; οἴομαι; ὄμνυμι; παρέχω.

πεῖραν λαβεῖν · test

To make trial: what the temperate man must do to a doctor, and cannot · Charmides

πεῖραν λαβεῖν, *peiran labein*, "to test"

At a Glance

The word. Πεῖρα, "trial", "attempt", with λαμβάνω, "take": to make trial of, to put to the test.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "That the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know; but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won't he look into what it is of?" (171a).

In this edition. "Test".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Πεῖρα lies behind the English "empirical", through ἐμπειρία, "experience", and is a cousin of Latin *periculum*, "peril": a trial, an attempt, the experience gained by trying. To take a trial of something is to try it out, to find out by testing what it is or what it is worth, as one tests a horse or a friend.

Use in the book

The phrase names the task that defeats temperance. Knowledge of knowledge can tell that a man has some knowledge, since medicine is a knowledge; "but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won't he look into what it is of?" (171a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). Each knowledge is defined by its objects (see ὁρίζω), so to test the doctor one must look into the healthy and the diseased, and only a doctor can do that (171a–c; see ᾗ ἰατρικός; ὁμότεχνος). The trial is the point at which knowing that someone knows must become knowing what he knows, and temperance, as defined, cannot make the step (see ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν).

The phrase describes what Socrates spends the dialogue doing: making trial of what others say they know. He tests the boy's opinion (159a) and Critias' formula (163d–175b), and his tests succeed because he looks at what each claim is about. The phrase can be read as the irony at the centre of the dialogue: the testing that Socrates practises is the one thing temperance, on Critias' account, could not do.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the argument it begins.

171a To test what knowledge the doctor has, the temperate man must look into what it is of.

171a–c Only a doctor can examine a doctor in the healthy and the diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* Socrates proposes a way of testing that leaves the poets out. Gatherings like theirs, he says, if they are made up of men of the kind most of

them claim to be, need no borrowed voices and no poets, who cannot be asked what they mean; when people bring the poets into a discussion, some say the poet means one thing and others another, and they argue about a matter they have no means of testing; such men talk among themselves in their own words, taking trial of one another and giving it. We too, he tells Protagoras, should put the poets aside and talk with each other directly, "taking trial of the truth and of ourselves" (347e–348a). The *Protagoras* makes trial of men and truth together; the *Charmides* asks whether a knowledge of knowledge could make trial of a man without the truth he claims to know.

Translation in this edition

"To test what knowledge it is" renders πεῖραν λαβεῖν ἥτις ἐστίν (171a4), the phrase's object a clause, "what [knowledge] it is". "When he has to" renders δέον δέ, Goldbacher's correction (Hermann proposed δεῖν δέ) of B's δεῖ δή and T's δὲ δή; "what it is of" renders ὥντινων, from a later hand in T (B ὠντινυν, T ὥντινῡν).

See also

ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἦ ἰατρικός; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; ὁμότεχνος; ὁρίζω.

περιέλκω · drag round

περιέλκεις, *perielkeis*, "you've been dragging (me) round"

Attested: περιέλκεις (*perielkeis*; 174b). To drag around, to pull about. Socrates uses it when Critias, asked which knowledge makes a man happy, at last names the knowledge of good and bad: "You rascal! … All this time you've been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy" (174b–c; see κύκλῳ; μιαρός). The verb is physical: Critias has hauled Socrates about by withholding what he knew. The joke turns the end of the search into a reproach for its length, and the circle (see κύκλῳ) into a thing done to Socrates by Critias rather than by the argument.

See also κύκλῳ; μιαρός.

περιρρέω · flow round

περιέρρεον, *perierreon*, "came swirling round"

Attested: περιέρρεον (*perierreon*; 155d). To flow round, of a crowd, to stream round someone. When the boy sat down beside Socrates and looked at him, "everyone in the wrestling-school came swirling round us in a ring" (155d; see κύκλῳ; παλαίστρα). The verb pictures the crowd as water, closing round the pair, and it is at that moment, Socrates says, that "I saw inside his cloak, and I was on fire" (155d; see ἱμάτιον). The image of flowing returns, transformed, in the Thracian's teaching, where good and bad flow from the soul into the body (156e; see ἐπιρρέω).

See also ἐπιρρέω; ἱμάτιον; κύκλῳ; παλαίστρα.

περιττός · odd

τοῦ περιττοῦ, *tou perittou*, "the odd"

Attested: περιττοῦ (*perittou*; 166a twice). Beyond the regular, extraordinary; in arithmetic, odd. Socrates uses it to answer Critias' claim that calculation has no work as a house is the work of house-building: calculation is of the even and the odd (see πλῆθος), and "the odd and the even are something other than calculation itself" (166a; see ἄρτιος; λογιστική). The odd and the even are the objects that make calculation a knowledge of something; they are distinct from the knowledge itself, and the question that follows is what temperance is knowledge of, "that is something other than temperance itself" (166b).

See also ἄρτιος; λογιστική; πλῆθος.

πιστεύω · trust

πιστεύεις, *pisteueis*, "(don't you) believe"; πιστεύω, *pisteuō*, "(I don't) trust"

Attested: πιστεύεις (*pisteueis*; 161a), πιστεύω (*pisteuō*; 169a). To trust, to believe, to rely on. Twice, once of a poet and once of oneself. Socrates asks the boy, "don't you believe that Homer is right when he says Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need?" (161a; see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ), and the boy's trust in Homer refutes his own definition. Later Socrates says of the question whether anything can have its power in relation to itself, "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ). The boy trusts the poet and loses his answer; Socrates distrusts himself and keeps the question open.

See also αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; μέγας ἀνήρ.

πλείων · more

πλέον, *pleon*, "more", "anything more"

Attested: πλέον (*pleon*; 168c, 170a). More; the comparative of πολύς. In the argument about self-relation it gives one of the impossible cases: "And what is more than itself will also be less, will it not, and what is heavier lighter, and what is older younger …?" (168c–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; νέος). A thing that is more than itself must be less than itself, since "more" requires something less. At 170a the same word measures what knowledge of knowledge can do: "will it be able to distinguish anything more than that, of these things, this one is knowledge and that one is not knowledge?" (170a; see διαιρέω), where "distinguish" renders διαιρεῖν, a later correction in T; B, T and W have διευρεῖν, "find out". The comparative that makes self-relation absurd also marks the narrow limit of the knowledge that was to relate to itself.

See also διαιρέω; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; νέος.

πλῆθος · number

Number, quantity: the object of calculation, and one of the things that cannot relate to themselves · Charmides

πλήθους, *plēthous*, "quantity"; πλήθη, *plēthē*, "numbers"

At a Glance

The word. A great number, a multitude; in mathematics, plurality, number as distinct from magnitude.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: calculation is of the even and the odd, "how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other" (166a); and "with magnitudes and numbers and such things" a power related to itself is "altogether impossible" (168e).

In this edition. "Quantity", "numbers".

A place to read. 166a–b and 168b–e.

Meaning

Πλῆθος, from the root of πλήρης, "full", is fullness, a crowd, the mass of the people; for Aristotle, plurality, what is counted, set against μέγεθος, magnitude, what is measured. Calculation, λογιστική, was the study of how numbers stand to one another.

Use in the book

The word appears at two points in the argument about what a knowledge is of. Critias has denied that calculation and geometry have works like the crafts; Socrates answers that he can still point to what each knowledge is of: "Calculation, for instance, is surely of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other, isn't it?" (166a; see ἄρτιος; λογιστική; περιττός). Number is the object, distinct from the knowledge, and temperance is asked for its object in turn (166b).

At 168e number becomes a case of impossible self-relation. Socrates has argued that what is greater than itself would be smaller, and what is double itself half (168b–d; see διπλάσιος; ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον); he sums up: "For with magnitudes and numbers and such things it is altogether

impossible, isn't it?" (168e; see ἀδύνατος; μέγεθος). The word thus does opposite work in the two passages. At 166a number is the example of an object a knowledge can have; at 168e it is the example of a thing that cannot be its own object. The dialogue can be read as using the plainest of objects to show both what a knowledge needs and what a knowledge of itself would lack.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

166a Calculation is of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other.

168e With magnitudes and numbers, a power related to itself is altogether impossible.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines the term in his dictionary of the *Metaphysics*. Quantity is whatever can be split into constituents present in it, each of them by nature a single thing and an individual; a quantity that can be counted is a plurality, πλῆθος, one that can be measured a magnitude. A plurality can in principle be divided into discrete parts, a magnitude into continuous ones; and a plurality with a limit is a number.[209] The *Charmides*' pair at 168e, magnitudes and numbers, is Aristotle's pair of quantities.

Translation in this edition

"How they stand in quantity" renders πλήθους ὅπως ἔχει (166a6), and "magnitudes and numbers" μεγέθη ... καὶ πλήθη (168e5–6).

See also

ἀδύνατος; ἄρτιος; διπλάσιος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; λογιστική; μέγεθος; περιττός.

[209] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.13, 1020a7–14.

ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν · making and doing

Making and doing: the pair Socrates first treats as one and Critias then divides · Charmides

τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν, *to poiein kai to prattein*, "making and doing"

At a Glance

The word. Two infinitives with the article: ποιεῖν, to make, produce; πράττειν, to do, act, fare.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "Tell me ... don't you call making and doing the same thing?" "No indeed" (163b).

In this edition. "Making and doing".

A place to read. 161d–163e.

Meaning

Ποιεῖν is to bring something about, to make a product; πράττειν is to carry through, to act, and also to fare, as in εὖ πράττειν, "do well". In ordinary Greek they overlapped, and either could be said of a craftsman at work.

Use in the book

The pair has two moments, and in the first Socrates runs them together. Against the boy's formula he argues that writing and reading are "doing something", so that the boys who wrote their enemies' names as well as their own were not doing their own business, and that "healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e; see οἰκοδομέω; ὑφαίνω). If producing is doing, a man who does his own business must work at and do everything for himself (162a; see νόμος). With Critias Socrates repeats the step: craftsmen make other people's things and may be temperate, so those who do other people's business may be temperate too (162e–163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες).

In the second moment Critias divides them. Asked, "don't you call making and doing the same thing?", he says, "No indeed", and draws the distinction from Hesiod (163b). The division and the definition that comes

from it are told elsewhere (163b–e; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). What belongs to the pair is the shift it records. Socrates' argument depended on ordinary usage, in which a man who makes a shoe is doing something; Critias' defence depends on a technical usage of his own, in which only good things done are doings. The pair can be read as the place where the dialogue moves from what words ordinarily mean to what a speaker decides they mean, and Socrates lets the move stand (163d; see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων).

Places to read

The passage in which the pair is set side by side, with the arguments on either side.

161d–e Writing, reading, healing, building and weaving are all doing something.

162e–163a Craftsmen make other people's things and may be temperate.

163b Does Critias call making and doing the same? No.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the distinction a principle. Among the things that can be otherwise there is what can be made and what can be done, and production and action are distinct; so the state of acting with reason differs from the state of producing with reason, and neither contains the other, for an action is not a production, nor a production an action.[210] Everyone who makes, he says elsewhere, makes for the sake of something, and what is made is an end not without qualification but in relation to something and of something; what is done is an end without qualification, since doing well is the end, and desire is directed at it.[211] His account of craft and of prudence that rests on the distinction is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4–5; see ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

Translation in this edition

"Making and doing" renders τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν (163b1–2), and the edition keeps "make" for ποιεῖν and "do" for πράττειν throughout 161b–

[210] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4, 1140a1–6.

[211] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139b1–4.

164c, as the Key Words explain, so that the distinction is visible in English (see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν).

See also

ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; νόμος; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; οἰκοδομέω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; ὑφαίνω.

ποιέω · make, do

To make, to do, to cause: the verb of the craftsman, of the virtue that makes men good, and of the last plot of the boy and his guardian · Charmides

ποιεῖ, *poiei*, "makes"; ποιεῖν, *poiein*, "make", "making", "do"; ποιῶν, *poiōn*, "in making"; ποιοίην, *poioiēn*, "do"; ποιήσω, *poiēsō*, "I'll do it"; ποιήσει, *poiēsei*, "will ... make"

At a Glance

The word. To make, produce, bring about; to do, act; to cause something to be so, to make someone such.

In the *Charmides*. Throughout the dialogue: of craftsmen who make things (162e–164b), of temperance that makes men good (160d–161a), of medicine that makes us healthy (164b, 174c), and at the end of the boy's resolve, "Then I'll do it" (176c).

In this edition. "Make" in the argument of 161b–164c; elsewhere "do", "make".

A place to read. 160d–161b and 162e–164c.

Meaning

Ποιέω covers what English divides between "make" and "do", and adds "cause" and "treat as". Plato and Aristotle narrowed it: in the *Sophist* making is bringing into being what was not there before (219b), and for Aristotle the end of making is something other than the making (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5, 1140b6–7).

Use in the book

The verb carries three arguments. In the refutation of modesty it is the verb of a virtue's effect: Socrates asks the boy to consider "what sort of person temperance makes you by being present" (160d; see σωφροσύνη παροῦσα), and temperance is good "if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad" (161a; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). A virtue is known by what it makes of its possessor.

In the argument with Critias it is the craftsman's verb. All craftsmen make something; they make other people's things as well as their own; may they be temperate even so? (162e–163a; see δημιουργός). The doctor "in making someone healthy" makes something beneficial for himself and for his patient (164a–b; see ὀνίνημι). Between these, Critias separates making from doing (163b; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). The verb returns in the last argument, where Socrates asks whether, if the knowledge of good and bad is taken away, medicine will "make us any less healthy" (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; οὐχ ἧττον).

At the end the verb is simply "do". The boy, who would not disobey his guardian, says, "Then I'll do it" (176c; see πείθω); and Socrates asks, "You two ... what are you plotting to do?" (176c; see βουλεύομαι; πείθω). The verb that measured virtues and crafts ends as the verb of a decision made without argument.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb carries the argument; its ordinary uses are not listed.

160d What sort of person does temperance make the boy by being present?

161a Temperance is good if it makes good those it is present with.

160e The boy: temperance makes a person feel shame.

162e–163a All craftsmen make something, and other people's things as well as their own.

163b–e Critias separates making from doing; temperance is the doing of good things.

164a–b The doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial.

174a Which of the kinds of knowledge makes the man happy?

174c Without the knowledge of good and bad, will medicine make us any less healthy?

174e Would temperance make us healthy, and not medicine?

176c The boy will do what his guardian orders; what are the two plotting to do?

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea defines making for the first division of the arts. Farming and the care of every mortal body, the making of things put together and fashioned, which we call equipment, and imitation, can all be called by one name, since whatever was not before and someone brings into being afterwards, we say that the one who brings it makes, ποιεῖν, and the thing brought is made; so all these arts are productive, ποιητική (219a–b). The definition can be read as the one the *Charmides*' craftsmen fit, and Critias' distinction as an attempt to raise doing above it.

Translation in this edition

"Make" renders ποιεῖν and its forms through the argument of 161b–164c, as the Key Words record, so that "make", "do" and "work" render ποιεῖν, πράττειν and ἐργάζεσθαι apart; elsewhere the English follows the sense: "makes you" at 160d7, "makes good" at 161a8, "make us ... healthy" at 174c5, and "do" at 176c1–5.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; βουλεύομαι; δημιουργός; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ὀνίνημι; οὐχ ἧττον; πάρειμι; πείθω; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα.

ποίημα · verses, a thing made

A thing made, a poem: Critias' "own verses", and the making that may be a disgrace · Charmides

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα, *ta heautou poiēmata*, "the poet's own verses"; ποίημα, *poiēma*, "a thing made"

At a Glance

The word. A thing made, a work; especially a poem, the poet's making.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: Critias seemed as angry with Charmides "as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses" (162d), and Hesiod held that "a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace" (163c).

In this edition. "Verses", "a thing made".

A place to read. 162c–163c.

Meaning

Ποίημα is the product of ποιέω, "make": anything made, and above all a poem, since the poet, ποιητής, was the maker par excellence. The two senses lie side by side in the *Charmides*, a page apart.

Use in the book

The first use is a simile. The boy, wanting not to answer for the definition himself, kept prodding Critias and made out that he had been refuted; Critias would not put up with it, and seemed to Socrates "as angry with Charmides as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses" (162c–d; see ὑποκριτής; φιλοτίμως). The edition's note at 162d explains its point: "Critias was also a poet", and "'the poet's own verses' (ta heautou poiēmata) echoes the formula under discussion, 'one's own'." The definition, doing one's own business, is Critias' own poem, and the boy has performed it badly.

The second use is Critias' own, in his reading of Hesiod, who, he says, held "that a thing made may sometimes become a disgrace, when it does not come about with what is fine, but that work is never any disgrace" (163c; see ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ). The noun that named Critias' verses

names the class of products he now ranks below works. The two uses can be read together: the man who was angry for his own poem goes on to make "things made" the lower class, and keeps the higher, "works", for what is made finely and beneficially.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

162d Critias is as angry as a poet with an actor who makes a mess of his own verses.

163c A thing made may sometimes become a disgrace; work never.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Laws* the lawgivers call themselves poets. If the tragic poets come asking to perform in the new city, the Athenian stranger would answer them: we ourselves are poets of a tragedy, the finest and best we are able to make; the whole of our polity has been put together as a likeness of the finest and best life, and that, we hold, is in truth the truest tragedy. So you are poets, and we too are poets, of the same matter: your competitors in craft and in contest for the finest of dramas, which by its nature only a true law can complete, or so we hope (7.817b–c). The *Charmides*' Critias, a poet who would later help to rule Athens, guards his own verses; the *Laws*' lawgivers make the city itself their poem.

Translation in this edition

"The poet's own verses" renders τὰ ἑαυτοῦ ποιήματα (162d3), with the reflexive kept as "own"; "a thing made" renders ποίημα (163c1), where Critias sets it against ἔργον, "work".

See also

ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; μετὰ τοῦ καλοῦ; ποιητής; ὑποκριτής; φιλοτίμως.

ποίησις · making

Making: the class Critias sets below doing and working, and the word Socrates lets go · Charmides

ποίησιν, *poiēsin*, "making"; ποιήσεις, *poiēseis*, "makings"

At a Glance

The word. Making, production, the act of bringing a thing into being; also poetry, the poet's making.

In the *Charmides*. Four times, in Critias' distinction and Socrates' summary of it: Hesiod "held making to be something other than doing and working" (163b), and "makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163c); "the makings of good things that you call doings" (163d); "the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things" (163e).

In this edition. "Making", "makings".

A place to read. 163b–e.

Meaning

The noun of ποιέω names the act of making and, in the plural, particular makings. As with ποίημα, the art of the poet took over the general word, and ποίησις came to mean poetry.

Use in the book

The noun belongs to the four sentences in which Critias ranks the verbs and Socrates sums him up. Critias says that Hesiod "held making to be something other than doing and working" (163b), and that "things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163c; see ἐργασία). Socrates restates the rule: Critias calls "the makings of good things" doings (163d; see πρᾶξις). Then he lets the distinction go: "Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?" (163e; see ὀνομάζω). The noun moves in four steps from Critias' lowest class to a word Socrates treats as interchangeable with "doing".

The ranking is told elsewhere (163b–e; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). What belongs to the noun is that it ends as the word Socrates no longer needs. He accepts Critias' thing, the good things done, and leaves him his names (163d), and making, which Critias had made the mark of the lower trades, is set beside doing as one of several names for the same act. The noun can be read as the casualty of Socrates' indifference to words.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

163b Hesiod held making to be something other than doing and working.

163c Makings of things made finely and beneficially Hesiod called workings and doings.

163d Critias calls the makings of good things doings.

163e The doing, or the making, or whatever one likes to call it, of good things.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* Diotima uses the noun to show how a name for the whole can be given to a part. Making, ποίησις, covers a great deal: whatever causes anything to pass from not being into being is making, so that the work done under every craft is making, and all who practise the crafts are makers. Yet we do not call them makers, ποιηταί; they go by other names, and from making as a whole one portion is marked off, the one that deals with music and verse, and given the name of the whole: only this is called ποίησις, and only those who have this portion are called poets (205b–c). Diotima makes the point to explain why only one kind of desire is called love; the *Charmides*' Critias can be read as making the same move in the other direction, keeping the general word for the lower kind.

Translation in this edition

"Making" renders ποίησιν (163b9, 163e1), and "makings" ποιήσεις (163c4, 163d3), the plural kept so that "makings" answers "workings and doings".

See also

ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἐργασία; ὀνομάζω; πρᾶξις.

ποιητής · poet

ποιητῶν, *poiētōn*, "poets"; ποιητής, *poiētēs*, "a poet"

Attested: ποιητῶν (*poiētōn*; 157e), ποιητής (*poiētēs*; 162d). A maker; above all, a poet. Twice. The boy's father's house "has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets" (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; παραδίδωμι), so that poets are the keepers of a family's fame. And Critias, when the boy prods him and makes out that he had been refuted, is likened to a poet angry with an actor who spoils his verses (162d; see ποίημα; ὑποκριτής), so that the formula under discussion becomes a poet's work. Poets praise the house in the prologue, and the man of the house is likened to a poet in the argument; the *Protagoras*' advice to put the poets aside and test one another directly is told elsewhere (347e–348a; see πεῖραν λαβεῖν).

See also ἀρετή; παραδίδωμι; πεῖραν λαβεῖν; ποίημα; ποιητικός; ὑποκριτής.

ποιητικός · poetic

ποιητικός, *poiētikos*, "(quite) the poet"

Attested: ποιητικός (*poiētikos*; 155a). Able to make; of a person, gifted at poetry. Critias uses it of his ward: the boy is "a philosopher and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (154e–155a; see φιλόσοφος). Socrates answers, "That fine gift ... has been in your family a long way back, from your kinship with Solon" (155a; see Σόλων), and the edition's note at 155a adds that Solon was a kinsman of Dropides, and that "poetry, Socrates suggests, runs in the family." The adjective follows "philosopher" in Critias' praise of the boy's soul, and Socrates at once asks for the boy to be called over (155a; see νέος).

See also νέος; ποιητής; Σόλων; φιλόσοφος.

πόλις · city

The city: the field in which a temperance that knows would rule, and the one the dialogue never sees · Charmides

πόλις, *polis*, "city"; πόλεως, *poleōs*, "city"

At a Glance

The word. A city, a citizen body with its territory and laws, the self-governing community of the Greeks.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, each time as the city a definition of temperance would have to govern well: a city under the law of making everything for oneself (161e–162a), a city governed by temperance (171e) and temperance as guide of the management "of household and of city" (172d).

In this edition. "City".

A place to read. 171d–172d.

Meaning

The πόλις was at once a place and its people: Athens, the Athenians. To manage it well, εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι, was the end of politics.

Use in the book

The city appears only in hypotheses. The boy's formula is tested by asking whether "a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man" to make everything for himself (161e; see νόμος; οἰκέω); a temperately managed city would be well managed, and this one would not, so the formula, read so, falls (162a). The city returns in Socrates' picture of what temperance would give if, as was supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know: a household run by temperance would be run well, "and a city governed by it too, and everything else that temperance ruled" (171e; see πολιτεύω; ἀναμάρτητος). Socrates then withdraws the agreement that temperance would be a great good "as the guide of the management of household and of city" (172d; see διοίκησις).

The city is the measure of the two definitions it is brought against, and is never seen. The dialogue is set in a wrestling-school, among the young men of Athens, beside the heir of two great houses, the day after Socrates' return from the army at Potidaea, where there had been a battle shortly before he left (153a–b), and the city those men will later rule appears only as a thing a definition would have to make well run. The word can be read as the dialogue's horizon: temperance must make a city well managed, and none of the temperances proposed could.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

161e Would a city be well managed under a law that each man make everything for himself?

171e A city governed by temperance would be governed well.

172d Temperance as guide of the management of household and of city.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* temperance is found in a city before it is found in a soul. Socrates and Glaucon agree that the city they have founded may be called stronger than its pleasures and desires and than itself, and so temperate, since in it the desires of the many and inferior are ruled by the desires and wisdom of the few and better; and if the rulers and the ruled share the same opinion about who should rule, temperance is in both. So temperance is like a harmony: not in one part, as wisdom and courage are, but stretched through the whole city, making the weakest, the strongest and the middle sing the same tune, so that this like-mindedness is most rightly called temperance: the accord between what is by nature worse and what is by nature better over which of them is to rule, in a city and in each one of us (4.431d–432a). The *Charmides*' city is run by a knowledge; the *Republic*'s is held together by an agreement.

Translation in this edition

"City" renders πόλις at 161e10 and 171e6 and πόλεως at 172d4. At 161e10 "would be well managed" renders εὖ οἰκεῖσθαι, the reading of T and W; B has ἀρκεῖσθαι, "be content".

See also

ἀναμάρτητος; διοίκησις; νόμος; οἰκέω; πολιτεύω.

πολιτεύω · be governed

πολιτευομένη, *politeuomenē*, "governed"

Attested: πολιτευομένη (*politeuomenē*; 171e). To be a citizen, to take part in public life; in the passive, of a city, to be governed, to have a constitution. It comes once, in the picture of the life without error: "And so a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too" (171e; see οἰκέω; πόλις). The participle pairs with the household's οἰκουμένη, "run" (so B and W; T has οἰκονομουμένη): the household is managed, the city governed, and temperance would do both. The verb belongs to the vocabulary of constitutions, πολιτεία, and gives the picture the shape of political theory: a constitution in which knowledge rules.

See also οἰκέω; πόλις.

πολιτική · statesmanship

πολιτική, *politikē*, "statesmanship"

Attested: πολιτική (*politikē*; 170b). The art of the citizen and of the city; statesmanship. It names the knowledge of the just in Socrates' sorting of the kinds of knowledge: knowledge of knowledge is not the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy, or of the just (the datives that make this the comparison are Bonitz's conjecture; B and T have nominatives); "No: the one, I think, is medicine, the other statesmanship, and this one nothing but knowledge" (170b; see ἰατρική). Statesmanship is set beside

medicine as a knowledge with its own object, the just, which knowledge of knowledge does not share. The *Gorgias*' division of the art of the soul, politics, into legislation and justice is told elsewhere (464b–c; see θεραπεύω).

See also δίκαιος; θεραπεύω; ἰατρική.

πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν · concede many things

πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν, *polla ge synkechōrēkamen*, "we have conceded many things"

Attested: πολλά γε συγκεχωρήκαμεν (*polla ge synkechōrēkamen*; 175b). To concede many things: Socrates' phrase for the inquiry's errors. "And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument" (175b; see συγχωρέω; συμβαίνω). He lists them. "For we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was; and we conceded, again, that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either" (175b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης); and the purpose of the second, conceded "with the utmost magnificence", that the temperate man might know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it (175c; see μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογία). The first had been made at 169d, "to keep our argument moving"; Socrates counts them to show how much was given away and how little it helped: "though it found us so simple-minded and so easy to deal with, our inquiry is no more able to find the truth" (175c–d; see πανταχῇ ἠττώμεθα); the failure he lays on himself as a poor inquirer (175e).

See also ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογία; πανταχῇ ἠττώμεθα; συγχωρέω; συμβαίνω.

πολυπραγμονέω · be a busybody

ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε, *epolypragmoneite*, "were you being busybodies"

Attested: ἐπολυπραγμονεῖτε (*epolypragmoneite*; 161d). To be busy with many things; to meddle, to be a busybody. Socrates asks the boy, who as a schoolboy wrote his enemies' names as well as his own and his friends': "Well, were you being busybodies, and not temperate, when you did that?" "Not at all" (161d–e; see γραμματιστής; ὄνομα). The verb is the opposite that "doing one's own business" was meant to exclude: in ordinary Greek, as the edition's note at 161b puts it, the formula meant "keeping to one's own affairs, the opposite of polypragmosynē, meddling", and the boy's formula, read in that sense, is ordinary morality. Socrates' question takes it literally instead, so that writing another's name would be meddling, and the boy's denial starts the refutation (see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The *Republic*'s definition of justice as doing one's own and not meddling, μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν, is told elsewhere (4.433a–b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

See also γραμματιστής; ὄνομα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

πορίζω · provide

πορίζειν, *porizein*, "provide"

Attested: πορίζειν (*porizein*; 157b). To provide, procure, furnish; from πόρος, a way through, a ford or a passage, and so a means of getting something. In the Thracian's teaching temperance comes to be in souls from beautiful words, "and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b; see λόγοι καλοί; πάρειμι). The verb shares its root with the dialogue's perplexity. The edition's Key Words put it plainly: "poros is a way through, and aporein, 'to be at a loss', is to have none" (see ἀπορέω; ἀπορία). In the doctrine, once temperance is present the way to health is easy; in the argument, the search for what temperance is leaves both partners without a way, and Socrates asks whether Critias is "better provided with a way

through" than he is (167b; see εὔπορος). The two uses of the root can be read as the dialogue's contrast between the charm, which makes everything easy to provide, and the inquiry, which finds no passage.

See also ἀπορέω; ἀπορία; εὔπορος; λόγοι καλοί; πάρειμι.

πρᾶξις · doing, action

Doing and action: the quiet actions of the first definition, the noun of Critias' distinction, and every action of the temperate life · Charmides

πράξεις, *praxeis*, "actions", "doings"; πράξεων, *praxeōn*, "(the vigorous and quick) ones"; πράξεως, *praxeōs*, "doing"; πρᾶξιν, *praxin*, "the doing"; πράξει, *praxei*, "action"

At a Glance

The word. A doing, an action, a piece of business; also the way things go for a man, his fortune. The noun of πράττω.

In the *Charmides*. Eight times: the "quiet actions in life" of the first definition (160b–c); the doing that Critias sets apart from making (163b–d); his formula, "temperance is the doing of good things" (163e); and the temperate life, whose members "must necessarily do finely and well in every action" (172a).

In this edition. "Actions", "doing", "doings", "action".

A place to read. 163b–e.

Meaning

Πρᾶξις names the act of doing and the thing done, and, like its verb, the outcome: a man's πράξεις can be his affairs or his fortunes. Greek used the word of any undertaking, a transaction, a campaign, a deed. Against ποίησις, "making", it came to mean action as distinct from production, the doing whose point is in the doing (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

Use in the book

The noun comes at three turns of the argument. In the first, actions are counted. Socrates has shown that in writing, reading, music and exercise, and in learning, remembering and deliberating, the quick is finer than the quiet, and concludes that "quiet actions in life have appeared finer to us than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places"; and even supposing "the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones", temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting quickly (160b–c; see οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν). Actions here are the units of a life, set side by side and compared.

In the second the noun is given a rank. Critias, defending "doing one's own business", says that Hesiod "held making to be something other than doing and working", and that "things made finely and beneficially he called works, and makings of that kind he called workings and doings" (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος). Socrates restates it, calling good what is one's own and the makings of good things doings (163d; see οἰκεῖος; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). A doing, in Critias' vocabulary, is a making that has turned out well, and the noun has become a title of honour. Socrates lets him assign the words as he likes, and Critias gives his definition with it: "temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

In the third the noun recovers its whole range. In the life that knowledge of what one knows would make possible, "with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy" (172a; see εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης). "Every action" takes back what Critias had narrowed: a doing is again anything done, and the question is whether a knowledge could make all of them go well. The step from acting well to being happy rides on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, "to act well" and "to fare well", as the edition's note at 172a observes; the dialogue spends its last pages showing that the step has not been earned (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

160b–c Quiet actions in life have appeared finer than quick and strong ones either nowhere or in very few places.

160c Even if the quiet actions that turn out finer were no fewer than the quick ones, temperance would not be acting quietly.

163b Hesiod held making to be something other than doing and working.

163c Makings that are fine and beneficial he called workings and doings.

163d Socrates: Critias calls the makings of good things doings.

163e Is temperance the doing, or the making, of good things? Critias: temperance is the doing of good things.

172a With error removed, those so disposed must do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* the noun separates justice from its image. The rule that the born shoemaker should cobble and do nothing else, and the carpenter build, was, Socrates tells Glaucon, a phantom of justice, and useful for that reason; justice in truth is not about a man's outward doing of his own, τὴν ἔξω πρᾶξιν τῶν αὑτοῦ, but about the inward, about himself and what is truly his. He keeps each element in him to its own task and lets the kinds in his soul meddle in none of one another's; he manages what is truly his own aright, governs and composes himself, becomes a friend to himself, and brings his three parts into accord like the three boundary notes of a scale, top, bottom and middle, binding them and whatever lies between until he is wholly one out of many, temperate and in tune. From that state, and not before, he turns to whatever he has to do, money-making, the care of his body, the city's affairs or his private bargains, and in all of it he names just and fine the action, πρᾶξις, that keeps this condition and works with it to bring it about, and wisdom the knowledge that directs that action (4.443c–e). The *Charmides*' boy offers "doing one's own business" as temperance, and the argument takes the doing outward, to writing names and cobbling shoes (161d–162a; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν); the *Republic* turns it inward, and makes the action that counts the one that follows from an ordered soul.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's separation of action from production is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.4, 1140a1–6; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

Translation in this edition

"Actions" for πράξεις (160c1), with the noun understood in "the vigorous and quick ones" for πράξεων (160c4); "doing" for πράξεως (163b9); "doings" for πράξεις (163c4, 163d3); "the doing" for πρᾶξιν (163e1, 163e10); "action" for πράξει (172a1). The Glossary pairs the noun with its verb and records the rule the English keeps: "do, πράττειν (prattein); doing, πρᾶξις. Kept apart from make and work: 161b–163e, 171d–172a."

See also

ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; εὖ πράττειν; οἰκεῖος; ὀρθότης; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; πράττω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν.

πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν · the doing of good things

The doing of good things: Critias' plain definition of temperance, and the pair that returns at the end · Charmides

τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν, *tēn tōn agathōn praxin*, "the doing ... of good things", "the doing of good things"; τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις, *tas tōn agathōn poiēseis*, "the makings of good things"

At a Glance

The word. Πρᾶξις, "doing", with the genitive of what is done: the doing of things that are good.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, with Socrates' restatement before it: "Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?" and Critias' answer, "I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e).

In this edition. "The doing of good things".

A place to read. 163c–164c.

Meaning

The phrase is a definition cast as a noun: temperance not as a disposition or a knowledge but as an activity, judged by what it does. Τὰ ἀγαθά in Greek covers both goods in the sense of things that benefit and good acts (see ἀγαθός), and Critias passes between them, speaking of the man who "makes good things" and of "the doing of good things" in a single breath.

Use in the book

The phrase is where Critias' rescue of "doing one's own business" comes to rest. He has argued from Hesiod that only things made finely and beneficially are works, that such makings are "workings and doings", and that what is fine and beneficial is "appropriate to one", everything harmful "belonging to others" (163b–c; see ἀλλότριος; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; οἰκεῖος). Socrates translates the argument into a sentence: "it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings" (163d). "One's own" has become "good", and the formula of 161b has turned into a new definition. Socrates asks for it plainly; Critias tries first to turn the question back, and then gives it: "I say that the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate, and that the one who makes good things and not bad ones is. I give you a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see διορίζομαι; ἐάω; κακός).

The definition is tested in a single step, and the step is about knowledge. A doctor who makes a patient healthy makes something beneficial and does what he ought, and so, by Critias' account, is temperate (164a–b; see τὰ δέοντα); but he need not know when his treatment benefits, and so he could be temperate without knowing it (164b–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν). Critias would sooner retract than allow a temperate man ignorant of himself, and turns to knowing oneself (164c–d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The doing of good things is not refuted. It is abandoned for a definition about knowledge.

Its pair comes back at the end. The knowledge that, Critias finally says, makes a man do well and be happy is the one "By which he knows good ... and bad" (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ), and the edition's note at 174c observes that this is "the pair on which Critias built his own definition at 163e". Critias had the right object and the wrong relation to it. The doctor showed that good things can be done without being known for good, and the dialogue's last proposal puts the knowing first: the phrase can be read as the first draft of the answer that the argument reaches and then cannot keep.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase and Socrates' restatement of it occur, with the test that follows.

163d Socrates: Critias calls the makings of good things doings.

163e Is temperance the doing, or the making, of good things? Critias: temperance is the doing of good things.

164a–c A doctor who does good things need not know when he benefits, and so may be temperate without knowing it.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates makes the good the end of every action. Callicles has conceded that some pleasures are good and some bad, and Socrates draws the consequence: good pleasures and pains are to be chosen and acted on, bad ones not, and everything, as he and Polus agreed, is to be done for the sake of good things. Does Callicles too hold that the good is that at which all actions aim, τέλος ἁπασῶν τῶν πράξεων, so that all else is done for its sake and it for the sake of nothing else? Callicles votes with them, making three. Then pleasant things too are to be done for the sake of good ones, not good things for the sake of pleasant; and can anyone at all sort the good pleasures from the bad, or does each case call for an expert? An expert, Callicles answers (499e–500a). The *Gorgias* supplies what Critias' formula leaves out: to do good things one must be able to tell which they are, and that is a knowledge.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's opening, that every action and choice is thought to aim at some good, is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 1.1, 1094a1–9; see ἀπεργάζομαι).

Translation in this edition

"The doing of good things" renders τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν πρᾶξιν (163e10), and "the doing ... of good things" the same words at 163e1, where ποίησιν, "making", stands beside πρᾶξιν; "the makings of good things" renders τὰς τῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήσεις (163d3). At 163e10 the words τῶν ἀγαθῶν are the reading of T and W; B has τῶν alone, without ἀγαθῶν.

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀλλότριος; ἀπεργάζομαι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; διορίζομαι; ἐάω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; κακός; οἰκεῖος; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; πρᾶξις; τὰ δέοντα.

πράττω · do, act

To do, to act, to fare: the verb of the boy's first and third definitions, of the doctor's treatment, of the life run by knowledge, and of the last resort to force · Charmides

πράττειν, *prattein*, "doing", "do", "to do", "acting"; πράττων, *prattōn*, "the man who does"; πράττει, *prattei*, "does", "acts"; πράττῃ, *prattēi*, "(the work he) is doing"; πράξας, *praxas*, "having acted"; ἔπραξεν, *epraxen*, "he has acted", "he acted"; ἐπράττετε, *eprattete*, "you were (not) doing"; πράττοντες, *prattontes*, "(by) acting", "those who do"; πράττοντας, *prattontas*, "those who do"; πράττοντα, *prattonta*, "the man who does (his own business)"; πράξειν, *praxein*, "(what they) would do"; πραττομένοις, *prattomenois*, "done"; πραττόμενα, *prattomena*, "the things done"; πράττεται, *prattetai*, "are done"; πράττοιεν, *prattoien*, "did"; πράττοιμεν, *prattoimen*, "we would do (well)"; πράττοιτο, *prattoito*, "be done"; πράττοι, *prattoi*, "would act"

At a Glance

The word. To do, to carry out, to manage; with an adverb, to fare, so that εὖ πράττειν is both to act well and to do well in life.

In the *Charmides*. Forty-eight times. It is the verb of Charmides' first and third definitions, "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly" (159b) and "doing one's own business" (161b); of the doctor who, "having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted" (164b–c); of the life without error, in which no one would try to do what he did not know (171e); and of the last exchange: "When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176d).

In this edition. "Do", "doing"; "act", "acted" (164b–c, 173d); "done", "are done" (171b), "be done" (173b); "do well" for εὖ πράττειν.

A place to read. 161d–164c and 171d–173d.

Meaning

Πράττω, the Attic form of πράσσω, is to pass through to an end, and so to accomplish: to do a thing, to transact business, to manage affairs; intransitively, with an adverb, to fare. The Greek verb is wider than English "do". It is the word for a statesman's dealings and a man's private affairs, and its noun πράγματα, "matters", "business", covers what both deal with. Set beside ποιεῖν, "make", it leans towards the act rather than the product, and Critias turns that leaning into a doctrine (see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). The double sense of doing and faring is the hinge of the dialogue's second half, as the edition's Key Words say of εὖ πράττειν: it "means both to act well and to fare well, to prosper, as English 'do well' also can".

Use in the book

The verb carries two of the three definitions that the boy offers and loses. His first makes temperance "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly" (159b; see κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ), and Socrates answers by comparing actions, quick and quiet (160b–c; see τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν). His third is "doing one's own business" (161b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), and Socrates refutes it by widening the verb until it covers anything done at all, writing and reading, healing, building and weaving (161d–e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πολυπραγμονέω). The edition's note at 161e names the move: "Socrates takes 'doing' to mean making or performing anything at all."

Critias narrows the verb again, from Hesiod, and makes doing the making of good things (163b–e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The doctor's case gives the verb its own argument (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; τὰ δέοντα). In a few lines it passes from doing a thing, healing, to acting in a manner: a doctor need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor each craftsman when he is going to profit from "the work he is doing", and so the doctor, "having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself—how he has acted", and yet, having acted beneficially, "he acted temperately", by Critias' account (164b–c). The doctor's deed has two descriptions, what he does and how it turns out for the patient, and he can know the first without the second. The gap between them is the whole difficulty of Critias' definition.

The same gap opens again in the life without error. If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, Socrates says, "neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know ... Nor would we allow the others we ruled to do anything except what they would do correctly", and so those so disposed would "do finely and well" and be happy (171d–172a; see εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθῶς; πρᾶξις). The verb begins the sentence as acting and ends it as faring. Socrates later withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good "if each of us did what we knew" (172d; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν), and in the dream he grants everything except the last step: everything would "be done according to the kinds of knowledge", and "the human race would act and live knowledgeably, I grant ... But that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173a–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας). The dream's question is whether doing in the first sense ever yields doing in the second.

The last use takes the verb out of the argument. Charmides and his guardian have resolved that Socrates will charm the boy whether he will or not, and Socrates yields to the boy: "When you set about doing anything, and use force, no man alive will be able to oppose you" (176d; see βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι). What the two did with force some twenty-five years later is told elsewhere (176c; see βιάζομαι). The verb that the argument could not tie to

knowledge can be read as ending, in the hands of the boy and his guardian, as doing backed by force.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb occurs outside its set phrases, which have their own entries: κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ (159b), τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν (160c), τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν with ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν and οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες (161b–163c, the verb's other uses there included), and εὖ πράττειν (172a, 173d, 174b).

163e The man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things.

164b The doctor who makes someone healthy does what he ought; and the man who does what he ought is temperate.

164b–c A doctor need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor a craftsman when he will profit from the work he is doing; having acted beneficially, the doctor may not know how he has acted.

171b The examiner looks into whether the things said are said truly and whether the things done are done rightly.

171e We would not try to do what we did not know, nor allow others to do anything except what they would do correctly.

172d Socrates doubts that it would be a great good if each of us did what we knew.

173a–b If temperance ruled, everything would be done according to the kinds of knowledge.

173d The human race would act and live knowledgeably; that by acting knowledgeably we would do well is not yet shown.

176d When Charmides sets about doing anything and uses force, no man alive will be able to oppose him.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* the same double verb is read in a poem. Simonides had written that every man is good who has fared well, πράξας εὖ, and bad if he has fared badly, and Socrates gives the line his own sense. What faring well at letters makes a man good at letters? Plainly, learning them. What well-doing makes a good doctor? Learning how to treat the sick. A bad doctor must first have been a doctor, and a good one; those who know nothing of medicine

could never fare badly into being doctors at all. So a good man may become bad, through time, toil, illness or some other mischance, "for this is the one bad doing, to be robbed of knowledge" (344e–345b). Socrates' reading makes faring well a matter of knowing, and can be read as the very step that the *Charmides*' dream withholds and cannot show.

Translation in this edition

The Key Words record that the three verbs of 161b–164c are kept apart, "'make' for poiein, 'do' for prattein, 'work' for ergazesthai", and of "doing one's own business" that "the English keeps the verb 'do' wherever the argument depends on it". With the adverbs of 164b–c and 173d it is "act": "having acted beneficially", "he acted temperately" (164b11–c5), "would act and live knowledgeably", "by acting knowledgeably" (173d1, 173d4); the passive is "done", "the things done" and "are done" (171b7–9) and "be done" (173b1). Εὖ πράττειν is "do well" (172a2–3, 173d4, 173d7, 174b12). At 164b9 Burnet prints οὗ with T and W, where B has τοῦ, and πράττῃ with B and W, where T has πράξῃ; at 173b1 *πάντ' ἂν* is his own correction, for ἄν in B and T and *πάντα* in Stobaeus; at 173d4 ἂν πράττοντες is T's reading, where B has τὰ πράττοντες.

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; βιάζομαι; ἐναντιόομαι; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; ὀρθῶς; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; πολυπραγμονέω; πρᾶξις; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὰ δέοντα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν.

πρεσβεύω · go as ambassador

πρεσβεύων, *presbeuōn*, "(whenever) he went as ambassador"

Attested: πρεσβεύων (*presbeuōn*; 158a). To be the elder, and so to serve as an envoy; the plural of πρέσβυς, πρέσβεις, "elders", was the ordinary Greek word for an embassy (see πρέσβυς). The participle comes in Socrates' praise of the boy's mother's side: no one on the continent was thought handsomer

or bigger than his uncle Pyrilampes, "whenever he went as ambassador to the Great King or to anyone else on the continent" (158a; see μέγας βασιλεύς). The edition's note on his embassies is given under ἤπειρος. The praise is of the envoy's looks and stature, not of his diplomacy. In the family's record, as at the boy's entrance, what is admired first is what can be seen (see κάλλος; μείζων).

See also ἤπειρος; κάλλος; μέγας βασιλεύς; μείζων; πρέσβυς.

πρέσβυς · older

πρεσβύτερον, *presbyteron*, "older"

Attested: πρεσβύτερον (*presbyteron*; 168c). Old, an old man; the comparative πρεσβύτερος is "older", and as a noun "elder", whence the church's "presbyter" and, through it, English "priest". The comparative comes in the list of relatives by which Socrates tests a power related to itself: "And what is more than itself will also be less, will it not, and what is heavier lighter, and what is older younger, and so with everything else?" (168c–d; see βαρύς; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; νέος); "will also be less" renders ἔσται, B's reading, where T has ἐστι, "is" (168c9). Age can be read as the plainest of the cases: a thing older than itself would have to be, at the same moment, younger than itself, and the absurdity needs no argument. The comparative names a relation between two terms, and the list shows by such examples that a relation turned back on its own subject makes it its own opposite (see πρὸς ἄλλο; πρὸς ἑαυτό).

See also βαρύς; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; νέος; πρὸς ἄλλο; πρὸς ἑαυτό.

προβάλλω · put forward

προύβαλεν, *proubalen*, "he put it forward"

Attested: προύβαλεν (*proubalen*; 162b), the aorist with its augment contracted, προ-έβαλεν. To throw before, to put forward; of a question or a riddle, to set it for someone to solve, whence πρόβλημα, a thing put forward,

a problem. Charmides has said that the man who defined temperance as doing one's own business "was thought to be very wise indeed", and Socrates concludes: "Then I am quite certain he put it forward as a riddle, on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one's own business is" (162b; see αἴνιγμα; σοφός; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The verb turns the definition into a challenge set by its author. Its absurdity on the literal reading becomes a sign that it was meant to be solved, and the solving falls, a page later, to Critias, whom Socrates by then is sure is the author (162c–e; see αἰνίττομαι; παραδέχομαι).

See also αἴνιγμα; αἰνίττομαι; παραδέχομαι; σοφός; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

Πρόδικος · Prodicus

Προδίκου, *Prodikou*, "Prodicus"

Attested: Προδίκου (*Prodikou*; 163d). The sophist Prodicus of Ceos, a contemporary of Socrates, whom the edition's note at 163d calls "famous for distinguishing near-synonyms". When Critias separates making from doing and working, Socrates recognizes the school: "After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words. Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to" (163d; see διαιρέω; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). The note finds the joke in "Critias, aristocrat and poet, ... splitting words like a paid sophist". Plato's Socrates speaks of Prodicus often, usually with mock respect for his lessons on the correctness of names. He has not heard Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture on the subject, he says, only the one-drachma one (*Cratylus* 384b–c); "first, as Prodicus says, one must learn about the correctness of names" (*Euthydemus* 277e); he calls himself Prodicus' pupil (*Protagoras* 341a; see δεινός), and blames him for not educating him well enough (*Meno* 96d; see προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν). Prodicus' lesson in distinctions in the *Protagoras* is told elsewhere (337a–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν). Xenophon's Socrates retells from memory his best-known piece, a treatise on Heracles: the hero, setting out from boyhood towards manhood, goes off by himself and sits uncertain

which of the two roads to turn down, and two women, Virtue and Vice, come to him, each urging her own; Socrates adds that Prodicus set out the ideas in loftier language than he has just done.[212]

See also δεινός; διαιρέω; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; Ἡρακλῆς; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν.

πρόδρομος · advance guard

πρόδρομοι, *prodromoi*, "the advance guard"

Attested: πρόδρομοι (*prodromoi*; 154a). Running ahead; as a noun, a forerunner. Critias sees young men coming in, trading insults, with a crowd following behind: "The fellows coming in are the advance guard and the lovers of the one who is thought the most beautiful—at the moment, anyway" (154a; see ἐραστής; λοιδορέω). The edition's note at 154a observes that "Prodromoi, 'forerunners', was also the military word for scouts riding ahead of an army; if the sense is felt, Critias is teasing Socrates in the language of his campaign". Socrates had "got back from the army at Potidaea the evening before" (153a), and the word can be read as greeting the soldier with an army of lovers, the boy's arrival announced like the approach of a force; a page later Socrates is the one taken by it (155d–e; see ἁλίσκομαι).

See also ἁλίσκομαι; ἐραστής; λοιδορέω.

πρόειμι · keep moving

προΐοι, *proioi*, "(to keep our argument) moving"

Attested: προΐοι (*proioi*; 169d). To go forward, advance, from εἶμι, "go". Critias, ashamed before the company, will not admit that he cannot make the distinctions asked of him, and covers up his perplexity (169c–d; see ἐπικαλύπτω; σαφής). Socrates steps in, as he says, "to keep our argument moving": "Well, if you like, Critias, let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time, whether it is so or not" (169d; see αὖθις; ἐπισκέπτομαι). The argument is a

[212] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.1.21–34.

traveller that must not stall, and to keep it going Socrates grants what has not been shown. The grant is one of the concessions he counts against himself at the end (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The verb names the price of momentum: an argument kept moving by agreement rather than by proof.

See also αὖθις; ἐπικαλύπτω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; σαφής.

προκαλέομαι · challenge

προυκαλούμην, *proukaloumēn*, "I was challenging (him to make)"

Attested: προυκαλούμην (*proukaloumēn*; 169c), the imperfect with its augment contracted. To call forth, to challenge: to call out an opponent to single combat, or, in the law courts, to challenge the other party to a formal test of his evidence. Socrates has asked Critias to show first that a knowledge of knowledge is possible, and then that it would be of benefit (169b–c). Critias, Socrates says, caught by the perplexity as one catches a yawn, "was ashamed in front of the company; he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀπορία; διαιρέω). The distinctions are those of the great man's task a few lines before: whether anything has its power in relation to itself, and whether knowledge is among such things (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ). Socrates had disclaimed the task for himself; he sets it to Critias as a challenge, and the challenge goes unanswered.

See also αἰσχύνομαι; ἀπορία; διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ.

πρὸς ἄλλο · in relation to something else

In relation to something else: the rule that the argument presupposes, and the alternative that a great man would have to decide · Charmides

πρὸς ἄλλο, *pros allo*, "in relation to something else"

At a Glance

The word. Πρός with the accusative, "towards, in relation to", and ἄλλο, "something else": a power or a thing directed at another.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the question that Socrates leaves to a great man: "whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else" (169a).

In this edition. "In relation to something else".

A place to read. 168b–169a.

Meaning

With the accusative, πρός marks direction, and so relation: what a thing faces, what it is measured against. Aristotle made it the name of a class, τὸ πρός τι, the relative: the greater is greater than something, the double double of something (see διπλάσιος). Πρὸς ἄλλο is the ordinary case, the relation that needs a second term.

Use in the book

The phrase states, in its one place, the rule that the whole argument has taken for granted. Every knowledge Socrates names is of something "distinct from the knowledge itself": calculation of the even and the odd, weighing of the heavy and the light (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος). Every sight, hearing, desire, wish, love, fear and opinion is of something other than itself (167c–168a; see ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων), and every relative has its correlate: the greater is greater than something smaller, and "there is no double of anything but a half" (168b–c; see διπλάσιος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). Critias' claim is that temperance alone breaks the rule, a knowledge of itself as well as of the others (166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν).

After the parallels Socrates puts the matter in general form and declines to settle it: "It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not; and again, if there are things that relate to themselves, whether among them is the knowledge that we say temperance is" (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἑαυτό). The phrase gives the first horn its content. If nothing has its power in relation to itself, everything has it only in relation to something else, and a knowledge of knowledge is impossible. Socrates does not choose between the horns. He leaves the decision to a great man and grants the possibility for now, as he puts it, "to keep our argument moving" (169d; see πρόειμι).

Every knowledge that survives the argument is of the ordinary kind, directed at something else. Medicine makes us healthy, cobbling shod and generalship safe in war (174c; see σκυτική; στρατηγική), and the knowledge of good and bad, the last candidate, is of what makes the others' work turn out well (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The one knowledge turned towards itself is the one that cannot be shown to do any good. The dialogue can be read as ending, without saying so, where the phrase put the burden of proof: what is not shown to be an exception falls under the rule.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the passages that state the rule it names.

166a–b Each knowledge is of something distinct from the knowledge itself: calculation of the even and the odd, weighing of the heavy and the light.

166c Critias: all the other kinds of knowledge are of something else, this one alone of itself and of the others.

167c–168a No sight, hearing, sense, desire, wish, love, fear or opinion is of itself and the others without being of what the others are of.

168b–c The greater is greater than something smaller; there is no double of anything but a half.

169a It needs a great man to determine whether nothing has its power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea uses the same distinction to tell the different apart from being. He takes it that Theaetetus will grant that of the things that are, some are spoken of as themselves by themselves, αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά, and others always in relation to others, πρὸς ἄλλα; and the different is always in relation to a different. Were the different like being, sharing in both kinds, there would sometimes be a different thing that was not different from anything; as it is, whatever is different turns out of necessity to be just what it is by being of another (255c–d). The *Sophist*'s different is the model of what is wholly in relation to something else. The *Charmides* asks about a case that the *Sophist*'s division does not name: a knowledge that would still be of something, its power still turned towards an object, but with itself as that object; and it finds no way to show that there is such a thing. The *Republic*'s list of relatives, with knowledge among them, is told elsewhere (4.438b–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle's account of relatives, which opens with the *Charmides*' greater and double, is told elsewhere (*Categories* 7, 6a36–b6; see διπλάσιος).

Translation in this edition

"In relation to something else" renders πρὸς ἄλλο (169a4–5), with ἀλλά as "but only", in the same sentence as "in relation to itself" for πρὸς ἑαυτό, so that the two halves of the alternative stand side by side. The words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, "except knowledge", which the manuscripts have between them and Burnet brackets after Schleiermacher, are told elsewhere (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

See also

διπλάσιος; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἕτερος; μέγας ἀνήρ; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; πρόειμι; πρὸς ἑαυτό; σκυτική; στρατηγική.

πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα · to themselves and to each other

To themselves and to each other: the relations of numbers that give calculation an object distinct from itself · Charmides

πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα, *pros hauta kai pros allēla*, "to themselves and to each other"

At a Glance

The word. Two phrases with πρός, "in relation to": πρὸς αὑτά, with the reflexive pronoun, "to themselves", and πρὸς ἄλληλα, with the reciprocal, "to each other".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' definition of calculation: "Calculation, for instance, is surely of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other, isn't it?" (166a).

In this edition. "To themselves and to each other".

A place to read. 165e–166b.

Meaning

Λογιστική, "calculation", was the art of numbers in their relations, as against ἀριθμητική, which counted (see λογιστική). The phrase names the two directions of relation the art studies: each kind of number with its own kind, odd with odd and even with even, and each kind with the other. The reflexive here is wholly ordinary. It belongs to the objects, the numbers, and it raises none of the trouble that a reflexive raises when it belongs to the knowledge.

Use in the book

The phrase comes where Critias objects to Socrates' method. Asked what fine work temperance produces, he answers that this knowledge is not like the others, and that calculation and geometry have no work in the way that "a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving" (165e–166a; see ἀπεργάζομαι; γεωμετρική). Socrates grants the point and changes the question from product to object: "But I can point out to you what each of these kinds of knowledge is knowledge of, which is something distinct from

the knowledge itself." Calculation is his example, and the phrase gives its object a structure: it is "of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other", and the odd and the even, Critias agrees, are "something other than calculation itself" (166a; see ἄρτιος; περιττός; πλῆθος). Weighing follows, of the heavier and the lighter (166b; see στατική), and then the question: "what is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?" (166b).

The example is chosen with care. Calculation is a knowledge of relations, and among the relations it studies are relations of things to themselves; yet its objects are other than itself. Critias' temperance will claim a reflexive of another sort, to be "knowledge ... of itself" (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς), with the reflexive on the side of the knowledge. Socrates' example can be read as showing in advance where a reflexive stands without trouble, in the object, and so where Critias' does not.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the question it answers and the question it prepares.

165e–166a Critias: calculation and geometry have no work, as a house is the work of house-building.

166a Calculation is of the even and the odd, how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other; they are something other than calculation itself.

166b What is temperance knowledge of, that is something other than temperance itself?

Elsewhere in Plato

The definition is almost word for word the one given in the *Gorgias*, as the edition's note at 166a observes. Socrates is pressing Gorgias to say what rhetoric is about, and takes as models the arts that do their work through speech. Asked about the art of number, he would say that it is one of these, and that it is about the even and the odd, how many each of them happens to be. Calculation is about the same things, the even and the odd, and in everything else, speaking as the framers of decrees in the Assembly do, he would say that it stands as arithmetic does; it differs only in this, that

calculation examines how the odd and the even stand in quantity to themselves and to each other. Astronomy, asked the same question, is about the courses of the stars, the sun and the moon, how they stand to each other in speed (451a–c). In the *Gorgias* the phrase marks off one art from another; in the *Charmides* it marks off an art from its object.

Translation in this edition

"To themselves and to each other" renders πρὸς αὑτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα (166a7), with "in quantity" for the genitive πλήθους (see πλῆθος).

See also

ἀπεργάζομαι; ἄρτιος; γεωμετρική; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; λογιστική; περιττός; πλῆθος; στατική.

πρὸς ἑαυτό · in relation to itself

In relation to itself: the boy who thinks a question over to himself, and the power turned back on itself that the argument cannot find · Charmides

πρὸς ἑαυτό, *pros heauto*, "in relation to itself"; πρὸς ἑαυτά, *pros heauta*, "in relation to themselves"; αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτά, *auta pros hauta*, "(things that) relate to themselves"; πρὸς ἑαυτόν, *pros heauton*, "to himself"

At a Glance

The word. Πρός with the reflexive pronoun: towards oneself, in relation to oneself.

In the *Charmides*. Five times: once of the boy, who answers "after thinking it over to himself" (160e), and four times in the question whether a power can be related to itself (168d–169a).

In this edition. "In relation to itself", "in relation to themselves", "relate to themselves"; "to himself" (160e).

A place to read. 168b–169b.

Meaning

The reflexive turns a relation back on its own subject. Of persons Greek uses it without strain: one speaks, reckons or is angry πρὸς ἑαυτόν, with oneself. The dialogue asks whether the same construction can be used of a power whose whole nature is to be directed at something.

Use in the book

The phrase first comes in its ordinary sense, of a person. Told to "pay closer attention and look within yourself", the boy "paused, and after thinking it over to himself very much like a man", gave his second answer, that temperance makes a person feel shame and is the same as modesty (160d–e; see διασκέπτομαι; ἐμβλέπω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν). Nothing in the scene is strange: a person can take counsel with himself.

In the argument the phrase becomes the question. Socrates has run through the relatives: what is greater than itself would be smaller than itself, what is double of itself would be its own half (168b–c; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). He puts it generally, that whatever has its power in relation to itself must also have the character its power is directed at (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; οὐσία). Of the cases gone through, "some appear to us to be altogether impossible, while others are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves" (168e; see ἀπιστία). And the decision is left to a great man, whether anything has its own power in relation to itself or only in relation to something else, and whether knowledge is among the things that relate to themselves (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἄλλο).

The two uses can be read together. The boy thinking to himself is a person turning his attention on what is in him; a knowledge of knowledge would be a power whose object is itself. Socrates' tests show that a power directed at itself would have to have the property it detects, sight a colour, hearing a sound (168d–e; see ἀκοή; ἄχρως). The boy's self-consultation raises no such difficulty, because the one who consults and the one consulted are a whole person and not a single power. The dialogue shows the easy case before it argues the hard one, and when it ends, the question whether the boy

has temperance is again put to him as a person (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

160e The boy thinks it over to himself before giving his second answer.

168d Whatever has its own power in relation to itself will also have the character its power is directed at.

168e Some cases appear impossible, others are strongly doubted ever to have their power in relation to themselves.

169a Whether anything has its power in relation to itself, or only in relation to something else; and whether knowledge is among the things that relate to themselves.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* and the *Sophist* make thinking a conversation the soul holds with itself, πρὸς αὑτήν, and opinion what the soul, done with questioning, says silently to itself and to no one else (*Theaetetus* 189e–190a; *Sophist* 263e; see αἴσθησις; διάνοια). The self-moving soul of the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws*, which takes up one of the *Charmides*' doubted cases, is told elsewhere (*Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* 895e–896a; see ἀδύνατος).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle asks whether a man can be unjust to himself, and answers that justice in the strict sense needs two parties. Only by transfer of terms and likeness is there a justice, not of a man towards himself, πρὸς αὑτόν, but between some of the things that are his, and even then not every kind of justice, only that of a master or of the head of a household. In these discussions the part of the soul that has reason is set apart from the part that lacks it, and it is with these in view that people think there is injustice towards oneself, since in them each part can be made to suffer something against its own desires.[213] Aristotle keeps the relation by dividing the self into

[213] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 5.11, 1138a4–20, 1138b5–13.

two. The *Charmides* can be read as asking whether a knowledge could be divided so, into the knowing and the known, and finding no way to say how.

Translation in this edition

"In relation to itself" for πρὸς ἑαυτό (168d1, 169a4), "in relation to themselves" for πρὸς ἑαυτά (168e5), "relate to themselves" for αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτὰ ἔχει (169a5), and "to himself" for πρὸς ἑαυτόν (160e2). The words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, "except knowledge", which follow the phrase at 169a4 in the manuscripts and are bracketed by Burnet after Schleiermacher, are told elsewhere (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

See also

ἀδύνατος; αἴσθησις; ἀκοή; ἀπιστία; ἄχρως; διάνοια; διασκέπτομαι; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἑαυτοῦ μείζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐμβλέπω; μέγας ἀνήρ; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; οὐσία; πρὸς ἄλλο; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν.

προσαγορεύω · address

προσαγορεύει, *prosagoreuei*, "addresses"

Attested: προσαγορεύει (*prosagoreuei*; 164e). To address, to greet; also to call by a name. Critias reads the inscription at Delphi as a greeting: "That is how the god addresses those who enter his temple, differently from men" (164e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; πρόσρησις). The verb sets the god among those who greet. He says to all who come in what men say to one another, but in another word, "Be temperate" instead of "rejoice" (164d–e; see πρόσρημα; Σωφρόνει; χαίρω). Stobaeus, who quotes the passage, has "with this, then" for Burnet's "That is how" (τούτῳ οὖν δή for οὕτω μὲν δή, 164e3). The third of the letters under Plato's name uses the verb of the writer's own habit of addressing his friends with εὖ πράττειν (315b; see εὖ πράττειν; πρόσρησις).

See also Γνῶθι σαυτόν; εὖ πράττειν; πρόσρημα; πρόσρησις; Σωφρόνει; χαίρω.

προσδιδάσκω · teach (one thing) more

προσδίδαξον, *prosdidaxon*, "teach me (one small thing) more"

Attested: προσδίδαξον (*prosdidaxon*; 173d). To teach in addition, διδάσκω with πρός, "besides". When Critias insists that nothing else crowns doing well if one slights "knowledgeably", Socrates replies: "Then teach me one small thing more" (173d; see διδάσκω; *σκυτῶν τομή*; τέλος). The pupil's request can be read as Socrates' irony at work. The "small thing" he asks to be taught, knowledgeably about what, is the object of the knowledge, which is the whole question, and Critias' answers, refusing the crafts one after another, accept the prophet Socrates offers, and another besides, and at last name the knowledge of good and bad (173d–174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

See also διδάσκω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; *σκυτῶν τομή*; τέλος.

πρόσειμι · be (there) in addition

προσόν, *proson*, "(if he has just one little thing) more"

Attested: προσόν (*proson*; 154d). To be present in addition, to belong besides, εἰμί, "be", with πρός, "besides". Chaerephon has said that if the boy stripped, his figure would make his face seem nothing, and the others agree; Socrates exclaims, "Heracles! What an invincible man you are describing, if he has just one little thing more" (154d; see ἄμαχος; Ἡρακλῆς; μόνον). The little thing is a soul well made (154d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα), and the participle presents it as an extra, something to be present besides the beauty everyone has praised. The dialogue reverses that order. In the Thracian's doctrine the soul is to be treated "first and foremost" (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα), and what must be present in it is temperance (157a, 158b–159a; see πάρειμι). In the participle's line Burnet prints δή from a manuscript he calls Θ, where the others have δέ (154d8).

See also ἄμαχος; εὖ πέφυκα; Ἡρακλῆς; μόνον; πάρειμι; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα.

προσεπίσταμαι · also know

προσεπίστηται, *prosepistētai*, "(does not) also know"

Attested: προσεπίστηται (*prosepistētai*; 170b). To know besides, ἐπίσταμαι with πρός, "in addition". Socrates separates a knowledge of knowledge from the knowledges of particular things: medicine is of the healthy, statesmanship of the just, "and this one nothing but knowledge" (170b; see πολιτική). "So if someone does not also know what is healthy and what is just, but knows only knowledge, since that is all he has knowledge of, it stands to reason that he would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge, both about himself and about others, wouldn't he?" (170b; see ἐπίσταμαι; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν). Critias agrees; what it is that the man knows, that knowledge cannot tell him (170b–c). The prefix carries the argument. Whatever the temperate man knows about health he must know in addition, as a doctor, and so, as Socrates says a page later, "he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate" (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). A knowledge of knowledge adds nothing of its own; whatever it seems to add has been brought from another knowledge. In the *Phaedrus* the same verb is the test of a would-be doctor. A man who says he knows how to warm and cool bodies, make them vomit and purge them, and on that ground counts himself a doctor, would be asked whether he also knows whom to treat so, when, and how far; and if he said no, he would be called mad (268a–c; see ἐπαΐω).

See also ἐπαΐω; ἐπίσταμαι; ὃ οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οἶδεν; ὁμότεχνος; πολιτική.

προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν · pay attention

To hold the mind towards something: Socrates watching the boys, the boy told to look within, Critias told to attend to the argument · Charmides

προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν, *proseschon ton noun*, "I watched"; προσέχων τὸν νοῦν, *prosechōn ton noun*, "pay (closer) attention", "pay attention"

At a Glance

The word. Προσέχειν, "to hold towards, to bring to", with τὸν νοῦν, "the mind": to turn one's mind to something, to attend.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: Socrates, as the boy comes in, "I watched the boys too" (154c); to the boy, "pay closer attention and look within yourself" (160d); to Critias, "Just pay attention to the argument itself" (166e).

In this edition. "Watched"; "pay closer attention"; "pay attention".

A place to read. 166c–e.

Meaning

Προσέχειν is to hold one thing towards another, and of a ship to put in to shore; with τὸν νοῦν, "the mind", it is to bring one's mind to bear on something, and the noun is often left out. The idiom names attention as an act directed at an object, and the dative says what the object is: τοῖς παισί, "the boys", τῷ λόγῳ, "the argument".

Use in the book

The three uses turn the mind on three objects, and they move inward and then outward again. At the boy's entrance Socrates attends to the onlookers. Everyone in the room seemed in love with Charmides, and that, Socrates says, was less surprising among the grown men: "But I watched the boys too, and not one of them was looking anywhere else, not even the littlest: they were all gazing at him as if he were a statue" (154c–d; see ἄγαλμα; νοῦς; παῖς). The attention is a narrator's, turned on the effect of beauty in others.

The second use turns attention on the boy's own soul. After his first definition has failed, Socrates asks for another: "Then once more, Charmides

... pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person" (160d; see ἐμβλέπω; πάρειμι). The comparative can be read as measuring the first answer, which matched what people say of the quiet (159b; see ἡσυχιότης). The boy obeys, thinks the question over "to himself" (160e; see πρὸς ἑαυτό), and gives an answer taken, as he was bidden, from what he finds in himself, modesty (160e; see αἰδώς).

The third turns attention from persons to the argument. Critias, stung at being refuted, is told to let go of who is being refuted: "Just pay attention to the argument itself" (166e; see ἔα χαίρειν; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον). The order of the three can be read as the dialogue's own movement: from beauty seen in a body, through a soul asked to look at itself, to an argument that matters apart from whoever holds it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

154c Socrates watched the boys too, all gazing at Charmides as at a statue.

160d The boy is to pay closer attention, look within himself, and consider what temperance makes him.

166e Critias is to pay attention to the argument itself and look to see what becomes of it under refutation.

Elsewhere in Plato

At the start of the *Apology* Socrates asks the jurors for the one thing he thinks just: to let his manner of speaking go, which may be worse or may be better, and to look at this alone and turn their minds to it, whether what he says is just or not; for that, he says, is what makes a good judge, as telling the truth makes a good speaker (18a). It is the request he makes of Critias: attend to what is said, not to the speaker. In the *Meno*, when the search for teachers of virtue has found none, he turns the phrase on the inquirers themselves. It seems, he says, that he and Meno are men of little worth, Meno not adequately taught by Gorgias, nor he by Prodicus; so before anything else they must bring their minds to bear on themselves and look for someone who will make them better in at least one respect (96d–e; see Πρόδικος).

Translation in this edition

"Watched" for προσέσχον τὸν νοῦν (154c6), where the narrator's English wants a verb of looking; "pay closer attention" for μᾶλλον προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (160d5); "pay attention" for προσέχων τὸν νοῦν (166e1). The verb that follows at 166e2, σκόπει, "look", is Heindorf's conjecture (see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον). The noun's other uses are told under νοῦς. At 154c7 "was looking anywhere else" renders ἄλλοσ' ἔβλεπεν as written in the Coislin manuscript; T runs the words together, ἀλλοσέβλεπεν, and B and W have ἄλλος ἔβλεπεν, "(no) other was looking".

See also

ἄγαλμα; αἰδώς; ἔα χαίρειν; ἐμβλέπω; ἡσυχιότης; νοῦς; παῖς; πάρειμι; Πρόδικος; πρὸς ἑαυτό; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

προσκαθοράω · have a view of (it) as well

προσκαθορῶντι, *proskathorōnti*, "(he) has a view of (the knowledge) as well"

Attested: προσκαθορῶντι (*proskathorōnti*; 172b). To look down on and survey, καθοράω, with πρός, "besides": to see in addition. The compound occurs nowhere else in Plato. When the life without error has been given up, Socrates looks for a smaller good that a knowledge of knowledge might still bring: "that whoever has it will learn more easily whatever else he learns, and everything will appear more clearly to him, since in addition to each thing he learns he has a view of the knowledge as well; and that he will examine others better about the things he himself has learned" (172b; see ἐναργής; ἐξετάζω; μανθάνω). The verb pictures a second sight beside the first: the learner sees the thing learned, and sees besides his knowing of it. Socrates offers the benefit as a question, and at once suspects that it is all they will get, "while we have been looking at something greater" (172b–c; see ἀπολαύω). With προσεπίσταμαι, "also know", the compound belongs to the language of addition in which the argument weighs what this knowledge could add to the others (see προσεπίσταμαι).

See also ἀπολαύω; ἐναργής; ἐξετάζω; μανθάνω; προσεπίσταμαι.

προσποιέομαι · pretend

To claim what is not one's own: the pretence licensed at the start, and the pretenders temperance was to expose · Charmides

προσποιήσασθαι, *prospoiēsasthai*, "pretending"; προσποιούμενον, *prospoioumenon*, "(the man) who pretends", "pretends"; προσποιούμενος, *prospoioumenos*, "who pretended"

At a Glance

The word. The middle of προσποιέω, "to make over": to make something one's own, to lay claim to it, and so, of what one does not have, to pretend.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: Critias' ruse, "What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b); the man "who pretends to be a doctor, but is not" (170e), and the one who "does not know them but pretends or thinks he does" (171c); and, in the dream, the pretender who would no longer escape our notice (173b).

In this edition. "Pretending", "pretends", "pretended".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Ποιεῖν is "make", and the middle with πρός, "to oneself", is to make a thing over to oneself. The claim can be honest, to adopt or take on; most often it is a claim to what one lacks, a knowledge, a virtue, a feeling, and so a pretence. The word does not decide whether the pretender knows that he is pretending, and the dialogue, at its third use (171c), adds a word to make the difference.

Use in the book

The dialogue opens with a pretence licensed. Critias calls the boy over on the excuse of his morning headaches, and asks Socrates, "What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" "Nothing,"

Socrates answers. “Only let him come” (155b; see κεφαλή; κωλύω). When the boy asks, Socrates “did somehow manage to answer” that he knew it (155e), and the conversation begins with a pretended doctor. The pretence is not quite empty. The remedy he describes is a leaf with a charm, and the charm turns out to be beautiful words for the soul (155e–157a; see ἐπῳδή; λόγοι καλοί).

The verb returns as the thing temperance was to catch. If temperance is only a knowledge of knowledge, the temperate man “will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not” (170e; see ἀληθινός; διακρίνω). The conclusion repeats it: temperance will be able to tell “neither a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does, nor anyone else who knows anything at all” (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). The pair “pretends or thinks” separates the impostor, who knows that he does not know, from the man who believes he knows, whom Socrates’ questioning exposes (see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; οἴομαι). In the dream, where temperance rules, no pilot would deceive us, “nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know” (173b; see ἀλαζών; λανθάνω; στρατηγός).

The first and the last uses can be read together. The figure the dream’s temperance would have caught, a doctor pretending to know, is the figure Socrates played at the start. The temperance the argument looked for could not have told whether he knew the remedy, and the dialogue does not settle it either; what it shows is the pretended doctor, through the whole conversation, saying that he does not know (165b–c; see ζητέω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155b Critias: what is to stop Socrates pretending to the boy that he knows a remedy for the head?

170e Temperance could not distinguish the man who pretends to be a doctor from the one who truly is.

171c It could tell no doctor who knows his craft from one who pretends or thinks he does.

173b In the dream, no one who pretended to know what he did not know would escape our notice.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* the verb names what Socrates' examinations bring to light. The young men who copy him and examine others, and the anger of the men they examine, are told elsewhere (23c; see ἐξετάζω). Those men, Socrates says, call him a corrupter of the young; asked what he does or teaches to corrupt them, they have no answer, and rather than look at a loss they fall back on the charges that lie ready to hand against anyone who philosophizes. What they will not say is the truth: that they have been exposed as men who make out that they know and know nothing (23d).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle places the boaster and the dissembler on either side of the truthful man, in what concerns pretension, προσποίημα, in words and deeds. The boaster seems to be one who lays claim, προσποιητικός, to things of good repute that are not his, or to more of them than are; the dissembler, the εἴρων, goes the other way, denying what he has or making it smaller; and the man between them, plain and straightforward, truthful in how he lives and in what he says, admits that what is his is his, neither enlarging nor shrinking it.[214] The examples Aristotle gives of the boaster are told elsewhere (4.7, 1127b17–20; see ἀλαζών). On his scale Socrates' claim at 155e can be placed with the boaster; his conduct in the argument, disowning knowledge, Aristotle places himself, naming Socrates among the dissemblers who disown what is held in esteem (4.7, 1127b22–26).

Translation in this edition

"Pretending" for προσποιήσασθαι (155b5), with the infinitive of the thing claimed, ἐπίστασθαι, "that you know"; "who pretends" for τὸν

[214] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 4.7, 1127a20–26.

προσποιούμενον (170e1); "pretends" for προσποιούμενον (171c7), paired with οἰόμενον, "thinks he does"; "who pretended" for προσποιούμενος (173b3).

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀληθινός; διακρίνω; ἐξετάζω; ἐπῳδή; ζητέω; κεφαλή; κωλύω; λανθάνω; λόγοι καλοί; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; οἴομαι; ὁμότεχνος; στρατηγός.

πρόσρημα · greeting

τοῦ προσρήματος, *tou prosrēmatos*, "this greeting"

Attested: προσρήματος (*prosrēmatos*; 164e). A word of address, a form of greeting: the thing said, where πρόσρησις is the saying of it. Critias holds that the inscription at Delphi was set up as the god's greeting, "on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one" (164e; see παρακελεύομαι; πρόσρησις; χαίρω). The noun lets Critias treat a greeting as a formula that can be right or wrong, and the god as correcting it. The apposition is unsettled in the manuscripts: B and T have the nominative τὸ χαίρειν, a later hand in B and Stobaeus have τοῦ χαίρειν, which Burnet prints, and Cobet deleted the words. The English "this greeting, 'rejoice'" follows Burnet.

See also παρακελεύομαι; πρόσρησις; χαίρω.

πρόσρησις · greeting

A greeting: Critias' reading of "Know thyself" as the god's word to all who enter, not a piece of advice · Charmides

πρόσρησις, *prosrēsis*, "greeting"; πρόσρησιν, *prosrēsin*, "greeting"

At a Glance

The word. An addressing, a greeting; the noun of προσερῶ, "I shall address".

In the *Charmides*. Twice, in Critias' reading of the Delphic inscription: it "was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of 'Rejoice!'" (164d), and the later dedicators thought "Know thyself" "was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter" (165a).

In this edition. "Greeting".
A place to read. 164d–165b.

Meaning

A greeting is the word said on meeting, to whoever comes; it supposes nothing about the person met except that he is there. The everyday Greek greeting was χαῖρε, "rejoice", and the edition's note at 164e explains that it was "used as we use 'hello' or 'goodbye'". Advice, συμβουλή, is different in kind: it answers a need, and supposes that the hearer lacks something.

Use in the book

The noun carries the hinge of Critias' reading. The inscription "Know thyself", he says, "was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of 'Rejoice!', on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one" (164d–e; see πρόσρημα; χαίρω), and the god's greeting to everyone who comes in is "Be temperate!" (164e; see Σωφρόνει). The reading as a whole is told elsewhere (164d–165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). What the noun adds is the contrast on which Critias builds, greeting against advice. The later dedicators, he says, "thought 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter; and then, so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less, they wrote these up and dedicated them" (165a; see ἀνατίθημι; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν).

The contrast can be read as doing work for Critias. Advice is one maxim among others, open to the question whether it is good advice; a greeting from the god is said to all, needs no defence and cannot be mistaken. Made a greeting, "Know thyself" is lifted above the advice-givers who added "Nothing too much", and Critias' definition, that temperance is knowing oneself, borrows the god's authority. At the same time a greeting is said on entering, before anything else is said, and Critias' god meets each visitor with a command to be temperate, as though temperance were the condition of coming in at all. Socrates does not dispute the reading. He declines the part of one who knows the answers, and asks what such a knowledge would be of (165b–c; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; προσφέρω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs, with the verb and the noun of greeting that stand beside it.

164d The inscription was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of "Rejoice!".

164e The greeting "rejoice" is not the right one; the god addresses those who enter differently from men.

165a The later dedicators took "Know thyself" for advice, not the god's greeting.

Elsewhere in Plato

The choice of a greeting comes up again in the third of the letters under Plato's name, where the writer weighs "rejoice" against his own habit of writing εὖ πράττειν, and recalls Dionysius' flattering "Rejoice" to the god at Delphi (315a–b; see εὖ πράττειν). He then gives his reason for refusing the common word. He would not urge it even on a man by way of address, still less on a god: on a god, because he would be commanding something against its nature, the divine being set far from pleasure and pain; on a man, because pleasure and pain do harm more often than not, bringing forth in the soul slowness to learn, forgetting, thoughtlessness and outrage (see δυσμαθία). So much, he ends, for his word on the greeting, πρόσρησις (315b–c). The verb of urging is the one Critias uses at 164e (see παρακελεύομαι). The letter-writer and Critias agree that "rejoice" is not the right greeting, and each puts in its place a word for a life lived well: the letter, doing well; Critias' god, being temperate.

Translation in this edition

"Greeting" for πρόσρησις (164d7) and πρόσρησιν (165a6). At 165a5 Burnet brackets, after Cobet, the word ἕνεκεν, "for the sake of", which B, T, W and Stobaeus have after "those who enter" and Heindorf had doubted; the English "the god's greeting to those who enter" follows his text. At 165a6 "they too" renders σφεῖς, T's reading; W has αὐτοὶ σφεῖς, Stobaeus αὐτοί, and B αὐτὸς φῄς, "as you yourself say"; Stobaeus also omits εἶθ', "and then".

See also

ἀνατίθημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; δυσμαθία; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; εὖ πράττειν; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; παρακελεύομαι; προσαγορεύω; πρόσρημα; προσφέρω; Σωφρόνει; χαίρω.

προσφέρω · apply, treat

προσοίσω, *prosoisō*, "I shall apply"; προσφέρῃ, *prospherēi*, "you are treating (me)"

Attested: προσοίσω (*prosoisō*; 157c), προσφέρῃ (*prospherēi*; 165b). To bring to, to apply; in the middle, to bear oneself towards someone, to treat him in a certain way. The two uses show the two senses. Socrates, bound by his oath to the Thracian, will treat the boy's head only if he first hands over his soul to the charms: "I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see ἐντολή; παρέχω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). The active is the doctor's word for bringing a drug or a diet to a body; the *Phaedrus* has a would-be doctor claim to know "how to apply such things to bodies" as warm or cool them (268a–b; see προσεπίσταμαι). And to Critias, who offers an account if Socrates will not agree: "But Critias ... you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to" (165b; see ζητέω; ὁμολογέω). The two uses can be read as a pair: Socrates, the pretended doctor, offers to apply a remedy if the soul is handed over first; as inquirer he refuses to be treated as one who has the answers.

See also ἐντολή; ζητέω; ὁμολογέω; παρέχω; προσεπίσταμαι; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα.

προτίθημι · propose

τὸ προτιθέμενον, *to protithemenon*, "whatever is proposed"

Attested: προτιθέμενον (*protithemenon*; 165b). To set before; to propose, as a subject for discussion or a prize for a contest. Socrates answers Critias, who treats him as one who knows: "That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know" (165b–c; see ζητέω; προσφέρω). The participle leaves open who proposes. A question

is set before both partners and belongs to neither, and "each time" makes the arrangement a practice: the boy's three definitions and Critias' were each set down and then examined (see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The sentence can be read as Socrates' account of the method the reader has been watching, given at the moment Critias tries to change it.

See also ζητέω; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; προσφέρω.

προφήτης · foreteller

προφήτας, *prophētas*, "(as) foretellers"

Attested: προφήτας (*prophētas*; 173c). One who speaks out for a god, an interpreter of oracles, and so a foreteller. In the dream Socrates grants, "if you like, ... that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be, and that temperance, presiding over it, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets for us as foretellers of the future" (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω; μαντική). In the edition "prophet" renders μάντις, as the Glossary records, and προφήτης is "foreteller", so that the seer who has the gift and the man whose office is to speak it out for others are kept apart (see μάντις). The distinction is Plato's own in the *Timaeus*, told elsewhere (72a–b; see μάντις). Temperance in the dream does not prophesy. It supervises the prophets and appoints them to their office, and the next step makes the prophet Critias' candidate for the happy man (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

See also ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική; μάντις.

πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα · first and foremost

First and foremost: the Thracian's order of treatment, the soul before the body · Charmides

πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα, *prōton kai malista*, "first and foremost"

At a Glance

The word. Two adverbs joined: πρῶτον, "first", of order, and μάλιστα, "most of all", of degree.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the Thracian's teaching: "So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition" (157a).

In this edition. "First and foremost".

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

The pair joins two rankings that need not coincide: what comes first in time and what matters most. A doctor may attend first to what is urgent and most to what is grave. The Thracian's phrase makes them one, so that the soul comes first because it matters most.

Use in the book

The phrase is the conclusion of the doctrine Socrates says he learned from the Thracian doctor. Good Greek doctors know that one cannot cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body; the Thracian adds, as the saying of his king and god Zalmoxis, that one cannot cure the body without the soul, because everything, bad and good, "starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes. So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition" (156b–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; ἔχειν καλῶς; Ζάλμοξις; θεραπεύω). The soul is treated with charms, the charms are beautiful words, and from them temperance comes to be in souls (157a; see λόγοι καλοί).

The order then becomes a rule of practice, and the first half of the phrase is repeated without the second. The Thracian's charge was, "Mind that

nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm", for the mistake of the day is to be doctors of temperance and of health separately (157b; see ἁμάρτημα; παρέχω); and Socrates puts the same condition to the boy: "if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see ἐντολή; προσφέρω). The order had been anticipated before the doctor appeared. When Critias called the boy beautiful in soul as well, Socrates asked, "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure?" (154e; see ἀποδύω; εἶδος).

The phrase can be read as the plan of the dialogue. The head is never treated and the remedy never given; the whole conversation is the charm, the part that comes first. At the end the boy asks to be charmed every day, "until you say it's enough" (176b; see ἐπᾴδω), and the order has not reached the body.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, the earlier passage that anticipates its order, and the two that repeat its "first".

154e Socrates proposes to strip the boy's soul and look at it before his figure.

157a The soul must be treated first and foremost, if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition.

157b No one is to have his head treated with the remedy unless he first hands over his soul to the charm.

157c If the boy hands over his soul first to be charmed, Socrates will apply the remedy to his head.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Apology* the same order is Socrates' whole message to Athens. His exhortation to care for the soul rather than for money and reputation is told elsewhere (29d–30a; see ἐπιμέλεια). He then sums up his life: his one business, as he goes about, is to persuade the younger and the older among them to care for body and money neither before the soul nor as intensely as for the soul, that it may be as good as it can be, and to tell them that virtue is

not born of money, but money and every other human good, private and public, are born of virtue (30a–b). The *Apology*'s pair, "before" and "as intensely", can be read as the *Charmides*' "first and foremost" in other words, and its reason as the Thracian's: what is good for the rest comes from the soul.

Translation in this edition

"First and foremost" renders καὶ πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα (157a1), the doubled καί, "both ... and", left unexpressed. In the same sentence "the rest of the body" renders τοῦ ἄλλου σώματος (157a2), with B, W and Stobaeus; T has ὅλου, "the whole body" (see ὅλος). "First" renders πρῶτον at 157b4 and 157c3, and "before" renders πρότερον at 154e6.

See also

ἁμάρτημα; ἀποδύω; εἶδος; ἐντολή; ἐπᾴδω; ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιρρέω; ἔχειν καλῶς; Ζάλμοξις; θεραπεύω; λόγοι καλοί; ὅλος; παρέχω; προσφέρω.

πυκτεύω · box

πυκτεύειν, *pykteuein*, "boxing"

Attested: πυκτεύειν (*pykteuein*; 159c). To box. It comes, with the pancration, in the list of bodily actions by which Socrates refutes the boy's first definition: "And boxing and the pancration? Isn't it the same?" "Certainly" (159c; see παγκρατιάζω). In boxing, as in writing, reading, the lyre and wrestling, the quick and nimble is finer than the quiet (159c–d; see ὀξέως; ταχύς), and the example can be read as needing no argument, since no one admires a slow boxer. The *Gorgias* pairs the same two arts for another purpose. Gorgias, defending his own, says that rhetoric must be used like any other fighting skill: a man who has learned boxing and the pancration and fighting in armour should not strike or kill his friends with them, and if someone who has gone to a wrestling-school, got his body into good condition and become a boxer, then beats his father or mother, the trainers and the teachers of fighting in armour are not to be hated and driven from

the cities, since they handed on the skill to be used justly against enemies and wrongdoers, in self-defence and not to strike first (456c–e).

See also ὀξέως; παγκρατιάζω; ταχύς.

πυνθάνομαι · hear, ask

πεπυσμένοι, *pepysmenoi*, "(had only just) heard (the news)"; πεπύσμεθα, *pepysmetha*, "(we haven't) got (the whole story straight)"; πυνθάνομαι, *pynthanomai*, "(what) I am asking about"

Attested: πεπυσμένοι (*pepysmenoi*; 153b), πεπύσμεθα (*pepysmetha*; 153c), πυνθάνομαι (*pynthanomai*; 158e). To learn by inquiry or by report, and so also to ask. The perfect is having learned by hearsay: of the battle at Potidaea "the people here had only just heard the news" (153b), and Chaerephon, eager for an eyewitness, says, "We still haven't got the whole story straight" (153c; see σαφής; Χαιρεφῶν). The present is asking: "we ought to look into it together," Socrates tells the boy, "whether or not you possess what I am asking about" (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The verb's two senses can be read as framing the opening. Athens learns of the battle by report, and the man who was there turns from reporting to asking questions of his own (153d; see ἀνερωτάω). The dialogue's inquiry is of the second kind, a learning that begins from a question rather than from a rumour.

See also ἀνερωτάω; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; σαφής; Χαιρεφῶν.

P Rho

ῥῆμα · words

τὰ ῥήματα, *ta rhēmata*, "the words"

Attested: ῥήματα (*rhēmata*; 161d). A thing said; a word, a phrase, a saying; in the grammar of the philosophers, the verb. Socrates insists that the man who called temperance doing one's own business "surely did not mean it the way the words sound" (161d; see νοέω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; φθέγγομαι), literally that he did not mean it in the way he uttered the words. The sentence parts what is said from what is meant, and that gap turns the formula into a riddle (161c–162b; see αἴνιγμα). "The way" renders ᾗ, the reading of W; B has the relative ἥ, and T leaves the word out. In the *Sophist* the visitor from Elea uses the noun in its technical sense. Of the signs that the voice gives about being, the one applied to actions is a ῥῆμα, a verb, and the one applied to those who perform them a name, ὄνομα; a string of verbs alone, "walks runs sleeps", or of names alone, "lion stag horse", makes no statement until a name is mixed with a verb, as in "a man learns" (262a–c; see ὄνομα). The *Charmides*' ῥήματα are words in the ordinary sense, and the argument that follows turns on a verb in the *Sophist*'s: "doing" (161d–e; see πράττω).

See also αἴνιγμα; νοέω; ὄνομα; πράττω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; φθέγγομαι.

Σ Sigma

σαφής · clear, plain

σαφέστερον, *saphesteron*, "more plainly"; σαφές, *saphes*, "clear"; σαφῶς, *saphōs*, "straight", "plain"

Attested: σαφέστερον (*saphesteron*; 163d), σαφές (*saphes*; 165b, 169d), and the adverb σαφῶς (*saphōs*; 153c, 163e). Clear, distinct, plain; of speech, unambiguous. The adverb first comes in Chaerephon's wish for a straight account of the battle (153c; see πυνθάνομαι). The other uses mark the turns of Critias' definitions. Socrates asks him to "go back to the beginning and define it more plainly" (163d; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ὁρίζω); Critias obliges, "I give you a plain definition" (163e; see διορίζομαι); when he gives that definition up, he concedes of all that went before, "perhaps what you said about it was more correct, perhaps what I said, but nothing that we said was really clear" (165b; see ἀφίημι); and when he cannot make the distinctions Socrates asks for, "he said nothing clear, but kept covering up his perplexity" (169d; see ἐπικαλύπτω). The word can be read as measuring Critias' course in the argument: he begins by offering plainness, and ends by concealing its absence.

See also ἀφίημι; διορίζομαι; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐπικαλύπτω; ὁρίζω; πυνθάνομαι.

σκέπτομαι · look into

To look into, in the tenses σκοπέω lacks: the look that must be taken, the look handed to a partner, and the look taken before an answer · Charmides

σκεπτέον, *skepteon*, "we ought to look into it", "we have to look into"; σκέψασθαι, *skepsasthai*, "look into it"; σκέψαι, *skepsai*, "look into this", "look into it"; σκεψάμενος, *skepsamenos*, "once I have looked into it"; σκέψωμαι, *skepsōmai*, "(until) I have"; σκεψώμεθα, *skepsōmetha*, "let us look into it", "let us look"; σκέψεται, *skepsetai*, "(won't) he look into"

At a Glance

The word. To look carefully, to consider, to examine. In Attic prose its future σκέψομαι and aorist ἐσκεψάμην serve as the future and aorist of σκοπέω, so that the two make one verb, "to look into".

In the *Charmides*. Ten times in the simple verb, from "we ought to look into it together" (158d) to "let us look still better at whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all" (172d). The compounds and the noun have their own entries.

In this edition. "Look into", "look".

A place to read. 161b–c and 165b–c.

Meaning

Σκέπτομαι is the older verb of looking, of the family of σκοπός, a watcher, and of σκέψις, a looking. Its tenses carry distinctions that the present σκοπέω does not: the aorist takes a look as a whole, done or to be done; the verbal adjective σκεπτέον says that it must be done. The family gave English "sceptic", from σκεπτικός, "given to looking into things".

Use in the book

The verbal adjective states obligation, twice at the start. Socrates resolves the boy's dilemma with it: "we ought to look into it together, whether or not you possess what I am asking about" (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). And when the boy, asked whom he heard his third answer from, says it makes no difference, Socrates agrees and states a rule: "For in any case what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not" (161c; see ἀκούω; ἀληθής). The rule governs the rest of the dialogue. An answer is examined on its own terms, whoever owns it; and later, when Critias fears

that he is the one being refuted, Socrates repeats it in another form (166d–e; see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον).

The aorist imperative hands the look to someone else, and in its first use it is the boy who hands it. Having lost two definitions, Charmides offers a third that is not his own and asks Socrates to do the examining: "But look into this: what do you think of it, as an account of temperance?" (161b; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι). Socrates hands the look back in turn when he is at a loss: "Come then, Critias ... look into it, and see whether, on these matters, you turn out to be better provided with a way through than I am" (167b; see εὔπορος).

The aorist participle and subjunctive make looking the condition of agreeing. Critias offers to give an account if Socrates will not agree that temperance is knowing oneself, and Socrates refuses to be hurried: "So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have" (165c; see ἐπέχω; ὁμολογέω). The sentence is the opposite of the concessions Socrates regrets at the end, made "without even considering" whether what they granted was possible (175c; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The hortatory subjunctive opens fresh tests, "Let us look into it from this angle" (170e) and "let us look still better" (172d), and the future asks what an examiner would do: when he has to test what knowledge a doctor has, "won't he look into what it is of?" (171a; see πεῖραν λαβεῖν; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι).

Places to read

Every passage in which the simple verb occurs; its compounds and the noun are listed under their own entries.

158d We ought to look into it together, whether the boy possesses what Socrates is asking about.

158e The boy: look into it in whatever way you think best.

161b The boy: look into this account of temperance.

161c What we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true.

165c Once he has looked into it Socrates will say whether he agrees; Critias must wait until he has.

167b Socrates to Critias: look into it, and see whether you are better provided with a way through.

170e Let us look into it from this angle: how would the temperate man tell a true doctor?

171a To test what knowledge the doctor has, he will look into what it is of.

172d Let us look still better at whether such a knowledge would benefit us.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Euthyphro* the verbal adjective decides between two ways of treating a definition. Euthyphro has said that the holy is what all the gods love. Are we to examine this in its turn, Socrates asks, and see whether it is rightly said? Or are we to leave it alone and take it on trust from ourselves and from others, conceding the point the moment anyone claims it? Or must the speaker's words be looked into? We must, Euthyphro answers, though he thinks it well said (9e). The *Charmides*' rule at 161c is the same choice: not who says it, but what is said, must be looked into.

Translation in this edition

"Look into" throughout, as the Key Words rule for σκοπεῖν and σκέπτεσθαι, with "look" where English wants the shorter verb (172d2). At 158e5 a single "look into it" renders both σκέψασθαι and the imperative σκόπει that follows it (see σκοπέω), and in "Just wait until I have" (165c2) the verb is left to be understood. At 158e5 "best" renders Heindorf's βέλτιον, where B and T have βελτίω, and Stephanus proposed the future σκέψεσθαι for the aorist; at 172d2 "at all" renders ἄρα τι, a correction in B, where B and T have ἄρτι, "just now", and "will benefit" is T's ὀνήσει, where B has the infinitive ὀνήσειν. The two verbs stand as alternatives in the manuscripts at 167b1, where T has the aorist ἐπισκεψώμεθα and B the present ἐπισκοπώμεθα (see ἐπισκέπτομαι).

See also

ἀκούω; ἀληθής; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἀσκέπτως; διασκέπτομαι; ἐπέχω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; εὔπορος; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; ὁμολογέω; πεῖραν λαβεῖν; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; σκέψις; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον; σκοπέω; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

σκεῦος · equipment

τὰ σκεύη, *ta skeuē*, "our equipment"

Attested: σκεύη (*skeuē*; 173b). A vessel, an implement; in the plural, gear, equipment, the furniture of a house or the tackle of a ship. In the dream: "With things so, what else would happen to us than that we would be healthier in body than we are now, and come through safe when in danger at sea and in war, and that our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us, and much else besides, because we would be using genuine craftsmen?" (173b–c; see ἀμπεχόνη; τεχνικῶς; ὑπόδεσις). The family closes the picture as well: "Equipped in this way", κατεσκευασμένον, "the human race would act and live knowledgeably" (173c–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The goods of the dream are the body's and its belongings', health, safety, gear, and the participle stretches the furnishing from a household to the whole race. Socrates' list can be read as answering itself: everything in it would be well made, and nothing in it is shown to make a man happy (173d).

See also ἀμπεχόνη; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; τεχνικῶς; ὑπόδεσις.

σκέψις · way of looking into it

The way of looking into it: Socrates' method for asking whether temperance is present in the boy · Charmides

ἡ σκέψις, *hē skepsis*, "the (best) way of looking into it"

At a Glance

The word. A looking, an examination, a way of examining; the noun of σκέπτομαι.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "This, then ... seems to me the best way of looking into it" (158e).

In this edition. "The best way of looking into it".

A place to read. 158c–159a.

Meaning

A σκέψις is an examination and the manner of conducting it, so that "the best σκέψις" is the best procedure for finding something out. The word names the inquiry as a method, where σκοπεῖν names it as an activity (see σκοπέω).

Use in the book

The noun marks the dialogue's first decision about method. Asked whether he is temperate, the boy can neither say yes without praising himself nor no without calling Critias a liar (158c–d; see αἰσχυντηλός; ἔξαρνος). Socrates proposes that they look into it together, and the boy lets him choose the way, "look into it in whatever way you think best", and Socrates chooses: "This, then ... seems to me the best way of looking into it. For it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it" (158e–159a; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The chain that follows, from presence to a sense, from a sense to an opinion, and from an opinion to words, is told elsewhere (159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι).

What the method does is replace a question the boy cannot answer with one he can. He cannot say whether he has temperance without seeming either boastful or rude; he can say what temperance seems to him to be (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The method spares his modesty, and it sets the shape of the first half of the dialogue, in which the boy offers what he thinks temperance is and Socrates tests it.

The method rests on an assumption, which the edition's note at 159a finds, on one reading, in Socrates' "since you know how to speak Greek": "that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words" (see αἴσθησις; ἑλληνίζω). The assumption can be read as being tested, as well as used, by what follows. The boy's first answer is one that people commonly give, as Socrates remarks, his second from looking within, his third is borrowed; and at the end, asked again whether he has temperance, he answers that he cannot know (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The best way of looking into it has not shown him what is in him.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the dilemma and the proposal that lead to it and the method it introduces.

158c–d The boy can neither affirm nor deny that he is temperate.

158d–e Socrates proposes to look into it together; the boy lets him choose the way.

158e–159a The best way: if temperance is present, it gives rise to a sense and an opinion of it, which the boy can put into words.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Meno* Socrates turns to another way of looking into a question when the first is barred. He would have looked first into what virtue is, and only then into whether it can be taught; but since Meno, who will not rule himself, rules him, he gives way, and asks leave to look into it from a hypothesis, as geometers often do. Asked whether a given area can be fitted as a triangle into a given circle, a geometer may say that he does not yet know, but has a supposition that will serve: if the area is of one kind, one thing follows, and something else if it is not. So with virtue: since they know neither what it is nor what sort of thing it is, they will look into whether it can be taught from a supposition, asking what sort of thing among those that concern the soul it would have to be; if it is a kind of knowledge, plainly it can be taught, and if it is something other than knowledge, it cannot; the next question is whether it is a knowledge (86d–87c; see ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι). The *Meno*'s method gives up the first question for a conditional; the *Charmides*' gives up the boy's question about himself for his opinion about the virtue.

Translation in this edition

"The best way of looking into it" renders βελτίστη ... ἡ σκέψις (158e6), the noun given the verb phrase that the Key Words keep for σκοπεῖν and σκέπτεσθαι (see σκοπέω).

See also

αἴσθησις; αἰσχυντηλός; ἑλληνίζω; ἔνειμι; ἔξαρνος; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; σκέπτομαι; σκοπέω.

σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον · examine the argument

Examining the argument: Socrates' account of why he refutes, and his charge to Critias to attend to the argument and not to the man · Charmides

τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν, *ton logon skopein*, "examining the argument"

At a Glance

The word. Σκοπεῖν, "to look into", with τὸν λόγον, "the argument": to examine what is being said rather than the one who says it.

In the *Charmides*. Once: "And so now too, I say, this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends" (166d); with the charge that follows, "Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166e).

In this edition. "Examining the argument".

A place to read. 166b–e.

Meaning

Λόγος here is the argument in progress, the discussion itself, as the Glossary has it for 166c–e. To examine it is to test what it says and where it leads. The phrase sets the argument apart from the people who carry it on, as something with a course of its own.

Use in the book

Critias, pressed to say what temperance is knowledge of, complains that Socrates is only trying to refute him, and Socrates answers that he refutes him for the reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not (166c–d; see διερευνάω; ἐλέγχω; λανθάνω). Then he names

the activity: "And so now too, I say, this is what I am doing: examining the argument for my own sake above all, but perhaps also for the sake of my other friends" (166d; see ἐπιτήδειος). The common good he adds, that each thing should become plain as it is, is told elsewhere (166d; see κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). Then the charge: "say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted. Just pay attention to the argument itself, and look to see what will become of it under refutation" (166d–e; see ἔα χαίρειν; ἐκβαίνω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν).

The phrase parts the argument from its owners. An argument has its own fate, "what will become of it", and the man who holds it can watch that fate as a spectator. Critias' grievance assumed that to refute what he says is to defeat him; Socrates' phrase denies it, and the denial lets Critias go on: "All right ... I'll do that; you seem to me to be talking sense" (166e). The order of beneficiaries can be read as the phrase's sharpest point. The examination serves the examiner "above all", as a guard against his own unnoticed error, and the other man only after; the edition's note at 166d calls it, on one reading, Socrates' fullest statement in the dialogue of what his refutations are for (see διερευνάω).

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the accusation and the motive that lead to it and the charge it leads to.

166c Critias: Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about.

166c–d Socrates refutes as he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking he knows what he does not.

166d He is examining the argument for his own sake above all, and perhaps for his friends'.

166d–e Critias is to say goodbye to who is being refuted and attend to the argument itself.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* Socrates hesitates to refute Gorgias for the reason Critias resents being refuted. He is afraid, he says, that Gorgias will think he speaks

out of rivalry, not about the matter, to make it clear, but against Gorgias himself (457e). The kind of man he then says he is, as glad to be refuted as to refute, is told elsewhere (458a–b; see ἐλέγχω), and so is whether he would let Gorgias be if Gorgias were not of that kind (458a; see ἐάω). In the *Phaedo*, on the day of his death, Socrates warns his friends that he may be arguing out of a wish to win. The uneducated, when they dispute, care nothing for how things stand but only that what they have proposed should seem true to those present; he will differ from them only in this: his eagerness will be, not that what he says should seem true to those present, except as a by-product, but that it should seem so, as far as it can, to himself (91a–b). The advice that follows, to think little of Socrates and much more of the truth, is told elsewhere (91c; see ἀλήθεια).

Translation in this edition

"Examining the argument" renders τὸν λόγον σκοπεῖν (166d3). At 166e2, where Socrates tells Critias to "look to see what will become of it", Burnet prints Heindorf's imperative σκόπει; B has the infinitive σκοπεῖν, and T writes σκόπεῖν, with both accents.

See also

ἀλήθεια; διερευνάω; ἔα χαίρειν; ἐάω; ἐκβαίνω; ἐλέγχω; ἐπιτήδειος; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; λανθάνω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; σκοπέω.

σκοπέω · look into

To look into: Socrates' constant word for what the partners do, from his first offer to the boy to his reproach to himself at 175a · Charmides

σκοπεῖν, *skopein*, "look into (it)", "examining"; σκόπει, *skopei*, "look into", "look to see", "see whether"; σκοποίμην, *skopoimēn*, "(I would much rather) look into it"; σκοπῶμεν, *skopōmen*, "let's (not) look (yet)", "let us go on looking into"; σκοπῶ, *skopō*, "I am looking", "looking into"; σκοπῇς, *skopēis*, "(if) you look at"; σκοπούμενος, *skopoumenos*, "(the man who) looks into it", "examining"; σκοποῖμεν, *skopoimen*, "we were (not) looking into it"

At a Glance

The word. To watch, look at, consider; to look into, examine. In Attic it supplies the present and imperfect of the verb whose future and aorist are σκέψομαι and ἐσκεψάμην (see σκέπτομαι).

In the *Charmides*. Twenty times, from Socrates' offer to the boy, "I am willing to look into it with you" (158e), to his reproach to himself for "looking into temperance to no useful purpose" (175a). The compound ἐπισκοπέω has its own entry.

In this edition. "Look into" throughout, with "look", "look at", "see" and "examining" where the English needs them.

A place to read. 158d–e, 165b–c, 171a–b and 175a.

Meaning

A σκοπός is a watcher, and also the mark one aims at; σκοπεῖν is to fix one's eyes on something in order to judge it. It is a looking with attention and purpose, unlike ὁρᾶν, "to see"; and, unlike ζητεῖν, "to seek", it supposes that the thing is already before one and needs to be examined. The edition's Key Words call it Socrates' constant word: "Socrates' constant word for what he and his partners are doing is skopein or skeptesthai, 'to look into', and it is rendered with the same English phrase wherever the repetition can be heard (158d–e, 161b–c, 167b, 169b, 175a)."

Use in the book

The verb enters as an offer. The boy cannot say whether he has temperance, and Socrates proposes a joint inquiry: "if you'd like, I am willing to look into it with you; if not, let's leave it"; and the boy answers, "look into it in whatever way you think best" (158e; see *κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι*; *σκέψις*). The looking is consented to before it begins, as the boy's soul had to be handed over before the charm (157b–c; see *πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα*).

The object of the looking then shifts from the boy to what is said. Charmides himself uses the verb to hand on his third answer: "So look into whether you think the man who said it was right" (161b; see *σκέπτομαι*). Critias, taking the argument over, is offered the same partnership: "I would much rather look into it with you, to see whether what was said is true or not" (162e; see *παραδέχομαι*). And when Critias tries to turn the question back on Socrates' own opinion, Socrates refuses: "Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now" (163e; see *ἐάω*). The verb fixes what is under examination, and Socrates guards it.

Its shortest use is its plainest. Critias, offering an account of knowing oneself, says, "Look into it, then." "I am looking," Socrates answers (165c). The present tense is the inquiry in progress, and the next sentence begins it: "If temperance is knowing something, then clearly it would be a kind of knowledge" (165c; see *ἐπιστήμη τινός*). From there the verb carries the long examination of a knowledge of knowledge. It turns on the argument itself, "examining the argument for my own sake above all" (166d; see *σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον*); it keeps the question open through the parallels, "if you look at this same thing in other cases" (167c), "see whether you think there is any sense which is a sense of senses" (167d; see *αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς*), and "let's not yet insist that there isn't; let us go on looking into whether there is" (168a; see *διισχυρίζομαι*).

In the test of the doctor the verb is given a rule. Socrates lays it down, and Critias agrees, that "whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found", not outside them; so "the man who looks into it correctly will examine the doctor, in so far as he is a doctor, in what is healthy and diseased", examining whether what he says is true and what he

does is rightly done (171a–b; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἦ ἰατρικός). Looking into a knowledge means looking into its field. The rule defeats Critias' temperance, which has no field of its own, and it can be read as the dialogue's account of what its own looking has been doing: examining each definition where it claims to apply.

The last uses turn the verb on itself. Socrates looks back on his own words: "I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me, and that I was afraid we were not looking into it correctly" (172e; see ἄτοπος); "one must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random, if one cares for oneself even a little" (173a; see εἰκῇ; παρίημι). And when the argument has made temperance the craftsman of no benefit, he judges the whole inquiry: "So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose?" (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The verdict is itself a looking into the looking, and Socrates does not let it stand. Before the page is out he refuses the result, saying he is "a poor inquirer" and that temperance is a great good (175e; see ζητητής). The dialogue's constant verb ends by examining its own use and finding the examiner, not the virtue, at fault.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs; the compound ἐπισκοπέω (167a) is listed under its own entry.

158e Socrates is willing to look into it with the boy; the boy: look into it in whatever way you think best.

161b The boy: look into whether the man who said it was right.

162e Socrates would much rather look into it with Critias.

163e Let us not look yet at what Socrates thinks, but at what Critias says.

165c Critias: look into it, then. Socrates: I am looking.

166d Socrates is examining the argument for his own sake above all.

166e Critias is to look to see what will become of the argument under refutation.

167b Critias: we must look into it.

167c If you look at the same thing in other cases, it will seem impossible.

167d See whether there is a sense of senses and of itself.

168a Let us not insist that there is no such knowledge, but go on looking into whether there is.

171a–b Whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in its own field; the man who looks into it correctly examines the doctor there.

172e Socrates was afraid they were not looking into it correctly.

173a One must look into what comes to light and not let it go by at random.

175a Socrates was right to blame himself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* Socrates tells how the object of his looking changed. When he had worn himself out looking at the things that are, he was afraid of suffering what befalls those who watch the sun in eclipse, some of them have their eyes destroyed, unless they observe its image in water or the like. So he was afraid that he would blind his soul altogether by looking at things with his eyes and trying to lay hold of them by each sense in turn, and he decided to flee for shelter to λόγοι, accounts, and to examine in them the truth of the things that are. He will not grant that a man who looks at things in accounts is looking at them in images any more than one who looks at them in what is done; and from then on he set out each time from whatever account he judged strongest (99d–100a). The *Charmides*' looking can be read as of this second kind from beginning to end: it looks at temperance in what is said about it.

Translation in this edition

"Look into" renders the verb wherever the repetition can be heard, as the Key Words say; "look" at 163e6 and 165c4, "look at" at 167c5, "see whether" at 167d7, "look to see" at 166e2, and "examining" for σκοπεῖν with τὸν λόγον (166d3) and for σκοπούμενος at 171b8. At 166e2 the imperative is Heindorf's conjecture (see σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον); at 168a11 a later hand in T has the compound ἐπισκοπῶμεν for ἔτι σκοπῶμεν.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; αἰτιάομαι; ἄτοπος; διισχυρίζομαι; ἐάω; εἰκῇ; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ζητητής; ἦ ἰατρικός; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; παραδέχομαι; παρίημι; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; σκέπτομαι; σκέψις; σκοπεῖν τὸν λόγον.

σκυτική · cobbling

ἡ σκυτική, *hē skytikē*, "cobbling"

Attested: σκυτική (*skytikē*; 174c). The cobbler's art, from σκῦτος, "leather". Once Critias has named the knowledge of good and bad, Socrates asks: "For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed ...?" "No less" (174c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; οὐχ ἧττον; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική). Cobbling keeps its product without that knowledge; what goes is "each of these things being done well and beneficially" (174d; see καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως). In the *First Alcibiades* the art separates caring for oneself from caring for what is one's own. Cobbling makes shoes better, and so cares for what belongs to the foot; the foot itself is made better by gymnastics, as the hand is, while ring-engraving cares for what belongs to the hand. One art cares for each thing, another for what is its; and so when a man cares for what is his, he is not caring for himself (128a–d; see ἐπιμέλεια).

See also ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως; οὐχ ἧττον; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική.

σκυτοτομέω · cobble

σκυτοτομεῖν, *skytotomein*, "cobble"; σκυτοτομοῦντι, *skytotomounti*, "(to anyone) to cobble (shoes)"

Attested: σκυτοτομεῖν (*skytotomein*; 161e), σκυτοτομοῦντι (*skytotomounti*; 163b). To cut leather, to make shoes; the verb of the σκυτοτόμος, "leather-

cutter", the cobbler. Socrates' imagined law asks whether a city would be well managed "under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil" (161e; see λήκυθος; νόμος; στλεγγίς). When Critias takes over, he answers from Hesiod, who said that work is no disgrace: "Do you suppose that, if he had called the sort of things you were mentioning just now 'works' ... he would have said that it was no disgrace to anyone to cobble shoes, or to sell salt fish, or to sit in a brothel?" (163b; see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ταριχοπωλέω). The cobbler is Socrates' example of ordinary doing and Critias' example of a shameful making, and the dialogue's third mention of the trade, "cutting leather" (173d; see σκυτῶν τομή), can be read as using it as both at once. The *Republic* makes the born shoemaker's keeping to his trade an image of justice (4.443c; see πρᾶξις), and its city of one man, one craft is told elsewhere (2.369e–370d; see ἐργάζομαι).

See also ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐργάζομαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; λήκυθος; νόμος; πρᾶξις; σκυτῶν τομή; στλεγγίς; ταριχοπωλέω.

σκυτῶν τομή · cutting leather

Cutting leather: the first and lowest of the crafts that Socrates offers as the knowledge that makes a man happy · Charmides

σκυτῶν τομῆς, *skytōn tomēs*, "(about) cutting leather"

At a Glance

The word. Σκῦτος, "hide, leather", in the genitive plural, with τομή, "cutting": the cutting of hides, the cobbler's and leather-worker's trade.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' first question about the object of the happy life: "Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?" (173d).

In this edition. "Cutting leather".

A place to read. 173d–174b.

Meaning

The phrase spells out what Greek usually said in one word, the trade of the σκυτοτόμος, the leather-cutter or cobbler (see σκυτοτομέω). Spelled out, it keeps the physical act in view: knives and hides.

Use in the book

Critias has said that "you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d; see τέλος). Socrates asks to be taught one small thing more (see προσδιδάσκω): "Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?" "By Zeus, not I." "Working bronze, then?" "Not at all." "Or wool, or wood, or anything else of that sort?" "Certainly not" (173d–e; see ἐπιστημόνως; χαλκοῦ ἐργασία). The refusals force Critias to mark off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things, which is told elsewhere (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

Cutting leather is the first example, and it is not an innocent one. At 163b Critias had set the cobbler beside the salt-fish seller and the man who sits in a brothel, as makers of things that Hesiod, as Critias reads him, did not call works (see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; σκυτοτομέω), and the edition's note at 173d remarks that he is not amused to meet the cobbler again (see ἐργασία). The example also does the argument's work. Leather-cutters live knowledgeably, and Critias will not call them happy; so living knowledgeably is not, as such, what makes a man happy. The lowest craft is the plainest proof that knowledge of a craft is not enough.

The trade comes back at the end of the chain. When the knowledge of good and bad has been named, Socrates asks whether, if it were taken away, "cobbling" would shoe us any less well, and Critias says no (174c; see σκυτική). The craft Critias would not count as the happy man's knowledge survives without the knowledge he finally names, and only its being done "well and beneficially" goes (174d). The leather-cutter of 173d can be read as the dialogue's fixed point: the crafts keep their products whatever happens to the argument, and what is in question is only whether anything makes their use good.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the questions it begins and the return of the trade.

173d–e Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather? Critias: not I.

173e Working bronze, wool, wood? Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things.

174c Without the knowledge of good and bad, cobbling would shoe us no less well.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium* Alcibiades makes the lowly examples the mark of Socrates' talk. Anyone willing to hear Socrates' words would find them laughable at first: the nouns and verbs they wear on the outside are of such a kind, the hide, as it were, of an insolent satyr: he speaks of donkeys under their packs, of smiths, shoemakers and hide-tanners, and seems always to say the same things in the same words, so that every inexperienced and thoughtless man would laugh at them. But whoever sees them opened and gets inside will find that they alone of all words have sense within them, and that they are the most divine, holding the most images of virtue, and reaching to everything that a man who means to be fine and good should look into (221e–222a). Callicles' complaint about the same habit is told elsewhere (*Gorgias* 491a; see ἐργασία).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that Critias, as one of the Thirty, later forbade Socrates his cobblers, builders and smiths; the passage is told elsewhere (*Memorabilia* 1.2.37; see δημιουργός).

Translation in this edition

"Cutting leather" renders σκυτῶν τομῆς (173d9), the reading of T and W; B has the compound σκυτοτομῆς, and a later hand in B σκυτοτομικῆς, "the cobbler's art".

See also

ἀφορίζω; δημιουργός; ἐπ᾽ οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐργασία; προσδιδάσκω; σκυτική; σκυτοτομέω; τέλος; χαλκοῦ ἐργασία.

Σόλων · Solon

Σόλωνος, *Solōnos*, "Solon"

Attested: Σόλωνος (*Solōnos*; 155a, 157e). Solon, the Athenian lawgiver and poet of the early sixth century BC, counted among the Seven Sages. Both uses praise the boy's family. When Critias calls his ward "quite the poet", Socrates answers, "That fine gift, my dear Critias ... has been in your family a long way back, from your kinship with Solon" (155a; see ποιητικός; *συγγένεια*); and the house of Critias son of Dropides "has come down to us celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets" (157e–158a; see ποιητής). The edition's note at 155a cites the *Timaeus* for the kinship. There a Critias of the same house says that Solon, "the wisest of the seven", was a relation and close friend of his great-grandfather Dropides, as Solon himself says in many places in his poetry; and he recalls a festival of his boyhood at which the boys sang Solon's poems, then new, and a clansman said that Solon had been wisest in all else and in his poetry the most liberal-minded of all poets. Old Critias, pleased, answered that if Solon had not treated poetry as a sideline but worked at it as others did, neither Hesiod nor Homer nor any other poet would have been more famous than he (20e–21d). The family's poetry, which Socrates traces to Solon, can be read as having its living heir in the boy's guardian, whom Socrates likens at 162d to a poet angry with an actor who makes a mess of his verses; the edition's note there records that Critias was a poet himself (see ποίημα). Solon's part in the Delphic maxims is told elsewhere (*Protagoras* 343a–b; see ἀνατίθημι).

See also ἀνατίθημι; ποίημα; ποιητής; ποιητικός; συγγένεια.

σοφία · wisdom

Wisdom: the distinction Socrates asks after among the young, and the word the argument then leaves aside for knowledge · Charmides

σοφία, *sophiāi*, "(outstanding) in wisdom"

At a Glance

The word. Skill, cleverness, learning, wisdom; the noun of σοφός, "wise".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' first question on his return: "whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d).

In this edition. "Wisdom".

A place to read. 153c–155a.

Meaning

Σοφία began as skill in a craft. Homer's carpenter, straightening a ship's timber, "knows well all wisdom", πάσης ... σοφίης, by Athena's promptings (*Iliad* 15.411–412; see λευκὴ στάθμη). It came to mean cleverness of every kind, the poet's art, the statesman's judgement, the sophist's learning, and in the philosophers wisdom in the highest sense, a knowledge of what matters most.

Use in the book

The noun appears once, at the start, and it gives one of the two terms of the prologue. Socrates, back from Potidaea and done with the news, asks in turn "how philosophy was doing these days, and about the young men, whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d; see διαφέρω; σοφία ἢ κάλλος; φιλοσοφία). How the room answers the two halves of the question is told elsewhere (154a–155a; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος): beauty is answered at once, wisdom only by Critias' report that the boy is a philosopher and a poet (see φιλόσοφος), and then the examination of his soul begins.

After 153d the dialogue does not use the noun again. The adjective appears three times, of Cydias, "the wisest of men in the ways of love"

(155d), of "the other wise men" (161c), and of the author of "doing one's own business", who "was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b; see σοφός). Each time wisdom is a reputation, something others ascribe. When the argument reaches the virtue it is testing, its word is ἐπιστήμη, knowledge, and temperance is defined as a knowledge of knowledge (165c–166e; see ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). The absence can be read as pointed. The question Socrates brought home was whether the young had wisdom; the question the dialogue examines is whether temperance is a knowledge, and what such a knowledge would be of.

Places to read

The passage in which the noun occurs, with the answer it receives.

153d Socrates asks how philosophy is doing, and whether any young man is outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both.

154e–155a Critias: the boy is a philosopher and quite the poet.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* Socrates argues that wisdom and temperance are one. Folly, ἀφροσύνη, he gets Protagoras to agree, is the opposite of wisdom; but when men act rightly and beneficially they act temperately, and those who act wrongly act foolishly, so that folly is the opposite of temperance as well; and since each thing has only one opposite, either that rule must go, or wisdom and temperance are the same. Protagoras grants, very unwillingly, that the two cannot both stand, and Socrates concludes that temperance and wisdom would be one (332a–333b). In the *Theaetetus* the step runs the other way. The wise are wise by wisdom, and men are wise in what they know, so that knowledge and wisdom are the same; and that, Socrates says, is just what he is at a loss about, what knowledge is (145d–e). The *Charmides* can be read as standing between the two: it tests temperance as a knowledge, which on the *Theaetetus*' terms would make it a wisdom, as the *Protagoras* had argued, and it finds that it cannot say what such a knowledge would be.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle traces the word from the crafts to the highest knowledge. In the crafts we ascribe wisdom to their most exact masters, calling the sculptors Phidias and Polyclitus wise, and all we mean by the word there is that each is excellent in his art; but some men we think wise outright, not wise in a part or at some one thing, as Homer says in the *Margites*, a comic poem then ascribed to him: "The gods made him no digger and no ploughman, nor skilled at anything else." Wisdom, then, would be the most exact of the kinds of knowledge: the wise man must not only know what is drawn from the starting-points but also have the truth about the starting-points themselves, so that wisdom would be intellect and knowledge together, a knowledge, as it were, with a head on it, of the most honourable things.[215]

Translation in this edition

"Wisdom" renders σοφίᾳ (153d4), the dative of respect with διαφέροντες, "outstanding".

See also

διαφέρω; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης; λευκὴ στάθμη; ποιητικός; σοφία ἢ κάλλος; σοφός; φιλοσοφία; φιλόσοφος.

σοφία ἢ κάλλος · wisdom or beauty

Wisdom or beauty, or both: the two distinctions Socrates asks after among the young, and the shape of the prologue · Charmides

ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις, *ē sophiāi ē kallei ē amphoterois*, "in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both"

At a Glance

The word. Σοφία, "wisdom", and κάλλος, "beauty", in the dative with διαφέροντες, "outstanding": the two ways a young man might stand out, and the third, "in both".

[215] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.7, 1141a9–20.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' question about the young men: "whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d).

In this edition. "In wisdom, or in beauty, or in both".

A place to read. 153d–155a.

Meaning

The pair names the two gifts of youth that an Athenian admirer might look for in a boy, the one that is seen and the one that is heard. The third choice, "in both", can be read as the ideal that the stock phrase καλὸς κἀγαθός, "beautiful and good", held up for a gentleman, the phrase Critias uses of the boy's soul at 154e (see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός).

Use in the book

The question organizes the prologue, and the room answers its terms in reverse order. Beauty is answered at once and by everyone. Critias tells Socrates, "As for the beautiful ones ... I think you'll know in a moment" (154a; see πρόδρομος); Charmides enters, "a marvel of stature and beauty", with every eye on him (154c; see κάλλος; μέγεθος); and Chaerephon adds that if he stripped "you'd think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful" (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος).

Wisdom is answered by a condition and a report. Socrates would call the boy invincible "if he has just one little thing more", a soul well made (154d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα; πρόσειμι). Critias vouches that he is "thoroughly beautiful and good" in that respect too, and Socrates asks, "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure?" (154e; see ἀποδύω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). Critias' report is that the boy is "a philosopher and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (154e–155a; see ποιητικός; φιλόσοφος). "Both", then, is the boy, but the wisdom only by hearsay, and the conversation that follows is the test of it.

The pair returns in other words when Socrates praises the boy to his face. His father's house was celebrated "for its outstanding beauty and virtue" (157e–158a; see ἀρετή); "As for what can be seen of your looks ... you seem

to me to fall short of none of your forebears in any respect", and if he is also endowed for temperance, "blessed is the child" (158a–b; see μακάριος). What can be seen is granted, and what must be asked is put as a question. Socrates asked for wisdom first and beauty second, and the dialogue can be read as spending its length restoring his order against the room's.

Places to read

The passage in which the phrase occurs, with the answers it receives and its return in Socrates' praise of the boy.

153d Socrates asks whether any young man is outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both.

154a–d Critias promises the beautiful one; Charmides enters, a marvel of stature and beauty; his figure would put his face in the shade.

154d–e He would be invincible if his soul too were well made; let us strip his soul before his figure.

154e–155a Critias: the boy is a philosopher and quite the poet.

158a–b In looks the boy falls short of none of his forebears; does he also have temperance?

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* opens with the same question and the opposite answer. Socrates tells Theodorus that he cares more for the young of Athens than for those of Cyrene, Theodorus' city, and wants to know which of them are likely to turn out well; that is what he himself looks into as far as he can, and he asks those whom he sees the young like to be with. Theodorus has met one worth telling of. Were the boy beautiful, he says, he would hardly dare to speak of him, for fear someone should think he desired him; but as it is, and Socrates must not take it amiss, he is not beautiful: he resembles Socrates, flat-nosed, with eyes that stand out, though both are less marked in him (143d–e). The boy is Theaetetus, and the nature Theodorus goes on to praise, quick to learn and gentle and brave at once, is told elsewhere (144a–b; see δυσμαθία). The *Charmides* finds beauty first and has to ask after wisdom; the *Theaetetus* finds a mind first, in a face like Socrates' own.

Translation in this edition

"Outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" renders διαφέροντες ἢ σοφίᾳ ἢ κάλλει ἢ ἀμφοτέροις (153d4–5), with "had turned out to be" for ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν.

See also

ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; ἀρετή; διαφέρω; δυσμαθία; εὖ πέφυκα; κάλλος; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; μακάριος; μέγεθος; ποιητικός; πρόδρομος; πρόσειμι; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; σοφία; φιλόσοφος.

σοφός · wise

σοφώτατον, *sophōtaton*, "the wisest"; σοφῶν, *sophōn*, "(the other) wise men"; σοφός, *sophos*, "(very) wise"

Attested: σοφώτατον (*sophōtaton*; 155d), σοφῶν (*sophōn*; 161c), σοφός (*sophos*; 162b). Skilled, clever, wise. Three times, and each time the wisdom is credited to a man by someone else. Cydias is the man Socrates "thought ... the wisest of men in the ways of love" at the moment of his glimpse inside the boy's cloak (155d; see Κυδίας; τὰ ἐρωτικά). When the boy offers his third answer, Socrates says he has heard it "from Critias here, or from one of the other wise men" (161b–c; see ἀκούω). And the author of that answer, the boy says, "was thought to be very wise indeed" (162b; see δοκέω). Socrates' "other" counts Critias among the wise men, and Socrates is sure that the boy heard the answer from him (162c). The reputation is what makes the formula a riddle: a fool's absurdity would need no reading, and a wise man's must have been meant otherwise (162a–b; see αἴνιγμα; ἠλίθιος; προβάλλω).

See also αἴνιγμα; ἀκούω; δοκέω; ἠλίθιος; Κυδίας; προβάλλω; σοφία; τὰ ἐρωτικά.

σπουδή · pains

σπουδῇ, *spoudēi*, "hard"; μετὰ πολλῆς σπουδῆς, *meta pollēs spoudēs*, "(took) great pains"

Attested: σπουδῇ (*spoudēi*; 155c), σπουδῆς (*spoudēs*; 175e). Haste, eagerness, earnest effort. When the boy comes in, "Every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up and shoved his neighbor hard to make room for Charmides to sit beside him" (155c; see καταβάλλω): the dative is the eagerness of the shove. At the end Socrates says, "I am still more aggrieved on account of the charm I learned from the Thracian, if I took great pains to learn a charm for a thing worth nothing" (175e; see ἀγανακτέω; ἐπῳδή; Θρᾷξ). The two uses can be read as framing the dialogue: the company's eagerness for a seat beside the boy's body, and Socrates' earnest labour over a charm for his soul.

See also ἀγανακτέω; ἐπῳδή; Θρᾷξ; καταβάλλω.

σταθμητός · measure

σταθμητόν, *stathmēton*, "(no) measure (of anything)"

Attested: σταθμητόν (*stathmēton*; 154b). Measurable, that can be weighed or gauged; the verbal adjective of σταθμάομαι, "measure", from σταθμός, a weight or a balance (see σταθμός). As Charmides comes in, Socrates disclaims judgement: "Now I, my friend, am no measure of anything. Where the beautiful are concerned I am simply a white measuring-line on white stone" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη). Literally he says that for him nothing is measurable: the fault lies in the measurer, who cannot tell one beauty from another. The edition's note on the chime of "measure" and "measuring-line" is given under λευκὴ στάθμη. A later hand in B has ἀστάθμητον, "unmeasurable", for the σταθμητόν of B and T. The measure that fails before beauty can be read as the first of the dialogue's failing instruments of judgement; later the argument finds that a knowledge of

knowledge could no more tell a doctor from a pretender (170e–171c; see προσποιέομαι).

See also λευκὴ στάθμη; προσποιέομαι; σταθμός.

σταθμός · weight

σταθμοῦ, *stathmou*, "weight"

Attested: σταθμοῦ (*stathmou*; 166b). A standing-place, a station; a weight, and the balance on which weights are set; from the root of ἵστημι, "set, stand". Socrates' second example of a knowledge whose object is other than itself is weighing, "the weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight", whose objects, the heavy and the light, are something other than weighing itself (166b; see βαρύς; κοῦφος; στατική). The question follows at once, what temperance is knowledge of (166b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The noun names the object of the art as a thing weighed, so that the knowledge and its object stand as far apart as the weigher and the weight.

See also βαρύς; ἐπιστήμη τινός; κοῦφος; σταθμητός; στατική.

στατική · weighing

ἡ στατική, *hē statikē*, "weighing"; στατική, *statikē*, "the weighing"; τῆς στατικῆς, *tēs statikēs*, "(than) weighing (itself)"

Attested: στατική (*statikē*; 166b twice), στατικῆς (*statikēs*; 166b). The art of weighing, from ἵστημι, "set up", the setting of the balance. It follows calculation as Socrates' second knowledge with an object distinct from itself: "And again, weighing is the weighing of the heavier and the lighter weight; and the heavy and the light are something other than weighing itself" (166b; see λογιστική; πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα; σταθμός). Heindorf proposed to delete the second στατική, "the weighing", and in the same line T has τε καί where B has καὶ τό. The *Euthyphro*'s quarrels about heavier and lighter, settled by going to the scales, are told elsewhere (7b–d; see κοῦφος), and so is the *Republic*'s weighing as a safeguard against appearances (602d; see βαρύς).

In the *Protagoras* weighing becomes the model for choosing. Socrates tells the many that, like a man good at weighing, one should put the pleasant things together and the painful, set the near and the far on the scale, and say which are more; and then do the action in which the pleasures outweigh the pains (356a–c).

See also βαρύς; κοῦφος; λογιστική; πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα; σταθμός.

στλεγγίς · strigil

στλεγγίδα, *stlengida*, "strigil"

Attested: στλεγγίδα (*stlengida*; 161e). The strigil, the curved scraper with which an athlete cleaned off oil and dust after exercise. In Socrates' imagined law each man is to "make his own oil-flask and strigil and everything else on the same principle" (161e–162a; see λήκυθος; νόμος; σκυτοτομέω). The edition's note on the pair (162a), and Hippias' boast that he came to Olympia with a strigil and an oil-flask of his own making, are told elsewhere (*Hippias Minor* 368b–d; see λήκυθος). The strigil was the gear of the very wrestling-school in which they sit (see παλαίστρα), and the law can be read as made absurd by the plainest object of the place.

See also λήκυθος; νόμος; παλαίστρα; σκυτοτομέω.

στρατηγική · generalship

ἡ στρατηγική, *hē stratēgikē*, "generalship"

Attested: στρατηγική (*stratēgikē*; 174c). The general's art. It closes Socrates' list of crafts that would keep their products without the knowledge of good and bad: would "the pilot's art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?" "No less" (174c; see κυβερνητική; οὐχ ἧττον; σκυτική). The art keeps its power to save without the knowledge that would make the saving good. In the *Euthydemus* generalship is proposed as the art that would make its possessor happy, and refused. Socrates suggests it, and Clinias, as Socrates reports him, answers that it is an art of hunting men, and

that hunters cannot use what they catch. Hunters and fishermen hand their catch to the cooks, and geometers, astronomers and calculators hand their findings to the dialecticians; so generals, when they have captured a city or a camp, hand it over to the statesmen, since they themselves do not know how to use what they have hunted; and another art must be sought in place of generalship (290b–d; see παραδίδωμι).

See also κυβερνητική; οὐχ ἧττον; παραδίδωμι; σκυτική; στρατηγός.

στρατηγός · general

στρατηγός, *stratēgos*, "general"

Attested: στρατηγός (*stratēgos*; 173b). A general, a commander in war. In the dream, if temperance ruled, no pretended pilot would deceive us, "nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice" who pretended to know (173b; see κυβερνήτης; λανθάνω; προσποιέομαι). The general stands with the pilot and the doctor as a man on whose knowledge lives depend and whose pretence would be fatal; the safety the dream promises, coming through "when in danger at sea and in war" (173b), is theirs to give. The word can be read as having a particular weight in a dialogue whose narrator has just come home from the fighting at Potidaea (153a–c), and the general's art is set, a page later, among those that save without making the saving good (174c; see στρατηγική).

See also κυβερνήτης; λανθάνω; προσποιέομαι; στρατηγική.

στρατόπεδον · army, camp

στρατοπέδου, *stratopedou*, "army", "camp"

Attested: στρατοπέδου (*stratopedou*; 153a, 153c). The ground on which an army lies encamped, from στρατός, "army", and πέδον, "ground"; so the camp, and the army in the field. The dialogue's first sentence brings Socrates home "from the army at Potidaea" the evening before (153a; see ἀσμένως; διὰ χρόνου; συνήθης διατριβή), and the room wants the war before anything else:

seated beside Critias, he gives them "the news from the camp, whatever anyone asked" (153c–d; see διηγέομαι; πυνθάνομαι). The charm belongs to the same campaign. Socrates learned it, he says, "out there on campaign" from one of the Thracian doctors (156d; see Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ), where the Greek is another word, στρατιᾶς, "expedition", and Stobaeus reads στρατείας, "campaign" (apparatus, d4).

See also ἀσμένως; διὰ χρόνου; διηγέομαι; Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; πυνθάνομαι; συνήθης διατριβή.

συγγένεια · kinship

συγγενείας, *syngeneias*, "kinship"

Attested: συγγενείας (*syngeneias*; 155a). Kinship by birth, from συγγενής, "born with", "related", on the root of γένος, "family". Critias has called his ward a philosopher and, "in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet", and Socrates answers, "That fine gift, my dear Critias, ... has been in your family a long way back, from your kinship with Solon" (155a; see ποιητικός; Σόλων). The compliment is paid to the guardian as much as to the boy, since the kinship runs through Critias' own line: the edition's note at 155a makes Solon a kinsman of Critias' ancestor Dropides (*Timaeus* 20e). Socrates returns to the boy's descent at length later, the father's house "celebrated by Anacreon and by Solon and by many other poets", the mother's through his uncle Pyrilampes (157e–158a; see ἀρετή; πατρῷος).

See also ἀρετή; πατρῷος; ποιητικός; Σόλων.

συγχωρέω · concede, grant, agree

To make room, to give way; in the argument, to let a point pass, and to grant a premise for the sake of looking into it · Charmides

συγχωρῶν, *synchōrōn*, "squeezed up"; συγχωρεῖς, *synchōreis*, "you agree", "do you agree?"; συγχωρῶ, *synchōrō*, "I agree"; συγχωρήσαιμ' (ἄν), *synchōrēsaim' (an)*, "(than ever) concede"; συγχωρῆσαι, *synchōrēsai*, "to concede"; συγχωρήσωμεν, *synchōrēsōmen*, "let us grant"; συγχωρήσαντες, *synchōrēsantes*, "granting"; συγκεχωρήκαμεν, *synkechōrēkamen*, "we have conceded"; συνεχωρήσαμεν, *synechōrēsamen*, "we conceded"

At a Glance

The word. To go together, and so to make room by moving up; to give way, to yield; in argument, to concede a point or grant a premise.

In the *Charmides*. Fourteen times. It begins on the bench, where everyone "squeezed up" to make room for the boy (155c), and ends in Socrates' reckoning: "we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument" (175b).

In this edition. "Concede" and "grant", in the Glossary's words "of steps allowed for the sake of argument"; "agree" at 162e and 166b; "squeezed up" at 155c.

A place to read. 169c–d and 175b–c.

Meaning

Συγχωρέω is χωρέω, "make way", "move", with σύν, "together": to come together, to make room for another, and so to give way. In argument it is the answerer's word for letting a point pass, whether from conviction, for the sake of the argument, or because he cannot hold out. The edition keeps it apart from ὁμολογέω, "agree", which says the same thing as the other speaker (see ὁμολογέω). To concede is to allow a thing without making it one's own, and the dialogue's last pages turn on that difference.

Use in the book

The first use is bodily. When Charmides comes over, Socrates tells us, "every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up and shoved his neighbor hard to make room for Charmides to sit beside him", until of the two men at the end of the bench one was made to stand up and the other tipped off sideways (155c; see καταβάλλω; σπουδή). Every later use is a concession in the argument, and the first can be read as a figure for the rest: the company made room on the bench for the boy, and the speakers will make room in the argument for his guardian's definition.

Critias' agreements come first. Socrates asks him to take the boy's answer over, "So if you agree that temperance is what this young man says, and take the argument over", and Critias replies, "I agree entirely, ... and I take it over" (162e; see παραδέχομαι). He agrees as readily that all craftsmen make something (162e) and that the heavy and the light are other than weighing (166b; see σταθμός). Then twice he refuses. Faced with a doctor who is temperate without knowing it, he declares, "I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate" (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). Faced with Socrates' perplexity, he catches it, and, as Socrates tells it, being ashamed in front of the company "he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make" (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀπορία; προκαλέομαι). The two refusals frame his whole defence of self-knowledge, the first can be read as withheld for the sake of his thesis, the second for the sake of his standing.

Socrates' own uses are of another kind. Three times he grants a premise so that the argument can go on to what would follow from it. The first grant comes at 169d: "let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time" (169d; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; πρόειμι). He grants it again, with the definition of 167a beside it, before asking whether temperance so understood would benefit us (172c–d; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην), and in the dream he adds, "if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is

going to be" (173c; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική). The grants are a method: what is doubtful is allowed, to see what would come of it.

The reckoning counts the grant of 169d first among the "many things that did not follow in the argument" (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συμβαίνω). It had been made "for now", with the promise to look into it "another time", and the other time never came.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155c Everyone on the bench squeezed up to make room for the boy.

162e Critias agrees that temperance is what the boy said, and takes the argument over.

162e He agrees that all craftsmen make something.

164c–d He would sooner take back some of what he agreed than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.

166b He agrees that the heavy and the light are other than weighing.

169c Ashamed before the company, he will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions.

169d Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible.

172c Granting that it is possible to know knowledge, he asks whether temperance would benefit us.

173c He grants that prophecy is knowledge of what is going to be.

175b–c They have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument, "with the utmost magnificence".

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* the verb names a concession made without conviction. Socrates has called flattery every pursuit that aims at pleasure without regard to the better and the worse, and asks Callicles whether he holds the same opinion or speaks against it. "No, I don't," Callicles answers, "I concede it, so that your argument can reach its end, and as a favour to Gorgias here" (501c). Earlier he had complained that Polus conceded out of shame what he did not believe, and the complaint is told elsewhere (482c–e; see αἰσχύνομαι). Critias' refusals can be read as the other face of the same shame: Polus

conceded because he was ashamed to say what he thought, and Critias will not concede because he is ashamed to be seen at a loss.

Translation in this edition

The Glossary sets the verb apart from "agree", ὁμολογεῖν, except at 162e and 166b, where "agree" renders it: "concede, grant, *συγχωρεῖν* (synchōrein), of steps allowed for the sake of argument: 164d, 169c–d, 172c, 173c, 175b–c". The English has "grant" for Socrates' provisional concessions (169d, 172c, 173c) and "concede" for Critias' refusals and the final count (164d, 169c, 175b–c). At 155c the participle is rendered by what it describes, "squeezed up". At 172d "let us ... grant it" and "having granted" render another verb, δίδωμι, "give"; there Burnet prints δῶμεν with T and a variant in W, where B and W have ἴδωμεν, "let us see" (apparatus, d1).

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; ἀνατίθημι; ἀπορία; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; καταβάλλω; μαντική; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; ὁμολογέω; παραδέχομαι; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; πρόειμι; προκαλέομαι; σπουδή; σταθμός; συμβαίνω.

συλλήβδην · in short, taking all together

συλλήβδην, *syllēbdēn*, "in short", "taking (all) together"

Attested: συλλήβδην (*syllēbdēn*; 159b, 167d). An adverb from συλλαμβάνω, "gather together": taken all together, in sum. It comes twice, both times where a list is gathered into one thing to be tested. The boy, having described temperance as doing everything in an orderly way and quietly, walking in the streets and talking, gathers his examples: "And in short, ... I think what you are asking about is a kind of quietness" (159b; see ἡσυχιότης; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ). Socrates, having found no sight that sees no colour but sees itself and the other sights, and no hearing that hears no sound but hears itself and the other hearings, gathers the rest: "Then, taking all the senses together, see whether you think there is any sense

which is a sense of senses and of itself" (167d; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς). The boy's summary turns behaviour into a definition; Socrates' turns two cases into a rule.

See also αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἡσυχιότης; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ.

συλλογίζομαι · put together

συλλογισάμενος, *syllogisamenos*, "put (all this) together"

Attested: συλλογισάμενος (*syllogisamenos*; 160d). To reckon together, to sum up, from λογίζομαι, "reckon", with *σύν*. After the refutation of quietness Socrates asks the boy to look within himself and consider what sort of person temperance makes him by being present, and what sort of thing could produce such a person: "then put all this together and tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be" (160d–e; see ἀνδρείως; ἐμβλέπω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). What he puts together is modesty (160e; see αἰδώς). The verb asks for an inference from oneself, a reckoning of effects up to their cause. In Aristotle the noun of the same verb, συλλογισμός, becomes the name for a deduction, defined by what follows from what is laid down (see συμβαίνω).[216]

See also αἰδώς; ἀνδρείως; ἐμβλέπω; συμβαίνω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα.

[216] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 1.1, 24b18–20.

συμβαίνω · follow, happen

To come together, to fall out; of an argument, to follow: the verb of consequence that Critias refuses, asserts and is finally found to lack · Charmides

συμβαίνειν, *symbainein*, "(necessarily) follows"; συμβαίνει, *symbainei*, "it (does) follow"; συμβαίνοι, *symbainoi*, "would happen"; συμβαίνονθ', *symbainonth'*, "(that did not) follow"

At a Glance

The word. To go together; of events, to fall out, to happen to someone; of propositions, to follow, to result.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: Critias' protest that he would sooner retract than accept what "necessarily follows" (164c), his claim that self-knowledge "does follow" from knowledge of knowledge (169d), the good things that "would happen to us" under temperance (173b), and the concessions "that did not follow in the argument" (175b).

In this edition. "Follow"; "happen" at 173b.

A place to read. 169d–e and 175b.

Meaning

Συμβαίνω is βαίνω, "go", with *σύν*: to go together, to come to terms; of things, to come about, to befall; of statements, to follow from others. The two senses lie close in Greek, since what follows from premises is what comes about when they are granted. The perfect participle, τὸ συμβεβηκός, "what has come along", became Aristotle's word for an accident: what belongs to a thing and can truly be said of it, but neither of necessity nor for the most part, like the treasure a man comes upon when he digs a pit to set a plant in.[217]

Use in the book

Critias meets the verb first as a threat. Socrates has shown that a doctor who acts beneficially acts temperately without knowing it, and Critias answers, "If you think that this necessarily follows from anything I agreed to earlier, I

[217] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.30, 1025a14–19.

would sooner take back some of it", rather than concede the conclusion (164c–d; see ἀναγκαῖος; ἀνατίθημι; συγχωρέω). He will give up premises rather than accept the consequence, and its denial becomes his next definition.

At 169d he uses the verb himself, as an assertion. Socrates has granted for the sake of argument that knowledge of knowledge is possible, and asks how it makes one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not; Critias replies, "Certainly, ... and it does follow, Socrates", and gives his reason: whoever has knowledge of itself will be knowing himself, as whoever has speed is fast (169d–e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; τάχος). Socrates allows that consequence and presses the one he asked about: "That isn't what I'm disputing ... But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?" (169e; see ἀμφισβητέω). Critias has proved that something follows, but not the thing in question.

In the dream the verb means what happens to us. If temperance ruled and no pretender deceived us, Socrates asks, "what else would happen to us than that we would be healthier in body than we are now, and come through safe when in danger at sea and in war ...?" (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; σῴζω). The happy consequences are granted, and only one is withheld, that by acting knowledgeably we would do well (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

The reckoning brings the two senses together. "And yet we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument" (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω). The dialogue's question can be read as asking of temperance, in both senses, what συμβαίνει: what follows from the definition, and what would come of it for us. The concessions supplied the first only by granting what did not follow, and the second never came.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

164c–d Critias would sooner take back his agreements than accept what necessarily follows from them.

169d He claims that knowing oneself does follow from knowledge of knowledge.

173b Under temperance's rule, what would happen to us is health and safety.

175b They have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the verb the hinge of his definition of a deduction, συλλογισμός: a λόγος in which, once certain things have been put down, something different from them comes about of necessity, συμβαίνει, because they are so.[218] His deduction can be read as the thing Critias claims at 169d and Socrates finds missing at 175b: a consequence that comes from the premises themselves and not from the partners' readiness to grant them.

Translation in this edition

"Follow" at 164c9, 169d9 and 175b5, "happen" at 173b5. At 164c9 Burnet records Hirschig's deletion of εἰς before τοῦτο; at 173b5 the ἤ, "than", that completes Socrates' question is Heindorf's conjecture, where Stobaeus has μή, and Stobaeus also moves τι next to ἄλλο; at 175b5 Schanz would omit ἐν before τῷ λόγῳ (apparatus).

See also

ἀμφισβητέω; ἀναγκαῖος; ἀνατίθημι; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω; συλλογίζομαι; σῴζω; τάχος.

συμβουλεύω · advise

συμβουλεύσαιμι (ἄν), *symbouleusaimi (an)*, "I would (sooner) advise"

Attested: συμβουλεύσαιμι (*symbouleusaimi*; 176a). To give counsel, from βουλή, "counsel", with σύν: to take counsel with another, and so to advise him; it is the verb of the speaker who advises the Assembly. The verb comes once, at the dialogue's end, and the advice it gives is against Socrates himself: "For if you have it, I would sooner advise you to regard me as a babbler, unable to inquire into anything whatever by argument, and yourself to be happier just in proportion as you are more temperate" (176a; see λῆρος; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ). The condition, "if you have it", is the one thing the boy cannot settle, and he says so at once (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The plotting of the last lines belongs to the boy and his guardian; when

[218] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* 1.1, 24b18–20.

Charmides tells Socrates to take counsel in his turn, he answers, "There's no counsel left" (176c–d; see βουλεύομαι).

See also βουλεύομαι; λῆρος; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; συμβουλή.

συμβουλή · advice

συμβουλήν, *symboulēn*, "a piece of advice"; *συμβουλάς*, *symboulas*, "advice"

Attested: *συμβουλήν* (*symboulēn*; 165a4), *συμβουλάς* (*symboulas*; 165a6). Advice, counsel, what one man gives another; the noun of *συμβουλεύω*. Critias sets advice against greeting. The god at Delphi, on his reading, greets those who enter with "Know thyself", meaning "Be temperate", and the men who set up the later inscriptions mistook it: "For they thought 'Know thyself' was a piece of advice, and not the god's greeting to those who enter; and then, so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less, they wrote these up and dedicated them" (165a; see *ἀνατίθημι*; *Γνῶθι σαυτόν*; *πρόσρησις*). The later maxims are "Nothing too much" and "Pledge, and ruin is near" (see *Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη*; *Μηδὲν ἄγαν*). Advice is what men give one another; the greeting is the god's, and on Critias' reading it needs an interpreter. At 165a6 Burnet prints *συμβουλὰς χρησίμους* with B and W, where T and Stobaeus have the words in the other order (apparatus).

See also *ἀνατίθημι*; *Γνῶθι σαυτόν*; *Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη*; *Μηδὲν ἄγαν*; *πρόσρησις*; *συμβουλεύω*.

συμπάσχω · catch

συμπάσχουσιν, *sympaschousin*, "catch (a yawn)"

Attested: *ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν* (*tauton touto sympaschousin*; 169c). To suffer along with another, to be affected in the same way, from *πάσχω*, "undergo", with *σύν*. When Critias saw him at a loss, it was, Socrates says, "like people who catch a yawn from those they see yawning opposite them" (169c; see *ἀπορία*; *καταντικρύ*; *χασμάομαι*). The Greek says only that the

onlookers "undergo this same thing along with" the yawners, and the English supplies the yawn the simile is about. Perplexity passes from Socrates to Critias like a yawn across the room, and the verb that follows is the one used of Socrates caught by the boy at 155e (see ἁλίσκομαι). Burnet's doubt about "forced", ἀναγκασθῆναι, is told elsewhere (169c6; see ἀναγκάζω).

See also ἁλίσκομαι; ἀναγκάζω; ἀπορία; καταντικρύ; ταὐτόν; χασμάομαι.

συμπλάττω · make up

To mould together, to make up between them: Socrates' word for the definition he and Critias built and the inquiry undid · Charmides

συμπλάττοντες, *symplattontes*, "(and) made up between us"

At a Glance

The word. To mould or shape together, as a potter or a modeller in wax does; to put together, to concoct.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the recapitulation: "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175d).

In this edition. "Made up between us".

A place to read. 175b–d.

Meaning

Πλάττω is to mould soft material, clay or wax or dough, into a shape, and so to form, to fashion, and, of words, to make up, to invent. With *σύν* it is to mould something together with another. The verb carries the craftsman's hands: what is moulded has the shape its maker gave it, and nothing guarantees that the shape matches anything outside.

Use in the book

The word comes once, at the turn of Socrates' last speech, and it makes the definition a thing that he and Critias manufactured. The inquiry, he says, found them simple-minded and easy to deal with, and still could not find the

truth: "It has made such a mockery of the truth that what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175d; see καταγελάω; ὑβριστικῶς). Three verbs describe the definition's making: agreed on, made up, laid down (see συνομολογέω; τίθημι). The middle one admits what the other two do not say, that the partners shaped the thing between them.

The admission matches the concessions just counted, both made though the argument did not allow them (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συγχωρέω). A definition built from concessions the argument did not supply is a moulded thing, made to the makers' wish. The irony of their "magnificence" is told elsewhere (175c; see μεγαλοπρεπῶς).

The verb can be read as Socrates' last diagnosis of Critias' method. From 163d onward Critias assigned words as he pleased, with Socrates' leave (see Πρόδικος), and from 169d Socrates granted for now what was doubtful (see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν). Each step was allowed, and the whole was made up. The inquiry, personified, is what refuses to be shaped: it makes a mockery of the truth, and shows the shape to be of no benefit.

Places to read

The verb's only place.

175d What they long ago agreed on, made up between them and laid down as temperance has been shown to be of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Republic* the city is moulded in words, and the simple verbs of the same pair, ὁμολογέω and πλάττω, go together. Asked whether the citizens cannot fight for themselves, Socrates answers that they cannot, if Glaucon and all the rest of them agreed rightly "when we were moulding the city": they agreed that one man cannot work well at many crafts (2.374a). A few pages later he would have the founders persuade nurses and mothers to tell children only the approved tales, and so to mould their souls with stories far more than they mould their bodies with their hands, since the young take whatever stamp one wishes to press on them (2.377b–c). There the moulding is deliberate and its makers know what they are shaping. In the

Charmides Socrates uses the compounds of the same pair, agreeing and moulding together, of a shape the makers took for the truth.

Translation in this edition

"Made up between us" renders the participle at 175d3, and keeps the "together" of the compound in "between us". Its partner συνομολογοῦντες, "agreed on", has its own entry (see συνομολογέω).

See also

εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; καταγελάω; μεγαλοπρεπῶς; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; Πρόδικος; συγχωρέω; συνομολογέω; τίθημι; ὑβριστικῶς.

σύμφημι · say the same

συνέφασαν, *synephasan*, "(all) said the same"

Attested: συνέφασαν (*synephasan*; 154d). To say along with another, to assent, from φημί, "say", with σύν. When Charmides has come in and Chaerephon has called out that the boy has a lovely face, and that if he were willing to strip "you'd think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful", the room joins in: "The others all said the same as Chaerephon" (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος; πάγκαλος). The verb gives the company one voice, and the voice speaks of the body. Socrates answers with an exclamation and a condition, "Heracles! What an invincible man you are describing, if he has just one little thing more", and the little thing is a well-made soul (154d–e; see ἄμαχος; Ἡρακλῆς). The chorus of assent can be read as the opinion Socrates sets aside: what the many agree on is the boy's figure, and he asks after his soul.

See also ἄμαχος; ἀπρόσωπος; εἶδος; Ἡρακλῆς; πάγκαλος.

συνεργός · work alongside

συνεργόν, *synergon*, "(to) work alongside (us)"

Attested: συνεργόν (*synergon*; 173d). A fellow worker, a helper, sometimes an accomplice, from ἔργον, "work", with σύν. In the dream temperance stands guard over our work: the human race would act and live knowledgeably, "since temperance, standing guard, would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us" (173d; see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; παρεμπίπτω; φυλάττω). The lack of knowledge is pictured as a hand that slips into the workshop unnoticed and puts itself to the job, and it can be read as the pretenders of 173b–c turned into a figure (see ἀλαζών; προσποιέομαι). The guard keeps the workshop honest, and Socrates' reservation follows at once: that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, "this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). In the *Symposium* the word names a helper of the opposite kind, Love, than whom human nature could not easily find a better fellow worker for the possession Diotima has described (212b; see τὰ ἐρωτικά).

See also ἀλαζών; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; παρεμπίπτω; προσποιέομαι; τὰ ἐρωτικά; φυλάττω.

συνήθης διατριβή · old haunts

Socrates' accustomed places for passing the time, to which he returns from the war in the dialogue's first sentence · Charmides

τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς, *tas synētheis diatribas*, "my old haunts"

At a Glance

The phrase. Διατριβή is a way of passing time, and the place where one passes it; συνήθης is "accustomed", "familiar". Together, the places one habitually spends one's days.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the first sentence: back from the army at Potidaea, "after so long away I was glad to make for my old haunts" (153a).

In this edition. "My old haunts".

A place to read. 153a–d.

Meaning

Διατριβή is the noun of διατρίβω, "rub through", "wear away", and so "spend time": a pastime, an occupation, a way of life, and the place where these go on. From it comes the later use for a school and for a philosopher's talk, the diatribe. Συνήθης, from ἦθος, "custom", "habit", is what one is used to, and with persons "intimate". The phrase names Socrates' habits by their places.

Use in the book

The dialogue opens with a man who has come back from a battle and does at once what he always does. Socrates had got back from Potidaea the evening before, and, as he tells it, "after so long away I was glad to make for my old haunts" (153a; see ἀσμένως; διὰ χρόνου; στρατόπεδον). The haunt he chooses is a wrestling-school, the wrestling-school of Taureas, opposite the shrine of Basile, where he finds a great crowd, most of them people he knows (153a; see Βασίλη; γνώριμος; παλαίστρα). The phrase tells the reader where Socrates belongs: not with the army, which he has served, but among the young men and their admirers in the places where they exercise and talk.

The room asks him for the war, and he gives them the news from the camp (153c–d; see διηγέομαι; στρατόπεδον). Then he asks his own questions, and they are the questions of the haunts, about philosophy and about the young men, whether any had turned out outstanding in wisdom or in beauty (153d; see σοφία ἢ κάλλος; φιλοσοφία). The haunts are where philosophy and the young are found together, and the conversation that follows is the kind for which Socrates came back to them.

Places to read

The phrase's only place.

153a Back from Potidaea, Socrates is glad to make for his old haunts.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato gives Socrates' haunts a name and a place more than once. In the *Euthyphro* the first question put to him is why he has left "his haunts in the

Lyceum", the gymnasium outside the walls east of the city, and is passing his time now at the porch of the King Archon, where indictments were lodged (2a). In the *Apology* the word names what the city could no longer bear: having been convicted, Socrates says that his fellow citizens could not bear his διατριβαί and his words, which had grown so heavy and odious to them that they were seeking to be rid of them, and that strangers would hardly bear them more easily (37c–d). The *Lysis* begins on the road outside the city wall between the Academy, the gymnasium north-west of Athens, and the Lyceum; there Hippothales calls Socrates into an enclosure in which, he says, "we pass our time, ourselves and a great many others, and fine ones"; asked what the place is and what the pastime, he answers that it is a wrestling-school lately built, and that the pastime is mostly talk (203a–204a). The *Charmides*' phrase comes earliest of these in dramatic date: the habit the *Apology* calls unbearable, seen from inside on the day after his return from the war.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon describes the same habit as part of his answer to the charge of impiety. Socrates was always in public view: early in the morning he made for the walks and the gymnasia, he was to be seen in the market when it was full, and for the rest of the day he went wherever he would be among the most people; he talked most of the time, and anyone who wished could listen.[219]

Translation in this edition

"My old haunts" renders τὰς συνήθεις διατριβάς at 153a3, with "old" for συνήθεις, "accustomed", and "haunts" for the places of the διατριβή rather than the pastime.

See also

ἁσμένως; Βασίλη; γνώριμος; διὰ χρόνου; διηγέομαι; παλαίστρα; σοφία ἢ κάλλος; στρατόπεδον; φιλοσοφία.

[219] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.1.10.

συνίημι · understand

συνιέναι, *synienai*, "understanding"

Attested: συνιέναι τὰ λεγόμενα (*synienai ta legomena*; 160a). To send together, to bring together, and so to grasp, to understand; the noun is σύνεσις, "understanding". In the refutation of quietness Socrates passes from the body to the soul, and understanding is one of his examples: "And understanding what is said, at the writing-master's and the lyre-master's and everywhere else: isn't that finest when it is done not as quietly as possible, but as quickly as possible?" (160a; see γραμματιστής; ἡσυχῇ; ὀξύτης). The boy agrees, and the example joins learning, teaching and remembering in the soul's half of the argument (159e–160b; see ἀγχίνοια; εὐμαθία). In the *Cratylus* Socrates hears in σύνεσις something like a reckoning together, συλλογισμός (see συλλογίζομαι), and in συνιέναι the soul's going along with things, the same as knowing (412a–b).

See also ἀγχίνοια; γραμματιστής; εὐμαθία; ἡσυχῇ; ὀξύτης; συλλογίζομαι.

συνομολογέω · agree on

To agree with one another: the partners' joint agreements, which Socrates names at the end as the material of their definition · Charmides

συνομολογοῦντες, *synomologountes*, "(what we long ago) agreed on"

At a Glance

The word. To agree together, to come to an agreement with another; ὁμολογέω, "say the same", with σύν.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the recapitulation: "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance" (175d).

In this edition. "Agreed on".

A place to read. 175b–d.

Meaning

Ὁμολογέω is to say the same thing as another, and so to agree, to admit (see ὁμολογέω). The compound adds "together": an agreement reached jointly, by both parties, each conceding to the other until they say one thing. In Greek dialectic the agreement of the partners is the test that each step passes, and a thing agreed together is, for the purposes of the conversation, settled.

Use in the book

The compound comes once, where Socrates looks back on all the simple verb's agreements as one work. The simple verb comes fourteen times, most of them steps in the argument, from the boy's difficulty "either to agree or to deny" (158c) through Socrates' withdrawal at 172d, "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to", to "what is agreed to be the finest of all things" at 175a–b (see ὁμολογέω). At 175d the agreements become a single thing they built, "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance", which the inquiry has shown to be of no benefit (175d; see συμπλάττω; ὑβριστικῶς). The present participle with "long ago", πάλαι, has the sense of agreements going on for a long while, and the English gathers them into their result.

The compound sets the partners against the inquiry. Each of the agreements that built the definition was made between Socrates and Critias; none was made with the truth, and the inquiry shows what they built to be of no benefit (175d; see καταγελάω; συμπλάττω). The recapitulation a moment before gives the agreement a voice of its own, "our agreement says that he knows them, knows that he does not know them" (175c; see ὁμολογία), and the voice says something absurd. Agreement between two speakers can be read as the dialogue's test of a step, and the end of the dialogue as its judgement that the test is not enough: two men can agree together on a thing that does not hold.

Places to read

The compound's only place.

175d What they long ago agreed on, made up between them and laid down as temperance has been shown to be of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the first book of the *Republic* Socrates sets the method of agreement against the method of set speeches. If they answer Thrasymachus speech for speech, listing the goods of justice against his list for injustice, they will have to count and measure on both sides, and will need judges to decide between them; but if they look into the question as they did before, "coming to agreement with one another", ἀνομολογούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, they will themselves be judges and advocates at once (1.348a–b). The *Charmides* can be read as showing the cost of that economy: when the speakers are their own judges, the judgement is no better than their agreements.

Translation in this edition

"Agreed on" renders συνομολογοῦντες at 175d3; the Glossary lists the simple verb's agreements as "the partners' steps in the argument", among them 175a–d.

See also

καταγελάω; ὁμολογέω; ὁμολογία; συμπλάττω; ὑβριστικῶς.

σφόδρα · vigorously, very

σφόδρα, *sphodra*, "vigorously", "very strictly", "very strongly"; Σφόδρ', *sphodr'*, "vigorously"

Attested: σφόδρα (*sphodra*; 157b, 159e, 160c, 168e), Σφόδρ' (*sphodr'*; 159e). An adverb from σφοδρός, "vehement": vigorously, violently; and as an intensive, very, exceedingly. As an intensive it comes twice: the Thracian, Socrates says, "charged me very strictly" (157b; see ἐντέλλομαι), and some of the cases of 168e "are very strongly doubted" to have their power in relation to themselves (168e; see ἀπιστέω). In the refutation of quietness Socrates brings the word in himself, beside "quickly". He asks whether teaching is

finer done "quickly and vigorously than quietly and slowly", and whether recollecting and remembering are finer "quietly and slowly, or vigorously and quickly", and the boy, taking the word from him, answers "Vigorously, ... and quickly" (159e; see μέμνημαι; ταχέως). At 160c the summary keeps it: temperance would not be acting quietly "any more than acting vigorously and quickly" (160c; see σφοδρός). The boy's quietness is set against speed and vigour together, and the pairing widens the contrast past anything he had said. At 159e6 Burnet brackets a *καί* after ταχέως, which a corrector of the Coislin manuscript struck out (apparatus).

See also ἀπιστέω; ἐντέλλομαι; μέμνημαι; σφοδρός; ταχέως.

σφοδρός · vigorous

σφοδρῶν, *sphodrōn*, "(the) vigorous (ones)"

Attested: τῶν σφοδρῶν (*tōn sphodrōn*; 160c). Vehement, violent, vigorous, of winds, of passions and of actions. In the second half of Socrates' dilemma the adjective stands for the opposite of the boy's quiet: "But even supposing, my friend, at the very most, that the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones, even so temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly" (160c; see δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ). A line before, the same class of actions was "quick and strong" (160b–c; see ἰσχυρός). The words for the actions opposed to quiet ones shift from sentence to sentence, quick, strong, vigorous, and the argument treats them as one class.

See also δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἰσχυρός; οὐδαμοῦ ἢ ὀλιγαχοῦ; σφόδρα; ταχύς.

σῴζω · come out alive, come through safe

ἐσώθης, *esōthēs*, "did you come out (of the battle) alive?"; σῴζεσθαι, *sōizesthai*, "come through safe"

Attested: ἐσώθης (*esōthēs*; 153b), σῴζεσθαι (*sōizesthai*; 173b). To keep safe, to save; in the passive, to come safe through, to survive. Chaerephon's

first words to Socrates are a question of survival: "Socrates, ... how did you come out of the battle alive?" and Socrates answers, "Like this, as you see" (153b; see λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; Χαιρεφῶν). In the dream it is among the goods that temperance's rule would bring: we would be healthier in body "and come through safe when in danger at sea and in war" (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κινδυνεύω; κυβερνήτης). The dialogue opens with a survival the room asks about and closes its hopes with a safety granted and then shown to be the crafts' gift, not temperance's: the pilot's art would still keep us from dying at sea, and generalship in war (174c; see στρατηγική). The *Cratylus* finds the verb in the name of the body (400c; see σῶμα).

See also κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; κινδυνεύω; κυβερνήτης; λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; στρατηγική; σῶμα; Χαιρεφῶν.

σῶμα · body

The body: the part that the Thracian's medicine treats through the soul, the field of quick actions in the refutation of quietness, and the health temperance cannot make · Charmides

σῶμα, *sōma*, "body"; σώματος, *sōmatos*, "(of the) body"; σώματι, *sōmati*, "(for the) body"; σώματα, *sōmata*, "(in) body"

At a Glance

The word. The body, living or dead; the whole bodily frame as against its parts, and as against the soul.

In the *Charmides*. Twelve times. In the doctors' principle the body is the whole they treat (156c); in Zalmoxis' teaching, as the Thracian reports it, it is the part whose good and bad flow from the soul (156e–157b); in the refutation of quietness it is where the quick actions are finest (159c–160b); in the dream we would be "healthier in body" (173b).

In this edition. "Body".

A place to read. 156b–157b.

Meaning

Σῶμα in Homer is always a corpse; after Homer it is the living body too (so already Hesiod, *Works and Days* 540), the person in his physical being, and the word that stands over against ψυχή, "soul". It can also mean a whole of any kind, a body of troops or of writings. The dialogue uses it in the medical sense, the whole frame that a regimen treats, and in the moral sense, the half of a man that is not soul.

Use in the book

The body enters the dialogue as the boy's, but under another word. The room praises his face and his figure, εἶδος, and Socrates asks to strip "that very part of him", the soul, before looking at his figure (154d–e; see ἀποδύω; εἶδος). Σῶμα comes with the doctors. The good doctors say that one cannot treat the head "on its own, apart from the whole body", and "they put the entire body on a regimen and try to treat and heal the part along with the whole" (156c; see δίαιτα; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος). The body here is the whole. Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, makes it a part: the body must not be cured without the soul, since everything bad and good, "for the body and for the whole human being", starts from the soul and flows from there (156e; see ἐπιρρέω; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς). Once temperance is present in the soul, health for the head and the rest of the body is easy to provide (157a–b; see πορίζω; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια).

In the refutation of quietness the body is a field of examples. Running and jumping and "all the actions of the body" are fine when done nimbly and quickly, so that in the body the quiet is not finest (159c–d; see ἡσυχῇ; ὀξέως; ταχύς), and Socrates gathers the two halves, body and soul alike, under quickness (160b; see τάχος). The body comes first in the argument as it came first in the room, and the soul's cases follow it.

The last use is the dream's. If temperance ruled, "we would be healthier in body than we are now" (173b; see κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας). The health the Thracian promised to a body whose soul had temperance is granted again, and then taken from temperance: health belongs to medicine, and temperance, the knowledge of knowledge only, is not "the craftsman of

health" (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). The dialogue's body can be read as the place where temperance was to show its benefit and does not: the remedy for the head is never given, and the headache is not mentioned again.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

156c The head cannot be treated apart from the whole body; the doctors put the entire body on a regimen.

156e The head must not be cured without the body, nor the body without the soul.

156e Everything bad and good, for the body and the whole human being, starts from the soul.

157a The soul must be treated first if the head and the rest of the body are to be in good condition.

157a–b Once temperance is present, health is easy to provide for the head and the rest of the body too.

159c Running and jumping and all the actions of the body are fine when done nimbly and quickly.

159d In the body it is not the quiet that is finest; as far as the body goes, quickness would be more temperate.

160b In the soul and in the body alike, quickness appears finer than quietness.

173b Under temperance's rule we would be healthier in body.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato twice reports a saying that the body is a tomb. In the *Gorgias* Socrates says he has heard from one of the wise "that we are dead even now, and the body is a tomb to us", σῶμα σῆμα, and that some clever teller of myths, a Sicilian perhaps or an Italian, named the part of the soul where the desires live a jar, πίθος, for its readiness to be persuaded (493a–b). In the *Cratylus* the word for body is said to have several derivations: some call it the soul's tomb, σῆμα, since the soul is buried in it in this life, or its sign, since the soul signifies through it; but Socrates thinks the name was given by the followers of Orpheus, the legendary Thracian singer under whose name poems on the gods and the soul circulated, who held that the soul is paying a penalty for what it has to pay for and has the body as an enclosure, "so that it may be

kept safe", ἵνα σῴζηται, in the likeness of a prison (400b–c). The *Charmides*' body is not a prison. It is the patient, and the soul is its source of health and sickness.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines the soul by the body: it is the first actuality of a natural body that has organs, and so there is no need to ask whether soul and body are one, any more than whether the wax and its shape are one.[220] On his account the soul is the body's form, and the *Charmides*' wish to strip the boy's soul before looking at his figure can be read as a question his account leaves no room for.

Translation in this edition

"Body" throughout, and "in body" at 173b5, where the Greek is the accusative of respect τὰ σώματα, "as to our bodies". Εἶδος, the boy's "figure" at 154d–e, is kept apart from it (see εἶδος).

See also

ἀποδύω; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; δίαιτα; εἶδος; ἐπιρρέω; ἡσυχῇ; κατὰ τὰς ἐπιστήμας; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; ὀξέως; πορίζω; σῴζω; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; τάχος; ταχύς; ψυχή.

σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς · body without the soul

The last link of the Thracian's chain, which carries the Greek doctors' rule from the body to the soul · Charmides

σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς, *sōma aneu psychēs*, "the body without the soul"

At a Glance

The phrase. A body without a soul, here the object of a cure: one must not try to cure the body apart from the soul.

[220] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.1, 412a27–b9.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 156e: Zalmoxis says "that just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either".

In this edition. "The body without the soul".

A place to read. 156b–157c.

Meaning

Ἄνευ, "without", "apart from", with the genitive. The phrase is the last of three in one sentence, each built the same way, eyes without head, head without body, body without soul, so that the soul stands to the body as the head to the eyes. The first two belong to Greek medicine, the third to the Thracian king.

Use in the book

The chain is told in three steps, and the phrase is the step that changes its meaning. The good Greek doctors, Socrates says, will not cure the eyes on their own but treat the head with them, and think it sheer folly to treat the head "apart from the whole body" (156b–c; see ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; ἄνοια). The boy approves the principle, and Socrates reports that the Thracian approved it too: "the Greeks were right to say what I was telling you just now" (156d; see Θρᾷξ). Then the Thracian goes further, in the name of his king: "just as one must not try to cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, so one must not try to cure the body without the soul either" (156e; see Ζάλμοξις). The two Greek steps are anatomy, a part treated with the larger part it belongs to. The third crosses from the body to something that is not a larger body, and the sentence treats the crossing as one more step of the same kind.

The phrase is also a diagnosis. Zalmoxis says that this is "the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for" (156e; see αἴτιος; ἀμελέω; διαφεύγω). The Greek doctors cure the body without the soul, and what they miss is the soul. The same chain supplies the image for the soul's priority, since everything bad and good flows from the soul "as it flows from the head into the eyes"

(156e–157a; see ἐπιῤῥέω), and the order of treatment that follows: the soul "first and foremost" (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). If the boy is willing to hand over his soul first to be charmed, Socrates will apply the remedy to his head (157c). The phrase can be read as the dialogue's first argument, and its form is the one Socrates will use against the boy's definitions: a principle granted in an easy case and carried, without a pause, to a hard one.

Places to read

The phrase's only place, with the comparison it completes.

156e One must not cure the eyes without the head, or the head without the body, or the body without the soul.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Timaeus* has the phrase itself, and turns it both ways. A soul too strong for its body shakes it with disease, as is told elsewhere (87e–88a; see ἐπιῤῥέω), and a great body joined to a small and feeble mind makes the soul dull, slow to learn and forgetful. "There is one safeguard for both: to move neither the soul without the body, nor the body without the soul, so that the two, defending themselves against each other, may become evenly balanced and healthy" (88b–c). So the mathematician must give his body its exercise, and the man who works at shaping his body must practise music and all philosophy, "if he is to be rightly called both beautiful and good" (88c; see καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός). The Thracian's soul is the source of the body's good and bad; the *Timaeus*' soul and body balance each other, and the cure of either is exercise of both.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle takes the eye as his example of what soul is to body. If the eye were an animal, sight would be its soul; the eye is the matter of sight, and when sight fails it is an eye no longer except in name, like an eye of stone or a painted one; and as the part is to the part, so the whole of sensation is to the whole sensing body.[221] The *Charmides*' chain and Aristotle's analogy begin

[221] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.1, 412b17–25.

from the same organ. For the Thracian a body without the soul is a body badly treated; for Aristotle a body without its soul is not a living body at all.

Translation in this edition

"The body without the soul" at 156e2, matching "the eyes without the head" and "the head without the body" in the same sentence, with the verb "cure" carried through all three.

See also

ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός; αἴτιος; ἀμελέω; ἄνοια; διαφεύγω; ἐπιρρέω; Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; σῶμα; ψυχή.

σωτήρ · Savior

τῷ σωτῆρι, *tōi sōtēri*, "for the Savior"

Attested: τῷ σωτῆρι (*tōi sōtēri*; 167a). A saviour, preserver, from σῴζω, "keep safe"; as a title of gods, above all Zeus the Saviour, to whom the third libation was poured at a drinking-party. When Critias has agreed that temperance is knowing what one knows and what one does not, Socrates starts again: "Then once more, ... the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning" (167a–b; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι). The edition's note at 167b explains the custom and the proverb it became, which are told under the phrase.

See also ἐξ ἀρχῆς; σῴζω; τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι.

Σωφρόνει · Be temperate!

σωφρονεῖν, *sōphronein*, "Be temperate"; Σωφρόνει, *Sōphronei*, "Be temperate!", "Be temperate"

Attested: σωφρονεῖν (*sōphronein*; 164e2), Σωφρόνει (*Sōphronei*; 164e6, 164e7). The imperative of σωφρονέω, "be temperate": on Critias' reading, the god's own greeting at Delphi. The inscription "Know thyself", he says, was set up as the god's greeting to those who enter, in place of the everyday

"Rejoice!", "on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one, and that we ought not to urge this on one another, but 'Be temperate.' ... To everyone who enters he says nothing other than 'Be temperate!' But he says it, as a prophet would, rather riddlingly. For 'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same" (164d–165a; see αἰνιγματώδης; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; πρόσρησις; χαίρω). At 164e2 Critias reports the god's word as an infinitive, σωφρονεῖν, in indirect speech, and the English turns it back into the greeting; at 164e6 Stobaeus has the infinitive too, where Burnet prints the imperative (apparatus). The Key Words note that the verb σωφρονεῖν "is also the word of the Delphic greeting as Critias reads it". The greeting can be read as turning Critias' definition into a command, which needs no argument; the dialogue asks instead what the thing commanded is.

See also αἰνιγματώδης; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; πρόσρησις; σωφρονέω; χαίρω.

σωφρονέω · be temperate

To be temperate: the verb that passes, in the course of the argument, from doing one's own business to knowing oneself, and at the end to obeying a guardian · Charmides

σωφρονεῖν, *sōphronein*, "being temperate", "is temperate", "be temperate"; σωφρονεῖ, *sōphronei*, "is temperate", "Temperate (indeed)"; σωφρονοῦσιν, *sōphronousin*, "are (they) temperate", "are temperate"; σωφρονοῦντας, *sōphronountas*, "people who are temperate"; ἐσωφρονεῖτε, *esōphroneite*, "(and not) temperate"; σωφρονεῖς, *sōphroneis*, "you are temperate"

At a Glance

The word. To be of sound mind; to be temperate, self-controlled, moderate; the verb of σώφρων, "temperate".

In the *Charmides*. Twenty times, besides the god's imperative at 164e. It carries the argument about doing (161d–164c), the definition by knowing (164d–170d), and the last exchange, Critias' "it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you" (176b).

In this edition. "Be temperate", "being temperate", with the adjective's English; the Key Words give the verb as "to be temperate".

A place to read. 163e–164d and 170d.

Meaning

Σωφρονέω is to have a sound mind, σῶς and φρήν, and so to be in one's senses, to be prudent, to behave with restraint. Of a boy it is to be modest and well behaved; of a man, to keep within his limits; of a madman restored, to come to his senses. The verb puts temperance into a sentence as something a person is doing or being, and the *Charmides* uses it wherever the question is whether this person, now, is temperate.

Use in the book

The verb first enters the argument as a test case. If doing one's own business is temperance, were the schoolboys who wrote their enemies' names "being busybodies, and not temperate"? (161d–e; see πολυπραγμονέω). Critias, taking the argument over, allows that craftsmen who make other people's things may still be temperate (163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες), and gives his own rule: the man who makes bad things "is not temperate", and the one who makes good things "is" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὰ κακά). The verb so far belongs to what a man does.

Socrates then asks a question of another kind, "whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate", and builds the case of the doctor, who does what he ought and so is temperate, and yet may not know that he is (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; σωφρόνως; τὰ δέοντα). The verb has split in two: to be temperate, and to know that one is. Critias refuses the split and makes the second the definition of the first, "this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself" (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

From there the verb is defined by knowing. "And this is being temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: knowing what one knows and what one does not know" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and at 169d Socrates asks for that knowledge, "For this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself

and being temperate is, isn't it?" The argument then shows that knowledge of knowledge would yield only that a man knows, not what, and draws the verb's conclusion: "Then being temperate, and temperance, would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know" (170d; see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν). The pairing of verb and noun, "being temperate, and temperance", marks both points, the definition and its failure.

The last use takes the verb out of the argument. Charmides says he does not know whether he has temperance and will be charmed every day, and Critias makes his obedience the test, "proof to me that you are temperate" (176b; see ἐπᾴδω; τεκμήριον). The question Socrates could not settle by inquiry is answered by the guardian's test, and the proof of being temperate becomes doing what one is told. Read beside what the guardian and the ward later became (notes at 153c and 176c; see βιάζομαι; σώφρων), the verb's last use can be read as the dialogue's last irony.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs; the imperative of 164e has its own entry (see Σωφρόνει).

161d–e Were the schoolboys being busybodies, and not temperate, when they wrote others' names?

163a Craftsmen who make other people's things may be temperate; Critias denies that those who do other people's business are.

163e The man who does bad things is not temperate; the one who makes good things is.

164a Do those who are temperate not know that they are temperate? Craftsmen may be temperate even when they make other people's things.

164b The man who does what he ought is temperate.

164c The doctor acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.

164d Critias would never concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.

164e The god's greeting: not "Rejoice", but "Be temperate".

167a Being temperate, temperance and knowing oneself are knowing what one knows and what one does not know.

169d This is what they said knowing oneself and being temperate is.

170d Being temperate would be knowing only that one knows, not what.

176b It will be proof that the boy is temperate if he lets Socrates charm him.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Protagoras* the verb is examined directly. Socrates asks whether anyone seems to be temperate in doing injustice, and Protagoras answers that he would be ashamed to agree, though many people say so. Socrates asks whether he should argue against the many or against Protagoras; Protagoras would have him take the many's view first, and Socrates says it makes no difference to him whether it is Protagoras' own view, so long as he answers: it is the argument he is examining most of all, though perhaps the questioner and the answerer are examined too. Protagoras grants that some seem to be temperate though unjust; that being temperate is thinking well, εὖ φρονεῖν; and that thinking well is planning well in their injustice, if they fare well by it (333b–d). The *Protagoras* hears in the verb its root, sound thinking; the *Charmides* tries it as knowing, and at the end gives it to obedience.

Other ancient sources

Stobaeus' anthology preserves under the name of Heraclitus a saying that joins the verb to self-knowledge: "It belongs to all men to know themselves and to be temperate", γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.[222] Critias' claim that "Know thyself" and "Be temperate" are the same (164e–165a) has a companion here.

Xenophon applies the verb to Critias himself. Answering the charge that Socrates' companions Critias and Alcibiades did the city great harm, he grants that Socrates should perhaps have taught them to be temperate before politics, and says that both of them were temperate as long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of punishment but because they then thought it best. Many who claim to philosophize, he goes on, would say that the just man

[222] Heraclitus, fragment 116 Diels–Kranz (Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.5.6).

can never become unjust nor the temperate man insolent; he disagrees, for as those who do not train their bodies cannot do the body's work, so those who do not train the soul cannot do the soul's, neither doing what they ought nor keeping from what they ought not.[223] Xenophon's Critias is temperate while he keeps company with Socrates, and this can be read as the condition the *Charmides*' last page sets for his ward.

Translation in this edition

The English keeps the verb in the family of "temperate", "one English word for one Greek word", as the Glossary says of the noun, adjective and verb together: "be temperate", "being temperate", "is temperate", "are temperate". At 161d–e it is the second half of a pair, "being busybodies, and not temperate"; at 164b Critias' answer Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν is "Temperate indeed". At 163a11 the words "just because I agreed" rest on Heindorf's conjecture εἰ, where B has ᾗ, T ἢ and W ᾖ (apparatus); the readings at 176b5–6 are told elsewhere (see τεκμήριον).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἀπολείπω; βιάζομαι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπᾴδω; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; πολυπραγμονέω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Σωφρόνει; σωφρόνως; σωφροσύνη; σώφρων; τὰ δέοντα; τὰ κακά; τεκμήριον.

σωφρόνως · temperately

Temperately: the manner of an action, which the doctor may have without knowing it · Charmides

σωφρόνως, *sōphronōs*, "temperately"

At a Glance

The word. The adverb of σώφρων: in a temperate way, with good sense, with restraint.

[223] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.17–19.

In the *Charmides*. Three times: a city "temperately managed" (162a), and the doctor who, having acted beneficially, "acted temperately" (164c) and "acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself" (164c).

In this edition. "Temperately".

A place to read. 164b–c.

Meaning

The adverb describes how something is done, as the adjective describes who does it. Greek could say that an act was done σωφρόνως, "temperately", without saying that its agent was σώφρων, and the gap between the two descriptions is the gap the *Charmides* finds in the doctor.

Use in the book

The first use is a premise in the argument against doing one's own business. A city whose law ordered every man to make his own cloak, shoes, oil-flask and strigil would not be well managed, the boy agrees; "And yet," says Socrates, "a city that is temperately managed would be well managed" (161e–162a; see νόμος; οἰκέω). The adverb is granted without question: whatever temperance is, a city run by it is run well. The same assumption returns at 171e, where a household and a city governed by temperance would be bound to be run well (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία); there, with temperance taken as knowledge of knowledge, Socrates withdraws it at once: "I don't think, Critias, we were right to agree to" (172d).

The second and third uses are the doctor's. Critias has granted that the man who does what he ought is temperate, and that a doctor making someone healthy does what he ought (164b; see τὰ δέοντα). Then a doctor who does not know whether his treatment will help sometimes does not know how he has acted (164b–c; see οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν), and yet, Socrates tells Critias, "having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, by your account" (164c). Socrates draws the conclusion, that sometimes "he acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself" (164c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ). The adverb has carried the step from the act to the man. Because the act was beneficial, it was temperate; because he acted

temperately, he is temperate. Critias will not accept a temperate man who does not know himself, and rather than deny the step from the adverb to the verb he gives up the definition and calls temperance self-knowledge (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

The doctor's case can be read as turning on a question the dialogue never states: whether an act done temperately makes its agent temperate. Critias accepts that it does, and pays for it with his definition.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs.

162a A city that is temperately managed would be well managed.

164c Having acted beneficially, the doctor acted temperately, by Critias' account.

164c He acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle states the distinction that Critias passed over. What the crafts produce holds its excellence within it, so that it is enough for the product to come out a certain way; but what is done according to the virtues is not done justly or temperately, σωφρόνως, because the act itself is a certain way. The agent must be in a certain state when he acts: he must know what he is doing, must choose it, and choose it for its own sake, and must act from a settled and unshakeable state; and of these, knowing counts for little or nothing towards having the virtues, while the other two count for everything. So an act is called temperate when it is the kind of act a temperate man would do; but a man is temperate not by doing such acts, but by doing them in the way the temperate do.[224] By the first condition the doctor of 164c, who does not know whether he has helped, can be read as not having acted temperately at all. But Aristotle weighs knowing least of the three, and Critias, who wanted knowing to be the whole of temperance, would have found no ally in him.

[224] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.4, 1105a26–b9.

Translation in this edition

"Temperately" at all three places. At 162a4 Burnet prints γε, "a city that is temperately managed", from a later hand in B, where B and T have τε (apparatus).

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἁμαρτία; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; νόμος; οἰκέω; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; σωφρονέω; σώφρων; τὰ δέοντα.

σωφροσύνη · temperance

Temperance: the virtue the dialogue looks for, tries under six definitions and does not find, and still calls a great good · Charmides

σωφροσύνη, *sōphrosynē*, "temperance"; σωφροσύνης, *sōphrosynēs*, "(of) temperance"; σωφροσύνῃ, *sōphrosynēi*, "(by) temperance", "(being) temperate"; σωφροσύνην, *sōphrosynēn*, "temperance"

At a Glance

The word. Soundness of mind; good sense, self-control, moderation, modesty, decorum; the virtue of knowing and keeping one's limits.

In the *Charmides*. Eighty times, in every part of the dialogue after the charm is named. Charmides offers quietness, modesty and doing one's own business; Critias, the doing of good things, knowing oneself, and knowledge of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge. None survives, and Socrates ends: "I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e).

In this edition. "Temperance" throughout, "one word for one word, because the argument tests definition after definition of that word"; the one exception is a phrase at 171c.

A place to read. 158e–159a, 164d–165b and 175a–176a.

Meaning

The word is σῶς, "safe, sound", and φρήν, "mind", and the edition's Key Words give its range in Athenian use: "sound-mindedness and good sense,

self-control over appetite, moderation, the modesty and good order expected of a well-brought-up youth, and the grown man's sense of his own limits." The note at 157a adds "decorum and discretion: the virtue of the well-brought-up youth who blushes, keeps quiet and knows his place, and the virtue of the grown man who knows his limits." The Greeks heard the word as the opposite of ὕβρις, the overreaching that forgets what a man is, and the Delphic maxims "Know thyself" and "Nothing too much" were its proverbs (see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Μηδὲν ἄγαν). It was also a political word, praised by the conservative and claimed by the oligarchs (see σώφρων). No English word covers the range, and the dialogue's argument moves through it.

Use in the book

Temperance enters as the charm's effect. From the Thracian's beautiful words, "temperance comes to be in souls", and once it is present, health is easy to provide for the head and the body (157a; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). Critias, hearing that the charm is for temperance, says that the boy is thought the most temperate of the young (157d; see σώφρων), and Socrates sets the inquiry's terms: if temperance is already present in him he needs no charm, and if it is present he must have some opinion of what it is, which he can put into words (158b–159a; see πάρειμι; σκέψις; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα).

The boy's first two answers, in the Key Words' phrase, "take the virtue as it shows in a young man's behavior, which is how he knows it"; the third is borrowed. It is "a kind of quietness", refuted because temperance is "one of the fine things" and quick acts are as fine as quiet ones (159b–160d; see ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχιότης; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). It is modesty, refuted because temperance is good and modesty, by Homer's line, "no good thing to be present with a man in need" (160e–161b; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς). It is "doing one's own business", a phrase he has heard, which Socrates calls a riddle and reduces to absurdity by taking "doing" to mean making anything at all (161b–162b; see αἴνιγμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

Critias' answers move, in the Key Words' phrase, "from conduct ... to knowledge". He takes the third answer over and refines it into the doing of

good things (162e–163e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). When the doctor's case shows that a man might be temperate without knowing it, he gives that up and says that temperance is knowing oneself, the god's greeting at Delphi (164d–165b; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Σωφρόνει). Asked what it produces, as medicine produces health, he says that it alone of the kinds of knowledge is knowledge of itself and of the others, and Socrates adds the lack of knowledge, so that the temperate man alone will know what he knows and what he does not (165c–167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν). The rest of the dialogue tests this last answer twice, as Socrates sets out at 167b: whether such knowledge is possible, and whether it would benefit us (167b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν).

The first question is tried on sight, hearing and the other relatives, left undecided for want of "a great man" to settle it, and the knowledge granted for now (167c–169d; see μέγας ἀνήρ; συγχωρέω); the second goes against it. A knowledge of knowledge would tell its possessor only that someone knows, not what he knows (170a–d; see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν), and so could not tell a true doctor from a pretender (170e–171c; see ἀληθινός). The life without error that it promised needs knowledge of what each man knows (171d–172a; see ἁμαρτία), and even the dream of temperance ruling, everything done by the kinds of knowledge, would make us live knowledgeably, but could not yet show that we would be happy (173a–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The knowledge that makes us happy proves to be the knowledge of good and bad, and temperance, which was agreed to be knowledge of knowledge only, is "the craftsman of no benefit" (174b–175a; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The ending keeps the name and loses the thing. "We are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα). Socrates blames himself, not the virtue: "I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed" (175e–176a; see ζητητής; μακάριος). The dialogue's question is unanswered, and its premise, that temperance is something fine and good, has never been doubted.

Two shapes can be read in the sequence. The first is a climb: the definitions go from the outside of the virtue to its inside, from how a boy walks in the street to what a mind knows of itself; and the higher they climb, the less they say about any act. Quietness and modesty could be seen; knowledge of knowledge could not tell a doctor from a pretender. The second is a turn: the dialogue can be read as showing that temperance, sought as self-knowledge, has to be knowledge of something, and that the something is the good.

Places to read

The passages in which temperance is defined, tested or judged; the noun's other uses fall within them.

157a–b The Thracian's charms produce temperance in souls; once it is present, health is easy to provide.

157d–158c Critias calls the boy the most temperate of the young; Socrates asks whether temperance is already present in him.

158e–159a If temperance is present in him, he will have an opinion of what it is.

159b–160d First definition: a kind of quietness, refuted from the premise that temperance is fine.

160d–161b Second: modesty, refuted from the premise that temperance is good.

161b–162b Third: doing one's own business, which Socrates calls a riddle.

162c–163e Critias takes the definition over and makes it the doing of good things.

164a–165b The doctor temperate without knowing it; Critias: temperance is knowing oneself.

165c–166c What temperance produces; Critias: it is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.

166e–167b Knowledge of the lack of knowledge; the two questions, whether it is possible and whether it benefits.

169a–d Whether among the things related to themselves is the knowledge they say temperance is; Socrates' hunch that temperance is beneficial; Critias at a loss.

170c–171c Temperance would know only that a man knows, not what, and could not test a doctor.

171d–172a What temperance would give if it were what was supposed: a life without error.

172b–173a The lesser benefit; the great good doubted; even if temperance is of this kind, it is not clear that it does any good.

173a–d The dream of temperance ruling.

174b–175a The knowledge of good and bad is not temperance; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

175b–d They cannot discover what the lawgiver gave the name to.

175e–176b Temperance a great good; the boy does not know whether he has it.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Cratylus* reads the name as the dialogue's ending could not: σωφροσύνη is σωτηρία ... φρονήσεως, the keeping safe of φρόνησις, "wisdom", whose own name Socrates has just explained (411e–412a). In his first speech in the *Phaedrus*, which he later recants, Socrates finds two things in each of us that rule and lead us wherever they go: a desire for pleasures that we are born with, and an opinion, acquired later, that reaches for the best. When opinion, guided by reason, carries us to the best and wins, the name for its mastery is temperance; when desire pulls us unreasoning after pleasures and takes command in us, the name is ὕβρις, "insolence" (237d–238a). In the *Symposium* Agathon takes the common view as settled, "it is agreed that temperance is mastery over pleasures and desires", and proves that Love is supremely temperate since no pleasure is stronger than Love (196c). The *Laws* asks that the young tyrant who is to reform a city have temperance among his gifts, and specifies the ordinary kind, which blossoms by nature in children and even in beasts, leaving some without control over pleasures and others with it, not the solemn kind that would compel being temperate to be wisdom (4.709e–710a). The *Republic*'s account of temperance as the rule of the better part over the worse, and as the agreement of ruler and ruled about who should rule, is told elsewhere (4.430e–432a; see ἡττάομαι; πόλις).

Apart from the *Cratylus*' etymology, none of these is the *Charmides*' temperance. The dialogue never treats it as mastery of pleasure, and its definitions come from manners, from a slogan and from Delphi.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle hears in the name what the *Cratylus* heard: hence the name we give temperance, as the keeper of practical wisdom, *σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν*. What it preserves, he explains, is a particular kind of judgement: pleasure and pain do not destroy or distort every judgement, such as that a triangle has angles equal to two right angles, but only those about action.[225] His temperance, narrowed to the pleasures of the body, is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 3.10; see ἀρετή).

Translation in this edition

The Editorial Note explains the choice: *σωφροσύνη* is rendered "temperance" throughout, "one word for one word, because the argument tests definition after definition of that word and the reader needs to see the same thing being tried each time". The Key Words add a warning: "Its narrower modern sense, abstinence from drink, should be set aside: the dialogue never treats temperance in that way." The one place where the English leaves the noun is 171c2, *πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ*, "in addition to being temperate". The Glossary sets noun, adjective and verb together, "temperance, *σωφροσύνη* (sōphrosynē); temperate, *σώφρων*; be temperate, *σωφρονεῖν*. Throughout, one English word for one Greek word."

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς; αἴνιγμα; ἀληθινός; ἁμαρτία; ἀρετή; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐγγίγνομαι; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ζητητής; ἡσυχῇ; ἡσυχιότης; ἡττάομαι; λόγοι καλοί; μακάριος; μέγας ἀνήρ; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; νομοθέτης; ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα; πάρειμι; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πόλις; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; σκέψις; συγχωρέω; Σωφρόνει; σωφρονέω; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; σώφρων; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

[225] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.5, 1140b11–16.

σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια · temperance and health

The pair the Thracian joins as cause and effect, and the argument separates · Charmides

σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας, *sōphrosynēs te kai hygieias*, "of temperance and of health"

At a Glance

The phrase. Temperance and health, the good condition of the soul and the good condition of the body.

In the *Charmides*. Once as a pair, at 157b: "some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health"; and as cause and effect a few lines before: once temperance is present in the soul, "it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b).

In this edition. "Of temperance and of health".

A place to read. 157a–c and 174e–175a.

Meaning

Health, ὑγίεια, is the body's good condition; temperance, in the Thracian's teaching, is the soul's. The Thracian puts the two under one doctor, and the phrase names the mistake of parting them. Plato elsewhere calls virtue a kind of health of the soul (*Republic* 4.444c–e; see εὖ ἔχω), and the Thracian goes further: the soul's health is the cause of the body's.

Use in the book

The Thracian's order of treatment makes the pair a sequence. The soul must be treated first and foremost, with charms that are beautiful words, and "From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls; and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; πορίζω). Then the warning: no one is to persuade Socrates to treat anyone's head who has not first handed over his soul, "For that … is the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings: some try to be doctors of the two separately, of

temperance and of health" (157b; see ἁμάρτημα; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου). The pair is the whole man, and to treat one half is to fail with both.

The argument takes the pair apart. When Critias defines temperance as self-knowledge, Socrates asks for its work on the model of medicine: medicine, the knowledge of the healthy, produces health, "a fine work for us", and temperance must produce something too (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Health is now not temperance's effect but medicine's, the product of another knowledge. In the dream of temperance ruling, "we would be healthier in body than we are now" (173b; see σῶμα), but only because the doctors would be genuine. And at the end the separation is explicit. Socrates asks, "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?", and Critias answers "Certainly not", since health, he agrees, belonged "to another craft" (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

The Thracian warned against doctors "of the two separately", and the argument ends with exactly that division: health is medicine's, and temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, has no work at all. The dialogue can be read as testing the Thracian's pair and finding that Critias' temperance cannot be the cause the Thracian promised. Whether the charm's temperance, which is not Critias', could be, is the question the ending leaves open: Socrates still thinks temperance a great good, and the boy still asks for the charm (175e–176b).

Places to read

The pair's place, with the Thracian's sentence of cause and effect a few lines before it.

157a Once temperance has come to be in the soul, health is easy to provide for the head and the body.

157b Some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* ranks the pair. A soul set in its best nature, gaining temperance and justice with wisdom, takes on a condition more honourable than a body gaining strength and beauty with health, as much as soul is more honourable than body. So the man of sense will live with this as his aim: he will tend his

body, but not with an eye to health, nor making much of it, nor caring whether he will be strong or healthy or beautiful, unless he is also going to become temperate by it; he will keep the body in tune for the sake of the soul's concord (9.591b–d). The Thracian's temperance makes health easy; the *Republic*'s health is worth having only if it serves temperance. The *Gorgias*' naming of the body's order as health and strength, and of the soul's as lawfulness and law, that is, justice and temperance, is told elsewhere (504b–d; see ἔχειν καλῶς).

Translation in this edition

"Of temperance and of health" at 157b6, with the English repeating "of" to keep the two objects of "doctors" apart. The words are missing in one Florentine manuscript, Laurentianus lxxxv. 6 (apparatus, b6).

See also

ἁμάρτημα; ἀπεργάζομαι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐγγίγνομαι; εὖ ἔχω; ἔχειν καλῶς; καλὸν ἔργον; λόγοι καλοί; πορίζω; σῶμα; σωφροσύνη; ὑγίεια; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου.

σωφροσύνη καλόν τι · temperance something fine

The premise, granted at once, on which the refutation of quietness rests, and which returns at the dialogue's end · Charmides

τῶν καλῶν ... ἡ σωφροσύνη, *tōn kalōn ... hē sōphrosynē*, "temperance is one of the fine things"; ἡ σωφροσύνη καλόν τι (ἦν), *hē sōphrosynē kalon ti (ēn)*, "temperance was something fine"; καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, *kalon hē sōphrosynē*, "temperance is something fine"; καλὸν ... τὴν σωφροσύνην (εἶναι), *kalon ... tēn sōphrosynēn (einai)*, "temperance is fine"; κάλλιστον πάντων, *kalliston pantōn*, "the finest of all things"

At a Glance

The phrase. "Temperance is something fine", καλόν, the word for a beautiful body and a noble act.

In the *Charmides*. The premise of 159c, "temperance is one of the fine things, isn't it?", granted at once and repeated at 159d, 160b and 160d, and recalled at 160e: "Weren't you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?"

In this edition. "Fine", as the Key Words explain: "in the argument it is the premise that temperance is something kalon, rendered 'fine' (159c–160d)".

A place to read. 159b–160e.

Meaning

Καλός is the word for Charmides' beauty in the prologue and for a fine act in the argument (see καλός). To say that temperance is καλόν τι is to say that it is admirable, something one would praise and be proud to have. The premise is a judgement of value, and the refutation of quietness turns on it.

Use in the book

The boy has said that temperance is a kind of quietness, and the first question Socrates puts to test it is not about quietness at all: "Tell me: temperance is one of the fine things, isn't it?" "Certainly" (159c). The premise is granted without a pause, as the edition's note at 159c observes: "The refutation that follows rests on the premise, which Charmides grants at once, that temperance is something kalon." Everything else in the refutation is a survey of cases, writing and reading, the lyre and wrestling, learning, remembering and deliberating, in which quick acts are finer than quiet ones (159c–160b; see ἡσυχῇ; ὀξέως; τάχος). The premise turns the survey into a proof. "And temperance was something fine?" "Yes." "Then as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine" (159d).

The conclusion is stated twice in terms of it. The temperate life would not be quiet, "since, being temperate, it has to be fine" (160b; see βίος; δεῖ), and "in our argument we laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones" (160d; see οὐχ ἧττον). The second definition is refuted by a second premise of the same kind: temperance is not only fine but good, and modesty is not always

good (160e–161b; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς). The Key Words point to the word's two senses: "A reader who hears only one sense will miss that the argument begins with the same word as the flirtation." The boy whose beauty the room has praised grants that temperance is beautiful, and the argument proceeds from his own word.

The premise outlives the inquiry. At the end Socrates says that he was right to fear that he had looked into temperance to no useful purpose, "For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής; κάλλιστος). Every definition has fallen, and what was granted at 159c is still granted, now in the superlative. The dialogue can be read as holding the value of temperance fixed while its nature is lost, and as ending where it began: sure that temperance is fine, and unable to say what it is.

Places to read

Every passage in which the premise is stated or used.

159c Temperance is one of the fine things; the boy agrees.

159d Temperance was something fine; so in the body quickness would be more temperate.

160b The temperate life would not be quiet, since, being temperate, it has to be fine.

160d They laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things are no less fine.

160e The boy agreed just now that temperance is fine; it is good as well.

175a–b What is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out of no use, if Socrates were a good inquirer.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* has the same refutation with courage in temperance's place. Laches proposes that courage is a kind of endurance of the soul, and Socrates objects: he is nearly sure that Laches counts courage among the very fine things. "Among the finest," says Laches. Endurance with wisdom is fine and good, but endurance with folly is harmful and malign; and since what is harmful cannot be fine, foolish endurance is not courage, "since it is not fine, and courage is fine" (192c–d). Both refutations can be read as resting on a

premise the answerer grants gladly, since to deny it would dishonour the virtue; the *Laches* uses it to narrow the definition, the *Charmides* to overturn it. A few lines before, in the same dialogue, Socrates defines quickness, the very quality the *Charmides* sets against quietness (192a–b; see τάχος).

Translation in this edition

"Fine" renders καλόν throughout 159c–160e, where the prologue had "beautiful" for the same word; the Key Words explain the division and the note at 159c the pun. At 159c3 Stephanus would read κάλλιον, "finer", for Burnet's κάλλιστον, "finest" (apparatus); at 160d2 the readings that bear on the premise are told elsewhere (see καλός).

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς; ἀνωφελής; βίος; δεῖ; ἡσυχῇ; κάλλιστος; καλός; ὀξέως; οὐχ ἧττον; σωφροσύνη; τάχος.

σωφροσύνη παροῦσα · temperance, by being present

Temperance as something present in the boy, which he is asked to find by looking within and reasoning from its effect · Charmides

ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα, *hē sōphrosynē parousa*, "temperance ... by being present"

At a Glance

The phrase. Temperance by being present: the virtue considered as something in a person, known by what it makes him.

In the *Charmides*. At 160d: "Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person".

In this edition. "By being present".

A place to read. 160d–161b.

Meaning

Πάρειμι, "be present", is the Greek for a quality's being in someone, and Plato made the noun, παρουσία, "presence", a term for how a thing comes to

have a character (*Lysis* 217b–e; *Phaedo* 100c–d; see πάρειμι). The participle with temperance turns the question from what temperance is to what it does to the one who has it.

Use in the book

The phrase comes at the start of the boy's second attempt, and it changes the method. The first method was to ask for an opinion: if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, and from that he will have an opinion of what it is (158e–159a; see αἴσθησις; σκέψις). That produced quietness, which has just failed. Now Socrates asks for an inference instead: "Then once more, Charmides, ... pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person; then put all this together and tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be" (160d–e; see ἐμβλέπω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; συλλογίζομαι). The boy is to look at himself, see the effect, and reason back to the cause.

He does so, and the answer describes himself: "Well, I think temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and that temperance is the same thing as modesty" (160e; see αἰδώς; αἰσχυντηλός). The edition's note at 160e finds "a self-portrait in the answer": his word for bashful is the one used of his blush at 158c. The method of presence produces a portrait of the one in whom the virtue is present, and Socrates' reply turns presence into a premise: temperance makes good those it is present with, while modesty, by Homer's line, is "no good thing to be present with a man in need" (161a; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ).

The phrase can be read as the dialogue's first statement of what the later definitions forget. A temperance that is present makes its possessor a certain kind of person, and the question is what kind. Critias' last definition says what the temperate man could do, examine himself and others (167a), and the argument finds that he could not; and at the end Socrates tells the boy that he is aggrieved if this temperance "is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you" (175e; see ὀνίνημι).

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the presence premise that answers it.

160d The boy is to consider what sort of person temperance makes him by being present.

161a Temperance is good, if it makes good those it is present with.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Sophist* uses the same language for the virtues of the soul. Even those who hold that only bodies exist, says the visitor from Elea, if they could be made better, would agree that a soul becomes just by the possession and presence, παρουσίᾳ, of justice, and the opposite soul by the opposite; and that what can be present to a thing and absent from it must be something. Asked whether any of these is visible and tangible, they would say almost none is; the soul itself they think has some kind of body, but of wisdom and the other virtues they would be ashamed either to say that they are nothing or to insist that they are bodies (246e–247c). In the *Euthydemus* the same language is turned into a joke. Socrates has said that beautiful things are other than the beautiful itself, though some beauty is present with each of them, and Dionysodorus, one of the two sophist brothers from Chios whose word-play the dialogue mocks, answers: "So if an ox comes to be present with you, you are an ox, and since I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?" (300e–301a). The *Charmides* asks the boy to know temperance by its presence without raising either puzzle.

Translation in this edition

"By being present" renders παροῦσα at 160d7, and the same participle at 175e2, "by being present in you". At 160d6 the participle before it, ἐμβλέψας, "look within", is Burnet's own reading (see ἐμβλέπω).

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; αἴσθησις; αἰσχυντηλός; ἐμβλέπω; ὀνίνημι; πάρειμι; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; σκέψις; συλλογίζομαι; σωφροσύνη.

σώφρων · temperate

Temperate: said of the boy, who is thought the most temperate of the young, and of "the temperate man" of Critias' theory · Charmides

σώφρων, *sōphrōn*, "temperate", "the temperate man"; σώφρονα, *sōphrona*, "temperate"; σώφρονες, *sōphrones*, "temperate men"; σώφρονας, *sōphronas*, "temperate"; σώφροσιν, *sōphrosin*, "(to be) temperate"; σωφρονέστερον, *sōphronesteron*, "the more temperate"; σωφρονέστερος, *sōphronesteros*, "more temperate"; σωφρονέστατος, *sōphronestatos*, "the most temperate", "most temperate"

At a Glance

The word. Of sound mind, prudent, self-controlled, moderate, modest.

In the *Charmides*. Twenty times. It is the boy's reputation, "far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d), and his difficulty, "if I say I'm not temperate" (158d); and it is the subject of Critias' theory, "only the temperate man will know himself" (167a).

In this edition. "Temperate"; "the temperate man" for ὁ σώφρων.

A place to read. 157d–158d and 170e–171d.

Meaning

Σώφρων is the adjective of σωφροσύνη: of sound mind, and so sensible, discreet, moderate, chaste, modest. Said of a boy it is praise of his behaviour; of a city or a constitution it was a political word, used by those who favoured rule by the few and the well-born.

Use in the book

The adjective is first a reputation. Critias says that Charmides "is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d; see δοκέω), and Socrates sets the boy his problem: if he is temperate enough, he needs no charm (158b; see ἱκανός). The boy's reply shows that the word is a social fact. "For if I say I'm not temperate, ... not only is it an odd thing to say such things against oneself, but at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account. But

if I say I am, and praise myself, that will probably seem obnoxious" (158c–d; see οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι). To call oneself temperate is to lack the modesty the word implies, and the answer itself can be read as a temperate one.

In the boy's argument the adjective is said of people and lives: "People do say ... that quiet people are temperate" (159b; see ἡσύχιος); quickness, as far as the body goes, would be "the more temperate" (159d); the temperate life would not be quiet (160b; see βίος); and temperate men, the boy grants, are "good men, too" (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). Critias' Hesiod calls "the man who does his own business temperate" (163c; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

With Critias' last definition the adjective becomes a figure in a theory, ὁ σώφρων, "the temperate man". "Then only the temperate man will know himself, and be able to examine what he in fact knows and what he does not" (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The argument then tests the figure against a doctor. If the temperate man is to tell a true doctor from a false one, he cannot discuss medicine with him; that the doctor has some knowledge, "the temperate man will know", but what knowledge, only a doctor could judge, "and so not the temperate man either; for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate" (170e–171c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος). The figure is left with no field of his own. In the recapitulation Socrates names him with a shrug, "so that, if you please, our temperate man might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it" (175c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν).

The last uses return to the boy. Socrates tells the boy he is very aggrieved "if you, being such as you are in your looks and, besides, most temperate in soul, are to get no profit from this temperance" (175d–e; see ἰδέα), and his advice, if the boy has it, is to think himself the happier the more temperate he is (176a; see ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ). The superlative Critias gave the boy at 157d, Socrates gives back at 175e, and the boy's answer is that he does not know whether he has it (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

157d Charmides is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays.

158b If he is already temperate enough, he needs no charm.

158d If he says he is not temperate, he makes Critias a liar; if he says he is, he praises himself.

159b People say that quiet people are temperate.

159d As far as the body goes, quickness would be the more temperate.

160b The temperate life would not be quiet, since, being temperate, it has to be fine.

160d Nor would the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet one.

160e Temperate men are good men.

163c Hesiod and anyone of sense calls the man who does his own business temperate.

167a Only the temperate man will know himself and examine what he and others know.

170e–171a If the temperate man is to tell the true doctor, he will know only that the doctor has some knowledge.

171c No one but a doctor could judge a doctor, and so not the temperate man, unless he were a doctor besides.

171d If the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not, it would be of enormous benefit to be temperate.

175c Our temperate man might turn out to know that he knows what he knows.

175e The boy, most temperate in soul, is to get no profit from this temperance.

176a He should think himself happier in proportion as he is more temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Gorgias* the adjective carries the plain view that Callicles despises. Asked whether the rulers he admires should also rule themselves, Callicles does not understand, and Socrates explains that he means nothing subtle, but what the many mean: being temperate and master of oneself, ruling the pleasures and desires within oneself (491d–e). Callicles' answer, that Socrates means the fools, is told elsewhere (491e; see ἠλίθιος). The *Charmides* never tries this sense (see σωφροσύνη).

Other ancient sources

Thucydides records what became of the word in the civil wars of his time. In the faction-fighting at Corcyra, the island state off north-western Greece, and after it, men changed the accepted meaning of words to suit their deeds: unreasoning daring passed for courage loyal to one's party, cautious delay for

cowardice in decent dress, and moderation, τὸ *σῶφρον*, for a screen for want of manhood. The leaders on each side used fine-sounding names, equal political rights for the many on one side and, on the other, "a temperate aristocracy", *ἀριστοκρατία σώφρων*, while they fought for power by every means.[226] The Editorial Note recalls that Critias and Charmides were, a quarter of a century later, among the men of the oligarchy of 404/3; on Thucydides' showing, the adjective the dialogue gives the boy was already a word of the oligarchs' fair-sounding programme.

Translation in this edition

At 157d6 "the most temperate" is T's reading, also a variant in W; B has "thought the most sagacious (polyphrenestatos) of very many", as the edition's note at 157d records, and editors have proposed several repairs (apparatus, d6; see *ἐπῳδή*). "Temperate" throughout, and "the temperate man" for *ὁ σώφρων* at 167a, 170e, 171a, 171c, 171d and 175c; "our temperate man" at 175c renders the article with *ἡμῖν*, "for us". The comparative and superlative are "more temperate", "the more temperate" and "most temperate". At 171c2 the adjective ends one clause, "and so not the temperate man either", and the next gives the reason, "for then he would be a doctor in addition to being temperate", where the Greek has the noun, *πρὸς τῇ σωφροσύνῃ*, "besides temperance".

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; ἀληθινός; βίος; δοκέω; ἐπῳδή; ἠλίθιος; ἡσύχιος; ἰδέα; ἱκανός; ὁμότεχνος; ὅσῳπερ ... τοσούτῳ; οὐκ ἔχω ὅτι ἀποκρίνωμαι; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; σωφρονέω; σωφρόνως; σωφροσύνη; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν.

[226] Thucydides 3.82.4 and 3.82.8.

T Tau

τὰ ἀγαθά · good things

Good things: what flows from the soul in the Thracian's teaching, and what Critias makes one's own and temperance the doing of · Charmides

τὰ ἀγαθά, *ta agatha*, "good"; ἀγαθά, *agatha*, "good", "good things"; τἀγαθά, *tagatha*, "good things"; τῶν ἀγαθῶν, *tōn agathōn*, "(of) good things"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural of ἀγαθός, "good": good things, goods, whatever benefits.

In the *Charmides*. Eight times in two places: in the Thracian's teaching, that everything, "bad and good alike", starts from the soul (156e), and in Critias' first definition of his own, that what is one's own is good and temperance is "the doing of good things" (163d–e).

In this edition. "Good", "good things".

A place to read. 156e–157a and 163c–e.

Meaning

In Greek the good things, τὰ ἀγαθά, were the goods of life: health, wealth, beauty, birth, honour, and the goods of the soul, as Socrates lists them in the *Euthydemus* (279a–c; see εὐδαιμονία). To call a thing good was to say that it benefits, and the plural keeps that sense of things to be had and used.

Use in the book

The first use is a claim about causes. Zalmoxis says that the Greek doctors neglect the whole, "For everything, ... bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; ὁρμάω; τὰ κακά). The good things of the body, health above all, have their source in the soul,

and so the soul is to be treated first (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). Good things here are what a man has, and the soul is where they start.

The second use is Critias'. From Hesiod he derives that things made finely and beneficially are works, that only such things are "appropriate to one", and everything harmful "belonging to others" (163c; see ἀλλότριος; οἰκεῖος). Socrates restates him: "it is what is appropriate to one, and one's own, that you call good, and the makings of good things that you call doings" (163d; see Πρόδικος). The good things are now what a man does and makes, and Critias' definition follows: "temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). The doctor who makes someone healthy makes something beneficial, both for himself and for his patient, and so does what he ought, and so is temperate (164a–b; see τὰ δέοντα).

The two uses can be read together. The Thracian's good things flow from a soul in good condition, and Critias' good things are made by a man who does his own business. Both tie temperance to good things, the first as their source, the second as their maker; and the argument will find that a man may make good things without knowing that he has, and that knowing which things are good is a knowledge other than Critias' temperance (164b–c, 174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the plural occurs.

156e Everything, bad and good alike, starts from the soul and flows from there.

163d Critias calls good what is appropriate to one and one's own, and doings the makings of good things.

163e Temperance is the doing or making of good things; the man who does good things, not bad ones, is temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the second book of the *Republic* Glaucon sorts the good things into three kinds: some we welcome for their own sake, not for what comes of them, like harmless pleasures; some we love both for themselves and for their results, like thinking, seeing and being healthy; and some we would not choose for themselves, but only for the wages and other things that come of them, like

gymnastic training, being treated when sick, and the practice of medicine (2.357b–d). Socrates places justice in the second and finest kind (2.358a). Socrates' own claim at his trial, that from virtue come wealth and all the other good things for men, is told elsewhere (*Apology* 30a–b; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα). The *Charmides*' good things are the Thracian's, which flow from the soul as the *Apology*'s come from virtue.

Translation in this edition

"Good" and "good things", with "bad" for κακά beside them; the English keeps "good and bad" at each of the three joints where the pair appears (156e, 163e, 174b–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). At 163e10 B omits ἀγαθῶν, "of good things", which T and W have (apparatus; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

See also

ἀλλότριος; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; εὐδαιμονία; οἰκεῖος; ὁρμάω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Πρόδικος; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; τὰ δέοντα; τὰ κακά; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

τὰ γεγονότα · everything that has happened

The things that have happened: the past, which the dialogue's man of perfect knowledge knows along with the present and the future · Charmides

τὰ γεγονότα πάντα, *ta gegonota panta*, "everything that has happened"; τῶν γεγονότων, *tōn gegonotōn*, "(of the things that) have been"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural of the perfect participle of γίγνομαι, "come to be": the things that have come to be, all that has happened.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: in Socrates' guess at the man Critias means, one "who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now" (174a), and in his question which of that man's knowledges makes him happy, "of the things that are and have been and are going to be" (174b).

In this edition. "Everything that has happened"; "have been".

A place to read. 173e–174b.

Meaning

Γέγονε, "it has come to be", is the Greek for what has happened and is now settled. The participle with the article makes a whole of it, the past as a body of facts that could be known. Beside τὰ ὄντα, "the things that are", and τὰ μέλλοντα, "the things that are going to be", it completes the old triad of the seer's knowledge (*Iliad* 1.70; see τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα).

Use in the book

The phrase belongs to the figure Socrates builds at 174a and then dismantles, which is told elsewhere (173e–174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα). Socrates has concluded that Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω), and Critias accepts the prophet, who knows all that is going to be, "and another as well". Socrates supplies the other, a man who, besides the future, "knew everything that has happened and everything that is now" (174a; see μάντις). Knowledge of the past is the first thing added to the prophet's; with the present it makes him complete, "ignorant of nothing".

The past is also what the dialogue is made of: Socrates tells the whole conversation afterwards, and it begins with the room asking him about a battle of which the city had only just heard (153b–c; see πυνθάνομαι; στρατόπεδον). On this reading the dialogue's first readers stood where the imagined man stands, knowing what became of Critias and Charmides (see σώφρων), and the dialogue asks what good such knowledge does.

Its own answer is none, unless another knowledge is added. Asked which of his knowledges makes the man happy, Critias names neither past nor present nor future. Socrates offers draughts, calculation and health, and Critias, granting only that health comes nearer ("More so"), names the one "by which he knows good, ... and bad" (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Knowledge of all that has happened is part of the most

knowledgeable life Socrates can imagine, and it is not what makes that life go well.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

174a Besides the future, the man Socrates imagines knows everything that has happened and everything that is now.

174b Which of his knowledges, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes him happy?

Other ancient sources

Aristotle uses the past to mark the limit of choice and deliberation. Nothing that has happened is an object of choice; no one chooses to have sacked Troy. Nor does anyone deliberate about what has happened, but about what will be and can be otherwise, and what has happened cannot not have happened. So, he says, Agathon was right that even a god is robbed of this one power alone, to unmake what has been done.[227] On Aristotle's terms the knowledge of the past, however complete, is no knowledge of what to do, which is the knowledge the *Charmides* finally asks for.

Translation in this edition

"Everything that has happened" for τὰ γεγονότα πάντα at 174a5, and "have been" for τῶν γεγονότων in the sequence "are and have been and are going to be" at 174b1–2.

See also

ἀρετή; ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; μάντις; πατρῷος; πυνθάνομαι; στρατόπεδον; σώφρων; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα; τὰ ὄντα.

[227] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139b5–11.

τὰ δέοντα · what he ought

What one ought to do: the step in the doctor's case that makes a beneficial act a temperate one · Charmides

τὰ δέοντα, *ta deonta*, "what he ought"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural participle of δεῖ, "it is needful": what is needed, what is due, what one ought.

In the *Charmides*. Twice, at 164b: "And the man who does this does what he ought?" and "isn't the man who does what he ought temperate?"

In this edition. "What he ought".

A place to read. 164a–c.

Meaning

Τὰ δέοντα πράττειν is ordinary Greek for doing one's duty, doing what the situation requires. The phrase looks to the occasion rather than the rule: what is needed here and now, by this patient, in this business. It joins being right and being fitting, and does not say who judges which is which.

Use in the book

The phrase is the hinge of the doctor's case. Critias has defined temperance as the doing of good things (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν), and Socrates asks whether a doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and for his patient. Critias agrees. "And the man who does this does what he ought?" "Yes." "And isn't the man who does what he ought temperate?" "Temperate indeed" (164b; see ὀνίνημι; σωφρονέω). Doing what one ought stands between doing good things and being temperate, and both steps are granted at once.

The next question takes the phrase apart. Must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not, and each of the craftsmen when he is going to profit from the work he is doing? "Perhaps not" (164b; see τὰ μέλλοντα). Then the doctor sometimes does what he ought without knowing it, and so, by Critias' account, is temperate without knowing that he is (164c;

see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; ἐνίοτε; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν). Critias refuses the conclusion and redefines temperance as knowing oneself (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The phrase can be read as the place where the dialogue's question changes. Doing what one ought turns out to be a fact about the act, which the agent may not see; Critias wants temperance to be a fact about the agent, and so turns from what is done to what is known.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

164b The doctor who makes someone healthy does what he ought.

164b The man who does what he ought is temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Philebus* uses the phrase in a test of the life of pleasure. Socrates asks Protarchus whether he would accept a whole life of the greatest pleasures, and whether he would then need anything more; Protarchus says no. Then would he need nothing of thinking and understanding and reckoning what is needed, τὰ δέοντα, and the like? Nothing, says Protarchus, since he would have everything in having enjoyment. But without intelligence, memory, knowledge and true opinion, Socrates replies, he would not even know whether he was enjoying himself or not (21a–c). The *Philebus*' man of pleasure, who cannot know that he is enjoying, can be read as the counterpart of the *Charmides*' doctor, who cannot know that he is temperate: in both, the good is had without the knowing.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes "as one ought" the mark of virtue itself. Fear, confidence, desire, anger and pity, and pleasure and pain generally, can be felt too much and too little, and both are wrong; but to feel them "when one ought, about the things one ought, towards the people one ought, for the sake one ought, and as one ought" is the mean and the best, and this is the work of virtue.[228] His "ought" is fixed by reason and by the man of practical wisdom, and

[228] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 2.6, 1106b16–24 and 1106b36–1107a2.

requires that the agent know what he is doing (*Nicomachean Ethics* 2.4, 1105a30–33; see σωφρόνως). Xenophon's kindred phrase, ἃ δεῖ πράττειν, "doing what one ought", in his defence of Socrates' company with Critias and Alcibiades, is told elsewhere (*Memorabilia* 1.2.19; see σωφρονέω); and he has the phrase itself a little later: men drawn into drinking and love affairs are less able to attend to what they ought, τῶν δεόντων, and keep from what they ought not.[229]

Translation in this edition

"What he ought" at 164b3 and 164b5. Elsewhere the verb's forms are "must", "ought", "has to" (see δεῖ). At 164b5 a corrector of the Coislin manuscript adds δέ before τά (apparatus).

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; δεῖ; ἐνίοτε; ὀνίνημι; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; σωφρονέω; σωφρόνως; τὰ μέλλοντα.

τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν · doing one's own business

Doing one's own business: the boy's third definition, borrowed from his guardian, called a riddle, taken over by Critias and turned into the doing of good things · Charmides

τὸ τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, *to ta heautou prattein*, "doing one's own business"; τὸ τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττειν, *to ta hautou prattein*, the same; τὸν τὰ αὑτοῦ πράττοντα, *ton ta hautou prattonta*, "the man who does his own business"

At a Glance

The phrase. Literally "to do one's own (things)": to mind one's own affairs, the opposite of meddling.

In the *Charmides*. Nine times between 161b and 163c. Charmides offers it as something he has heard, "that temperance would be doing one's

[229] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.22.

own business" (161b); Socrates makes it absurd and calls it a riddle; Critias, its author, takes it over and reinterprets it by Hesiod (162c–163c).

In this edition. "Doing one's own business"; the Key Words: "The English keeps the verb 'do' wherever the argument depends on it."

A place to read. 161b–163e.

Meaning

The edition's Key Words describe the phrase: "Literally 'doing one's own (things)', this was an ordinary Greek phrase for minding one's own affairs, the opposite of meddling, polypragmosynē". The quiet citizen who kept to his own affairs, ἀπράγμων, could be praised, as Plato praises the philosopher who does his own business, or despised, as Thucydides' Pericles despises him. It was also, as the Key Words add, the formula with which the *Republic* defines justice. Everything turns on its two vague words: what counts as "doing", and what counts as "one's own".

Use in the book

The boy offers it as a last resort, and not as his own. "I have just remembered something I once heard someone say: that temperance would be doing one's own business" (161b; see ἀναμιμνήσκομαι). Socrates guesses at once that he heard it from Critias, and Critias denies it (161b–c; see ἀληθής). It does not matter, Charmides says, whom he heard it from, and Socrates agrees: "what we have to look into is not who said it, but whether what is said is true or not" (161c). But he adds a warning: "it looks like a kind of riddle" (161c; see αἴνιγμα).

Socrates then takes "doing" at its widest. The writing-master does something when he writes or reads, and does not teach the boys only his own name; they wrote their enemies' names as much as their own and their friends'; healing, building and weaving are doing something too; and a city whose law ordered each man to make his own cloak, shoes, oil-flask and strigil would not be well managed, though a city temperately managed would be (161d–162a; see λήκυθος; νόμος; πολυπραγμονέω; στλεγγίς). The edition's note at 161e names the move: "Socrates takes 'doing' to mean making or

performing anything at all, so that a boy who writes his enemy's name is doing his enemy's business." The conclusion is that the man who said it "was speaking in riddles", since he was no simpleton, and put it forward "on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one's own business is" (162a–b; see αἰνίττομαι; ἠλίθιος). The boy, laughing slyly, looks across at Critias (162b).

Critias, stung like a poet whose verses an actor has spoiled, takes the definition over (162c–e; see παραδέχομαι; ποίημα). His defence draws on Hesiod and turns on two distinctions. Making is not doing: craftsmen make other people's things and may still be temperate (163a–b; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). And "one's own" is not what belongs to one but what is good: things made finely and beneficially are works, Hesiod regarded only such things as "appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others", and so "Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate" (163b–c; see ἀλλότριος; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; οἰκεῖος). Socrates sees that he calls good what is appropriate to one and one's own, and asks for a plainer definition; Critias gives it: "temperance is the doing of good things" (163d–e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Πρόδικος).

The formula returns later without its name. In the life without error that temperance would bring if it were what Critias claimed, each would do only what he knew and hand the rest over to those who knew (171d–e; see ἁμαρτία; παραδίδωμι), which can be read as doing one's own business in the sense the *Republic* gives it, each man his own work. A page later Socrates withdraws the agreement that this would be a great good (172d; see ὁμολογέω; παραδίδωμι). The boy's formula, refuted as a definition, comes back as a plan for a city, and the dialogue doubts that the plan would make anyone happy.

The phrase thus passes through three readings. The boy's is the ordinary one, minding one's own affairs, which he had heard and could not explain. Socrates' is the literal one, doing only what is one's own, which makes nonsense of every craft and every city. Critias' is his own, doing what is good, which keeps the words and changes their sense. The riddle can be read as solved by redefinition rather than by understanding; and the next step, the

doctor who does good without knowing it, shows that the redefinition has lost what the phrase was for, a temperance that its possessor could recognise in himself (164a–c; see τὰ δέοντα).

Places to read

Every passage in which the formula occurs, with the variations in which Socrates turns it.

161b The boy remembers hearing that temperance would be doing one's own business.

161d The man who said it did not mean it as the words sound.

161e The schoolboys were not doing their own business when they wrote others' names.

162a A city where each man worked at and did his own, and kept his hands off others', would not be well managed; doing one's own business in this way would not be temperance.

162a The man who said it was speaking in riddles.

162b It is hard to know what doing one's own business is; can the boy say?

162d Critias: does the boy think the man who said it does not know what he meant?

163a Socrates: the man who laid it down now says that those who do other people's business may be temperate.

163c Hesiod, and anyone of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the fourth book of the *Republic* the phrase becomes the definition of justice. From the founding of the city, Socrates says, they laid it down that each must practise the one pursuit for which his nature is best fitted; and that "doing one's own business and not being a busybody is justice" they have heard from many others and often said themselves. "This, then, my friend, ... in a certain way coming to be, seems to be justice: doing one's own business." He gives his evidence: it is what remained in the city after temperance, courage and wisdom, and gave them all the power to come to be there and, once there, preserved them (4.433a–c). The *Republic* thus assigns to justice the formula the *Charmides* tried as temperance, and reads it as 171e reads it:

one's own is the work one's nature fits one for. Its later turn inward, to the doing of one's own within the soul, is told elsewhere (4.443c–e; see πρᾶξις), as is the philosopher of the sixth book, who keeps quiet and does his own business like a man sheltering behind a wall from a storm (6.496c–d; see ἀνωφελής). The *Gorgias* closes with the same praise: the judge of the dead admires the soul of "a philosopher who had done his own business and not meddled while he lived", and sends it to the Isles of the Blessed (526c). The *Timaeus*' old saying that only the temperate man may do and know his own and himself is told elsewhere (72a; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).

Other ancient sources

Thucydides gives the democratic answer to the phrase in Pericles' funeral speech. The Athenians, Pericles says, attend to their own affairs and to the city's together, and those who are busy with their work still judge public affairs well; "the man who has no share in these we alone count not a man who keeps to himself but a man of no use".[230] The quiet man, ἀπράγμων, is in Pericles' Athens ἀχρεῖος, "of no use".

Translation in this edition

The Key Words and the note at 161b keep the verb "do", "on which the argument turns". Burnet records Bekker's deletion of ἄν at 161b6, and at 161d2 a corrector of the Coislin manuscript adds the article before λέγων, "the man who said" (apparatus).

See also

αἴνιγμα; αἰνίττομαι; ἀληθής; ἀλλότριος; ἁμαρτία; ἀναμιμνήσκομαι; ἀνωφελής; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; ἠλίθιος; λήκυθος; νόμος; οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες; οἰκεῖος; ὁμολογέω; παραδέχομαι; παραδίδωμι; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; ποίημα; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; πολυπραγμονέω; πρᾶξις; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Πρόδικος; στλεγγίς; τὰ δέοντα.

[230] Thucydides 2.40.2.

τὰ ἔξω · the things outside

τοῖς ἔξω, *tois exō*, "the things outside (it)"

Attested: ἐν … τοῖς ἔξω (*en … tois exō*; 171b). The adverb ἔξω, "outside", made a noun by the article: the things outside a field, where the knowledge in question is not. Each kind of knowledge, Socrates has argued, is defined by being of particular things, medicine by being of the healthy and the diseased (171a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός; ὁρίζω). Then "whoever wants to look into medicine must look into it in the things in which it is found, and surely not in the things outside it, in which it is not?" (171b; see ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἰατρική). The phrase draws a boundary around each knowledge, and the boundary shuts temperance out: the examiner of a doctor must look at what is healthy and diseased, and only a doctor can do that (171b–c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος). Knowledge of knowledge, which has no field of things of its own, stands outside every field it would judge.

See also ἀληθινός; ἐπισκέπτομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἰατρική; ὁμότεχνος; ὁρίζω.

τὰ ἐρωτικά · the ways of love

Matters of love: the field in which Socrates, overwhelmed by the boy, declares Cydias the wisest of men · Charmides

τὰ ἐρωτικά, *ta erōtika*, "(in) the ways of love"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural of ἐρωτικός, "of love": love-matters, the art and conduct of love.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 155d: "I thought Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love".

In this edition. "In the ways of love".

A place to read. 155c–156a.

Meaning

Ἐρωτικός is the adjective of ἔρως, "love", "desire", and the neuter plural with the article covers everything belonging to love: its feelings, its pursuit, its etiquette, and the knowledge of them. In the accusative, as here, it states the field in which someone is wise.

Use in the book

The phrase comes at the moment Socrates loses hold of himself. The boy has sat down between him and Critias, and Socrates, at a loss, finds his old boldness knocked clean out of him. Then the boy gives him "a look with those eyes of his, a look beyond words", and the whole wrestling-school crowds round them; Socrates sees inside his cloak and is no longer in his own possession (155d; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἱμάτιον). "And I thought Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love", he says, who warned a lover against coming, a fawn, into the lion's presence, "for I felt I had been caught by just such a creature myself" (155d–e; see ἁλίσκομαι; Κυδίας; σοφός).

Two things are odd about the compliment. It is paid by Socrates, whom Plato elsewhere makes claim no knowledge but this one (*Symposium* 177d–e), and it is paid at the moment his own knowledge fails him: the expert in love is the man overcome by it, and he hands the title to a poet. And the expertise he praises is a warning to keep away, the fawn kept out of the lion's presence, which is the opposite of what Socrates is about to do. He recovers by talking: asked whether he knows the remedy for the head, he "did somehow manage to answer" that he did (155e; see μόγις), and begins on the charm.

The scene can be read, as the edition's note at 155d records many readers reading it, as a trial passed, the dialogue's first test of temperance (see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι). The virtue the boy is said to have to the highest degree is the one his beauty has just taken from Socrates, and Socrates regains it not by turning away, as Cydias advised, but by turning the encounter into an inquiry. His knowledge of the ways of love, if he has it, is shown by what he does next.

Places to read

The phrase's only place.

155d Socrates, on fire and no longer in his own possession, thinks Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Symposium*, when Eryximachus proposes that each guest praise Love, Socrates agrees at once: he could hardly refuse, "I who say I know nothing else but the ways of love", τὰ ἐρωτικά (177d–e). At the end of his speech he says that he honours the ways of love himself and practises them beyond others, and urges everyone else to do the same, since human nature could not easily find a better helper than Love (212b). In the *Phaedrus* he ends his second speech with a prayer to Love not to take away or maim, in anger, "the art of love which you gave me", but to let him be honoured still more among the beautiful (257a). The *Lysis*' advice that whoever is wise in the ways of love does not praise his beloved before he has caught him is told elsewhere (205e–206a; see ἐραστής). The *Charmides* gives the title to Cydias at the moment Socrates seems least to deserve it, and the dialogue that follows can be read as his claim to it.

Translation in this edition

"In the ways of love" renders the accusative of respect τὰ ἐρωτικά at 155d5.

See also

ἁλίσκομαι; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἐραστής; ἔρως; ἱμάτιον; Κυδίας; μόγις; σοφός; συνεργός.

τὰ κακά · bad things

Bad things: what flows from the soul with the good in the Thracian's teaching, and what Critias' temperate man never does · Charmides

τὰ κακά, *ta kaka*, "bad", "bad things"; κακά, *kaka*, "bad (things)"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural of κακός, "bad": bad things, harms, evils.

In the *Charmides*. Four times in two places: everything, "bad and good alike", starts from the soul (156e); and Socrates' question, "Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?" (163e), which Critias answers in his own words: "the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate" (163e).

In this edition. "Bad".

A place to read. 163c–164c.

Meaning

Κακός is bad in every sense, of poor quality, cowardly, low-born, harmful, wicked (see κακός). The neuter plural names bad things as harms: what injures the body or the man. The plural keeps that sense of benefit and harm wherever it occurs.

Use in the book

The first use is the Thracian's, that everything "bad and good alike" starts from the soul (156e; see ἐπιρρέω; τὰ ἀγαθά). Bad things here are above all sicknesses, of the body and of the whole man, and their source is a soul in bad condition; the charm that makes temperance in the soul is their cure.

The second is Critias'. Socrates asks him to define his doing more plainly: "Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?" "It is." "Then the man who does bad things is not temperate, but the one who does good things?" Critias turns the question back, "And don't you think so, my good fellow?", and Socrates refuses to answer for himself: "Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now" (163e; see ἐάω; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). Critias then states it as his own: "I say that the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate, and that the one who makes good things and not bad ones is", and gives the plain definition told elsewhere (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). Bad things have already been ruled out of "one's own": Hesiod, on Critias' reading, counted "everything harmful as belonging to others" (163c; see ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός). The temperate man, on this definition, cannot do

anything bad, because whatever he did that was bad would not have been his own doing.

The definition fails at the first case Socrates brings. The doctor sometimes acts "beneficially or harmfully" and does not know which (164b–c; see βλαβερῶς; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν). A doctor who harms his patient does bad things, and so by Critias' rule is not temperate; and he cannot tell whether he has. Critias wanted a definition under which the temperate man could not go wrong, and got one under which he could not know whether he had. The pair good and bad returns at the end as the object of the one knowledge that makes men happy, and the return is told elsewhere (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).

Places to read

Every passage in which the plural occurs.

156e Everything, bad and good alike, starts from the soul.

163e The man who does bad things is not temperate; Critias: the man who makes bad things and not good is not temperate.

Elsewhere in Plato

In this passage the *Timaeus* reverses the Thracian's direction. Most of the excesses of pleasure for which men are blamed as bad by choice are blamed wrongly, says Timaeus, for no one is bad by his own will: a bad man grows bad through a poor state of body and an upbringing without education, and these befall every man unwelcome and unwilled (86d–e). In the *Charmides* bad things flow from the soul to the body; here they flow from the body into the soul. In the *Theaetetus* Socrates tells Theodorus that bad things can never perish, since the good must always have some contrary, nor can they be established among the gods; of necessity they haunt mortal nature and this region, and so one should try to flee from here to there as quickly as possible, and the flight is becoming like god as far as one can (176a–b). There bad things belong to mortal life itself, to be fled rather than cured; the Thracian's charm promised a cure.

Translation in this edition

"Bad" at 156e7 and 163e4–9, kept, with "good", at every joint where the pair appears (156e, 163e, 174b–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). Never "evil", as the Key Words explain (see κακός).

See also

ἀλλότριος; βλαβερός; βλαβερῶς; ἐάω; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κακός; κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὰ ἀγαθά; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν.

τὰ μέλλοντα · all that is going to be

The things that are going to be: the prophet's field, and the first of three in the knowledge of the man who knows everything · Charmides

τῶν μελλόντων, *tōn mellontōn*, "(of) the future", "(are) going to be"; τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι, *ta mellonta esesthai*, "all that is going to be"; τοῖς μέλλουσιν, *tois mellousin*, "the future"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural participle of μέλλω, "be about to", with or without ἔσεσθαι, "be": the things that are going to be, the future.

In the *Charmides*. Four times, all in the dream and after: the true prophets "as foretellers of the future" (173c), "the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet" (174a), the man who, "besides the future", knows past and present (174a), and the question which knowledge, "of the things that are and have been and are going to be", makes him happy (174b).

In this edition. "The future"; "all that is going to be"; "are going to be".

A place to read. 173c–174b.

Meaning

Μέλλω is to be about to, to intend, to be destined; τὰ μέλλοντα are the things that lie ahead. Knowledge of them was the seer's, and the poets described the seer by the triad of times: Homer's Calchas knew what is, what will be and

what was before, and Hesiod's Muses tell the same (*Iliad* 1.70; *Theogony* 38; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος).

Use in the book

The future enters the dialogue as a doubt about the crafts. A doctor, Critias allows, perhaps need not know when his treatment is beneficial, nor each craftsman "when he is going to profit from the work he is doing" (164b; see τὰ δέοντα). The craftsman knows how to make, not what will come of it.

In the dream the future becomes a knowledge of its own: prophecy is granted to be knowledge of what is going to be, and temperance, presiding over it, sets up the true prophets "as foretellers of the future" (173c; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική; προφήτης). Then, having concluded that Critias marks off the happy man as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω), Socrates offers him the prophet: "perhaps you mean the one I was speaking of just now, the one who knows all that is going to be, the prophet. Do you mean him, or someone else?" "Him ... and another as well." Socrates guesses the other: "Can it be the sort of man who, besides the future, knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing? Let us suppose there is such a man. For I don't think you would say that anyone lived still more knowledgeably than he" (173e–174a; see μάντις; τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα).

Socrates supposes the man of total knowledge only to question him. "Then this is what I still long to know: which of the kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Or do they all, alike?" "Not alike at all." "Then which, most of all? The one by which he knows what, of the things that are and have been and are going to be? Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?" Not draughts, not calculation, more so health, and most of all the one "by which he knows good ... and bad" (174a–b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; λογιστική; τὸ πεττευτικόν). The future, the prophet's whole field, is one object among many, and knowing it does not make its knower happy. The dialogue's question was never what will happen, but whether what happens will be good for us, and that question the prophet's knowledge cannot answer.

Places to read

Every passage in which the participle stands for the things to come.

173c Temperance sets up the true prophets as foretellers of the future.

174a The prophet is the one who knows all that is going to be.

174a Besides the future, the man Socrates imagines knows all that has happened and all that is now.

174b Which knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes him happy?

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Theaetetus* the future is where expertise shows. Socrates turns Protagoras' doctrine that man is the measure of all things to the things that are going to be: when a layman thinks he will have a fever and a doctor thinks he will not, whose opinion will the future follow? The farmer, not the lyre-player, will judge whether a wine will be sweet or harsh; the musician, not the trainer, whether a tune will be in tune; and at a feast being prepared, the cook's judgement of the pleasure to come is worth more than a guest's. Laws too are laid down for the future, as going to be beneficial, and about what is beneficial to come some judge better than others (178a–e). The *Theaetetus*' experts know the future of their own fields; the *Charmides*' prophet knows all of it, and still the question of benefit is not his.

Translation in this edition

"Foretellers of the future" for προφήτας τῶν μελλόντων at 173c6–7, "all that is going to be" at 174a1, "the future" at 174a5 and "are going to be" at 174b2. At 174a6 Schanz would read φῶμεν, "let us say", for θῶμεν, "let us suppose", and H. Richards proposed τοιοῦτον, "such a man", for αὐτόν (apparatus).

See also

ἀλαζών; ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; λογιστική; μαντική; μάντις; προφήτης; τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ δέοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα; τὸ πεττευτικόν.

τὰ νῦν ὄντα · everything that is now

The things that are now: the present, the third of the times the imagined man of perfect knowledge knows · Charmides

τὰ νῦν ὄντα, *ta nyn onta*, "everything that is now"

At a Glance

The phrase. The things that are now, the present state of affairs.

In the *Charmides*. At 174a, where Socrates imagines a man who, besides the future, "knew everything that has happened and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing", and at 174b, where the present heads the list: "the things that are and have been and are going to be".

In this edition. "Everything that is now"; "the things that are".

A place to read. 173e–174b.

Meaning

Νῦν, "now", limits τὰ ὄντα, "the things that are", to the present. The adverb makes the difference between being in time and being simply, which the phrase τὰ ὄντα without it can also mean (see τὰ ὄντα).

Use in the book

The present is the last thing Socrates adds to the prophet's knowledge, and the least remarkable. The prophet knows the future; the other man knows the past as well, "and everything that is now, and was ignorant of nothing" (174a; see τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα). To know what is now seems the easiest of the three, and yet it is the one that completes the figure. Everyone sees something of the present, and no one sees all of it: the boy, asked at 158b–c whether temperance is present in him, ends by saying that he does not know whether he has it (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω), and the doctor, Critias allows, may not know whether the treatment he is giving is beneficial (164b). The imagined man's knowledge of all that is now would include both, and Socrates' question at once reduces it to a part: which of his knowledges makes him happy? Not the knowledge of the present either, but the knowledge of good and bad (174b–c; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

The order of 174b, the things "that are and have been and are going to be", is the seer's old order, the present first (*Iliad* 1.70; see τὰ μέλλοντα), and here it can be read as fitting the dialogue's question: its question is what temperance is, now, in the boy, and whether it would benefit him; the past is his ancestry and the future what Socrates says he is likely to be, "first in everything" (158a–b), and neither answers it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the present is named among the objects of knowledge.

174a The imagined man knows everything that has happened and everything that is now.

174b Which knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes him happy?

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Timaeus* says that "was" and "will be" belong only to what comes to be in time. Days and nights, months and years, are parts of time, and "was" and "will be" are forms of time that has come to be, which we wrongly carry over to eternal being: we say that it was, is and will be, but "is" alone belongs to it in truth, while "was" and "will be" fit becoming, which moves in time. And even of things in time, Timaeus adds, we speak inexactly when we say that what has come to be is come to be, and what is coming to be is coming to be (37e–38b). The *Charmides*' omniscient man knows the three times of the seer; on the *Timaeus*' account all three, the present included, are times of what comes to be, and the "is" proper to eternal being is no tense of time, so that his knowledge, however complete, can be read as reaching only what comes to be.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle divides oratory by the times. The hearer is either a spectator or a judge, and a judge either of what has happened or of what will be; so there are three kinds of speech: the counsellor's, about the future, since he advises for or against what will be; the litigant's, about the past, since he accuses or

defends what was done; and the speaker of praise and blame, whose most proper time is the present, since all praise or blame according to what is there, though they often recall the past and guess at the future. Each kind has its own end besides: the advantageous and the harmful for the counsellor, the just and the unjust for the litigant, the noble and the shameful for the speaker of praise.[231] Aristotle's three times can be read as the seer's, divided among three speakers; and the one whose end is benefit and harm, the counsellor, speaks of what will be, not of what is or was.

Translation in this edition

"Everything that is now" for τὰ νῦν ὄντα at 174a5, and "the things that are" for τῶν ὄντων at 174b1, where the present heads the sequence.

See also

ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; τὰ γεγονότα; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ ὄντα.

τὰ ὄντα · the things that are

The things that are: the whole of what exists, over which the dialogue asks what becomes plain, what relates to itself, and what the name temperance names · Charmides

τῶν ὄντων, *tōn ontōn*, "(of) the things that are"

At a Glance

The phrase. The neuter plural participle of εἰμί, "be": the things that are, everything there is, reality.

In the *Charmides*. Four times, always in the genitive: three times of all things together, that "each of the things that are should become plain" (166d), whether "none of the things that are" relates to itself (169a), and "to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name" (175b); and once, at

[231] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.3, 1358a36–b29.

174b, of the present beside the past and the future, in the knowledge "of the things that are and have been and are going to be".

In this edition. "The things that are".

A place to read. 166c–d and 175b.

Meaning

Τὰ ὄντα in ordinary Greek can mean one's property, or the facts, or the truth of a matter. In philosophy it is the whole of what is, and in Plato often what truly is as against what only appears. The *Charmides* uses it in the widest sense, a range over which a question is asked.

Use in the book

Each use asks a question of everything at once. The first states the inquiry's aim. Critias has accused Socrates of trying to refute him, and Socrates answers that he examines the argument for his own sake, and perhaps for his friends': "Or is it not a common good, do you think, for practically all men, that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is?" (166d; see καταφανής; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν). The things that are form the object of the inquiry, and their becoming plain is its good.

The second asks a question no one present can answer. It needs a great man to determine "whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not" (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἄλλο). The question about temperance has become a question about all things, and Socrates declines it.

The third is the scope of the imagined man's knowledge, "of the things that are and have been and are going to be" (174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα). The fourth is the ending: "we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα).

The four uses can be read as the dialogue's arc. It sets out to make each of the things that are plain as it is; it meets a question about the things that are too large for it; it imagines a man who knows them all and finds that this

knowledge does not make him happy; and it ends unable to say which of them temperance is. The name was given by a lawgiver to one of the things that are, and the inquiry has not found which.

Places to read

Every passage in which the phrase occurs.

166d It is a common good that each of the things that are should become plain, as it really is.

169a It needs a great man to determine whether any of the things that are has its power in relation to itself.

174b Which knowledge, of the things that are and have been and are going to be, makes the man happy?

175b They cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave the name temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Phaedo* Socrates divides the things that are into two kinds. What is always the same, beauty itself and equality itself, can be grasped only by the reasoning of thought, and is unseen; what is never the same, beautiful men and horses and cloaks, can be touched and seen and perceived. "Shall we then posit two kinds of the things that are, the one visible, the other unseen?" Cebes agrees, and that the unseen is always the same and the visible never (78d–79a). The *Charmides*' things that are are not yet divided, and its question about temperance asks among which of them to look.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle calls it the question sought of old, sought now and always, and always a puzzle: what being is, which comes to the question what substance is.[232] Socrates' last words on temperance, that he cannot discover which of the things that are bears its name, can be read as putting the *Charmides* inside that perplexity, in miniature.

[232] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 7.1, 1028b2–4.

Translation in this edition

"The things that are" at all four places, 166d6, 169a3, 174b1 and 175b3. At 175b3 "cannot discover" follows εὑρεῖν, a variant recorded in T, where B and T have ἔχειν; at 175b4 later manuscripts read ὀνοματοθέτης, "name-giver", for νομοθέτης, "lawgiver" (apparatus; see νομοθέτης).

See also

δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; καταφανής; κοινὸν ἀγαθόν; μέγας ἀνήρ; νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα; πρὸς ἄλλο; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὰ νῦν ὄντα.

ταριχοπωλέω · sell salt fish

ταριχοπωλοῦντι, *tarichopōlounti*, "to sell salt fish"

Attested: ταριχοπωλοῦντι (*tarichopōlounti*; 163b). To deal in τάριχος, salted or pickled fish, a cheap staple of the Athenian market. The trade is the second of the three Critias names as no work in Hesiod's sense: if Hesiod had called such things works, "Do you suppose ... he would have said that it was no disgrace to anyone to cobble shoes, or to sell salt fish, or to sit in a brothel?" (163b; see ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; σκυτοτομέω). The edition's note at 163b judges the list: "Critias' trades seem chosen to shock, and the choice is an aristocrat's: the cobbler, the salt-fish seller, and the prostitute who 'sits in a room'." The fishmonger stands between the craftsman and the prostitute: he trades in goods and makes none, and Critias' Hesiod refuses him the name of worker.

See also ἐπ' οἰκήματος καθῆσθαι; ἔργον οὐδὲν ὄνειδος; Ἡσίοδος; σκυτοτομέω.

ταὐτόν · the same

ταὐτόν, *tauton*, "the same (thing)", "the same as"; εἰς ταὐτόν, *eis tauton*, "(whose) union"; ταὐτὸν τοῦτο, *tauton touto*, "the same (situation)"; τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, *to auto touto*, "this same thing"; τὸ αὐτό, *to auto*, "the same thing"

Attested: ταὐτόν (*tauton*; 157e, 163b, 165a, 169c, 170a, 170a, 171d), with the uncontracted τὸ αὐτό at 167c and 170a3. The crasis of τὸ αὐτό, "the same". Its uses mark the claims of identity on which the argument turns. Socrates asks, "don't you call making and doing the same thing?", and Critias denies it, learning from Hesiod that making, doing and working differ (163b; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). Critias asserts the next identity himself: "'Know thyself' and 'Be temperate' are the same, as the inscription says and as I say; but one might think them different" (165a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Σωφρόνει). And he asserts a second when pressed: asked why knowing oneself should mean knowing what one knows and what one does not, he answers, "Because, Socrates, this is the same as that", and Socrates replies, "I don't understand how it is the same thing" (170a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). Twice Critias makes two things one, after refusing to make making and doing one, and neither identity does Socrates take on trust (165b–c, 170a). The other uses are idiomatic: the boy's two houses coming together in "union" (157e; see οἰκία), the onlookers who "catch a yawn" from the yawners opposite, ταὐτὸν τοῦτο συμπάσχουσιν, literally "suffer this same thing with them" (169c; see συμπάσχω), and another man "in the same situation" (171d). At 170a1 Burnet prints τοῦτο, the conjecture of Janus Cornarius, a sixteenth-century German physician who translated Plato into Latin, where B and T have τὸ αὐτό, and at 170a10 ταὐτὸν οὖν with T and W, where B has ταῦτ' οὖν οὖν (apparatus).

See also ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; οἰκία; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; συμπάσχω; Σωφρόνει.

ταχέως · quickly

ταχέως, *tacheōs*, "quickly", "Quickly"

Attested: ταχέως (*tacheōs*; 159c ×3, 159e ×4, 160c). The adverb of ταχύς, "quick". It is Socrates' word against the boy's ἡσυχῇ, "quietly", through the first refutation. At the writing-master's, reading "Quickly, or slowly?" "Quickly"; playing the lyre quickly and wrestling nimbly are finer than doing them quietly and slowly (159c; see ἀναγιγνώσκω; βραδέως; κιθαρίζω). In the soul, "learning easily ... is learning quickly", teaching is finer done "quickly and vigorously", and recollecting and remembering "Vigorously, ... and quickly" (159e; see εὐμαθία; μέμνημαι; σφόδρα). The summary at 160c concludes that temperance would not be acting quietly "any more than acting vigorously and quickly" (160c). The adverb and its kin, ταχύ, τάχιστα and ὀξέως, take the place of the boy's adverb in every example, and the refutation of quietness is, sentence by sentence, an argument for quickly (see ἡσυχῇ; τάχος).

See also ἀναγιγνώσκω; βραδέως; εὐμαθία; ἡσυχῇ; κιθαρίζω; μέμνημαι; σφόδρα; τάχος; ταχύς.

τάχος · speed, quickness

Speed: the quality set against quietness in the refutation of the boy's first definition, and Critias' model of a quality that makes its possessor what it is · Charmides

τάχους, *tachous*, "(of) quickness"; τάχος, *tachos*, "speed"

At a Glance

The word. Swiftness, speed, quickness, of body or of mind.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: at the end of the refutation of quietness, where "what belongs to quickness and sharpness" appears finer than what belongs to slowness and quietness (160b), and in Critias' principle, "Just as when someone has speed he is fast" (169e).

In this edition. "Quickness" at 160b, "speed" at 169e.

A place to read. 159c–160d and 169d–e.

Meaning

Τάχος is the noun of ταχύς, "quick", as βραδυτής is of βραδύς, "slow". It is a quality one has, in running, in speaking, in learning, and the Greek can say of a man that he has it, ἔχει τάχος, as he has beauty or strength.

Use in the book

The noun gathers the refutation of quietness into a single quality. Socrates has run through the body's actions, writing, reading, the lyre, wrestling, boxing, running, jumping, and the soul's, learning, teaching, remembering, understanding, inquiring and deliberating, and in each the quick is finer than the quiet (159c–160b; see ἡσυχῇ; ταχέως). Then he names what all of them share: "So in everything, Charmides, ... in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?" (160b; see βραδυτής; ὀξύτης). Quickness and sharpness are one side, slowness and quietness the other, and since temperance is fine, it cannot be on the quiet side (160b–d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι).

The noun returns at 169e in a new use, as the first of Critias' three examples of a quality that makes its possessor what it is: "when someone has speed he is fast", and so, he argues, whoever has knowledge that knows itself will know himself (169d–e; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; κάλλος). The first of his examples is the quality that had defeated the boy's quietness.

The two uses can be read together. Speed is the plainest case of a quality that is simply had: a man with speed is fast, and nothing more need be known. It served against quietness because it could be seen in every action, and it serves Critias because having it is being it. Socrates grants the principle and denies that it helps: a man who has knowledge of itself will know himself, but that is not the same as knowing what he knows and what he does not (169e–170a; see ἀμφισβητέω; ταὐτόν). Knowledge, unlike speed, is of something, and having it makes one knowing only of its object.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

160b In soul and body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer than what belongs to slowness and quietness.

169e Whoever has speed is fast, as whoever has knowledge of itself will know himself.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* defines the quality the *Charmides* argues from, and with some of the same examples. Socrates asks Laches to say what courage is that is the same in all its cases, and gives a model. If someone asked what quickness is, which we find in running and in playing the lyre, in speaking and in learning, and in the actions of hands and legs and mouth and voice and mind, he would answer that he calls quickness "the power that accomplishes much in a short time", in voice and in running and in everything else (192a–b). The *Charmides* takes quickness to be fine in all these cases without defining it; the *Laches* defines it in order to show what a definition of courage should look like, and Laches' answer, endurance, then falls to the premise that courage is fine (192c–d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι).

Translation in this edition

"Quickness" at 160b4, beside "sharpness", and "speed" at 169e2, where the English needs the adjective "fast" to follow from it. The adjective has its own entry (see ταχύς), and the abstract noun ταχυτής, "quickness", at 159d (see ταχυτής).

See also

ἀμφισβητέω; αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει; βραδυτής; ἡσυχῇ; κάλλος; ὀξύτης; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; ταὐτόν; ταχέως; ταχύς; ταχυτής.

ταχύς · quick, fast

ταχύ, *tachy*, "quickly", "Quickly"; τάχιστον, *tachiston*, "the quickest"; τάχιστα, *tachista*, "(as) quickly (as possible)", "most quickly"; ταχεῖαι, *tacheiai*, "quick (ones)"; ταχειῶν, *tacheiōn*, "quick (ones)"; ταχέα, *tachea*, "quick things"; ταχύς, *tachys*, "fast"

Attested: ταχύ (*tachy*; 159c ×2, 159d), τάχιστον (*tachiston*; 159d), τάχιστα (*tachista*; 160a, 160b), ταχεῖαι (*tacheiai*; 160c), ταχειῶν (*tacheiōn*; 160c), ταχέα (*tachea*; 160d), ταχύς (*tachys*; 169e). Quick, swift, fast; the neuter ταχύ serves as an adverb. The adjective runs through the refutation of quietness beside the adverb ταχέως. The first question is "which is finest at the writing-master's: to copy out the letters quickly, or quietly?" "Quickly" (159c; see γραμματιστής; γράφω). "In the body, at any rate, it is not the quiet that is finest, but the quickest and the nimblest" (159d; see ὀξέως); understanding what is said is finest done "as quickly as possible" (160a; see συνίημι); and the man who deliberates and finds things out "most easily and most quickly" is praised (160b). The conclusion counts quiet actions against "the vigorous and quick ones" (160c; see σφοδρός), and the finding is set beside the premise: "quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones" (160d; see οὐχ ἧττον). At 169e the adjective follows from the noun, "when someone has speed he is fast" (169e; see τάχος). At 160d2 the article before ταχέα is supplied by a corrector of the Coislin manuscript (apparatus; see καλός).

See also γραμματιστής; γράφω; καλός; ὀξέως; οὐχ ἧττον; συνίημι; σφοδρός; ταχέως; τάχος; ταχυτής.

ταχυτής · quickness

ταχυτής, *tachytēs*, "quickness"

Attested: ἡ ταχυτής (*hē tachytēs*; 159d). The abstract noun of ταχύς, "quick": quickness as a quality, the word the *Laches* defines (192a–b; see τάχος). It comes once, in the conclusion of the body's half of the argument: "Then as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine"

(159d; see ἡσυχιότης; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). The boy had said that temperance was "a kind of quietness", ἡσυχιότης, and the abstract noun answers his abstract noun: quietness against quickness, and quickness, on this argument, the more temperate of the two. The further step, that temperance is quickness, would be absurd, and Socrates does not take it; he concludes only that quietness is not temperance, and that temperance is no more quietness than quickness (160b–d).

See also ἡσυχιότης; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; τάχος; ταχύς.

τεκμαίρομαι · infer

τεκμαίρομαι, *tekmairomai*, "I infer"

Attested: τεκμαίρομαι (*tekmairomai*; 172c). To judge from signs, to infer, from τέκμαρ, "mark", "sign", "goal". Socrates has suggested that knowledge of knowledge might give only a lesser benefit, and turns the suggestion on the whole inquiry: "And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose. I infer this because some strange things come to light about temperance, if it is of this kind" (172c; see ἄτοπος; ζητέω). The evidence is the strangeness of the consequences, and the inference is the fear Socrates later says was reasonable (175a; see εἰκότως). At 172c5 Burnet prints τεκμαίρομαι δέ with T, where B and W have the participle τεκμαιρόμενοι, "inferring", and W has the first-person ending written above (apparatus). Plato uses the same verb to introduce evidence in the *Laches*, "I judge from this" (192c; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι), and in the *Republic*, "Do you know what my evidence is?" (4.433b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν).

See also ἄτοπος; εἰκότως; ζητέω; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τεκμήριον.

τεκμήριον · proof

τεκμήριον, *tekmērion*, "proof"

Attested: τεκμήριον (*tekmērion*; 176b). A sure sign, a proof, from τεκμαίρομαι, "infer". The last attempt to settle whether the boy is temperate is Critias', and it is a proof by obedience: "But Charmides, if you do this, it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you and don't desert him, great or small" (176b; see ἀπολείπω; ἐπᾴδω; σωφρονέω). The boy had said he did not know whether he had temperance (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω), and the inquiry had not found what it was; Critias supplies a sign instead of a definition. Aristotle distinguishes the τεκμήριον as the one kind of sign that is necessary, from which a conclusion follows, and notes that people call a sign by that name when they think what they have said cannot be undone, as shown and brought to its limit, since "in the speech of old τέκμαρ and πέρας are the same".[233] Critias' proof is no such sign: obedience to a guardian shows obedience, and the dialogue has given no reason to think it shows temperance. At 176b5 the first "if" is Goldbacher's supplement, and the second, at 176b6, is B's and W's, where T has ἵν' (apparatus; see δράω).

See also ἀπολείπω; δράω; ἐπᾴδω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; σωφρονέω; τεκμαίρομαι.

τέλος · crown

The end, the crown: what Critias says nothing else supplies to doing well but "knowledgeably" · Charmides

τέλος, *telos*, "(anything else that) crowns"

At a Glance

The word. The end, the completion, the fulfilment; the goal for whose sake a thing is done; also an office, a rite, a payment.

[233] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.2, 1357b3–10.

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Critias' defence of the dream: "you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d).

In this edition. "Crowns", the noun turned into a verb.

A place to read. 173a–174c.

Meaning

Τέλος is the point at which a thing is complete: the end of a road, the fulfilment of a wish, the maturity of a living thing, and so the purpose for whose sake it acts. It is also what finishes something off as its crown: authority, a consecration, the rite of initiation, the death that completes a life. The word is both a limit and a perfection, and philosophers argued over the relation of the two.

Use in the book

Socrates has granted, in the dream, that if temperance ruled the human race would act and live knowledgeably, but not that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy (173a–d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν). Critias protests: "And yet, ... you won't easily find anything else that crowns doing well, if you slight 'knowledgeably'" (173d; see ἀτιμάζω). The Greek says "any other τέλος of doing well": no other end or completion for it. On Critias' claim, knowing is what perfects acting, and a life done knowledgeably is a life done well.

Socrates' reply takes the crown apart by asking what it is of. "Then teach me one small thing more. ... Knowledgeably about what? About cutting leather?" (173d; see προσδιδάσκω; σκυτῶν τομή). Not leather, not bronze, not wool or wood: Socrates concludes that Critias marks off the man who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω), and then, asked which knowledge makes the man happy most of all, Critias names the one "by which he knows good ... and bad" (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὰ μέλλοντα), the only one, Socrates concludes, that makes us do well and be happy (174c). The end of doing well proves not to be a manner of acting, "knowledgeably", but an object of knowledge, the good. Critias' τέλος was a

form without a content; the argument supplies the content, and it is not temperance. Plato names the good as the end of all actions in the *Gorgias* (499e–500a; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν), and Diotima's answer that the wish to be happy needs no further end is told under εὐδαίμων (*Symposium* 204e–205a).

The word can be read as the dialogue's own unreached goal. Critias names a crown and cannot say what it crowns; the inquiry at its close, beaten on every side, does not reach its end either (175b; see πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα). Near its close the boy resolves to go on being charmed every day, until Socrates says it is enough (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

Places to read

The noun's only place.

173d Critias: nothing else crowns doing well, if one slights "knowledgeably".

Other ancient sources

Aristotle separates the end from the last thing. Nature is an end and that for whose sake, since in any continuous process with an end, the last stage is that for whose sake it happens; hence the poet's comic slip, "he has reached the end for which he was born", since what is last is not every time an end, only what is best.[234] In the *Metaphysics* he records the same double sense from the other side: things are called complete, τέλειον, by having their end, when that end is good, and since the end is something last, death too is called an end by a transfer of meaning, because both are last; but the end is also that for the sake of which.[235] Critias' "knowledgeably" is a last step in the dream's sequence, and Socrates' question can be read as showing it to be no end in Aristotle's sense. Aristotle's own statement that doing well is itself the end of action is told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.2, 1139b1–4; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).

[234] Aristotle, *Physics* 2.2, 194a27–33.

[235] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.16, 1021b23–1022a3.

Translation in this edition

"Anything else that crowns doing well" renders ἄλλο τι τέλος τοῦ εὖ πράττειν at 173d6–7, turning the noun into a verb so that "crown" can carry both its senses, completion and honour.

See also

ἀτιμάζω; ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; εὖ πράττειν; εὐδαίμων; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; προσδιδάσκω; σκυτῶν τομή; τὰ μέλλοντα.

τέχνη · craft, art

Craft: the model of knowledge against which temperance is measured, and the field each knowledge keeps for itself · Charmides

τέχνῃ, *technēi*, "(by any) craft", "(to another) craft"; τέχνης, *technēs*, "(of) craft", "(to another) craft", "(of his) craft"; τεχνῶν, *technōn*, "(the other) crafts", "(many) crafts"; τέχνης, *technēs*, "(the) art (of calculation)"

At a Glance

The word. Art, craft, skill; the trained know-how of the doctor, the builder, the weaver, the pilot, and the body of rules by which each works.

In the *Charmides*. Nine times. Crafts are "doing something" against doing one's own business (161e), the model of a knowledge with a work (165d–166a), the field only a practitioner can judge (171c), and at the end the knowledges to which health and benefit belong, so that temperance is "the craftsman of no benefit" (174e–175a).

In this edition. "Craft"; "art" at 165e, "the art of calculation". The Key Words: "the argument treats crafts such as medicine and house-building as epistēmai (165c–d)."

A place to read. 165c–166b and 174c–175a.

Meaning

Τέχνη is the skill of making or doing something according to rules that can be taught: the doctor's, the carpenter's, the potter's, the orator's. A craft has a field and a product, and its practitioner can give an account of what he does. Greek used ἐπιστήμη, "knowledge", and τέχνη of the same expertises, and the *Charmides* passes between them without comment (see ἐπιστήμη). Aristotle later pulled them apart, defining craft as a state concerned with making, accompanied by true reasoning, and setting it apart from science and from prudence; both distinctions are told elsewhere (*Nicomachean Ethics* 6.3–5; see ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).

Use in the book

The crafts first serve Socrates against doing one's own business. If writing and reading are doing something, "Yes, and healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; πράττω), and a city in which each man practised every craft for himself would not be well managed (161e–162a; see νόμος). Here the craft is simply activity, the plainest case of doing.

Then the crafts become the model of knowledge. If temperance is knowledge of oneself, it should produce something, as medicine, knowledge of the healthy, produces health, and house-building houses, "and the same with the other crafts" (165c–d; see καλὸν ἔργον; οἰκοδομική). Critias objects with crafts that have no product: "what work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving, or the many other works of the kind that one could point to for many crafts?" (165e–166a; see γεωμετρική; λογιστική). Socrates concedes the point and moves the model from product to object: each knowledge is of something other than itself, calculation of the even and the odd (166a–b; see ἐπιστήμη τινός). From then on the craft is defined by its field.

The field is what shuts temperance out. To examine a doctor one must look at what is healthy and diseased, which only a doctor can do, and so

temperance, if it is only knowledge of knowledge, could tell a doctor who knows "the things of his craft" from a pretender no better than any other knower, except its own fellow craftsman (171b–c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος; τὰ ἔξω). Each craft judges its own, and a knowledge with no field of its own judges none.

The end returns the crafts their work. Without the knowledge of good and bad, medicine still makes us healthy, cobbling shod and weaving clothed, but nothing is done "well and beneficially" (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). Critias proposes that temperance, ruling all knowledge, would rule this too; Socrates answers that it would not do "the other things belonging to the crafts" in place of each craft's own work, since health, Critias agrees, belonged "to another craft", and benefit too had been assigned "to another craft", so that temperance is the craftsman of no benefit (174e–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The dialogue can be read as testing whether temperance can be a craft among crafts, and finding that, defined as Critias defines it, it is a craft with neither a work nor a field.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

161e Healing, building and weaving, producing any of the works of craft by any craft, are doing something.

165d Medicine produces health, house-building houses, and the same with the other crafts.

165e–166a What work does the art of calculation have, or geometry, as many crafts have works?

171c Temperance could not tell a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not.

174e Would temperance do the things belonging to the crafts, and not each craft its own work?

175a Health belonged to another craft, and benefit was assigned to another craft too.

Elsewhere in Plato

Protagoras' myth in the dialogue named after him separates craft from the art of living together. When the gods made mortal creatures, Epimetheus, Prometheus' brother, spent all the powers on the beasts and left man naked, barefoot, without bedding or weapons; Prometheus, at a loss how to preserve him, stole the skilled wisdom of Hephaestus and Athena, and fire with it, and gave it to man. So man had the wisdom for staying alive, but not political wisdom, which was with Zeus. With craft men made speech and names, houses, clothes, shoes, bedding and food; but living scattered they were destroyed by beasts, and when they gathered into cities they wronged one another, not having the political art, and scattered again (321c–322b). The *Charmides*' dream can be read as ending in the same place: equipment, clothing and footwear expertly made, health and safety secured, and still no knowledge of what would make us happy (173b–174c; see σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς). The principle that a craft knows its own work and no other's is told elsewhere (*Ion* 537c–d; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός), as is the *Gorgias*' rule that a craft must be able to give an account of what it does (465a; see ἄλογος).

Translation in this edition

"Craft" at 161e7, 165d6, 165e8, 171c6, 174e4 and 175a1–4, as the Glossary has it, "craft, τέχνη (technē): 161e, 165d, 171c, 174e–175a"; "art" only at 165e6, "the art of calculation", where the English idiom requires it. The family is kept together: "craftsman" for δημιουργός (see δημιουργός), "fellow craftsman" for ὁμότεχνος (see ὁμότεχνος), and "expertly" for τεχνικῶς (see τεχνικῶς).

See also

ἀληθινός; ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἄλογος; ἀπεργάζομαι; γεωμετρική; δημιουργός; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἰατρική; καλὸν ἔργον; λογιστική; νόμος; οἰκοδομική; ὁμότεχνος; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; πράττω; σκεῦος; τὰ ἔξω; τεχνικῶς.

τεχνικῶς · expertly

τεχνικῶς, *technikōs*, "expertly"

Attested: τεχνικῶς (*technikōs*; 173c). With craft, skilfully, by the rules of an art; the adverb of τεχνικός, "of craft". In the dream of temperance ruling, Socrates asks what else would happen to us than that we would be healthier and come through safe at sea and in war, "and that our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us, and much else besides, because we would be using genuine craftsmen?" (173b–c; see ἀληθινός; ἀμπεχόνη; σκεῦος). The adverb promises the crafts at their best, every product made as it should be, and the dream grants it all; what it withholds is that a life so equipped would be a happy one (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The list of goods, made expertly and still short of happiness, can be read as recalling the craft-wisdom Prometheus gave to men in the *Protagoras*, with which they clothed and shod themselves and still could not live together (321c–322b; see τέχνη).

See also ἀληθινός; ἀμπεχόνη; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; σκεῦος; τέχνη.

τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων · assign each word

Socrates' permission to Critias to assign the words as he pleases, on one condition: that he makes clear what each word is applied to · Charmides

τίθεσθαι … τῶν ὀνομάτων … ἕκαστον, *tithesthai … tōn onomatōn … hekaston*, "assign each word"

At a Glance

The phrase. To assign words: the middle of τίθημι, "set", "lay down", used of giving names, with a partitive genitive, literally "to set each of the names".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 163d: "Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to."

In this edition. "Assign each word".

A place to read. 163b–e.

Meaning

Τίθεσθαι ὄνομα, to set a name, was ordinary Greek for naming; Plato's *Cratylus* imagines the first namer as a setter of names, a lawgiver, and the *Charmides* recalls his act at its end (see νομοθέτης; ὄνομα). The middle voice gives the setting to the speaker for his own use. In the late fifth century the question was whether a name was right by nature or by agreement, and Prodicus made a profession of the proper use of each word (see Πρόδικος). Socrates' phrase sets the question aside without answering it: let the speaker set the words, so long as he says what they are set on.

Use in the book

Critias has defended his definition by separating making from doing, with Hesiod for his authority: cobbling and selling salt fish are makings, and only what is made finely and beneficially counts as work (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). Socrates recognizes the school at once: "After all, I have heard Prodicus draw countless distinctions between words" (163d; see διαιρέω; Πρόδικος). Then comes the permission: "Well, I allow you to assign each word as you please; only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to. So now go back to the beginning and define it more plainly" (163d; see δηλόω; δίδωμι; ὁρίζω).

The sentence has two halves, and they do opposite work. The first gives up the quarrel over words: Critias may call good doings "doings" and refuse the name to the cobbler, and Socrates will not dispute it. The second keeps what the quarrel was hiding, the thing each word picks out (see φέρειν τοὔνομα). Socrates uses the permission in his very next question: "Is it the doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it, of good things that you say temperance is?" (163e; see ὀνομάζω). The distinction Critias drew from Hesiod falls away without being refuted, and what is left is "a plain definition: temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The permission can be read as the dialogue's method in small: words are free, things are not. It costs Socrates nothing to let Critias name as he likes, because the argument does not turn on names. The end reverses the

situation. There the name is fixed and the thing escapes: "we are beaten on every side, and cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης; πανταχῇ ἡττώμεθα). The lawgiver's verb is the same, ἔθετο, "set" (see τίθημι). The name was set long ago, and no one present can say what it was set on.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with Socrates' use of the permission that follows.

163d Socrates allows Critias to assign each word as he pleases, if he makes clear what he applies it to.

163e "The doing, or the making, or whatever you like to call it": the permission used, and Critias' plain definition.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Cratylus* turns the permission into a theory and puts it in Hermogenes' mouth. He cannot be persuaded, he says, that the rightness of a name is anything but agreement and convention: whatever name someone sets on a thing, θῆται, is right, and if he sets another in its place and stops using the first, the second is right no less than the first, just as we rename our household slaves; for nothing has its name by nature, but by the convention and usage of those who have made it customary and who call things so (384d). The *Statesman* praises the attitude without the theory. When young Socrates says that either of two names will do, the visitor from Elea tells him that if he keeps from being serious about names, he will be found richer in wisdom in his old age (261e). The *Charmides*' permission is the *Statesman*'s, not Hermogenes': it claims nothing about how names are right, only that the argument can go on without settling it.

Translation in this edition

"Assign each word" renders τίθεσθαι ... τῶν ὀνομάτων ... ἕκαστον (163d5–6); ὄνομα is "word" here and in Prodicus' "distinctions between words" (163d4), "name" elsewhere (see ὄνομα). The simple verb is "lay down", "suppose" and, of the lawgiver, "gave" (see τίθημι). At 163d5 "as you please" renders ἄν

βούλῃ, the reading of W; B has ἂν θέλῃ, T βούλει, and Hermann conjectured ἂν ἕλῃ, "as you choose" (apparatus).

See also

δηλόω; διαιρέω; δίδωμι; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; νομοθέτης; ὄνομα; ὀνομάζω; ὁρίζω; πανταχῇ ἠττώμεθα; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; Πρόδικος; τίθημι; φέρειν τοὔνομα.

τίθημι · lay down

τίθεσαι, *tithesai*, "you lay it down"; ἐτιθέμεθα, *etithemetha*, "we laid down"; θῶμεν, *thōmen*, "let us suppose"; ἔθετο, *etheto*, "gave"

Attested: τίθεσαι (*tithesai*; 169b), ἐτιθέμεθα (*etithemetha*; 172c, 175d), θῶμεν (*thōmen*; 174a), ἔθετο (*etheto*; 175b); the middle infinitive of 163d has its own entry (see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). To set, place; in argument, to lay down a thesis. The verb marks a definition as something the speakers set up, not something they found. Socrates challenges Critias, "since you lay it down that temperance is this, knowledge of knowledge and indeed of the lack of knowledge", to show first that it is possible (169b; see δυνατός); he looks back to "what we laid down at the start that temperance is" (172c; see ἐξ ἀρχῆς); and at the end the inquiry has shown what they "laid down as temperance" to be of no benefit (175d; see ὑβριστικῶς). At 174a the verb is a supposition made for the argument's sake: "Let us suppose there is such a man", one who knows past, present and future (see τὰ μέλλοντα). Against the speakers' positings stands the lawgiver who "gave this name, temperance" (175b; see νομοθέτης): their settings fail, and his stands without their being able to say what it names. At 175b4 some later manuscripts have ὀνοματοθέτης, "name-giver", for the lawgiver (apparatus). The compounds have their own entries (see ἀνατίθημι; προτίθημι; ὑποτίθημι).

See also ἀνατίθημι; δυνατός; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; νομοθέτης; προτίθημι; τὰ μέλλοντα; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; ὑβριστικῶς; ὑποτίθημι.

τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν · good and bad

The pair that frames the argument: in the Thracian's doctrine, in Critias' first definition of his own and in the knowledge he names at the end · Charmides

τὸ ἀγαθόν ... καὶ τὸ κακόν, *to agathon ... kai to kakon*, "good ... and bad"; τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν, *to agathon te kai kakon*, "good and bad"; ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, *agathou te kai kakou*, "of good and bad"; τὰ κακὰ καὶ τὰ ἀγαθά, *ta kaka kai ta agatha*, "bad and good alike"; ἀγαθὰ ... κακά, *agatha ... kaka*, "good things ... bad ones"; ἀγαθοὺς ... κακούς, *agathous ... kakous*, "good ... bad"; ἀγαθὸν ἢ καὶ κακόν, *agathon ē kai kakon*, "good than bad"

At a Glance

The phrase. Good and bad: the neuter adjectives with the article, the pair in its most general form.

In the *Charmides*. At three joints of the argument: the Thracian's doctrine (156e), Critias' definition of temperance (163e) and the knowledge that makes us happy (174b–d); and once between them, in the refutation of modesty (161a–b).

In this edition. "Good and bad", never "good and evil".

A place to read. 174b–d, read beside 163e.

Meaning

Ἀγαθός and κακός are the widest words of praise and blame Greek has: good and bad at anything, for anyone, in any respect (see ἀγαθός; κακός). The plural names things, the goods and harms a body or a man has; the singular with the article names what makes them good or bad. Paired, the words make the whole field of what helps and what hurts. The pair is not a moral one in a narrow sense: what is good is what benefits, what is bad what harms, and the *Charmides* keeps that sense from first to last.

Use in the book

The pair appears first in the doctrine of Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports it: "everything ... bad and good alike, for the body and for the whole human being, starts from the soul and flows from there" (156e; see ὁρμάω; τὰ ἀγαθά;

τὰ κακά). The soul is the source of both, and so the charm must work on the soul first (see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). Between the prologue and Critias' entry, the pair settles the boy's second definition. Temperance is good, "if it makes good those it is present with, and does not make them bad", while modesty, by Homer's line, "is no more good than bad" (161a–b; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ).

At its second joint the pair carries Critias' first definition of his own. Asked whether it is the doing of good things that he calls temperance, he answers: "I say that the man who makes not good things but bad ones is not temperate, and that the one who makes good things and not bad ones is" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). Critias defines the temperate man by what he does, and the doctor of 164b–c, who does good without knowing it, wrecks the definition from inside (see τὰ δέοντα). What the doctor lacks is knowledge of when his work benefits and when it harms: the knowledge of good and bad, though the dialogue does not yet call it so.

At the third joint the pair returns as the object of a knowledge. Asked which of the all-knowing man's kinds of knowledge makes him happy, Critias waves away draughts and calculation, rates health higher, and names the one "By which he knows good ... and bad" (174b; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). Take it away and the crafts still work, but nothing is done "well and beneficially" (174c–d; see τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The Key Words say why the edition keeps the same English at each joint: "so that the reader can see Critias' last answer return to his first."

The return is the dialogue's shape. Critias began by defining temperance as the doing of good things, gave it up for knowing oneself, and followed that into a knowledge of knowledge that turned out to know nothing in particular. At the end he names, without meaning to, what the first definition needed: to do good things one must know which things are good. The plural of 163e has become the singular of 174b; the things done have become the object known. The dialogue can be read as showing that the virtue it sought sits between the two joints and was missed by both: Critias' doing of good things had no knowledge in it, and his knowledge of knowledge had no good in it.

Places to read

Every passage in which good and bad are named together.

156e Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him: everything, bad and good alike, starts from the soul.

161a–b Temperance makes good, not bad; modesty is no more good than bad.

163e Critias: the man who makes good things and not bad ones is temperate.

174b Critias names the knowledge by which one knows good and bad.

174c–d Only that knowledge makes us happy; it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge but of good and bad.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Philebus* says of the good what the *Charmides* can be read as finding at its end without saying it. Socrates asks whether the good must be complete, and whether it is sufficient; Protarchus agrees to both, and Socrates adds what he calls most necessary of all, that everything that knows the good hunts it and reaches for it, wanting to catch it and have it for its own, and cares for nothing else except what comes to completion along with goods (20d). Two other passages are told elsewhere: the *Euthydemus*' conclusion that wisdom alone is good and ignorance alone bad (281d–e; see ἀγαθός), and the *Protagoras*' claim that no one does bad things willingly (345d–e; see κακός).

Other ancient sources

The Stoics define the pair by benefit and harm, the terms the Key Words give for the context of 174b–d. Diogenes Laertius reports them as saying that life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, wealth, good repute and good birth, with their opposites, are not goods or bads but indifferents; for as heating and not cooling is the property of the hot, so benefiting and not harming is the property of the good, and wealth and health benefit no more than they harm; and again, what can be used both well and badly is not good.[236] Read beside 174c–d, their argument can be read as drawing a conclusion the *Charmides*

[236] Diogenes Laertius 7.102–103.

only points to: if medicine's product can be had without being had well, health is not in itself a good.

Translation in this edition

"Good and bad" at every joint, and never "good and evil", which would bring in what the Key Words call "a narrowly moral sense and a biblical echo that the Greek does not have; the context there is benefit and harm." The Glossary's entry reads "bad, κακός (kakos). Never 'evil': 156e, 161a–b, 163e, 174b–d." At 156e7 the English keeps the Greek order, "bad and good alike"; at 174b10 it keeps Critias' "he said" between the two words, as the Greek has it. At 174b10 Burnet prints ἢ τὸ ἀγαθόν with T; B omits ἢ (apparatus).

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; κακός; ὁρμάω; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; τὰ ἀγαθά; τὰ δέοντα; τὰ κακά; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον · its own work

Each craft's own work, which Socrates refuses to hand over to temperance · Charmides

τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον, *to hautēs ergon*, "its own work"

At a Glance

The phrase. A craft's own work: the product or result proper to each art, which no other art produces.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 174e: "And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work?"

In this edition. "Its own work".

A place to read. 174c–175a.

Meaning

Ἔργον is the work a thing does and the work it makes: the house of the builder, the cloak of the weaver, the health of the doctor (see ἔργον). The

reflexive αὑτῆς, "its own", ties the work to the craft whose work it is. Greek used the phrase of a division of labour, each to its own task; here it is a division of objects, each knowledge to its own product.

Use in the book

The phrase answers Critias' last attempt. Socrates has found that the knowledge that makes us happy is the knowledge of good and bad, and that without it the crafts still make their products but nothing is done well and beneficially (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). Critias proposes that temperance, if it presides over all knowledge, would rule this knowledge too, and so benefit us (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστατέω). Socrates replies with a question about health: "Would it also make us healthy ... and not medicine? And would it do the other things belonging to the crafts, and not each of those crafts its own work?" (174e; see ἰατρική). Then the restriction Critias himself accepted, that temperance is knowledge only of knowledge "and of nothing else", settles it (174e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; διαμαρτύρομαι). Temperance is not the craftsman of health, nor of benefit, since that work too belongs to another (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The phrase keeps the principle on which the whole second half of the argument has rested. Every knowledge is of something other than itself, even one that, like calculation, has no work to show as building shows a house and weaving a cloak (165d–166b; see ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Critias' temperance was to be the one exception, a knowledge of knowledge with no object of its own; at the end he tries to make it the rule over the rest, and the principle refuses. If each craft does its own work, a knowledge that rules them all has nothing of its own to do.

The answer can be read as the dialogue's judgement on Critias' politics as well as his logic. The picture of 171d–172a was of a household and a city run by temperance, where no one tried to do what he did not know and everything was handed to those who knew it (see διοίκησις; οἰκέω). Socrates' question turns that picture against Critias: a ruler who knows no craft can

only rule the crafts by doing their work for them, and the phrase says he cannot.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the claim it answers and the verdict that follows.

174d–e Critias: temperance, presiding over all knowledge, would rule the knowledge of the good and benefit us.

174e Socrates: would temperance make us healthy, and not medicine, or do each craft's own work?

174e–175a Health belongs to another craft, and so does benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* states the principle in the same words. Socrates' argument against Thrasymachus that each craft has its own power and gives its own benefit, medicine health and piloting safety at sea, is told elsewhere (1.346a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). It ends with the wage: earning wages is a craft of its own, so that medicine makes health and the wage-earning that goes with it the fee, building makes a house and wage-earning the pay, and "each of them works its own work", τὸ αὑτῆς ἑκάστη ἔργον ἐργάζεται, and does good to the thing it has been put in charge of (1.346d). The *Charmides* has the same two examples, medicine and piloting (174c), and draws the same line round each craft's product.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle puts the principle into nature. Nature, he says in the *Politics*, makes nothing as the bronze-smiths make the Delphian knife, stingily, but one thing for one use; for each instrument is best finished when it serves not many works but one.[237] The figure can be read as the *Charmides*' answer in small: a knowledge set to do every work would be a Delphian knife.

Translation in this edition

"Its own work" renders τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον (174e5), with ἑκάστη, "each of those crafts"; both questions rest on corrections, "would it also" on Schanz's κἂν,

[237] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2, 1252b1–5.

where B and T have καί (174e3), and "and not each of those crafts" on Hermann's οὐχ αἱ, where B and T have οὐχί, which Madvig bracketed (174e4; apparatus); "the other things belonging to the crafts" renders τἆλλα τὰ τῶν τεχνῶν (174e4), and "make us healthy" the infinitive ὑγιαίνειν (see ὑγιαίνω). The Glossary lists ἔργον, "work (noun)", at 174d–e and 175a–b among its places (see ἔργον).

See also

ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἀπεργάζομαι; ἄρχω; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; διαμαρτύρομαι; διοίκησις; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἔργον; ἰατρική; οἰκέω; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὑγιαίνω.

τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι · being done well

The difference the knowledge of good and bad makes to every craft: not its product, but its product's being done well and beneficially · Charmides

τὸ εὖ ... τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι, *to eu ... toutōn hekasta gignesthai*, "each of these things being done well"

At a Glance

The phrase. The coming about well of each thing: an articular infinitive, with the adverb εὖ, "well", and γίγνεσθαι, "come to be", "be done".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 174c–d: "But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent."

In this edition. "Being done well".

A place to read. 174b–d.

Meaning

Εὖ is the adverb of good: well, rightly, to good effect. With γίγνεσθαι it names the success of what happens, not the happening itself, and it is the same adverb that the dialogue's question about happiness turns on (see εὖ πράττειν). The articular infinitive makes the success a thing that can be present or absent, as the sentence goes on to say.

Use in the book

The phrase is the result of a subtraction. Socrates asks Critias to take the knowledge of good and bad away from the others, and Critias agrees that medicine, cobbling, weaving, the pilot's art and generalship would do their work "No less" (174c; see ἐξαιρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ὑγιαίνω; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική). Then: "But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent" (174c–d; see ἀπολείπω).

The two answers draw the line on which the rest of the argument depends. Each craft keeps its product without the knowledge of good and bad: the doctor still heals, the pilot still keeps us from dying at sea. What goes is the "well", and the edition's pair "well and beneficially" shows what the word means here: done well is done to our benefit. The doctor of 164b–c does not always know when his treatment benefits: the crafts do not know their own benefit. From the phrase Socrates draws his conclusion: the knowledge whose work is to benefit us is not temperance, but the knowledge of good and bad (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν).

The phrase can be read as answering the question Critias' first definition left open. The doer of good things at 163e did not need to know that they were good; the doctor of 164b–c benefited his patient without knowing it (see τὰ δέοντα). At 174c–d the benefit has a knowledge of its own, separate from every craft and from temperance as Critias defined it. The "well" in "do well", which the dialogue had let slide from acting rightly to faring happily (see εὖ πράττειν), is here given its source.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the subtraction that leads to it.

174c Take away the knowledge of good and bad, and medicine, cobbling, weaving, piloting and generalship still do their work.

174c–d But each of these things being done well and beneficially will be gone.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthydemus* makes the same distinction through use. Its argument that goods must be not only had but used, and used rightly, since wrong use is worse than leaving a thing alone, is told elsewhere (280b–281a; see εὐδαιμονέω), and so is its conclusion, that it is knowledge that leads and sets the action right and gives men not only good fortune but doing well (281a–b; see ἐπιστημόνως). The *Euthydemus*' knowledge of right use can be read as the *Charmides*' knowledge of the "well", and the *Euthydemus* goes on, as the *Charmides* does not, to call it wisdom.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the same fact as the reason why ethics cannot be exact. The fine and the just, he says, admit of much variation and wandering, so that they seem to exist by convention only and not by nature; and good things too have this wandering, because harm comes to many from them: some have perished through wealth, others through courage.[238] What the *Charmides* assigns to a knowledge, Aristotle takes as a limit on what can be known precisely.

Translation in this edition

"Each of these things being done well and beneficially" renders τὸ εὖ γε τούτων ἕκαστα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὠφελίμως (174c9–d1); the English puts the subject first, as the Greek does, and gives the verb, "will be gone from us", a clause of its own after a colon. "Beneficially" keeps the family the Key Words render "benefit" throughout (see ὠφέλιμος). At 174d1 the perfect participle ἀπολελοιπός is B^2's and T's, where B first wrote ἀπολελοιπώς (apparatus).

[238] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.3, 1094b14–19.

See also

ἀπολείπω; ἐξαιρέω; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; εὖ πράττειν; εὐδαιμονέω; τὰ δέοντα; ὑγιαίνω; ὑποδέω; ὑφαντική; ὠφέλιμος.

τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν · acting quietly

The boy's manner of acting turned into a candidate for temperance, and set beside its opposite · Charmides

τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν, *to hēsychēi prattein*, "acting quietly"

At a Glance

The phrase. Acting quietly: the adverb ἡσυχῇ with the articular infinitive of πράττω, "do", "act".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 160c: "even so temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly, whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else".

In this edition. "Acting quietly".

A place to read. 159b–160d.

Meaning

The boy's first answer already had this form: temperance is τὸ κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ, "doing everything in an orderly way and quietly", and he summed it up himself as "a kind of quietness" (159b; see κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ). Socrates' phrase drops "in an orderly way" and "everything" and keeps the one adverb the argument has been testing, so that the manner of acting can be weighed against its opposite. The adverb is the old word for calm and leisure (see ἡσυχῇ); the articular infinitive is the form in which Greek argument turns a way of doing into a candidate for definition.

Use in the book

The phrase closes the refutation of quietness. Socrates has run through the boy's lessons and his body's exercises, and found the quick and sharp finer in

almost all of them (159c–160b; see ὀξύτης; ταχυτής). Then he covers the other flank: "But even supposing, my friend, at the very most, that the quiet actions which turn out finer are no fewer than the vigorous and quick ones, even so temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly, whether in walking or in talking or anywhere else, nor would the quiet life be more temperate than the unquiet one" (160c–d; see βαδισμός; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; λέξις; ὅτι μάλιστα; σφόδρα).

The phrase states the candidate at its barest. "A kind of quietness" has already been refuted on the first flank (160b); without "in an orderly way" and "everything", "acting quietly" can be set beside "acting vigorously and quickly", and since both are found among fine actions, neither can be the fine thing temperance is (160d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). The edition's note at 160d leaves the fairness of this to the reader: "Whether the argument is fair to what Charmides meant is another matter, and the dialogue leaves it to the reader." The phrase can be read as the place where the unfairness lies. The boy had described the way temperance shows; the phrase makes the way into the thing, and then finds that the way is shared.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the boy's answer that it restates.

159b The boy: temperance is doing everything in an orderly way and quietly.

160c–d Even if the quiet actions are as often the finer as the quick, temperance would not be acting quietly any more than acting vigorously and quickly.

Other ancient sources

Thucydides gives the phrase's opposite a famous advocate. Arguing for the expedition to Sicily in 415 BC, Alcibiades tells the Athenians not to let Nicias' talk of keeping out of affairs turn them aside: a city, if it keeps quiet, ἡσυχάζῃ, will wear itself out like anything else, and its skill in everything will grow old, while in struggle it will keep adding to its experience; and in general, he says, a city that is not inactive would be destroyed soonest by a change to inactivity.[239] The *Charmides*' boy offers quiet as the mark of the

[239] Thucydides 6.18.6–7.

temperate man; Alcibiades makes it a danger for a city. Neither speaker is refuted by the other, and Socrates' argument, which finds the fine on both sides, can be read as leaving room for both.

Translation in this edition

"Acting quietly" renders τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν (160c5), and "acting vigorously and quickly" the second articular phrase, τὸ σφόδρα τε καὶ ταχέως, with πράττειν understood; its article, in ἢ τό, is Priscian's reading; B and T have ἢ τοῦ, and Schanz proposed τοῦ alone (apparatus; see λέξις). The Glossary lists "quietness, ἡσυχιότης (hēsychiotēs); quietly, ἡσυχῇ: 159b–160d."

See also

βαδισμός; δυοῖν τὰ ἕτερα; ἡσυχῇ; κοσμίως πάντα πράττειν καὶ ἡσυχῇ; λέξις; ὀξύτης; ὅτι μάλιστα; σφόδρα; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; ταχυτής.

τὸ καλόν · the beautiful

The beautiful as the object of love: the condition that makes a love of nothing beautiful impossible · Charmides

καλοῦ … οὐδενός, *kalou … oudenos*, "of nothing beautiful"

At a Glance

The phrase. The beautiful, as what love is of: the neuter of καλός, here in the genitive after ἔρως, "love".

In the *Charmides*. At 167e: "And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?"

In this edition. "Of nothing beautiful".

A place to read. 167c–168a.

Meaning

Καλός is beautiful to look at and fine to praise (see καλός). With love the first sense governs: the beloved is beautiful, and love is love of beauty. The Glossary lists the word "of persons, of the object of love, and of the charm's

words", and the *Charmides* uses all three. The phrase at 167e takes the second as a rule: whatever love there is must have something beautiful for its object.

Use in the book

The phrase belongs to Socrates' survey of self-related states. He is testing whether a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, with no object of its own, could exist, and he looks for its like among the soul's powers. There is no seeing that sees no colour but only itself and the other sights, no hearing that hears no sound but only itself and the other hearings (167c–d; see ἀκοή; ὄψις). Then the desires: there is no desire for no pleasure, but for itself and the other desires, and no wish for no good, but for itself and the other wishes (167e; see βούλησις; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν). "And would you say there is a love of such a kind that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and of the other loves?" "No ... I wouldn't" (167e; see ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων). Fear and opinion follow (168a; see φόβος).

Each power has its object, and the beautiful is love's, as pleasure is desire's and the good wish's. The edition's note at 167e records the assumption and adds a judgement: "A love of no beautiful thing is a contradiction as well as a joke; after the prologue, perhaps a pointed one." The prologue was a story about the beautiful: Critias' promise that Socrates would soon know "the beautiful ones" (154a), Socrates' confession that "nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη), and the moment when he saw inside the boy's cloak and remembered Cydias' warning, "speaking of a beautiful boy" (155d; see Κυδίας; τὰ ἐρωτικά). The lover who could not look away from the beautiful boy now asks whether a love could look at nothing beautiful, and Critias says it could not.

The joke carries the argument. A love that loved only itself and other loves would be the image of what Critias proposes for knowledge, and no one present can believe in it, least of all after the scene in the wrestling-school. The dialogue can be read as testing the abstract definition against the experience it began with, and finding that the experience does not allow it.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the prologue's beautiful young men that it recalls.

154a Critias: as for the beautiful ones, Socrates will know in a moment.

154b Socrates is a white line on white stone where the beautiful are concerned.

155d Cydias, speaking of a beautiful boy, warned the fawn against the lion.

167e There is no love that is love of nothing beautiful, but of itself and the other loves.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Symposium* starts from the same assumption, as the edition's note at 167e says, and then refines it. Socrates' argument with Agathon, that love is of beauty, that one loves what one lacks, and so that love lacks beauty and, since good things are beautiful, lacks good things too, is told elsewhere (201a–c; see ἔρως); so is Diotima's correction, that love is not of the beautiful but of begetting in the beautiful (206e; see γεννάω). The *Charmides* uses only the first step, love's object, and its question is whether any power could do without one.

Translation in this edition

"Of nothing beautiful" renders καλοῦ μὲν οὐδενός (167e8). The Glossary lists καλός as "beautiful" of persons and of the object of love, "fine" of acts, works and things (see καλός); here the object of love takes "beautiful", as in the prologue. At 167e8 καλοῦ μὲν is the reading of T and W; B runs the letters together as καλοῦμεν, "we call". In the reply that follows, "he said", ἔφη, is the reading of later manuscripts, where B, T and W have ἔφην, "I said", which would give the answer to Socrates (apparatus).

See also

ἀκοή; βούλησις; γεννάω; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; ἔρως; ἔρως αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐρώτων; καλός; Κυδίας; λευκὴ στάθμη; ὄψις; τὰ ἐρωτικά; φόβος.

τὸ λογιστικόν · calculation

The art of calculation as one of the all-knowing man's kinds of knowledge, offered and refused as the one that makes him happy · Charmides

τὸ λογιστικόν, *to logistikon*, "calculation"

At a Glance

The phrase. The calculative, what has to do with reckoning: the neuter adjective of λογίζομαι, "reckon", used with the article for the skill or its object.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 174b: "The one, then, by which he knows calculation?" "Not at all."

In this edition. "Calculation".

A place to read. 173e–174c.

Meaning

Λογίζομαι is to count and reckon, and by extension to reason and calculate consequences; λογιστική is the art of calculation, which the *Charmides* defines by the even and the odd and how they stand in quantity to themselves and to each other (166a; see λογιστική); the later contrast between practical reckoning and the theory of number is not Plato's. The neuter adjective with the article is less definite than the name of the art: what has to do with reckoning, the reckoning part of things. Plato used the same neuter for the reckoning part of the soul.

Use in the book

The phrase is the second step of Socrates' search for the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy. Socrates has supposed a man who knew past, present and future, and asks which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy; after draughts, which Critias waves away (see τὸ πεττευτικόν), comes "The one, then, by which he knows calculation?" "Not at all." "The one by which he knows what is healthy?" "More so" (174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The steps run from a game to a science to the body's good, and

Critias' answers grow warmer, until he names the knowledge of good and bad (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν).

Calculation had been Critias' own example earlier, and he had used it against Socrates. When Socrates asked what work temperance produces, as building produces houses, Critias answered that the art of calculation and geometry have no such work either (165e–166a; see ἀπεργάζομαι; λογιστική). Socrates then granted that calculation has no product, but answered that it has an object, the odd and the even, other than itself. At 174b the same knowledge is weighed by a third measure, happiness, and it fails. The dialogue has now tried calculation three ways, by its product, by its object and as a road to happiness, and only the second holds. Critias' "Not at all" can be read as the verdict of a man who had once used calculation to defend his definition and now sees that it makes no one happy.

Places to read

The phrase's place, in the sequence of kinds of knowledge it belongs to.

174b Draughts, calculation and the healthy are offered in turn as the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy; calculation "Not at all".

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* gives the neuter a larger home. Socrates divides the soul by the conflicts within it: the part with which it reckons is to be called "the calculating part", τὸ λογιστικόν, and the part with which it loves, hungers and thirsts and is stirred by the other desires "the uncalculating and desiring", the companion of certain fillings and pleasures (4.439d). Temperance, a few pages later, is the friendship and concord of the parts, when the ruler and the two ruled agree that the calculating part should rule and do not rebel against it (4.442c–d). The word that names a lesser science in the *Charmides* names the soul's ruler in the *Republic*, and temperance there is the consent given to its rule.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle keeps the *Republic*'s word and narrows it. Dividing the part of the soul that has reason, he calls the part with which we study things that cannot

be otherwise the scientific part, and the part with which we deal with things that can be otherwise the calculative, τὸ λογιστικόν; for deliberating is calculating, and nobody deliberates about what cannot be otherwise.[240] Prudence, the true state joined with reason that acts concerning what is good and bad for a man, is in Aristotle the excellence of this part, which he there calls the opinion-forming part (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The *Charmides*' word for a lesser science can be read as naming, in Aristotle, the part of the soul that holds the knowledge Critias named.

Translation in this edition

"Calculation" renders τὸ λογιστικόν (174b5); At 165e6 Critias' λογιστικὴ τέχνη is "the art of calculation", the one place the Glossary gives τέχνη as "art"; at 166a λογιστική alone is "calculation" (see λογιστική; τέχνη).

See also

ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; λογιστική; τὰ μέλλοντα; τέχνη; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι · not knowing

Socrates' reason for inquiring: because he does not know the answer to what he asks · Charmides

διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι, *dia to mē autos eidenai*, "because I myself do not know"

At a Glance

The phrase. Not knowing: the articular infinitive of οἶδα, "know", negated, here after διά, "because of".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 165b–c: "I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know."

In this edition. "Because I myself do not know".

A place to read. 164d–165c.

[240] Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 6.1, 1139a5–15; 6.5, 1140b4–6 and 25–28.

Meaning

Διὰ τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι gives a reason: because of not knowing. Socrates' ignorance, which in other dialogues is a confession or an irony, is here a cause. He inquires because he does not know, and the inquiry is the consequence of the ignorance, not a display of it.

Use in the book

Critias has read the Delphic inscription as the god's greeting, "Be temperate", and has given up everything he said before; now he offers Socrates an account of temperance as knowing oneself, "if you do not agree" (164d–165b; see ἀφίημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον). Socrates refuses the role the offer gives him: "But Critias ... you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask, and as though I will agree with you if only I want to. That is not how it is. I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not. Just wait until I have" (165b–c; see εἴτε ... εἴτε μή; ζητέω; ὁμολογέω; φάσκω).

Critias has assumed that a questioner knows the answers and is keeping them back, and that his agreement is a favour to grant or withhold. Socrates answers with the order of things: first the inquiry, then the agreement, and the inquiry because of the not knowing. The phrase can be read as the dialogue's turning point in the treatment of knowledge. Critias has just defined temperance as knowing oneself, and will defend it as a knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, which Socrates spells out, with his assent, as knowing what one knows and what one does not (166e–167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν). The man who will be asked to examine that knowledge has just stated, as his reason for asking, that he does not know. Whatever the knowledge of knowledge turns out to be, Socrates has already shown its plainer form: knowing that he does not know, and acting on it by asking.

The reason returns a page later, when Critias accuses him of trying only to refute. Socrates answers that he refutes Critias for the same reason he would scrutinize himself, for fear of thinking, without noticing, that he knows what he does not (166d; see διερευνάω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; φοβέομαι). At 165b–c the

not knowing is the ground of the inquiry; at 166d the danger of not noticing it is the ground of the refutation. Between them they give the method of the whole dialogue, and the definitions Critias goes on to offer are tested by a man who has said, twice, why he cannot simply accept them.

Places to read

The phrase's place.

165b–c Socrates inquires with Critias into whatever is proposed, because he himself does not know.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* gives the same reason in the figure of the midwife. Socrates says that he has what midwives have: he is barren of wisdom, and the reproach many have made against him, that he questions others but declares nothing about anything himself because he has nothing wise in him, is true; the god compels him to deliver others and has prevented him from giving birth (150c–d). The *Theaetetus*' "because he has nothing wise", διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἔχειν σοφόν, is built like the *Charmides*' phrase, and turns the same ignorance into the same method. Aristotle's account of why Socrates asked questions and did not answer them, because he confessed that he did not know, is told elsewhere (*Sophistical Refutations* 34, 183b7–8; see ἐλέγχω).

Translation in this edition

"Because I myself do not know" renders διὰ τὸ μὴ αὐτὸς εἰδέναι (165b8–c1); "whatever is proposed" renders τὸ προτιθέμενον, from προτίθημι, "set before" (see προτίθημι). At 165b7 "as though I will agree with you" renders Heusde's conjecture, told elsewhere (see ὁμολογέω).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀφίημι; Γνῶθι σαυτόν; διδόναι λόγον; διερευνάω; εἴτε ... εἴτε μή; ἐλέγχω; ζητέω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; ὁμολογέω; προτίθημι; φάσκω; φοβέομαι.

τὸ νοσῶδες · the diseased

What is diseased, the second half of medicine's object, beside the healthy · Charmides

τὸ νοσῶδες, *to nosōdes*, "the diseased"; νοσώδους, *nosōdous*, "(of) the diseased"; νοσώδεσιν, *nosōdesin*, "(in what is) diseased"

At a Glance

The word. Diseased, unhealthy, what causes or belongs to disease: an adjective from νόσος, "disease", with the suffix of likeness and fullness.

In the *Charmides*. Three times, always beside the healthy: "the doctor ... understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e), medicine "defined ... by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" (171a), and the doctor examined "in what is healthy and diseased" (171b).

In this edition. "The diseased"; "diseased".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Νοσώδης is what has the character of disease: a sickly body, an unwholesome place or food, whatever brings illness or belongs to it. Greek used it as the plain opposite of ὑγιεινός, "healthy", and the pair named the whole field of a doctor's judgement (see τὸ ὑγιεινόν). A knowledge of one is a knowledge of the other, since telling what makes a man sick is part of telling what makes him well.

Use in the book

The word enters when medicine's object is completed. Medicine had been "knowledge of the healthy" (165c, 170a); in the test of the doctor it becomes knowledge of the healthy and the diseased. The temperate man, if he is to tell the true doctor from the false, "will surely not discuss medicine with him—for the doctor, as we said, understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased" (170e; see ἐπαΐω; ἰατρός). Each knowledge is defined by its objects, and medicine "was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased" (171a; see τῷ τινῶν εἶναι).

So the man who would examine a doctor must examine him "in what is healthy and diseased" (171b; see ἐπισκοπέω), and only a doctor can do that (171c; see ὁμότεχνος). The passage as a whole is told under ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους.

The second word changes nothing in the argument and much in the picture. A knowledge of the healthy alone looks like a knowledge of a good; a knowledge of the healthy and the diseased is a knowledge of a pair of opposites, as calculation was of the odd and the even and weighing of the heavier and the lighter (166a–b). The completed pair can be read as preparing the last step, where a knowledge of another pair, good and bad, proves to be the one that makes us happy (174b; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). The doctor knows the diseased; he does not always know, as 164b–c showed, when his treatment benefits.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

170e The doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.

171a Medicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.

171b The examiner will examine the doctor in what is healthy and diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* draws the limit of the doctor's knowledge with the same pair. Nicias' answer to Laches, that doctors can say no more about the sick than what is healthy and what is diseased, and cannot tell whether health or sickness is the more to be feared for a given man, is told elsewhere (195b–d; see ἰατρός). The doctor's knowledge of the diseased stops short of knowing whether the disease is, for this man, a harm; Nicias gives that knowledge to the brave man, the *Charmides* to the knowledge of good and bad (174c–d; see τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι).

Translation in this edition

"The diseased" renders τὸ νοσῶδες (170e7) and νοσώδους (171a9), and "diseased" νοσώδεσιν (171b4), each time beside "healthy". The noun νόσημα, "disease", comes once, in the Thracian's report (156e; see νόσημα).

See also

ἐπαΐω; ἐπισκοπέω; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ἰατρός; νόσημα; ὁμότεχνος; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ ὑγιεινόν; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος · the whole and the part

The pair in which Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, turns the Greek doctors' principle against them: when the whole is not well, the part cannot be · Charmides

τοῦ ὅλου, *tou holou*, "the whole"; τὸ μέρος, *to meros*, "the part"

At a Glance

The phrase. The whole and the part: the neuter adjective ὅλος, "whole", and the noun μέρος, "part", each with the article.

In the *Charmides*. At 156e, in the Thracian's report: the Greek doctors "neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well."

In this edition. "The whole"; "the part".

A place to read. 156b–157a.

Meaning

The pair names a relation of dependence, not two things side by side. A part is a part of something, and in medicine the part's being well was taken to depend on the whole's (see μέρος; ὅλος). The Greek doctors whom Socrates cites first had already turned this into a rule of treatment; the Thracian's sentence states it as a condition, and in the negative: if the whole is not well, the part cannot be.

Use in the book

Socrates has given the boy the doctors' rule, that one cannot cure the eyes without the head nor the head without the whole body, so that they treat the part along with the whole (156c; see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος). The boy accepts it. Then Socrates tells what the Thracian added. The Greek doctors, he said, were right so far; but Zalmoxis, the Thracians' king and a god, says that the

body must not be cured without the soul (156d–e; see Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς), "and that this is the very reason why most diseases elude the Greek doctors: they neglect the whole, which is what they ought to be caring for, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well" (156e; see ἀμελέω).

The pair does not change; what it is applied to does. In the Greek doctors' mouths the whole is the body and the part its organs. In Zalmoxis' teaching, as the Thracian reports it, the body itself has become a part, and the whole is the human being, whose good and bad start from the soul (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν). The Greek doctors are refuted by their own principle: they treat the part with the whole, and they have mistaken what the whole is.

The sentence is the bridge by which Socrates passes from a headache to the examination of the boy's soul, and the boy, who has accepted the doctors' rule, cannot refuse its extension. The dialogue can be read as keeping the pair's logic to the end. Critias' temperance, set over all the kinds of knowledge, was to be a whole of which the crafts are parts, and it turned out to make no part go well (174b–175a; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). The knowledge whose presence makes the parts go well is the knowledge of good and bad, as the soul is the whole on which the body's good depends.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the doctors' principle it extends.

156c The doctors treat and heal the part along with the whole.

156e The Greek doctors neglect the whole, and when the whole is not in good condition the part cannot possibly be well.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle makes the same relation an argument for the city. The city, he says, is prior by nature to the household and to each of us, since the whole is necessarily prior to the part: if the whole is destroyed there will be no foot or hand except in name, as when someone speaks of a hand of stone, for

everything is marked out by what it does and what it can do.[241] His whole is prior because the part takes its being from it; the Thracian's whole is prior because the part takes its health from it.

Translation in this edition

"The whole" at 156e4 renders τοῦ ὅλου, Burnet's own emendation; Stobaeus has τοῦ ἄλλου, "the rest", and B and T τὸ ὅλον. "Neglect", ἀμελοῖεν, is itself a variant, where B and T have "they do not know the whole" (see ἀμελέω). At 157a2 "the rest of the body" renders ἄλλου, the reading of B, W and Stobaeus, where T has ὅλου, "the whole" (apparatus).

See also

ἀμελέω; ἐπιρρέω; Ζάλμοξις; Θρᾷξ; μέρος; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; ὅλος; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον.

τὸ πεττευτικόν · draughts

Skill at the board game, the first knowledge Socrates offers as the one that makes a man happy, and the one Critias bristles at · Charmides

τὸ πεττευτικόν, *to petteutikon*, "draughts"

At a Glance

The phrase. Skill at draughts: the neuter of the adjective from πεττεύω, "play draughts", from πεσσός, the pebble moved on the board.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 174b: "Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?" "Draughts? ... What draughts?"

In this edition. "Draughts".

A place to read. 173e–174c.

Meaning

Πεττεία was a board game played with pebbles, πεσσοί, in which one player tried to hem in the other's pieces. The edition's note at 174b describes it:

[241] Aristotle, *Politics* 1.2, 1253a18–25.

"Petteia, draughts, was a board game played with pebbles. Plato treats it as a real skill that needs long practice (Republic 374c; Statesman 292e), and in the Republic Adeimantus likens Socrates' own questioning to it". The adjective with the article names the skill: what has to do with draughts, the player's knowledge.

Use in the book

Socrates has supposed a man who knew past, present and future, and asks which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy. He begins at the bottom: "Is it perhaps the one by which he knows draughts?" Critias is indignant: "Draughts? ... What draughts?" (174b; see τὰ μέλλοντα). Then come calculation, health and, from Critias himself, good and bad (174b; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The note ends: "Critias bristles at being offered a game."

The offer is a joke with a purpose. Critias has already refused happiness to the leather-cutter and the bronze-worker and narrowed it to a man who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173d–e; see ἀφορίζω); Socrates now asks which of the all-knowing man's kinds of knowledge it is, and starts with a game. Critias' indignation repeats what he has conceded: not every knowledge makes happy, and he must say which one does. The game can also be read as a figure for the conversation. Critias, who took back a move earlier (164d; see ἀνατίθημι), is being hemmed in square by square, and the knowledge Socrates offers him first is the one by which such games are won.

Places to read

The phrase's place, in the sequence of kinds of knowledge it opens.

174b Draughts is offered first as the knowledge that makes the all-knowing man happy, and Critias bristles.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* uses the game twice, once to praise a skill and once to describe Socrates. In founding the city, Socrates argues that no one could become a capable player of draughts or dice who did not practise from childhood, but only took it up on the side (2.374c), and so much the less a soldier. Later,

Adeimantus tells him what his hearers feel: led a little astray at each question by the argument, through inexperience in asking and answering, they find at the end a great error, the opposite of what they first thought; and as poor players at draughts are in the end hemmed in by good ones and left without a move, so in the end they find themselves hemmed in and left without a word by this other draughts, whose pieces are words and not pebbles, though the truth is no more on Socrates' side for that (6.487b–c). The *Gorgias* puts draughts beside arithmetic, calculation and geometry among the arts that achieve everything through speech and need little or no work of the hands (450d; see γεωμετρική), the class to which Critias assigned calculation when he denied it a product (165e–166a). The *Statesman* measures the rarity of kingly knowledge by the game: young Socrates objects that among a thousand men there would never be so many first-rate draughts-players, let alone kings (292e). Adeimantus' complaint can be read as a description of Critias at 169c, caught in Socrates' perplexity, with nothing to say and ashamed to admit it (see ἀπορία; συμπάσχω).

Other ancient sources

The game is as old as Greek poetry. When Athena comes to Ithaca she finds the suitors before Odysseus' doors, amusing themselves at draughts, sitting on the hides of oxen they had killed themselves.[242] Herodotus reports that the Lydians claimed to have invented dice, knucklebones, ball and every other game, except draughts, which they did not claim; they devised them, they said, in a famine, playing one whole day so as not to think of food and eating the next.[243]

Translation in this edition

"Draughts" renders τὸ πεττευτικόν (174b2–3) and Critias' repetition of it, πεττευτικόν (174b4).

[242] Homer, *Odyssey* 1.106–108.
[243] Herodotus 1.94.2–3.

See also

ἀνατίθημι; ἀπορία; ἀφορίζω; γεωμετρική; συμπάσχω; τὰ μέλλοντα; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ ὑγιεινόν.

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι · the third time, for the Savior

The proverb of the third libation, with which Socrates opens the examination of Critias' final definition · Charmides

τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι, *to triton tōi sōtēri*, "the third time, for the Savior"

At a Glance

The phrase. The third for the Saviour: a proverb from the drinking-party, where the third cup was poured to Zeus the Saviour.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 167a–b: "Then once more ... the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning".

In this edition. "The third time, for the Savior".

A place to read. 167a–c.

Meaning

The edition's note at 167b gives the custom and its proverb: "At a drinking-party the third cup was poured to Zeus the Savior, and 'the third, for the Savior' became a proverb for a third and, one hopes, successful attempt." The Saviour is Zeus as preserver, the god prayed to for safety (see σῴζω; σωτήρ). The proverb carries the hope of the third cup into any third try.

Use in the book

Critias has given his last definition: temperance is knowing what one knows and what one does not, and only the temperate man can examine himself and others (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξετάζω). Socrates begins again: "Then once more ... the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning, first whether it is possible or not for this to be ... and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it"

(167a–b; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐπισκέπτομαι). Then he confesses that he can find no way through (167b; see ἀπορία).

The proverb needs no count, but the dialogue invites one. The third time can be read as the third start on Critias' self-knowledge: first Socrates asked what work it produces (165c–e), then what it is knowledge of (166a–c), and now whether it can exist at all and whether it would benefit. The third cup is the one that brings safety, and Socrates pours it with a prayer for success. The prayer is not answered. The inquiry that follows grants the knowledge's possibility only for the argument's sake (169d; see συγχωρέω), finds that it could not tell a doctor from a pretender (170e–171c), and ends with temperance the craftsman of no benefit (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The Saviour saves nothing, and the irony can be read as Plato's: the third try fails as the first two did.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the two questions it introduces.

167a–b Socrates begins again, the third time, for the Saviour: whether the knowledge is possible, and what benefit it would bring.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato uses the proverb at the point of decision. In the *Philebus*, as the argument closes, Socrates says, "Come then, the third time, for the Saviour, let us go through the same account, calling it to witness", and restates Philebus' thesis that pleasure is the good, so as to refute it once more (66d). In the *Republic* the just man has beaten the unjust twice, and Socrates announces the third bout "Olympic fashion, to the Saviour and to Olympian Zeus": that no pleasure but the wise man's is wholly true and pure (9.583b). In the seventh of the letters under Plato's name the writer tells of his third voyage to Sicily to Dionysius: he went, he says, the third time, for the Saviour, and that at least was truly done, for he came back safe (340a). In all three the third time succeeds; in the *Charmides* it does not.

Other ancient sources

Pindar, in an ode for a young victor at the Isthmian games from Aegina, whose family had already won at Nemea, prays that they may yet mix a third bowl for the Olympian Saviour and pour it over Aegina in honey-voiced songs, a prayer that can be read as a hope for a third victory, at Olympia.[244] The third libation is a hope for the crowning success, as it is in Socrates' mouth.

Translation in this edition

"The third time, for the Savior" renders τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι (167a9), with "Savior" capitalized as a title of Zeus. At 167b2 the words "that one knows it and" are supplied from later manuscripts and printed by Burnet in angle brackets, as the note at 167b records.

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἀπορία; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ἐξετάζω; ἐπισκέπτομαι; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; συγχωρέω; σῴζω; σωτήρ.

τὸ ὑγιεινόν · the healthy

What is healthy, the object of medicine, kept apart from health, its product · Charmides

τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, *tou hygieinou*, "(of) the healthy"; ὑγιεινοῦ, *hygieinou*, "(of) the healthy"; τὸ ὑγιεινόν, *to hygieinon*, "the healthy", "what is healthy"; ὑγιεινοῖς, *hygieinois*, "(in what is) healthy"

At a Glance

The word. Healthy, what makes or belongs to health: the adjective of ὑγίεια, "health", used with the article for the object of medicine.

In the *Charmides*. Ten times, from 165c to 174b: medicine is "knowledge of the healthy" (165c), it knows "the healthy and the diseased"

[244] Pindar, *Isthmian* 6.7–9.

(170e), and at the end Socrates asks whether the knowledge that makes a man happy is "the one by which he knows what is healthy" (174b).

In this edition. "The healthy"; "what is healthy".

A place to read. 170a–171b.

Meaning

Ὑγιεινός is healthy in the sense of what makes for health: a healthy food, a healthy place, a healthy regimen. With the article it names a field of knowledge, everything that bears on health. The Glossary keeps it apart from health itself: "The healthy, what is healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν (to hygieinon), the object of medicine: 165c, 170a–171b, 174b. The two are kept apart: medicine is knowledge of the healthy and produces health." The distinction is the argument's: a knowledge has an object it is of and a work it produces, and in medicine they differ (see ὑγίεια).

Use in the book

The word enters as the first example of a knowledge with an object. When Critias defines temperance as knowledge of oneself, Socrates asks: "And medicine ... is knowledge of the healthy?" "Certainly." If Critias asked what medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, is useful for and produces, Socrates would answer health (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός). The word marks what medicine is about; health marks what it makes.

In the second half of the argument the word becomes the test of the knowledge of knowledge. Is knowledge of knowledge the same as knowledge and lack of knowledge "of the healthy"? No: that is medicine (170a–b). So a man who "does not also know what is healthy and what is just, but knows only knowledge", will know that he knows something, but not what: "For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance" (170b–c; see προσεπίσταμαι). The doctor understands "nothing but the healthy and the diseased", and the examiner must test him "in what is healthy and diseased", which he cannot do without medicine (170e–171b; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; τὸ νοσῶδες). The healthy is now the clearest case of what

temperance, as Critias defines it, cannot reach: a field with its own knowledge, closed to a knowledge of knowledge.

At 174b the word returns in the sequence of the all-knowing man's kinds of knowledge. "The one by which he knows what is healthy?" "More so" (174b; see τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν). Critias ranks the knowledge of the healthy above draughts and calculation, and the reason can be read as that health is a good; but it is not that knowledge, since without the knowledge of good and bad medicine still heals and nothing is done well (174c–d; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The dialogue can be read as using the healthy as its standard example of a knowledge of a good thing that is not knowledge of the good.

Places to read

Every passage in which the word occurs.

165c–d Medicine is knowledge of the healthy, and produces health.

170a–b Knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy is medicine, not the knowledge of knowledge.

170b–c He who knows only knowledge does not know what is healthy; he knows the healthy by medicine, not by temperance.

170e The doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.

171a–b Medicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased, and the doctor must be examined in what is healthy and diseased.

174b The knowledge by which the all-knowing man knows what is healthy makes him happy "more so" than draughts or calculation.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Crito* uses the pair to set the expert against the many. Socrates asks whether, if we ruin what is made better by the healthy and destroyed by the diseased, by obeying an opinion that is not that of those who understand, life is worth living with it ruined; that thing, Crito agrees, is the body, and life is not worth living with a body ruined and wretched. Then is it worth living with that ruined which the unjust maims and the just benefits (47d–e)? The *Crito*'s healthy is known by the one expert, as the *Charmides*' is known by

medicine alone; and the *Crito* goes on to the soul, as the *Charmides* goes on to good and bad.

Translation in this edition

"The healthy" renders τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ (165c8, 171a9), ὑγιεινοῦ (165c10, 170a10) and τὸ ὑγιεινόν (170c1, 170c7, 170e7); "what is healthy" renders τὸ ὑγιεινόν (170b6, 174b7) and ὑγιεινοῖς (171b4). "The healthy" is kept from 165c on, so that 171a's reference back to the definition at 165c finds its words (see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους). At 170a10 Burnet prints Bonitz's datives, ἐπιστήμῃ … ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, which make knowledge of knowledge the subject of the question; the manuscripts have nominatives (apparatus).

See also

ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; προσεπίσταμαι; τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ νοσῶδες; τὸ πεττευτικόν; ὑγίεια.

τοπάζω · make a guess

τοπάσωμεν, *topasōmen*, "we can make a guess"

Attested: τοπάσωμεν (*topasōmen*; 159a). To guess, to conjecture. It comes once, at the start of the boy's first definition. Socrates has said that if temperance is present in the boy it must give rise to some sense, from which he would have an opinion of it, and asks for that opinion: "Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me … what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a; see αἴσθησις; δοξάζω). The verb is modest about the method. From what the boy says Socrates will only guess whether he has the virtue; and the dialogue ends with the guess unmade, the boy declaring that he does not know whether he has it or not (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω).

See also αἴσθησις; δοξάζω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω.

τυγχάνω · turn out, be in fact

τυγχάνουσιν, *tynchanousin*, "turn out"; τυγχάνει, *tynchanei*, "is in fact", "turns out"; ἐτύγχανε, *etynchane*, "were"; τυχοῦσα, *tychousa*, "found"

Attested: τυγχάνουσιν (*tynchanousin*; 154a, 160c), τυγχάνει (*tynchanei*; 154d, 154e, 156b, 161b, 166a, 166b, 167a, 167e, 171a), ἐτύγχανε (*etynchane*; 155a), τυχοῦσα (*tychousa*; 175d). To hit, chance upon; with a participle, to happen to be, to be in fact. The idiom carries little weight in most of its places, and the English renders it "in fact" (154e, 161b, 167a, 171a) or leaves it to the verb (154a, 154d, 155a, 156b, 166a, 166b). Twice it is "turn out", and both times it carries the argument: the quiet actions "which turn out finer" (160c; see τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν), and the love "that it turns out to be love of nothing beautiful" (167e; see τὸ καλόν). In both the verb marks what a thing proves to be when it is looked at, as against what it was taken for. At 175d the aorist participle with a genitive means "meet with", "find": the inquiry, "though it found us so simple-minded", could not find the truth (see εὐήθης; ὑβριστικῶς).

See also εὐήθης; τὸ ἡσυχῇ πράττειν; τὸ καλόν; ὑβριστικῶς.

τῷ τινῶν εἶναι · by its being of particular things

The principle that each knowledge is defined by its objects, by which medicine is told from the other kinds of knowledge · Charmides

τῷ τινῶν εἶναι, *tōi tinōn einai*, "by its being of particular things"

At a Glance

The phrase. By its being of certain things: the dative of the articular infinitive, "by being", with the genitive plural of the indefinite τις, "some", "certain".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 171a: "Or isn't each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?" "By that, yes."

In this edition. "By its being of particular things".

A place to read. 170e–171c.

Meaning

Τινός, "of something", is the genitive of relation that every knowledge takes: knowledge is knowledge of something (see ἐπιστήμη τινός). The plural τινῶν, "of certain things", and the dative of means, τῷ ... εἶναι, "by its being", turn that grammar into a criterion of definition. A knowledge is told from other knowledges not by being knowledge, which all of them are, but by what it is knowledge of.

Use in the book

The phrase comes in the test of the doctor. Socrates has shown that the temperate man, knowing only knowledge, can know that a doctor has some knowledge but not which. "That the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know; but when he has to test what knowledge it is, won't he look into what it is of? Or isn't each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?" "By that, yes." "And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased." "Yes" (171a; see ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; ὁρίζω). So the examiner must look in the field where medicine is found, and only medicine can look there (171b–c; see ὁμότεχνος; τὰ ἔξω).

The principle has been at work since 165c, where Socrates first asked what temperance was knowledge of (see ἐπιστήμη τινός), and at 166a, where calculation's object, the odd and the even, was "something distinct from the knowledge itself" (see λογιστική). At 171a it is stated as a rule of definition, and it settles the question. Temperance, as Critias defines it, is a knowledge of knowledge "and of nothing else"; it has no particular things to be of, and so, by the principle, it cannot tell what any other knowledge is of, nor a knower from a pretender (171c). The phrase can be read as the dialogue's sharpest statement of why the knowledge of knowledge fails: what makes a knowledge this knowledge is exactly what Critias' temperance lacks.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the definition of medicine that applies it.

171a Each kind of knowledge is defined, as a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things.

171a Medicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* gives the principle its fullest statement, in the division of the soul. Its rule that knowledge itself is of learning itself and a particular knowledge of a particular object is told elsewhere (4.438b–d; see ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον). When there came to be a knowledge of making houses, it differed from the others and was called house-building, because it was of a particular kind. This does not mean that a knowledge is like its object, that the knowledge of the healthy and the diseased is healthy and diseased, or the knowledge of good and bad things good and bad; but because it came to be of a particular object, the healthy and the diseased, it became a particular knowledge and was called no longer simply knowledge but medicine (4.438d–e). The *Republic*'s example is the *Charmides*'. Its knowledge itself, of learning itself, has a general object; Critias' knowledge of knowledge was to have none.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle places the principle among relatives. Some things are called relative because something else is related to them, as the measurable, the knowable and the thinkable are; and some things are relative because their genus is, "as medicine is among relatives because its genus, knowledge, is thought to be relative".[245] On his account medicine is relative to its object only by belonging to knowledge, which is relative to the knowable; the *Charmides* and the *Republic* say that it is medicine, not knowledge, by being of its particular object.

[245] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.15, 1021a29–b6.

Translation in this edition

"By its being of particular things" renders τῷ τινῶν εἶναι (171a6); "not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge" renders μὴ μόνον ἐπιστήμη εἶναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τίς (171a5–6), the English rendering the interrogative τίς, "which", as "a particular knowledge".

See also

ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους; λογιστική; ὁμότεχνος; ὁρίζω; τὰ ἔξω.

Υ Upsilon

ὑβριστικῶς · with insolence

ὑβριστικῶς, *hybristikōs*, "with ... insolence"

Attested: ὑβριστικῶς (*hybristikōs*; 175d). Insolently, outrageously, from ὕβρις, the violence and contempt of one who treats another as beneath him. It comes once, in Socrates' personification of the inquiry. Though it found them "so simple-minded and so easy to deal with", the inquiry could not find the truth; it has made such a mockery of the truth "that what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance, it has shown, with the utmost insolence, to be of no benefit" (175c–d; see ἀνωφελής; εὐήθης; καταγελάω; συμπλάττω). The edition's note at 175d calls the inquiry "an insolent mocker". The insolence is the inquiry's, but the word was often turned on Socrates himself. In the *Symposium* Agathon calls him insolent for his mock modesty (175e), and Alcibiades, having likened him to the satyr Marsyas, goes on, "You are insolent, aren't you?" (215b); his talk, Alcibiades says at the end, is wrapped in the hide of an insolent satyr (221e; see σκυτῶν τομή). At the close of the *Charmides* the role is handed to the argument, and Socrates, for once, is its victim.

See also ἀνωφελής; εὐήθης; καταγελάω; σκυτῶν τομή; συμπλάττω.

ὑγιαίνω · be healthy

ὑγιαίνειν, *hygiainein*, "healthy"

Attested: ὑγιαίνειν (*hygiainein*; 174c, 174e). To be healthy, be sound, the verb of ὑγίεια, "health"; ὑγιαίνειν ποιεῖν, "to make someone healthy", is the doctor's work. It comes twice, each time with ποιεῖν: at 174c medicine makes us healthy, and at 174e temperance is put in medicine's place. At 174c it is the first item in the test by subtraction: take away the knowledge of good and

bad, and "will medicine make us any less healthy"? No less (see τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). At 174e Socrates turns the same words against Critias' claim that temperance, ruling all knowledge, would benefit us: "Would it also make us healthy ... and not medicine?" (see τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον). In the last pages being healthy is the one result no one doubts medicine can produce, and both times it serves to show what else a life needs. Nicias' question in the *Laches*, whether being healthy is more to be feared than being ill, is told elsewhere (195b–d; see ἰατρός).

See also ἰατρός; τὸ αὐτῆς ἔργον; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; τὸ νοσῶδες; ὑγίεια.

ὑγίεια · health

Health, the product of medicine: promised with temperance by the Thracian, cited as medicine's fine work, and at the end refused to temperance · Charmides

τὴν ὑγίειαν, *tēn hygieian*, "health"; ὑγιείας, *hygieias*, "(of) health"; ὑγίεια, *hygieia*, "health"

At a Glance

The word. Health, soundness of body: the noun from the root of ὑγιής, "sound", "healthy".

In the *Charmides*. Five times: in the Thracian's doctrine (157a, 157b), as medicine's work (165d), and in the verdict that temperance is not its craftsman (174e, 175a).

In this edition. "Health".

A place to read. 156e–157b, then 174e–175a.

Meaning

Health was the first of the goods in Greek reckoning, and the doctor's whole art aimed at it. The Glossary gives it its place in the argument: "health, ὑγίεια (hygieia), the product of medicine: 157a–b, 165d, 174e–175a", kept apart from "the healthy", medicine's object (see τὸ ὑγιεινόν). Health is what medicine makes, as the house is what building makes.

Use in the book

In the prologue health is the promise. Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, teaches that the soul must be treated first, with charms that are beautiful words; temperance comes to be in souls from them, "and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too" (157a–b; see ἐπῳδή; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). The mistake of the doctors is to try "to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b; see χωρὶς ἑκατέρου). Health follows temperance as the part's well-being follows the whole's (see τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος).

In the argument health is the example of a work. Asked, as he imagines it, what medicine, being knowledge of the healthy, produces, Socrates would answer, "'No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us'" (165d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον), and asks Critias for temperance's work in return. Critias denies that it need have one, any more than calculation. At the end health is taken from temperance altogether. Would temperance, ruling all knowledge, also make us healthy, and not medicine? "Then it will not be the craftsman of health?" "Certainly not." "For health belonged to another craft, didn't it?" "To another" (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον).

The word thus marks the dialogue's reversal. The Thracian joined temperance and health, and made health easy once temperance was present. The argument ends by separating them, with health belonging to medicine and temperance the craftsman of no benefit (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The argument ends where the Thracian said the doctors of his day went wrong, with temperance and health treated separately. The dialogue can be read as letting the reader ask which of the two is wrong: the charm's promise, or Critias' definition of the temperance it was to bring.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

157a Once temperance is present in the soul, it is easy to provide health for the head and the body.

157b The mistake is to try to be doctors of temperance and of health separately.

165d Medicine produces health, a fine work.

174e Temperance will not be the craftsman of health.
175a Health belonged to another craft.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias*' drinking-song, which counts health the best of things, and the doctor who claims for its product the greatest good for men, are told elsewhere (451e–452b; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας). The *Charmides* agrees that health is medicine's work and denies that the knowledge which produces it is the one that makes us happy (174c).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines health by its use. The excellence of the body is health, he says in the *Rhetoric*, and health such that people are free from disease while using their bodies; for many have their health in the way Herodicus is said to have had his, and nobody would call such people fortunate in it, since they keep away from all, or nearly all, that human beings do.[246] Health that cannot be used is not counted a good, and read beside 174c–d, where the crafts go on working when nothing is done well and beneficially, Aristotle's point can be read as a step the *Charmides* leaves untaken.

Translation in this edition

"Health" at each place: τὴν ὑγίειαν (157a7, 165d1), ὑγιείας (157b6, 174e9) and ὑγίεια (175a1). At 157b6 one manuscript omits the words "of temperance and of health", as is told elsewhere (see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). The adjective ὑγιής, "healthy", and the verb ὑγιαίνω, "be healthy", have their own entries.

See also

ἀπεργάζομαι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; ἐπῳδή; καλὸν ἔργον; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος; τὸ ὑγιεινόν; ὑγιαίνω; ὑγιής; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου.

[246] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1.5, 1361b3–7.

ὑγιής · healthy

Healthy, sound: what the charm promises to make the boy, what the doctor makes his patient, and what the dream of temperance would make us all · Charmides

ὑγιᾶ, *hygiā*, "healthy"; ὑγιέσιν, *hygiesin*, "healthier"

At a Glance

The word. Healthy, sound, whole: the adjective of ὑγίεια, "health", used of bodies, and in Greek also of arguments and plans.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: the remedy makes one "perfectly healthy" (155e), the charm cannot make "the head alone healthy" (156b), the doctor makes someone healthy (164a), and the dream would make us "healthier in body than we are now" (173b).

In this edition. "Healthy"; "healthier".

A place to read. 155e–156c.

Meaning

Ὑγιής is sound in the old sense: whole, uninjured, in working order. It is said of a body that is well, of a ship that comes through undamaged, and of an argument or a mind that is not corrupt; οὐδὲν ὑγιές, "nothing sound", is common Greek for a thing or a speech that cannot be trusted. Ὑγιᾶ ποιεῖν, "make healthy", is the doctor's phrase, and three of the four places use it.

Use in the book

The word first belongs to Socrates' improvised remedy. Asked whether he knows the cure for the headache, he says that it is a leaf with a charm to go with it, and that with the charm "the remedy made one perfectly healthy" (155e; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον; φύλλον). Then he enlarges the claim: "It is the kind of charm, Charmides, that cannot make the head alone healthy" (156b; see κεφαλή), and he goes on to the good doctors' principle and Zalmoxis' teaching (see μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος). In the prologue health is a whole condition, and the head cannot have it alone.

In the argument the word moves to the doctor. Socrates asks Critias whether a doctor, "in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial

both for himself and for the patient he is treating" (164a–b; see ὀνίνημι; τὰ δέοντα). Making healthy is now an act whose benefit the doctor may not know, and it brings down Critias' definition. In the dream of temperance the word measures the dream's gains: if everyone did only what he knew, we would be "healthier in body than we are now", safe at sea and in war, with our equipment, clothing and footwear well made (173b–c; see ὄναρ; ὑπόδεσις). Socrates grants it all, and then doubts that it would make us happy (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

The four places can be read as a descent. The charm promised to make the boy healthy whole, body and soul together; the doctor makes a body healthy without knowing whether he has benefited it; the dream makes all bodies healthier and leaves the question of happiness open. The word that began as the soul's gift to the body ends as one craft's product among others.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs.

155e With the charm, the remedy makes one perfectly healthy; without it, the leaf is no use.

156b The charm cannot make the head alone healthy.

164a–b A doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial for himself and his patient.

173b Under temperance's rule we would be healthier in body than we are now.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* carries the word from the body to the soul. Those who run from punishment, Socrates tells Polus, see its pain and are blind to its benefit, not knowing how much more wretched it is to live with a soul that is not sound, but rotten and unjust, than with a body that is not sound (479b–c). The *Phaedo* turns the word on arguments. Those who spend their time on arguments for both sides, Socrates says, end by thinking themselves the wisest of men, having grasped that there is nothing sound or stable in things or in arguments (90c); but we should not let it into our souls that there is nothing sound in arguments, but rather that we ourselves are not yet sound, and must take heart and be eager to be so (90e). The *Charmides* uses the

word of bodies; the dialogue's failing arguments are left to be read in the light of the *Phaedo*'s.

Translation in this edition

"Healthy" renders ὑγιᾶ (155e7, 156b4, 164a9), the accusative after "make"; "healthier" renders ὑγιέσιν ... μᾶλλον (173b5). The noun and the verb have their own entries (see ὑγιαίνω; ὑγίεια), as does the healthy, medicine's object (see τὸ ὑγιεινόν).

See also

ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐπῳδή; κεφαλή; μετὰ τοῦ ὅλου τὸ μέρος; ὄναρ; ὀνίνημι; τὰ δέοντα; τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος; τὸ ὑγιεινόν; ὑγιαίνω; ὑγίεια; ὑπόδεσις; φάρμακον; φύλλον.

ὑπάρχω · belong, be true of

ὑπάρχει, *hyparchei*, "has been"; ὑπάρχοι, *hyparchoi*, "would ... be true of"

Attested: ὑπάρχει (*hyparchei*; 155a), ὑπάρχοι (*hyparchoi*; 168c). To begin, to be there from the start; and so to belong to, to be available to, to hold true of. Its two places show both senses. In the prologue it is inheritance: Critias has said the boy is a poet, and Socrates answers, "That fine gift, my dear Critias ... has been in your family a long way back, from your kinship with Solon" (155a; see Σόλων; συγγένεια). In the argument it is logic. If something were greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than none of the things the others are greater than, "then surely this would certainly be true of it: if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself" (168b–c; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μείζων). The same verb that gives the boy his family's gift tests whether self-relation can belong to anything at all; the first is granted at once, the second leads to absurdity.

See also δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μείζων; Σόλων; συγγένεια.

Ὑπερβόρεος · Hyperborean

Ὑπερβορέου, *Hyperboreou*, "the Hyperborean"

Attested: Ὑπερβορέου (*Hyperboreou*; 158b). Of the Hyperboreans, the people "beyond the north wind", Boreas, whom Greek legend placed at the edge of the world, beloved of Apollo. The word comes once, as Abaris' epithet. If temperance is already present in the boy, Socrates tells him, "then you would have no further need of charms, whether of Zalmoxis or of Abaris the Hyperborean" (158b; see Ἀβάρις; Ζάλμοξις). The two names set the charm's authorities on the northern edge of the Greek map, a Thracian god and a man from beyond the north wind. Pindar gives the Hyperboreans the life such charms promise: no one, by ship or on foot, can find the road to their gathering, where Apollo delights in their feasts and the Muse is never absent, and sickness and baneful old age have no part in that sacred people.[247] The charm Socrates says he does not need for a temperate boy comes, on this account, from a people who have no need of medicine.

See also Ἀβάρις; Ζάλμοξις.

ὑπερφυῶς · extraordinarily

Ὑπερφυῶς, *hyperphyōs*, "Extraordinarily"

Attested: Ὑπερφυῶς (*hyperphyōs*; 154d). Beyond nature, prodigiously, amazingly: an adverb from ὑπέρ, "beyond", and φύω, "grow", "be by nature" (see φύω). It is Socrates' one-word answer to Chaerephon. When the boy has come in, Chaerephon calls out, "Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn't he a lovely face?" "Extraordinarily" (154d; see εὐπρόσωπος; Χαιρεφῶν). Chaerephon caps it: if the boy stripped, Socrates would think he had no face at all, his figure is so perfectly beautiful (see εἶδος; πάγκαλος). Socrates' word grants the face something beyond nature, and the next exchange asks what lies beyond the face and the figure: whether the boy's soul is "well made" by nature too (154e; see εὖ πέφυκα; ψυχή). The

[247] Pindar, *Pythian* 10.29–44.

adverb from φύω in Socrates' answer becomes the perfect of φύω in his proviso.

See also εἶδος; εὖ πέφυκα; εὐπρόσωπος; πάγκαλος; φύω; Χαιρεφῶν; ψυχή.

ὑπέχειν λόγον · answer for

To be accountable for an answer: the burden Charmides wants to pass to Critias, and Critias takes up · Charmides

ὑπέχειν λόγον, *hypechein logon*, "answer for"

At a Glance

The phrase. To hold out an account, to submit to account: ὑπέχω, "hold under", "undergo", with λόγος, "account".

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 162c: Charmides, "wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it", keeps prodding him.

In this edition. "Answer for".

A place to read. 162b–e.

Meaning

Ὑπέχειν λόγον is a phrase of accountability: to stand an audit, to answer to a charge, to give an account of what one has done or said when called on. In the *Laws* an official who fails to exact a fine is to answer for it, λόγον ὑπεχέτω, at his audit (6.774b). Applied to an argument, it names the obligation of the one who has put a claim forward to defend it under questioning, the burden that διδόναι λόγον, "give an account", describes from the other side (see διδόναι λόγον).

Use in the book

The phrase marks the change of answerers. Charmides has offered his third definition, doing one's own business, and Socrates has called it a riddle and reduced it to absurdity (161b–162b; see αἴνιγμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The boy, asked what it could mean, says that perhaps even the man who said it

did not know what he meant, and laughs slyly, looking across at Critias (162b; see ὑπογελάω). Critias, the narrator says, had long been eager to shine before the company (162c; see φιλοτίμως); "So Charmides, wanting not to answer for the definition himself but to have Critias answer for it, kept prodding him, and made out that he had been refuted" (162c–d; see ἀπόκρισις; ἐλέγχω). Critias, angry "as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses" (162d; see ὑποκριτής), takes the argument over: "I agree entirely ... and I take it over" (162e).

The phrase shows that the boy has understood how the conversation works. A definition is not merely said; whoever says it must answer for it, and the boy, who had it from Critias, declines a liability that is not his. Critias' agitation has already confirmed what Socrates suspected, that the saying was Critias' (162c; see ἀκούω), and the boy's manoeuvre is the turning point of the dialogue's cast. From here Critias answers for every definition, and the boy does not speak again until 176a. The dialogue can be read as testing the accountability of a man who holds his views from others: the boy repeats a saying and will not answer for it; Critias answers for it and cannot hold it.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the change of answerers it brings about.

162c–d Charmides, not wanting to answer for the definition himself, prods Critias to answer for it.

162e Critias agrees and takes the argument over.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates is charged with refusing the burden he lays on others. When Hippias boasts that he has something new to say about justice and Socrates asks to hear it, Hippias answers that he will not tell him before Socrates declares what he thinks justice is: "it is enough that you mock the others, questioning and refuting everyone, while you yourself are unwilling to answer for your account to anyone, ὑπέχειν λόγον, or to declare your opinion about anything."[248] Socrates replies that he never stops showing

[248] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.4.9–10.

what he thinks just, if not in words, then in deeds. In the *Charmides* the burden is shifted between his partners, not laid on Socrates; but at 165b Critias assumes, much as Hippias does, that Socrates has answers of his own and is keeping them back (see τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι).

Translation in this edition

"Answer for" renders ὑπέχειν λόγον (162c7), and the English repeats the verb for the elliptical second half, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον τῆς ἀποκρίσεως, "but to have Critias answer for it", where the Greek leaves the infinitive understood. Whether "he had been refuted" at 162d1 means Charmides or Critias, the edition's note at 162d says, "is left open by the Greek, and by the English".

See also

αἴνιγμα; ἀκούω; ἀπόκρισις; διδόναι λόγον; ἐλέγχω; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι; ὑπογελάω; ὑποκριτής; φιλοτίμως.

ὑποβαίνω · fall short

ὑποβεβηκέναι, *hypobebēkenai*, "fall short"

Attested: ὑποβεβηκέναι (*hypobebēkenai*; 158b), Burnet's text, a conjecture of Madvig. To step down, to come down below; and so to fall below, be inferior to. Socrates has praised the boy's father's house, celebrated by Anacreon, Solon and other poets, and his mother's, Pyrilampes' house (157e–158a; see ὑποδεέστερος), and concludes: "As for what can be seen of your looks, dear son of Glaucon, you seem to me to fall short of none of your forebears in any respect" (158b). The edition's note at 158b gives the manuscripts' readings: "B and W have 'surpassed' (hyperbeblēkenai), which would make the compliment say that Charmides has outdone none of his ancestors; T (and a variant in W) has 'to disgrace none of your forebears' (apparatus, b1)." Madvig's verb keeps the compliment a compliment. The praise is of looks only, "what can be seen", and the next sentence turns to what cannot: whether the boy is also well enough endowed for temperance (158b; see φύω).

See also ὑποδεέστερος; φύω.

ὑπογελάω · laugh slyly

ὑπεγέλα, *hypegela*, "laughed slyly"

Attested: ὑπεγέλα (*hypegela*; 162b). To laugh under one's breath, to smile slyly, ὑπό, "under", with γελάω, "laugh". It comes once, at the boy's last moment as answerer. Asked what doing one's own business could be, he answers, "By Zeus, I don't know ... But perhaps there is nothing to stop even the man who said it from not knowing what he meant." "And as he said this he laughed slyly and looked across at Critias" (162b; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The sly laugh is the narrator's evidence for what follows: the boy knows whose saying it is, and is teasing its author. The edition's note at 162b adds that, if the phrase is Critias', the boy's earlier praise of its author, "thought to be very wise indeed", is a compliment to his guardian that may already carry the tease. The laugh shows again what his laugh at 156a showed, that the boy can play the game Socrates plays, and it brings Critias in (162c; see ὑπέχειν λόγον).

See also τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑπέχειν λόγον.

ὑποδεέστερος · inferior

ὑποδεεστέρα, *hypodeestera*, "inferior"

Attested: ὑποδεεστέρα (*hypodeestera*; 158a). The comparative of ὑποδεής, "lacking somewhat", "falling below": lesser, inferior. It comes once, in Socrates' praise of the boy's two families. His father's house has been celebrated by the poets; and his mother's side is no different, for it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than his uncle Pyrilampes, whenever he went as ambassador to the Great King, "and that whole house is in no way inferior to the other" (158a; see ἤπειρος; μέγας βασιλεύς). The edition's note at 158a observes that here "Plato is praising his own family" (see πατρῷος). The litotes, "in no way inferior", balances the

two houses before Socrates draws the conclusion that a boy of such descent is likely to be first in everything (158a–b; see ὑποβαίνω).

See also ἤπειρος; μέγας βασιλεύς; πατρῷος; ὑποβαίνω.

ὑπόδεσις · footwear

ὑπόδεσιν, *hypodesin*, "footwear"

Attested: ὑπόδεσιν (*hypodesin*; 173b). A binding under the foot, footwear, from ὑποδέω, "bind under", "put on shoes". It comes once, in the dream of temperance. If temperance ruled and every craft were in the hands of those who know it, what else, Socrates asks, would happen to us than that we would be healthier and safer, "and that our equipment and clothing and our footwear, all of it, and all our possessions would be expertly made for us ... because we would be using genuine craftsmen?" (173b–c; see ἀμπεχόνη; σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς). Footwear is the cobbler's product, and the cobbler has been in the dialogue since the law that would make each man cobble his own shoes (161e; see σκυτοτομέω), and Critias' Hesiod refused his trade the name of work (163b); the dream gives him his due as a genuine craftsman. The plain noun is one of a series of everyday goods by which the dream measures what knowledge would secure, and what, at 174c, it would still not make happy (see ὑποδέω).

See also ἀμπεχόνη; σκεῦος; σκυτοτομέω; τεχνικῶς; ὑποδέω.

ὑποδέω · shoe

ὑποδεδέσθαι, *hypodedesthai*, "well shod"

Attested: ὑποδεδέσθαι (*hypodedesthai*; 174c). To bind under, to put shoes on; in the passive, to have one's shoes on, be shod. It comes once, in the test by subtraction. Take the knowledge of good and bad away from the others, Socrates asks, and will medicine make us any less healthy, "or cobbling any less well shod"? "No less" (174c; see σκυτική; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The perfect passive names the result of the cobbler's craft in the wearer, as "healthy"

names medicine's in the patient. The series repeats the dream's goods of 173b–c, clothing and footwear (see ὑπόδεσις), and the refutation of doing one's own business, where a city whose law made each man cobble his own shoes would not be well managed (161e–162a; see σκυτοτομέω). Being shod is the plainest of the goods the crafts secure, and the dialogue keeps it to the end to show that a craft can secure it without the knowledge that makes a man happy.

See also ἀμφιέννυμι; σκυτική; σκυτοτομέω; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὑπόδεσις.

ὑποκριτής · actor

ὑποκριτῇ, *hypokritēi*, "with an actor"

Attested: ὑποκριτῇ (*hypokritēi*; 162d). An actor, from ὑποκρίνομαι, "answer", "interpret": the performer of a poet's lines on the stage. It comes once, in the narrator's simile for Critias' anger when the boy prods him to answer for his definition: "Critias would not put up with it: he seemed to me as angry with Charmides as a poet is with an actor who makes a mess of the poet's own verses" (162d; see ὑπέχειν λόγον). The edition's note at 162d explains the fit: Critias was himself a poet, and dramatic verse circulated under his name; and "'the poet's own verses' (ta heautou poiēmata) echoes the formula under discussion, 'one's own'" (see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). The boy has performed a definition he did not write and performed it badly, and its author is angry at the performance. The simile can also be read as saying something about the definition: a saying recited by someone who does not understand it is like a part spoken by an actor who has not grasped the play. Aristotle records that in the beginning the poets performed their tragedies themselves, and that in the contests of his own day the actors had more power than the poets.[249] At 162e the poet takes the part back.

See also τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑπέχειν λόγον.

[249] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.1, 1403b22–24 and 1403b31–35.

ὑποτίθημι · lay down, advise

To put something under: to give advice, in Cydias' verse, and to lay down a premise or a definition, in the argument · Charmides

ὑποτιθέμενος, *hypotithemenos*, "advising"; ὑπετέθη, *hypetethē*, "we laid it down"; ὑποθέμενος, *hypothemenos*, "laid it down"; ὑπετιθέμεθα, *hypetithemetha*, "we supposed"

At a Glance

The word. To place under; in the middle, to suggest, advise; and to lay down as a basis, to posit, whence ὑπόθεσις, "hypothesis".

In the *Charmides*. Four times: Cydias "advising someone else" (155d), the premise that temperance is fine, "we laid it down" (160d), "the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one's own business" (163a), and "as we supposed at the start" (171d).

In this edition. "Advising"; "laid it down"; "supposed".

A place to read. 160d and 171d–172a.

Meaning

Ὑποτίθημι is to put something underneath. In the middle voice it is to put a thought under someone, to suggest it to him, and so to advise; and it is to put something under an argument, to lay it down as the ground on which the rest is built. The second sense gives the noun ὑπόθεσις, the hypothesis, which in Plato's mathematics and dialectic is a starting point taken as granted for the sake of what follows. The *Charmides* uses both senses, the first once and the second three times (see τίθημι).

Use in the book

The first use is in a love poem. Cydias, "speaking of a beautiful boy and advising someone else", warned the lover, a fawn, off the lion (155d; see Κυδίας; τὰ ἐρωτικά). Advice is already the verb's sense in Homer, where Athena promises to put counsel to the Argives (*Iliad* 8.36), and the word's first use is a poet's counsel that Socrates applies to himself.

Then the word turns to the argument, and each time it marks what was laid down earlier and must now answer. At 160d Socrates sums up the refutation of quietness: "For in our argument we laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones" (160d; see σωφροσύνη καλόν τι). At 163a he turns the boy's third definition against Critias: "see whether it doesn't stop the man who laid it down that temperance is doing one's own business, and then says there is nothing to stop those who do other people's business from being temperate too" (163a; see τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). At 171d he returns to Critias' definition: "For if, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and what he did not know ... then, we say, it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate" (171d; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς).

Each time the word is used of the past tense of the argument, and each time the thing laid down returns as a constraint. The premise of 160d decides the refutation of quietness; the definition laid down at 163a binds Critias to what follows from it; the supposition of 171d is held up against what the argument has since shown the knowledge of knowledge can do, and found wanting. The dialogue can be read as a sequence of things laid down and then examined, and the verb is the word for the laying down. The examination ends with every definition withdrawn and Socrates still holding to the premise from which it began: "I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e; see ζητητής).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

155d Cydias, advising someone else, warned the fawn against the lion.

160d We laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things.

163a The man who laid it down that temperance is doing one's own business cannot let those who do other people's business be temperate.

171d If, as we supposed at the start, the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, temperance would be of enormous benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* describes the method the verb names and its limit. Those who work at geometry and calculation, Socrates says, lay down the odd and the even, the figures and the three kinds of angle, as hypotheses, as though they knew them, and think they need give no account of them to themselves or to anyone else, as if they were plain to all; starting from these, they go through the rest and arrive in agreement at what they set out to examine (6.510c–d). The *Charmides*' partners do the opposite: what they lay down they examine at once, and it is the premises that fail. Only the premise that temperance is fine can be read as held the way the geometers hold theirs.

Translation in this edition

"Advising" renders ὑποτιθέμενος (155d6); "we laid it down" ὑπετέθη (160d2), a passive with temperance as its subject, literally "temperance was laid down for us as one of the fine things"; "laid it down" ὑποθέμενος (163a7); "supposed" ὑπετιθέμεθα (171d3). At 160d2 Burnet prints καλὰ with T, where B has καὶ ἄλλα, and the article τὰ before "quick" is added by a corrector of the Coislin manuscript (apparatus).

See also

ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν; ἐξ ἀρχῆς; ζητητής; Κυδίας; σωφροσύνη καλόν τι; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; τὰ ἐρωτικά; τίθημι.

ὑφαίνω · weave

ὑφαίνειν, *hyphainein*, "weaving", "weave"

Attested: ὑφαίνειν (*hyphainein*; 161e twice). To weave, the work of the loom; the craft is ὑφαντική (see ὑφαντική). It comes twice in the refutation of doing one's own business. First weaving is one of the crafts that are "doing something": "healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something" (161e; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν). Then it is the first of the tasks a law would impose if doing one's own business meant doing everything for

oneself: "do you think a city would be well managed under a law that ordered each man to weave and wash his own cloak, cobble his own shoes, and make his own oil-flask and strigil ...?" (161e–162a; see λήκυθος; σκυτοτομέω; στλεγγίς). The boy thinks not, and the definition, taken at its widest, falls. Weaving can be read here as standing for the division of labour on which a city rests: the weaver weaves for others, and is no busybody for it.

See also λήκυθος; ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν; σκυτοτομέω; στλεγγίς; ὑφαντική.

ὑφαντική · weaving

The weaver's craft, an example of a knowledge with a product and of a craft that keeps its work without the knowledge of good and bad · Charmides

ὑφαντικῆς, *hyphantikēs*, "(of) weaving"; ἡ ... ὑφαντική, *hē ... hyphantikē*, "weaving"

At a Glance

The word. The art of weaving: the feminine of ὑφαντικός, the adjective of ὑφαίνω, "weave", with τέχνη, "craft", understood.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: as the craft whose work is a cloak (165e), and in the test by subtraction, "or weaving any less well clothed" (174c).

In this edition. "Weaving".

A place to read. 165c–166a and 174c–d.

Meaning

Weaving was the household craft above all, the work of the women of the house at the loom, and also a trade. For Plato it was a model craft, with a clear material, a clear process and a clear product, and he often used it as an example of a craft whose work anyone could see.

Use in the book

The word first appears in Critias' list of crafts with visible works. Socrates has asked what work temperance produces, as medicine produces health and building houses; Critias answers that not every knowledge has such a work,

for the art of calculation and geometry have none "in the way that a house is the work of house-building, or a cloak of weaving" (165e; see ἀπεργάζομαι; λογιστική; οἰκοδομική). Weaving here is the plain case, the craft whose product can be held up and shown. Socrates grants the objection and changes the question from what temperance produces to what it is knowledge of (166a; see ἐπιστήμη τινός).

At the end weaving returns in the test of the knowledge of good and bad. Take that knowledge away, Socrates asks, and will weaving clothe us any less well? "No less" (174c; see ἀμφιέννυμι; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The weaver still makes cloaks, and we are still clothed; what is lost is the cloak's being made well and to our benefit. The craft that was the plainest example of a knowledge with a work becomes the plainest example of a knowledge that does not know its own good.

The two places can be read together. At 165e weaving shows what temperance would have to be like to have a work; at 174c it shows why having a work is not enough. Between them the dialogue has moved from asking what a knowledge makes to asking whether what it makes is good.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

165e A cloak is the work of weaving, as a house is of house-building; calculation and geometry have no such work.

174c Without the knowledge of good and bad, weaving would clothe us no less well.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Statesman* makes weaving the pattern of the kingly art. Looking for a small example that will show the nature of statesmanship, the visitor from Elea proposes weaving, and only the weaving of woollen cloth (279b), and divides it from every neighbouring art. At the dialogue's end the pattern is applied: the statesman's work is a fabric woven straight, in which the characters of brave and temperate men are bound together in concord and friendship; and the kingly art, having made the finest and best of fabrics and wrapped in it everyone in the city, slave and free, holds them together by this weave, and rules and presides over it (311b–c). The *Statesman*'s kingly art,

which weaves the temperate together with the brave and "presides over" the city (ἐπιστατῇ, 311c), can be read as doing what Critias' temperance claimed to do when it was set to preside over all the kinds of knowledge (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). The *Cratylus* uses the weaver's shuttle to explain what a name is: as the shuttle is a tool for separating the threads, a name is a tool for teaching and for separating being (388b–c; see φέρειν τοὔνομα).

Translation in this edition

"Weaving" renders ὑφαντικῆς (165e7) and ἡ … ὑφαντική (174c6), and the verb at 161e is "weaving" and "weave" (see ὑφαίνω). "Well clothed" at 174c renders the perfect ἠμφιέσθαι, T's reading, where B has ἀμφιέσθαι (apparatus; see ἀμφιέννυμι).

See also

ἀμφιέννυμι; ἀπεργάζομαι; ἐπιστατέω; ἐπιστήμη τινός; λογιστική; οἰκοδομική; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὑφαίνω; φέρειν τοὔνομα.

Φ Phi

φαίνομαι · seem, appear

How things look and what seems so: the boy's appearance in the prologue, and the answerer's own view in the argument · Charmides

φαίνονται, *phainontai*, "looks"; ἐφάνη, *ephanē*, "struck me as", "looked"; φαίνεται, *phainetai*, "do you think", "seems"

At a Glance

The word. To be brought to light, to appear; with a dative, to seem to someone: the middle and passive of φαίνω, "bring to light".

In the *Charmides*. Often, from the boy's approach (154a) to the last page. In the prologue it is how the boy looks: "nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b). In the argument it is what the answerer thinks: "you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?" (159a).

In this edition. "Look", "seem", "strike as", "appear", and in answers "It seems so", "It appears so".

A place to read. 154b–d and 158c–159a.

Meaning

Φαίνομαι is to come to light and so to be seen. With a participle it means to be evidently so; with an infinitive or a dative, to seem so to someone, which may or may not be so. Greek kept both senses in one verb, and the difference between appearing and being was one Plato's Socrates pressed on his partners. In conversation the verb is also the plainest way of asking what someone thinks, "how does it seem to you?", and of answering, "it seems so".

Use in the book

The prologue is a story of appearances. Socrates confesses that "nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to me" (154b; see λευκὴ στάθμη); when

the boy came in, "he struck me as a marvel of stature and beauty" (154c); Chaerephon asks, "what do you think of the young man?" (154d; see ὑπερφυῶς); and when Socrates asks whether he is temperate, the boy blushes and "he looked even more beautiful" (158c; see αἰσχυντηλός). Each of these is about how the boy looks, and the beauty that appears is unquestioned.

Then the verb turns from the boy's looks to the boy's mind. Socrates asks him to say what temperance seems to him to be: "Well then, this opinion of yours ... since you know how to speak Greek, you could surely tell us what it seems to you to be?" (159a; see δοξάζω; ἑλληνίζω). After the first definition fails he asks him again to look within himself and say "what it seems to you to be" (160d–e; see ἐμβλέπω); and when Critias complains that Socrates is trying to refute him and letting go of what the argument is about, Socrates tells him to "answer the question as it seems to you, and say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (166d–e; see ἐάω; ἐλέγχω). The appearance asked for is now an opinion, and it is to be given honestly, as it seems, and then tested.

The dialogue can be read as moving through the verb's range. What appeared in the prologue was taken as it appeared: the boy is beautiful. What seems so in the argument is taken only to be examined, and most of what seems so to the boy and to Critias does not survive. At the end the verb carries Socrates' reproach to himself: what is agreed to be the finest of all things "would not have turned out to be of no use to us", if he were of any use at inquiring (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής). The beauty that appeared at the door is the one appearance the dialogue never tests.

Places to read

The passages in which the verb concerns how the boy looks, or asks what seems so to the answerer; its other uses, among them Critias' guess at 154a and the answerers' "It seems so" and "It appears so", are not listed.

154b Nearly everyone of that age looks beautiful to Socrates.

154c The boy struck Socrates as a marvel of stature and beauty.

154d Chaerephon: what do you think of the young man?

158c Blushing, the boy looked even more beautiful.

159a The boy could surely say what temperance seems to him to be.

160e Once more: what does temperance seem to him to be?

166d Critias is to answer as it seems to him.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Theaetetus* builds a theory of knowledge on the verb. Protagoras says, Socrates recalls, that a human being is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, and of things that are not, that they are not; which means that as each thing appears to me, so it is for me, and as it appears to you, so it is for you. When the same wind blows, one of us shivers and the other does not; is the wind cold in itself, or cold for the one who shivers? And "it appears" is "he perceives", so that appearance and perception are the same, and perception is always of what is and cannot be false, as knowledge is (152a–c). On Protagoras' account what seems so to the answerer is so, for him; on Socrates' practice in the *Charmides*, what seems so is where the examination begins.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders by context: "looks" for φαίνονται (154b10), "struck me as" and "looked" for ἐφάνη (154c1, 158c6), "do you think" for τί σοι φαίνεται (154d1), "seems" in the requests of 159a7, 160e1 and 166d9, and "It seems so", "It appears so", "So it appears" in the answerers' replies. At 154b9 the English completes Plato's proverb, as the edition's note at 154b explains (see λευκὴ στάθμη).

See also

αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνωφελής; δοξάζω; ἐάω; ἐλέγχω; ἑλληνίζω; ἐμβλέπω; λευκὴ στάθμη; ὑπερφυῶς.

φάρμακον · remedy

The remedy for the head that Critias' ruse requires and Socrates pretends to know, subordinated by the Thracian to the charm for the soul · Charmides

φάρμακον, *pharmakon*, "remedy"; φαρμάκῳ, *pharmakōi*, "(with) the remedy"; φαρμάκου, *pharmakou*, "(of) the remedy"

At a Glance

The word. A drug, a remedy; also a poison, a dye, a spell. The word covers whatever acts on a body from outside, for good or ill.

In the *Charmides*. Ten times, all in the prologue, from Critias' ruse at 155b to Socrates' "the charm must be sung before the remedy is given" at 158c.

In this edition. "Remedy", always.

A place to read. 155b–158c.

Meaning

Φάρμακον is already Homer's word for a drug, and the ambiguity of drugs is in it: the same word means the medicine that heals and the poison that kills, the herb a sorceress uses and a dye. The Key Words give its place in the dialogue: "The pharmakon is a drug or remedy, here a leaf for the head; the epōidē, from epaeidein, 'to sing over', is an incantation sung over the patient, and is rendered 'charm' (155e). Greek healing could pair the two." The remedy works on the body; the charm, in Socrates' story, on the soul (see ἐπῳδή).

Use in the book

The remedy begins as a lie. The boy has complained of a heavy head in the mornings, and Critias asks Socrates, "What's to stop you pretending to him that you know a remedy for the head?" (155b; see βαρύνω; προσποιέομαι). Socrates agrees, and when Critias tells the boy that Socrates is "the one who knew the remedy", the boy gives him a look (155c–d; see ἐμβλέπω). Asked whether he knows it, Socrates tells his listener, "I did somehow manage to answer that I did", and goes on: "And I told him that the thing itself was a

leaf, but that there was a charm to go with the remedy; if one sang the charm while using it, the remedy made one perfectly healthy, but without the charm the leaf was no use at all" (155e; see ὑγιής; φύλλον).

Then the Thracian's teaching subordinates the remedy. Zalmoxis, as the Thracian reports him, taught that the soul must be treated first, with charms, and the Thracian charged Socrates: "Mind that nobody persuades you to treat his head with this remedy unless he first hands over his soul to be treated by you with the charm" (157b; see ἐπῳδή; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια). Socrates puts the condition to the boy: if he hands over his soul to be charmed, "I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c); if he is already temperate, "the remedy for the head itself should be given you straightaway"; if not, "the charm must be sung before the remedy is given" (158b–c; see δοτέος).

The edition's note at 155b observes: "The remedy and its charm frame the opening of the dialogue; at its close (175e–176b) the charm returns, though the remedy and the headache are never mentioned again." The dialogue can be read as enacting the Thracian's order. The remedy was promised for the body on condition that the soul be treated first; the treatment of the soul is the conversation, which takes the rest of the book, and the remedy for the head is left where the order puts it, after a cure that has not yet been finished.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

155b Critias: pretend to the boy that you know a remedy for the head.

155c Critias introduces Socrates as the one who knows the remedy.

155e Socrates says he knows the remedy: a leaf, with a charm to go with it.

157b The Thracian: treat no one's head with the remedy unless he first hands over his soul to the charm.

157c If the boy hands over his soul, Socrates will apply the remedy to his head.

158c If he is temperate, the remedy should be given at once; if not, the charm must be sung first.

Elsewhere in Plato

Plato uses the word's double edge. In the *Phaedrus* Theuth, presenting writing to Thamus, calls it a remedy, φάρμακον, for memory and wisdom; the king answers that it will breed forgetfulness in the souls of those who learn it, and that what Theuth has found is a remedy for reminding, not for memory (274e–275a). In the *Republic*, if a lie is useless to gods but useful to men as a kind of remedy, it must be given to doctors and not touched by laymen; so it belongs to the rulers of the city, if to anyone, to lie, in dealing with enemies or citizens, for the city's benefit (3.389b). In the *Republic* the remedy is given by one who knows to one who does not, and its good depends on the giver's knowledge; in the *Phaedrus* its inventor is told that the man who makes an art is not the one to judge its harm and benefit (274e); the *Charmides*' remedy is promised by a man who agreed, at Critias' suggestion, to pretend that he knew it (155b).

Other ancient sources

Homer's Helen has a drug that works on grief. At Menelaus' table in Sparta she slips into the wine a drug that ends sorrow and anger and makes a man forget all his troubles: whoever drank it once it was mixed in the bowl would shed no tear all that day, not even at the death of his mother and father; she had it from an Egyptian woman, and in Egypt the soil yields drugs in abundance, many beneficial and many deadly, and every man there is a physician, knowing more than all others.[250] The Thracian's claim for the charm, a cure for the soul that makes the body's cure easy, can be read as belonging to the same tradition of foreign doctors who know more than the Greeks.

Translation in this edition

"Remedy" at every place, as the Glossary rules: "remedy, φάρμακον (pharmakon): 155b–158c." At 155c8 "the one who knew the remedy" renders ὁ τὸ φάρμακον ἐπιστάμενος; in the words that follow, ἐνέβλεψέν τέ μοι,

[250] Homer, *Odyssey* 4.219–232.

"gave me a look", τέ μοι is T's reading (with ε written above οι in T), where B has δέ με (apparatus).

See also

βαρύνω; δοτέος; ἐμβλέπω; ἐπῳδή; προσποιέομαι; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; ὑγιής; φύλλον.

φάσκω · claim

To claim, to profess, as against to know: the pretender's verb, and Critias' assumption about Socrates · Charmides

φάσκοντος, *phaskontos*, "claimed", "say"; φάσκοντα, *phaskonta*, "claims"; φάσκων, *phaskōn*, "claimed"

At a Glance

The word. To say, assert, claim: an iterative form of φημί, "say", often of a claim the speaker does not make good.

In the *Charmides*. Four times: "you are treating me as though I claimed to know", Socrates tells Critias (165b); the temperate man cannot examine another "who claims to know something" (170d); no one who "claimed to be a pilot, but was not" would deceive us (173b); and the argument did not allow knowledge of knowledge "or say that there was" (175b).

In this edition. "Claim"; "say".

A place to read. 170d–171c and 173a–c.

Meaning

Φάσκω is to say, and to keep saying, and in use it is often the verb of an assertion that is only an assertion: what someone claims or professes, as against what he is. With an infinitive it is to claim to be or to know something. In the *Charmides* it stands against the verbs of knowing, and the gap between them is where the second of Socrates' two questions, whether a knowledge of knowledge would benefit us, does its damage: such a

knowledge could not tell those who know from those who only claim to (170d–171c).

Use in the book

The word first characterizes Socrates as Critias sees him. Critias offers his account "if you do not agree", and Socrates answers, "you are treating me as though I claimed to know the answers to what I ask": he inquires because he does not know (165b–c; see τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι). Critias takes the questioner to be a claimant; Socrates denies the claim.

In the test of the knowledge of knowledge the word names the man to be tested. The temperate man, knowing only that he knows and not what, will not be able "to examine someone else who claims to know something, to see whether he knows what he says he knows or does not know it" (170d; see ἐξετάζω); he cannot tell "the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is" (170e; see προσποιέομαι). In the dream that follows, the pretenders are all exposed: "No one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us, nor would any doctor or general or anyone else escape our notice who pretended to know what he did not know" (173b; see ἀλαζών; κυβερνήτης; ὄναρ). At the end the verb is turned on the argument itself, which did not allow knowledge of knowledge "or say that there was" (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The inquirers conceded what their own argument had not claimed.

The four places make a pattern. The dialogue's first claimant is Socrates, falsely accused of claiming; its last is the argument, which never claimed what was granted on its behalf. Between them stand the pretenders whom the dream would expose and the knowledge of knowledge could not. The dialogue can be read as asking where Critias stands among them: the man who claims that temperance is a knowledge of what one knows and does not know, and cannot show that such a knowledge exists.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

165b Critias treats Socrates as though he claimed to know the answers to what he asks.

170d The temperate man cannot examine another who claims to know something.

173b Under temperance no one who claimed to be a pilot, but was not, would deceive us.

175b The argument did not allow knowledge of knowledge, or say that there was.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates kept his companions from the pretender's claim. His argument that one who wished to seem a good flute-player without being one would make himself a laughing-stock, and a pretended pilot or general would destroy those he least wished to and come to grief himself, is told elsewhere (*Memorabilia* 1.7.1–3; see ἀλαζών). He called it no small cheat to take money or goods from someone by persuasion and keep them, but by far the greatest to have deceived others, being worth nothing, into believing one fit to lead the city.[251] The *Charmides*' dream exposes the pretended pilot and doctor; Xenophon's greatest cheat, the worthless man who persuades the city that he is fit to lead it, can be read as the pretender the *Charmides* leaves unnamed.

Translation in this edition

"Claimed to know" renders φάσκοντος ... εἰδέναι (165b5–6); "claims to know something" φάσκοντά τι ἐπίστασθαι (170d5–6); "claimed to be a pilot" φάσκων εἶναι (173b2); "or say that there was" οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι (175b7), with the argument as subject.

See also

ἀλαζών; ἐξετάζω; κυβερνήτης; ὄναρ; πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; προσποιέομαι; τὸ μὴ εἰδέναι.

[251] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.7.5.

φαῦλος · ordinary, poor

οὐ … φαῦλος, *ou … phaulos*, "nothing to sniff at"; φαυλότερον, *phauloteron*, "poorly"; φαῦλον, *phaulon*, "poor"

Attested: φαῦλος (*phaulos*; 154b), φαυλότερον (*phauloteron*; 172b), φαῦλον (*phaulon*; 175e). Slight, ordinary, of no account; and so poor, inferior, bad at something. It comes three times, and its last use is Socrates' verdict on himself. In the prologue it is litotes: the boy "was nothing to sniff at even then, when he was still a child" (154b; see παῖς). In the argument it measures the small advantage Socrates asks whether the knowledge of knowledge might still have: whoever has it would examine others better, "while those who examine without it will do so more feebly and poorly?" (172b; see ἐξετάζω). At the end Socrates tells the boy that he does not think temperance worthless: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer" (175e; see ζητητής). The adjective that began as understatement about the boy ends as self-accusation, and it relocates the failure: not temperance, but the man who looked for it.

See also ἐξετάζω; ζητητής; παῖς.

φέρειν τοὔνομα · apply the word

To apply a word to a thing: the one condition Socrates sets on Critias' freedom to name · Charmides

φέρῃς τοὔνομα, *pherēis tounoma*, "you are applying … word"

At a Glance

The phrase. To carry a name onto something, to apply a word: φέρω, "carry", with τοὔνομα, "the name", by crasis of τὸ ὄνομα.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 163d: "only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to."

In this edition. "Applying … word".

A place to read. 163d–e.

Meaning

Greek spoke of carrying a name onto a thing, ἐπί with the accusative, as English speaks of applying a word to it. The picture is of a label brought to a thing and set on it. Where τίθεσθαι, "set", names the act of giving a name (see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων), φέρειν names its direction: the word goes onto something, and the question is what.

Use in the book

The phrase is the condition attached to Socrates' permission. Critias may assign words as he pleases; "only make clear what you are applying whatever word you use to" (163d; see δηλόω; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). The sentence turns from the word to its object. Critias has been distinguishing making from working and doing, and refusing cobbling the names of work and doing (163b–c; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν); Socrates does not care which name he uses, only what he carries it onto. Critias answers by naming the thing: "temperance is the doing of good things" (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν).

The condition can be read as the rule the rest of the dialogue keeps. Later definitions are tested the same way: knowing oneself is a knowledge, and a knowledge of something (165c; see ἐπιστήμη τινός); and a knowledge of knowledge, asked what it is of, has no subject of learning of its own, while each kind of knowledge is defined by what it is of (166a–c, 171a; see τῷ τινῶν εἶναι). The end shows the condition unmet. The inquirers cannot discover to which of the things that are the lawgiver gave the name (175b; see νομοθέτης; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων): they have the word, and cannot say what it is carried onto.

Places to read

The phrase's place.

163d Socrates lets Critias assign words as he pleases, if he makes clear what he applies each to.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Cratylus* explains why the condition matters. A name, Socrates gets Hermogenes to agree, is a tool, and what we do with it in naming is to

instruct one another and to sort things out as they are; so a name is an implement for instruction and for sorting out what is, as the shuttle is for parting the tangled threads on the loom (388b–c). On that account a word applied to nothing in particular would be a shuttle that parts nothing, and the *Charmides*' knowledge of knowledge, which could not tell what another knowledge is of, can be read as the case (170c–171c).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle uses a neighbouring picture to explain how arguments deceive. Since in argument we cannot carry the things themselves along, he says, we use their names as tokens in their stead, and take whatever holds of the names to hold of the things too, as reckoners do with their counting-pebbles; but names and phrases are limited in number and things numberless, so that one phrase and one name must mean several things, and those who do not know what names can do are led into false reasoning by them.[252] Socrates' condition at 163d can be read as the precaution against that error: before the argument goes on, say what the word is carried onto.

Translation in this edition

"What you are applying whatever word you use to" renders ἐφ' ὅτι ἂν φέρῃς τοὔνομα ὅτι ἂν λέγῃς (163d6–7). At 163d6 Burnet prints ἂν φέρῃς with B and T; other manuscripts have ἂν φέροις, and H. Richards conjectured δὴ φέρεις (apparatus).

See also

δηλόω; ἐπιστήμη τινός; ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; νομοθέτης; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι.

[252] Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 1, 165a6–17.

φθέγγομαι · utter

ἐφθέγξατο, *ephthenxato*, "the words sound"

Attested: ἐφθέγξατο (*ephthenxato*; 161d). To utter a sound, to speak aloud; of the voice as sound rather than as meaning. It comes once, as Socrates explains why the boy's third definition is a riddle: "Because the man who said that temperance is doing one's own business ... surely did not mean it the way the words sound" (161d; see αἴνιγμα; νοέω). The Greek sets two verbs side by side, ᾗ τὰ ῥήματα ἐφθέγξατο ταύτῃ καὶ ἐνόει, literally "in the way he uttered the words, in that way he also meant them", and the riddle lies in the gap between them. The utterance is the sound of the words; the meaning is what the man had in mind, and Socrates' refutation proceeds by taking the utterance at its sound to show that it cannot have been the meaning (161d–162a; see γραμματιστής).

See also αἴνιγμα; γραμματιστής; νοέω.

φιλοσοφία · philosophy

The first thing Socrates asks about on his return from the war, before the young men and before the boy · Charmides

φιλοσοφίας, *philosophias*, "philosophy"

At a Glance

The word. The love of wisdom: from φίλος, "dear", "loving", and σοφία, "wisdom". In Plato's Athens it could mean any serious intellectual pursuit, and in Plato the life of inquiry Socrates led.

In the *Charmides*. Once, at 153d: Socrates asks his friends "how philosophy was doing these days".

In this edition. "Philosophy".

A place to read. 153c–154a.

Meaning

The noun was still young in the fifth century, and its sense was wide: the cultivation of the mind, the pursuit of learning, the arguments of the sophists as well as the questions of Socrates. Herodotus' Croesus uses the verb of Solon's travels for the sake of seeing the world (1.30.2; see εὐδαιμονία). Plato narrowed it to the love of a wisdom one does not yet have, and the *Charmides*, set at Socrates' return from Potidaea in 432 or 429 BC, can be read as showing what the word meant in Socrates' practice before Plato defined it.

Use in the book

Socrates has come back from the army at Potidaea the evening before and gone straight to his old haunts (153a; see συνήθης διατριβή). The company asks him about the battle, and he tells them the news from the camp, "whatever anyone asked" (153d; see ἀνερωτάω; στρατόπεδον). Then he asks his own questions: "When we had had our fill of all that, I asked them my own questions in turn about things here at home: how philosophy was doing these days, and about the young men, whether any of them had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or in beauty, or in both" (153d; see ἄδην ἔχω; σοφία ἢ κάλλος). The man just back from a battle in which many of his acquaintances died asks first about philosophy.

The question is never answered directly, and the dialogue is the answer. Critias replies about beauty, promising that Socrates will soon see the most beautiful of the young men (154a; see τὸ καλόν); asked about the boy's soul, he calls Charmides a philosopher and a poet (154e–155a; see φιλόσοφος). What follows shows how philosophy was doing: a beautiful boy whom his guardian calls a philosopher, and a guardian who can speak its language, are examined on temperance, and neither can say what it is. The state of philosophy at home is a conversation that ends at a loss, with the boy asking to be charmed every day (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι).

The question can also be read against the frame. The dialogue was written for readers who knew what became of the guardian and the ward, and the edition's notes at 153c and 176c remind them (see σώφρων). Socrates' first

question, how philosophy was doing and whether any of the young men stood out, has an answer the dialogue does not state and its readers knew.

Places to read

The word's place.

153d Socrates asks how philosophy is doing these days, and about the young men.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Gorgias* gives the word the measure a man of affairs set on it. Philosophy, Callicles tells Socrates, is a pretty thing for a man who takes it in moderation at the proper age, but it destroys a man who lingers over it longer than he should; for even a gifted man who keeps at it beyond his youth must remain inexperienced in everything a man needs who is to be a gentleman and well thought of: the city's laws, the speech of public and private dealings, the pleasures and desires of men, their characters altogether. A taste of philosophy, so far as it serves education, does a lad credit and no discredit; but a man already older who is still at it makes himself a laughing-stock (484c–485a). Callicles' view can be read as the one the *Charmides*' company would have recognized: philosophy as a part of a young man's education, beside his looks and his poetry. Socrates' question at 153d puts philosophy and the young side by side, and the *Charmides* shows Socrates, a grown man still philosophizing, examining a boy of the age at which, for Callicles, philosophy is still no shame.

Other ancient sources

In the Funeral Speech that Thucydides gives to Pericles, delivered in the first winter of the Peloponnesian War, the city's two loves are joined as Socrates joins wisdom and beauty: "we love beauty with economy, and love wisdom without softness", φιλοσοφοῦμεν ἄνευ μαλακίας.[253] The verb is Pericles' boast for all Athens. The *Charmides*, set within a few years of the speech, asks the city's young men what their love of wisdom amounts to.

[253] Thucydides 2.40.1.

Translation in this edition

"How philosophy was doing these days" renders περὶ φιλοσοφίας ὅπως ἔχοι τὰ νῦν (153d3). The adjective φιλόσοφος, "a philosopher", has its own entry.

See also

ἄδην ἔχω; ἀνερωτάω; εὐδαιμονία; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; σοφία ἢ κάλλος; στρατόπεδον; συνήθης διατριβή; σώφρων; τὸ καλόν; φιλόσοφος.

φιλόσοφος · philosopher

φιλόσοφος, *philosophos*, "a philosopher"

Attested: φιλόσοφος (*philosophos*; 154e). A lover of wisdom; in ordinary use, a man of learning or culture. It comes once, in Critias' answer to Socrates' question about the boy's soul. Socrates proposes that they strip that part of him and look at it before his figure, since at his age he must be willing to have a conversation. "Very much so," said Critias, "seeing that he is a philosopher and, in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (154e–155a; see ἀποδύω; ποιητικός). Socrates answers that the gift has been in Critias' family a long way back, from its kinship with Solon (155a; see Σόλων). Critias means a cultivated boy; the dialogue tests the word. In the *Lysis* Socrates defines the philosopher as one who is neither wise nor yet bad with ignorance, but has the bad of ignorance and still thinks that he does not know what he does not know; the wise, whether gods or men, no longer love wisdom, and the ignorant who are bad do not love it (218a–b). By that standard the boy can be read as earning the name at the end, when he says that he does not know whether he has temperance or not (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω), and his guardian, who will not admit that he is at a loss (169c–d), does not.

See also ἀποδύω; οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ' εἰ ἔχω οὔτ' εἰ μὴ ἔχω; ποιητικός; Σόλων; φιλοσοφία.

φιλοτίμως · eager to shine

φιλοτίμως, *philotimōs*, "eager to shine"

Attested: φιλοτίμως (*philotimōs*; 162c). Ambitiously, with love of honour, from φιλότιμος, "loving honour". It comes once, in the narrator's description of Critias at the change of answerers: "Critias had plainly been on edge for some time, and eager to shine before Charmides and the company; he had held himself back with difficulty until then, but now he could contain himself no longer" (162c; see ὑπέχειν λόγον). The adverb names the motive that brings Critias into the argument, and the dialogue keeps it in view. When he cannot answer at 169c, it is shame before the same company, the narrator says, that keeps him from admitting it (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Plato's Socrates reminds Glaucon in the *Republic* that to be called a lover of honour, like a lover of money, is a reproach (1.347b); in the *Charmides* it is the passion that brings Critias into the argument and keeps him from admitting that he is at a loss.

See also αἰσχύνομαι; ὑπέχειν λόγον.

φλέγομαι · be on fire

ἐφλεγόμην, *ephlegomēn*, "I was on fire"

Attested: ἐφλεγόμην (*ephlegomēn*; 155d). To be set ablaze, to burn; of desire, to be inflamed. It comes once, when Socrates sees inside the boy's cloak. The boy has given Socrates a look beyond words, and the wrestling-school has crowded round them: "then, my noble friend, I saw inside his cloak, and I was on fire, and was no longer in my own possession" (155d; see ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἱμάτιον). The fire returns transformed a page later, when the boy accepts the doctors' principle and Socrates feels his boldness rekindle (156d; see ἀναζωπυρέω). Between the two fires stands the scene that many readers, as the note at 155d records, have taken for a trial passed (see τὰ ἐρωτικά).

See also ἀναζωπυρέω; ἐν ἐμαυτοῦ εἶναι; ἱμάτιον; τὰ ἐρωτικά.

φοβέομαι · fear, be afraid

φοβούμενος, *phoboumenos*, "for fear that"; φοβεῖται, *phobeitai*, "fears"; φοβοίμην, *phoboimēn*, "I was afraid"

Attested: φοβούμενος (*phoboumenos*; 166d), φοβεῖται (*phobeitai*; 168a twice), φοβοίμην (*phoboimēn*; 172e). To be put to flight; to fear, be afraid. Its uses fall on either side of the argument about self-related powers. Twice it is Socrates' own fear, and both times a fear for the inquiry: he refutes Critias, he says, for the reason he would scrutinize himself: "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166d; see διερευνάω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι); and when strange things come to light, he reminds Critias, "I said just now that some strange things were coming to light for me, and that I was afraid we were not looking into it correctly" (172e; see ἄτοπος). Between them it is the verb of the self-related fear that cannot exist, a fear of itself and of the other fears that fears nothing dreadful (168a; see δεινός; φόβος). Socrates' fear has an object, error, and the impossible fear has none.

See also ἄτοπος; δεινός; διερευνάω; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; φόβος.

φόβος · fear

Fear among the soul's powers: a fear of itself and of other fears, but of nothing dreadful, would be no fear · Charmides

Φόβον, *phobon*, "a fear"; φόβους, *phobous*, "fears"

At a Glance

The word. Fear, fright; originally flight, from φέβομαι, "flee".

In the *Charmides*. At 167e–168a: "And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?"

In this edition. "Fear", "fears".

A place to read. 167c–168b.

Meaning

Φόβος is first flight, the rout of an army, and then the fear that makes men flee; its object is the dreadful, τὸ δεινόν. Fear is defined by what it is afraid of, and Greek thinkers who analysed it defined it as an expectation of something bad. A fear without anything dreadful to fear would not be fear at all.

Use in the book

The word is one item in Socrates' survey of the soul's powers. He is testing whether a knowledge could be of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge but of no subject of learning, and he asks whether any other power is like that. There is no seeing that sees no colour, no hearing that hears no sound, no desire for no pleasure, no wish for no good, no love of nothing beautiful (167c–e; see ἀκοή; βούλησις; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; τὸ καλόν). Then: "And have you ever yet come across a fear which fears itself and the other fears, but fears not one of the things that are dreadful?" "I haven't come across one" (168a; see δεινός; κατανοέω; φοβέομαι). Opinion follows, and then knowledge itself (168a; see δόξα).

Fear completes the list of the passions. Desire, wish and love are each of a good, pleasure, the good and the beautiful; fear is of a bad, the dreadful, and it is the first power in the survey whose object the soul flees. The argument holds for it as for the others: a fear of fears alone would fear nothing. The survey can be read as building, by sheer accumulation, the principle the argument goes on to state, that whatever has its own power in relation to itself must also have the character toward which that power is directed (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).

The example has a sharper edge than its neighbours. A fear of fear is a familiar human condition, and the argument passes over it. The passage can be read as allowing for it: such a fear would still fear something dreadful, the fears themselves as dreadful things, and so would not be a fear of "not one of the things that are dreadful". The impossibility lies in the exclusion, "but fears not one", as it does in Critias' knowledge "of nothing else".

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

167e–168a No fear fears itself and the other fears, but not one of the things that are dreadful.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Protagoras* defines fear and sets it on the same footing as the *Charmides*. Socrates asks the company whether they call something dread and fear, and whether it is what he calls it, "an expectation of something bad", whether one calls it fear or dread; Protagoras and Hippias agree, though Prodicus, true to his habit, distinguishes the two words. So what a man fears he thinks bad, and no one goes willingly toward what he thinks bad (358d–e). In the *Laches* Socrates sets out for Nicias the view he shares with Laches, using the other word, δέος: dreadful things are those that cause dread, things to be faced with confidence those that do not, and dread is a looking-forward to an evil still to come (198b). Both fix fear by its object, as the *Charmides* does, and both make that object a future bad, so that a knowledge of what is to be feared is a knowledge of good and bad.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle gives the definition its classic form in the *Rhetoric*. Fear, he says, is a kind of distress or agitation that comes from picturing some coming evil able to destroy or to hurt; for men do not fear every bad, such as being unjust or slow, but those that can bring great pains or destruction, and these not if they are far off but if they seem near at hand: all men know that they will die, but since it is not near they give it no thought.[254] The definition keeps the *Charmides*' condition: fear is of something dreadful, and what is not dreadful, or not near, is not feared.

Translation in this edition

"A fear" renders Φόβον (167e10), and "the other fears" τοὺς ἄλλους φόβους (167e10–168a1); "fears ... fears" render φοβεῖται twice (168a1), the verb

[254] Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 2.5, 1382a21–27.

keeping step with the noun (see φοβέομαι). The edition's English keeps the article of "the things that are dreadful", τῶν δεινῶν, so that fear's object is named as the other powers' objects were.

See also

ἀκοή; βούλησις; δεινός; δόξα; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιθυμία αὐτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν; κατανοέω; τὸ καλόν; φοβέομαι.

φρόνιμος · of sense

φρόνιμος, *phronimos*, "of sense"

Attested: φρόνιμος (*phronimos*; 163c). Sensible, prudent, having φρόνησις, practical wisdom. It comes once, at the end of Critias' defence of his definition from Hesiod. Hesiod, Critias says, called only things made finely and beneficially works, and held such things alone to be one's own and everything harmful another's; "So we must suppose that Hesiod, and anyone else of sense, calls the man who does his own business temperate" (163c; see Ἡσίοδος; οἰκεῖος). The adjective is an appeal to authority: Hesiod and every sensible man agree with Critias. The argument does not check it. Socrates answers by setting the words aside and asking what Critias applies them to (163d; see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων). The man of sense whom Critias invokes is the man the dialogue is looking for, and Critias assumes him before he has shown what sense in conduct would be.

See also Ἡσίοδος; οἰκεῖος; τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων.

φυλάττω · stand guard

φυλάττουσα, *phylattousa*, "standing guard"

Attested: φυλάττουσα (*phylattousa*; 173d). To watch, guard, keep. It comes once, in Socrates' grant of the dream: the human race would act and live knowledgeably, "since temperance, standing guard, would not allow the lack of knowledge to slip in and work alongside us" (173d; see

ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; παρεμπίπτω; συνεργός). Temperance can be pictured as a sentry at the gate of every craft, turning away the ignorant who would slip in. The image completes the dream (173a–d), where temperance, presiding over prophecy, turns away the impostors and sets up the true prophets (173c; see ἀλαζών; ἐπιστατέω). In the *Republic* the city's guardians take their name from the same family, and the guardians' work is the greatest, needing most leisure, craft and care, and a nature fitted for it (2.374d–e). The *Charmides* gives the guard's post to temperance, and then asks what it would be guarding: knowledge of what, and for whose good (173d–174d).

See also ἀλαζών; ἀνεπιστημοσύνη; ἐπιστατέω; παρεμπίπτω; συνεργός.

φύλλον · leaf

φύλλον, *phyllon*, "a leaf"; φύλλου, *phyllou*, "(of) the leaf"

Attested: φύλλον (*phyllon*; 155e), φύλλου (*phyllou*; 155e). A leaf; in medicine, a herb. It comes twice in one sentence, Socrates' improvised description of the remedy for the head: "the thing itself was a leaf", with a charm to go with it, and "without the charm the leaf was no use at all" (155e; see ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον). The leaf is the remedy's material, the plainest thing in the cure, and Socrates says no more about what kind it is. The Key Words note that "Greek healing could pair the two", herb and incantation. The sentence ranks them at once: the leaf without the charm is useless. The leaf is never mentioned again; the remedy lasts until 158c (see φάρμακον), and only the charm returns at the close (175e–176b).

See also ἐπῳδή; φάρμακον.

φύω · be by nature

To be by nature: the boy's natural gifts, and the question whether any knowledge is by nature able to relate to itself · Charmides

πεφυκώς, *pephykōs*, "made"; πέφυκας, *pephykas*, "endowed"; πέφυκεν, *pephyken*, "is by nature"

At a Glance

The word. To bring forth, to grow; in the perfect, to have grown so, to be by nature. The root of φύσις, "nature".

In the *Charmides*. Four times: the boy "in fact well made" in his soul (154e) and "well enough endowed" for temperance (158b); Critias' knowledge "not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge" (165e); and whether anything "is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself" (169a).

In this edition. "Made"; "endowed"; "by nature".

A place to read. 154e and 168e–169a.

Meaning

Φύω is growth: what a plant puts forth, what a child is born with. Its perfect, πέφυκα, "I have grown", means "I am by nature", and is a common way Greek says what something is born to be or do. The noun φύσις, nature, does not occur in the *Charmides*; the perfect of the verb carries the idea instead, and it divides between the nature of the boy and the nature of knowledge.

Use in the book

In the prologue the verb is about the boy: Socrates asks whether his soul is "in fact well made" (154e), and later whether he is "well enough endowed for temperance and the rest" (158b); both places are told under the phrase (see εὖ πέφυκα). The question of the dialogue is put as a question of nature: whether the boy was born with what temperance needs.

In the argument the verb is about knowledge. Critias objects that his knowledge "is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge, any more than they are like each other" (165e; see ὅμοιος), and so need not have a

product. Socrates turns the claim into a question of nature: it would need a great man to determine "whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else" (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; πρὸς ἄλλο). Critias appealed to the special nature of his knowledge; Socrates asks whether such a nature is possible at all, and leaves the question to someone greater.

The two uses can be read as one inquiry. The boy's nature is praised and then tested; the knowledge's nature is asserted and then doubted. The dialogue ends with both undecided: the boy does not know whether he has temperance (176a), and no one has shown that a knowledge can be by nature of itself. What a thing is by nature is the one thing the conversation could not settle by agreement.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

154e Socrates asks whether the boy is in fact well made in his soul.

158b If the boy is well enough endowed for temperance, blessed is the mother who bore him.

165e Critias: this knowledge is not by nature like the other kinds of knowledge.

169a Whether anything is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself needs a great man to determine.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic*'s warning about the best natures badly reared, which the dialogue's first readers could apply to the boy and his guardian, is told elsewhere (6.491d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle begins his account of nature in the *Metaphysics* from the verb. Nature, φύσις, is said in one way of the coming to be of things that grow, as if one pronounced the υ long; in another, of the first thing present in a growing thing from which it grows; and again of the source of the first motion in each thing that is by nature, present in it as itself.[255] His third sense can be read as

[255] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.4, 1014b16–20.

the one the *Charmides*' question at 169a reaches for: whether a knowledge could have in itself, by nature, a power directed at itself.

Translation in this edition

"Well made" renders εὖ πεφυκώς (154e1), with τυγχάνει, "in fact" (see τυγχάνω); "well enough endowed" ἱκανῶς πέφυκας (158b3); "is not by nature like" ὁμοία ... πέφυκεν (165e3–4); "is by nature able to have" πέφυκεν ἔχειν (169a4), after which Burnet, following Schleiermacher, brackets the words πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, "except knowledge" (apparatus; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). The adverb ὑπερφυῶς, "extraordinarily", is from the same root (see ὑπερφυῶς).

See also

δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; εὖ πέφυκα; μακάριος; μέγας ἀνήρ; ὅμοιος; πρὸς ἄλλο; σώφρων; τυγχάνω; ὑπερφυῶς; ὑποβαίνω; ψυχή.

φωνή · sound

The object of hearing, which a hearing that heard itself would have to have · Charmides

φωνῆς, *phōnēs*, "(of) sound"; φωνήν, *phōnēn*, "a sound"

At a Glance

The word. Voice, the sound a living creature utters; by extension any sound, and the speech of a people. It is akin to φημί, "say".

In the *Charmides*. Three times in two places: as what hearing hears, "a hearing which hears no sound" (167d) and "the hearing of nothing but sound" (168d); and as what a hearing that heard itself would have, "will hear itself as having a sound" (168d).

In this edition. "Sound".

A place to read. 167c–d and 168d–169a.

Meaning

In ordinary Greek φωνή is first a voice: the cry of an animal, the speech of a man, the dialect of a people. Philosophers also used it, as the *Charmides* does,

for whatever is heard: sound is what hearing is of, as colour is what sight is of. The two uses sit uneasily together. Plato himself uses φωνή for sound in general in the *Timaeus* (67b) and the *Republic* (6.507c), and sets it against ψόφος, mere noise, as a term of art in the *Theaetetus*' account of the letters (203b); Aristotle draws the line the *Charmides* leaves undrawn, keeping φωνή for voice and making ψόφος the name of sound in general.

Use in the book

The word comes in the second of Socrates' parallels to a knowledge of itself. After the sight that sees no colour he asks after "a hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings, and the non-hearings", and Critias denies there is one (167d; see ἀκοή; μὴ ἀκοαί). The case shows that sound is what makes hearing hearing: take sound away, and a hearing would be a hearing in name only. Critias, who is to defend a knowledge with no object of its own, refuses the hearing without an object at once.

At 168d the word returns in the principle that whatever has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Hearing, Socrates says, "was the hearing of nothing but sound", so that if it is to hear itself, "it will hear itself as having a sound"; Critias calls it "Absolutely necessary" (168d; see ἀκοή). The argument now asks what hearing would have to be, not what it hears. Since hearing hears only sound, a hearing that heard itself would itself have to have a sound, and so be a thing heard. Hearing is left undecided with sight (168e–169a; see ἀκοή; μέγας ἀνήρ).

The phrase at 168d6 is φωνὴν ἐχούσης, "as having a sound", and in plain Greek φωνὴν ἔχειν is also "to have a voice". Heard that way, the hearing that hears itself would be a hearing with a voice of its own. The English keeps the word the argument needs, but the Greek can be read as letting the absurdity be heard.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

167d A hearing which hears no sound, but hears itself and the other hearings: Critias denies there is one.

168d Hearing is of nothing but sound; to hear itself it would have to have a sound.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Timaeus* defines the pair the *Charmides* sets side by side. Timaeus lays it down that sound in general is the blow passed by the air through the ears, by way of brain and blood, as far as the soul, and that hearing is the motion this blow sets going, starting from the head and coming to rest around the liver's seat; the quick part of it is high in pitch, the slower part deeper (67b). Sound there is the cause and hearing the effect in the body, and neither is the other. In the *Theaetetus* Theaetetus, asked to give an account of the letter sigma as he had of the syllable, answers that an element has no elements to give: sigma is one of the voiceless letters, a noise only, ψόφος, like the hiss of the tongue; beta has neither voice nor noise; and the seven clearest letters, the vowels, "have voice only", φωνὴν μόνον ἔχει (203b). The phrase is the one Socrates uses of the hearing that hears itself at 168d.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in *On the Soul*, separates the two senses of the word. Voice, he says, is a sound belonging to a thing with soul: nothing without soul has a voice, though pipe and lyre are said to by likeness, because they have pitch, melody and articulation; and voice is the sound of a living creature, made not with any chance part of it.[256] On his terms what the *Charmides*' hearing hears is ψόφος, sound in general, and φωνή is one kind of it. In the *Poetics* he calls a vowel a letter that has audible voice without contact of tongue or lips.[257]

Translation in this edition

"Sound" renders φωνή at all three places: "hears no sound" (167d4), "the hearing of nothing but sound" (168d4), and "as having a sound" (168d6). The English word covers what hearing hears in general, which is the sense the argument needs.

[256] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.8, 420b5–13.
[257] Aristotle, *Poetics* 20, 1456b25–29.

See also

ἀκοή; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ; μὴ ἀκοαί; χρῶμα.

X Chi

Χαιρεφῶν · Chaerephon

Χαιρεφῶν, *Chairephōn*, "Chaerephon"; Χαιρεφῶντι, *Chairephōnti*, "(as) Chaerephon"

Attested: Χαιρεφῶν (*Chairephōn*; 153b, 154d), Χαιρεφῶντι (*Chairephōnti*; 154d). Chaerephon of the deme Sphettus, Socrates' devoted friend, is the first to speak to Socrates in the dialogue, and speaks in only two scenes. He jumps up from the middle of the company, runs to Socrates, seizes him by the hand and asks, "Socrates ... how did you come out of the battle alive?" (153b; see θέω; λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; μανικός; σῴζω). When the boy comes in, he calls across, "Well, Socrates, what do you think of the young man? Hasn't he a lovely face?", and adds that if the boy stripped he would seem to have no face at all; "The others all said the same as Chaerephon" (154d; see ἀπρόσωπος; εὐπρόσωπος). Socrates takes his verb, "strip", and turns it on the soul (154e; see ἀποδύω; ψυχή), and Chaerephon is not heard again. The edition's note at 153b recalls that he is the man who asked the Delphic oracle whether anyone was wiser than Socrates (*Apology* 21a; see Δελφοί). Aristophanes made him a butt of his jokes against Socrates' school in the *Clouds*: Socrates, a pupil reports, has just asked Chaerephon how many of its own feet a flea can jump, after it bit Chaerephon's eyebrow and leapt onto Socrates' head, and Strepsiades, the debt-ridden old countryman who enrols in the school, told by Socrates that he will be no different from Chaerephon in nature, cries that he will be half-dead.[258]

See also ἀποδύω; ἀπρόσωπος; Δελφοί; εὐπρόσωπος; θέω; λαμβάνομαι τῆς χειρός; μανικός; σῴζω; ψυχή.

[258] Aristophanes, *Clouds* 156 (Sphettus), 144–147, 503–504.

χαίρω · rejoice

Χαῖρε, *Chaire*, "Rejoice!"; χαίρειν, *chairein*, "rejoice"

Attested: Χαῖρε (*Chaire*; 164d), τοῦ χαίρειν (*tou chairein*; 164e), and in the idiom ἔα χαίρειν (*ea chairein*; 166d), which has its own entry. To rejoice, be glad; in the imperative Χαῖρε, the everyday Greek greeting at meeting and at parting, as "Hello" and "Farewell" both. The word belongs to Critias' reading of the inscription at Delphi as the god's greeting "in place of 'Rejoice!', on the view that this greeting, 'rejoice', is not the right one" (164d–e; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν; πρόσρημα; πρόσρησις; Σωφρόνει). Critias can be read as hearing the ordinary greeting literally, as a wish for pleasure, which the god corrects with a better wish. The reading of 164e1, τοῦ χαίρειν or τὸ χαίρειν, is told elsewhere (see πρόσρημα). At 166d–e Socrates uses the infinitive to set aside a question of persons: "say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted" (see ἔα χαίρειν). The third of the letters under Plato's name refuses the same greeting and gives the reason Critias leaves unsaid, that pleasure is no fit wish for god or man (315a–c; see εὖ πράττειν; πρόσρησις); Critias' god can be read as refusing it for the same reason.

See also Γνῶθι σαυτόν; Δελφοί; ἔα χαίρειν; εὖ πράττειν; πρόσρημα; πρόσρησις; Σωφρόνει.

χαλκοῦ ἐργασία · working bronze

The second of the crafts Critias will not count as the happy man's knowledge · Charmides

χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας, *chalkou ergasias*, "working bronze"

At a Glance

The phrase. The working of bronze, the smith's trade: χαλκός, copper and its alloy with tin, and ἐργασία, "working".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in Socrates' list of the crafts by which a man might live knowledgeably: "Working bronze, then?" "Not at all" (173e).

In this edition. "Working bronze".

A place to read. 173d–e.

Meaning

Χαλκός is copper and the bronze made from it, the metal of arms and armour, tools and statues, and the χαλκεύς, "bronze-smith", was the ordinary name for a smith of any metal. The smith worked with his hands at a fire, for wages or for a master, and so belonged to the trades that gentlemen called βάναυσος, "mechanical".

Use in the book

The phrase is the second step of a short descent. Critias has said that nothing else crowns doing well, if one slights "knowledgeably" (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως; τέλος), and Socrates asks, knowledgeably about what: cutting leather, bronze, wool, wood? The exchange is told elsewhere (173d–e; see σκυτῶν τομή); the bronze has a line of its own: "Working bronze, then?" "Not at all" (173e). The cobbler had been Critias' example of a man whose makings are not works (163b; see σκυτοτομέω); the smith is the next trade down the street, and Critias refuses him with the same promptness.

The refusal does the argument's work, as the cobbler's does: bronze-workers live knowledgeably, and Critias will not call them happy, so that the happy man must be marked off as one who lives knowledgeably about certain things (173e; see ἀφορίζω; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). The smith can be read as the plainest witness against the formula, because nobody in the room would call his life the best one. The knowledge of good and bad, when it is named (174b–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ), does not raise him: like the cobbler's, his craft keeps its product, and what it lacks is the knowledge that would make its use beneficial (174c–d; see σκυτῶν τομή).

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the questions round it.

173d–e Knowledgeably about what? Cutting leather, working bronze, wool, wood? Critias refuses each.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* uses the bronze-smith for the unworthy suitor of philosophy. When the best natures desert her, Socrates says, little men leap out of their crafts into philosophy, as runaways flee from prison into a temple, because her standing is grander than that of the other arts; their natures are imperfect, and as their bodies are maimed by their crafts and trades, so their souls are cramped and broken by the mechanical work. Do they look any different, he asks, from a bald, undersized smith who has got hold of some silver, just let out of his fetters, washed at the baths, in a brand-new cloak and got up like a bridegroom, about to marry his master's daughter because she is poor and has been left alone (6.495c–e)? Plato's Socrates draws his examples from the smithy as freely as Critias scorns it: Alcibiades says he talks of pack-asses, smiths, cobblers and tanners (*Symposium* 221e–222a; see σκυτῶν τομή), and in the *Republic* the scorn falls on the smith's presumption, though Socrates also blames the trades for maiming the bodies and cramping the souls of those who work at them.

Other ancient sources

Herodotus' report that nearly all the barbarians, and all the Greeks after them, hold craftsmen in less honour than other citizens, the Spartans most and the Corinthians least, is told elsewhere (2.167.1–2; see ἐργασία), and Critias' "Not at all" can be read as speaking for that common opinion. Xenophon reports that Critias, as one of the Thirty, later told Socrates to keep away from his cobblers, builders and smiths (*Memorabilia* 1.2.37; see δημιουργός).

Translation in this edition

"Working bronze, then?" renders Ἀλλὰ χαλκοῦ ἐργασίας; (173e2), the genitive continuing the construction of "knowledgeably about what". The English has "bronze", not "copper", since bronze was what the smith worked.

See also

ἀφορίζω; δημιουργός; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἐπιστημόνως; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν; ἐργασία; σκυτοτομέω; σκυτῶν τομή; τέλος.

Χαρμίδης · Charmides

Χαρμίδην, *Charmidēn*, "Charmides"; Χαρμίδης, *Charmidēs*, "Charmides"; Χαρμίδη, *Charmidē*, "Charmides" (in address)

Attested: Χαρμίδην (*Charmidēn*; 154b, 155b, 162c twice), Χαρμίδης (*Charmidēs*; 154b, 157d, 158c, 161c, 162c, 176a, 176c), Χαρμίδη (*Charmidē*; 156b, 156d, 157c, 157d, 158b, 158d, 159b, 160b, 160d, 162b, 162d, 175d, 176b). Charmides son of Glaucon, Critias' cousin and ward (154b, 155a; see ἐπίτροπος) and, as the edition's note at 153c says, the brother of Plato's mother, gives the dialogue its name and is its first respondent. He enters as the most beautiful of the young men, with lovers in his train (154a–c; see λευκὴ στάθμη), and is called over on the pretext of a headache (155b; see κεφαλή). Critias vouches that he is thought "far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d), and asked whether he is, he blushes and will neither affirm nor deny it, since either answer would be unseemly (158c–d; see ἀνερυθριάω; ψευδής). He gives three answers, quietness, modesty and doing one's own business (159b–161b; see αἰδώς; ἡσυχιότης; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν), and with a sly laugh goads his guardian into taking over (162b–e; see ὑπογελάω). He speaks again only at the close, when he does not know whether he has temperance, asks to be charmed every day, and, with his guardian, answers that they have finished plotting and will use force (176a–d; see βιάζομαι; ὅσαι ἡμέραι). In Xenophon's *Memorabilia* Socrates finds him a man of note and far abler than the men then running the city's affairs, who yet hung back from addressing the people and taking a hand in public business, and urges him on (see ἀγνοέω; αἰδώς).[259] In the *Hellenica* he falls, one of the Ten who held the Piraeus for the Thirty, in the battle at Munychia in which Critias also died (see ἄρχω; βιάζομαι).

[259] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.7.1; *Hellenica* 2.4.19.

See also ἀγνοέω; αἰδώς; ἀνερυθριάω; ἄρχω; βιάζομαι; ἐπίτροπος; ἡσυχιότης; κεφαλή; Κριτίας; λευκὴ στάθμη; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν; ὑπογελάω; ψευδής.

χασμάομαι · yawn

χασμωμένους, *chasmōmenous*, "yawning"

Attested: τοὺς χασμωμένους (*tous chasmōmenous*; 169c). To yawn, to gape; from χάσκω, "gape", the root of χάσμα, "a gaping hole". The word gives the simile with which Socrates describes Critias at a loss: he was "like people who catch a yawn from those they see yawning opposite them" (169c; see ἁλίσκομαι; καταντικρύ; συμπάσχω). The yawn fits the case in two ways. It passes from one man to another without being willed, as Socrates' perplexity passes to Critias: "he too seemed to me to be forced by my perplexity to be caught by perplexity himself" (169c; see ἀπορία). And it can be read as a thing the body does in public that a man of standing would rather not be seen doing: Critias, "used to being admired on every occasion", is ashamed before the company, says nothing clear and keeps covering up his perplexity (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἐπικαλύπτω). A yawn caught is a yawn the others can see, and so is Critias' perplexity, however he covers it.

See also αἰσχύνομαι; ἁλίσκομαι; ἀπορία; ἐπικαλύπτω; καταντικρύ; συμπάσχω.

χράομαι · use, be in need

χρῷτο, *chrōito*, "using"; κεχρημένῳ, *kechrēmenōi*, "in need"; χρῆσθαι, *chrēsthai*, "using"

Attested: χρῷτο (*chrōito*; 155e), κεχρημένῳ (*kechrēmenōi*; 161a), χρῆσθαι (*chrēsthai*; 173c). To use, deal with, consult, with the dative of what is used; in the perfect participle, κεχρημένος, "in want of", "needy". The verb comes twice where use is shown not to be enough. Socrates' remedy is a leaf, and the charm must be sung "while using it" (155e; see ἐπῳδή; φύλλον): use alone

does nothing without the words. In Socrates' dream of temperance ruling, our possessions would be expertly made "because we would be using genuine craftsmen" (173c; see ἀληθινός; δημιουργός), and use is again not enough (173d; see χρῆμα). Between the two stands the line of Homer that Socrates puts to the boy, "Modesty is no good thing to be present with a man in need" (161a), where the participle has its other sense, a man who must ask for what he needs (see αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; πάρειμι). The verb χρή, "one must", is a different word and is not listed.

See also αἰδὼς δ' οὐκ ἀγαθὴ; ἀληθινός; δημιουργός; ἐπῳδή; πάρειμι; φύλλον; χρῆμα.

χρῆμα · possessions

χρήματα, *chrēmata*, "possessions"

Attested: τὰ χρήματα (*ta chrēmata*; 173c). A thing one needs or uses, from χράομαι, "use"; in the plural, goods, property, money. It comes once, in the dream of life under temperance's rule, where Socrates asks what else would follow than that "all our possessions would be expertly made for us" (173c; see σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς; χράομαι). The word gathers everything a household owns under the craftsmen's care, and its root gives the reason: possessions are things for use, and the dream secures their making, not their use. The question that follows, whether acting knowledgeably would make us do well and be happy, can be read as the question of what the possessions are for (173d; see ἐπιστημόνως).

See also ἐπιστημόνως; σκεῦος; τεχνικῶς; χράομαι.

χρήσιμος · useful

χρησίμους, *chrēsimous*, "useful"; χρησίμη, *chrēsimē*, "use"

Attested: χρησίμους (*chrēsimous*; 165a), χρησίμη (*chrēsimē*; 165c). Useful, serviceable, from χράομαι, "use". Critias uses it first, of the men who dedicated the later inscriptions at Delphi: thinking "Know thyself" a piece of

advice, they wrote up their own "so that they too, if you please, could dedicate useful advice no less" (165a; see Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; συμβουλή). The sneer is in his "if you please": advice is merely useful, the god's greeting something higher. Socrates takes the word back at once and puts it to temperance itself. Medicine, knowledge of the healthy, would be asked "what use is it to us and what does it produce?", and Critias, who calls temperance knowledge of oneself, must be able to say the same for it (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι). Critias set the god's greeting above useful advice; now his definition must show its use.

See also ἀπεργάζομαι; Ἐγγύη πάρα δ' ἄτη; Μηδὲν ἄγαν; ὄφελος; συμβουλή; χράομαι; χρηστός; ὠφελία.

χρηστός · useful

χρηστόν, *chrēston*, "useful"

Attested: οὐδὲν χρηστόν (*ouden chrēston*; 172c, 175a). Useful, serviceable, and so good, of things and of men; from χράομαι, "use". Both times it is Socrates' judgement on his own inquiry, in the phrase "to no useful purpose", literally "nothing useful". When Critias allows that temperance may give only such smaller goods as learning more easily ("Perhaps that is how it is"), Socrates says: "Perhaps ... And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose" (172c; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ζητέω). At the end he recalls the fear: "So you see, Critias, that my fear long ago was reasonable, and I was right to blame myself for looking into temperance to no useful purpose?" (175a; see αἰτιάομαι; σκοπέω). The second place answers the first: the doubt of 172c has become the verdict of 175a, and Socrates lays the blame on himself, not on temperance. Since χρηστός is also the ordinary word for a decent man, "nothing useful" can be read as a verdict on the search, not on temperance, which Socrates still calls a great good (175e; see ἀγαθός; ὠφέλιμος).

See also ἀγαθός; αἰτιάομαι; ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην; ζητέω; σκοπέω; χρήσιμος; ὠφέλιμος.

χρῶμα · color

The object of sight, which a sight that saw itself would have to have · Charmides

χρῶμα, *chrōma*, "color"; χρῶμά τι, *chrōma ti*, "some color"

At a Glance

The word. Colour; first the surface of the body, the skin and its complexion, from χρώς, "skin", and then the colour of anything.

In the *Charmides*. Twice: as what sight sees, a sight "which, though it is sight, sees no color" (167d); and as what a sight that saw itself would have, "must have some color" (168d).

In this edition. "Color".

A place to read. 167c–d and 168d–169a.

Meaning

The word began on the body. Χρώς is the skin, and χρῶμα the look of it, the colour of a face that blushes or turns pale; it then became the colour of anything seen. Colour is what sight is of, and Aristotle made it the plainest case of an object proper to one sense (*On the Soul* 2.6, 418a11–13; see ὄψις); the *Charmides* uses it as that: the thing without which seeing has nothing to do.

Use in the book

The word opens the procession of parallels by which Socrates tests a knowledge of itself. He asks whether there is a sight of itself and of the other sights and of non-sights (see μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων) "which, though it is sight, sees no color, but sees itself and the other sights" (167d), and Critias swears by Zeus that he does not think so (see μὰ Δία). Colour is the word for everything sight is ordinarily of. A sight that sees no colour but sees itself is the image of Critias' temperance, a knowledge that knows no object of its own but knows itself and the other kinds of knowledge (see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).

At 168d the word comes back in the same principle, after hearing (see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; φωνή): sight, "if it is to see itself, must have some color"

(168d), since sight sees nothing colourless (see ἄχρως). The second place answers the first. At 167d a sight that saw no colour was refused as absurd; at 168d a sight that saw itself would have to be coloured, and so be one of the things it sees. Of the senses, sight is the case in which the requirement is plainest, because nobody doubts what sight is of; yet Socrates puts it, with hearing, among the cases only doubted, not with magnitudes and numbers, where the thing is "altogether impossible" (168e–169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ).

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

167d A sight which sees no colour but sees itself and the other sights: Critias does not think there is one.

168d A sight that is to see itself must have some colour.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the *Meno* Socrates, to please Meno, gives an answer about colour in the manner of Gorgias, using the doctrine of Empedocles, the philosopher of Acragas in Sicily in the mid-fifth century BC, that things give off effluences which fit the pores of the senses. Introducing it with words of Pindar, "understand what I tell you", he defines colour as an outflow from shapes, matched in measure to sight and perceptible (76c–d). Meno thinks the answer excellent; Socrates calls it "tragic", grand in the manner of the stage, and says his earlier answer about shape was better (76e). The definition's word is χρόα, another word for colour, though Meno had asked about χρῶμα (76a); its colour is something given off by things to meet sight; the *Charmides*' colour is simply what sight is of. The *Republic*'s third thing, light, without which colour goes unseen, is told elsewhere (6.507c–508b; see ὄψις).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle states as doctrine what the *Charmides* assumes. What sight is of, he says in *On the Soul*, is the visible, and the visible is colour; colour is what lies upon the thing visible in itself, and every colour has the power to set in motion the transparent when it is actually transparent, which is its nature; so

it is not visible without light.[260] Sight, on this account, is defined by colour, as the *Charmides*' argument requires. His answer to the *Charmides*' difficulty, that what sees is in a way coloured, is told elsewhere (*On the Soul* 3.2, 425b12–25; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς).

Translation in this edition

"Color" renders χρῶμα at 167d1 and 168d10, in the edition's American spelling. The adjective ἄχρων, in "anything that has no color" (168d10), has its own entry.

See also

αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἄχρως; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; μὰ Δία; μέγας ἀνήρ; μὴ ὄψεις; ὄψις; ὄψις ἑαυτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὄψεων; φωνή.

χωρὶς ἑκατέρου · of the two separately

The Thracian's name for the mistake of the Greek doctors, who treat body and soul apart · Charmides

χωρὶς ἑκατέρου, *chōris hekaterou*, "of the two separately"

At a Glance

The phrase. Each of the two apart: χωρίς, "apart", "separately", and ἑκάτερος, "each of two".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the Thracian's warning as Socrates reports it: "some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b).

In this edition. "Of the two separately".

A place to read. 156d–157c.

Meaning

Χωρίς is an adverb, "apart", "by itself", and with a genitive a preposition, "without", "apart from". The phrase can be construed either way. If χωρίς

[260] Aristotle, *On the Soul* 2.7, 418a26–b3.

governs ἑκατέρου, they would try to be doctors "apart from each" of the two, that is, without either; if ἑκατέρου goes with ἰατροί, "doctors", they are doctors of each of the two, separately. The edition takes the second construction, and the apposition that follows, σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας, names the two: temperance and health.

Use in the book

The phrase turns the Thracian's principle, that the body is not to be cured without the soul (156e; see σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; ψυχή), into a charge. The Thracian puts it as an instruction to Socrates: no one is to persuade him to treat a head with the remedy who has not first handed over his soul to the charm, "For that ... is the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings: some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health" (157b; see ἁμάρτημα). The doctors he means are specialists. One looks after the body and its health, another, if anyone does, after the soul and its temperance, and each thinks his part can be well while the whole is not. The adverb carries the error: the trouble is not that they treat health or temperance, but that they treat them apart.

Socrates takes the warning as binding. He has sworn the Thracian an oath, and he will not give the remedy to the boy unless the boy first hands over his soul (157b–c; see ὄμνυμι). The argument ends in the very division the Thracian warned against (174e–175a; see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια), and the adverb can be read as naming it in advance.

Places to read

The phrase's place, with the oath that binds Socrates to it.

157b Some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health.

157b–c Bound by his oath, Socrates will treat the boy's head only if he first hands over his soul to the charm.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* can be read as correcting the same error for education. Socrates asks Glaucon whether the men who set up the schooling in music and in exercise had in view, as some suppose, the body's care in the one and the

soul's in the other; very likely, he suggests, it was with the soul above all in view that they set up both, since a lifetime of exercise without any touch of music leaves the mind itself shaped one way, and the reverse schooling another (3.410b–c). Gymnastics, too, is care of the soul, and the *Republic* can be read as refusing the division of labour that the Thracian blames on the doctors. The *Timaeus*' rule, to move neither the soul without the body nor the body without the soul, is told elsewhere (88b–c; see σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς). In the *Phaedo* the adverb names death itself: to be dead, Socrates and Simmias agree, is for the body to have come to be apart by itself, released from the soul, and the soul apart by itself, released from the body (64c). Set beside it, the Thracian's charge can be read as saying that to treat body and soul apart is to treat the living man as death will divide him.

Translation in this edition

"Of the two separately, of temperance and of health" renders χωρὶς ἑκατέρου, σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας (157b6), "the two" giving the sense of ἑκατέρου, "each of two", and "separately" the adverb. The words σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας are missing in one manuscript (see σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια).

See also

ἁμάρτημα; Ζάλμοξις; ὄμνυμι; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια; ψυχή.

Ψ Psi

ψευδής · a liar

The word of the boy's dilemma: to deny that he is temperate would make his guardian a liar · Charmides

ψευδῆ, *pseudē*, "a liar"

At a Glance

The word. False, untrue; of a person, lying or mistaken, a liar. Akin to ψεύδομαι, "lie", "be deceived".

In the *Charmides*. Once, in the boy's reason for not answering: "I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar" (158d).

In this edition. "A liar".

A place to read. 158c–e.

Meaning

Ψευδής is said of words, of things and of men. A false statement is one that is not so; a false man is one whose statements are not so, whether he means to deceive or has been deceived himself. The boy's sentence uses the second sense in its mildest form. Critias would be shown to have said something untrue about his ward, not to be a cheat.

Use in the book

Socrates has asked the boy whether he agrees with Critias that he already has a sufficient share of temperance. The boy blushes and says that it is not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny (158c; see ἀνερυθριάω). To deny, he says, would be an odd thing to say against oneself, and "at the same time I shall be showing up Critias here as a liar, and many others too who think I am temperate, by his account"; to affirm would be self-praise (158d;

see αἰσχυντηλός; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἔξαρνος). Socrates calls the answer sensible, and proposes that they look into it together (158d–e; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι).

The dilemma rests on testimony. Whether the boy is temperate has been settled, so far, by what Critias says and many others think, and the boy cannot answer for himself without contradicting them. Socrates' remedy is to replace testimony with inquiry: the boy is to say what temperance seems to him to be, and from that they can make a guess whether he has it (159a). The boy's fear can be read as fulfilled in another way. Critias is not shown a liar about his ward, but his own definitions are shown false one after another, and when he is caught at a loss he hides it, "ashamed in front of the company" (169c; see αἰσχύνομαι). Socrates' own fear at 166d is of a different falsehood: he refutes, he says, for the reason he would scrutinize himself, "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166d; see οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι). The boy fears making another man false in words; Socrates fears being false in his own mind.

Places to read

The word's place.

158d To deny that he is temperate would show up Critias as a liar; to affirm it would be self-praise.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* can be read as naming the falsehood Socrates fears. All gods and men, Socrates tells Adeimantus, hate what is truly a lie, if one may call it that: no one is willing to be deceived in the most sovereign part of himself about the most sovereign things, and everyone is most afraid of having falsehood there. To be deceived in the soul about the things that are, and to be ignorant, and to hold the lie there, is what men would least accept; so the ignorance in the soul of the deceived man would most rightly be called the true lie, while the lie in words is an imitation of what the soul undergoes, an image that comes after it (2.382a–c). On those terms the boy's fear concerns the imitation, and Socrates' the original.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics*, distinguishes the senses in which things, accounts and men are false. A false account is an account of what is not; a false man is one who takes up such accounts readily and by preference, as an end and not as a means to something further, and also one who plants them in others. So, he says, the argument of the *Hippias* leads us astray when it concludes that the same man is false and true: it counts as false the man with the power to lie, and that is the man of knowledge and good sense.[261] On the first part of that definition Critias, who believed what he said of his ward, can be read as mistaken at worst, not false; on the second, since many others think the boy temperate by his account (158d), he would come nearer to it. The *Hippias Minor*'s argument itself is told elsewhere (366e–367a; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).

Translation in this edition

"Showing up Critias here as a liar" renders καὶ Κριτίαν τόνδε ψευδῆ ἐπιδείξω (158d3); a conjecture on the verb is told elsewhere (see ἐπιδείκνυμι). "A liar" gives the adjective, used of a person, the English noun.

See also

αἰσχύνομαι; αἰσχυντηλός; ἀνερυθριάω; ἔξαρνος; ἐπιδείκνυμι; ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης; κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι; οἴεσθαι εἰδέναι; Χαρμίδης.

[261] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 5.29, 1024b17–1025a13.

ψυχή · soul

The part of the boy to be stripped first and treated first, which the argument about knowledge never names · Charmides

ψυχήν, *psychēn*, "soul"; ψυχῆς, *psychēs*, "(of) the soul"; ψυχαῖς, *psychais*, "souls"

At a Glance

The word. Breath, life, soul: in Homer what leaves a man when he dies, and by Socrates' time the seat of thought and character, the self that can be good or bad, healthy or diseased.

In the *Charmides*. Eleven times. The boy's soul, which Socrates would strip and look at first (154e); the Thracian's teaching, that everything good and bad starts from the soul, which must be treated first, with charms (156e–157c); the soul's quickness in the argument against the boy's first answer (160a–b); and, at the end, the boy "most temperate in soul" (175d).

In this edition. "Soul" throughout.

A place to read. 154d–e, 156d–157c and 175d–176b.

Meaning

In Homer the ψυχή is what a man loses when he dies: it leaves through the mouth or a wound and goes down to Hades, a shade without strength or wits, while thinking and feeling belong to other organs.[262] By the fifth century the word had become the name of the man himself as distinct from his body: the seat of intelligence and character, of courage and desire, the part of him that can be educated and can be in good or bad condition. Plato's Socrates made the care of it his charge, and the *Charmides* uses the word in that sense from its first page.

Use in the book

The soul enters as a beauty still hidden. Chaerephon has said that the boy, stripped, would seem to have no face, and Socrates answers that he would be

[262] Homer, *Iliad* 9.408–409 (past the barrier of the teeth), 14.518–519 and 16.505 (through a wound), 23.103–104 (soul and phantom, but no wits); *Odyssey* 10.493–495 (Teiresias alone keeps his mind) and 10.521 (the strengthless heads of the dead).

invincible "if he has just one little thing more": "If where his soul is concerned ... he is in fact well made" (154d–e; see εὖ πέφυκα). Then the proposal: "Then why don't we strip that very part of him ... and take a look at it before we look at his figure?" (154e; see ἀποδύω; διαλέγομαι). The joke treats the soul as a second body under the clothes, and the way to strip it is conversation. The order is fixed at once: the soul first, the figure after.

The Thracian's teaching makes the order medical. One must not cure the body without the soul (156e; see σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς), because everything, bad and good alike, "starts from the soul and flows from there, as it flows from the head into the eyes" (156e–157a; see ἐπιρρέω). "So it is the soul that must be treated first and foremost" (157a; see πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα), and the treatment is words: "the soul, my dear fellow ... is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words. From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls" (157a; see ἐπῳδή; θεραπεύω; λόγοι καλοί). The soul is now a patient, and temperance is its health. Socrates holds the boy to the order: "if you are willing, as the stranger instructed, to hand over your soul first to be charmed with the Thracian's charms, I shall apply the remedy to your head" (157c; see παρέχω). The stripping of 154e and the charm of 157a can be read as the same act described twice, as looking and as healing.

In the argument against the boy's first answer the soul is a field of activity, like the body. Quick-wittedness is "a kind of sharpness of the soul, and not a quietness" (160a; see ἀγχίνοια; ὀξύτης), and speed is finer "in the soul's inquiries and in deliberation" (160a; see ζήτησις). Socrates sums up: "So in everything, Charmides ... in the soul and in the body alike, what belongs to quickness and sharpness appears finer to us than what belongs to slowness and quietness?" (160b; see ἡσυχιότης). The soul here moves as a body moves, faster or slower, and the parallel does the refuting.

Then the word disappears. Through the boy's last two answers and all of Critias' definitions (temperance as doing one's own business, as the doing of good things, as knowing oneself, as knowledge of knowledge) the soul is never named. Critias' temperance is a knowledge, and the argument asks what it knows and what benefit it brings; when it asks what the knowledge

makes of the man who has it (169e, 172b), the answer is a knower, never a soul in good condition. Even "knowing oneself" is examined without the question what the self is (164d–167a; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). Socrates names the soul again only in his lament, telling the boy that he is aggrieved if he, "most temperate in soul", is to get no profit from his temperance (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; ὠφελέω). The last use joins the first. Looks and soul are the two things set side by side at 154d–e, the body Chaerephon would strip and the soul Socrates would strip first, and when the soul returns the charm returns with it, and the boy asks to be charmed every day (175e–176b; see ἐπῳδή). The dialogue can be read as losing the soul in the argument about knowledge and finding it again when it turns back to the boy.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

154e If, where his soul is concerned, the boy is well made; Socrates proposes to strip that part first.

156e One must not cure the body without the soul; everything good and bad starts from the soul.

157a The soul must be treated first and foremost, with charms that are beautiful words; from them temperance comes to be in souls.

157b No one is to have his head treated who does not first hand over his soul to the charm.

157c Socrates asks the boy to hand over his soul first to be charmed.

160a Quick-wittedness is a sharpness of the soul; speed is finer in the soul's inquiries.

160b In the soul and the body alike, quickness appears finer than slowness.

175d The boy, beautiful in looks and most temperate in soul, is to get no profit from temperance.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *First Alcibiades* asks the question the *Charmides* passes over, and answers it: the self one is bidden to know is the soul (130e; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The *Laws* ranks the soul among a man's possessions. Of all that is his own, the Athenian stranger says, the soul is the most divine after the gods, being most his own; of what a man has, the better part is master and the

worse is slave, and the masters must always be honoured before the slaves; so he is right to bid men honour their soul second, after the gods and those who attend on them. Yet scarcely anyone gives it its due, though each supposes he does. Honour is a divine good, and a man who means to raise his soul up with speeches, presents or concessions, while leaving it no better than it was, has the look of honouring it without the fact (5.726a–727a). The Thracian's charms of beautiful words can be read as the opposite of that flattery, since their work is to make the soul better. In the *Phaedo* Socrates draws the hierarchy from nature: once soul and body are joined, nature gives the body the slave's part, to obey and take orders, and the soul the master's, to command; and since the divine is fitted by nature to lead and the mortal to follow, Cebes grants that the soul resembles the divine and the body what dies (79e–80a). Socrates' exhortation in the *Apology* to care for the soul, how it will be best, is told elsewhere (29d–30a; see ἐπιμέλεια), and so is the self-moving soul of the *Phaedrus* and the *Laws* (*Phaedrus* 245c–e; *Laws* 10.895e–896a; see ἀδύνατος).

Other ancient sources

Homer's soul is the one the *Charmides* has left behind. When Hector dies, his soul takes wing out of his limbs and is away to Hades, weeping for its lot as it quits his vigour and his prime; the same lines are used of Patroclus.[263] The Thracian's soul is what must be cared for while the man lives. Heraclitus, as Diogenes Laertius reports him, gave it a depth no inquiry exhausts: "going, you would not come upon the ends of soul, though you walked every road; so deep is its account".[264] Aristotle's definition of the soul as the first actuality of a natural body that has organs is told elsewhere (*On the Soul* 2.1, 412a27–b9; see σῶμα).

Translation in this edition

"Soul" renders ψυχή at every place, and "souls" the plural at 157a5. The first and last uses are accusatives of respect: "where his soul is concerned" for τὴν

[263] Homer, *Iliad* 22.361–363; of Patroclus, 16.855–857.
[264] Diogenes Laertius 9.7 (Heraclitus, fragment 45 Diels–Kranz).

ψυχήν (154e1), and "most temperate in soul" for τὴν ψυχὴν σωφρονέστατος (175d7–e1). "The soul's inquiries" renders ταῖς ζητήσεσιν τῆς ψυχῆς (160a8).

See also

ἀγανακτέω; ἀγχίνοια; ἀδύνατος; ἀποδύω; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; διαλέγομαι; ἐπιμέλεια; ἐπιρρέω; ἐπῳδή; εὖ πέφυκα; ζήτησις; ἡσυχιότης; θεραπεύω; λόγοι καλοί; ὀνίνημι; ὀξύτης; παρέχω; πρῶτον καὶ μάλιστα; σῶμα; σῶμα ἄνευ ψυχῆς; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου; ὠφελέω.

Ω Omega

ὠθέω · shove

ἐώθει, *eōthei*, "shoved"

Attested: ἐώθει (*eōthei*; 155c). To push, thrust, shove. It comes once, in the scramble when the boy is called over: "Every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up and shoved his neighbor hard to make room for Charmides to sit beside him, until, of those sitting at the end, we made one stand up and tipped the other off sideways" (155c; see καταβάλλω; σπουδή; συγχωρέω). The imperfect pictures the shove passing down the bench, each man pushing the one beside him in turn, and the sentence ends with the men at the end of the bench on their feet or on the floor. The company of the palaestra behaves like a crowd of schoolboys at the boy's arrival, and the comedy prepares Socrates' own confession a moment later that his boldness had been knocked clean out of him (155c; see ἐκκόπτω). The form is the Attic imperfect with the syllabic augment, ἐώθει, Wilhelm Dindorf's correction, which Burnet prints; B and T have ὤθει (apparatus, c2).

See also ἐκκόπτω; καταβάλλω; σπουδή; συγχωρέω.

ὠφελέω · benefit

Critias' last claim for temperance, and Socrates' grief that it will not benefit the boy · Charmides

ὠφελοῖ, *ōpheloi*, "would benefit"; ὠφελεῖν, *ōphelein*, "to benefit"; ὠφελήσει, *ōphelēsei*, "is to be of ... benefit"

At a Glance

The word. To help, to do good to, to benefit, with the person benefited in the accusative; the opposite of βλάπτειν, "harm".

In the *Charmides*. Five times: Socrates' question whether such a knowledge "would benefit us or not" (169b); "the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d); Critias' reply, "Why couldn't it benefit us?" and "it would benefit us" (174d–e); and Socrates' grief that temperance "is to be of no benefit to you in life" (175e).

In this edition. "Benefit".

A place to read. 174d–175a and 175d–176a.

Meaning

To benefit someone is to make him better off: to help him in need, to cure him, to profit him. The verb takes the person benefited as its object, and the question it raises is whom a thing benefits and how. In the *Charmides* the object is "us" three times, understood a fourth time in Critias' "Why couldn't it benefit us?" (174d8, where the English supplies it), and "you", the boy, once.

Use in the book

The verb first frames Socrates' condition for accepting Critias' definition: he will not grant that knowledge of knowledge is temperance until he has looked into whether a thing of that kind "would benefit us or not" (169b; see ὠφέλιμος). At 174d it names the work of the knowledge of good and bad, "the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν), and so takes the benefit away from temperance.

Critias answers with his last claim for his definition, "Why couldn't it benefit us?": temperance, if it presides over the other kinds of knowledge, would rule over the knowledge of the good as well, and so "it would benefit us" (174d–e; see ἄρχω; ἐπιστατέω). His temperance benefits as a ruler benefits, by commanding the knowledge that does the work. Socrates' reply shows the cost: then temperance would also make us healthy, and not medicine, and do each craft's work, though they had agreed long ago that it was knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else (174e; see τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον). A ruler that knows only knowledge has nothing of its own to give, and the reply leaves Critias' claim with no

ground. The political dream of temperance presiding over the city's knowledge (171d–172a, 173a–d) is here compressed into one sentence, and the sentence fails.

The last use turns from "us" to the boy. "But on your account, Charmides ... I am very aggrieved", Socrates says, if temperance "is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you" (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; βίος; ὀνίνημι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). The question of benefit is now a question about one life, and Socrates will not accept the answer the argument has given. He blames himself as a poor inquirer (175e; see φαῦλος; ὠφέλιμος).

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

169b Socrates will not grant the definition until he has looked into whether such a knowledge would benefit us.

174d The knowledge whose work is to benefit us is the knowledge of good and bad, not temperance.

174d–e Critias: temperance, ruling over the knowledge of the good, would benefit us.

175e Socrates is aggrieved that temperance is to be of no benefit to the boy in life.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon opens the fourth book of his memoirs of Socrates with the family's words, the adjective twice and then the verb. Socrates, he says, was so beneficial in every matter and in every way that anyone who considered it, even with modest discernment, could see that nothing was more beneficial than to be with Socrates and spend time with him, anywhere and on any matter; even the memory of him, when he was not there, benefited not a little those who used to be with him and accepted him.[265] The *Charmides* ends with temperance shown, by the argument, to be of no benefit, and with the boy resolved to be charmed by Socrates every day (176b; see ὅσαι ἡμέραι). Xenophon's sentence can be read as saying what the boy's resolve implies.

[265] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.1.1.

Translation in this edition

"Benefit" renders the verb at 169b3, 174d4, 174d8 and 174e2. At 175e2 μηδέ τί σ' ὠφελήσει, literally "and will not benefit you at all", is "it is to be of no benefit to you", keeping the family's word beside ὀνήσῃ, "get no profit", just before it.

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀγανακτέω; ἄρχω; βίος; ἐπιστατέω; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; ὀνίνημι; ὅσαι ἡμέραι; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα; τὸ αὑτῆς ἔργον; φαῦλος; ὠφελία; ὠφέλιμος; ὠφελίμως.

ὠφελία · benefit

The question Socrates puts to temperance, and the word of the answer it receives · Charmides

ὠφελίαν, *ōphelian*, "benefit"; ὠφελία, *ōphelia*, "benefit"; ὠφελίας, *ōphelias*, "(of) benefit"

At a Glance

The word. Benefit, help, advantage; the noun of ὠφελέω, "benefit". It is also spelled ὠφέλεια, as in Xenophon and Aristotle, in Plato's *Theaetetus* (186c), and regularly in later Greek.

In the *Charmides*. Five times: medicine produces "No small benefit" (165d); the question "what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b) and "Then what benefit ... would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?" (171d); and twice at 175a, "Nor of benefit either" and "the craftsman of no benefit".

In this edition. "Benefit".

A place to read. 165c–d, 167a–b, 171d–172a and 174e–175a.

Meaning

A benefit is always someone's: the good a thing does to the person who has or uses it. To ask the benefit of a knowledge is to ask whom it helps and in what, and in the dialogues the question tests whether a supposed good is one.

Use in the book

The noun enters with medicine as the model. Asked what use medicine is and what it produces, Socrates would answer, "'No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us'" (165d; see καλὸν ἔργον; ὑγίεια). Benefit is the work's value to the people it serves, and temperance is asked for a work of the same kind (165e).

At 167b the question becomes the second of the two that govern the rest of the dialogue: after whether such a knowledge is possible (see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν), "even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b). The first question takes the long argument of the parallels (167c–169c); the second returns at 171d, when knowledge of knowledge has shrunk to knowing that one knows, not what. "Then what benefit, Critias ... would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?" (171d). Socrates recalls the life they had supposed it would give, lived without error by its possessors and by everyone they ruled (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; μεγαλωστί), and the reduced temperance cannot give it.

At the end the noun is given to another craft and denied to temperance. Health belongs to medicine, and benefit too belongs elsewhere: "Nor of benefit either, then, my friend", Socrates says, since that work had just been assigned to another craft (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). Then the verdict: temperance is "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The word begins as the thing medicine plainly provides, and ends as the thing Critias' temperance cannot provide at all. The question of 167b is answered in its own word.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

165d Medicine produces no small benefit: health, a fine work for us.

167b The second question: what benefit there would be in knowing what one knows and does not know.

171d What benefit would we still get from temperance, if it knows only that one knows?

175a Benefit was assigned to another craft; temperance is the craftsman of no benefit.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Euthyphro* puts the same question to another virtue defined as a kind of care. All tending, Socrates says, is done for the good and benefit of what is tended: horses in the horseman's charge gain by it and grow better, and so do dogs in the huntsman's and cattle in the herdsman's. Is piety, then, being the tending of the gods, a benefit to the gods, and does a pious act improve one of them? Euthyphro swears it does not (13b–c). What work the gods' servants help to produce, Socrates' next question, is told elsewhere (13d–14a; see καλὸν ἔργον). The *Euthyphro* asks of piety what the *Charmides* asks of temperance at 165c–d: its benefit and its work. The *Republic*'s argument that each art provides its own benefit is told elsewhere (1.346a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

Other ancient sources

The Stoics' account of the good, as Diogenes Laertius reports it, can be read as making the question of 167b impossible to ask of a virtue. The good, they said, is in general that which is of some use, and in the proper sense it is either the same as benefit or not other than benefit; and so virtue itself is a good, and so are the action done from virtue and the good man who shares in it.[266] On their terms temperance, being a virtue, is a benefit, and a temperance that benefits no one would not be a virtue at all.

Translation in this edition

"Benefit" at 165d1, 167b3, 171d1, 175a3 and 175a6–7. The edition's Key Words keep "benefit" for the whole family, so that the verdict of 175a answers the question of 167b in its own terms, and keep "use" and "useful" for other words (see χρήσιμος; χρηστός).

[266] Diogenes Laertius 7.94.

See also

ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀποδίδωμι; δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; καλὸν ἔργον; μεγαλωστί; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ὑγίεια; χρήσιμος; χρηστός; ὠφελέω; ὠφέλιμος.

ὠφέλιμος · beneficial

Socrates' prophetic hunch about temperance, which the argument fails to make good and he refuses to give up · Charmides

ὠφέλιμα, *ōphelima*, "something beneficial"; ὠφέλιμον, *ōphelimon*, "beneficial"; ὠφέλιμος, *ōphelimos*, "beneficial", "what benefits"

At a Glance

The word. Beneficial, helpful, profitable; the adjective of ὠφελέω, "benefit".

In the *Charmides*. Seven times, one of them in words Burnet brackets: a doctor makes "something beneficial" (164b); Socrates' hunch that temperance is "something beneficial and good" (169b), and his demand that Critias show it "beneficial too" (169c); "of enormous benefit" (171d); "if this is what benefits us" (174d); and "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a).

In this edition. "Beneficial", with "of benefit" and "what benefits" where the English needs them.

A place to read. 169b–c and 174d–175a.

Meaning

Ὠφέλιμος is said of whatever does someone good: food, a remedy, advice, a friend, a craft. Socrates' hunch at 169b joins the good and the beneficial in one phrase.

Use in the book

The adjective first appears in the doctor's case. Socrates asks Critias "whether you think a doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating", and Critias agrees (164a–

b; see ἰατρός). The beneficial is here the product of a craft, and the next step shows that the craftsman may produce it without knowing that he has (164b–c; see ὠφελίμως).

At 169b it becomes Socrates' own claim, the reason he asks whether such a knowledge would benefit us (see ὠφελέω): "For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good" (169b; see ἀγαθός; μαντεύομαι). So Critias must first show that such a knowledge is possible, "and then, besides its being possible, that it is beneficial too" (169b–c; see ἀποπληρόω; δυνατός). The hunch is the one thing Socrates claims for temperance in his own person while Critias' definitions are on trial, and he claims it as a prophet, not as one who knows. It becomes the test Critias' account must pass.

The adjective then marks the stages of the failure: on their first supposition "it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate" (171d; see μεγαλωστί; ὠφελία). At 174d the benefit passes to the knowledge of good and bad: "So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us" (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). And the last step uses the hunch's own word: "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" "It seems it can't be, Socrates, in any way" (175a; see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός).

The argument has tested Critias' temperance against Socrates' hunch and found it wanting. Socrates draws the conclusion against the definition, not against the hunch. He is a poor inquirer, he says, "For I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e; see ἀγαθός). The hunch of 169b survives the argument that was meant to confirm it.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adjective occurs, with the words Burnet brackets at 174d.

164b A doctor, in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial for himself and for his patient.

169b Socrates' prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good.

169c Critias must show that such a knowledge is possible and beneficial too.

171d If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not know, it would be of enormous benefit to be temperate.

174d If the knowledge of good and bad is what benefits us, temperance is something else; Burnet brackets the words ἡ ὠφελίμη that follow.

175a How will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Republic* makes the step from good to beneficial in a few lines. The god is good in reality, Socrates tells Adeimantus, and nothing good is harmful; what is not harmful does no harm, and what does no harm does no evil, nor is it the cause of any. "Is the good beneficial?" "Yes." "Then it is the cause of faring well?" "Yes." So the good is not the cause of all things, but only of those that are well, and is not the cause of evils (2.379b). The *Republic* can be read as inferring benefit from goodness because it begins from a god whose goodness is granted. The *Charmides* begins from a definition, and when the benefit cannot be found, it is the definition that falls. The *Meno*'s inference, that if virtue makes us good it is beneficial, is told elsewhere (87e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ).

Other ancient sources

Xenophon's Socrates defines the good by the beneficial and makes both relative to the person. He asks the young Euthydemus whether the same thing seems to him beneficial to everyone. No, he answers, and he agrees that what is beneficial to one man is sometimes harmful to another. Would he call the good anything other than the beneficial? He would not. "Then the beneficial is good for whomever it is beneficial to?" "I think so."[267] The *Charmides* asks more than once whether temperance would benefit "us" (169b, 171d, 174d–e), and Xenophon's Socrates can be read as stating the relation the question assumes.

Translation in this edition

"Something beneficial" renders ὠφέλιμα (164b1) and ὠφέλιμόν τι (169b4); "beneficial" ὠφέλιμον (169c1) and ὠφέλιμος (175a6). At 171d5–6 μεγαλωστὶ

[267] Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 4.6.8.

… ὠφέλιμον ἦν is "it would be of enormous benefit", and at 174d6 εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος is "if this is what benefits us". At 174d7 B reads ἡ ὠφελίμη between ἄλλο τι ἂν εἴη, "would be something else", and ἡμῖν, "for us", and T ὠφελίμη without the article; Schleiermacher proposed ἢ ὠφελίμη, so that temperance "would be something other than beneficial to us"; Burnet brackets the words, and the English does not translate them.

See also

ἀγαθός; ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; ἀναμάρτητος; ἀποπληρόω; δυνατός; ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν; ἰατρός; μαντεύομαι; μεγαλωστί; οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός; ὠφελέω; ὠφελία; ὠφελίμως.

ὠφελίμως · beneficially

The adverb of the doctor who may act beneficially without knowing that he has · Charmides

ὠφελίμως, *ōphelimōs*, "beneficially"

At a Glance

The word. Beneficially, to someone's benefit; the adverb of ὠφέλιμος.

In the *Charmides*. Six times: Critias' Hesiod, things made "finely and beneficially" (163c); the doctor who acts "beneficially or harmfully" and may not know it, four times (164b–c); and "each of these things being done well and beneficially" (174d).

In this edition. "Beneficially".

A place to read. 163c–164d and 174c–d.

Meaning

The adverb judges an action by what it does for someone, the patient or the doer himself. A doctor treats beneficially if the patient is the better for it, and whether he has done so is settled by the outcome, which the doctor may not foresee. That gap between the act and its result is what Socrates finds in the word.

Use in the book

Critias brings the adverb in with Hesiod: things made "finely and beneficially" are works, and what is harmful belongs to others (163c; see καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως). Temperance, on his account, is the doing of good things, and the beneficial is part of what makes a doing good.

Socrates then takes the adverb out of the pair. Must a doctor know "when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not"? "Perhaps not" (164b; see ὀνίνημι; ὠφέλιμος). Then a doctor who has acted beneficially, and so, on Critias' account, temperately, may be temperate without knowing it (164b–c; see βλαβερῶς; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; σωφρόνως), and Critias, rather than grant that, retreats to knowing oneself (164c–d; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The adverb, which measures an act by its result, can be read as what drives Critias from doing to knowing; the rest of the dialogue follows from his retreat.

The adverb returns at the end. Take the knowledge of good and bad away, and medicine will still heal and cobbling still shoe us, but "each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent" (174c–d; see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). What the doctor of 164b could not know about his own act, whether it benefited, is now the province of a knowledge of its own. The doctor's ignorance of 164b–c and the knowledge of good and bad of 174c–d can be read as the two halves of one problem, and the adverb joins them.

Places to read

Every passage in which the adverb occurs.

163c Critias' Hesiod: things made finely and beneficially are works.

164b Must a doctor know when his treatment is beneficial? Perhaps not; sometimes he acts beneficially or harmfully without knowing how he has acted.

164c Having acted beneficially, he acted temperately, and so may be temperate without knowing it.

174d Without the knowledge of good and bad, things will not be done well and beneficially.

Elsewhere in Plato

The *Laches* can be read as giving the doctor's ignorance its reason: doctors know what is healthy and what is diseased, but not whether, for a given patient, health is more to be feared than sickness (195b–d; see ἰατρός). The *Gorgias*' pilot, who cannot tell whom he has benefited by saving him, is told elsewhere (511e–512a; see κυβερνητική).

Other ancient sources

A Hippocratic writer, independently of Plato, made benefit and harm, the pair of 164b, a rule of practice. In the first book of *Epidemics* he sets out the physician's task: to tell what has gone before, to know what is present, to foretell what is to come, and to study these things; and in diseases to train himself in two things, to benefit or not to harm.[268] The rule asks the doctor to aim at benefit and guard against harm, and can be read as presupposing the gap the *Charmides* exploits: he may intend the one and do the other.

Translation in this edition

"Beneficially" at 163c3, 164b11, 164c1, 164c5 and 174d1. At 164b7 ὅταν τε ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται is "when his treatment is beneficial", the adverb turned into an adjective with "treatment".

See also

ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; βλαβερῶς; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ; ἰατρός; καλῶς τε καὶ ὠφελίμως; κυβερνητική; ὀνίνημι; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; σωφρόνως; τὰ δέοντα; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι; ὠφελέω; ὠφέλιμος.

[268] Hippocrates, *Epidemics* 1.11.