Ficino Platonic Theology Volume II Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

October 2026

Books V–VIII
A companion to the supplied Diotimos bilingual edition

Introduction

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Scope and purpose

This lexicon accompanies Books V–VIII of Marsilio Ficino's *Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, in the supplied Diotimos bilingual edition. It explains the Latin words, the English translation's choices, the distinctions on which the arguments turn, and the concrete examples through which those distinctions are tested. It is a companion to this volume, not a substitute for the complete eighteen-book work or a new critical edition of its historical witnesses.

The preceding volume establishes the fivefold hierarchy of body, quality, soul, angelic mind and God. Volume II makes the soul's immortality the direct object of sustained proof. Book V develops general arguments; Book VI argues from the soul's natural powers; Book VII turns to sensation; Book VIII turns to understanding. The stages overlap, but they do not simply repeat one argument. A proof that soul is not extended like a body, an argument that a living activity needs an inward source, and a claim that rational soul cannot lose its being require different premises.

The vocabulary is correspondingly precise. *Per se* can mean through a thing's own nature without making that thing uncreated. *Causa* can designate efficient, final, material or formal causation. *Complexio* concerns a bodily constitution or mixture; *harmonia* concerns arrangement or proportion. Sensation, imagination, phantasy and intellect are differentiated powers in the opening of Book VIII. The changing senses of *forma*, *species*, *ratio*, *virtus*, *potentia* and *actus* need local explanation, while ordinary verbs such as receiving, containing, mixing, dividing, judging and returning often carry the decisive step of a proof.

The extended article on the First Cause has particular prominence. The source's "first cause" and "first principle" in V.10 refer to God, while the "principal cause" in VII.8.1 concerns the chief agent of growth in contrast to an instrument. These are consistent translations of the Latin distinctions. The possible English label "primary cause" is explained as a reader's lookup question, not presented as an error or as a phrase printed in this volume.

How to use this companion

The argument map follows all fifty-nine chapters in their source order. It provides the continuous route that an alphabetical lexicon cannot supply by itself. The distinctions for close reading then identify recurrent traps: independence from body is not independence from God, formal self-causation is not efficient self-creation, and a reported opinion is not necessarily a conclusion Ficino endorses.

Each extended article has five parts. **The word** defines the relevant Latin lemma, family or phrase. **In the Platonic Theology** explains its work in the actual arguments and examples. **Places to Read** gives annotated comparison-unit references and source PDF

pages. **In this edition** addresses local translation, editorial divisions, source readings or ambiguity. **See also** supplies routes to related explanations without identifying their concepts as interchangeable.

The Latin register is independently usable. Each record supplies a definition and a local explanation, not merely a redirect to an article. A dictionary headword can differ from its printed inflections; the listed attestations reproduce forms checked in the cited passages. A family or contrast record can encompass more than one lemma, so a record count is not a count of unique dictionary words. The original-form lookup returns the reader from an encountered Latin form to those explanations; the English lookup provides alternative terms and common reading questions. The passage index covers every numbered comparison unit; the thematic index offers routes through ideas that cross the alphabetical arrangement.

The very small amount of Greek actually printed in this volume receives its own contextual explanation. Greek equivalents are not supplied merely to decorate Latin terms. Where Ficino quotes Greek, the account distinguishes the printed expression, his accompanying Latin gloss, its argumentative role and the edition's textual note. An attribution in Ficino is reported as an attribution, not as an independently established quotation from an ancient author.

References and consulted edition

A reference such as **V.13.4** identifies Book V, chapter 13, comparison unit 4 in the supplied Diotimos edition. These comparison units are editorial. A sentence, objection or inference can continue across a unit boundary, as at V.13.15–16. References must therefore be read with their immediate neighbours when the syntax or argument requires it.

Source page numbers refer to the supplied **461-page PDF**, in which the Latin generally appears on an even-numbered page and its facing English on the next page. They do not refer to the early printed folios or the page counts of digital witness scans. The matching supplied DOCX was used to verify the extracted text: all 297 paired comparison units agree between the two files after whitespace normalization.

The edition describes its Latin as a conservatively normalized text based on the Florence 1482 printing, collated against Paris 1559, with Paris 1641 as a later control. Its apparatus records corrections, variant readings, adopted construals and disclosed editorial subdivisions.[1] Those are the source edition's statements. This companion consults the supplied text and apparatus; it does not claim a fresh collation of those three historical witnesses or independent confirmation of every reported reading.

Reading argument and attribution

Ficino frequently asks the reader to suppose an opponent's thesis and then follows its consequences until a contradiction appears. Such sentences should not be lifted out as his own settled doctrine. Book VI's accounts of bodily soul and Book VII's arguments about soul as harmony are particularly sensitive to that distinction. Nor should the rhetorical

1 Marsilio Ficino, *Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, Volume II, Books V–VIII, supplied Diotimos bilingual edition, source PDF pp. 2, 5, 381–451 and 453–461. The witness descriptions and readings are the source edition's reports; this companion does not claim a new collation.

confidence of a conclusion be confused with a modern demonstration accepted independently of its premises.

Several qualifications shape the volume. V.13.1 explicitly prefers one group of authorities over another concerning the soul's origin. V.14.9 distances Ficino from the soul-fall and transmigration accounts being discussed. VII.5.4 allows an account in which a low animal soul perishes while new souls arise in severed fragments; it must not be turned into the immortality of every soul. VIII.15.2 leaves Proclus's stronger self-production claim to Proclus, and VIII.15.3 limits mind's self-causation to the formal rather than the efficient sense. VIII.16.4 corrects the suggestion of self-owned infinity by locating its source in divine enlargement.

The natural, physiological and medical examples belong to the philosophy of the source. The lexicon explains what Ficino asks them to establish. It does not recommend remedies, endorse historical accounts of digestion or sensation as current science, or infer that an animal's reported behaviour has been verified. Likewise, geometric examples and light images have a role within the argument and are not automatically literal descriptions of soul's substance.

Coverage and its limits

The primary reading comprises all 297 numbered units in paired Latin and English: 117 in Book V, 100 in Book VI, 25 in Book VII and 55 in Book VIII. The source's relevant editorial apparatus and locator register were also consulted. The 59 chapters appear in the argument map, and every comparison unit has an entry in the passage index.

There are 150 extended five-part articles. The Latin register groups 1,458 local explanations into 1,396 lemma, family, contrast and phrase records, with 4,129 distinct printed-form strings. Its 2 Greek passage records concern expressions actually quoted in this volume. These are different, overlapping measures; they cannot be added together as a total of distinct words or ideas.

The vocabulary review distinguishes exact attestations, explained lexical families, routine grammar and forms not separately expanded. Similar spelling does not by itself establish a family or a shared sense. This is a substantial philosophical reading lexicon, not a complete morphological dictionary, a concordance of every repetition, or a replacement for a Latin grammar.

A separate source-accuracy review examined every article's lexical and edition notes, the chapter maps, the reading-log coverage and the Greek explanations, with fuller rechecking of high-risk causal and cognitive arguments. Exact printed-form attestations were tested against each record's own cited units. A separate completeness review compared the companion's structure with the preceding volume and checked the preservation of objections, examples and qualifications. These checks are not a second complete Latin–English collation, a new collation of historical witnesses or an external scholarly peer review.

Argument map

Book V: fifteen arguments for the immortality of rational soul

The book takes over the hierarchy established earlier and asks how the third essence can be immortal. V.2.1 expressly restricts the word soul in the present proofs to rational souls.

The arguments are cumulative: later objections repeatedly depend on earlier claims of immateriality, self-motion, formal independence and divine conservation. The comparison units are editorial anchors, not necessarily separate authorial paragraphs.

V.1.1–5, PDF 8–11: primary motion and circular return

The first route starts with self-motion. Primary movement supplies inward life and outward movement, and what is its own mover cannot lose its mover by abandonment. Ficino tests the soul's ceasing to be before motion ceases, motion ceasing before being, and simultaneous cessation; he excludes each through the necessary relation of act and subject and the absence of an inward or outward destructive source. Circular motion adds a second consideration: it gathers rather than dissipates power and renews itself. The reported Pythagorean beginning/end argument is briefly stated, then spiritual spheres and visible shadows supply a hierarchical comparison. The argument does not make soul an extended celestial body.

V.2.1, PDF 12–13: stability of substance

The apparent opposite of the first route now supports the same conclusion. Soul changes in operation but remains in substance. This is also where Ficino clarifies that the present use of anima means rational soul; irrational lives are derivative images and likenesses. Motion of operation must not be mistaken for destruction or replacement of its abiding subject.

V.3.1, PDF 14–15: proximity to the active divine levels

Matter and quantity are passive, God and angel active. Quality and soul occupy intermediate ranks but do not undergo equally. A bodily quality changes in both essence and activity because it inheres in the passive subject. Soul can be affected in operative capacity while remaining free from such passion in essence. Divine proximity is explanatory rank, and the conclusion does not deny every bodily influence on experience.

V.4.1–10, PDF 16–25: rule over enduring matter

The chapter first establishes the persistence of the inferior term, matter, then argues a fortiori for soul that rules it. Pottery supplies the analogy of changing shapes in enduring material. Elemental transformations expose a form-neutral underlying subject; solar vapor and the limits of natural seeds deny that alteration annihilates its material or creates the replacement from nothing. Rarefaction and condensation show one matter receiving different forms.

The proof then excludes separate destructive routes. Matter precedes quantitative parts, has no hostile contrary of its own, and needs no deeper bodily support. Natural activity propagates perfection and returns toward good rather than aiming at absolute nothingness. Annihilating matter would make material production impossible; independent production would have no need to destroy it. Partial survival after transformation is incompatible with primary simplicity, while the proposed surviving forms would either still need matter or be produced separately from it. The conclusion distinguishes God's unifying production, angelic ordering and soul's moving and vivifying work. The apparatus expressly construes hanc at V.4.10 as the efficient power formed by the first-moving power; the facing English follows that reading.

V.5.1–9, PDF 26–31: graded causal independence

The four causes are illustrated by a human being. God has none; body depends on all four. Quality lacks a further formal cause because it is itself a form, but it depends on agent, end and matter. Soul must surpass quality without claiming the divine exemption from efficient or final causality; freedom from matter is the remaining distinction. Angel's additional superiority concerns absence of material inclination, not a fictitious reduction to one cause.

Ficino then gives four supports for soul's independence: the preceding causal argument, its ability to join low and high as world-bond, free circular self-motion, and rule over matter without mixture. The consequences exclude division into quantitative parts, collapse after loss of a bodily prop, elemental disturbance of essence and admission of a hostile material quality. Separated is finally qualified as separable in potency, preserving embodied relation without dependence of essence.

V.6.1, PDF 32–33: indivisibility and nondestructive reception

A divisible thing could touch an indivisible one either through a point or through a divisible part. The first makes the contacting term indivisible; the second would require division in what is touched. Ficino excludes direct and reflected bodily disturbance on that basis. He then tests corruption by indivisible forms: spiritual reception, illustrated through images in water, mirrors and cognition, perfects rather than destroys. A superior source either creates a separate form separately or infuses beneficent power. The proof denies destructive material contact, not every reception or relation.

V.7.1–2, PDF 34–37: essence and actual being

A comet's definition can be true without a comet now shining; actual occurrence needs a particular time and place, but the common definition cannot include those particular coordinates. Humanity versus Plato and Socrates develops the distinction. Essence considered in itself is called immortal, but that alone does not prove every instance perpetual. The maker determines some forms to bodily being, contracting them to bodily change, while others receive being in themselves. The receiving mode of separate essence supplies the additional bridge to immortal actuality.

V.8.1–4, PDF 38–45: form, composite being and the fashioner's law

Bronze figures and natural kinds show that proper being comes through form rather than common matter. Fire then supplies a sustained analysis. Its substantial form, provisionally named heat, exists through the common being of the composite; when cold expels it, both that fire and its dependent form cease, while matter takes another form. The fashioner's law specifies that material mode of being.

Soul is instead pure form, immediately explained as form itself rather than a material subject plus another form. Self-preserving striving and spiritual reception exclude separation from its own nature. No middle term could stand closer to soul's form than soul itself. Soul also remains under the law of self-subsistence assigned by its maker: neither itself, superior conserving causes nor lower weaker agents can remove that condition. Formal identity and efficient conservation therefore work together.

V.9.1–4, PDF 46–53: being through one’s own nature and the fire objection

Roundness belongs to circle intrinsically but to wood through an added shape. Form likewise explains proper being; appealing to further forms without a first formal ground produces regress. The material counterexample is answered by defining per se as through one’s own nature: a material form’s own assigned nature is to inhere in matter, whereas a separate form adheres to itself.

The objector then observes that fire is always hot only while it exists. Ficino first attacks the repeated qualification as generating an endless chain without a root of being. He then distinguishes being from hotness: the latter is a further act dependent upon the fire’s materially conditioned being. Soul’s being is its first proper act without such a removable bodily link. The next chapter must still clarify dependence on God, which this argument has not abolished.

V.10.1–3, PDF 54–59: stable relation to the First Cause

Ficino explicitly allows that soul depends on God while denying that it needs bodily help. Things remain insofar as they relate to the source through formal likeness. A composite relates through form as a part; a corporeal form itself depends on a higher source like a mirror image on a face. Soul’s mobile production relates those bodily effects mutably. Soul, by contrast, relates through its own stable essence, and that relation perfects it. God constantly overflows and soul constantly draws being. The adopted variants mutabiliter and relatio are consequential to the causal contrast.

V.11.1–8, PDF 60–67: attempted resolution and spiritual matter

Normal corruption leaves underlying potency rather than ending in nothing. Soul’s created essence can analogically stand to being as matter/potency to form/act, though it has no bodily material composition. If its essence survived a hypothetical loss of being, it would still be and therefore still live. The objector proposes a merely potential remainder, forcing a search for its location.

It cannot be in matter or matter’s potentiality, nor in a subordinate creative agent. God alone creates soul, but pure act cannot become the material reservoir for a withdrawn psychic act. Seal and wax instead portray return to an exemplar as restoration of identity. Essence receiving itself still needs spiritual actuality; exchanging that act like matter exchanges forms fails because a soul’s defining nature is not common indifferent matter. Ficino excludes both a change of psychic species and migration between individual minds. The concluding celestial-matter analogy is expressly reported as the view of many.

V.12.1–15, PDF 68–77: potency not to be, creation’s possibility and eternal cognition

Corruption requires a capacity not to be, which neither being itself nor complete separate essence can receive. In bodies that capacity lies in prime matter. Relative to unformed matter, a finished work is neither necessary nor impossible, leaving two-sided possibility. Forming a lion does not erase prime matter’s indifference, so that retained capacity explains its later corruption. Soul has no such material beginning or substrate.

Nevertheless a made soul must have been able to be made. That prior possibility lies neither in the absent soul, any part, bodily matter nor nothing; it lies in God’s active power. Stable actuality corresponds to that source, and God’s establishing and soul’s subsisting express one sustaining act. The objection of withdrawal of influx, pictured by a

disappearing mirror image, is answered by examining source and recipient: neither changes in the way required to remove the soul's proper life.

The chapter closes with a positive cognitive direction. Rational nature produces separate forms without requiring instruction or practice for the capacity itself. Natural ascent to Ideas calls for natural rest in them; continual activity toward everlasting objects points toward perpetual activity within them. Attaining an Idea according to its mode supplies the final argument for eternal life. The inference concerns a mode of rational participation, not merely thinking the word eternity.

V.13.1–18, PDF 78–93: God alone creates and preserves soul

Ficino states his preference for Dionysius, Origen and Augustine over the angelic-production account attributed to Plotinus, Proclus and others. Soul's simplicity excludes both assembly and material eduction. The causal analysis distinguishes common being, given by God, from determinate modes supplied by secondary causes through divine power. Being is prior in explanation to this or that mode; a participant cannot generate its own absolute source. Ariston/Plato illustrates the point.

Sculptor/stone, seed and elemental readiness then scale the power needed to actualize a capacity. Nothing has no proportion to being, so creation is assigned to unlimited power. The extended analysis of essence, being, power and operation gives a second limitation: created operative power inheres in and is bounded by a subject. Outward heating and inward cognition/will or understanding/pleasure establish operation's distinctness from being. Such limited agency cannot create without a substrate.

The angel-as-instrument workaround fails because instruments require subject, movement and time, and because a finite recipient would bound the creative power. Unequal Ideas, illustrated by a painter's human and horse, explain unequal soul and angel despite immediate divine origin. The same power preserves what it creates; a beginning is allowed while an end is denied. A concluding attributed account distinguishes Idea, proximate effect and remoter animation, including perpetual ethereal and perishable elemental recipients. The qualification concerns the derivative life, not loss of rational essence.

V.14.1–9, PDF 94–103: life, contraries and the limits of lower-soul claims

The proof shifts from soul as independent essence to soul as life. A wholly living essence is contrasted with an animated recipient; perennial vivification identifies the proper function. Detailed cognition and deliberate desire cannot account for each hidden physiological process or make departure and continuance occur at will, so natural power supplies the explanation. Ficino permits both soul as life itself and soul as substance with life properly attending it, while preferring the former.

Contrary forms do not receive one another while remaining themselves. Fire nevertheless perishes without becoming cold, so the analogy cannot automatically identify resistance to a contrary with imperishability. The Greek line assigned to Zoroaster summarizes soul as mistress of life, but Strato or an Epicurean immediately objects that soul might disappear without receiving death. Ficino clarifies the intended denial of any death-bearing quality entering immaterial essence; matter brings opposed forms into destructive encounter, whereas separate soul lacks that common recipient.

The closing units distinguish rational from derivative life, list disagreement about irrational immortality, and state a five-stage image/true-being ladder. A threefold descent of souls associated with Egyptian and Pythagorean traditions is reported and explicitly set aside.

The present conclusion must not be inflated into an endorsement of every soul-fall doctrine or universal plant-soul immortality.

V.15.1–27, PDF 104–125: life's persistence, Augustinian reasoning and preserved identity

The opening comparison says body remains generically body through alteration and division; the superior rational life should at least remain life. Three gifts of the soul's middle position strengthen the inference: divine images, formation and containment of bodies, and universal reconciliation. Shadows/images, head/members and bond/unbinding articulate distinct aspects, with a local probable rather than unqualified assertion.

Ficino then invokes Augustine. A temporally unfolding work contrasts with the mind's simultaneous purpose, attention, memory and expectation. Form and unity explain a body's organization better than bulk alone, and soul's greater stability excludes changing species or becoming another mind. Death as deprivation is also tested: the departing life is true soul, whereas what it abandons is an animated recipient.

The temperament challenge leads through withdrawal from senses and the cognition of unchanging objects. Three relations are considered: principles in mind, mind in principles or both self-subsisting. Arithmetic, proportion and rational art support the first; teaching does not remove truth from the teacher. The remaining alternatives likewise exclude identity with bodily mixture. Improved philosophical activity and the possible divergence of bodily and mental concord supplement the analysis.

The final section acknowledges that nonannihilation alone does not exclude worse survival. Conversion into body would require willing or compulsion, though neither is sufficient. Desires toward body presuppose superior agency; a change abolishing desire cannot fulfill it. The coercion branches consider body, stronger mind, benevolent or malicious purpose, embodiment and divine goodness. Sleep supplies a further objection, answered by distinguishing inhibited organs from the power shown in valid dream reasoning.

Finally, natural rather than spatial nearness orders the transmission of form from supreme life through soul to body. Soul must remain soul for body to receive form; conversion would remove the very mediating condition it required. The argument is extended to irrational life. Higher formal power communicates without losing its own possession and does not derive strength from increased spatial bulk. The book therefore closes by defending rational identity as well as continued being.

Book VI: the human soul and the natural-power proofs

All references follow the supplied Volume II comparison units. Page numbers are source-PDF pages, not pages or folios of the early witnesses. Every chapter's Latin and facing English, and its relevant apparatus on PDF pp. 404–429, were read. Book VI contains 100 units on PDF pp. 128–229.

VI.1 — Five positions and an uncompleted classification (VI.1.1–6; PDF 128–133)

The remembered gathering beneath a laurel at Regnano supplies the book's question through Cavalcanti's speech. He accepts the five grades and the immortal third essence but regards the placement of our own soul there as only probable. The previous common proof therefore needs arguments proper to human soul. Five exhaustive headings organize the work: an exceedingly subtle body; a quality distributed in it; a luminous qualitative point located in heart or brain; an unlocated, whole-present principle still materially

dependent; and a divine indivisible principle produced through incorporeal agency alone. Each change removes a different dependence. In particular, the fourth already has whole presence and can have a producer beyond bodily constitution; the fifth must still exclude derivation from matter's potentiality and continued material support. Ancient authorities are reported under each heading, and the contemporary dinner circle agrees on the required method. Only the closing Haec ille yields the voice to Ficino's answer.

VI.2 — Undoing corporeal habit before the formal proof (VI.2.1–27; PDF 134–167)

The first task is pedagogical: expose the habit that makes body seem the only reality. Three functions organize the diagnosis: natural power acts in body; outward and inward sense through body; understanding through itself on what is neither body nor bodily image. Natural power and the two senses become misleading teachers when their objects are taken as the whole of reality. Even mind can mistake the soul's acquired covering for its essence. The humoral garment and mud-coated child illustrate accretion; the boy over a well and bird over its shadow illustrate mistaken self-location. Returning within consequently means amplitude rather than contraction. Number and magnitude provide a mathematical comparison, with unlimited increase and unlimited decrease assigned to different series.

Reason corrects six kinds of apparent sensory error. The argument then explicitly concedes that senses disclose real bodies, while denying their claim that only bodies exist; reason would likewise err if it denied bodies. A two-branch test of intellectual objects either gives those objects independent explanatory reality or establishes at least the incorporeal intellect fashioning its own structures. Blindness and the owl's eye illustrate the difference between what is manifest in itself and what is accessible to a limited knower. Intellectual discipline separates imparted bodily life from inward soul-life, and stages an ascent through reason, pure angelic intellect and divine truth/light/joy.

Two educational fictions follow. Ficino's Avicenna creates an adult without sensory experience, whose soul nevertheless has its own substance present and affirms existence. The passage defends the further incorporeality inference through the supposed truth of uncorrupted natural judgement and answers an objection about inventing an unfamiliar body. Plato's cave supplies gradual re-education: release initially dazzles; staged reflections, objects, night and day precede direct sunlight. The relation is then mapped onto visible and intelligible worlds, while descent into body reverses the process through darkness and disorientation.

The final exercises move through dimensions, concentrated fire and light. Surface, line and point remove dimensions; release from position is first conceptual, then a fifth degree reaches actual substantial unity capable of higher activity. A bronze mirror's concentrated rays illustrate intensified power, and removal of the heart's remaining portion is imagined before life, sensation and self-reflection are added. Visible light's harmless instantaneous penetration and the inference from splendor to unseen radiance provide a visual route. Adjacent elemental spheres, point/circumference, spark/flame, lunar halo and luminous vehicles extend the analogy. The Heraclitean Greek maxim follows Ficino's own gloss. Crucially, VI.2.27 calls the entire chapter an excursio and praeludium: the imaginative preparations have not completed the formal classification.

VI.3 — Different proof stages, different burdens (VI.3.1–2; PDF 168–169)

Ficino specifies what the coming stages must establish. Natural power principally excludes a body and partly excludes a form divided through body. Sensation will establish

indivisibility and whole presence unconfined to one member. Understanding will confirm these and add the denial of origin from matter. Only then is the human soul assigned to the everlasting third essence. An invocation of divine power introduces the first stage. The programme limits the conclusions that should be attributed to each of the ten following arguments.

VI.4 — First argument: nourishment requires a life-giving form (VI.4.1–6; PDF 170–173)

Flourishing organisms and plants grow, while detached logs and stones do not, though all share corporeal matter. The source of nutrition must therefore exceed that matter. The opponent proposes a specially disposed body rather than just any body. Ficino asks what makes it special: either no addition exists, and the distinction collapses, or some quality/form supplies the proper difference. The life-giving form is what he calls soul; the matter participating in its life is animatum, neither soul nor part of soul. Operations accompanying soul's arrival and ceasing at its departure reinforce the causal conclusion. The reply establishes more than a lexical change, because it assigns the explanatory work to the determining principle.

VI.5 — Second argument: animated and inanimate alternatives (VI.5.1–5; PDF 174–177)

An inanimate soul-body cannot animate; an animated one requires another soul. Repeating the question generates regress. Wisdom and first light distinguish a source from what receives its defining perfection. The series must terminate in what properly animates through itself. An opponent's substitution of "animal" for "animated" and "living" for "vivified" does not solve the causal problem: body as body would make all bodies souls, while another life-giving nature is precisely what Ficino calls soul. This denies dependence on another soul in the way a body is animated, without denying an incorporeal producer.

VI.6 — Third argument: texture cannot explain animation (VI.6.1–5; PDF 178–181)

Dense matter is unsuitable for pervasive animation; rarefied fire or air is more plausible but faces the same question of a further life-giving nature. Otherwise every fire would be alive. A fifth subtle body beyond the elements repeats the matter-versus-power dilemma. The immediate result is a power "in some manner" incorporeal. Reported brief arguments then test living parts, sensible appearance, boundedness, temporal divisibility, essential rather than quantitative presence, and containing rather than being contained. The closing "more indivisible" than a point refers to independence from geometrical position and bodily subject, not smaller spatial fractions.

VI.7 — Fourth argument: form, substance and the bearer of opposites (VI.7.1–4; PDF 182–185)

The parallel analyses of an animal into matter/form and body/soul locate soul on the formal side. It gives actual life and is an inward principle of being, movement and operation. If soul were itself a matter–form body, another unifying form would be needed; its material part would not form the organism, one form would perfect two like matters, and shared matter would permit mutual transmutation of souls and bodies. The positive account is substantial rather than accidental form. Soul contains and governs, the mover does not depend for being upon the moved, and a stable subject receives opposed opinions and

affects. Further arguments from resistance, reflection and knowledge of substance are named but explicitly postponed.

VI.8 — Fifth argument: a dispersed body needs an undispersed binder (VI.8.1–7; PDF 186–189)

Spatial distance, temporal succession and contrary qualities explain bodily dispersion. Yet bodies actually cohere. The inference is not that bodies lack all unity but that unity needs a source beyond bodily nature considered alone. An allegedly bodily binder would need another binder. Soul or its power therefore binds humours and members, holds back flux and coordinates discord. On the Platonist account a form divided with the body shares the same instability. The closing wood-and-stones question distinguishes union and growth while attached to earth from union alone after severance; corrected ab anima does not specify terrae in the reading text.

VI.9 — Sixth argument: coincidence and whole essential presence (VI.9.1–4; PDF 190–195)

Two bodies cannot entirely coincide: dimensionless parts cannot make magnitude, while divisible parts keep their own positions, leaving many little bodies in many little places. Soul nevertheless gives substantial being and operation to every member and is united without intermediary; it therefore cannot be a second occupying body. A soul confined to one organ would leave an aggregate like walls in a house. The common sinew and immanent activities illustrate the unity of an organism rather than artificial collection. A solid soul-body would break the body and itself, causing continual pain; a fluid one would fail to consolidate it and need another stable binder. Rennet, magnet and clock illustrate binding, directed movement and coordinated operation. The closing qualification distinguishes the substantial soul from its power and from the temperament of humours it regulates.

VI.10 — Seventh argument: complete power in small and great (VI.10.1; PDF 196–197)

The claimed production of whole animals from portions of seed, particularly fish eggs, is taken to show the whole seminal power in each productive portion. Soul is then inferred to be present still more fully because this power is its instrument. Plant seeds and a tree whose life extends from root to branches and returns to root when branches dry or are cut provide a second comparison. Plotinus and Porphyry are named for the quantity-free vegetative soul. The biological premises are historical and must not be promoted into an unrestricted modern rule of reproductive division.

VI.11 — Eighth argument: life, ordered conjunction and opposed powers (VI.11.1–2; PDF 198–201)

Soul is allowed to be life or to have life as its attendant. If a soul-body consists of elements, life in all yields many souls rather than one; life in none cannot arise by mere unordered meeting; life in one makes that alone the relevant soul. If an ordered conjunction produces life, its inward orderer supplies the explanation. A single element still lives through form rather than formless matter. The second half contrasts fixed bodily qualities with soul’s ability to generate opposing effects, regulate bodily states and direct light spirits downward or heavy humours upward. Wide agency therefore exceeds a single quality’s supposed fixed range.

VI.12 — Ninth argument: primary self-motion exceeds body (VI.12.1–20; PDF 202–221)

The first proof requires the primary self-mover to be source and recipient throughout itself. Self-motion in every divisible bodily part would require an actually infinite multitude of independently actual movers; such agents would also cease to be mere parts under the composite's being. The second proof exhausts part-by-part, part-to-whole, whole-to-part and whole-to-whole possibilities. Numerical difference or dependence on a self-moving part defeats primary self-motion. An indivisible final part concedes nonbody; a divisible one renews regress. Soul is the impartible inward source, while bodies move of themselves only derivatively through participation.

An opponent's integrated whole proposes emergent movement through form and reception through matter. Ficino replies that it divides the causal roots and that a quantitatively extended integrity inherits body's problem, whereas indivisibility concedes the sought incorporeal principle. The ensuing clarification denies transitive self-action: psychic movement is natural succession, not an agent sending an action into itself as patient. A cause unfolds vital act before giving it to the effect. Platonists distinguish action in the source from passion in body and describe essential vital motion as constant while cognitive and other acts can lapse. The strong wording about noncognitive primary motion is preserved rather than silently repaired.

The third proof tests eight bodily motions. Self-heating requires simultaneous possession/nonpossession; the cold-water objection distinguishes virtual power from actual quality and its source. Finite self-generation yields contradictions of being and priority; self-corruption opposes natural preservation. Growth, decrease, condensation and rarefaction depend on previously excluded motions. Passage and circuit are then excluded through the contrast of internal and external termini.

The positive conclusion identifies two temporal psychic sequences: productive seeds arise to govern body, and cognitions/affections pass through ascent and descent via causes. These belong to soul rather than simultaneous divine/angelic knowing or inactive body. Each bodily motion receives a psychic exemplar, with recollection, forgetting, concentrated attention, distraction, causal reasoning and self-reflection distinguished. A second directional scheme maps body/sense, self/angel, God, universals/particulars, differences and causes/effects. Soul's fountain-like role explains derivative spontaneous activity in living bodies. Self-generation and self-corruption here remain multiply qualified analogies.

VI.13 — Tenth argument: size, nourishment and enduring identity (VI.13.1–11; PDF 222–229)

A quantitatively extended soul would leave little souls in severed limbs, become mentally diminished after amputation, and become more divine with larger body-size. These are rejected consequences. Its growth would require soul-like food: lifeless food would have to borrow the life it supposedly lends, while living food contains souls assimilated and destroyed to preserve one. Flux then threatens even the original soul's preservation. Persistent will, character, knowledge and ten-year recognition require the same preserver as the original receiver and judge. A subtle bodily soul would be especially unstable on Ficino's physics, outlasted by flesh, sinews and bones.

The argument extends to bodily quality and temperament: changing humours cannot by themselves account for enduring organic unity, continuity and the order and limit of growth. The objection from persistent bodily figure is answered through numerical identity versus repeatedly produced likeness. A stable inward craftsman carries the patterns and seeds; a face over changing river waves shows why similar new reflections require a

source beyond the stream. Finally, an image cannot migrate numerically to a new subject, a perishing soul cannot adequately fashion its successor's image, and a newly born incomplete soul cannot form itself. These three exclusions complete the stable-bearer account rather than merely reiterating that memories can last.

Book VII: sensory unity and the rejection of bodily harmony

Book VII opens by recognizing that the preceding argument has already entered the inquiry through sensation. Its first six chapters develop sensory reception, comparison, whole presence and active judgement. Chapter 7 explicitly announces arguments proper to the further denial that soul is a bodily quality or a form diffused through body. Nutrition and substantial unity prepare chapters 10–15, which examine several different versions and consequences of identifying soul with harmony. These are fifteen numbered arguments, not fifteen interchangeable formulations of one assertion.

VII.1.1–3, PDF 232–237 — Receiving, retaining and distinguishing images

The wax-and-seal hypothesis makes bodily reception spatial: the container limits the impression's size, and new impressions erase or confuse old ones. Eye, brain and the whole of Socrates' body successively expose the same problem. Solid and fluid alternatives threaten learning or memory. The mirror then highlights a contrast between image-size and the large objects soul judges or conceives. A corrective passage denies that spiritual images are literal bodily deposits and gives Ficino's positive account of light and meanings. A final dilemma contrasts transient surface images with penetrating qualities that mix without discrimination.

VII.2.1–2, PDF 238–241 — One power must compare the senses

Each external sense knows one kind of object; comparison of color and voice requires one inward power knowing both. Two proposed powers are either redundant or mutually unable to compare. A point-and-line model restates the dilemma through endpoints a and b. The indivisible comparing power then supports a conclusion about the soul's substance, which cannot be inferior to its own power.

VII.3.1, PDF 242–243 — Acuity and sufficient power are not bodily bulk

The tiny pupil and eagle's sight begin an ascent from external vision to common sense, soul's substance and eventually reason. The ordered animal examples reject both a necessary benefit and a necessary disadvantage from larger size. The argument concerns the inadequacy of quantity as explanation; it does not claim that every smaller creature is cognitively superior.

VII.4.1–2, PDF 244–247 — One comprehension cannot be assembled from isolated sensory pieces

A distributed inward sight gives each part only part of an object. Appealing to a common form either repeats the division or concedes an indivisible knower. Finite minima and mathematical infinite division are tested in turn. Proposed escapes through a sensing whole of nonsensing parts or a common whole vision fail to supply the required unity. The contrast between gradual aggregation and immediate sensation, and the possibility of a higher unifying sentient source, lead to indivisible sense and its source, soul.

VII.5.1–3, PDF 248–253 — Whole awareness of localized affection

An injured foot elicits coordinated eye, hand and mouth movements. Whiteness provides a contrasting distributed quality: a local stain need not alter the rest. Augustine's vital-intensity account states whole presence without local diffusion. An objection divides soul into successive reporting stations up to the brain. Ficino replies that each station would know only its own affection, producing countless delayed pains and no adequate localization of the original injury. The positive conclusion is whole immediate awareness and command.

VII.5.4, PDF 254–255 — The severed-animal objection qualifies indivisibility

Moving fragments seem to divide one soul. Ficino's Platonist reply makes the former low animal soul perish and new souls arise from world-life in suitable fragments. Few-power souls need few organs; more perfect souls do not inhabit detached members. Cutting-points, broken-mirror images and the segmented name Lucifer illustrate replacement rather than division of an indivisible entity. The passage therefore does not support a blanket equation of indivisibility with immortality.

VII.6.1–3, PDF 256–261 — Bodily injury and active sensation

Fine luminous bodily spirit mediates soul and gross body. The physician's cut distinguishes affection in flesh, torment in spirit, sensing in touch and shared distress in imagination. Substance–power–operation reasoning, localization and the regress of passive judgements independently oppose transferring the same lesion into soul. The argument ends with an unmodified judge and an active account attributed to Augustine and Plotinus: soul animates the instrument already, acts more attentively when stimulated, and knows this activity. Capacity, exercise and awareness remain distinct.

VII.7.1, PDF 262–263 — Why soul is no bodily quality

Ficino explicitly turns to arguments proper against a diffused form. A simple quality has one characteristic effect; soul has many and contrary effects. A constitution still has a dominant quality and its corresponding motion; soul is not bound to one such operation. Simple quality, constitution and a form dependent on them are separate candidates.

VII.8.1, PDF 264–265 — Nutrition and growth distinguish principal agency from instrument

Heat penetrates and dissolves, but soul uses it to produce living flesh and determinate organic shape. Growth reaches a definite magnitude and figure, whereas heat supplied with material has no such intrinsic prescription. Heat is therefore an instrument, not growth's principal craftsman. Soul is excluded from being an accidental form, an aggregate of accidental forms, and an elemental or mixed substantial form directed toward one terminus. Principal agency is local to this organic work and is not the absolute First Cause.

VII.9.1–2, PDF 266–269 — Constitution is accidental; soul is substantial

The constitution's middle position among contrary qualities, dependence on their material subject, exposure to a disruptive excess and capacity for more and less distinguish it from substance. The first unit concludes conditionally that a substantial soul cannot be constitution. The second proves soul's substantial status through determinate living kinds

and bodily fabrication, preservation and repair. A separate nutritive maker followed by a sensitive soul is rejected; sorrow and joy's effects on nutrition illustrate one soul with both offices.

VII.10.1, PDF 270–271 — Harmony cannot govern its own strings

Ficino rejects the harmony view attributed to Aristoxenus and other musicians. Harmony depends on strings moved from elsewhere; it does not move or govern them. A soul similarly dependent on humors would not explain organized form, resistance to bodily affect, self-reflection, orientation to incorporeal objects or independent action.

VII.11.1, PDF 272–273 — A specially vital harmony still needs its producer

Harmony as such occurs in any composite and cannot by itself explain life. The qualified proposal of a definite, properly tempered concord introduces a determination absent from concord in general. A source beyond bare concord is required; an external source alone does not explain constant natural inward tempering. A superior internal power produces vital harmony. Harmony remains an effect, while its identity with the life-giving producer is denied.

VII.12.1, PDF 274–275 — Neither composition nor proportion is the one soul

The first proposed sense, composition itself, fails to explain the soul's powers and the one source uniting the many members. The inward-glue image distinguishes unifier from resulting union. The second sense, proportional composition, would give bone, nerve and flesh different souls. Proportion legitimately explains bodily health, strength and, qualifiedly, beauty, but not yet sensing and understanding. The Aristotle–Hippocrates comparison keeps these explanatory competencies distinct.

VII.13.1, PDF 276–277 — Material causes cannot produce freer powers

A producer must be superior and freer from matter than its effect. Nutrition, sensation and understanding show increasing freedom, the last reserved for fuller demonstration. Seeing a wall's color without its matter illustrates sensation. Humoral mixtures would instead receive material fire or earth through elemental qualities; if that sufficed for sensing, earth and stone would perceive. This rejected consequence completes the causal objection.

VII.14.1, PDF 278–279 — More moral concord does not mean more soul

Degrees of musical concord, transferred to soul, imply that the good person has more soul and more life than the robber. The ensuing catalogue would give the just person superior digestion, reproduction, bodily movement, ingenuity, memory, eloquence, boldness and duration of breathing. These are consequences of the rejected thesis, not promises that virtue guarantees physiological advantage.

VII.15.1, PDF 280–281 — Soul remains amid discord

Strict harmony cannot remain harmony while dissonant, but soul persists amid opposed opinions and affections. The objection that humoral discord nevertheless destroys soul is answered through the supposed greater inwardness of psychic discord. The conclusion concerns soul's identity and life, not the body's immunity to disorder. The book closes by rejecting identity with harmony without denying the positive role of concord in the living body.

Book VIII: argument map

Book VIII begins the third major route to the soul's immortality, through understanding. Its sixteen chapters examine the objects, forms, unity, activity and range of mind. The arguments do not all have the same premise or force. They repeatedly distinguish what mind knows from the manner in which it knows, then infer properties of the knowing subject. References below are the supplied comparison units and PDF pages, not new divisions attributed to Ficino.

VIII.1 — From sense to universal knowledge (VIII.1.1–5; PDF 284–293)

The account of cognition is a preliminary to the proofs. Socrates sees Plato through sensation, retains and collects his sensible features through imagination, and recognizes him as this good and beautiful friend and pupil through phantasy. These are distinct operations. Phantasy conjectures substance but does not know its rational account or recognize the incorporeality of its intentions. It retains singular place, time and position. Intellect, operating alongside it, apprehends common humanity, beauty and goodness. From the common nature in many instances Ficino argues toward a self-subsisting divine Idea, excluding chance, matter and the individual persons as sufficient causes. Stable, mutually coordinated species point toward exemplars in an immutable world-moving mind. He then corrects a possible misunderstanding: this discursive proof is not required for every immediate intellectual apprehension. A further correction affirms intellect's knowledge of particulars by a secondary reflexive return to the prompting image. The final comparison with nutrition and sensation introduces the distinctively intellectual proof of incorporeal origin and immortal life.

VIII.2 — Truth as nourishment (VIII.2.1–8; PDF 294–305)

Food must be akin to what assimilates it. A soul fed as a subtle body would become wiser and more virtuous through eating, weight gain and bodily maturation; the text rejects these consequences. The brief no-food alternative is followed by spiritual nourishment as the positive account. Against the reported Epicurean growth argument, Ficino distinguishes art from its changing instruments, bodily proportion from bulk, and mental exercise from bodily increase. The Magian description of virtue as equality is illustrated by an angular line made circular and a lyre tuned without growing larger. The objection from bodily well-being is partly conceded: moderation helps because the soul is less occupied with bodily care. Children, artisans and the costs willingly borne in inquiry identify truth as its own food. Truth is then shown incorporeal through divine and numerical objects, mathematical exactness, unextended accounts of quantity and immutable principles. Immortal nourishment, pure delight and the naturalness of separation support immortality. An expressly attributed Olympiodoran confirmation connects genuinely good natural desire with possible attainment. These are distinct steps, not a single decorative food metaphor.

VIII.3 — Indivisible virtues and their subject (VIII.3.1–8; PDF 306–315)

A bodily quality either touches a divisible region and shares its division or belongs only to an indivisible point rather than the body. Virtue is then established as a quality of soul, which can persist without it. Ficino distinguishes intellectual and moral virtues and gives their local objects and definitions. Their perfection is not bodily size. The hare hunt, struck spark, repeated breath, mirror and prepared wool distinguish lengthy preparation from sudden realized clarity and rational ardour. Parallel reductios challenge a partition of completed knowing or willing into simultaneously present and absent parts. Indivisible

origin and end support indivisible virtue. Several sciences or virtues can coexist without collision; the argument then strengthens this to mutual implication through connected propositions and interdependent virtues. The chapter concludes that soul has no bodily magnitude and is not merely the subject but the productive principle of these nonbodily qualities. Contemplative virtue flees mortal things; moral virtue drives them away.

VIII.4 — No bodily location or partition for intellectual form (VIII.4.1–13; PDF 316–337)

The chapter introduces the universal form through which intellect defines a human as a rational animal. A bodily intellect would locate its form at a point or across extension. A point is only a limit, not a self-subsisting subject. Detaching it introduces a regress of further boundary points; the three-point demonstration denies that juxtaposed indivisibles produce length. Potential points are not sufficiently distinguished to select a receiver and would yield infinitely many simultaneous actual forms or acts. Extension fares no better: homogeneous parts duplicate the whole or yield mere quantity; unlike parts, modelled on genus and difference, become endlessly divided and destroy a bounded definition. The reported Epicurean right-and-left arrangement cannot explain one mind's unified knowledge. Chance mixture fails; an active mental union must correspond to the nature of the thing. Literal subdivision becomes mangling, not analysis. Unspecified parts and numerical component-sciences are separately tested.

Ficino then distinguishes intelligible essences from intellectual representing forms and exhausts the alternatives for their supposed parts' reference: none, some or all, and then the same or different reference. Knowledge of composites is addressed by the aspectual simplicity of humanity and ten. Seven, eight and six show fixed species, while words and discursive preparation need not be parts of the resulting simple act. Analysis reaches first concepts, unity and other irreducibles. The conclusion distinguishes wholly simple objects from indivisible aspects of composites, then passes from simple acts and forms to their subject and from simplicity to indissoluble life. Life's priority to intelligence supplies the last inferential relation. The difficult compressed Latin in VIII.4.10 is retained rather than repaired.

VIII.5 — Knowing is not physical traversal (VIII.5.1–2; PDF 338–341)

A bodily mind would have to contact an object by point, extension or both. Points cannot by themselves apprehend magnitude, and extension reaches only extended things. Their combination would require endless component-to-component traversal and multiplied apprehensions. The excessive infinitude belongs to the reductio, not Ficino's positive account of mind. A Plotinian reply identifies the indivisible sufficient knower alone as mind and sets the nonknowing remainder aside. Points without length, lines without breadth, surfaces without depth, numbers without position and beauty without deformity exemplify abstraction. Mind actively restores pure accounts from admixture, rather than merely receiving objects already purified.

VIII.6 — Whole knowledge and equality (VIII.6.1; PDF 342–343)

Bodily containment follows quantitative correspondence, but the same whole mind knows a whole body and each limb. Its ability to compare each with the others requires one knower of all relevant terms. A dog's body cannot be equal in bulk to an ant, horse, elephant and sun, yet mind apprehends each without bodily enlargement. The argument ascends to supreme equality as a standard for more and less equal participants. The mind's

correspondence to that standard is qualified and cognitive, not numerical identity with the divine source.

VIII.7 — Reception perfects mind without replacing it (VIII.7.1; PDF 344–345)

Water takes heat by losing coldness, and diluted wine loses intensity of flavour. Mind instead receives forms without surrendering its own intellectuality and is perfected by fuller understanding. Composition and analysis show its ability to understand mixtures through principles and principles in mixtures. Its being all things in each is intellectual presence, not material identity with the world. Its distinction of bodily and incorporeal objects supports its claimed independence from bodily violence.

VIII.8 — Universal rules cannot be explained by a singular receiver (VIII.8.1–2; PDF 346–347)

A materially restricted receiver would particularize even a universal form. Form would restrict operation, and operation its product, so a bodily intellect could think only singular objects. It could not know humanity common to Plato and Socrates, establish rules for arts and conduct or make laws governing many acts. The natural daily production of universals makes mind their source and receptacle. Ficino then associates corruption with material dependence and infers mind’s freedom from it.

VIII.9 — Reciprocal intellectual containment (VIII.9.1; PDF 348–349)

Saturn’s sphere contains Jupiter’s without the converse; quantitative containment is asymmetric. Minds can consider one another reciprocally and each can consider their common species. This is not a claim to read every private thought. The individual mind’s cognitive commensurability with its enduring species is then referred to its prior direct act of life. The conclusion expressly permits either past-and-future eternity or at least future permanence, so the argument does not compel an unqualified doctrine of pre-existence.

VIII.10 — Operation cannot exceed its substance (VIII.10.1–2; PDF 350–353)

Natural agents act within their kind: a dog does not generate sheep or humans. A bodily intellect could neither acquire indiscriminately the forms of other bodies nor conceive accounts beyond its proper nature. Understanding requires both reception and conception. A merely bodily substance could not explain an operation comprehending every kind of body and incorporeals. A form mixed with body would also be restricted, as sight is through the eye. Ficino differentiates a teaching attributed to Aristotle from additions attributed to Platonists. Mind’s active abstraction, reflection, conceptual childbirth and figurative mental hands are displayed in the present argument about incorporeal soul. The chapter ends by excluding bodily and temporal confinement and saying nothing prevents perpetual existence; that local conclusion should not be silently strengthened.

VIII.11 — Contemplative repose (VIII.11.1; PDF 354–355)

Bodies receive new forms through alteration, while mind advances in contemplation when free from disturbance. Ficino infers from perfection in repose a stable source and enduring substance. This is not the claim that embodied people never experience fatigue. The supplied edition corrects the early erroneous chapter numeral on the evidence of the eleventh-argument rubric and sequence.

VIII.12 — Contrary objects need not corrupt their knower (VIII.12.1; PDF 356–357)

Elemental contraries exclude each other in matter but assist understanding when known together. Good and evil, usefulness and uselessness, light and darkness, voice and silence, sweetness and bitterness exhibit the distinction. Mind's mode of reception is therefore nonbodily. Ficino separately argues against destruction by a contrary and against corruption by separation from preservative causes; the second movement depends on mind's capacity to reconcile and approach its proper sources.

VIII.13 — True intellectual reception and the mirror objection (VIII.13.1–2; PDF 358–361)

Wood receiving fire becomes fiery, whereas a distant mirror's image does not heat it. Ficino locates the image in spiritual light around the mirror and attributes that light to the sun's soul, with an Orphic/Heraclitean comparison of visible light and invisible soul. The supplied visibilis is an explicit editorial emendation against reported unanimous invisibilis. Returning from the optical digression, he says mind receives forms truly when it judges truly. The Platonic account brings latent forms to light under image-induced stimulation; a universal notion retains necessary content and excludes accidental restrictions. Mind does not become material water or fire, and knowing defects and evils perfects rather than corrupts it. Their intellectual benefit does not make the harms good in themselves.

VIII.14 — The simplifying gaze (VIII.14.1; PDF 362–363)

Being and operation belong to the composite of matter and form, which naturally produces composite effects. Mind instead considers the constituents apart. The catalogue proceeds through exact figures, purified qualities, many individuals under one species, changing times in one view, spatial distance together, lifeless stones referred to first life and corruptible particulars regarded apart from location and time. These are transformations in mode of understanding, not external physical transmutations. Ficino infers a subject exceeding the conditions it can thus remove from its apprehension.

VIII.15 — Inward operation, generation and qualified self-cause (VIII.15.1–3; PDF 364–369)

Bodily action is presented as outwardly directed; intellectual activity can terminate within mind, although will can use limbs to produce external work. Essence, life and mind are aligned with repose, motion and reflection. Recursive knowing and willing can continue without an assigned final level. Self-perfecting activity, linked to Paul's daily renewal, is described as inward generation; unlike natural succession, it retains its products in the individual intellectual parent. Being-well is then used to argue for formal self-preservation. Ficino reports but reserves Proclus's stronger doctrine of self-produced essence. He distinguishes acts from, through and upon the self. The next unit moves from self-operation to life and being, then expressly calls mind its own formal cause, not its efficient cause. Four failures of wholly effluent life are opposed to rational life's supporting return. The final motion argument concerns fullness of living activity. None of this erases the higher divine source made explicit in the closing chapter.

VIII.16 — Several forms of unbounded reach, all finally received (VIII.16.1–4; PDF 370–377)

Self-revolution and repeated higher-order knowing and willing begin the catalogue. It expands to division, arithmetic, geometrical ratios, lines, place, time, qualities, every sensory class and unrealized or impossible representations. Inward products have their own reality as representations, not necessarily as externally existing objects. Thought rises beyond finite angels to an infinite source; God as infinite act is distinguished from matter as infinite potency subject to God. Universal cognition gathers indefinitely many instances into one and descends again into multiplicity. A further argument appeals to proportionate knowledge of infinity and to the conceptual passage between nonbeing and being. Insatiable human and divine desire points to an adequate infinite object. Fire and descending stone illustrate intensified approach to the end.

The decisive correction assigns the mind's qualified infinity more truly to divine enlargement than to itself alone. God implants, preserves and recalls dependent minds. Life's priority to intelligence then supports a granted unbounded power of living. Absolute divine infinity, communicated intellectual/vital infinity, indefinite repetition and a rejected actually infinite simultaneous multitude remain distinguishable. The awkward readings sitis eius utrumque and talem quandam alicubi aut talem infinitatem are disclosed rather than silently normalized.

Distinctions for close reading

Through itself and without any cause

Per se must be read with its complement and contrast. V.5 reserves complete absence of every cause for God. Soul's freedom from matter still leaves efficient and final dependence. V.9 also uses the expression for what belongs to a thing through its own nature. Its presence alone therefore does not prove that the subject is uncreated or self-sufficient.

First cause and principal agent

The first cause of V.10 and V.13 is the universal source of being. A principal agent is the chief directing cause within an operation, contrasted with an instrument. VII.8 makes the soul principal in growth and heat instrumental. These descriptions answer different questions, and a created principal agent still depends on the first cause.

Efficient cause and formal self-causation

VIII.15.3 expressly calls mind its own formal cause rather than its efficient cause. The qualification concerns the way mind possesses and perfects its life. It does not make mind its own creator. The stronger Proclean self-production report in VIII.15.2 carries Ficino's distancing qualification and must not be substituted for the restricted conclusion.

Coming to be and continuing to be

Arguments for the soul's immortality need not establish beginningless existence. V.13.17 allows a soul that has a beginning yet no end. Creation, preservation, natural generation and successive replacement of individuals are different accounts of origin and persistence.

The succession of a species does not amount to the continued existence of the same individual.

Indivisibility and the survival of this rational soul

The denial of bodily division is one step in the argument. It is not automatically an assertion that every lower form of life survives every disruption. VII.5.4 discusses the generation of new animal souls after division and the disappearance of an original low soul. V.15 presses a different issue: preserving the rational soul's identity and nature, not merely preventing an indeterminate remainder from becoming nothing.

The whole and the aggregate

A body can be an aggregate with different extended parts in different places. The claim that soul is wholly present in each member is not the claim that a tiny complete bodily copy is lodged in every member. Nor does it identify soul with a geometrical point. The source repeatedly tests the point hypothesis and the possibility of a sensation shared across an extended chain.

Potency and a material receptacle

A capacity to receive being, illumination or an operation does not invariably mean bodily matter. V.11 examines language of "spiritual matter" through distinctions among essence, potency and reception. The argument must be followed through its qualifications rather than settled by the appearance of the noun *materia* alone.

Bodily constitution and harmony

Complexio concerns the composite body's constitution through qualities and mixture. *Harmonia* can concern composition or proportion. Ficino can grant bodily concord and treat it as a produced condition while rejecting the claim that soul is identical with that harmony. VII.10–15 therefore requires a distinction between a maker, an arrangement, a disposition and the living activity explained.

Sense imagination phantasy and intellect

VIII.1 separates four cognitive levels. Imagination can retain an image after the external object is absent. Phantasy adds judgements or intentions but only conjectures substance and does not recognize its intentions as incorporeal. Intellect apprehends more than the image's particular bodily appearance. The distinctions should not be flattened into the modern colloquial opposition between "real" sensation and "imaginary" thought.

Universal knowledge and knowledge of individuals

The universal object of intellect does not entail complete ignorance of particulars. VIII.1 allows intellect to know particulars through a reflexive act. Likewise, distinguishing a common nature from individuals is not by itself identical with establishing a separate Idea. The steps of the argument and the senses of *species*, *forma* and *ratio* must be kept visible.

Change in a knower and material alteration

Ficino distinguishes receiving a form cognitively from becoming the material thing known. Intellectual possession of fire does not make a mind hot, and thinking contrary qualities does not impose their bodily conflict on the knower. The argument concerns a different mode of reception; it should not be reduced to the claim that no cognitive activity or state ever changes.

Inward operation and outward production

V.13 and VIII.15 distinguish an activity remaining in the agent from an activity passing into external material. Understanding may be inward even when, through willing and bodily movement, it leads to an outward work. Images of flowing, turning and returning help articulate this distinction; they do not make the mind a literal liquid.

Unlimited range and absolute infinity

VIII.16 describes the mind’s capacity to pass beyond any assigned finite object and to reflect upon its own acts. It does not ascribe actual possession of every truth to an ordinary human knower. At the chapter’s close, the relevant infinity is communicated and continuously sustained by God. A gifted enlargement and the absolute infinity of its source remain different.

A conceded thesis and an endorsed conclusion

An imperative to suppose, a question, an opponent’s answer and a consequence drawn for refutation have different argumentative roles. The vocabulary of concession, impossibility, contradiction, division and conclusion helps the reader locate those roles. A striking statement about bodily soul, mixture or self-production may be the position under examination rather than the result defended.

An image and an identity

The fountain, mirror, circle, line, point, centre, light, musical instrument, garment and womb each explain a particular relation. Their use does not identify soul with a bodily object or prove every property of the image belongs to its subject. A reader should ask which feature is doing the explanatory work and where Ficino limits the analogy.

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Lexicon

Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction

Latin: *resolutio*; *resolvere*; *dilaniatio*; *lacerare*; *figmentum*; *machinatio*; *compositio*

The word.

Resolutio is intellectual analysis into explanatory constituents; dilaniatio is physical tearing or mangling. Figmentum can be an invention unsupported by things, and machinatio a contrivance. These words distinguish legitimate intellectual construction from arbitrary or destructive operations.

In the Platonic Theology.

In the bodily hypothesis, dividing a genus would leave half in one half of the right side of mind and half in the other; difference would be treated similarly. The resulting procedure would destroy the universals it was supposed to explain. Ficino calls it mangling rather than analysis. If the universal instead remains whole throughout the division, the opponent has abandoned its dependence on a determinate bodily quantity. An infinity of supposed duplicated genera would then be a mental contrivance rather than an independently established natural plurality.

This criticism does not mean that all mental making is false. Elsewhere mind makes concepts, definitions, artistic exemplars and images of possibilities. A construction is called figmentum rather than knowledge when it departs from the nature of its object while claiming to know that object. VIII.16 openly allows the mind to imagine things that may never exist, or even be impossible; such scope demonstrates a cognitive power, not the truth of every imagined content.

Composition and resolution also become complementary operations: mind sees mixed things in their simple principles and simple things in mixtures. It can isolate a point without length or beauty without deformity. These separations concern objects as understood and do not claim that a knife could produce the same pure constituents from a bodily specimen.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, PDF pp. 324–327.** True union must correspond to things; spatial cutting destroys rather than analyzes universals.
- **VIII.5.2, PDF pp. 340–341.** Analysis restores simple intelligible content from a composite presentation.
- **VIII.7.1, PDF pp. 344–345.** Composition and resolution are paired cognitive operations.

- **VIII.16.1, PDF pp. 370–371.** Invented possible and impossible objects exhibit breadth of thinking without becoming verified existents.

In this edition.

The apparatus deliberately retains the sharp opposition “mangling”/“analysis.” A single English “division” for dilaniatio and resolutio would suppress the reason the opponent’s account fails.

See also.

Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds

Animal acuity and bodily size

Latin: *acies*; *acutus*; *sollers*; *astutus*; *ingeniosus*; *audens*; *prudens*; *sagax*; *quantitas*

The word.

Acies is the sharpness or directing edge of sight; the animal predicates distinguish skill, cunning, ingenuity, boldness, practical intelligence and discernment. They are not a single numerical measure of reason. *Quantitas* and *magnitudo* concern bodily size.

In the Platonic Theology.

The small pupil gathers the appearance of a large visible body, even heaven. Ficino then contrasts the eagle’s keen sight with the ox’s larger eyes. This leads to an argument from the greater sufficiency of inward sense and, beyond it, the soul’s substance: a superior power should not require an increase of bodily magnitude to accomplish its activity.

The animal comparisons block two opposite necessary correlations. If size necessarily improved the soul’s gifts, the bee could not be more skillful than the sheep, the fox more cunning than the pig, the ape more ingenious than the ass, or the lion bolder than the ox. If size necessarily harmed those gifts, the elephant could not be more prudent than the horse, or the dog more discerning than the lamb. The second set is essential. Ficino is not simply claiming that smaller animals are always cognitively better.

These historical assessments of animal capacities are illustrations in his argument. They should not be converted into a scientific ranking of intelligence. Their function is to loosen the supposed dependence of sensing and practical ability on sheer bulk. The final inference is comparative: if quantity does not explain powers concerned with bodily quantities, still less will it explain reason, which transcends them. Reason’s full treatment is promised later.

Places to Read.

- **VII.3.1, PDF 242–243**. Eye size, both animal series, inward sense and the promise concerning reason form one ordered argument.

In this edition.

The edition keeps *impartibile* as “impartible,” preserving its relation to indivisibility rather than merely translating it as “small.” A tiny pupil and a power without quantitative parts are related steps in the argument, not interchangeable objects.

See also.

Comparison and common sense; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors

Animation, first light and regress

Latin: *animatum*; *inanime*; *animale*; *vivificatum*; *vivens*; *in infinitum procedere*

The word.

Animatum names what has soul imparted to it; inanime what lacks soul. Animale in the objection means belonging to animal or living nature, not simply a modern zoological class. Vivificatum and vivens distinguish being given life from being alive. The argument asks whether a verbal shift removes causal dependence.

In the Platonic Theology.

If the alleged soul-body is inanimate it cannot give animal life; if animate it requires a soul. Asking the same question about that soul produces an endless regress. Ficino's deliberately jarring comparison with wisdom being wise or foolish marks the difference between a principle and a thing described through it. Similarly, first light is neither darkness nor something illuminated by another in the same derivative way as its recipients. The explanatory series must terminate in what properly animates and vivifies.

The opponent then tries "animal body" instead of "animated body," and "living" instead of "vivified." Ficino returns to the decisive question: is it soul precisely because it is body, or through a further nature? The former would make all bodies souls; the latter locates soul in what exceeds corporeality. The argument does not abolish the soul's dependence on an incorporeal author established in VI.1.6. It denies that the animating principle needs another soul to animate it in the same derivative sense as the body.

Places to Read.

- **VI.5.1, VI.5.2; source PDF pp. 174, 175**. The animate/inanimate dilemma forces an explanatory regress.
- **VI.5.3; source PDF pp. 174, 175**. The first-light analogy locates a nonderivative animating principle.
- **VI.5.4, VI.5.5; source PDF pp. 176, 177**. Changing predicates fails to avoid the distinction between body and its life-giving nature.

In this edition.

The English intentionally does not flatten all five predicates into "living/dead." The apparatus records the authorial correction operationes in VI.5.4, keeping the inference broader than a narrow phrase about principles of life.

See also.

Nourishment and the life-giving form; Divine production and the third essence

Ariston, sculptor and painter

Latin: *Ariston*; *Plato*; *humanitas*; *sculptor*; *lapis*; *statua*; *pictor*; *pictura*; *exemplar*

The word.

The named father and son illustrate generation of an individual. Sculptor, stone and statue illustrate material potency actualized by craft. Pictor and exemplar introduce the painter and the mental pattern used to produce a picture. These are three different causal examples.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ariston, Plato’s father in Ficino’s example, is this human being in this matter. He therefore generates Plato as another determinate human rather than generating absolute humanity. The example supports the participation argument: a limited possessor cannot produce the unrestricted nature upon which he depends. It does not say that the father contributes nothing to generation.

The sculptor draws an actual statue from stone prepared to receive it. A human agent similarly generates from seed with a relevant power. Preparedness can vary, and the examples of air and water becoming fire compare easier and harder transitions from potency to act. This introduces the claim that greater distance requires greater power, followed by the alleged infinite distance of creation from nothing.

The painter answers a different difficulty. If both soul and angel are created immediately by God, why are they unequal? One painter can make both a human figure and a horse while employing unequal exemplars. Ficino judges the human figure more beautiful because of the superior pattern in the painter’s mind. The comparison explains why sameness of efficient source need not entail sameness of resulting perfection. It does not establish the aesthetic hierarchy as a universal modern judgment.

Together the examples separate material readiness, efficient source, exemplary determination and individual production. Collapsing them into a generic craftsman image would lose the work each does.

Places to Read.

- **V.13.5, PDF 82–83.** Ariston/Plato and sculptor/stone supply two distinct steps in the causal proof.
- **V.13.6, PDF 82–83.** The scale of finite making leads to the claimed infinite distance of creation.
- **V.13.16, PDF 88–89.** A painter’s unequal exemplars answer the equality objection concerning soul and angel.

In this edition.

The source uses ratio beside idea at V.13.16 in the sense of intelligible plan. The proper names in the supplied normalized Latin are retained as edition evidence; this article relies on Ficino’s usage rather than claiming a new biographical investigation.

See also.

Participation, common and proper; Creation and generation; Seal, wax and restoration

Art and elemental transformation

Latin: *ars*; *natura*; *figulus*; *lutum*; *vas*; *commutatio*; *rarefactio*; *densitas*; *semen*

The word.

Ars means a craft or practiced art; natura is nature as a productive principle. Figulus is the potter, lutum clay, and vas a vessel. Commutatio describes transformation. Rarefactio and densitas mark thinning and density or condensation in the elemental model.

In the Platonic Theology.

The maxim “art imitates nature” introduces an inference from familiar craft to the hidden structure of natural change. Clay receives one vessel shape after another and remains when a pot breaks. Nature is consequently called an artisan with a universal material. The analogy illustrates the relation of mutable forms to a continuing recipient; it does not claim that prime matter is ordinary clay or that natural generation is merely external reshaping.

Ficino follows this with an ancient elemental account: solar rays thin seawater into vapor and air; matter then passes through fire, air, water and earth as rarefaction and condensation alternate. The warmth, coldness, moisture and dryness are properties within that model. Their explanatory role should be reported without replacing them silently with modern chemistry or endorsing the account as current science.

The seed examples restrict natural power. Wheat does not yield pears, millet does not yield figs, and human seed does not yield an eagle. A natural agent unable to produce just anything from any existing seed cannot, Ficino argues, make anything from nothing. The different examples therefore support one inference about the bounds of natural agency, not three botanical curiosities.

Later the sculptor’s prepared stone and the differing readiness of air and water to become fire illustrate distances between potency and actuality. The power needed rises with the distance to be traversed. This prepares the special case of creation from nothing, which no finite craft can perform.

Places to Read.

- **V.4.1, PDF 16–17.** Potter and clay lead into nature’s universal underlying matter and solar vapor.
- **V.4.2, V.4.3, V.4.4, PDF 18–21.** Nonannihilation, specific seeds and elemental transformations form one connected argument.
- **V.13.5, V.13.6, PDF 82–83.** Prepared stone and elemental readiness support the contrast between finite production and creation.

In this edition.

Latuerat/delitescit preserve matter’s hiddenness beneath qualities; indui formas preserves the clothing image. At V.4.3 the moisture common to air and water is expressly “as the Platonists hold,” an attribution worth retaining. These are historical natural-philosophical examples.

See also.

Prime matter and enduring support; Creation and generation; Ariston, sculptor and painter

Avicenna’s imagined adult

Latin: *educatio ficta*; *aetas perfecta*; *apprehendere*; *affirmare esse*; *intuitus*; *expergisci*

The word.

Ficta means imagined or devised in this thought experiment, not necessarily deceitful. Apprehendere is cognitive reception; intuitus is an immediate regard or apprehension. Affirmare esse concerns the assertion of one’s existence. Expergisci introduces the transition to ordinary waking sensation.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino attributes to Avicenna's sixth book of Natural Philosophy an imagined adult created instantaneously without apprehending anything through the five senses. The subject is not an infant gradually deprived of impressions. Immediate maturity removes the bodily disturbance Ficino's earlier developmental account assigns to childhood, while sensory isolation removes the occupations that normally distract mind. This is an imagined alternative education, not a report of an observed person or a direction to induce sensory deprivation.

The absence of sensation is not itself the positive object thought. The soul's own substance remains present to mind and supplies something intelligible. The imagined subject consequently thinks that substance without calling it coloured, long, broad, sounding or fragrant, because no sense has furnished those predicates. What first offers itself to intuition is its own essence. It affirms that it exists, and Ficino's version then draws the further conclusion that it is incorporeal. The steps should remain separate: exclusion of sensory predicates, positive self-affirmation and interpretation of the affirmed essence are not one identical proposition.

VI.2.13 tests an objection: the isolated mind might deny that it is one of our familiar bodies but invent some body of an unfamiliar nature. Ficino replies first through an account of imagination. Even people experienced in many bodies devise new things by combining or eliciting what encountered bodies supply. A mind without such experience lacks the materials for fabricating an entirely unfamiliar corporeal nature. He then adds a different point about identification: even if it could conceive a member of its body, it would not thereby include that member in the substance whose existence it already affirms. The experiment does not claim that the person has no body; an adult bodily constitution is part of its premise. It distinguishes that constitution from the content of immediate self-knowledge.

The argument then explicitly supplies a warrant for trusting the distinction. What is affirmed and what is not affirmed are different; and the judgement follows the soul's unadulterated nature, rather than images acquired externally. Ficino therefore calls it thoroughly natural and utterly true. That premise must stay visible. The inference from absence of corporeal self-predication to actual incorporeality should not be presented as if it required no philosophical account of natural judgement.

Finally, the imagined person awakens into ordinary sensation. Because self-awareness came first, this person would retain an easier path to inward contemplation than those who encountered bodies before considering themselves. The comparison returns the experiment to the chapter's diagnosis of habituation: ordinary people mistake the bodily conditions of early cognition for the full nature of the cognizing subject. VI.2.14 expressly calls the preceding narrative educatio ficta before introducing Plato's cave. It serves the preliminary weakening of corporealist disbelief and is not silently interchangeable with a different familiar version of Avicenna's flying-man argument.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.12; source PDF pp. 148, 149**. The adult's immediate self-affirmation is staged without sensory predicates.
- **VI.2.13; source PDF pp. 150, 151**. The unfamiliar-body objection is answered and natural judgement is explicitly defended.

In this edition.

This is Ficino's report and development of the experiment, translated from his Latin. It should not be replaced by another standard version of Avicenna's "flying man." The apparatus records the correction pervidere, "see through/discern fully," at the end of VI.2.13.

See also.

Plato's cave and gradual education; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment

Bodily constitution and temperament

Latin: *complexio*; *qualitas simplex*; *affectio corporis*; *forma astricta*; *temperatio*; *mixtio*

The word.

Complexio is a bodily constitution arising from the combination of contrary qualities. It is not merely facial complexion or a person's emotional temperament. *Temperatio* emphasizes an appropriate tempering; *mixtio* the mingling. A quality, a composite constitution, and a form bound to either are distinguished.

In the Platonic Theology.

Chapter 7 explicitly begins arguments directed against soul as a divisible bodily form, even though the preceding sensory arguments have already opposed that view. Ficino calls the relevant bodily form a quality or affection in the Platonist manner. A simple quality, and a form following it, produce one characteristic effect rather than contrary effects; soul does many and contrary things. A composite constitution still has a predominant quality whose operation governs it. Soul is bound to no such one quality or proper movement.

Chapter 8 distinguishes the limits of the qualities composing a constitution from what nutrition and growth accomplish. Chapter 9 then examines constitution itself: it is a middle condition of contrary qualities, received in matter rather than subsisting in itself, vulnerable to an excessive opposing quality, and capable of intensification and remission. These are several arguments for its accidental status, not a single claim that every mixture is defective.

Constitution remains useful. Chapter 6 requires a properly tempered instrument for sensing, and later chapters recognize vital harmony, health and bodily proportion. The denial is that the soul's substance is identical with or wholly generated by these conditions. A suitable constitution can be an effect, instrument or condition of life without being the sufficient productive source of the life that orders it.

Places to Read.

- **VII.6.3, PDF 260–261**. The soul appropriately tempers its sensory instrument.
- **VII.7.1, PDF 262–263**. Simple quality, constitution and a dependent form are separately excluded as soul.
- **VII.8.1, PDF 264–265**. Constitution operates through its constituent qualities.
- **VII.9.1, PDF 266–267**. Contrariety, material dependence and degrees mark the constitution's accidental nature.

In this edition.

In VII.7.1 and VII.9.1, *complexio* is introduced as “bodily constitution” and subsequently shortened to “constitution”; elsewhere the edition also uses “temperament.” The elliptical *anima plurima et contraria* at VII.7.1 takes its verb from *facit*: soul produces many and contrary effects; it is not itself merely a mixture of contradictions.

See also.

Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Substance, qualities and degrees; Vital harmony and its producer

Bodily points and the seat of understanding

Latin: *punctum*; *terminus*; *latitudo*; *extensio*; *actu*; *potentia*; *intervallum*

The word.

A bodily punctum is a limit of magnitude, not a tiny self-subsisting substance. Latitudo names bodily extent broadly in this argument. Actual and potential existence are distinguished when Ficino asks whether a point could receive an intellectual form.

In the Platonic Theology.

The point-or-extension dilemma tests both proposed locations for a bodily intellect. A point naturally belongs to a bodily measure as its limit. If it receives a form in that role, it receives only that form’s boundary, while the rest extends through the body. If instead the point alone independently receives the whole form, the point would have to exist independently of the line. Applying the same account to the next point leads either to a line deprived of limits or to a line assembled from points.

The three-point demonstration challenges the latter option. If a middle point separates two outer points, it must touch them through different parts, becoming divisible and no longer a point. If it does not separate them, no interval or length arises from their juxtaposition. Ficino therefore rejects a bodily point as an independently actual subject.

Potential points do not solve the problem. Without a differentiating reason, any potential point would be as eligible as every other. The proposed account would yield infinitely many actual forms or simultaneous acts of understanding of one object. Ficino rejects that result. This objection concerns an actually instantiated, simultaneous multitude; it must not be confused with Book VIII’s later defence of an indefinitely repeatable reflective operation.

The argument is about the ontological suitability of an extended body’s limit as a cognitive subject. It does not settle modern questions about neural localization, nor does it require treating a mathematical point as a miniature atom.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.1, PDF pp. 316–317.** A point’s status as limit prevents it from receiving a whole nonextended form independently.
- **VIII.4.2, PDF pp. 318–319.** Detached points, the three-point demonstration and potential points are tested in sequence.
- **VIII.5.1, PDF pp. 338–339.** The point returns in a separate reductio of cognition as bodily contact.

In this edition.

The apparatus records the correction non for nos in VIII.4.2. Proprie existit actu and proprio existet actu preserve the claim of independent actuality being tested. Intelligentiae at the close means acts of understanding, not multiple minds.

See also.

Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds

Bodily spirit and mediation

Latin: *spiritus*; *corpusculum*; *tenuissimus*; *lucidissimus*; *sanguis*; *calor cordis*; *copulare*; *insinuare*

The word.

Spiritus in chapter 6 is explicitly a very subtle, luminous little body. It is neither the incorporeal soul nor simply modern breath. *Copulare* joins; *insinuare* describes the soul entering or intimately engaging a medium akin to itself.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino explains the joining of pure soul to gross earthly body through a mediating spirit generated by the heart's heat from the finest blood. It diffuses through the body; the soul first gives it life and motion and through it governs the larger body. The language of kinship explains why this intermediary is fitted for the relation, but does not abolish the difference between a bodily medium and the soul that animates it.

The physician's cut makes the distinction concrete. Flesh is severed; the spirit infused through it is partly loosened and partly contracts inward. Touch perceives the bodily event, while imagination attends to the perception, judges it and shares the distress. The concluding fourfold allocation is exact: bodily affection in flesh, torment in spirit, sensation in touch, and shared suffering in imagination. They are associated aspects of one event, not four names for a single material injury.

This physiology is Ficino's historical explanatory account. Its fine body generated from blood should not be renamed a nerve impulse or treated as established medicine. The following argument moreover denies that the injury passes into the soul's substance. To make the soul another even finer body immersed in the larger body would defeat the distinction chapter 6 is trying to secure.

Places to Read.

- **VII.6.1, PDF 256–257**. Generation and diffusion of bodily spirit introduce the mediating account and the surgical example.
- **VII.6.2, PDF 258–259**. Damage to flesh and spirit is distinguished from damage to soul.
- **VII.6.3, PDF 260–261**. An extremely subtle immersed body is excluded as the final sensory judge.

In this edition.

The relative *quem* follows the neuter *corpusculum* while anticipating masculine *spiritum*; the sense remains explicitly bodily. VII.11.1's "life-giving spirit" occurs in a different causal argument and should not automatically be assigned every physiological detail given here.

See also.

Injury and the uninjured judge; Sensation as attentive activity; Vital harmony and its producer

Body, instruments, and vital spirit

Latin: *ars*; *instrumentum*; *membrum*; *spiritus*; *proportio*; *conformatio*; *ingenium*; *usus*; *affectus*

The word.

An instrument is a bodily means through which a power acts. Ars supplies the comparison with an enduring skill whose expression varies with its tools. Spiritus in this local passage is the subtle bodily mediator, not the incorporeal soul proved elsewhere. Ingenium, usus and affectus name native capacity, exercise and engaged ardour.

In the Platonic Theology.

The Epicurean argument, as Ficino reports it, infers a growing and declining soul from the changes in children's, adults' and elderly people's strength. His reply distinguishes an unchanged art from variable instruments. Limbs that are too soft or dry cannot hold firm or bend equally well; that limitation does not prove that the governing art has itself become larger or smaller.

Even bodily effectiveness depends on proportion and skilful organization rather than simply weight of flesh. Ficino connects these factors with vital spirit. Intellectual and moral development also requires industry: a growing idle body does not acquire wisdom merely by growing. Practice, ability and ardour can strengthen mind, and reason or sudden frenzy can produce courage in an instant. The smaller person who overcomes the larger is an example of this divergence.

The argument does not deny that the condition of organs affects performance. It uses that admitted relation to distinguish the source of a power from the fitness of its means. Nor does every occurrence of virtus in this neighbourhood have exactly the same force: bodily strength, effective mental power and ethically formed virtue must be read in their respective sentences.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.3, PDF pp. 296–297.** Art and instruments answer the inference from age-dependent strength to a quantitatively growing soul.
- **VIII.2.5, PDF pp. 298–299.** Bodily illness diverts the soul into care and government.

In this edition.

The apparatus specifies "vital spirit" for spiritus and "ardor" for affectus. The corrected non tam, rather than non tamen, creates the comparison "not so much weight as proportion." Furor arma ministrat is retained as a vivid account of sudden arousal, not a recommendation of violence.

See also.

Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre; Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance

Bronze mirror and concentrated fire

Latin: *colligere*; *centrum*; *unio*; *speculum concavum aeneum*; *resilire*; *subtrahere*

The word.

Colligere gathers dispersed things; unio is their unification. Resilire is rebounding, here of rays from a concave bronze mirror. Subtrahere removes what burdens the imagined form. These verbs mark successive transformations in an exercise, not a literal anatomical procedure.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino asks the reader to gather a fiery form as extended as a three-cubit body into the heart's centre. Its power is to grow with its unity, as solar rays concentrated by a concave mirror become strong enough to burn hard things. He then removes the remaining bit of heart that weighs the form down. What remains is imagined as indivisible, agile, warm and luminous; from these predicates follow equal illumination, life-giving heat and sensation. Understanding is added if the form turns upon itself and rises upward.

The sequence makes a point about concentration, activity and independence from bodily bulk. It belongs to the preliminary route from touch toward an incorporeal conception. It neither identifies the rational soul with ordinary fire nor retracts the rejection of material fire as soul. The change of explanatory level occurs when extension and organ attachment are removed, and the final condition of self-reflection matters. The mirror is an analogy for intensified effective power, not experimental confirmation of each subsequent psychic predicate.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.21; source PDF pp. 160, 161**. The three-cubit fiery form, concentrated rays and removal of the heart portion form one ordered exercise.
- **VI.2.22, VI.2.27; source PDF pp. 160, 161, 166, 167**. Ficino marks the move from tactile to visual examples and finally calls the whole excursus a prelude.

In this edition.

The apparatus applies the authorial correction aeneique, "and bronze," in place of igneique. The mirror is not itself described as fiery. The imperatives and subjunctives preserve a guided imagining; they should not be turned into present-tense medical facts.

See also.

Point, dimension and substantial unity; Light, spirit and the unseen source

Cavalcanti and the five positions

Latin: *disputatio*; *opinio*; *quinque capita*; *confutare*; *approbare*

The word.

An opinio is a position held or proposed for examination; caput is a principal heading under which positions can be collected. Disputare and disserere name sustained discussion. Confutare and reprobare concern rejection by argument, while approbare here means establishing the final position rather than merely expressing approval.

In the Platonic Theology.

Book VI opens with Ficino's recollection of a discussion that leads into Giovanni Cavalcanti's speech. Ficino recalls a discussion beneath a laurel at Regnano with Landino, Nuzzi and Vespucci present. Cavalcanti accepts the five grades of reality and the everlasting third essence, yet distinguishes accepting the immortality of rational soul generally from proving that our human soul belongs to that grade. The latter remains probable rather than firmly established. He therefore requires a classification of the alternatives followed by arguments proper to the human case. The demand is methodological, not merely a request to repeat the earlier conclusion more emphatically.

The five positions remove different dependencies. The first makes soul an exceedingly subtle body diffused through the coarser organism, with the elemental variations and associated authorities enumerated in VI.1.2. The second replaces bulk with a quality spread through that subtle body, such as heat or warm constitution. It is genuinely different from the first because the proposed source of life is now a qualifying determination, not matter or quantity as such. The third places a luminous qualitative point in heart or brain, giving one privileged organ a ruling centre. It narrows the qualitative source without freeing it from local bodily dependence.

The fourth removes determinate position and makes the principle wholly present in every member, but still derives or supports it through matter. Its two alternatives are important. The bodily constitution might generate the principle itself; or another producer might draw it from matter's latent seed, beginning or proportion and bind it to matter as its natural womb. Merely admitting a producer beyond the constitution therefore does not reach the fifth account. The causal contribution and continuing support of matter must also be excluded. In the fifth, indivisible whole-present soul depends solely on its incorporeal author's effective power, not on a material beginning, capacity or tinder. It is consequently free from matter without being unproduced or independent of all cause.

These headings should not be equated with five uniform ancient schools. Ficino's reported names distinguish different proposals, and some attributions are qualified. The warm-constitution theorists "seem to have intended" their position. Aristotle the natural philosopher follows the ancient theologians "for the most part," not without qualification. The remembered dinner at Bernardo Bembo's, its named learned guests and Pier Leone's joining of Platonic and Peripatetic teaching reinforce the cross-school demand for demonstration rather than substituting reputation for proof. Haec ille finally ends Cavalcanti's speech and introduces Ficino's response.

The classification explains the later arguments' different scope. Nutrition first distinguishes common bodily matter from a life-giving form. Cohesion, whole presence and self-motion press further against a form divided with body. The locally seated source is challenged by soul's essential relation to each member. Temperament returns in the final argument because qualitative flux threatens the continuity attributed to soul. Even these successes do not by themselves settle material origin: VI.3 assigns natural, sensory and intellectual evidence separate tasks, reserving the additional origin question for understanding. A reading that treats every natural-power argument as an already complete proof of all five-position distinctions erases the programme that motivates the book.

Places to Read.

- **VI.1.1; source PDF pp. 128, 129**. Cavalcanti distinguishes general immortality from the unproved classification of our own soul.

- **VI.1.2, VI.1.3, VI.1.4, VI.1.5, VI.1.6; source PDF pp. 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133**. The five alternatives and the named supporters appear inside his reported speech.
- **VI.3.1, VI.3.2; source PDF pp. 168, 169**. Ficino assigns different conclusions to successive modes of proof.

In this edition.

The anchors are editorial comparison units. The apparatus retains Regnano against G1559's apparent Regoano and explains that transparent Italian personal names are rendered using their familiar Italian forms. The assertion that there are no other positions is Cavalcanti's exhaustive classification as Ficino presents it; it is not an independent modern history of all theories of mind.

See also.

Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Divine production and the third essence; Three offices and the order of proof

Circularity and spiritual spheres

Latin: *circuitus*; *circulus*; *sphaera*; *spiritalis*; *recolligere*; *renovare*; *umbra*

The word.

Circuitus is a circuit or returning course; circulus a circle; sphaera a sphere. Spiritalis qualifies both the soul's sphere and its circuit. Recolligere means gathering back together, and renovare renewing. The spatial imagery describes a claimed nonbodily self-relation.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino argues that circular motion recollects its powers instead of letting them run away. What looks like its failure becomes renewal. He then refers to, while saying he passes over, Pythagoras's argument that a sphere has no beginning or end and that motion in a spherical circuit therefore never begins or ceases. The reported conclusion is stronger than what the mere shape visibly proves; the lexicon preserves its attribution and does not turn geometry into an uncontested demonstration of temporal eternity.

Rational souls are called spiritual spheres whose invisible circuits are reflected by visible spheres and motions. Bodies serve as shadows, allowing an inference from the supposed perpetuity of the shadow to a stronger perpetuity in its source. The absence of contrary circular motion then supports absence of a destructive contrary. These are connected cosmological and metaphysical premises, not a statement that the soul is a tiny revolving globe.

V.5.8 gives the circle a different argumentative emphasis. The soul's returning into itself, leaving matter behind, supports independent activity and freedom from material bonds. The image therefore joins conservation of power, reflexive activity and immateriality. It need not imply an absence of every changing operation: the stable subject can act successively.

Places to Read.

- **V.1.3, V.1.4, V.1.5, PDF 8–11.** Circular movement gathers and renews power; spiritual spheres are contrasted with visible shadows.
- **V.5.8, PDF 30–31.** Return into oneself supplies an argument against bondage to matter.

In this edition.

The source applies the first printing's authorial corrections spiritales and facere at V.1.5. That unit continues the governing ostendit in V.1.4, so the English adds a short governing phrase. The edition's "all that belongs to it" for sua quaeque avoids reducing the phrase to powers alone (PDF 381–382).

See also.

Motion and substantial stability; Inclination and independence; Image, shadow and ranked truth

Comets and defining accounts

Latin: *crinita*; *coma*; *vapor siccus*; *definitio*; *ratio*; *hic*; *ibi*; *hodie*; *humanitas*

The word.

Crinita, literally the hairy one, names a comet; coma is its hair or streaming appearance. Definitio and ratio identify its defining account. Hic/ibi and hodie distinguish here/there and today from a definition's unrestricted applicability.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.7 gives a comet as dry vapor kindled in upper air and moving around in order. What matters to the proof is the distinction between this account and an actual shining comet. A true account need not become false when no such object appears today. The account therefore differs from the current presence that constitutes a particular comet's esse.

Ficino adds a counterfactual test. If "here today" were part of the common definition, all instances sharing the definition would be constrained to those coordinates. The essential rational capacity common to humans makes clear what inclusion in a definition would entail. Humanity can be instantiated in different centuries and in East or West; Plato and Socrates cannot avoid particular conditions in order to live.

The example does not by itself show that a personal soul's definition guarantees that individual's immortality. Ficino must still distinguish forms contracted to bodies from self-subsistent forms. The comet is an explanatory tool for that next step, not a counterexample he overlooks.

At V.14.6 the comet returns in a different function. Its streaming hair follows it as light follows the sun, illustrating life as the soul's attendant. The same natural object thus serves first definition versus occurrence, then inseparable accompaniment.

Places to Read.

- **V.7.1, PDF 34–35.** The comet, human definition and named individuals distinguish essence from actual presence.
- **V.14.6, PDF 96–97.** The comet's hair is an attendant image in the life argument.

In this edition.

The apparatus expressly retains Ficino's definition rather than silently modernizing crinita into a modern astronomical theory. The Latin's ferme in its generalization about times and places gives "almost"; the argument should not lose that qualification.

See also.

Essence and being; Life and vivification; Zoroaster and the mistress of life

Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea

Latin: *natura communis*; *humanitas*; *ratio*; *idea*; *participatio*; *similitudo*

The word.

Humanitas is humanity, the nature by which different persons are human. A common nature in many instances is distinguished from an Idea subsisting above them. Participatio and similitudo name the relation by which persons receive or resemble the formative principle; they do not mean that all persons are numerically one individual.

In the Platonic Theology.

Plato, Antisthenes and Xenophon differ as persons but share humanity; the example likewise presents them as sharing beauty and goodness. Humanity is communicable to people of different places and times and, considered as common, is not restricted to one of those conditions. Ficino distinguishes the one nature in many from a one subsisting in itself above them. The transition requires more than noticing a common word: what exists in another needs a principle existing in itself, and the common nature in material instances cannot supply its own ultimate foundation.

The causal argument excludes several proposed sources in turn. The nature does not arise by chance, because its order is regular. Matter cannot explain it, because matter does not form itself. One particular person cannot act upon all the others and, insofar as that person’s act is particular, cannot produce their commonality. Nor do all the persons together explain it: insofar as they differ they produce differences, while insofar as they agree they already presuppose the common nature. The last proposal therefore assumes what it is supposed to explain. Various individualizing properties supervene upon that simpler nature to constitute persons. Its priority is explanatory, not the chronological age of one person relative to another.

Because the common nature is one, Ficino traces it to one superior form rather than a mere aggregate of particular agents. He rejects an endless regress of derivative forms and ascends to a divine Idea capable of acting equally in all. The resulting structure has three distinguishable levels: individual embodiments, their shared immanent nature and the superior exemplar. Calling the common nature universal does not by itself make it separately subsistent; Ficino adds the causal-dependence premises to reach that conclusion.

The movement from part to whole to what stands above the whole supplies another account of the ascent. Persons occupy parts of place and time. Their common nature is as though spread through every place and the whole of time; the Idea stands above those conditions. The spatial image is qualified: humanity is not a vast body containing people as physical fragments. Nor does participation divide the exemplar into diminished portions. The claim is that each individual is human through an account shared with others and derived from a common cause.

Ficino further treats natural species as everlasting. A movable cause alone could fail through its movement and therefore cannot explain their stable character. Yet the species are caused, because they belong to a composite universe derived from another. Their coordination toward one nature, work and end points to one source, with exemplars in the immutable mind moving the world. Those exemplars belong neither to bodily nature nor merely to animate nature, whose operations would still be mobile, but to an intellectual and ultimately intelligible order. This is Ficino’s defended argument; a reader evaluating it

should examine the assumed stability of species, causal priority of simplicity and inference from coordinated order.

Two qualifications govern how the resulting Idea is known. VIII.1.3 describes intellect apprehending it either within itself or in divine light, without resolving every question about the relation of a human intellectual form to its divine exemplar. VIII.1.4 then says that the preceding discursive proof need not occur whenever intellect apprehends a universal: its natural activity can be immediate. The causal demonstration and the actual temporal course of cognition have different tasks. VIII.13.1's later Platonic account of latent forms awakened by images connects inward cognition to the same larger explanatory scheme, but does not make a human concept numerically identical with God's being.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.1.2, PDF pp. 286–287.** The shared humanity of three pupils leads from singular conditions to common nature and a self-subsisting Idea.
- **VIII.1.3, PDF pp. 288–289.** The exclusions of chance, matter and persons lead to a divine exemplar and immutable mind.
- **VIII.1.4, PDF pp. 290–291.** Discursive proof is distinguished from immediate intellectual access.

In this edition.

Ratio moves between account, principle and rational justification. The English "Idea" should not make natura communis and the separate exemplar interchangeable. Quodammodo, quasi and the alternative sive apud se ipsum sive in divino lumine preserve qualifications in how the ascent and apprehension are described.

See also.

Four stages of cognition; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency

Comparison and common sense

Latin: *comparare*; *diiudicare*; *vis interior*; *centrum*; *communis sensus*; *magistra sensuum*

The word.

Comparare means bringing different contents together for comparison, not merely acquiring them separately. *Diiudicare* adds discrimination or judgement. The "common sense" is an inward sensory power common to the several senses, not ordinary good judgement or public opinion.

In the Platonic Theology.

Sight knows colors, hearing voices, and smell odors. None of these specialized powers by itself compares color with voice. Ficino's question is how the mind can judge that they differ unless it knows both together. Merely collecting reports in one place does not yet explain that judgement: the compared contents must be available to the comparing act. Color remains color and voice remains voice, while one power apprehends their difference. Ficino pictures this inward power as a center receiving reports from five surrounding sensory instruments. The center models unified access; it does not by itself identify a location in the brain.

He next introduces an opponent’s concession: let there be two internal powers. If each knows both contents, each already performs the whole relevant work, and one is superfluous. Nature’s freedom from defect in necessities and excess in superfluities supports this horn. If instead each knows only its own content, neither can compare them; their juxtaposition leaves the relation unknown to either. This second horn fails independently of the economy principle. An additional common power must do the comparing, so the hypothesis intended to avoid such a power has merely postponed it. Chapter 2 then translates the dilemma into point and line, testing whether the ultimate comparing power could be quantitatively divided.

The conclusion does not abolish the plurality of sensory instruments. The account begins with five differently directed senses and later gives them different bodily media. What it denies is that a unified comparative judgement can be explained by mutually isolated apprehenders. One soul may possess differentiated functions and use distinct organs. The comparing power is common with respect to the contents it brings together, rather than indiscriminately identical with each external sense. Ficino also says it judges the senses’ operations, extending its scope beyond their objects. That claim helps explain its designation as their mistress, without supplying a complete theory of every form of self-consciousness.

A further metaphysical inference concerns the soul’s substance. Once the comparing power has been judged neither a body nor a quality diffused through body, Ficino argues that its source cannot remain corporeal: otherwise the power would be nobler than the substance to which it belongs. This premise about the adequacy of a source is an additional step, not a restatement of the earlier argument about comparative access. Chapter 3 accordingly calls inward sight and common sense more excellent and acute than each external sense, and therefore less dependent on bodily quantity. A still higher treatment of reason is promised; common sense is not thereby identified with rational intellection.

Places to Read.

- **VII.2.1, PDF 238–239**. Specialized senses require one inward comparing power.
- **VII.2.2, PDF 240–241**. The mistress of the senses is judged indivisible and superior to bodily diffusion.
- **VII.3.1, PDF 242–243**. Inward sight and common sense mediate the ascent from external senses toward reason.

In this edition.

At VII.2.1 the base *aut … iudicet* is rendered as a reformulation, “or, put another way,” rather than silently replaced by the later *ut*. *Animus* is translated “mind” for its comparing activity; this does not introduce a second substance beside *anima*.

See also.

Point, line and the comparing power; Animal acuity and bodily size; One comprehension and indivisible sensation

Composition and inward unity

Latin: *compositio*; *unio plurium*; *unum*; *coagulum*; *conglutinare*; *insita vis*

The word.

Composition is the joining of several constituents. *Unio plurium* makes its plurality explicit. *Coagulum* and *conglutinare* furnish the concrete image of an inward binder or glue; the image does not turn the unifying soul into a bodily adhesive.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino splits the assertion that soul is concord into two senses: the composition itself of humors and members, or the proportion governing that composition. Against the first, he asks how bodily compositions could correspond to the soul and its powers. Bodily structure is known to natural philosophers; the composition of intellect, sensation and appetite is not comparably transparent. The difficulty is not solved by reciting a list of faculties.

A positive causal distinction follows. Composition is union of many, but many are unified by one. Ficino specifies an inward one, present among the many like glue binding them. That implanted power from which the members' union comes is better called soul than the union produced by it. This restates in another vocabulary the difference between the tempering source and vital harmony as outcome.

The remainder of the chapter reinforces the unity of life. Distinct tissues have different proportions, yet one animal needs one form, mover and ruler. Bone, nerve and flesh cannot simply receive independent souls from their different mixtures. The argument distinguishes a multiplicity of instruments and conditions from a multiplicity of animating subjects. It does not deny that the living being has differentiated powers; it denies that merely listing or joining them explains the single source of their life.

Places to Read.

- **VII.12.1, PDF 274–275**. Composition and proportion are separated; the inward-glue argument distinguishes unifying cause from union.

In this edition.

The edition retains active *quomodo vires singulae componant*, with the soul supplied as understood object. Later witnesses read passive *componantur*. The active "how the individual powers compose [the soul]" should not silently become a claim about how each power is internally assembled.

See also.

Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Soul as the body's craftsman; Vital harmony and its producer

Conditions and the fashioner's law

Latin: *condicio*; *lex formantis*; *formator*; *opifex*; *assignare*; *determinare*; *contrahere*; *coarctare*

The word.

Condicio is a condition of existence. Lex formantis is the law or determination of the one that forms; it is not primarily a rule of civil conduct. Assignare and determinare describe the assignment of a definite mode; contrahere and coarctare narrow or confine.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino's forms do not enter existence under an identical arrangement. V.7.2 makes the agent determine some to bodily being, so the actuality and essence are contracted to place, time and exposure to contrary qualities. Other forms receive being in themselves. This creator-assigned distinction controls the later per se argument.

V.8.2 calls the material form's condition a fashioner's law. Heat, provisionally standing for fire's substantial form, has been drawn from matter and established within the composite's being. When contrary cold expels it, it leaves the condition under which it could exist. "Transgressing" the law is therefore descriptive of ontological failure, not a moral blame placed upon heat.

Soul's law is different: it is made to stand in itself. It does not cease to satisfy that condition because no removable material support mediates its being. The passage separately excludes displacement by the soul itself, by conserving higher causes and by weaker lower things. V.9.2 then repeats that "its own nature" means precisely the nature assigned by its maker.

V.9.4's conclusion that soul exists without condition must be read alongside V.10.1's explicit relation to God. The condition excluded is material or intervening dependence of the kind exposed by the fire example, not every causal relation. Creator-given independence from matter remains creator-given.

Places to Read.

- **V.7.2, PDF 36–37.** Being is either contracted to bodily conditions or received in the form itself.
- **V.8.2, V.8.4, PDF 40–41, 44–45.** The fashioner's law distinguishes dependent heat from self-subsisting soul.
- **V.9.2, V.9.4, V.10.1, PDF 48–49, 52–55.** Assigned nature explains per se, while dependence on God remains explicit.

In this edition.

The English "law" retains the repeated Latin lex rather than importing legislation. Proprius, natura and condicio are overlapping explanatory terms here, not synonyms for an externally imposed command.

See also.

Form and formal being; Through itself and through another; Relation and continuing dependence

Constitution, localized point and harmony

Latin: *complexio*; *qualitas*; *punctum lucidum*; *harmonia*; *materiae potentia*

The word.

Complexio is a bodily constitution or temperament, especially the proportion of constituent qualities. Qualitas is a qualifying determination. Harmonia names an arrangement or proportion of bodily parts, rather than necessarily audible music. A punctum lucidum is a luminous point; its metaphysical status depends on whether it remains tied to quality, organ or matter.

In the Platonic Theology.

Cavalcanti's second position is a quality spread through the soul-body, such as heat or a warm constitution. Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Antipater and Posidonius are said to seem to have intended this: voluisse videntur preserves a qualification. The third assigns a luminous point to the heart or brain, governing other members from that seat; Chrysippus, Archelaus and Heraclides of Pontus are its reported authorities. This point remains associated with a quality and subtle body, despite appearing purer than a distributed warmth.

The fourth removes determinate position and makes the principle whole in every member, but retains dependence on matter. Ficino carefully allows two versions: constitution itself generates the principle, or a producer draws it from matter's latent resources and binds it to matter. Xenophanes of Colophon, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus and Critolaus are associated with bodily motive power or harmony. The fifth position must therefore add independence of material origin, not merely indivisibility or whole presence. Later arguments against temperament address an explanatory source that flows with the humours, not only the cruder claim that the soul is bodily bulk.

Places to Read.

- **VI.1.3, VI.1.4; source PDF pp. 128, 129, 130, 131**. Distributed constitution and an organ-localized luminous point remain distinct theories.
- **VI.1.5; source PDF pp. 130, 131**. The fourth position has two explicitly different modes of material dependence.
- **VI.13.8; source PDF pp. 226, 227**. Flux is extended from a soul-body to qualitative temperament.

In this edition.

The apparatus reports that P1641 omits the constitution-generated branch in VI.1.5; the reading text retains both branches with M1482 and G1559. Its viscera, semen, incohatio, proportio and gremium preserve the imagery of latent birth from matter. "Constitution" avoids the modern skin-colour sense of "complexion."

See also.

Divine production and the third essence; Temperament, flux and the stable ruler

Contraries, death and imperishability

Latin: *contrarius*; *mors*; *mortifer*; *immortalis*; *infrigescibilis*; *imperdibilis*; *fugare*; *fugere*

The word.

Contraries are opposed qualities or forms, such as heat and cold. Mortifer means death-bearing; immortalis deathless. Infrigescibilis is incapable of becoming cold; imperdibilis incapable of being destroyed. The paired verbs fugare and fugere distinguish driving away from fleeing.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.14 argues that a contrary form does not receive its contrary while remaining itself. Heat cannot become cold heat, and fire cannot be cold while remaining fire. Yet fire can perish instead of becoming cold. Ficino explicitly marks this limit of the analogy: inability to become cold is not identical with indestructibility.

The proposed inference for soul uses life as its essence or proper attendant. Soul does not admit death, and Ficino identifies immortality with imperishability. V.14.7 immediately gives the objection to that step, assigned to Strato or an Epicurean: perhaps soul does not receive death only because it disappears when the death-bearing quality arrives. Simply refusing a predicate would not establish survival.

Ficino clarifies that death as nonbeing is not literally received by either the living or the nonexistent dead. His intended claim is that no death-bearing quality can enter soul so as to end its life. Material heat is vulnerable because the matter that supports it also opens to cold, allowing heat to be expelled. A separate form lacks the shared material recipient that brings contraries together.

V.14.8 therefore returns to the already argued immateriality of rational soul. The contrary may corrupt qualities bound to the body, but cannot reach the essence supporting rather than supported by matter. The proof is consequently cumulative; it does not rest solely on substituting “indestructible” for “deathless.”

Places to Read.

- **V.14.3, V.14.4, V.14.5, PDF 96–97.** Contrary forms and their bearers are compared, with the fire analogy’s limit made explicit.
- **V.14.7, PDF 98–99.** The Epicurean objection forces a distinction between receiving death and admitting a destructive quality.
- **V.14.8, PDF 100–101.** Independent subsistence excludes the common material ground of destructive opposition.

In this edition.

The source keeps infrigescibilis and imperdibilis visibly distinct. Death is only “in a certain sense” a contrary in V.14.3. The objection is a staged philosophical challenge, not proof that Ficino accepts an Epicurean account of the soul.

See also.

Life and vivification; Passivity and bodily affection; Necessary predication and the fire objection

Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil

Latin: *contrarius*; *privatio*; *defectus*; *malum*; *conciliare*; *conservator*; *salubris*

The word.

Contraries oppose and can destroy one another in matter. Their intelligible forms need not exercise that opposition within a knower. Privation and defect name lacks or failures; knowing such a lack is different from acquiring it as one’s own condition.

In the Platonic Theology.

Mind understands heat and cold, good and evil, useful and useless, beauty and deformity, light and darkness, voice and silence, sweet and bitter. In cognition one contrary can clarify the other, so their co-presence helps rather than destroys the act of knowing. Ficino infers that mind cannot be governed by the bodily mode of contrary reception.

Two proposed sources of corruption are addressed. First, destruction by a contrary fails because mind reconciles the intellectual forms of contraries. Second, separation from preservative causes is challenged because a power able to reconcile alien opposites should

be able to draw itself to its own causes and preservers. The second argument should not disappear into the more memorable list of contrasts.

VIII.13 adds that greater knowledge includes knowledge of privations, defects and evils. Mind becomes more perfect by discerning them than by remaining ignorant. Harmful things thus become cognitive goods under the aspect of being known. This does not make harmful acts morally good, declare suffering beneficial in itself, or erase the real differences between good and evil. The conversion occurs in the mode of reception: knowledge of an evil is not the evil itself afflicting the knower in its original manner.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.12.1, PDF pp. 356–357.** The examples of contraries lead to separate replies about contrary destruction and loss of preservative causes.
- **VIII.13.2, PDF pp. 360–361.** Knowledge of defects and evils perfects mind without turning it into what it knows.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves both modes of corruption. The translation's "wholesome" for salubria is part of the intellectual good/harm contrast, not medical advice. Quae in se ipsis mala sunt and in mente fiunt bona explicitly distinguish the objects in themselves from their cognitive reception.

See also.

Receiving forms without losing one's own; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause

Contrary powers and directed movement

Latin: *contraria*; *determinata operatio*; *compos*; *contrahere*; *extendere*; *acuere*; *obtundere*

The word.

Contraria are opposed qualities or effects. Determinata operatio is activity restricted by a definite nature. Compos with ad expresses command or capacity with respect to opposed movements. Acuere and obtundere mean sharpening and dulling, alongside paired verbs for bodily regulation.

In the Platonic Theology.

A body, simple or composite, has determinate qualities: hot or cold, dry or moist, light or heavy, rare or dense, fluid or solid, white or black. Ficino assumes that it acts according to this fixed character and does not generate the contrary effect precisely through the contrary quality. Soul, by contrast, arrests and moves, contracts and extends, rarefies and condenses, sharpens and dulls, opens and closes, liquefies and solidifies. The list supplies differentiated evidence for a power not restricted to one bodily quality.

The historical physiology gives that point directional force. Soul sends light spirits down to the feet and heavy humours up to the head, and moves the body upward, downward, sideways and in a circle against the natural inclinations attributed to its elements. The inference concerns governance of contraries, not a claim that the soul is simultaneously hot and cold in the same respect. Nor should the passage's categorical physics be treated as modern mechanics. The range of actions is supposed to exceed both body and a quality distributed through body.

Places to Read.

- **VI.11.2; source PDF pp. 200, 201**. Contrary qualities, regulatory verbs, products and spatial directions form four connected but distinct series.
- **VI.12.19; source PDF pp. 218, 219**. Directions later acquire explicitly psychic analogues rather than bodily meanings.

In this edition.

The English translates every pair separately. The qualification omnes ferme, “almost all,” in the closing summary should remain: Ficino’s rhetoric of range is not an unrestricted claim that the soul can produce absolutely any effect whatsoever.

See also.

Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul

Conversion, desire and compulsion

Latin: *converti*; *commutari*; *voluntas*; *appetitus*; *cupiditas*; *cogere*; *potestas*; *consulere*; *imperare*

The word.

Converti and commutari can mean changing into something else, not simply changing one’s mind. Appetitus and cupiditas name directed desire; voluntas willing. Cogere is compelling, potestas power or control, consulere caring for, and imperare commanding.

In the Platonic Theology.

At V.15.19 Ficino returns explicitly to Augustine and opens a question the preceding survival arguments do not yet answer: could mind avoid annihilation but become an inferior essence, such as body? The purpose is to protect determinate rational life, not merely insist that something remains after death.

The opening qualification is a useful model of Ficino’s argumentative discipline. He grants that someone might reasonably think the earlier proof excludes only reduction to nothing. A lower surviving substance would escape that conclusion while forfeiting rational life. The closing pages must therefore secure the identity and rank of what survives. His distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions shows that the willing/compulsion division is only a test of possible routes, not an assertion that any sufficiently intense desire could actually transform a mind into a body.

The argument about desire is equally specific. Desires directed toward body are analyzed as actions upon or for it: possessing, vivifying, fashioning and caring. A body could be an object of each act without being the subject that performs it. If the agent became mere body, it would lose the superior activity by which the desired relation was to be achieved. Ficino extends this through introspection to acting, knowing, sensing and, at minimum, living. He is not claiming that no one ever speaks of wanting to be an animal or an object. He is identifying what he takes to be the active good implicitly sought by a rational appetite.

The compulsory route is branched rather than dismissed in one sentence. The proposed cause must be stronger than its target. A body cannot outrank rational soul on the hierarchy already assumed. A stronger soul can exercise leverage only where the weaker soul’s desires make it subject, and a transformation eliminating all desire cannot satisfy that dependence. The would-be ruler’s own purpose also fails: care seeks the other’s good,

while malicious dominion seeks control over a mind, a more valuable object of rule than a body.

V.15.22 then separates a disembodied compeller from an embodied one and, within the latter case, an embodied target from a released target. Ficino's premises about disembodied goodness and superiority to bodily coercion must remain visible; they are not demonstrated anew in this paragraph. The conclusion about what is above rational soul being divine supplies a final appeal to benevolent action. This is why the account should not be detached as universal social psychology about interpersonal force.

The next two tests address weaknesses the division might leave. Sleep seems to overcome a person involuntarily, but only closes bodily sensation and does not abolish the truth accessible within a dream. More fundamentally, the final mediation proof argues that soul's conversion into body would require removing the form by which body can be produced. These are distinct arguments converging upon determinate continued life, rather than repetitions of the bare claim that nothing becomes nothing.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.19, V.15.20, PDF 116–117.** Nonannihilation is distinguished from identity preservation, and necessary from sufficient conditions.
- **V.15.21, V.15.22, PDF 118–119.** Desire and coercion are tested against the proposed conversion.
- **V.15.23, V.15.25, V.15.26, V.15.27, PDF 120–125.** Sleep and natural mediation provide the final related tests.

In this edition.

The source's solutus at V.15.22 means freed from bodily subjection in this argument, not dissolved into nonexistence. The chapter invokes Augustine and then returns to him by name; this companion treats the reasoning as Ficino's Augustinian presentation without claiming independent textual collation.

See also.

Sleep and dreams; Transmission of form and natural order; Generation, corruption and annihilation

Corporeal soul and elemental doxography

Latin: *corpusculum*; *tenuissimum*; *suffusum*; *igneum*; *aereum*; *aqueum*; *terreum*

The word.

Corpusculum is a little body; tenuis describes physical fineness or subtlety, not incorporeality. Suffundere pictures such a body diffused through a coarser one. The elemental adjectives specify what the hypothesized soul-body is made of.

In the Platonic Theology.

The first theory makes soul an exceedingly subtle body permeating the visible body. Ficino's catalogue attributes fire to Democritus, Leucippus and Hipparchus; air to Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia and Critias; water to Hippias; earth to Hesiod and Pronopides; fire and air to Boethus and Epicurus; and water and earth to Xenophantes. These are Ficino's reported associations, not independently authenticated ancient quotations. They must not be repaired into a modern doxography without evidence.

The subsequent arguments repeatedly concede subtlety to the opponent. Dense matter cannot readily penetrate the organs, but rarefied fire or air still leaves the question why this body gives life. If fire as fire were soul, every fire would be alive. A proposed fifth subtle body outside the four elements merely repeats the same explanatory problem. At the end of the book subtlety turns against the hypothesis: a soul-body light enough to spread through the organs would, on Ficino's physical assumptions, be exceptionally fleeting and unable to preserve memory.

Places to Read.

- **VI.1.2; source PDF pp. 128, 129**. The elemental theories are enumerated as the first rejected position.
- **VI.6.1, VI.6.2, VI.6.3; source PDF pp. 178, 179**. Density, rarity and a fifth body are tested without treating subtle matter as spirit.
- **VI.13.7; source PDF pp. 224, 225**. The opponent's subtle body becomes the unstable breath of the memory reductio.

In this edition.

The diminutive "little body" matters: it marks the proposed hidden bodily constituent, not an affectionate name for the visible person. Xenophantes in VI.1.2 and Xenophanes Colophonius in VI.1.5 are different printed names and are not silently merged. Natural claims here belong to the historical argument.

See also.

Dense and subtle bodies; Persistence, memory and recognition

Creation and generation

Latin: *creatio*; *creare*; *ex nihilo*; *generare*; *procreare*; *producere in esse*; *auctor*; *conditor*

The word.

Creatio here is production from nothing, without preexisting material subject. Generare and procreare can more broadly name bringing forth, and their presence alone does not settle whether the act is creation. Ex nihilo does not make nothingness a material ingredient.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.12 first concludes that soul, neither assembled from parts nor drawn from matter, comes from nothing. Its prior possibility belongs to the creator's active power rather than to a nonexistent part of soul or a supposed substrate called nothingness. V.13 develops this claim through several independent causal considerations and a sustained objection about angelic mediation.

The opening preference in V.13.1 should remain separate from the subsequent arguments. Ficino does not say that Plotinus and Proclus are non-Platonists or reject everything they teach. He contrasts one particular account of soul's origin with the view he chooses to follow. The soul's lack of parts excludes assembling preexisting elements; its superiority to matter excludes drawing it from an unformed material resource. Ex nihilo names the absence of both routes. Nothingness contributes no seed and supplies no hidden stuff.

The common-effect proof uses the explanatory order of gifts. A thing must be in order to be this or that, and so the gift common to every particular mode is assigned to the first

common source. “After nothing” and “before modes” need not be temporal stages in which a shapeless entity exists for a while and later becomes a human. They identify what every determinate creation presupposes. Secondary agents remain real causes of determination, but the text repeatedly adds that they act by divine power. A parent’s causation and God’s causation therefore answer different questions rather than competing to perform one interchangeable task.

The power argument takes a different route. A sculptor’s stone is already prepared; seed already has the capacity for its natural offspring; air is nearer to fire than water is within the elemental theory. An agent’s task grows with the gap between the starting potency and the intended act. Nothing has no proportion to being, and Ficino calls that gap infinite. His conclusion requires both this scale of power and the absence of any finite measure for nothing-to-being. It is not established simply by attaching the adjective infinite to the word distance.

Finally, created structure rules out delegating the task to a creature. This is why the chapter spends so long distinguishing essence, being, power and action: the conclusion about creation rests on the inherent limitation of the operative power, not merely on a conventional title reserved for God. The instrument proposal is then a real attempted escape. God could remain the principal agent while angel served as instrument, but the proposal imports material subject, movement and time and also confines the divine power in a finite recipient. Ficino rejects both mechanisms.

The conservation conclusion preserves the product rather than abolishing its distinctness. God keeps what he creates through the same power by which he creates it. Immediate dependence makes soul stable without making it identical with God, just as different Ideas explain why immediate angel and immediate soul need not be equal. The final either/or about beginning and end is particularly important: endless duration is the necessary conclusion of this passage, not the assertion that a created personal soul existed eternally before its appearance.

Places to Read.

- **V.12.7, V.12.8, V.12.9, V.12.10, PDF 72–73.** Soul’s origin is distinguished from material formation and its possibility located in God.
- **V.13.1, V.13.2, V.13.3, V.13.4, V.13.5, V.13.6, PDF 78–83.** Common being, participation and infinite distance support divine creative exclusivity.
- **V.13.7, V.13.13, V.13.14, V.13.15, V.13.16, PDF 84–89.** Creaturely limitation and the rejection of an angelic creative instrument.
- **V.13.17, PDF 90–91.** A beginning remains compatible with endless preservation.

In this edition.

The source’s “author,” “maker,” “creator” and “fashioner” follow several Latin nouns and should not be turned into four separate divine agents. V.13.15–16 divide a single interrogative sentence across source units, so neither should be read as a freestanding assertion.

See also.

Participation, common and proper; Instrument and creative mediation; Creature, power and operation; First Cause

Creature, power and operation

Latin: *creatura*; *essentia*; *esse*; *virtus*; *actio*; *operatio*; *potentia*; *accidens*; *qualitas*

The word.

Creatura is a creature, everything other than God. Virtus is effective power here, not primarily moral virtue. Operatio and actio name activity. The fourfold account distinguishes essence, being, power and action rather than listing four physical constituents.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.13.7 describes four creaturely constituents: essence, being, power and action. Ficino attributes to Pythagoreans the qualified language of four elements even in spirits, then explains the distinctions rather than treating the number as self-evident. These are different explanatory terms within a creature, not four bodily ingredients or four independently existing substances. The staged questions lead to a specific conclusion about the limits of created agency.

The sequence of questions is worth following in full because no one distinction does all the work. First, essence differs from being: an essence receives the act of existence, and that reception bounds it. If no receiver other than act existed, act would be unrestricted, which belongs to God alone. Second, essence differs from operation: the essence must already be before operating, and operation cannot be an independently subsisting infinite act. Third, operation differs from being. Outward action makes the difference visible, but inward action needs a further explanation.

The inward case is the more demanding one. A human remains a being of one determinate species while understanding objects from many species. The being by which the person exists is therefore not the cognitive operation that assumes the objects' intelligible determinations. Truth and good stretch at least as broadly as being, so understanding and enjoyment can in their objects range indefinitely. This range does not make the creature's own existence infinite or transform it into each object physically. It shows that operation and the species-limited act of existence cannot simply be the same term.

Fourth, operation differs from power and essence as act differs from potency. Fifth, power differs from being because one is capacity and the other actuality. Sixth, power differs from essence because powers are distinguished through their own acts: being actualizes essence, operation actualizes operative power. The argument supplies the ordered relationships operation-in-power and power-and-being-in-essence. The four terms are not four independently detachable substances, and they are not a physiological diagram of four bodily elements.

Ficino then infers that a creature operates immediately through a quality or accident rather than naked substance. The proximate product consequently has inhering being and requires a prior recipient. This explains the otherwise surprising conclusion that no creature creates anything. It is strict creatio from nothing that is denied, not ordinary making, generating, thinking or willing. The argument's scope also guards V.14.2: when soul vivifies "by its being," the phrase is immediately explained through natural power, not as a cancellation of the created essence/power distinction just established.

The stable spelling voluptas at V.13.11 is a small but consequential lexical point. V.13.10 names cognition and will as inward operations; V.13.11 then names understanding and pleasure and assigns truth and good as their objects. This companion explains the transition actually printed rather than making a silent emendation to align the two lists.

Places to Read.

- **V.13.7, V.13.8, V.13.9, PDF 84–85.** Four creaturely terms and their distinct relations to actuality.
- **V.13.10, V.13.11, V.13.12, PDF 84–87.** Outward and inward operations, their objects and their distinctions from being and power.
- **V.13.13, PDF 86–87.** Nested inherence and limited agency exclude creaturely creation.

In this edition.

V.13.11 really reads voluptas, “pleasure,” after V.13.10’s voluntas, “will.” The apparatus explicitly preserves that change rather than correcting it away. M1482’s per infinita is followed against G1559’s per infinitas, where species appears to be understood (PDF 397).

See also.

Creation and generation; Reception and the receiver; Intelligible principles and reasoning

Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts

Latin: *definitio*; *genus*; *differentia*; *animal*; *rationale*; *pars*; *totum*

The word.

Genus names the broader kind shared by species; differentia specifies what distinguishes a species within it. “Rational animal” supplies Ficino’s working definition of a human being. These are intelligible constituents, not spatial pieces of a body or mind.

In the Platonic Theology.

A bodily form received in an extended subject would be divisible. Ficino first tests like parts: if each has the full account of the whole, as each drop has the nature of water, one part suffices and the rest add only quantity. Such repetition could not adequately distinguish a structured whole from its parts. Wheat grains and water drops illustrate increase without a new formal account.

Unlike parts are then tested through genus and difference. If animal and rational occupied bodily regions, each region could be divided without limit. A bounded definition would yield infinitely repeated genera and differences or an endless ascent and descent of classification. Yet the argument presupposes upper genera and ultimate differences, including substance and the determinate power of reasoning.

The reported Epicurean model assigns genus to the right of mind and difference to the left. Ficino asks why either region should be privileged if both are equally mind. Separated constituents do not give one mind one knowledge of one thing through one definition at one time. They must be united, and a chance collision is rejected as an account of regular knowledge. If mind itself achieves their union, it is already doing what the bodily model cannot explain.

The polemic against mind composed of mindless parts belongs to this argument. Its target is not every possible account of emergence; its premises concern bodily reception, spatial distribution and the unity required for definition. Ficino also insists that a true mental combination must correspond to a real union in things, rather than being an arbitrary fiction.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.3, PDF pp. 320–321.** Similar parts yield redundancy or merely numerical and quantitative increase.
- **VIII.4.4, PDF pp. 322–323.** The genus-and-difference hypothesis is driven toward an impossible infinite definition.
- **VIII.4.5, PDF pp. 324–325.** Right-and-left localization, chance mixture and mind's unifying activity are examined.
- **VIII.4.7, VIII.4.8, PDF pp. 326–329.** Unspecified parts and numerical models of knowledge are tested after genus and difference.

In this edition.

The imperatives Sint hae duae and Sint extensae are hypothetical concessions to an opponent. They do not endorse spatially divided definitions. The corrected scitum/sciti in VIII.4.8 means the object known; confusing it with situm would turn the issue into position.

See also.

Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Simplicity of human and numerical species; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences

Dense, subtle and fifth body

Latin: *crassum*; *subtile*; *rarum*; *penetrare*; *implere*; *quintum corpusculum*; *superadditus*

The word.

Crassum is dense or gross, subtile physically fine, rarum rarefied. Penetrare and implere are penetrating and filling. Superadditus means added beyond a proposed base; it does not itself determine whether the added principle is accidental or substantial.

In the Platonic Theology.

Dense water or earth appears unfit to fill and move all parts readily. Fire or air seems more promising because of physical rarity. Ficino nevertheless asks whether the posited fire is soul insofar as fire or for a further reason. If the former, all fire and fiery things are alive. If the latter, the explanatory soul has been sought beyond fire's mere bodily nature. The same test applies to air.

A fifth exceedingly subtle body beyond the four elements does not escape. If it vivifies through matter common to every body, every body becomes soul; if through superadded power, the opponent has conceded something "in some manner" incorporeal. The qualification marks the limited immediate conclusion. In the wider sequence substantial form, indivisibility, whole presence and freedom from material origin still require their own arguments. Subtlety is accordingly a possible property of a bodily vehicle, never a sufficient synonym for spiritual substance.

Places to Read.

- **VI.6.1, VI.6.2, VI.6.3; source PDF pp. 178, 179**. Dense, rarefied and fifth-body proposals undergo the same causal test.
- **VI.13.7; source PDF pp. 224, 225**. The very fineness needed for penetration becomes a problem for enduring memory.

In this edition.

Quintum is numerically and philosophically specific: it is an imagined fifth body beyond the four elements. The edition retains quodammodo before incorpoream and the base witness's conditional detur, keeping a concession distinct from an assertion.

See also.

Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Essential presence and containment

Discord and the soul's persistence

Latin: *dissonantia*; *discordia*; *dissensio*; *permanere*; *perseverare*; *naturalis habitus*

The word.

The discord vocabulary ranges over opposed opinions and affections, disagreement of elements and humors, and discordant parts of soul and body. *Habitus* in "natural state" concerns the soul's enduring condition here, not automatically an acquired moral habit.

In the Platonic Theology.

Chapter 15 sharpens the argument: harmony, strictly considered as harmony, admits nothing dissonant while remaining harmony. Soul, however, is continually pulled by discordant opinions and affections and remains a genuine, vital soul. This contrasts persistence of the subject with failure of harmonious agreement within it.

An objection distinguishes psychic discord, which does not kill, from elemental and humoral discord, which supposedly does. Ficino replies by ranking kinds of dissonance according to their closeness to soul. Disagreement of opinions and affections is proper and inward: it affects souls, not lifeless bodies, and assails the souls of mortals generally. Since this does not overthrow their life and sensation, he argues, the more foreign discord of humors will not dissolve the soul's natural state. If that state were simply humoral concord, even slight humoral dissonance would undo it.

The scope is the soul's identity and persistence, not bodily invulnerability. The argument should not be paraphrased as medical advice that disturbances of bodily constitution cannot harm a living human being. Earlier chapters freely describe bodily injury and the dissolution of animal organization. Here Ficino opposes identifying the soul with the harmony whose disruption would, by definition, end that harmony. The concluding claim permits extensive discord of soul and body while a true living soul persists.

Places to Read.

- **VII.15.1, PDF 280–281**. Strict harmony, psychic discord, the bodily-discord objection and its reply complete Book VII.

In this edition.

Animus and *anima* alternate for the same subject and are both rendered "soul" in this argument. The three nested domains of discord must remain separate. The strength of the move from nearer to more foreign dissonance belongs to Ficino's reasoning and should not be silently replaced by a modern biological inference. The Latin omnes mortalium … animos means the souls of mortals; the English "every mortal soul" should not be taken as an assertion that soul is mortal.

See also.

Moral concord and the robber; Harmony and the strings; Severed animals and replacement souls

Divine production and the third essence

Latin: *individuum*; *incorporeus auctor*; *agentis virtus*; *tertia essentia*; *fomentum*

The word.

Individuum means an indivisible something here, not primarily a modern individual person. Auctor is the originating producer; virtus is effective power. Fomentum names matter's supposed supporting or generative resource, rendered through the image of tinder. Tertia essentia is the third grade between lower body/quality and higher mind/God.

In the Platonic Theology.

The final position in VI.1 calls the human soul divine, whole in each bodily part, and produced by an incorporeal author. The decisive contrast is between dependence solely upon the agent's power and dependence upon matter's beginning, capacity or tinder. The soul is produced and dependent; its freedom from matter is not self-creation or equality with God. Its substantial indivisibility and whole presence do not by themselves finish the argument, because the fourth rejected position already grants comparable features while retaining material origin.

The ancient theologians named here are Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras and Plato. Aristotle the natural philosopher is said to follow their footsteps "for the most part," a deliberately qualified assimilation. The contemporary circle is then represented as agreeing that the human classification must be demonstrated. VI.3 consequently reserves freedom from material origin for the intellectual stage, while natural power first establishes noncorporeality and partly excludes a divided bodily form. The reader should not use the fifth position's statement as though Book VI had already proved all its conditions.

Places to Read.

- **VI.1.5, VI.1.6; source PDF pp. 130, 131, 132, 133**. The final contrast is causal independence from matter, not merely freedom from an organ.
- **VI.3.1, VI.3.2; source PDF pp. 168, 169**. The proof's promised stages culminate in assignment to the immortal third essence.

In this edition.

The facing English renders Mercurius as Hermes and physicus Aristoteles as "Aristotle the natural philosopher." Plurimum must accompany the latter attribution. The lexical contrast between material capacitas and the producing agent's virtus is retained; neither is simply "strength."

See also.

Cavalcanti and the five positions; Point, dimension and substantial unity

Earth, wood and severed stones

Latin: *saxum*; *lignum*; *affigi*; *avelli*; *unio*; *augmentum*

The word.

Saxa are stones; ligna wood or logs. Affigi describes attachment to earth, avelli removal or tearing away. Unio is cohesion of parts, whereas augmentum is growth; the text distinguishes possession of the former from the latter.

In the Platonic Theology.

The opening nutrition argument uses logs and stones “torn from the earth” as bodies that do not grow like flourishing plants and animals. Near the end of VI.8, the obvious challenge returns: if body needs an incorporeal binder, whence comes the cohesion of these nonliving examples? The Platonists’ reported answer is that while attached to earth they receive both unity and growth from soul, but once severed retain unity alone.

This distinction prevents two misleading summaries. Ficino does not simply infer that every detached stone lives and grows as an animal does; nor does he regard its continued cohesion as independent of the higher unifying power. The attachment and severance conditions belong to his historical cosmological account. They should not be rewritten as current geology or botany. The source’s final corrected wording is simply “from soul,” although the reference to earth makes a terrestrial context natural.

Places to Read.

- **VI.4.1, VI.4.5; source PDF pp. 170, 171, 172, 173**. Detached wood and stones serve the distinction between mere corporeality and nourishment.
- **VI.8.7; source PDF pp. 188, 189**. The Platonist reply differentiates unity surviving severance from growth while attached.

In this edition.

The apparatus reports that M1482’s authorial correction removes terrae from ab anima terrae at VI.8.7. The reading text therefore has ab anima, while G1559 and P1641 retain the longer wording. “Earth-soul” may describe the broader context, but should not be printed as the exact phrase in this unit.

See also.

Nourishment and the life-giving form; Unity, dispersion and the inward bond

Eight motions and the cold-water objection

Latin: *alteratio*; *generatio*; *corruptio*; *augmentum*; *decrementum*; *condensatio*; *rarefactio*; *progressio*

The word.

The eight motions comprise qualitative alteration, coming-to-be, corruption, increase, decrease, condensation, rarefaction and progression or locomotion. “Motion” consequently exceeds spatial travel. Secundum virtutem is virtual possession by power, contrasted with a quality present secundum actum.

In the Platonic Theology.

The third main proof in VI.12 tests whether body moves itself under any of the eight headings. In self-heating it would have to possess the heat it gives and lack the heat it

receives at the same time. An objector proposes water's retained virtual coldness: after heating, its native power restores actual coldness. The Platonist replies allow either external elements cooling it, or an inward quality-producing power whose own source is incorporeal substance. The second reply therefore distinguishes actual quality, productive power and substantial source rather than merely declaring water unable to cool.

After rejecting bodily self-generation and self-corruption, Ficino reduces growth and diminution to alteration and the generation or loss of bodily parts, and condensation and rarefaction to alteration. Locomotion by passage or circuit is then excluded because a body unable to move itself to its own internal termini is said to be still less capable of reaching external termini. This is the work's historical metaphysical taxonomy and causal inference, not a modern account of heat flow or mechanics.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.13; source PDF pp. 214, 215**. The eightfold list, heating contradiction and water objection introduce the proof.
- **VI.12.15, VI.12.16; source PDF pp. 216, 217**. Dependent changes and local movement complete the exclusion of bodily self-motion.

In this edition.

"Virtually" here means in an effective power, not unreal or digitally simulated. The edition preserves "own" and "another's" termini to expose the disputed inference rather than substituting an unexplained general appeal to inertia.

See also.

Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul

Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer

Latin: *elementum*; *concursus*; *concursio*; *ordinator*; *conflare*; *vita comes et pedisequa*

The word.

Concursus and concursio are a coming together of constituents; ordinator is what orders their meeting. Conflare suggests combining or composing. Life as comes and pedisequa is life as companion and attendant, an alternative to directly identifying soul with life.

In the Platonic Theology.

VI.11 begins with an allowed pair of formulations: soul either is a kind of life or has life following it, since bodies receive life through soul. A supposed soul-body composed of elements then meets a threefold test. If each element independently lives, there are many souls occupying one seat rather than one composite soul. If none lives, the meeting alone cannot explain life; even if life arises in a conjunction, it does so in a determinate arrangement, requiring an inward orderer. If only some constituent lives, that alone is soul and the others are unnecessary to constitute soul itself.

A single element is no escape, since it is composed of matter and form. Formless matter cannot supply life, so the form must be the animating source. Ficino thus distinguishes conjunction from what explains its particular life-producing order. This is his objection to an emergent life from otherwise lifeless constituents; it should neither be recast as a modern experimental disproof of biological emergence nor stripped of its formal-causal premise. The permitted "life or attendant life" formulation also prevents forcing a stricter identity than the opening states.

Places to Read.

- **VI.11.1; source PDF pp. 198, 199**. Three possibilities for life in elemental constituents are tested before the single-element case.
- **VI.12.9; source PDF pp. 210, 211**. A different opponent later proposes the integrity of the whole as the source of self-motion.

In this edition.

The apparatus applies the correction aliquid rather than unum aliquid in the final constituent alternative. The local question is where explanatory life resides, not a numerical census of chemical elements. “Element” retains the work’s historical natural-philosophical meaning.

See also.

Integrity of the whole; Contrary powers and directed movement

Essence and being

Latin: *essentia*; *esse*; *ratio*; *definitio*; *actus essentiae*; *praesentia*; *existentia*

The word.

Essentia is what a thing is, grasped in its account or definition; esse is its actual being. V.7 calls esse the act of essence and a certain presence in the world of things. Ratio here is an intelligible account, not necessarily a chain of reasoning or a numerical ratio.

In the Platonic Theology.

The comet example in V.7 introduces essence as a defining account and being as its actual occurrence. The account can be true when no comet shines today; a present comet requires a particular place and time. If such coordinates belonged to the common definition, all comets would have to occur together there. Humanity likewise belongs across ages and in East and West, while Plato and Socrates must live in particular conditions. Ficino therefore calls every essence considered in itself immortal, then immediately distinguishes the ways it may be brought into actual being.

The comet passage also differentiates a definition’s truth from the existence of its instances. Its definition remains true “today” without an actually shining comet “today.” That does not mean an uninstantiated comet has a secret astronomical location. Nor does it establish that Plato’s personal soul is identical with the universal definition of humanity. Ficino uses the contrast to detach defining content from a single spatiotemporal occurrence, then asks in the next unit how an agent determines such a nature to actual being. His language gives the essence considered in itself a wider standing than a modern nominalist might allow; the companion should expose that premise rather than translate it away.

The argument from the receiver’s mode at V.7.2 is the decisive bridge. Whatever receives something receives according to its own character. A form whose being is in matter is subject to matter’s limits; a form whose being is in itself receives according to its own immaterial essence. Because essence as such was already called immortal, the independent form’s act is received immortally. The conclusion is therefore stronger than the definitional observation and depends on the claim of real self-subsistence. Without that premise the reasoning would incorrectly make every definition’s individual instances perpetual; Ficino blocks that route with the contrast between bodily and separate forms.

V.11 then makes the distinction do another kind of work. Essence is what would supposedly remain when an act of being is lost. Ficino provisionally grants the objector this model, then insists that a surviving essence already is. The objection must consequently identify a merely potential destination that avoids actual survival. The following alternatives show why none is available for soul. The essence/being distinction is not an invitation to imagine an actually existing essence with no being; that is precisely the incoherent situation the reductio exposes.

Finally, V.13 prevents the language of self-subsisting form from collapsing into divine simplicity. A creature's being is circumscribed by its essence; its power is circumscribed too, and operation is actualization of that power. Divine being is not another received instance. These distinctions explain why soul can be immaterial and imperishable while still possessing received actuality and a limited created nature. "Simple" must be read relative to the excluded bodily composition, rather than as an assertion that essence, existence, power and operation are all numerically identical in soul.

Places to Read.

- **V.7.1, V.7.2, PDF 34–37.** Definition and actual presence are distinguished before bodily and separate modes of being are contrasted.
- **V.11.1, V.11.3, V.11.8, PDF 60–63, 66–67.** Essence/being supports the analogy of spiritual potency and its proper act.
- **V.13.3, V.13.7, V.13.8, V.13.9, PDF 80–81, 84–85.** Absolute being and the creature's nonidentity with its act are specified.

In this edition.

The translation retains esse as "being" while using verbal constructions when necessary. The long definition in V.7 follows Ficino's historical comet theory; it is not a modern scientific definition. "Every essence" is expressly qualified by secundum se ipsam, considered in itself.

See also.

Comets and defining accounts; Form and formal being; Creature, power and operation; First Cause

Essential presence and containment

Latin: *per essentiam*; *per quantitatem*; *adesse*; *comprehendens*; *comprehensa*; *momentum*

The word.

Adesse means being present, not necessarily occupying a measurable place. Per essentiam and per quantitatem distinguish presence through essence from spatial occupancy through quantity. Comprehendere here contains or embraces; the active/passive contrast is metaphysical rather than solely cognitive.

In the Platonic Theology.

At the end of VI.6 Ficino reports short arguments supplied by unnamed others. If soul's divided parts live, the whole vital nature is in each and does not diminish with division; if they do not, life would be constructed from nonliving things. Other tests contrast bodily perceptibility, boundaries and temporally divisible action with soul's invisibility, lack of bodily outline and capacity to act in an instant. These compact arguments are not all the same proof and carry a reported introduction.

Body fills place by quantity. Soul gives being when present, and being proceeds from essence; its presence is accordingly essential. Nor is it contained by body as a body is by a place. It perfects, contains and guides body. VI.9 elaborates this argument: giving substantial being and operation to each member requires communicating essence and power there. Whole presence is not the distribution of little soul-pieces. The comparative "more indivisible than a line or point" expresses a superiority to geometrical entities still dependent on a corporeal subject.

Places to Read.

- **VI.6.4, VI.6.5; source PDF pp. 180, 181**. A reported sequence distinguishes essential presence, containment and quantitative placement.
- **VI.9.2, VI.9.3; source PDF pp. 190, 191, 192, 193**. Presence in members is inferred from their being, unity and immanent operations.

In this edition.

"Comprehended" and "comprehending" should be read through the following verbs perficit, continet and ducit. "In an instant" is Ficino's contrast with bodily temporal division, not an empirical claim about modern cognitive processing speed.

See also.

Place, coincidence and painless penetration; Substantial form and the receiving subject

Exemplars of bodily motion in soul

Latin: *exemplar*; *reminisci*; *oblivisci*; *colligere*; *distrahi*; *resolvere*; *deducere*; *reflecti*

The word.

Exemplaria are patterns or higher counterparts, not bodily movements copied at a smaller scale. Reminisci and oblivisci are recollecting and forgetting; colligere and distrahi gather or scatter attention. Resolvere traces an effect back into its cause, while deducere derives an effect from a cause.

In the Platonic Theology.

The catalogue maps each bodily motion onto psychic activity. Attachment to divine things exemplifies generation and to mortal things corruption; recollection increase and forgetting decrease; changing affections alteration; sudden insight or self-collection condensation; discursive ranging or distraction rarefaction. Initial contact with external objects is straight progression, causal return and derivation or self-contemplation circular movement. These are analogues of activity, not literal geometrical displacements.

The directions are then refined: toward body and sense is straight, toward oneself or angel oblique, toward God as origin and end circular; universals are upward and particulars downward; opposed differences of a genus are right and left; causes and effects are forward and backward. This repeated spatial vocabulary expresses intellectual relations. The closing inference calls soul a fountain of motions and explains the derivative self-alteration, nourishment, growth and locomotion of living bodies. Its self-generation and self-corruption remain expressly qualified. Recollection as increase does not make soul physically bigger, a distinction the next chapter will exploit.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.19; source PDF pp. 218, 219**. Every psychic exemplar and the second directional scheme is individually specified.
- **VI.12.20; source PDF pp. 220, 221**. The fountain image concludes with qualified self-change and derived living motion.

In this edition.

The edition retains the whole list rather than reducing it to “thought is movement.” Quodammodo, ut ita dixerim and quasi in VI.12.20 protect the analogy, including the final “as though” spontaneous motion belonged to life.

See also.

Temporal discourse and psychic ascent; Growth, amputation and soul-size

Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency

Latin: *angelus finitus*; *spiritus infinitus*; *actus infinitus*; *potentia infinita*; *unitas*; *multitudo*

The word.

The infinite act is God; infinite potency is matter subject to God and receptive to indefinitely many forms. These are opposed modes, not two independent equal first principles. An angel remains a finite spirit, however elevated it is conceived.

In the Platonic Theology.

Thought ascends beyond celestial spheres and imagines an angel higher than any finite angel already considered. As long as each remains finite, the ascent can continue. The mind ends the regress by concluding to an infinite spirit beyond every actual or conceivable angel. This is an argument from finite grades to a transcendent terminus, not a census showing that infinitely many actual angels occupy successively higher ranks.

The same cognitive power discovers infinite act and infinite potency. Matter is expressly subdita deo, subject to God, and capable of receiving forms from that source. Ficino then envisages the indefinite succession of generation flowing from act into receptive potency. The possibility of infinite temporal succession is not automatically an assertion that a particular material individual has always existed.

Universality supplies another route: indefinitely many humans fall under humanity; species gather into genus; genera into essence; essence is referred to divine unity, truth and goodness. Thought can descend again into multiplicity. Its power makes many one in understanding without physically compressing individuals into a lump or dissolving their differences.

This passage is important for the First Cause because it holds hierarchy, causal dependence and cognitive ascent together. The mind capable of conceiving the infinite source is not thereby that source, and matter’s receptivity does not replace God’s productive act.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.16.2, PDF pp. 372–373.** The ascending finite-angels argument leads to God, then to the act/potency contrast and the universal gathering of many into one.

In this edition.

The source preserves “in some manner” for mind’s infinite power, while calling God infinite act. Potentia is best retained as potency here; translating it simply as powerful matter would reverse its receptive function. The corrected quolibet governs universali.

See also.

Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement

First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence

Latin: *causa prima*; *prima rerum causa*; *primum principium*; *causa principalis*; *agens principale*; *causae sequentes*; *causa efficiens*; *causa finalis*; *causa formalis*; *per se*; *per aliud*

The word.

A *causa* is that through which something is, comes to be, or receives a determination. *Prima* identifies what is first in an order; in the central passages of this volume, the first cause is God, the source on which all things depend for being. *Principium* is a beginning, source or explanatory principle. In V.10, *primum principium* and *causa prima* refer to the same divine source while describing it as principle and cause respectively. Neither expression by itself requires an event earlier than every other event.

Principalis means principal or chief. A principal cause is distinguished from an instrument within a specified operation. In VII.8.1 the question is what governs an animal’s growth: the soul is the directing agent, whereas heat serves as an instrument. A principal cause of growth is therefore not automatically the first cause of all being. The dictionary forms displayed above are lookup forms; the exact constructions include *causam primam*, *a prima rerum causa*, *ad primum principium*, *tamquam causa principali* and *principalis agentis*.

“Primary cause” needs particular care. That exact English phrase does not occur in the supplied Volume II, and its numbered Latin text has no form of *primarius*. The translation does use “primary intention” for *principali … proposito* in V.5.2, “primary motion” for the language of *primo* in V.1, and “principal cause” in VII.8.1. A reader encountering “primary cause” in another translation should first check which Latin expression and which contrast lie behind it. It can be an English label for the first cause, or a way of describing the chief agent; the English adjective alone does not establish a second divine cause.

In the Platonic Theology.

The central question is not simply which thing caused an earlier thing. It is what an effect receives, from what kind of source it receives it, and whether that dependence makes its existence vulnerable to bodily dissolution. God, rational soul, bodily form, heat and an instrument can all enter causal accounts, but they do not enter them in the same way. The distinction between an ultimate source and a chief agent within a particular operation provides the first orientation; the distinctions between the four causes, formal self-possession and efficient production then make that orientation precise. V.2.1 explicitly establishes that “soul” in this discussion normally means rational soul; the account of its immediate creation must not be extended without qualification to every lower form of life.

Four causes and unequal kinds of independence. V.5.1 names efficient cause, end, matter and form. In its human example, universal nature together with a human being is the efficient cause, human happiness is the end, body is matter, and soul is form. These are

explanatory roles rather than four competing makers. God alone excludes all four kinds of cause from his own dependence: nothing makes, constitutes or completes him. Every lower being still has an efficient cause and an end. The subsequent ascent therefore cannot mean that soul becomes a second uncaused divine being.

Ficino distinguishes levels by what each requires. A natural body requires all four causes. Quality is already a form and so does not require another formal cause in that respect, but remains dependent on matter, a producer and an end. The third essence, soul, is free from material dependence as well: it has efficient and final causes but no matter or additional form as constitutive causes. The soul's inclination toward matter is not its dependence on matter for being. The angel's further superiority in V.5.5 concerns its lack of that inclination; the argument does not make angel or soul independent of God. Thus *per se* has a qualified use for soul and an unqualified use for God. To translate both with "through itself" and then treat the two beings as equally self-originating would erase the chapter's argument.

First cause and first principle in V.10. V.10.1 takes up a possible objection: perhaps the soul exists always only under some condition. Ficino allows its relation to the first cause, but denies that the condition is bodily assistance. All things remain in being through their relation to the first cause. That source is the purest act, and lower things resemble it through form rather than through matter. A natural composite bears the likeness through only one constitutive part; a form immersed in body is in turn related to the first cause through a higher source. V.10.2 describes the dependent bodily image as hanging from a face reflected in a mirror. The image cannot simply detach itself and retain its being.

The argument uses "first cause," "first principle," and God within the same connected sequence. These are descriptions of the same source, not a list of three separate entities. *Principium* emphasizes the source or ground toward which the account is traced; *causa* emphasizes dependence and production. At the lower level, by contrast, soul mediates the production of bodily qualities through its changing operations. Those effects change because their mode of dependence includes that mutable operation. The distinction is between how the effect depends and what kind of stability belongs to the dependent effect, not between dependence and complete autonomy.

V.10.3 then argues that soul relates to God through its own stable essence. The soul is the cause of its own relation, and the relation is the source of its perfection. This carefully limited claim does not say that soul efficiently creates its own essence. Ficino's concluding image keeps both sides together: God continually overflows, while soul continually draws and drinks being. Soul's stable relation to God through its own essence is the way in which it remains dependent upon the divine source. The image joins permanence to reception rather than replacing reception with self-sufficiency.

Being itself and determinate effects. V.13.1–4 distinguishes the common gift of being from the particular modes in which things are. The chapter opens by reporting that Plotinus, Proclus and some other Platonists make soul originate from angel, then explicitly prefers Dionysius, Origen and Augustine on its production by God alone. Those affiliations are Ficino's presentation here; the argument does not establish the exact wording or full position of every named author independently.

The common feature of all effects is that they are. Particular effects also have determinate conditions: being human, being hot, being this individual, being of a particular kind. Ficino assigns being itself to God and diverse determinations to diverse causes acting through God's power. His examples are deliberately concrete: that someone is comes from God; that the person is human also involves a human parent; that someone is hot can come from

fire. The parent and the fire are not thereby competing first causes. They contribute particular effects within an order whose agents, powers and effects already depend upon the universal source.

V.13.4 explicitly matches the first gift, being itself, with the first cause, and second or third gifts with subsequent causes. The phrase here is *sequentibus causis*, "subsequent causes." It should not be misquoted as a printed occurrence of *causae secundae*. "Secondary causes" is a useful explanatory grouping, provided the reader understands that it describes their subordinate role rather than supplying the exact wording of this sentence. Likewise, "being after nothing" in V.13.3–4 marks the explanatory priority of being over its determinations. The same chapter states that creation does not occur through motion or time. It therefore cannot be reduced to a sequence in which nothingness is an earlier material waiting to be changed.

Creation and the limits of an instrument. A created producer acts upon a foundation and brings a possibility into actuality: the sculptor works stone, and a human parent generates from seed. Nothingness, by contrast, is not a receptive material or an undeveloped capacity. V.13.5–6 argues that the transition from nothing to being requires an unlimited power. V.13.7–13 adds that a creature's essence, being, power and operation are distinguishable; its operative power is received and bounded. God alone creates in the strict sense at issue. "No creature creates" here does not mean that creatures cannot generate, make artifacts, heat bodies or perform real actions. It means that they do not supply being from no preexisting subject.

V.13.14 tests a proposed compromise: could God be the craftsman while an angel acts as the instrument through which the soul is created? Ficino rejects this proposal. As he describes an instrument here, it is moved by another, affects an underlying subject and conveys the principal agent's form into that subject over time. Creation requires neither substrate nor motion nor time. V.13.15–16 adds that the divine power would be limited if it had first to be received in a finite angel for the work that requires limitless power. The soul therefore depends immediately on God for its creation. This conclusion concerns the proposed creative instrument; it does not abolish every kind of subordinate agency or every mediation in nature.

V.13.18 makes the distinction explicit in a report attributed to Timaeus and Plato. Rational soul originates immediately through the Idea of life, while irrational life proceeds through rational soul as an intermediary. The immediate source acts stably; the mediated production involves the soul's mutable activity, so the derivative life is mutable in itself. Ficino then qualifies this through the Platonists' account of life impressed on an ethereal vehicle as on an enduring mirror, as contrasted with life impressed on a perishable composite body, and defers further treatment. The report's qualifications should remain attached to it. Immediate rational-soul creation and derivative animation are distinct causal questions.

Principal cause in growth. VII.8.1 places the distinction within a different operation. Heat can penetrate and dissolve food, but digestion must produce living flesh and the animal's determinate figure. Growth also has a particular magnitude and limit, whereas heat spreads according to the material available. Ficino therefore denies that heat is the principal cause or principal craftsman of growth. The soul's nutritive power directs heat as its instrument and specifies the ordered result. The chief agent of this bounded activity remains a created soul, itself dependent upon God. The contrast is soul and heat within nourishment and growth; it is not God and a rival first cause.

These claims belong to Ficino's historical natural philosophy. Their explanatory structure can be described without presenting his physiology as contemporary biological evidence. The important lexical point is that an agent can be principal relative to an instrument while subordinate relative to the source of its own being. Conversely, calling God principal in an account does not automatically identify every other use of *principalis* with God.

Formal self-causation is not efficient self-creation. VIII.15 returns to mind's reflexive activity. Ficino argues that mind forms and perfects itself through understanding and willing, and distinguishes the persistence of the knowing subject from the succession by which a natural kind continues in offspring. He mentions Proclus's stronger claim that soul has its essence from itself, but ends the report by leaving that assertion to Proclus. The distancing phrase must not disappear from a summary.

VIII.15.3 gives the decisive limit: mind is its own cause formally, not efficiently. Its form and reflexive life account for the way in which its being is possessed and preserved; it is not its own creator. VIII.16.4 likewise insists that the enlargement by which mind extends beyond determinate bodily limits is implanted and preserved by God, rather than owned in complete independence. These late chapters reinforce the distinction established by V.5: an incorporeal soul can possess being and act through itself without becoming the first cause of itself.

Preservation and immortality. The causal analysis serves the volume's central question. V.13.17 argues that the source needed for the soul to come to be is also sufficient for it to remain, and that God preserves through the same power by which he creates. An intervening bodily support cannot fail and separate soul from its preserver, because that is not the kind of dependence assigned to the soul's essence. The passage allows the alternative of a soul that has a beginning yet no end. An argument for continuing existence therefore does not by itself establish that an individual soul has always existed. Nor does the soul's immediate origin make soul and angel equal: V.13.16 differentiates the divine exemplars under which they are produced.

The safest reading sequence is consequently to ask four questions. What effect is being explained: being itself, a determinate bodily change, or the soul's own formal activity? Which causal role is named: efficient, final, material or formal? Is the comparison between the universal source and subsequent causes, or between a principal agent and an instrument? Finally, is the dependence absolute or qualified in a particular respect? Keeping those questions separate removes much of the apparent conflict among first cause, principal cause, first principle and self-causation.

Places to Read.

- **V.2.1, PDF 12–13.** Ficino specifies the rational-soul scope of the discussion and distinguishes irrational lives as images of souls.
- **V.5.1–5, PDF 26–29.** The four causes and the graduated uses of *per se*: soul retains efficient and final dependence although free from material dependence.
- **V.10.1–3, PDF 54–59.** First cause, first principle and God name the same ultimate source; the conclusion joins soul's stable relation to God through its own essence to continual reception of being.
- **V.13.1–4, PDF 78–81.** The reported Platonic disagreement, God as cause of being, determinate effects of other causes, and the sequence of first and subsequent gifts.
- **V.13.5–13, PDF 82–87.** Created production presupposes a foundation and limited operative power; strict creation does not.

- **V.13.14–17, PDF 88–91.** The proposed angelic instrument is rejected; immediate creation and preservation do not require beginningless existence.
- **V.13.18, PDF 92–93.** The reported contrast between immediate rational soul and derivative irrational life preserves a place for natural mediation.
- **VII.8.1, PDF 264–265.** Heat is denied the role of principal cause of growth; nutritive soul directs it as an instrument.
- **VIII.15.2–3, PDF 366–369.** The Proclean self-production report is qualified, and formal self-causation is explicitly distinguished from efficient causation.
- **VIII.16.4, PDF 376–377.** The mind's enlarged power remains implanted and preserved by God.

In this edition.

The comparison-unit references are editorial divisions of the supplied Diotimos proof. "First cause" and "first principle" in V.10 follow *causa prima* and *primum principium*. "Principal cause" in VII.8.1 follows *causa principali*. The article's English discussion of "primary cause" explains a possible reader's confusion; it does not manufacture that phrase as a quotation from this volume.

The apparatus reports *mutabiliter* in V.10.2 against a later *mirabiliter*, so the relation of bodily effects is mutable, not merely wonderful. In V.10.3 it retains *relatio perfectionis* rather than the later *ratio perfectionis*, sustaining the passage's emphasis on relation. These are the supplied edition's witness reports; no new collation is claimed here. V.13.15–16 divides a single continuous objection across two anchors, so the units must be read together. VIII.15.3 supplies the explicit efficient/formal distinction that limits the preceding language of making and preserving oneself.

See also.

Four causes and graded dependence; Essence and being; Creation and generation; Relation and continuing dependence; Form and formal being; Instrument and creative mediation; Participation, common and proper; Potency, possibility and the lion; Motion and substantial stability; Rational soul and irrational life; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Reflexive understanding and willing.

First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis

Latin: *primi conceptus*; *unitas*; *esse*; *sufficientia subsistendi*; *materia prima*; *principium*

The word.

First concepts are not resolved into concepts prior or better known. Esse names being; sufficientia subsistendi is the sufficiency or capacity for subsistence. The stopping point of analysis is meant to establish genuine simplicity rather than an indefinitely fragmented object.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino offers a chain: human resolves into animal and rational; animal into body and sensation; body into substance and quantity; substance into being and subsistence. He asks where an analysis of being itself could proceed, allowing with a cautious "unless perhaps" that Plotinus and Proclus might resolve it into unity and multitude. Even then unity itself cannot be resolved into numbers. A point cannot be resolved into magnitudes, the ultimate form into another form, or prime matter into more matter.

The chain does not have the same kind of constituent at every step. It is an explanatory analysis, not a physical dissection. Its final examples include simple principles of the sciences that are always luminous within mind. Where legitimate resolution ends, Ficino infers simplicity.

Some known things are divisible in themselves but understood under an indivisible aspect; others are wholly simple. Accordingly, simple concepts require simple intellectual forms and a simple subject. The final immortality inference adds an order of dependence: intelligence follows life, while simplicity precedes indissolubility. If the later activity reaches the higher explanatory condition, the prior life should possess the corresponding lower consequence. This is an argument from ordered perfection, not a claim that the human mind and God have identical simplicity.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.12, PDF pp. 334–335.** The chain of analysis reaches unity, prime matter and first scientific concepts.
- **VIII.4.13, PDF pp. 336–337.** Simple knowing is connected to the simple subject and then to indissoluble life.

In this edition.

The cautious nisi forte attached to Plotinus and Proclus must be preserved. The closing sequence of priority in VIII.4.13 is demanding but explicit: life precedes intelligence, and simplicity precedes indissolubility. It should not be paraphrased as a chronological creation sequence.

See also.

Simplicity of human and numerical species; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Food, lending and borrowing life

Latin: *alimentum*; *alimonia*; *nutrimentum*; *mutuare*; *haurire*; *adsciscere*; *bonitas naturae*

The word.

Alimentum, alimonia and nutrimentum refer to food and nourishment in related constructions. Mutuare carries the reciprocal imagery of lending and borrowing. Haurire is drawing in; adsciscere recruits or adopts replacements. The goodness of nature is a teleological premise, not a dietary instruction.

In the Platonic Theology.

If a bodily soul grows by assimilating bodily food, Ficino asks whether that food is alive before ingestion. If not, it cannot first lend life to soul, since it would itself have to borrow life from soul. If already alive, it possesses a soul. Daily nutrition would then draw new souls into us and transform them into the nature of the soul nourished. Many souls would be destroyed to preserve one, which Ficino rejects by appeal to nature’s goodness.

The difficulty becomes sharper if the supposed soul-body continually loses its substance as flesh does. Even the former soul would not be preserved; it would constantly recruit new souls. Ficino then asks how a newly arrived soul agrees with the previous one, opening the problem of continuity in will and memory. The hypotheses concern the corporealist model of soul-nutrition, not an assertion that ordinary eating literally devours immortal human

souls. The lending/borrowing reversal exposes circular causal explanation before the identity problem is introduced.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.3; source PDF pp. 222, 223**. Living and nonliving nourishment produce distinct difficulties for a growing soul-body.
- **VI.13.4, VI.13.5; source PDF pp. 222, 223, 224, 225**. Assimilation would destroy many souls and replace even the soul purportedly preserved.

In this edition.

The edition retains the different stages of nourishment and the purposeful ut una servetur, “so that one may be preserved.” The claims depend on Ficino’s account of life and natural goodness; they are not modern nutritional science.

See also.

Growth, amputation and soul-size; Persistence, memory and recognition

Food, truth, and the hungry mind

Latin: *alimentum*; *cibus*; *esca*; *alimonia*; *nutrire*; *vesci*; *esurire*; *sitire*

The word.

The several words for food support an extended analogy between bodily assimilation and intellectual nourishment. Vesci means feeding upon; esurire and sitire are hunger and thirst. “Growth” of mind concerns increased perfection, not an increase of bodily volume.

In the Platonic Theology.

Bread becomes flesh, and food must be akin to what it nourishes. Ficino uses this premise against the supposition that soul is a refined little body: if it grew by bodily food, eating, drinking and gaining bulk should automatically improve wisdom, memory, judgment, courage and continence. The observed mismatch is used as a reductio, not as advice to starve. A short alternative asks whether soul needs no nourishment; if so, it would already possess the independence sought. The principal argument instead identifies its proper nourishment as spiritual.

The objection from bodily well-being is expressly admitted in part. Moderation helps mental activity. Ficino explains this through government and attention: an ill or burdened body occupies the soul with its care; a quiet body leaves the mind free for truth. Thus dependence in the conditions of embodied activity is distinguished from the identity of mind’s own food.

Children’s questions, artisans’ inquiries and adults’ expenditures of time, money and labour illustrate desire for truth beyond immediate bodily benefit. The body’s meal can end while the mind still hungers. Even bodily depletion can accompany an increase of intellectual strength. These rhetorical contrasts culminate in truth’s alleged capacity to make mind stable and like higher minds.

The immortality inference is stronger than the metaphor alone: immortal truth, continually assimilated, is said either to be converted into the soul or to convert soul into itself. Ficino leaves those two descriptions side by side. The reader should distinguish his metaphysical claim about nourishment from a literal digestive mechanism.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.1, VIII.2.2, PDF pp. 294–295.** The assimilation premise and reductio oppose bodily food to spiritual nourishment.
- **VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, PDF pp. 298–301.** Bodily moderation frees attention; common desire identifies truth as mind's proper food.
- **VIII.2.8, PDF pp. 304–305.** Incorruptible nourishment supports the inference to immortal life.

In this edition.

The diminutive corpusculum is the rejected "little body" hypothesis. The wordplay enervamus corpus and animus fit nervosior contrasts bodily loss of sinews with mental strengthening. Odit at VIII.2.6 is forceful rhetoric; it does not cancel the explicit role of moderate nourishment at VIII.2.5.

See also.

Body, instruments, and vital spirit; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles; Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus

Form and formal being

Latin: *forma*; *species*; *mera forma*; *sui ipsius forma*; *esse proprium*; *commune esse*

The word.

Forma names a determining principle; species can mean determinate kind, form or appearance. Mera forma is pure form in the sense of being unmixed with bodily matter. A thing's esse proprium is its proper being, while commune esse in the composite discussion is the common being of that whole, not universal being in every context.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.8 asks why a thing has its own determinate being and what it would have to lose to cease. Generation tends toward being and corruption toward nonbeing through acquisition and loss of form. The examples move from artificial likeness to natural constitution, then to a bodily form's dependence upon a composite and finally to the soul as pure separate form.

The bronze example must be kept at its proper strength. A bronze horse is called a horse by resemblance to a form supplied by craft; it is not thereby a living animal. Ficino passes from that artificial case to natural determination without forgetting the change of case. Plato is a human not because the world's common material happens to be his, but because of the bodily constitution and soul associated with the human form. Ficus similarly becomes a tree of its kind. The examples show why material continuity cannot by itself account for species or individual form.

The lengthy fire passage then makes the being of a composite more precise. Being belongs primarily to the whole formed fire, not separately to a free-standing lump of matter and an independently existing heat. The heat has been drawn out under a condition: it is to extend through the matter and depend on it. Its being is the composite's shared being. Once the two are separated, there is no surviving free heat of that same kind. Matter, however, receives another form immediately. Thus "the parts separate" does not mean that both former parts continue with equal independence afterward.

Against that background, the soul's being its own form means that the soul is not an analogous combination of an underlying material part plus an added soul-form. V.8.3 adds two defenses against loss. First, natural self-preserving striving excludes the soul's willing separation from itself. Second, external influences are received according to its spiritual mode, so the material corruption of a receiver does not apply. The nourishment and reproduction questions are not digressions: they ask what motive or need an eternal received form could have for destroying a recipient's supposed material. Neither need fits an eternal immaterial object.

V.8.4 completes the proof through two distinct conditions of continuance: remaining with one's form and remaining under the fashioner's law. Identity with form answers the first; the assigned law of self-subsistence and the exclusion of displacement by self, superior or inferior answer the second. The conclusion therefore uses both formal identity and efficient conservation. The neighboring article on the fashioner's law develops the latter, while the First Cause article explains why formal self-possession never removes dependence on the giver of being.

Places to Read.

- **V.8.1, V.8.2, PDF 38–41.** Bronze figures, Plato and fire establish form's role and the composite's shared being.
- **V.8.3, V.8.4, PDF 42–45.** Soul is form itself and cannot be separated from a further formal part.
- **V.9.1, V.9.2, PDF 46–49.** Being follows form according to its specifically assigned mode.

In this edition.

At V.8.2 Ficino expressly calls the substantial form of fire "heat" for argumentative convenience because it lacks a readily evident name. This provisional naming must not be flattened into an uncomplicated identity between substantial form and sensible warmth. At V.8.4 the source construes nullo interveniente instrumentally: no intermediary separates soul from form.

See also.

Essence and being; Conditions and the fashioner's law; Through itself and through another

Fountains, drawing and infusion

Latin: *fons*; *haurire*; *bibere*; *exuberare*; *infundere*; *influxus*; *effundere*; *effluere*

The word.

Fons is a fountain or spring. Haurire is drawing a supply; bibere drinking; exuberare overflowing. Infundere pours into, effundere pours out, and influxus names the incoming flow. The verbs distinguish source, communication and recipient even when all use liquid imagery.

In the Platonic Theology.

The fountain of motion at V.1 cannot run dry without ending derivative movement. In V.4 it is rational soul as moving and forming matter. V.9 speaks instead of form as fountain of being, explaining why a dependent composite has its determinate existence through form. These phrases operate at different explanatory levels; every fons is not thereby God or an absolutely first cause.

V.10.3 gives the most sustained reciprocal image. God overflows, soul draws, and it drinks being. The joint attention to what is drawn and the one drawing makes the continuing relation vivid. The soul's own stable receptivity is as important to the argument as the source's constancy.

V.12.12 proposes a counter-image: perhaps God could withdraw the influx just as a face's withdrawal removes its mirror image. Ficino refuses that conclusion, then asks whether source or recipient changes. Neither can do so in the required way on his premises. V.12.13 thus identifies life as the first actuality entering essence and insists that both reception and infusion persist.

In V.14.8 soul pours irrational life toward body as a shadow; V.15.3–4 presents divine radiance as the reflection and outpouring of life. These are accounts of communicated dependence, not material liquids moving between containers. One should also keep the outward flow of an operation, such as heating in V.13.10, distinct from the enduring being of the agent.

Places to Read.

- **V.1.1, V.4.10, V.9.1, PDF 8–9, 24–25, 46–47.** Fountain names moving source and formal source in different arguments.
- **V.10.3, PDF 58–59.** Overflow, drawing and drinking articulate persistent relation.
- **V.12.12, V.12.13, PDF 74–77.** The withdrawal objection is distinguished from Ficino's answer.
- **V.14.8, V.15.3, V.15.4, PDF 100–101, 104–107.** Derivative animation and divine radiance extend the communication imagery.

In this edition.

The source retains the exact water-language sequence rather than translating every verb simply as "causes." The mirror's possible disappearance in V.12.12 belongs to an objection. It is not Ficino's final assertion that God may interrupt the soul's life.

See also.

Relation and continuing dependence; Reception and the receiver; Life and vivification

Four causes and graded dependence

Latin: *causa efficiens*; *finis*; *materia*; *forma*; *effector*; *finalis*; *pendere*

The word.

The four causes answer different explanatory questions: efficient cause supplies production, finis its end, materia its material basis, and forma the determination through which the thing is what it is. A cause is not always a temporally earlier event or a push.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.5 begins with four explanatory causes of a human being: universal nature together with a human parent is efficient cause, happiness the end, body the matter, and soul the form. The singular efficient-cause heading includes both natural and parental agency. God alone excludes all four dependencies; natural body includes all four. Soul remains dependent on an efficient source and an end even as the ascent removes material dependence. Quality provides the intermediate case: it is itself a form, yet is produced by an agent, directed

toward an end and drawn from matter’s pregnant womb, extended and divided with that matter.

The language of priority also has to be unpacked. A cause can be intrinsic to the explanation of a composite, as matter and form are, or productive and directive, as agent and end are. Consequently, saying that soul has fewer causes is not counting how many historical persons helped produce it. It is identifying fewer kinds of ontological requirement. Nor does “no form as cause” mean a lack of intelligibility. On the contrary, soul escapes a distinct formal constituent because it is itself form. Quality already shares that exemption, which is why Ficino explicitly refuses to make it the additional respect in which soul surpasses quality.

V.5.4 proceeds by elimination rather than only by a picturesque ladder. Could soul surpass quality by lacking an efficient source? No, that would be divine exemption. Could it lack an end? Again no. Could it lack a formal cause? Quality already does. Material dependence is therefore the remaining candidate. This is an argument whose force depends on the completeness of the fourfold classification and the ordered differentiation of levels. The reader can see what must be accepted for the conclusion to follow, rather than merely being asked to admire the number pattern.

The intermediate-level premise also receives a rationale. Whatever acts acts from its nature, and an immediate product should resemble its agent more than an extremely remote one. A wholly dependent body would be maximally unlike the wholly independent source; a middle is required to connect them. Ficino speaks of the work produced immediately and by the guiding intention, “so to speak,” so the resemblance account does not deny that God is also cause of body. It distinguishes ways in which effects stand to their source.

The final comparison with angel prevents a mechanically uniform sequence. Angel and soul both retain productive and final dependence. Their difference is that soul’s lower-facing inclination makes animation part of its role, whereas angel is occupied immediately by God. The chapter’s numerical ascent therefore reaches two dependencies without demanding a fictitious one-cause creature. The following four arguments secure that a lower-facing inclination does not smuggle bodily matter back into soul’s constitution.

Places to Read.

- **V.5.1, V.5.2, PDF 26–27.** Four causes, human example, divine exemption and the need for intermediate degrees.
- **V.5.3, V.5.4, V.5.5, PDF 28–29.** Body, quality and soul are compared by four, three and two dependencies; angel adds a different distinction.
- **V.13.1, V.13.2, PDF 78–79.** Common being and determinate modes require differently scoped causal accounts.

In this edition.

The translation supplies “as a cause” where V.5.5 says soul has neither form nor matter: the governing discussion requires it. Felicitas is “happiness,” distinguished by this edition from beatitudo. Principali … proposito in V.5.2 means a guiding or primary intention and carries ut ita loquar, “so to speak.”

See also.

Through itself and through another; Inclination and independence; First Cause

Four stages of cognition

Latin: *sensus*; *imaginatio*; *phantasia*; *intelligentia*; *intellectus*

The word.

The four names identify distinct cognitive activities in the account attributed to the Platonists. Sensus is bodily sensation; imaginatio collects and retains sensory appearances; phantasia recognizes and evaluates this particular represented thing; intelligentia or intellectus apprehends common natures and incorporeal accounts. The distinction is functional, not a list of four independent souls.

In the Platonic Theology.

Book VIII begins the third route to the soul's incorporeality and immortality, through understanding, after the operations of nourishment and sensation. Socrates seeing Plato supplies a controlled example: the object stays recognizably the same while the conditions of apprehending it change. Sight receives Plato's likeness without his matter but still needs the living body present. Imagination no longer requires that presence and combines what the five senses separately supply. Phantasy judges the pictured man to be Plato, beautiful, good, a friend and a pupil. Intellect goes beyond this person, place and hour to humanity, beauty and goodness common to many.

These stages are not simply four degrees of photographic vividness. Phantasy adds judgment, yet remains tied to singular conditions. Intellect's distinctive objects include common natures and principles that are not extended as bodily pictures are. Nor is sensation's initial reception of an incorporeal likeness already equivalent to fully incorporeal understanding. The argument depends on discriminating how much material restriction remains at each stage.

Ficino explicitly allows phantasy and intellect to perform their different works simultaneously. He also later reminds the reader that intellect knows particulars as well as universals. The ladder therefore identifies relative independence from material conditions; it does not forbid interaction or deny lower objects to a higher faculty.

The portrait also separates the sensory channels from their internal coordination. Colour and outline are visible, voice audible; the same internal imagination can collect both while no single external sense performs all five senses' tasks. That unity and the ability to operate with an absent object explain why imagination rises farther above matter than sensation. Yet its contents remain received or conceived through sensation. Ficino therefore distinguishes freedom from a body's present proximity from freedom from the bodily character of the presentation itself.

The next transition should not be summarized simply as "interpretation." Phantasy recognizes whose likeness is present and applies predicates not themselves visible shapes: good, beautiful, friend and pupil. This is why Ficino can describe it as dreaming of incorporeals. But the same passage denies it the rational account of substance. The distinction keeps meaningful recognition below full intellectual universality without reducing it to a passive picture. Its operations are richer than imagination's, and their limits are equally explicit.

Nor does the upward ordering entail that mind must become empty of sensible distinctions to know. In VIII.6 it compares individual limbs with each other and with the whole body; in VIII.12 it understands contraries together; in VIII.16 it ranges across all sensory classes. These applications depend on intellect retaining access to the materials it transcends in mode. The higher faculty's distinctive power is to know such contents without being

limited to one organ’s object or one image’s circumstance. The argument concerns the knower’s manner of possessing the objects, not the disappearance of bodies from knowledge.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.1.1, PDF pp. 284–285.** Socrates sees, remembers, and identifies Plato; each activity removes a different restriction.
- **VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, PDF pp. 286–287, 290–291.** Singular phantasy and universal intellect can work together; the four domains are restated.
- **VIII.1.5, PDF pp. 292–293.** Intellect also returns to particulars, and the new proof is related to earlier arguments from nutrition and sensation.

In this edition.

The edition deliberately distinguishes “imagination” from “phantasy.” Replacing both by imagination would erase the example’s central transition. At VIII.1.1, spiritum is the ascent’s nonbodily terminus; it is not the physiological “vital spirit” of VIII.2.3.

See also.

Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars

Freedom from matter and causal priority

Latin: *a materia liberior*; *causa*; *effectus*; *absque materia*; *immersus*; *fons virium*

The word.

Freedom from matter concerns a mode of operation and dependence, not political liberty or an agent’s lack of obligations. A *fons* is a source or fountain: soul is presented as the source of its powers, not as a reservoir of bodily fluid.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino begins from a principle of causal superiority: a producer must be more excellent than what it produces, and excellence is associated with freedom from matter. An effect cannot therefore possess a greater freedom from matter than its cause. The resulting hierarchy is local and ordered. Nutrition works above and beyond the elemental order; sensation receives forms without the objects’ matter; understanding does so more fully, as a later discussion will show. Soul, the fountain of these powers, cannot arise from wholly bodily humors or their mixture and concord.

The wall illustrates the sensory step. Seeing its color does not bring the wall itself into sight; the soul apprehends a spiritual image of the color. The reductio then contrasts this with material reception through elemental qualities. Through heat and dryness one would receive bodily fire, through cold and dryness earth, not the spiritual appearances of those things. If this kind of reception sufficed for sensing, earth and stone would sense in the same way as soul.

The closing consequence is rejected, not offered as a general affirmation that stones perceive. Likewise, the article should not convert the qualitative hierarchy into a contemporary physical demonstration. It explains why, within Ficino’s metaphysical account of cause and effect, the activities he attributes to soul outrun the resources of a humoral harmony.

Places to Read.

- **VII.8.1, PDF 264–265**. The productive surplus of nutrition over instrumental heat supplies the earlier premise.
- **VII.13.1, PDF 276–277**. Causal excellence, three degrees of liberation and the fire–earth–stone reductio form the argument.

In this edition.

The Latin pairs *super et praeter* for nutrition's relation to elemental order; both "above" and "beyond" matter. Understanding's fuller freedom is explicitly promised for what follows. The present chapter should not be presented as already completing that demonstration.

See also.

Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Spiritual images and light; Harmony and the strings

Garment, mud and misleading shadows

Latin: *vestis*; *lutum*; *testa*; *gleba*; *umbra*; *abluere*; *abstergere*; *revertere*

The word.

Vestis is clothing, testa a hardened earthen crust, gleba a clod. Umbra is shadow, distinguishable from the thing casting it. Abluere and abstergere mean washing away and wiping off; their force is to remove an accretion without destroying the underlying thing.

In the Platonic Theology.

VI.2.2 imagines the soul's faculties as covered by bodily conditions. The natural power is submerged in four humours and smothered by fat; imagination is overlaid with borrowed shapes. Ficino's striking comparison is a child coated in mud from birth who mistakes the crust for his own flesh. Washing exposes what was there beneath the accretion. The purpose is epistemic and ethical: a condition acquired in bodily life need not reveal the soul's essence. The humoral language is historical physiology and the mud story an analogy, not a medical account.

The next images shift from coating to projection. Body is appositional to "your shadow": the soul mistakes the low location of its bodily image for its own mode of being. A boy above a well imagines himself at its bottom; a bird flying in air thinks itself on earth because its shadow is there. These compact cases make the direction of dependence visible. Return into oneself consequently leads to amplitude rather than confinement. They prepare the cave's shadows, but each comparison has its own point and source unit.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.2; source PDF pp. 136, 137**. The garment and mud-clad child distinguish acquired covering from nature.
- **VI.2.3, VI.2.4, VI.2.5; source PDF pp. 138, 139**. The soul/body relation is compared with a boy's and a bird's misplaced identification with shadows.
- **VI.2.6; source PDF pp. 140, 141**. Return from the shadow's confinement opens spiritual amplitude.

In this edition.

The edition preserves the distinct body parts, humours, fat, clothing, mud, crust, clods and flesh. These are not interchangeable metaphors for “matter.” The apparatus emphasizes corpus as an apposition to umbram tuam and the independence of the well and bird units.

See also.

Number and spiritual amplitude; Plato’s cave and gradual education

Generation, corruption and annihilation

Latin: *generatio*; *corruptio*; *interitus*; *perire*; *interire*; *in nihilum*; *resolvi*; *commutari*

The word.

Generatio is coming-to-be; corruptio the loss of a constituted thing or form. Perire and interire mean perishing. In nihilum specifies reduction to nothing and must not be supplied every time a body is said to perish. Resolvi means being dissolved or resolved into an underlying principle.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.4’s elemental changes establish a fundamental restriction: natural agents change a determinate mode of being, but do not remove being altogether. Water may cease to be water while matter persists under another form. That is corruption and generation, not annihilation followed by creation from nothing.

V.8 describes generation as a path toward being and corruption as a path toward nonbeing. The relevant being is initially the thing’s proper determinate existence. Fire loses its form and ceases as fire; its matter persists. A material form likewise perishes when it loses the composite existence to which its maker assigned it. The terms do not all name the same fate.

V.11 tests whether an analogous resolution can be attributed to soul. The soul lacks material parts or a material seed into which it could return. If its essence survived the alleged loss of being, that essence would still be and, as soul, still live. Resolution into God cannot mean being absorbed into divine material potentiality, because God is pure act. The seal analogy instead figures strengthened conformity to an exemplar.

V.15.19 makes an important further concession: proving that the mind does not become nothing may still seem insufficient. Could it persist as something worse, such as body? The closing argument therefore protects determinate rational identity as well as bare nonannihilation. Its questions should not be omitted after announcing the immortality conclusion.

Places to Read.

- **V.4.2, V.4.8, V.4.9, V.4.10, PDF 18–19, 22–25.** Natural change is distinguished from annihilation of matter.
- **V.8.1, V.8.2, PDF 38–41.** Corruption of a composite differs from the survival of matter and loss of dependent form.
- **V.11.1, V.11.3, V.11.5, V.11.6, PDF 60–65.** Hypothetical resolution of soul is tested and rejected.
- **V.15.19, V.15.20, V.15.27, PDF 116–117, 124–125.** Nonannihilation alone does not settle preservation of rational identity.

In this edition.

The corrected adversative vero in V.8.1 replaces an erroneous non in the first printing. The book's negative statements about natural production from nothing do not deny divine creation; V.12–13 argues for exactly that distinction.

See also.

Creation and generation; Spiritual matter and identity; Conversion, desire and compulsion

Generation, corruption and self-preservation

Latin: *genitor*; *genitum*; *proles*; *instinctus*; *nixus*; *servare*; *non esse*

The word.

Genitor is a begetter and genitum what is begotten. Proles is offspring, used both for generated things and figuratively for a natural impulse. Instinctus and nixus are inward impulse and striving; they are not necessarily conscious deliberation. Non esse is nonbeing, not merely rest or altered location.

In the Platonic Theology.

Bodily self-generation would require the same finite thing to possess the being it imparts and lack the being it receives, and to be prior and posterior to itself. Ficino therefore denies it. Self-corruption is rejected differently: a thing's proper natural issue accords with its own nature, and its impulse, an "offspring" of essence and being, cannot as such aim against those sources. The striving to preserve oneself cannot be the same natural principle as a striving toward nonbeing.

These claims concern finite nature and natural tendency, not a modern empirical denial that organisms can contribute causally to their own destruction. They also set limits on the earlier phrase "life generating itself." The latter concerns soul's unfolding vital actuality; the former excludes producing one's own previously absent being as both finite generator and generated. VI.12.20 further qualifies soul's analogical generation and corruption with quodammodo, ut ita dixerim and quasi. Those restrictions are necessary to prevent a contradiction manufactured by flattening different kinds of motion.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.14; source PDF pp. 214, 215**. Generation and corruption fail as bodily self-motions for different reasons.
- **VI.12.10, VI.12.12; source PDF pp. 210, 211, 212, 213**. Vital self-unfolding and reported self-production must be distinguished from creation of finite being.
- **VI.12.19, VI.12.20; source PDF pp. 218, 219, 220, 221**. Psychic generation and corruption are introduced as exemplars and qualified analogies.

In this edition.

The restriction secundum finitam naturam belongs to the self-generation argument. The translation's "offspring" keeps the metaphorical causal connection between essence and instinct; it should not become a claim about literal biological parentage of every desire.

See also.

Vital motion, action and passion; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul

Growth, amputation and soul-size

Latin: *partiri*; *amputare*; *frustum*; *pusillanimis*; *adolescere*; *magnitudo*; *quantitas*

The word.

Frustum is a severed piece. Amputare is cutting off, while partiri divides. Pusillanimis conventionally means small-spirited or fainthearted, but the argument deliberately activates its literal “small-souled” sense. Bodily magnitude and quantity are tested as alleged measures of soul.

In the Platonic Theology.

The final chapter grants, for reductio, that a subtle soul-body fills the entire visible body. Dividing the body would then leave actual little souls in severed limbs, which should live, move and feel for a time. The surviving soul would be quantitatively reduced after amputation and should become correspondingly dull, forgetful and “small-souled.” These are consequences Ficino rejects, not descriptions he endorses of people with amputations.

The same quantitative model predicts a more magnificent and divine soul in a larger body and a soul growing as the adolescent body grows. Such growth would require adding more soul-like bodily material, which opens the nourishment dilemma. The issue is a mistaken proportionality between bodily size and psychic capacity, not the denial that cognition may be affected by bodily condition or develop with age. Earlier infant/adult distinctions and the present rejection of size as soul’s essence therefore need not be flattened into inconsistency.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.1, VI.13.2; source PDF pp. 222, 223**. Severance tests whole soul against quantitative partition and its absurd psychic consequences.
- **VI.13.3; source PDF pp. 222, 223**. Growth extends the reductio from diminished members to increased bodily size.

In this edition.

The apparatus reads anima unius sit tota naturae as “the whole soul is of one nature,” explaining why it unites diverse members. “Small-souled” preserves the pun. The entire opening is conditional on si anima corpus est; dropping it reverses Ficino’s position.

See also.

Food, lending and borrowing life; Persistence, memory and recognition

Habit, purification and intellectual experiment

Latin: *consuetudo*; *educatio*; *purificari*; *experiri*; *sevocare*; *pro viribus*

The word.

Consuetudo is habituation or long familiarity. Educatio is formative upbringing, not only formal instruction. Purificari and sevocare describe purification and withdrawal; pro viribus limits the latter to what lies within one’s powers. Experiri means making a trial or finding out through experience.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino begins his reply by attributing corporealist belief to unfortunate habit rather than argument. Natural power and the outward and inward senses have attended the soul’s

body before it practises pure understanding; their appropriate concern with bodies is then mistaken for an exhaustive account of reality. Even mind can misdescribe the soul when it sees only its bodily entanglements. The polemic targets habitual limitation, not a claim that sense never truthfully encounters its own objects: VI.2.8 explicitly grants the reality of corporeal things.

Purification changes the conditions of inquiry. The thinker is urged to make an inward experiment, distinguish imparted bodily life from the soul's own life, and withdraw as far as possible from motion, sensation, affect and bodily imagination. This is a philosophical discipline of attention, not an instruction to injure or literally remove the body. The ensuing ascent distinguishes reason seeking truth, angelic intellect enjoying already infused truth, and God as truth, light and joy themselves. Avicenna's imagined upbringing and Plato's gradual re-education are complementary devices for exposing the contingency of ordinary habituation.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.1, VI.2.2; source PDF pp. 134, 135, 136, 137**. Bodily habit is diagnosed through three inadequate teachers.
- **VI.2.3, VI.2.10, VI.2.11; source PDF pp. 138, 139, 146, 147**. Purity and inward experiment prepare an ascent through soul, angel and God.
- **VI.2.12, VI.2.14, VI.2.17; source PDF pp. 148, 149, 152, 153, 156, 157**. Two educational narratives recast the mind's starting conditions.

In this edition.

The imperative "render oneself incorporeal" is immediately glossed by Ficino as withdrawing the mind pro viribus. The short VI.2.11 continues the grammar of VI.2.10 despite having a separate source paragraph sign. Its light–truth–joy reciprocity is not a fourth created grade.

See also.

Avicenna's imagined adult; Plato's cave and gradual education; Separate forms and intellectual life

Harmony and the strings

Latin: *harmonia*; *fides*; *chorda*; *pendere*; *regere*; *Aristoxenus*

The word.

Harmony is the concord produced when strings are appropriately moved together. *Fides* here means musical strings, not faith; *chorda* supplies the same instrumental reference. Depending upon a configuration differs from actively governing the constituents that produce it.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino rejects a position he attributes to Aristoxenus and other musicians: soul is a harmony generated from bodily constitution. The proposal is more specific than saying that body and soul can be harmonious. It makes soul a product of bodily arrangement and therefore, in Ficino's opening classification, an accident. This connects the chapter directly with chapter 9's distinction between a constitution and the substance that makes its body.

The musical analogy separates three stages. An agent from elsewhere moves the strings; the moved strings produce sounding harmony; that harmony depends on their arrangement and movement. Ficino denies that the final stage supplies the prior agency that initiates or governs the others. The transferred claim is causal: a soul arising as the harmony of composed humors would be governed by those humors rather than govern them. The argument does not deny musical concord or condemn harmonious bodily order. It depends upon the assumed asymmetry between a produced arrangement and its directing source.

Ficino follows the consequences through productive, regulatory and cognitive activities. There would be no bodily motions beyond the humors' condition and no works above their command. The body's artful figure and disposition would lack the directing maker assigned to soul. Nor could soul resist bodily affections if the alleged resisting agent were wholly the bodily arrangement producing it. It could neither reflect upon itself nor turn from bodily things toward incorporeal objects as an independently active subject. These capacities are not all demonstrated anew here: Ficino appeals to earlier discussion and promises further treatment. Their present role is to specify what the harmony theory cannot explain if those capacities are established.

The reflexive phrases retain distinct objects. Turning back into oneself concerns self-relation; joining oneself to something incorporeal concerns the object or order of cognition. Separation from bodily things belongs here to an account of activity and should not automatically mean bodily death. The concluding link between acting through oneself and existing through oneself states the ontological requirement Ficino assigns to these activities. An effect wholly dependent on material configuration cannot supply that independent subject.

This opens a sustained sequence rather than completing the whole anti-harmony argument. Chapter 11 allows an opponent to specify vital concord and asks what determines and continually maintains it. Chapter 12 separates composition from proportion and tests each; chapter 13 examines the freedom from matter required by soul's powers; chapters 14 and 15 distinguish moral concord from the degree of life and test soul's persistence through discord. Ficino retains positive uses of coordinated order throughout. The target is the identity of soul with harmony, or the claim that bodily harmony sufficiently produces it, rather than every harmonious relation within a living being.

Places to Read.

- **VII.10.1, PDF 270–271**. Aristoxenus's reported thesis is tested through the direction of dependence between strings and harmony.
- **VII.11.1, PDF 272–273**. The reply to a specially tempered harmony requires a superior inner cause.
- **VII.14.1, PDF 278–279**. Degrees of musical concord supply a further reductio of soul-as-harmony.

In this edition.

The attribution to Aristoxenus is Ficino's report, not an independently verified quotation here. The edition retains singular *extiterit* with *animus* against later plural readings. Reflexive acting and existing belong to that same subject.

See also.

Vital harmony and its producer; Composition and inward unity; Discord and the soul's persistence

Ideas, natural ascent and rest

Latin: *idea*; *species absolutae*; *ascendere*; *quiescere*; *disciplina*; *usus*; *perpetuum*; *modus*

The word.

An Idea is an eternal exemplary intelligible principle. Species absolutae are separate forms arising within rational cognition. Ascendere and quiescere distinguish ascent toward a higher object from fulfilled rest in it; the verbal contrast is part of the argument rather than a change in literal location.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.12.13 has argued that soul continues to receive life because its essence depends immediately upon stable God. The ensuing cognition argument gives that nature a positive activity. Insofar as soul is rational, it daily produces separate forms within itself by its natural power, even without discipline or practice. These forms provide the nearer route toward eternal Ideas. The assertion concerns an intrinsic rational capacity, not a denial that particular people learn, practice or make mistakes.

The next inference is teleological. If ascent to Ideas is natural to rational mind, rest in Ideas must also be natural. Ficino moves from living through them to living in them, and from continual activity directed toward perpetual objects to perpetual activity among those objects. "Through" marks dependence and means; "in" marks the proposed fulfillment of that dependence. Continual striving during embodied life and perpetual fulfilled activity are thus related but not identical conditions.

V.12.15 supplies the mode principle. Every Idea is eternal life, so what can attain an Idea according to an Idea's mode can attain everlasting life in an eternal mode. The repeated modus is not decorative. The inference requires more than merely mentioning an eternal object: mind must be able to receive or attain it in the object's appropriate manner. This is another use of the relation between the mode of a recipient and the act it receives. It belongs to Ficino's metaphysics of cognitive assimilation rather than to an empirical claim that thinking about infinity makes an organism physically immortal.

V.13.18 supplies a related, explicitly attributed exemplary account. God produces through Ideas, defined as absolute exemplary principles. The immediate effect should most closely resemble its source; remoter effects resemble it less. Rational soul's production through the Idea of life gives it stable life, while derivative animation mediated through soul is naturally mutable. The reported ethereal vehicle qualification then explains how a derivative life can be continuously sustained without becoming the same kind of self-subsisting source.

The earlier seal example likewise gives an Idea a determinate preserving role: approaching the exemplar confirms this mind's assigned mode of being rather than dissolving its identity. V.13.16's different Ideas of angel and soul also explain unequal perfections from one immediate maker. These contexts prevent "Idea" from becoming a loose synonym for any thought a person happens to have. In this book Ideas are exemplary causes and objects of rational attainment, while species produced within cognition are the more immediate forms by which that attainment is approached.

Places to Read.

- **V.11.6, PDF 64–65.** Conformity to the Idea preserves a mind's determinate identity.
- **V.12.13, V.12.14, V.12.15, PDF 76–77.** Natural rational formation leads from ascent to rest and from continual striving to perpetual life according to the Idea's mode.
- **V.13.16, V.13.18, PDF 88–89, 92–93.** Different exemplars and different degrees of immediate production distinguish created ranks and modes of life.

In this edition.

The supplied apparatus explicitly preserves the transitions from through Ideas to in Ideas and from continual toward to perpetual within. It translates species absolutae as separate forms. V.13.18 is framed as the view of Timaeus and Plato and later Platonists; the reported ethereal embodiment should retain that attribution.

See also.

Essence and being; Reception and the receiver; Seal, wax and restoration; Platonist disagreement and descent

Image, shadow and ranked truth

Latin: *imago*; *umbra*; *idolum*; *simulacrum*; *verus*; *splendor*; *reflexio*

The word.

Imago and simulacrum are images or likenesses; umbra is shadow. Verus can mean genuinely belonging to a rank, not simply making a true assertion. A derivative image can be real in its own lower order without being the original whose power it reflects.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.1 uses visible spheres and circuits as shadows of invisible spiritual spheres. V.2 calls irrational lives images and likenesses of rational souls. The figures establish asymmetrical dependence, but do not mean that bodily life is nonexistent.

V.14.9 makes the logic explicit through five stages. God is true good. Angel images goodness yet is true intellect. Rational soul images intellect yet is true soul. Irrational soul images soul yet is true nature. A quality divided in matter images nature yet is a true instrument of natural agents. Each intermediate level is derivative relative to what stands above and genuine relative to its own characteristic function.

The vocabulary thus does more than sort "real" from "fake." A false or derivative soul can still name a real animation lacking the self-subsisting status of true soul. The reader should not translate every simulacrum as hallucination.

V.15.2–4 connects images with the soul's middle position. Divine images shine in soul while shadows appear in bodily things. Since some bodily shadows are taken to be everlasting, the superior soul-images support an a fortiori inference. Life is prior to radiance, which Ficino calls life's reflection and outpouring. The reasoning is hierarchical and causal, not an inference from visual brightness alone.

Places to Read.

- **V.1.5, V.2.1, PDF 10–13.** Visible shadows and irrational likenesses establish derivative relations.
- **V.14.8, V.14.9, PDF 100–103.** True soul and the five-stage image/true-being ladder.

- **V.15.2, V.15.3, V.15.4, PDF 104–107.** Divine images and bodily shadows support the soul's mediating permanence.

In this edition.

The edition keeps image and shadow distinct in V.15.3 and avoids "illusion" for simulacrum at V.15.8. The "false soul" terminology reports ranked Platonist usage rather than denying every reality to lower life.

See also.

Rational soul and irrational life; Circularity and spiritual spheres; Soul as universal bond

Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance

Latin: *simulacrum*; *imago*; *effigies*; *intentio*; *substantia*; *augurari*; *somniare*

The word.

Simulacrum, imago and effigies name likenesses or representations. Intentio here names a significant content discerned in connection with an image, such as this man's goodness or friendship; it does not mean a future plan. Augurari and somniare mark conjectural or incomplete apprehension rather than full knowledge.

In the Platonic Theology.

The opening image contains Plato's stature, forehead, shoulders, colouring, eyes, brow, nose, mouth and voice. These details explain what the lower faculties can supply. Imagination assembles the picture but does not know whom it depicts or what sort of person he is. Phantasy makes the recognition and evaluative judgments. The contrast turns on the move from visible or audible features to what is being recognized through them.

Ficino does not simply grant phantasy knowledge of substance. "Some" attribute to it a sense of substance, beauty, goodness and friendship; the Platonists nevertheless deny that it genuinely knows substance, because it does not recognize the account of substance. It at least divines that the approaching figure is a man and Plato. Its relation to incorporeals is described as a kind of dreaming. The double qualification of the intentions as incorporeal "in a manner" matters: phantasy neither recognizes their incorporeality nor frees them from this person's circumstances.

The vocabulary of painting, gathering, discerning, pronouncing and dreaming makes a fine-grained cognitive argument. The images do real work, but their possession alone does not constitute intellectual understanding. Conversely, calling an image immaterial in the limited sense of receiving no original bodily matter does not establish that its cognitive operation is independent of a bodily organ.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.1.1, PDF pp. 284–285.** The portrait distinguishes sensory features, imaginative collection, recognition and evaluative intention.
- **VIII.1.2, PDF pp. 286–287.** Phantasy depicts Plato under the same place-and-time conditions as the embodied individual.

In this edition.

The apparatus reports deletion of introspicit after auguratur in accordance with the 1482 correction list. "Intention" is retained technically, and the repeated qualifications must

remain visible. Disciplina in the list concerns the learning or pupil relationship, not merely external discipline.

See also.

Four stages of cognition; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Innate forms and the stimulus of images

Images, migration and the perfect agent

Latin: *imago*; *subiectum*; *insinuare*; *figurare*; *perfectus agens*; *deficere*; *memoriter tenere*

The word.

Insinuare means inserting or insinuating into; the proposed transfer is rejected. Figurare forms an image, requiring an agent capable of the act. Perfectus describes an agent's operative completeness, not moral perfection. Memoriter tenere is retaining in memory.

In the Platonic Theology.

The final unit blocks three attempted replacements for an enduring knowing soul. First, an image cannot migrate from an old soul into a new one as the former flows away: Ficino invokes the principle that a quality does not pass numerically from one subject into another. Second, the departing soul cannot impress a similar new image in its successor, because an act of formation requires a complete agent and the perishing agent is failing. Third, the incoming soul cannot form itself at the very moment of its birth, when it too is incomplete.

These are distinct failures: transfer of the same quality, productive copying by the former subject and self-formation by the new subject. The conclusion is that a soul flowing like body or quality cannot retain old images and knowledge. Ficino has not merely asserted that memory contents are incorporeal; he has pressed the need for a stable bearer and adequate cause across retention and recognition. The premise about qualities and subjects belongs to his metaphysical account and should remain explicit rather than being passed off as an uncontroversial modern theory of information transfer.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.11; source PDF pp. 228, 229**. Three transmission strategies fail for different metaphysical reasons, closing the book.
- **VI.13.6, VI.13.9, VI.13.10; source PDF pp. 224, 225, 226, 227**. Recognition and the stable-craftsman reply set up this final test.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves imaginem aliam suae similem, "another image like its own," against later sive similem and adopts corrected Figurare quidem. These readings distinguish copying from numerical migration, precisely the distinction the argument needs.

See also.

Stable craftsman and the river reflection; Substantial form and the receiving subject

Immediate intellection and the return to particulars

Latin: *statim*; *subito*; *discursus*; *abstractio*; *actus reflexus*; *particulare*

The word.

Immediate apprehension is marked by statim and subito; discursus is the movement through intermediate considerations. Abstraction frees an intelligible form from singular material conditions. A reflexive act turns intellect back toward the particular image that occasioned its activity.

In the Platonic Theology.

The argument about a shared nature and its divine exemplar could suggest that intellect always calculates its way to a universal. Ficino explicitly corrects that reading. By its natural power intellect apprehends common nature as soon as the particular image is present in phantasy. The long demonstration explains what this apprehension involves; it need not reproduce its actual temporal course.

A second correction prevents universality from becoming an exclusion of particulars. Intellect must know both universal and particular in order to compare them, and it also knows lower faculties and their operations. The order defended with broad Platonic and Peripatetic agreement is that universal nature is known first, through an abstract intelligible form, while the particular is reached in a second, reflexive movement toward the phantastic image. The image prompts conception; it is not simply identical with the universal form.

The inference to incorporeality rests on what is most natural to mind: its first, direct movement goes toward what is free from material conditions. This is stronger than the earlier claim that nutritive and sensory soul is not spatially divided through the body. Ficino argues that intellect's proper operation leaves matter altogether, supporting a further conclusion about its origin and survival. These are philosophical inferences from the stipulated operations, not observations that ordinary learning never takes time.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.1.4, PDF pp. 290–291.** Natural intellectual apprehension needs no preliminary discursive argument.
- **VIII.1.5, PDF pp. 292–293.** The particular is known by a second return through act and form to the initiating image.
- **VIII.3.2, VIII.3.3, PDF pp. 308–309.** Lengthy preparation is later reconciled with sudden realization.

In this edition.

The emphatic statim, simul ac, subito, inquam is intentionally repeated. "Absolute" translates a condition of release from restrictions here; it should not automatically imply that the human intellect is the unconditioned First Cause.

See also.

Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare; Universality, law, and material restriction; Reflexive understanding and willing

Inclination and independence

Latin: *inclinari*; *dependere*; *alligare*; *immergere*; *emergere*; *separabilis*; *mundi nodus*; *patera*

The word.

Inclinari means inclining toward something; dependere means depending upon it. The contrast is substantive. Immersion, emergence and binding give bodily attachment a spatial image, while separabilis names capacity for separation. Patera is a bowl; mundi nodus is the world's knot or bond.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.5 distinguishes soul from angel by orientation, not by making the soul material. Angel neither depends on matter nor inclines toward it. Soul is nearer matter and bends toward its animation, yet does not draw its own essence from it. Ficino relates the name anima to this inclination. This is his explanatory account, not an independently established linguistic etymology.

Four arguments secure independence. The causal ranking has already removed matter as soul's cause. The second argument says a principle immersed in matter could not rise to the divine and join lowest to highest. The third moves from primary self-motion through free activity to circular return into itself. The fourth says the principle that first moves and forms matter rules rather than mixes with it.

The ensuing consequences are separately stated. Soul has no quantitative parts to scatter, no bodily foundation whose removal would make it collapse, no elemental battle entering its essence, and no capacity to receive an alien harmful quality in the material manner. None of these claims requires that the embodied soul have no relation to a body. "Separated" is explained as separable in potency at the end of V.5.9.

The mixing-bowl of souls, attributed to Plato's Timaeus, supplies an image for the third essence as seat of rational souls. It should not be read as a physical container in which soul-parts are stirred together. The same chapter has excluded quantitative composition.

Places to Read.

- **V.5.5, V.5.6, PDF 28–29.** Soul's inclination is distinguished from causal dependence, and the prior argument is recalled.
- **V.5.7, V.5.8, PDF 30–31.** The world's bond and circular self-return argue for material independence.
- **V.5.9, PDF 30–31.** Rule, separability and absence of bodily routes to destruction are developed together.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves the repeated inclination/dependence contrast rather than treating the words as synonyms. "Mixing-bowl" translates Ficino's patera and attribution; this companion does not claim to have independently checked an exact quotation from Plato.

See also.

Four causes and graded dependence; Soul as universal bond; Passivity and bodily affection

Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Latin: *immortalis*; *perpetuus*; *sempiternus*; *futurus semper*; *indissolubilis*; *vivere*

The word.

Immortality denies death; perpetuity and sempiternity name continued duration. Indissolubility denies dissolution into constituent parts. A proof of future permanence is not automatically a proof of beginningless existence.

In the Platonic Theology.

Book VIII assembles different routes rather than simply repeating “incorporeal, therefore immortal.” Truth nourishes mind with an incorruptible object; indivisible virtues indicate an indivisible subject and source; simple intellectual forms imply a simple knower; receptive understanding is not corrupted by the contraries it understands; reflexive life preserves its own formal integrity; and divinely enlarged intellectual power supports unbounded living.

The steps differ in force. VIII.10.2 says that nothing prevents mind from being perpetual after arguing that it exceeds spatial and temporal confinement. VIII.9.1 explicitly preserves two alternatives: always having existed and always existing hereafter, or at least always existing hereafter. VIII.15.2 contrasts natural succession with intellectual generation retained in the individual knower. VIII.16.4 ends with a received power of living, rather than self-originating divine existence.

It is consequently misleading to make the result either mere survival of the human species or an unqualified claim that every human soul is coeternal with God. Ficino seeks the enduring individual mind, while his qualifications limit what each local argument establishes. Likewise, the statement that mind is not disturbed by bodily contraries concerns its intellectual mode and metaphysical nature; the text elsewhere acknowledges distraction and impediments in embodied exercise.

The lexicon’s references preserve these differences so that the reader can reconstruct the cumulative proof and evaluate its premises rather than encounter a single flattened slogan.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.8, PDF pp. 304–305.** Immortal nourishment and natural desire supply one route.
- **VIII.4.13, PDF pp. 336–337.** Simplicity and the priority of life supply another.
- **VIII.9.1, PDF pp. 348–349.** Future permanence is retained without requiring past eternity.
- **VIII.10.2, PDF pp. 352–353.** The conclusion is phrased as absence of an obstacle to perpetuity.
- **VIII.15.2, VIII.16.4, PDF pp. 366–367, 376–377.** Inward generation and divinely given vital power support individual endurance.

In this edition.

The several temporal and causal qualifications belong to the content, not merely to editorial caution. No single English word should obscure the difference between enduring forever in the future, existing without beginning, being formally self-sustaining and being efficiently uncaused.

See also.

Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement

Indivisibility and contact

Latin: *indivisibilis*; *individuum*; *dividuum*; *tangere*; *punctum*; *pars*; *recta linea*; *reflexa*

The word.

Indivisibilis and individuum here mean indivisible. Dividuum means divisible, not a modern individual person. Tangere is touching; punctum a point; pars a part. Contact is tested as an alleged mechanism by which a bodily quality could enter and damage soul.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.6 asks how a divisible thing could touch an indivisible one. If contact occurs only through a point, the contacting term is itself indivisible, not the divisible body as such. If it occurs through a divisible part, then the contacted thing must correspondingly have parts touched. It would cease to be the indivisible term initially asserted. Ficino takes this dilemma to rule out the soul's receiving divisible qualities.

He extends the exclusion to direct and reflected contact. Soul neither admits an opposed bodily quality head-on nor is swept along by qualities raging within a body. This is a metaphysical analysis of soul-body interaction, rather than a detailed theory of optical rays. The reflected line illustrates indirect bodily disturbance, which he also refuses to make destructive of essence.

The passage then tests an objection: could an indivisible quality cause corruption instead? Ficino answers that reception of indivisible forms perfects its recipient, as images are received in water, mirrors and the soul without destroying them. A bodily agent seeks to propagate its own form, but a corporeal form has no entry into immaterial essence. A superior source either produces a self-subsistent form separately or communicates a beneficent power. Neither alternative destroys the soul.

The argument excludes particular modes of corruption; it does not make soul incapable of cognition or every relation. Its distinction between a material quality and an image of that quality is indispensable.

Places to Read.

- **V.5.9, PDF 30–31.** Absence of quantitative parts prepares the contact argument.
- **V.6.1, PDF 32–33.** The point/part dilemma, direct/reflected contact and nondestructive reception occupy the complete chapter.
- **V.8.3, PDF 42–43.** The later reception argument repeats water and mirror examples.

In this edition.

The apparatus treats V.6 as one source paragraph, despite the many internal inferences. Individuum must retain the indivisibility sense. The first-printing correction impetu et furore replaces impetu a furore in the language of bodily disturbance (PDF 387).

See also.

Passivity and bodily affection; Reception and the receiver; Prime matter and enduring support

Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds

Latin: *infinitus*; *interminatus*; *innumerabilis*; *revolutio*; *replicare*; *per omnia*

The word.

Infinity has several local senses: indefinite repetition, unlimited extension in thought, unrestricted kinds of objects and qualified participation in divine infinity. Innumerabilis may emphasize uncounted or indefinitely many instances. These uses must be distinguished from an actually completed infinite multitude of simultaneous acts.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino begins with inward circularity. Intellect understands itself, so its activity returns to its own substance rather than ending at an external acquisition whose attainment would stop it. Desire for itself continues to animate this return. He calls the movement everlasting insofar as it is intellectual. Reflection also permits another act beyond any one assigned: knowing something, knowing that one knows it and noticing that notice. Rational appetite, will, has a corresponding recursive range. The earlier chapter allows either successive higher-order acts or one act repeatedly folded upon itself, without settling on a single mechanism.

The catalogue then turns outward. Mind divides bodies further, increases numbers, explores figures and proportions, extends lines beyond the heavens, thinks earlier and later times, conceives wider places and further degrees of qualities. Sight is confined to colour and hearing to sound, but mind compares these classes and reaches beyond any one of them. Past and future enlarge the temporal field; unrealized possibilities and imagined impossibilities enlarge the represented field. Conceiving them does not verify that they exist or even that they are possible. The next unit says that inward products have a reality as representations, comparable to words in air or paintings on a wall, rather than making every depicted object externally actual.

These forms of indefinite reach must be distinguished from the actual simultaneous infinity rejected earlier. In VIII.4.2, a bodily-point theory cannot privilege one potential point as receiver, so it generates infinitely many simultaneously actual forms or acts. In VIII.4.4, repeated bodily division of genus and difference would destroy the bounded comprehensibility of a definition. Those are consequences used against particular hypotheses. VIII.16’s indefinitely repeatable operation does not require every extension to have been completed at once, and its universal account can cover indefinitely many instances without enumerating them one by one.

Other senses enter through the ascent beyond finite angels. Whatever finite grade thought has reached, it can conceive a higher one; the regress ends only with an infinite spirit beyond every actual or conceivable finite angel. God is then named infinite act, while matter is infinite potency expressly subject to God and receptive to innumerable forms. This is not a pair of independent equal first principles. The gathering of individuals into species, species into genera and genera toward divine unity supplies yet another route: the many are one in an intelligible account, not physically compressed into one body.

VIII.16.3 adds an argument from proportionate knowledge. To define infinity, mind must in some manner correspond to what it knows. Ficino infers a qualified infinite power from that premise; this is not a modern theorem that defining infinity gives a thinker infinitely much information. The conceptual passage between being and nonbeing provides a further example of unmeasured reach without making nonbeing a spatial region. The argument then changes from cognition to appetite: finite human achievements and knowledge of

created things never completely fill the mind’s desire, so only infinite God is said to be adequate to it.

The final account is asymmetrical. God’s infinity is absolute; mind’s intellectual and vital infinity is communicated. Ficino explicitly corrects self-owned power to a divine enlargement continually implanted and preserved. The inference to limitless duration therefore concerns a granted capacity, not an independent infinite substance. Because life is prior in origin to intelligence, he argues that a mind given such scope in understanding and willing must have received an unbounded power of living even more fundamentally. Arithmetic extension, recursive thought, common universals, cognition of infinity and desire for the infinite contribute distinct premises. None should be silently substituted for the whole cumulative argument, and none establishes exhaustive human possession of divine knowledge.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.2, PDF pp. 318–319.** An actually infinite simultaneous multiplicity belongs to a rejected bodily hypothesis.
- **VIII.16.1, PDF pp. 370–371.** Self-revolution and recursive willing lead into the complete catalogue of unbounded intellectual range.
- **VIII.16.2, PDF pp. 372–373.** The ontological status of inward representations and qualified infinity are developed.

In this edition.

The text includes quasi, quatenus intellectualis est, forsitan and quodammodo. The apparatus reports the correction from odoribus to coloribus in the sight example. The qualifiers prevent the rhetoric of infinity from becoming an unqualified equation of human mind with God.

See also.

Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency; Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement

Injury and the uninjured judge

Latin: *laesio*; *solutio*; *contractio*; *substantia*; *virtus*; *operatio*; *iudex liber passione*

The word.

Laesio is an injury; loosening and contraction count as harmful when they corrupt the affected substance. A judge “free from affection” is free from the bodily modification it judges. This does not mean that the soul is indifferent to pain or incapable of sympathetic distress.

In the Platonic Theology.

The cut in flesh and spirit threatens their substance. Ficino argues through the ordered dependence of substance, power and operation: damaging the underlying substance would impair its power and consequently its activity. If the same cut passed into soul, its sensing and judging should be obstructed just when it must recognize the injury, locate it and direct a remedy. Yet the soul does perform those activities. The inference separates knowledge of a bodily lesion from undergoing that lesion in the same manner.

Whole presence yields another objection. If the whole soul itself suffered the lesion at the wounded part, the same whole soul, present throughout the body, would suffer it everywhere. It could then no longer report it as localized there rather than elsewhere. This builds upon the distinction between a painful awareness and the original bodily injury; it does not deny that the person experiences pain.

Finally, a passive judgement would require a further judgement of its affected state. If this further judge were equally passive, another would be needed without resolution. Ficino terminates the sequence in a judge that receives no bodily affection or bodily form. A subtle body, bodily affection, or point of an affection cannot fulfill this role. The positive active account of sensation follows from this conclusion, rather than leaving sensation as a bare absence of being affected.

Places to Read.

- **VII.6.1, PDF 256–257**. The surgical example distinguishes the levels affected and aware.
- **VII.6.2, PDF 258–259**. Substance–power–operation, localization and the regress of passive judgements are separate arguments.
- **VII.6.3, PDF 260–261**. An affection-free judge supplies the transition to active sensation.

In this edition.

“Affection” translates a passive bodily modification in the regress. It must not be confused with the compassion and shared pain assigned to imagination. The edition’s three comparison units divide one continuous source paragraph, preserving this connection.

See also.

Bodily spirit and mediation; Pain, location and reporting; Sensation as attentive activity

Innate forms and the stimulus of images

Latin: *excitare*; *adita mentis*; *promere*; *idea naturaliter insita*; *integritas*; *puritas*

The word.

Excitation by an image is a prompting, while promere is bringing forth what lies concealed. Adita evokes inner recesses. The naturally implanted Idea is presented as a source of conception; its relation to sensory stimulation is not simple copying.

In the Platonic Theology.

According to the Platonists as Ficino reports them, bodily images awaken the mind to bring forms out of its own recesses into light. The object of sensory representation occasions the activity, but the intellectual form’s universal power is not explained as a material imprint transported unchanged into a storehouse.

Human nature in Plato or Socrates is restricted to that person’s embodiment. The nature conceived under one definition applies to all humans. Ficino interprets this wider adequacy as greater formal perfection and truth. The mental notion includes what is necessary to the account and excludes superfluous circumstances. “Purity” therefore means the removal of accidental restrictions and admixtures from the intelligible account, not a judgment that an actual person is disposable or unreal.

This passage belongs with the opening account in which an image prompts universal conception, but its attribution must remain visible. It is a Platonic explanation of the source of the form. Ficino's subsequent proof uses the claim that mind receives forms truly without becoming a body of their kind; it does not require the reader to treat all imaginative products as innate truths.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.1.5, PDF pp. 292–293.** The phantastic image prompts the conception to which intellect later returns.
- **VIII.13.1, PDF pp. 358–359.** Image-induced awakening, inward forms and necessary-versus-superfluous content explain the superiority of intellectual reception.

In this edition.

Ut Platonici opinantur introduces the self-reception account. The paired pura integritate / integra puritate deliberately combines completeness with freedom from admixture. Neither phrase means sheer absence of content.

See also.

Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding

Insatiable desire and divine enlargement

Latin: *capacitas*; *ardor*; *amplificatio divina*; *infinitas absoluta*; *inserere*; *servare*; *revocare*

The word.

Capacity is the reach of intellectual and vital reception; ardour describes its unsatisfied desire. Divine enlargement is a received increase or communication of power. Absolute infinity belongs to God; the mind's intellectual and vital infinity is implanted and continuously preserved.

In the Platonic Theology.

The contrast with bodily appetite sharpens the closing proof. Hunger, thirst and sleep are satisfied by comparatively small things. The desire for wealth or dominion can go on, and the desire for divine truth finds no final fullness in finite created knowledge. Ficino argues that only infinite God adequately fills the capacity flowing from God.

Acquiring finite objects does not simply reduce the appetite. The closer mind comes to the infinite source through preparation, the more ardently it desires. Fire returning to its sphere and a stone descending more swiftly as it approaches earth illustrate directed acceleration. They belong to Ficino's historical physics of natural places, not a modern quantitative account of gravitational acceleration.

The decisive qualification follows. Does mind possess its infinite power by itself? Ficino corrects that suggestion: more truly, it has it through a certain divine enlargement. God's absolute infinity inserts and continually preserves intellectual and vital infinity in minds and souls most immediately dependent upon it, and calls them from an infinite principle toward an infinite end. Communication is therefore not independence.

The final immortality argument moves from power and operation to duration. A power so enlarged has no assigned limit in knowing and willing; because life is prior in origin to intelligence, the power of living should have been granted even more fundamentally.

“Granted” matters as much as “infinite.” The conclusion does not erase the causal distinction between the First Cause and created mind.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.16.3, PDF pp. 374–375.** Finite human achievements and created knowledge fail to satisfy intellectual desire.
- **VIII.16.4, PDF pp. 376–377.** Acceleration images lead to the explicit correction from self-owned power to divine enlargement and preserved dependence.

In this edition.

Talem quandam alicubi aut talem infinitatem is awkward in all three reported witnesses. The edition renders a distributive “some infinity of one kind or another”; this contribution does not silently emend it. The earlier sitis eius utrumque is also syntactically awkward in the supplied Latin; the English expands it as thirst for both human and divine things, an interpretation supported by the preceding contrast but not a smooth literal equivalent.

See also.

Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Instrument and creative mediation

Latin: *instrumentum*; *medium*; *principalis agens*; *subiectum*; *traducere*; *temporis intervallum*; *sine medio*

The word.

Instrumentum is an instrument, an agent moved by another to act upon a recipient. Medium is an intermediary. Principalis agens names the governing agent in an instrumental action; it need not mean the absolutely First Cause of all being. Sine medio means without an intervening cause of the relevant kind.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.4.10 makes qualities instruments through which rational soul moves matter. The example is genuinely causal: the instrument carries an agent’s operation into a receptive subject. The soul can therefore employ bodily powers without deriving its own essence from them.

V.13.14 tests whether an angel could have just that role in creating a soul: God the craftsman, angel the instrument. Ficino rejects it by analyzing what instruments do. They are moved by another, move something else, affect an underlying subject and convey the principal agent’s form through an interval of time. Creation from nothing lacks a subject and does not take place through motion or time. Its mode therefore cannot be transferred unchanged to this instrument model.

The following objection concerns power. If infinite creative power were first received in a finite angel, it would be delimited by the angel’s nature; it could not then perform an act requiring infinity. The two reasons are related but distinct: one concerns the structure of instrumental operation, the other limitation by a receiver.

The conclusion “without intermediary” concerns the soul’s creation and continuing dependence. It does not forbid every angelic illumination, assistance or ranked relation

elsewhere. The same V.6 that distinguishes separate forms from infused powers allows beneficent power from God or angel. Scope matters.

Places to Read.

- **V.4.10, PDF 24–25.** Qualities serve as instruments in soul's movement of matter.
- **V.6.1, PDF 32–33.** Infused beneficent power is distinguished from separately created subsistent form.
- **V.13.14, V.13.15, V.13.16, V.13.17, PDF 88–91.** Angelic instrumental creation is rejected and immediate creation/preservation affirmed.

In this edition.

The phrase formam principalis agentis at V.13.14 means the form of the principal agent in this proposed instrumental arrangement. It should not be cited as though every occurrence of principalis were the technical name causa prima. The hypothetical arrangement is rejected, not adopted. The apparatus at PDF 385 takes hanc in V.4.10 as the efficient power just mentioned: the first-moving power forms that subordinate power. The English follows this explicit editorial construal; this companion does not label it a mistranslation.

See also.

Four causes and graded dependence; Creation and generation; Reception and the receiver; First Cause

Integrity of the whole

Latin: *totius integritas*; *provenire*; *materia et forma*; *radix*; *fundamentum*; *quantitate protendi*

The word.

Integritas is the completeness or integrated nature of the whole. Provenire means arising or resulting. The proposal gives form the power to move and matter the capacity to be moved; radix and fundamentum picture the roots of these capacities.

In the Platonic Theology.

An opponent suggests that composition produces a nature beyond matter and form, or beyond the four elements: the whole's integrity. It would move itself because its form acts and its matter receives. This objection is more sophisticated than calling soul an isolated element, and should not be assimilated to the first materialist position without qualification.

Ficino gives two replies from the Platonist standpoint. First, distributing action and reception between different essences still fails to reach one primary source and receptacle of motion and life. Second, if the resulting integrity is extended quantitatively, it repeats the problems already demonstrated for bodily bulk; if indivisible, it concedes the incorporeal nature sought. The following clarification is essential: incorporeal self-motion does not mean a thing passing an action to itself as a separate patient. It means the natural alternation of its own affections. The objection's causal decomposition and Ficino's nontransitive account of psychic motion must remain distinct.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.9; source PDF pp. 210, 211**. The emergent integrity proposal is stated and answered in two different ways.

- **VI.12.10; source PDF pp. 210, 211**. Natural succession within soul replaces an agent-to-patient transfer.

In this edition.

The edition retains Ficino's polemical cavillatio, "quibble," without making it a neutral name for all theories of emergence. This is a reported objection and reply, not a settled modern adjudication of whole-system properties.

See also.

Primary self-motion and the regress of parts; Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer

Intellectual forms and intelligible essences

Latin: *forma intelligibilis*; *species*; *forma intellectualis*; *essentia intelligibilis*; *imago*; *aspectus*

The word.

An intelligible essence is what mind knows; an intellectual form is the image or form through which it is actually able to know that essence. Ficino says the latter is often also called intelligible, but that intellectual is the more exact Platonic designation. The lexical overlap does not abolish the distinction.

In the Platonic Theology.

VIII.4 opens with a teaching attributed to Arab Platonists: intellect acquires a universal form signifying human beings and then judges that human nature is rational animality. This judgment can be described as conception, account, definition or knowledge, according to the aspect emphasized. The sequence distinguishes possession of a representing form from the articulated apprehension it supports; none of these names locates a bodily picture inside the mind.

Ficino later makes the terminology more exact. Mind acts in knowing only insofar as it is actual, and it is actualized through form. To contemplate an essence it therefore possesses a form of that essence as an image. The essence is intelligible; its image in the knower is more properly intellectual, although the latter is often also called intelligible. The refinement does not erase earlier overlapping usage. It distinguishes what is known from the representation through which the knower operates. The essence and its intellectual image remain distinct even when both are simple.

The chapter's first set of arguments tests what bodily parts the representing species might possess. Homogeneous parts would merely duplicate a complete account or add quantity. Unlike parts, modelled on genus and difference, would be indefinitely cut with the body's regions, destroying the bounded definition. Separating them to right and left cannot explain one mind's one knowledge of one thing. Unspecified parts and numerical component-sciences are also tested. These arguments concern the proposed composition of an intellectual species; they prepare but do not replace the more direct representational argument at VIII.4.9.

That renewed argument begins from an object judged simple: goodness under its universal account, or God or angel when truly understood. Suppose its representing form were scattered into parts. Either no part refers to the essence, only some do, or all do. If none refers, the assembled whole has no basis for referring. If only some do, the nonreferring parts are irrelevant to the intellectual form. If all do, Ficino asks whether their reference is

the same or different. Aspectus and respectus here concern intentional regard, not literal optical rays.

If every portion adequately refers to the whole essence, each already performs the entire cognitive work. One suffices; the others are superfluous. If such duplicates track every potential bodily subdivision and each contributes to knowing, the hypothesis yields an actually innumerable set of operative forms. If the parts instead have different reference, each must answer to a different part of the object; the proposed representation thereby makes the supposedly simple essence multiple. Correctly judging simplicity requires a simple regard. The argument depends upon the correspondence between cognitive articulation and the object understood, rather than upon the assertion that every image is identical with its object.

Ficino anticipates the objection from knowledge of composites. A human body has parts, and ten can be divided into numbers, but humanity as humanity and ten as ten each have one defining account. A composite can therefore be known under an indivisible aspect without losing its bodily or numerical divisibility in other respects. Other objects, including unity and the first principles reached when analysis ends, are intrinsically simple. VIII.4.13 joins these two cases: simple objects and indivisible aspects of composites require simple acts and forms.

The conclusion then moves beyond representation to its subject. Ficino assumes that a mind receiving such forms must itself be simple, and that greater simplicity entails greater indissolubility. Since life is prior to intelligence, the living subject must possess the relevant permanence even more fundamentally than its reflective activity. These final premises make the immortality argument more than a lexical distinction between intellectual and intelligible. Keeping the steps separate lets the reader assess where the representational analysis ends and where the stronger metaphysical inference begins.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.1, PDF pp. 316–317.** Universal form, conception, definition and knowledge are connected at the opening.
- **VIII.4.9, PDF pp. 330–331.** Ficino explicitly distinguishes intellectual forms from intelligible essences and examines their possible parts.
- **VIII.4.13, PDF pp. 336–337.** Simplicity of acts and forms supports simplicity of the knowing subject.

In this edition.

The qualification proprius matters: Ficino is refining usage, not asserting that every earlier occurrence of intelligibilis has named only the external essence. The English preserves both labels at VIII.4.9 rather than harmonizing them.

See also.

Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts; Simplicity of human and numerical species; First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis

Intellectual generation and daily renewal

Latin: *generatio intellectualis*; *renovatio*; *formare*; *perficere*; *genitrix*; *bene esse*

The word.

Intellectual generation is the mind's inward production of intelligible accounts. Renewal and perfection concern its continuing activity. Bene esse, being well, is distinguished from simply being; the argument moves from self-perfection toward continued existence.

In the Platonic Theology.

Mind forms and perfects itself through understanding and willing. Ficino connects this to the apostle Paul's language of daily renewal. He then compares natural generation, which achieves a kind of immortality through successive offspring, with intellectual generation, whose products remain within the generating mind. The continuity of an external lineage is therefore distinguished from the supposed permanence of an individual intellectual parent.

The mind produces accounts of itself and other things whenever it understands. Because the generative activity remains within it, Ficino argues that the enduring power is preserved there too. He adds that what can confer the higher benefit of being well should be able to confer being in the relevant formal respect. Contemplation and ethical formation supply the examples of self-perfection.

This language must be read with the immediately following qualifications. Ficino does not simply adopt the claim that mind efficiently creates its own essence. He distances himself from Proclus's stronger statement and subsequently specifies formal, not efficient, self-causation. "Making itself" in the earlier sentences cannot safely be detached from that restriction.

The proof also links source, path and terminus: an act proceeding from mind, through mind and upon mind is not explained by inserting an external bodily intermediary. The question becomes whether such a power can continue to operate and live separately from body.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.12, PDF pp. 212–213.** Cross-book scope comparison: perpetual essential life is distinguished from cognitive powers and acts that may be interrupted.
- **VIII.15.2, PDF pp. 366–367.** Daily renewal, inward offspring, being-well and the source/path/terminus of self-operation support the argument.
- **VIII.15.3, PDF pp. 368–369.** The subsequent explicit formal-cause restriction governs the self-production language.

In this edition.

The correction perficit, not proficit, is adopted in the opening claim that mind forms and perfects itself. The Pauline reference is Ficino's attribution; no exact independently verified biblical quotation is being claimed here.

VIII.15.2 says semper intelligendo atque volendo, "always understanding and willing," and its emphatic wording is retained. VI.12.12 (PDF pp. 212–213), however, distinguishes the essence's perpetual vital motion from powers and acts that can be interrupted or go astray. These formulations should be compared without silently replacing either: the present account of continual intellectual renewal does not, by itself, establish uninterrupted ordinary conscious attention. The relation between essential life and the exercise of cognition requires its own explanation.

See also.

Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Outward flow and rational life's return; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Intellectual objects and the owl's eye

Latin: *obiectum*; *rationis oculus*; *fabricare*; *manifestissimum*; *noctua*

The word.

Obiectum is what a cognitive power attends to or encounters. The "eye of reason" names intellectual vision metaphorically. Fabricare can mean fashioning intelligible structures, not building physical objects. Manifestissimum describes what is most evident in itself, which need not be most evident to us.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino asks why one should accept the objects of animal sensation while dismissing what distinctively human reason sees. The claim of human dignity carries the rhetoric, but a two-branch argument does the further work. If intellectual objects move mind, they require a reality of their own to exercise that role. If intellect is not moved by its objects, its production of incorporeal structures at least demonstrates its own incorporeality. The second branch does not prove exactly the same thing as the first.

A child blind from birth illustrates difficulty believing a reality outside one's habitual experience; the point concerns limited access rather than a moral defect in blindness. Ficino then invokes Plato's Republic VII and Aristotle's second book of Divine Philosophy. The owl's eye facing sunlight represents a proportion between a weak knower and what is intrinsically manifest. Obscurity to us does not establish unreality in the object. These reports support the account of habituation and education; they should not be treated as independently checked word-for-word ancient citations.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.9; source PDF pp. 144, 145**. The two branches distinguish the reality of intellectual objects from the minimum conclusion about intellect itself.
- **VI.2.23; source PDF pp. 162, 163**. Owls reappear in a different light argument: unseen sunlight still exists.

In this edition.

The translation keeps the descriptive title "Divine Philosophy" rather than importing a modern book title and apparatus. "In themselves most manifest" concerns the order of reality, not ease of human recognition. No modern physiological claim about owl vision is being certified.

See also.

Sensory error and corrective reason; Light, spirit and the unseen source

Intelligible principles and reasoning

Latin: *ratio*; *rationes*; *intelligere*; *intelligentia*; *intueri*; *ars ratiocinandi*; *ratio artificiosa*; *ars rationalis*

The word.

Ratio ranges from defining account to intelligible principle and organized reasoning. Rationes in V.15 are stable intelligible contents, while ars ratiocinandi is the art of reasoning grounded in them. Intueri means contemplating or directly beholding, not necessarily seeing with bodily eyes.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.15.9–12 describes purified attention withdrawing from sensory familiarity and attaining unchangeable things without a bodily instrument. Ficino judges these supremely real because they remain in the same condition. He then offers an exhaustive-looking division: intelligibles are in mind, mind is in them, or each subsists in itself. The proof is meant to work under any of these alternatives, so it should not be cited as choosing only the first.

If principles inhere in mind, their immutability is incompatible, Ficino argues, with a mind wholly bound to mutable bodily temperament. Arithmetic and proportion make the claim concrete: two plus four is six, and two to four as four to eight. Their truth does not change with a bodily mixture. The art of reasoning gathers such principles into an ordered possession that cannot vanish or simply transfer away when taught.

If mind is in the principles as its subject, that immaterial subject likewise excludes its identity with bodily temperament. If both independently subsist, the mind’s own subsistence already supplies the desired distinction. V.15.18 supplements all three with philosophical experience: better understanding, calmer desire and fuller enjoyment accompany commerce with stable principles.

This is a metaphysical argument from truth and cognitive perfection. It does not require the reader to pretend that individual people never forget facts or make mathematical mistakes. Ficino is concerned with the status of true rational principles and the subject capable of grasping them.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.9, V.15.11, V.15.12, PDF 110–113.** Withdrawal and unchanging objects introduce three possible relations to mind.
- **V.15.13, V.15.14, V.15.15, V.15.16, PDF 112–115.** Immutable mathematics and rational art test the first alternative.
- **V.15.17, V.15.18, PDF 114–117.** The other alternatives and the common argument from improved activity.

In this edition.

Ratio is not mechanically “reason” everywhere: V.7 uses it for definition, V.11.8 for defining nature, V.13.16 for intelligible plan. The apparatus interprets rationum coetus as an ordered gathering, not a literal social meeting.

See also.

Teaching without loss; Temperament and harmony; Time, memory and expectation

Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance

Latin: *genus*; *species*; *proles*; *generare*; *operatio*; *substantia*; *principium*

The word.

An agent’s form supplies its principle of action, and its operation is said to follow its being. Genus and species differentiate broader kind from specific nature. Proles, offspring, connects natural production with the later image of intellectual conception.

In the Platonic Theology.

A dog does not generate a sheep, still less a human being. Ficino uses this assumed boundedness of natural generation to argue that a body cannot produce indiscriminately across kinds or above its own nature. A bodily intellect would therefore have two difficulties: receiving a form it already has and conceiving a form unlike itself. Complete understanding, however, requires reception followed by the conception of an account or definition.

Even a granted bodily reception would conform its object to the recipient’s particular nature. It could not explain the mind’s broad apprehension of bodies or its invention of varied possible forms. Still less could a body explain cognition of incorporeals. An operation cannot be more elevated than the substance that causes it; a merely bodily substance cannot therefore have a properly suprabodily intellectual operation.

A form mixed with body also acquires bodily determination, just as sight is limited through the eye to colours. The argument is attributed to Aristotle and accepted by Platonists; Ficino then distinguishes additions he attributes specifically to Platonists. In VIII.14, the principle is applied to composites: matter and form together have the composite’s being and operation, whereas intellect analyzes the composite into independently considered constituents.

The argument’s dependence on form and causal likeness should remain explicit. Its natural examples serve that historical metaphysics; they are not a modern account of heredity or evolutionary change.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.10.1, PDF pp. 350–351.** Dogs, sheep, fire, reception and conception establish the limits of a hypothesized bodily knower.
- **VIII.10.2, PDF pp. 352–353.** The mixed form and colour-bound sight extend the argument, with explicit Aristotelian and Platonic attributions.
- **VIII.14.1, PDF pp. 362–363.** The operation of a composite is contrasted with intellectual analysis of matter and form.

In this edition.

The apparatus takes aut quodlibet corpus aut incorporalia climactically: no unrestricted production of bodies, still less incorporeals. This avoids suggesting that a body could produce no bodily effect whatsoever. Species and genus should not both be rendered by an undifferentiated “kind.”

See also.

Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding; Mind’s transformation of material conditions; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause

Life and vivification

Latin: *vita*; *vivere*; *vivificare*; *vivificatio*; *vitalis*; *animatum*; *pedisequa*

The word.

Vita is life; vivere is living; vivificare gives life to another; vivificatio names that activity. Vitalis can mean life-bearing, living or life-giving according to context. Pedisequa is a female attendant following behind, used of life's inseparable accompaniment.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.14 shifts from soul as self-subsisting essence to soul as life. If some part of soul were not life, Ficino argues, the whole would be an animated recipient rather than soul itself. Whatever is wholly life lives through itself, while a derivative living thing combines its own nonliving nature with received life. The soul's unceasing animation of a prepared body confirms its proper function.

Vivification is then distinguished from conscious deliberation and appetite. If bodily life depended on cognition, everyone would know each hidden nutritive and generative operation; if on desire, one could remain embodied or depart at will. Since neither follows, Ficino identifies vivification with natural power or being. This does not mean every action of the rational soul is involuntary; it concerns the specific natural act of sustaining bodily life.

The argument permits two formulations: soul as life living through itself, or as a substance with life properly accompanying it, like fire with heat. Ficino prefers the first but says either can support the intended result. The distinction matters because the next proof examines the bearer of an inseparable form as well as the form itself.

V.15.7–8 reiterates that a recipient abandoned by life is not therefore the life that abandoned it. The departing life is the true mind; it cannot abandon itself. The thesis remains dependent on the prior rejection of the theory that life is merely the body's temperament.

Places to Read.

- **V.14.1, V.14.2, PDF 94–95.** Wholly living essence, constant vivification and the rejection of conscious or appetitive bodily control.
- **V.14.3, V.14.5, V.14.6, PDF 96–97.** Two permissible formulations and the attendant image lead into the contrary/death argument.
- **V.15.7, V.15.8, PDF 108–111.** Life as departing soul is distinguished from the body deprived of it.

In this edition.

Ipso esse in V.14.2 is immediately glossed naturali virtute. It must not be turned into the claim that a creature's substance is its own unmediated operative act, contrary to V.13.13. The edition's coniectura is an "indication," preserving the local status of this supporting argument.

See also.

Rational soul and irrational life; Contraries, death and imperishability; Temperament and harmony

Light, spirit and the unseen source

Latin: *lumen*; *lux*; *fulgor*; *splendor*; *spiritus*; *lucere*; *rutilare*; *coniectari*

The word.

Lumen and lux both denote light in this sequence; their local physical or spiritual reference matters more than a rigid two-word system. Fulgor is the sun's radiance, splendor its visible manifestation mixed with vapours. Spiritus can here name a spiritual mode of being; it is not invariably the physiological spirits found elsewhere.

In the Platonic Theology.

The visual exercise starts with light spreading instantaneously without shattering or being stained by bodies. On Ficino's premises this is something nonbodily seen with bodily eyes. He challenges the move from invisibility to nonexistence: the most excellent elemental and celestial spheres are not all directly visible. The sun would still exist even unseen by owls, and our visible splendor points to a purer radiance. The light of stars is similarly taken as an image of spiritual light in celestial souls.

Next Ficino imagines light separated from all matter, increasingly active and, conditionally, most alive "if it is ever to live." It would sense "so to speak," because other beings sense through its rays, yet evade earthly sight both through subtlety and through excess intelligible brightness. These are analogical and historical-philosophical claims about illumination, not modern optics. The repeated qualifications and the chapter's eventual "prelude" prevent a reductive identification of soul with visible radiation. Seeing a likeness can provide access to a source without making source and likeness numerically the same.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.22; source PDF pp. 160, 161**. Light's instantaneous, uninjuring penetration introduces the visual route.
- **VI.2.23; source PDF pp. 162, 163**. Visible splendor leads to an unseen source and a qualified ascent to living, sensing light.
- **VI.2.26, VI.2.27; source PDF pp. 164, 165, 166, 167**. Invisible intelligent light is summarized as a preliminary conception of soul.

In this edition.

Intelligibilem and intelligentem in VI.2.26 mean respectively available to intellect and itself understanding. The facing English's "light of spirits" must be read with Ficino's vocabulary of bodily vehicles and physiological mediation, not generalized into an identity of spirit and rational soul.

See also.

Spark, globe and luminous vehicles; Intellectual objects and the owl's eye

Lucifer and indivisible meaning

Latin: *Lucifer*; *luci*; *fer*; *vox*; *significatio*; *dictio*; *latio*

The word.

Here *Lucifer* is the Latin name designating Venus as the light-bearing morning star. The example expressly concerns that reference, not a demonic character. *Vox* is the uttered

sound; *significatio* its meaning; *dictio* a meaningful expression. *Latio* supplies the notion of bearing or carrying.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino compares the word with an animal: sound takes the place of body and meaning the place of soul. Divide *Lucifer* into *luci* and *fer*. The original designation of Venus ceases, but is not itself cut into two meaningful halves. Two further significations now sustain the two expressions: a meaning of light in *luci* and something associated with bearing in *fer*. Their continued meaningfulness parallels the new souls posited in severed animal fragments.

The example separates continuity of material components from identity of the organizing meaning. The meaning that disappeared and the meanings that remain must not be treated as three interchangeable versions of one content. Likewise, the account of animal division depends upon new souls rather than fragments of the original soul. Ficino postpones a fuller demonstration that a name's meaning is indivisible; this unit supplies an analogy, not the complete semantic proof.

The earlier discussion of word-meanings transmitted from soul to soul establishes the relevant background. A sound reaches hearing, but what is understood is not exhausted by the bodily sound. Translation must preserve the Latin segmentation because an English substitute would not reproduce both its letters and its locally stipulated meanings.

Places to Read.

- **VII.1.3, PDF 236–237**. Meanings reaching hearing are classed as spiritual and preserved through souls.
- **VII.5.4, PDF 254–255**. Lucifer, luci and fer illustrate cessation and replacement of indivisible meaning.

In this edition.

The edition explains rather than replaces the *luci/fer* wordplay. The printed *fer* is glossed broadly through *latio*; the article does not silently convert it into a fully specified grammatical analysis. Venus is named by the Latin source itself.

See also.

Severed animals and replacement souls; Spiritual images and light

Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing

Latin: *aequatio*; *mensura*; *proportio*; *infinitas*; *esse*; *non esse*; *creatio*; *interitus*

The word.

Aequatio is correspondence between knower and known; mensura is the measure by which something is apprehended. Creation passes from nonbeing to being; interitus passes oppositely. Their "interval" is metaphysical difference, not a measurable stretch of space.

In the Platonic Theology.

Mind is said to have no fixed place or grade insofar as it traverses all grades in knowing. Ficino then argues that defining infinity requires some proportion between mind and the infinity known. Since finite and infinite have no proportion in the relevant sense, the knowing power must itself be infinite in a qualified way. Time measuring motion supplies a comparison: if motion were endless, the successive measure would also be endless; stable intellectual comprehension of infinity is presented as an even stronger case.

The conclusion depends on Ficino's premise that knowledge requires a proportional matching of knower and object. It should not be silently recast as a modern proof that defining "infinite" gives a thinker infinite information. His own repeated qualifications indicate a power of intellectual reach rather than identity with God's absolute nature.

Being and nonbeing give another example. Mind understands creation and destruction and describes both termini. It also conceives common being as communicated in many modes. The immeasurable distance it "traverses" concerns this conceptual range; understanding creation is not itself an act of efficiently creating an external substance.

The passage then turns from knowledge to desire: bodily hunger is readily satisfied, but ambition or desire for divine knowledge seems unbounded. That change of argumentative route leads to the closing account of divine enlargement.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.16.3, PDF pp. 374–375.** Proportional cognition of infinity is followed by thought's passage between being and nonbeing and by insatiable desire.

In this edition.

The apparatus emphasizes aequatio and aequatur as equality language. Qualifiers such as ut ita loquar and quodammodo remain essential. The correction percurrit immensum keeps the verb's complete traversal image; it does not make nonbeing a place.

See also.

Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause

Members, house and sinew

Latin: *membrum*; *congregatum*; *domus*; *paries*; *nervus*; *articulus*; *conglutinare*

The word.

Membrum is an organic member. Congregatum denotes an aggregate gathered together, contrasted with a natural whole. Nervus can mean sinew or nerve in this bodily example; the translation chooses sinew. Conglutinare pictures binding together as with glue.

In the Platonic Theology.

If soul were located only in one organ, Ficino argues, it would be the form only of that member. The other members would require other forms, leaving an aggregate comparable to a house assembled from walls rather than one natural organism. The contrast does not deny that a house is ordered; it distinguishes the kind of substantial unity claimed for an animal from artificial aggregation.

The pulling sinew then gives a different analogy. For the joints to contract together under one pull, one connecting sinew must be present throughout the relevant parts. Similarly, concord between animal members requires one soul uniting them. The inference is reinforced by life in even tiny bodily portions and motion and sensation in most. These are said to be operations inward to the agent and impossible without its substance. Ficino therefore moves from immanent local effects to the soul's presence there, not merely from visible proximity between organs to psychic unity. The distinction between all parts alive and most parts sensing must remain intact.

Places to Read.

- **VI.9.3; source PDF pp. 192, 193**. House, sinew, life and immanent operations supply different supports for organic unity.
- **VI.1.4; source PDF pp. 130, 131**. The argument answers the earlier localized ruling-point account.

In this edition.

The facing English distinguishes “every portion” for life from “most” for motion and sensation. Nervus should not be silently modernized into a detailed neurological mechanism. The house and sinew are analogies with separate causal roles, not a single extended image.

See also.

Place, coincidence and painless penetration; Unity, dispersion and the inward bond

Memory, rigidity and fluidity

Latin: *memoria*; *solidum*; *fluxum*; *labile*; *docilitas*; *acumen*; *tenere*; *obfuscare*

The word.

Solidum names a solid body; *fluxum* and *labile* mark fluidity and instability. *Docilitas* is readiness to learn, *acumen* cognitive sharpness, and *memoria* retention. None is simply another word for the ease with which matter changes.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino tests a corporeal soul through opposed material conditions. If rigid, it hardly receives new figures and so loses both teachability and acuity. If it does receive successive figures, their coexistence obscures their distinctions. If fluid or unstable, it cannot retain them and consequently has no memory. A material property that seems to solve one difficulty therefore generates another: receptiveness without stability does not yield recollection, while stability as resistance to alteration does not yield learning.

The final division of chapter 1 recasts this dilemma. If an image only reaches the soul’s imagined surface, as in a mirror, it can account at most for a present object, not an absent object retained for thought. If qualities penetrate its substance like tastes and odors entering water, sensation and memory become successive bodily alterations whose contents mix without discriminating judgement. The ordinary verbs “hold,” “lose,” “obscure” and “confuse” carry the explanatory burden. Memory requires distinguishable retained content, not merely the continued existence of a material change.

The argument belongs to Ficino’s case for incorporeality. It neither supplies a contemporary theory of memory nor demonstrates that every process involving material stability is incapable of information storage.

Places to Read.

- **VII.1.1, PDF 232–233**. The images of Plato, Xenophon, Alcibiades and Phaedrus test distinguishable coexistence.
- **VII.1.2, PDF 234–235**. Solid and fluid alternatives threaten learning and memory in different ways.

- **VII.1.3, PDF 236–237**. Surface reflection is contrasted with penetrating mixture and recollection of absent things.

In this edition.

At VII.1.2 the edition retains *cepit*, “has received,” against the later witnesses’ *ceperit*. It also retains *Ubi*, rendered “There,” where those witnesses make the connection causal with *Nam*. Neither variation licenses merging the successive objections.

See also.

Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Comparison and common sense

Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding

Latin: *accipere*; *concipere*; *parturire*; *effingere*; *fingere*; *manus mentis*

The word.

Receiving, conceiving and giving birth are related but distinct activities. Effingere and fingere mean fashioning or forming; their truth-status depends on context. “Hands of the mind” is an expressly figurative name for active conceptual articulation.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino distinguishes receiving a form from conceiving its account or definition. This second activity is needed to complete understanding. A material recipient is constrained by its own kind, whereas mind abstracts, reasons and returns upon itself by producing forms for itself. Such production need not mean creating an external substance from nothing.

He turns the current debate into an example. To argue that soul is incorporeal, the disputants must already be able to conceive an incorporeal mode of being and fashion an account of it. They handle that account with mental hands. Describing something as existing without length, breadth, depth, bodily quality or figure demonstrates intellectual access to a nonbodily object; it does not by itself prove that every such described object exists outside thought.

The childbirth image reinforces the causal likeness argument. Mind produces an offspring resembling its own intellectual nature, not an object elevated beyond the substance of its parent. Ficino then infers that mind surpasses the restrictions of bodies. The last formulation is cautious in logical form: nothing prevents such mind from being perpetual. Other passages carry stronger positive demonstrations.

The same vocabulary later includes artistic and hypothetical construction. Mind paints within itself, speaks into the air or makes marks on a wall. Its inward products have an existence as conceived representations even when what they represent never comes to be.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, PDF pp. 350–353.** Reception becomes conception; active mental hands and offspring illustrate nonbodily intellectual operation.
- **VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, PDF pp. 370–373.** Possible, impossible and inwardly painted objects broaden the account of mental making.

In this edition.

In et capit sola summa cum voluptate at VIII.10.2, sola qualifies mind as subject: mind alone grasps these objects in the stated way. It does not mean that mind grasps only incorporeals. The apparatus makes this ambiguity explicit.

See also.

Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance; Intellectual generation and daily renewal

Mind's transformation of material conditions

Latin: *resolutio*; *purum*; *unum*; *stabile*; *praeteritum*; *futurum*; *vita prima*; *perpetuum*

The word.

Ficino's series contrasts things under material conditions with their intellectual apprehension: composite/simple, impure/pure, many/one, changing/stable, distant/united, dead/living and corruptible/perpetual. The change is first in the mode of understanding, not a physical alteration of the external object.

In the Platonic Theology.

VIII.14 gathers many earlier arguments into a catalogue. Mind resolves composite bodies into matter and form and considers each separately. It apprehends exact figures where material presentations lack exactness, isolates qualities from contrary admixtures and gathers many individuals under one species. It brings the changing parts of time together, relating past and future to present; and it can survey distant places together, as if beholding the world in a point.

The most striking claims concern life and perpetuity. Mind holds apparently lifeless stones "living" within itself by comparing them to the first life from which they were produced. It considers corruptible individuals apart from their locations and times. These are exercises of intellectual reference to principles and universal accounts, not claims that a thought revives a dead organism or preserves a specific stone indefinitely in the external world.

Ficino draws a conclusion about the knower: a power that liberates objects from these restrictions in understanding cannot itself simply possess all the restrictions of a bodily composite. The inference from operation to substance is doing the work. A reader can therefore distinguish the described cognitive achievement from the further metaphysical conclusion Ficino wants it to warrant.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.14.1, PDF pp. 362–363.** The complete series moves from analysis through purity, unity and stability to intellectual life and perpetuity.

In this edition.

Quodammodo qualifies the claim that material figures are false; ut ita loquar qualifies "dead." The English preserves both. Prima vita names the life to which stones are referred as effects; the supplied argument does not identify the stone's own material condition with that source.

See also.

Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis

Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun

Latin: *speculum*; *flamma*; *imago*; *lumen*; *lux*; *anima solis*; *reviviscere*

The word.

A real flame and its reflected image are distinguished. Lumen and lux concern light, with the passage contrasting outward visibility and an inward invisible source. Spiritalis marks the nonbodily status Ficino gives the image and its illuminating medium in this historical optical account.

In the Platonic Theology.

Wood receiving fire becomes hot and fiery. A remote mirror reflecting the flame does not. The mirror therefore supplies a possible objection to the rule that reception of a bodily form assimilates its recipient: an image appears without physical heating. Ficino responds by denying that the image is truly received in the mirror's body. He locates it instead in the spiritual light surrounding the surface.

The account then traces images to surrounding light rather than to bodies producing incorporeals, and light itself to the sun's soul rather than the solar globe. The Orphics and Heraclitus are named for the reciprocal description of light as visible soul and soul as invisible light. This attribution is part of Ficino's exposition; this contribution does not verify it as a literal quotation from an independently consulted ancient text.

The digression is recalled to its purpose: mind truly receives forms when it judges truly, whereas the mirror does not receive a material flame. The word "truly" therefore does not mean one unchanged mode of reception in every case. Mind's receiving is intellectual and can be more adequate than the restricted embodiment of a form in matter.

The physical explanation is historical natural philosophy. It should not be presented as current optics or used to infer that reflected light cannot heat a material surface under other conditions.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.13.1, PDF pp. 358–359.** Burning wood, a remote mirror, spiritual light and the sun's soul introduce the distinction between material and intellectual reception.

In this edition.

The reading text prints visibilis after effusa longius, an explicit contextual emendation against invisibilis reported in all three witnesses. The next clauses require visible manifestation, but the emendation remains the supplied editor's intervention, not an attested unanimous reading. The apparatus also reports tribuitur as the correction of attribuitur.

See also.

Innate forms and the stimulus of images; Receiving forms without losing one's own; Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil

Moral concord and the robber

Latin: *probus*; *iustus*; *nequissimus*; *latro*; *appetitus*; *concinere*; *magis anima*; *magis vita*

The word.

Moral concord is agreement of the soul's activities with reason. The good or just person is contrasted with the wicked person or robber. "More soul" and "more life" are consequences drawn from the disputed harmony thesis, not Ficino's accepted measures of human worth.

In the Platonic Theology.

Musical harmony admits degrees: better-concording strings yield more harmony. The wicked soul has conflicting appetites and a sense at odds with reason; the good soul accords. If soul were harmony, the good person would therefore have more soul, and since soul is a kind of life, more life. Ficino tests the resulting prediction against the broad range of organic and cognitive activities.

The robber would digest less well, generate offspring less effectively, support and move bodily members less adequately, discover less acutely, remember less firmly, speak less elegantly, attack less boldly and breathe less long than the just person. The catalogue is not a promised empirical rule that virtuous people enjoy better health or longer lives. It is the implausible package generated when degrees of moral agreement are identified with degrees of the substance or principle of life.

The example also explains why ordinary virtues or skills cannot be indiscriminately merged. Bold undertaking, ingenuity, memory and eloquence can serve a bad agent. Their possession does not establish moral goodness. The next chapter changes the angle from degree to identity: discordant opinions and affections do not stop the soul being a soul. The two arguments cooperate without saying that moral discord is harmless to a person's life in every respect.

Places to Read.

- **VII.14.1, PDF 278–279**. More harmony, more soul and more life lead to the rejected catalogue of predicted differences.
- **VII.15.1, PDF 280–281**. Persisting as a soul amid discord supplies the subsequent identity argument.

In this edition.

From *Neque concoquet* onward, the robber's soul remains the subject throughout. The edition keeps both *sustinebit* and *vibrabit*: supporting bodily members and setting them moving are separate actions. *Magis* here belongs to the reductio, not an editorial assertion of greater substantial humanity.

See also.

Substance, qualities and degrees; Harmony and the strings; Discord and the soul's persistence

Motion and substantial stability

Latin: *motus*; *motio*; *primo moveri*; *status*; *stare*; *substantia*; *operatio*

The word.

Motus and motio name movement or change; their objects determine whether the movement is bodily locomotion or the soul's activity. Primo is an adverb of priority. Status is standing or stability, not a social status. Ficino separates the substance that abides from the operation that changes.

In the Platonic Theology.

Book V's first two proofs deliberately approach immortality from opposite directions. In V.1 the rational soul is the primary moving source. It supplies inward motion, identified with life, and outward motion to bodies. A derivative mover continues only while attached to what moves it; a self-mover cannot be deserted by its mover without being deserted by itself. Ficino then tests three hypothetical orders of failure: being ends before motion, motion before being, or both together. He rejects the first because motion needs an existent source, the second because spontaneous activity accompanies self-motion, and the third because neither the inward life-giving principle nor an outside mover can originate the required destructive alteration.

V.2 argues from stability instead. The soul changes in operation while remaining in substance. There is no contradiction within Ficino's classification: the subject of successive acts is not itself a succession of perishing subjects. V.3 consequently allows bodily affection in the capacity for operating while excluding it from essence. The claim is stronger and more specific than "nothing ever affects us."

The same contrast recurs in V.10.2–3: mutable operations generate mutable bodily forms, while the soul's stable essence relates it stably to God. V.15.5–6 illustrates the distinction through purposive action. A moving work unfolds successively, but purpose, attention, memory and expectation can be held together by the mind. These are Ficino's reasons for substantial permanence; they should not be redescribed as modern empirical demonstrations that the mind is physiologically unaffected.

Places to Read.

- **V.1.1, V.1.2, PDF 8–9.** Self-motion, dependence of derivative movement, and three imagined orders of cessation.
- **V.2.1, V.3.1, PDF 12–15.** Changing operation is distinguished from abiding substance and essence.
- **V.10.2, V.10.3, PDF 56–59.** Mutable production below soul contrasts with its stable relation above.
- **V.15.5, V.15.6, PDF 106–109.** The simultaneous direction of a temporally unfolding task supplies a later illustration.

In this edition.

The apparatus explains primary motion as hierarchical rather than merely first in time. At V.1.1 the source retains assiduus comes, without the non printed in the two later witnesses: the negative would reverse the premise that self-motion continually accompanies its source (PDF 381). The authorial addition about attachment to a mover is also incorporated. Status is accordingly translated "stability" at V.2.1.

See also.

Circularity and spiritual spheres; Rational soul and irrational life; Time, memory and expectation; First Cause

Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres

Latin: *amplexus*; *continere*; *capere*; *complecti*; *claudi*; *actus rectus*; *actus reflexus*

The word.

The containing and embracing vocabulary describes mutual intellectual apprehension. The direct act is life, while the reflexive act is cognition. These terms express an explanatory order within mind rather than two spatial trajectories.

In the Platonic Theology.

Saturn's sphere contains Jupiter's in the cosmological model assumed here, while Jupiter's does not contain Saturn's. A bodily container must be larger than its contained object and cannot at the same time be smaller than that very object. Minds, however, can consider one another reciprocally: mine knows yours and yours mine. Each therefore "contains" what contains it through a mode that is not quantitative enclosure.

The argument extends to mind's common nature. Any mind, when it attends, can consider the species of all minds. Ficino does not claim that it thereby reads every private thought or knows every detail of every actual person. The crucial content is the common intellectual nature.

A further immortality inference says that an individual substance equal to its enduring species should endure. The mind makes itself commensurate with that species through reflexive knowing; its prior direct act, life, must therefore have the corresponding capacity. Ficino gives an explicit alternative: either it has always existed and always will, or at least it will exist forever. The passage must not be cited as an unqualified proof of the soul's pre-existence.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.9.1, PDF pp. 348–349.** Celestial containment contrasts with mutual knowing; the conclusion preserves the future-only alternative.

In this edition.

The apparatus emphasizes a single sustained embracing image. The qualifiers si contingat and si animadvertat retain the conditions of occasion and attention. "Any mind can consider another" is not unrestricted telepathic access.

See also.

The whole mind and the measure of equality; Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus

Latin: *appetitus naturalis*; *bonum*; *possibile*; *utile*; *potentia*; *impotentia*; *Olympiodorus*

The word.

Natural desire is presented as directed toward a good appropriate to the being that desires. Possibile concerns attainability, utile usefulness, and potentia the power associated with good. The argument does not say that every passing wish must be fulfilled.

In the Platonic Theology.

After arguing from truth as food, Ficino introduces a confirmation attributed to the Platonist Olympiodorus, woven from Pythagorean and Platonic mysteries associated with the Phaedo and Gorgias. Mind naturally separates forms from matter and strives to live apart from the perishable body, even though bodily sensation pulls it in the opposite direction. The life sought is characterized as devoted to truth and goodness.

The inference runs from the goodness of such a life to its possibility. What is impossible is said to be useless; good cannot be useless; and just as impotence is associated with evil, power belongs to good. Consequently, a genuinely natural appetite for good aims at a possible possession. The structure is an account of teleologically ordered desire, not a survey of human preferences.

Ficino’s preceding argument adds that what is most natural to mind as mind should intensify rather than diminish its life. Separation is therefore presented as a consummation. The restriction “insofar as it is mind” is important: the passage is not denying the ordinary distress or limitations of embodied persons, nor does it invite practical self-harm. Its subject is the metaphysical adequacy of a natural end.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.8, PDF pp. 304–305.** The argument from immortal nourishment is followed by the explicitly attributed Olympiodoran confirmation.

In this edition.

The repeated naturaliter is interpreted in the text itself as “truly.” The apparatus preserves the possible/useful and impotence/power pairs and the concluding vere beneque. The ancient works are named through Ficino’s report; this contribution does not claim a separate verification of Olympiodorus’s wording.

See also.

Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Natural striving, source and return

Latin: *appetitus naturalis*; *appetitio*; *operatio*; *bonum*; *unde*; *inde*; *illuc*; *reflecti*

The word.

Appetitus naturalis is a nature’s directed striving, not necessarily conscious deliberation. Appetitio emphasizes the directed act. Unde, inde and illuc mean from where, from there and toward there, giving the argument its outward-and-returning structure.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.4.6 connects natural action with propagation of the agent's perfection. An element, plant or animal produces something like itself as far as its powers permit. Ficino uses this to deny that an agent's natural aim is the annihilation of the very subject required for a new work. The claim does not deny that one living organism destroys or consumes another; it distinguishes destruction of a particular form from a directed act whose end would be absolute nothingness.

V.4.7 makes the underlying teleology explicit. Natural appetite tends toward good, identified here with life, being and similar perfections, rather than their contraries. The supreme good implants that direction in all subordinate things. From their source of being they receive movement, and toward that same source they are borne. Every appetite and operation arising from good therefore tends and turns back toward good.

The repeated directional expressions do real work. Source is not simply the earliest item in a chronology. It is the cause from which an existent receives being and the end toward which its natural activity is ordered. The passage thus prepares the later efficient-and-final dependence that soul retains even while free from matter. It also complements circular self-return without making the two identical: one concerns an effect's return toward its good source, the other the soul's gathering activity into itself.

The proof remains framed by the claim of divine governance in V.4.2. Ficino is not deriving providence from contemporary observation of every natural event, nor saying every particular human desire is morally admirable. He is specifying the good that natural appetite seeks under the metaphysical description of preserving or communicating form and life. Later appetitive arguments can therefore distinguish natural vivification from deliberate wishing and can criticize desires without retracting this general direction.

Places to Read.

- **V.4.2, PDF 18–19.** Nature's nonannihilating aim is grounded in divine goodness.
- **V.4.6, V.4.7, PDF 20–23.** Propagation of perfection is connected explicitly to movement from and return toward good.
- **V.5.1, V.14.2, PDF 26–27, 94–95.** Efficient/final dependence and natural rather than deliberate vivification clarify the scope.

In this edition.

The edition preserves the unde/inde/illuc sequence and reflectiturque, "and turns back." Omnibus sequentibus means things following after the supreme good in the hierarchy; it need not mean events occurring later on a timeline.

See also.

Art and elemental transformation; Four causes and graded dependence; Circularity and spiritual spheres; First Cause

Necessary predication and the fire objection

Latin: *rotunditas*; *circulus*; *lignum*; *calere*; *dum est*; *semper*; *absolute*; *radix essendi*

The word.

Rotunditas is roundness; lignum wood; calere being hot. Dum est means while it exists. Semper is always, and absolute removes a proposed qualification. The question is whether an inseparable predicate guarantees that its subject exists perpetually.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.9 contrasts the circle, intrinsically round, with wood made round by an artisan. Wood can survive the loss of roundness; a circle cannot remain a circle without it. The examples of fire's heat, water's moisture and the sun's light then lead into the claim that being belongs to form through itself.

The objection in V.9.3 correctly targets an additional step: fire is always hot while it exists, but it can cease to exist. Why should a self-subsistent form's possession of being imply more than being while it exists? Ficino first attacks the objector's repeated "is" and the proposed infinite series of conditions. A first root of being must eventually be reached. The lexicon reports that argumentative move without presenting its accusation of contradiction as an independently settled logical verdict.

V.9.4 gives the fuller metaphysical reply. Heat and being are different: otherwise everything existent would be hot and every cooling would be annihilation. For fire the order is essence, materially conditioned being, then heat. Its dependence upon matter permits the condition to fail. For a separate soul, being is the first proper act of essence without an intervening bodily bond that could be loosened.

Thus the contrast concerns the ontological source and conditions of predication, not merely the grammatical difference between nouns and verbs. The proof still requires the earlier premise that soul really is a separate form. V.10 makes clear that it does not claim exemption from God as efficient source.

Places to Read.

- **V.9.1, PDF 46–47.** Circle and wooden circle distinguish intrinsic and acquired roundness.
- **V.9.3, PDF 50–51.** The fire objection and Ficino's repetition/regress reply.
- **V.9.4, V.10.1, PDF 52–55.** Being is distinguished from being hot and material conditions from divine dependence.

In this edition.

The edition keeps the deliberately repetitive est/semper est/dum est sequence instead of replacing it with a paraphrased victory. V.9.4 applies the correction primo ponatur, preserving the ordered placement of essence, being and heat (PDF 390).

See also.

Through itself and through another; Conditions and the fashioner's law; Contraries, death and imperishability

Nourishment and the life-giving form

Latin: *alimentum*; *anima nutritiva*; *coalescere*; *adolescere*; *affectio*; *forma vivifica*; *animatum*

The word.

Alimentum is nourishment or its supply; coalescere here describes living growth. Affectio is a determinate condition rather than an emotion. Forma vivifica is the form that gives life; animatum is what has been animated, not the soul itself.

In the Platonic Theology.

The first natural-power argument compares flourishing organisms and plants with severed logs and stones. All are bodies, but only the former nourish and grow in the relevant way. Bare corporeal matter, shared by all, therefore cannot explain the difference. An opponent replies that the soul is a special, appropriately disposed body, not just any body. Ficino asks what makes it special: if nothing beyond common bulk, the proposed difference disappears; if a quality or form, that additional life-giving principle is what deserves the name soul.

The reply is therefore a causal and definitional distinction, not simply an observation that wood does not grow. Matter joined to soul shares life and is called animate, but is neither soul nor part of soul. The beginning and cessation of characteristic operations upon soul's arrival and departure reinforce the conclusion that body as such is not their source. This establishes noncorporeality within the staged programme; it does not yet identify every life-giving form with the fully independent rational soul.

Places to Read.

- **VI.4.1, VI.4.2; source PDF pp. 170, 171**. Growth distinguishes the relevant living bodies from detached wood and stones.
- **VI.4.3, VI.4.4; source PDF pp. 170, 171**. The opponent's "body of such a kind" requires an explanatory added determination.
- **VI.4.5, VI.4.6; source PDF pp. 172, 173**. The life-giving form is soul; the participating matter is animate.

In this edition.

At VI.4.6 the reading text keeps M1482's animatum quiddam rather than the later witnesses' animarum quiddam. This substantive distinction is essential to the inference. The supposed powers of attached stones elsewhere must not erase this chapter's explicit "torn from the earth" qualification.

See also.

Animation, first light and regress; Earth, wood and severed stones

Number and spiritual amplitude

Latin: *numerus*; *unitas*; *replicatio*; *magnitudo*; *amplitudo*; *angustia*

The word.

Numerus is number, and unitas the unity of which numbers are described as repetitions. Magnitudo is continuous magnitude. Amplitudo and angustia are breadth and narrowness,

used paradoxically to contrast spirit and body rather than to give spirit physical dimensions.

In the Platonic Theology.

After the shadow examples Ficino urges a return into oneself, calling spirit immeasurably broad and body infinitely narrow “if I may speak so.” Numbers approach spiritual nature because they lack position and can number both incorporeal and corporeal objects according to form. They increase without end but do not decrease without end: the downward series reaches unity. Magnitude, in contrast, is given a maximum extension but no final minimum of division.

This is a contrast between indefinite numerical multiplication and the indefinitely divisible finite body, not a claim that all mathematical quantities have identical limits. The assumptions are the passage’s philosophical mathematics, and the rhetoric of infinity must follow the indicated direction. The subsequent geometric ascent likewise distinguishes quantity from power. An indivisible substantial unity can be great in virtus without being great in quantitas. Spiritual amplitude therefore concerns scope and effective independence, not an invisible larger body.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.6; source PDF pp. 140, 141**. Number and magnitude run in opposite directions with respect to unlimited increase and decrease.
- **VI.2.19, VI.2.20; source PDF pp. 158, 159**. The geometric ascent culminates in greatness of power without greatness of quantity.
- **VI.12.2, VI.12.3; source PDF pp. 202, 203, 204, 205**. Potential divisibility must later be distinguished from an actually infinite multitude.

In this edition.

The apparatus explicitly declines to rationalize away the opposed directions of number and magnitude. “Infinite narrowness” carries ut ita loquar, and “numbers approach spiritual nature” should not be silently strengthened into an identity between numbers and souls.

See also.

Point, dimension and substantial unity; Primary self-motion and the regress of parts

Nutrition, growth and the principal agent

Latin: *nutritiva potentia*; *calor tamquam instrumentum*; *causa principalis*; *principale agens*; *principalis augmenti faber*; *terminus*; *figura*

The word.

A principal cause or agent determines the work as this organized work; an instrument supplies a subordinate power used in its production. “Principal” is relational here: heat is considered and rejected as the principal cause of animal growth. The phrase is not the title “First Cause,” and this passage does not identify the nutritive soul with God.

In the Platonic Theology.

The opening premise fixes the causal resources under examination. A bodily constitution and the form dependent upon it can act only through the qualities composing that constitution. Simply renaming the resulting form therefore cannot explain an operation beyond those qualities’ powers. Ficino tests this limitation through nourishment: heat

penetrates and dissolves food, but nutrition achieves a determinate organic result. Soul's nutritive power uses heat as an instrument, cooking and digesting the food and bringing it to living flesh and the human figure. The distinction is between heat's characteristic work and the ordering of that work into this living body. It does not deny that heat genuinely contributes.

Growth adds both a means and a measure. It proceeds through nourishment, yet reaches a particular magnitude and figure. Heat considered through its own quality does not prescribe that organism's boundary: given further material, it spreads. The principal agent must account for why the process stops at a fitting size and acquires its proper shape. Mere possession of heat, or possession of more heat, is insufficient within this argument. Calling the directing cause a craftsman emphasizes its prescription and ordering; it does not require the nutritive soul to deliberate verbally like a human artisan.

Three exclusions then follow on different grounds. Soul is not one accidental form, because the organized effect exceeds the power of heat, which Ficino treats as the leading accidental quality. It is not a collection of accidental forms, because adding qualities lacking a determinate limit, degree, proportion and figure does not explain their ordering toward those determinations. Finally, it is not the substantial form of an element or elemental mixture of the restricted kind under discussion. Such a form has movement toward one terminus, whereas the animal's growth extends in every direction. This third argument depends on directional range, rather than repeating the earlier accident/substance distinction.

The phrase about growth in every direction contrasts organic growth with one-directional elemental movement. It should not be converted into a geometrical law that every bodily part grows by identical measured increments or that every animal becomes a sphere. Nor do the exclusions amount to "soul is not form." The body-building soul is subsequently affirmed as substance, and one living being requires one form, mover and ruler. The distinction is between the kinds of forms proposed and the organized effects they can explain.

"Principal" therefore names a relative role within a bounded operation. The same heat can be a genuine cause of dissolution and an instrument of nutrition. A created soul can be principal relative to that heat while depending on higher causes for its own being and powers. God's universal causal priority answers a different explanatory question. Identifying the chief agent of growth does not turn it into the absolute First Cause of all being, and denying principal agency to heat does not remove its instrumental efficacy. These are the distinctions on which the historical physiological example depends.

Places to Read.

- **VII.8.1, PDF 264–265**. Instrumental heat, principal agency, bounded growth and three exclusions occur in a single continuous argument.
- **VII.9.2, PDF 268–269**. The soul's making, preserving and repairing of its own body supplies the positive causal role.
- **VII.13.1, PDF 276–277**. Nutritive power is again said to act above and beyond elemental order.

In this edition.

The translation preserves both "principal cause" and "principal craftsman." *Principalem … fabrum* is an explanatory craft image; *causa principali* is the same local ranking of causal

contribution. Neither should be silently translated as “first cause.” These conclusions concern Ficino’s natural philosophy, not established digestive physiology.

See also.

Soul as the body’s craftsman; Bodily constitution and temperament; Freedom from matter and causal priority

One comprehension and indivisible sensation

Latin: *comprehensio*; *comprehendens*; *individua vis*; *impartibilis*; *subito*; *paulatim*

The word.

Comprehensio is an integrated grasp of an object; *comprehendens* names what grasps it. *Individuus*, *indivisibilis* and *impartibilis* deny division into cognitive parts in this argument. *Subito* contrasts immediate sensing with something completed *paulatim*, by degrees.

In the Platonic Theology.

Chapter 4 asks whether inward sight can be spread through bodily bulk. If it is, each part receives only a corresponding part of the color, and nothing knows the whole. Invoking a common form of the composite restarts the question: if that form is divided, the problem remains; if undivided, the required indivisible knower has already been conceded. Large, small and intermediate sizes each fail to suit all objects; assigning finite natural minima does not recover one comprehension.

Ficino then presses mathematical division into indefinitely divisible magnitude. Each portion of sight acquires a corresponding portion of color, generating countless senses, colors and visions rather than a single perception. He examines two escapes. A sensing whole made of entirely non-sensing parts would need an explanation of how those parts produce sentience. Parts each sensing through one whole vision do not explain the unity either. The species is a means of seeing the color, and aggregation of distinct parts proceeds through accumulated moments, whereas sensing, he says, occurs at once.

The final alternative again exposes a concealed unifier: if a superior sentient power gathers the parts, that power is better called the soul and sense. The conclusion concerns both power and its source or subject. Its premise of instantaneous sensation is Ficino’s philosophical claim; it is not a report of experimentally measured neural processing.

The governing demand is repeated with unusual precision: one comprehension of one thing must come from one comprehender. The three occurrences of unity are not merely rhetorical. The object can have visible parts, but the question is how its parts are grasped as belonging to that single object. A collection of local apprehensions would leave the very relation required by the whole comprehension unexplained. Ficino’s appeal to a form common to the composite tests whether unity has been supplied in substance or only renamed.

The size argument is distinct from that first partition problem. Suppose the sensitive power has one fixed magnitude. A large power would contact a small object only through a matching portion, leaving its remainder outside the act; a small power would not contain the large object; an intermediate one would fail at either extreme. The relevant verbs of fitting and correspondence expose the cost of insisting on equal quantitative portions. The soul’s successful cognition of varied sizes is therefore evidence, in Ficino’s reasoning, against making its capacity an ordinary magnitude. This does not mean that the source’s

visible object must physically enter the organ at full size; that is the very material picture under examination.

The question of how many parts there are then produces two further versions. Natural minima might supply a determinate finite division, but still no single whole grasp. Mathematical division removes even that stopping point. The accumulating “countless” senses, colors and visions dramatizes the consequence of granting an independent act to each corresponding part. It should not be read as Ficino endorsing actual infinitely many perceivers within an eye. It is what follows if the proposed explanation keeps replicating the same part-to-part relation instead of supplying a knower of the whole.

The two proposed rescues address different problems. Giving sensation only to the whole makes all its constituent parts non-sensing and leaves the origin of sentience unexplained. Giving each part a complete share in the same total vision instead removes the need for the others: if one already suffices, plurality adds nothing. If each does not suffice, an additional source must make their union sentient. The higher sentient unifier thereby conceded has the explanatory role Ficino assigns to soul. The point is not merely that one component is numerically enough, but that the explanans must already possess the unity and sensing absent from the proposed aggregate.

The temporal comparison supplies yet another reason. Assembly from distinct parts involves accumulation of moments, whereas sensation is asserted to occur immediately. The conclusion therefore relies on a relation between quantitative division, temporal succession and conscious unity. A contemporary reader may dispute one of those premises without changing what the text argues. The lexicon preserves their separation so that accepting the phenomenological demand for one perception does not automatically entail accepting every physical and temporal claim used to defend it.

Places to Read.

- **VII.4.1, PDF 244–245**. A single object requires one comprehending power; magnitude and finite partition fail to supply it.
- **VII.4.2, PDF 246–247**. Infinite partition, non-sentient parts, temporal aggregation and a superior unifier are tested.

In this edition.

The two comparison units divide one source paragraph at the move to mathematical infinity. “Form” for *species* must be read with the explicit distinction between what is seen and that through which it is seen. *Subiectum* at the end means the bearer of the power, not its perceived object.

See also.

Point, line and the comparing power; Spiritual images and light; Whole presence and vital intensity

Outward flow and rational life’s return

Latin: *effluere*; *diffluere*; *influere*; *defluere*; *relabi*; *redundare*; *sustentaculum*

The word.

Ficino varies verbs of flow to distinguish going out, dispersing, entering another, ebbing away, returning and overflowing back. Sustentaculum is a supporting prop. The watery language makes dependence and loss visible without identifying soul as a liquid.

In the Platonic Theology.

A life whose entire operation passes into other things is said to fail in four ways. It wavers and needs external support; disperses and weakens; becomes mixed with foreign things; and finally, because of these deficiencies, falls away from its own nature. These are four linked vulnerabilities, not merely synonyms for mortality.

Rational life returns into itself. Ficino argues that it therefore supports itself, is not weakened or contaminated in the same way, and does not ebb out of its nature. Outwardly exhausted life tends toward death; life overflowing back into itself grows into fuller life. This extension of the reflexivity argument depends on the opposition between wholly outward operation and retained inward operation.

The last step uses the range of motion as an index of life. Rational life exercises bodily motions, possesses their exemplars and returns their activity to its principle through reflection. Ficino argues that such fullness excludes a privation of life. The account is a metaphysical contrast, not a blanket recommendation to avoid all outward activity: the same chapter allows will to move arms and produce a work, and the earlier virtues include civil prudence and justice.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.15.1, PDF pp. 364–365.** External work is possible through will and bodily instruments even though understanding terminates inwardly.
- **VIII.15.3, PDF pp. 368–369.** Four failures of effluent life contrast with the self-sustaining return of rational life.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves the separately numbered four failures and the repeated implet/implere, “brings to fullness.” Reducing every flow verb to “moves” would conceal the staged account of dependence.

See also.

Reflexive understanding and willing; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Intellectual generation and daily renewal

Pain, location and reporting

Latin: *passio*; *dolor*; *cruciatus*; *molestia*; *persensio*; *nuntiare*; *internuntius*; *medela*

The word.

Dolor and *cruciatus* concern pain or torment; *molestia* can name the distress occasioned by it. *Persensio* is awareness or a thorough sensing. Reporting and remedy are distinct: the soul must know both what is wrong and where assistance belongs.

In the Platonic Theology.

The injured foot elicits an immediate coordinated response. Ficino denies that a non-sensing messenger can explain sensory reporting and also rejects mere bodily continuity as a complete account, since pain is not necessarily present everywhere along the body. He then grants, for testing, a soul distributed from foot through leg and knee to a chief judge in the brain.

On that model, a local soul-part knows only the affection present where it resides. The lower leg therefore feels its own distress, not the original foot’s torment; each further

station repeats the limitation. The final judge would perceive only its own condition. The result would be a succession of innumerable pains rather than one immediate sensation, and no adequate recognition of the site requiring aid. The phrase *quod nefas est* marks Ficino's rejection of the principal sense arriving last; it is a polemical verdict within the reductio.

The positive alternative is the whole soul's immediate co-awareness and command. It suffers with itself, accords with itself, and deploys bodily members toward the injured part. This use of concord does not identify soul with bodily harmony. Nor should the critique of a corporeal series be paraphrased as a modern denial that nerves transmit signals: Ficino is working with a different causal and psychological model, whose local-knowledge assumptions must remain visible.

Places to Read.

- **VII.5.1, PDF 248–249**. The foot, eye, hand and mouth introduce localization and response.
- **VII.5.2, PDF 250–251**. Successive reporting to a cerebral judge is posed as an objection.
- **VII.5.3, PDF 252–253**. Distinct local affections fail to explain knowledge of the original injury and its remedy.

In this edition.

The apparatus retains *persensio*, confirmed in the principal collation, against the later *perpensio*. "Awareness" is therefore appropriate; "weighing" would obscure the sensory argument. It also adopts the authorial correction *ut quicquid sit*, removing a redundant *ubique*.

See also.

Whole presence and vital intensity; Injury and the uninjured judge; Sensation as attentive activity

Participation, common and proper

Latin: *particeps*; *participatio*; *commune*; *proprium*; *absolutum*; *modus essendi*; *effectus*; *causa*

The word.

Participatio is possession in a derived or restricted manner. Commune identifies what belongs across effects, while proprium identifies the determinate feature or effect under consideration. Absolutum can mean free from restriction or qualification; it is not always a proper name for God.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.13 reasons from effects to their causes. Distinctive conditions demand particular causes; being shared by all demands a cause common to all. A human parent explains the individual's being human, fire the person's being hot, and God the fact that the person is. The parent's role is not cancelled, since secondary causes give their modes through divine power.

Being without further determination is prior in explanation to being this or that, white or black, human or horse. The language of following "after nothing" articulates creation's

terminus, not a sequence in which an actual thing first exists without any nature and only later acquires one.

The participation argument prevents reversing the dependence. What possesses a nature by participation cannot generate that nature absolutely, because it would generate its own prior cause and thereby itself. Ariston's generation of Plato exemplifies a determinate individual producing another determinate individual, not production of humanity as such.

Elsewhere proprium is what belongs to a nature: fire's proper heat, soul's proper life, or a form's proper act. The word is not interchangeable with an accidental private possession. Likewise V.8's "common being of the whole" concerns a composite's unified act, a different scale from V.13's being common to all effects.

Places to Read.

- **V.8.2, V.11.8, PDF 40–41, 66–67.** Other local uses of common and proper concern composite being and a soul's specific act.
- **V.13.1, V.13.2, PDF 78–79.** Proper effects and common being are assigned differently scoped causes.
- **V.13.3, V.13.4, V.13.5, PDF 80–83.** Determinate being, participation and the Ariston example establish dependence.

In this edition.

The repeated esse/hoc aut illud/tale distinction is essential, not stylistic redundancy. The phrase virtute Dei preserves the subordination of secondary causal action. Readers should not infer a claim that creatures are pieces of divine substance from the shared word esse.

See also.

Essence and being; Ariston, sculptor and painter; Creation and generation; First Cause

Passivity and bodily affection

Latin: *passio*; *passivus*; *activus*; *pati*; *percipere*; *suscipere*; *expers*

The word.

Passio is undergoing or being affected, broader than an emotion. Passivus and activus contrast recipients with agents. Suscipere can mean receiving a form, while percipere here can mean experiencing an affection. Expers means without a share in something.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.3 places matter and quantity at the passive extreme and God and angel at the active extreme. Quality and soul occupy intermediate positions, but do not share equally in bodily passivity. Quality inheres in a passive body and undergoes change both in operation and essence. Soul may experience bodily affection in its operative capacity while its essence remains free of such passion. The contrast is a theory of ontological dependence, not a claim that sorrow, pain or sensory interruption never occurs.

V.5.9 explains why hostile elemental qualities can destroy a bodily composite but cannot enter the soul's immaterial essence: matter is the first subject exposed to those passions, and quantity and quality share that exposure through matter. The storm of elements and the battling qualities personify that conflict. Separable essence lacks the material receptive capacity through which a contrary would injure it.

V.6 and V.8 do not therefore exclude every kind of reception. An indivisible image or spiritual form can perfect a recipient without material alteration. The soul's receiving knowledge is not the same process as a hot body receiving cold. V.15's sleep discussion likewise distinguishes interruption of bodily sensation from loss of the soul's own power. Reading every occurrence of "affected" as corruption would undo distinctions the proof expressly needs.

Places to Read.

- **V.3.1, PDF 14–15.** Active/passive ranking permits operative affection without essential corruption.
- **V.5.9, V.6.1, PDF 30–33.** The material basis of destructive passion is contrasted with nondestructive reception.
- **V.8.3, PDF 42–43.** The soul receives according to its own spiritual mode.
- **V.15.23, V.15.24, PDF 120–121.** Sleep inhibits bodily sense without, on Ficino's account, removing psychic power.

In this edition.

The translation retains technical "passion" alongside the more explanatory "passivity." At V.5.9 potentia separabilis is adverbial, "separable in potency"; it must not be confused with the distinct potency for receiving hostile qualities later in the unit (PDF 386).

See also.

Indivisibility and contact; Reception and the receiver; Sleep and dreams

Persistence, memory and recognition

Latin: *idem*; *eadem*; *mos*; *opinio*; *scientia*; *memoria*; *agnoscere*; *servare*

The word.

Memory preserves what was received; agnoscere is recognizing it again. Mos is settled character or habitual manner, not merely a single custom. The repeated idem/eadem insist on sameness of will, character, opinion, knowledge and retained images, while the later reply distinguishes sameness from resemblance.

In the Platonic Theology.

The question of memory emerges from the hypothesis that a bodily soul is nourished and continually replaced like flesh. VI.13.5 asks how a newly arrived soul would agree with its predecessor. The next unit gives that question concrete contents: the same will, character, opinion, knowledge and memory. Recognition after ten years requires images once received to remain available, and Ficino asks who preserves them if not the same animus that received and judged them. "How can it preserve them if it is not preserved?" makes the identity of the retaining subject central, not only the similarity of successive representations.

This is not an assertion that every mental state remains unchanged. The text qualifies ordinary persistence with in plerisque, and elsewhere in Book VI the same soul receives contrary opinions and affections and reasons successively. What persists is the subject capable of changing and retaining, not an absolutely frozen list of thoughts. The appeal to recognition is sharper than merely noting similar behaviour: a current encounter is

recognized as one formerly experienced and judged. A successor resembling the earlier subject would still need an account of that relation to the past.

An opponent might nevertheless give the supposed soul-body a long enough material life. VI.13.7 answers by holding the original corporealist theory to its own requirements. To penetrate the organs and explain agility, it proposed an exceptionally subtle body. On Ficino's historical physics such matter would be especially unstable under the changing heavens, outlasted by bones and sinews and even by rapidly renewed flesh. It would vanish like breath and preserve knowledge for less than a day. The physical premises should remain attributed: this is an internal challenge to the hypothetical subtle substance, not an experimental finding in contemporary neuroscience.

The stronger objection in VI.13.9 appeals to the persistence of bodily form through material turnover. Why could an organized pattern of cognition not similarly survive replacement? Ficino distinguishes exact numerical identity from the successive making of figures resembling one another in some measure. Reproduced likeness then requires a stable source carrying the formative patterns and seeds. The face over a river makes that dependence visible: the waves and reflections are new, but the face producing them remains. Ficino identifies the stable bodily craftsman with soul. If soul also flows, the account loses both the continuing bearer and the continuing producer needed for the resemblance.

VI.13.11 tests three alternatives rather than simply repeating the need for stability. The same quality cannot migrate numerically from an old subject into a new one. A perishing soul cannot fashion a similar image in its successor because effective formation requires a complete agent. A newly coming-to-be soul likewise cannot form itself while incomplete. Thus transfer, copying and self-formation fail for different stated reasons. The memory argument's conclusion depends on these metaphysical premises about subjects and adequate agents as well as on ordinary long-term recognition. Keeping them explicit reveals the full reasoning without promoting it into a theory of modern information storage or deriving any judgement about a person's worth from the strength of their memory.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.6; source PDF pp. 224, 225**. Ten-year recognition and continuity of dispositions test a changing-substance model.
- **VI.13.7; source PDF pp. 224, 225**. The hypothetical subtle soul-body is judged exceptionally transient.
- **VI.13.9, VI.13.11; source PDF pp. 226, 227, 228, 229**. Objections from reproduced likeness and image transmission receive separate replies.

In this edition.

The repeated sameness language is intentional and should not be varied away into "similar." The edition's "in most people" preserves in plerisque. No claim about the mental abilities of people with different memory capacities should be inferred from this metaphysical reductio.

See also.

Stable craftsman and the river reflection; Images, migration and the perfect agent

Place, coincidence and painless penetration

Latin: *locus*; *loculus*; *aequari*; *porrigere*; *infundere*; *offensio*; *frangere*

The word.

Coincidence here is exact occupation of one place by two bodies. Loculus is a little place, part of the conclusion that intermingled bodies still occupy distinct sites. Infundere and porrigere express soul's inward presence, not automatically liquid pouring or spatial stretching of a substance.

In the Platonic Theology.

VI.9 first argues that two bodies cannot entirely coincide. If their parts are indivisible, they cannot add up to bodily magnitude; if divisible, each remains a body with its own position. Intermingling yields many little bodies in many little places, not two entire bodies in one place. Soul, however, gives substantial being throughout the living body and thus must be inward to the whole and each part. Its presence cannot be a second occupying body.

The later painless-motion argument adds a concrete test. A solid soul-body either fails to fill the organism, leaving some parts unanimated, or breaks and is broken by the body it penetrates, causing continual pain. A fluid unstable soul-body cannot bind the organism firmly and needs another stabilizer. Actual soul's own manner of movement causes no such continual disruption. "Motion through body" must consequently be read alongside the later account of psychic motion, not as a tiny object physically travelling inside every member.

Places to Read.

- **VI.9.1, VI.9.2; source PDF pp. 190, 191**. The impossibility of bodily coincidence is applied to essential whole presence.
- **VI.9.4; source PDF pp. 194, 195**. Solid and fluid soul-body hypotheses fail different causal tests.

In this edition.

VI.9 is one source paragraph divided editorially into four comparison units. The apparatus preserves the chapter number IX from M1482 against later printings' assimilation to "sixth argument." The lexical label offensio means injury or disturbance here; it is not modern offence at a statement.

See also.

Essential presence and containment; Members, house and sinew

Platonist disagreement and descent

Latin: *Platonici*; *Plotinus*; *Proculus*; *Dionysius*; *Origenes*; *Augustinus*; *delabi*; *prolabi*; *converti*

The word.

Platonici names a range of thinkers rather than a single unanimous school. Delabi and prolabi picture descent or falling; converti a turning back or transformation. Named attributions and distancing formulas determine whether Ficino is adopting or reporting a claim.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.13.1 openly chooses sides. Ficino prefers Dionysius the Areopagite, Origen and Augustine, whom he calls outstanding Platonists, in attributing the soul's making to God alone, over the angelic production attributed to Plotinus, Proclus and some others. This is his construction of a philosophical lineage, not a modern survey verifying every ancient text.

V.13.18 reports a related account of derivative animation: immediate production through the Idea of life gives rational soul stable life, while life mediated through soul is by its own nature mutable. The reported ethereal vehicle may nevertheless be continuously animated, unlike the perishable elemental body. The qualification "in itself" concerns the dependent life's natural mode rather than the permanence of rational soul's essence.

V.14.8 lists proponents and opponents of irrational immortality. V.14.9 then explains the stronger claim by reference to Egyptian and Pythagorean descent theories: minds fallen into reason and sensation; human souls fallen wholly into sensation and generation in beasts; the same souls fallen into generation alone in plants. Reascent remains possible within that reported theory.

Ficino ends "let them see to these things; let us pursue our purpose." That is a real reservation, not a decorative transition. One cannot cite the threefold descent as his unqualified account of human reincarnation, or infer that his present proof establishes all plant souls' immortality.

Places to Read.

- **V.13.1, PDF 78–79.** Ficino expressly prefers one account of the soul's creator over another.
- **V.13.18, PDF 92–93.** Idea, mediated life, ethereal vehicle and elemental body are distinguished in a reported account.
- **V.14.8, V.14.9, PDF 100–103.** Disagreement about irrational souls leads to an attributed descent theory and explicit distancing.

In this edition.

Proculus is this edition's Latin form for Proclus. "Appear to have intimated" preserves videntur in the named descent attribution. The final sed haec ipsi viderint should accompany any summary of that doctrine.

See also.

Rational soul and irrational life; Creation and generation; Image, shadow and ranked truth

Plato's cave and gradual education

Latin: *spelunca*; *vinculum*; *lampas*; *simulachrum*; *gradus*; *caligare*; *sincere*

The word.

Spelunca is a cave; vincula are bonds. Simulachra are carried representations whose shadows appear on the wall. Gradus are pedagogical stages. Caligare means having clouded sight, and sincere here means without distortion or mixture, not merely honestly.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino's Republic VII narrative places people bound from childhood in an underground cave, unable to turn from the facing wall. A lamp behind them casts shadows of themselves and of representations carried by walkers. They mistake shadows for themselves, objects and light. Sudden release does not immediately yield knowledge: turning toward the lamp brings pain and dazzlement, and abrupt ascent to daylight is worse. A sequenced education passes through reflections and objects in the cave, moonlit reflections and earthly things, the heavens at night, daytime reflections, things under the sun, and finally the sun.

The application relates cave to visible world as visible world to invisible divine world. Its "true sun" belongs to this intelligible contrast. Character, learning and time all contribute to education; ascent is not sheer accumulation of sensory detail. The movement then reverses: descent into body is compared with sudden entry into darkness, with stumbling and disorders illustrated by frenzy, sleep and intoxication. The historical physiological account and Ficino's language of soul's descent must remain attributed rather than converted into diagnosis or an independently demonstrated chronology of embodiment.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.14; source PDF pp. 152, 153**. The staging explains how a restricted field becomes mistaken for all reality.
- **VI.2.15, VI.2.16; source PDF pp. 154, 155**. Gradual re-education is mapped onto visible and invisible worlds.
- **VI.2.17, VI.2.18; source PDF pp. 156, 157**. Descent reverses the adaptation, followed by an exhortation to emerge.

In this edition.

Lampas and ignis designate the same cave light while remaining different printed words. The edition retains moribundi, "dying," and the distinct moral, intellectual and temporal stages. The report is Ficino's telling of Plato, not a replacement translation of the Republic.

See also.

Garment, mud and misleading shadows; Avicenna's imagined adult

Point, dimension and substantial unity

Latin: *superficies*; *linea*; *punctum*; *situs*; *unitas substantialis*; *virtute magnum*

The word.

Surface lacks depth, line lacks breadth as well, and point lacks length too. Situs is determinate position: a point can be dimensionless while still fixed as a line's limit. Substantial unity is consequently more than a geometrical point or a small extended object.

In the Platonic Theology.

The geometric exercise begins with finite body as long, broad and deep. Its limit of depth is a surface; the surface's limit of breadth is a line; the line's limit of length is a point. These successively remove three dimensions, but Ficino does not yet call the point a soul. As the line's terminus it remains fixed at a determinate site in body and neither fills nor vivifies the whole. Dimensionlessness alone therefore fails to supply the independence being sought.

A fourth step releases the point at least in thought. Ficino supports this by a qualified priority: what bounds the line exists “in some manner” before its function of bounding, and what is prior may be considered apart from what follows. The restriction cogitatione matters. The reader is not cutting a small physical object loose but considering a limit apart from its located relation. Ficino then invites the reader to give this released point an equal regard toward all bodily parts, diffusion throughout them and power to move them. Fundatur and moveat are jussives: these active capacities are introduced through guided supposition, not deduced as a geometrical theorem from absence of length. The irrational soul is assigned its seat at this fourth stage.

The fifth step claims a reality corresponding to the rational ascent. Because rational thought does not deceive in ascending, Ficino argues, it can find not merely a mentally released point but an indivisible something actually freed from body. It fills and moves body, is itself freely active, and can be raised toward higher things. This is called substantial unity and is the level assigned to rational soul. The transition from conceptual consideration to actual reality therefore depends on the stated reliability of rational ascent. It must not be represented as an empirical measurement proving that a material point changes into a soul.

The ensuing comparison ranks the stages by need and passivity. Body requires more dimensional conditions and admits more divisions; surface needs fewer, line fewer still, and point still depends on position. Substantial unity needs neither dimensions nor site. Ficino infers that the less dependent principle is more perfect, powerful and true. The point of the closing question is precisely whether something can be great in effective power without being great in measurable quantity. Removing size need not mean removing reality. When VI.6.5 later says soul is “more indivisible” than a point, the superiority concerns release from geometrical dependence, not possession of a still smaller spatial fraction.

These numbered degrees belong to a particular pedagogical ascent away from bodily bulk. They should not be mechanically equated degree by degree with either the five metaphysical grades of body, quality, soul, mind and God, or Cavalcanti’s five rival accounts. The succeeding concentrated-fire and light exercises pursue the same pedagogical purpose through different images. VI.2.27 finally recalls the liberated point as a substantial unity and expressly calls the chapter an initial excursio and praeludium. Its vivid construction prepares the reader for formal arguments while retaining distinctions between thought, reality, irrational animation and rational elevation.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.19, VI.2.20; source PDF pp. 158, 159**. Four conceptual releases are distinguished from the fifth step to rational substantial unity.
- **VI.2.27; source PDF pp. 166, 167**. The exercise is expressly labelled preliminary.
- **VI.6.4, VI.6.5; source PDF pp. 180, 181**. Indivisibility exceeds geometrical dependence and positional containment.

In this edition.

The jussives fundatur and moveat in VI.2.19 mean “let it be diffused” and “let it move,” preserving the imaginative construction. Cogitatione, quodammodo and re ipsa distinguish thought-experiment from the claimed real conclusion. No bodily conversion is asserted.

See also.

Number and spiritual amplitude; Bronze mirror and concentrated fire

Point, line and the comparing power

Latin: *punctum individuum*; *linea*; *terminus*; *concurrere*; *vacare*; *partibilis*

The word.

The point and line are argumentative models for indivisibility and extension. *Terminus* is an endpoint here, not the goal or limit of organic growth. *Vacat altera* means that the other power has nothing additional to do: it is redundant, not a physical empty space.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino asks whether the single comparing power is an indivisible point a or a line extending from a to b. Suppose color reaches a alone and voice b alone. Each endpoint then knows its own object and remains ignorant of the other; comparison is not produced. Suppose instead both contents reach both endpoints. Either endpoint already possesses what comparison requires, so the other contributes nothing. Moreover, each successful endpoint now functions as an indivisible power, which is precisely what the divided model was meant to avoid.

The argument is not a proof that a geometrical point is itself a soul. It uses the point's lack of parts to expose the failure of a distributed knower whose parts have isolated contents. The book later expressly distinguishes soul from body, from a form spread through body, and from a point of such a form. An indivisible source present throughout a living body cannot be reduced to one localized extremity.

The repeated verbs of reaching, touching, crossing and converging make the dilemma vivid but belong to the hypothesis being tested. The conclusion is about unified judgement and the substance able to sustain it, not about trajectories of actual colored or sounded objects traveling along a diagram.

Places to Read.

- **VII.2.2, PDF 240–241**. The a–b model tests separate and shared reception of color and voice.
- **VII.5.3, PDF 252–253**. The whole soul is explicitly distinguished even from a point of a diffused bodily form.

In this edition.

The apparatus identifies VII.2.2 as an editorial subdivision within one original source paragraph. The geometric question therefore continues the two-power comparison of VII.2.1 rather than opening an unrelated mathematical proof. The corrected *substantiae* preserves the final power–substance relation.

See also.

Comparison and common sense; Whole presence and vital intensity

Potency, possibility and the lion

Latin: *potentia ad non esse*; *possibile*; *necessarium*; *impossibile*; *indifferens*; *materia propinqua*; *leo*; *determinare*

The word.

Potentia is a capacity, whose object and bearer must be identified. Potentia ad non esse is capacity not to be. Possibile in V.12 is explicitly two-sided possibility: capable of being and

not being. Indifferens means undetermined between the alternatives, not emotionally unconcerned.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.12 begins with the premise that corruption requires a potency not to be. Such a potency belongs neither to being itself nor to soul's complete simple essence. In a bodily substance it lies instead in the prime matter beneath the determinate form: fire cannot receive cold while remaining fire, but its matter can receive a replacement form. The remainder of the chapter explains material possibility and distinguishes it from the power responsible for soul's creation.

The modal trilemma is expressly relative to a standpoint. Ficino asks what follows "as far as matter is concerned," not what the completed whole will do under every cause. Matter does not necessitate the finished work because it cannot form itself and needs a superior form-giver. It does not render the work impossible because it can be brought to the appropriate completion. The remaining possibility is two-sided. If it permitted only being, it would be necessity; if only nonbeing, impossibility. This context explains why possibile is narrower here than a broad modern use in which necessary propositions also count as possible.

Because matter is simple, the two opposed capacities are not assigned to two separately composed departments within it. The same material nature is open to both. The agent determines that nature to be a lion, but does not replace prime matter with another underlying principle. If its native indifference vanished at formation, prime matter would vanish just when a material object was made, contradicting the material constitution of the product. The continuing openness therefore permits later departure from lionhood.

V.12.7 adds a stronger claim: what is equally open to the extremes either turns to neither or turns by turns to both. This is the step by which potential corruptibility becomes an account of eventual bodily corruption. It is Ficino's natural-philosophical premise, not merely the logical meaning of the word possible. The argument's force should not be exaggerated by hiding that step. Rational soul is excluded because it is the simple source of the movement found in composites and because its judging ranges both above and below matter, supposedly demonstrating independence from a material base.

The question of prior possibility then prevents a loose appeal to creation from nothing. The fact that soul was made entails that it could be made, yet its prior possibility cannot be a part of an as-yet nonexistent soul. The soul is made whole, not piece by piece. Nothing cannot be the foundation of being's potentiality because the two contradict one another. The only remaining ground is the creator's stable power. God's active ability to make and soul's ability to be made are the same power viewed from opposite sides of the production relation, not a passive potency within God awaiting perfection.

Places to Read.

- **V.12.1, V.12.2, PDF 68–69.** Corruptibility requires a specifically opposed potency, absent from separate soul.
- **V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5, V.12.6, V.12.7, PDF 68–73.** Modal alternatives lead to prime matter's enduring two-sided capacity and the lion example.
- **V.12.8, V.12.9, V.12.10, V.12.11, PDF 72–75.** The soul's capacity to be created is located in God's active power.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves quodammodo in the claims that matter precedes formation: the priority is qualified. V.12.6 applies secundaque, distinguishing secondary/proximate from primary matter. Exstat at V.12.7 is construed as being brought forth from matter in contrast with constat, being constituted from it.

See also.

Prime matter and enduring support; Creation and generation; Creature, power and operation

Primary self-motion and the regress of parts

Latin: *per se et primo*; *fons*; *receptaculum*; *participatio*; *partes actu*; *impartibile*

The word.

Per se and primo distinguish self-motion in its own right and in the primary sense from derivative apparent self-motion. Fons is its source and receptaculum its receiving principle. Impartibile means incapable of partition. Actual parts here are independently acting beings, not merely possible divisions of a continuous whole.

In the Platonic Theology.

VI.12 begins by specifying primary self-motion: the same reality must be source and recipient throughout itself. A body could meet this demand only if every part, and every part of each part, moved itself. Any inactive fraction would prevent the whole from being primary self-mover throughout. Since bodily parts are divisible without end, the hypothesis then gives infinitely many movers. Moving is acting, and acting requires actuality; the hypothetical movers would consequently constitute an actually infinite multitude.

This first reductio depends on the difference between potential division and independently actual agency. Ficino does not say that every body already contains an actually infinite population. He derives that population after granting self-motion to every proposed part. VI.12.3 adds that an independently acting part would subsist in its own actuality rather than remain merely a part contained under the composite's being. The hypothesis thus both produces an unacceptable actual infinity and destroys the unity of the body whose motion it was meant to explain. Its result is that body cannot primarily move itself throughout its own nature.

A second proof in VI.12.4 approaches the claim through four relations. One part may move another; a part may move the whole; the whole may move a part; or the whole may move the whole. In the first case, mover and moved are numerically different, so there is motion by another rather than strict self-motion. In the second, a part moving every part includes itself among what it moves, transferring the decisive problem to that special part. In the third, the whole's action upon one part still leaves only that part as the proposed self-moving locus; the other parts do not thereby acquire self-motion through themselves. In the fourth, the whole is interpreted as all its parts together moving all its parts, and the claim to self-motion again depends upon what each constituent does. These alternatives converge on dependence on parts rather than merely repeating the initial actual-infinity argument.

Ficino acknowledges that the whole is "in some manner" all its parts. His criticism is that its motion remains borrowed from them, as its composite substance is received from them. Calling the composite self-moving does not yet give it the capacity primarily. The

supposedly ultimate active part must therefore be examined. If indivisible, it is already something nonbodily within body, and the sought distinction has been conceded. If divisible, the analysis starts again with its parts. Infinite division never yields one first source; multiplying smaller explanations postpones rather than supplies the origin of movement. VI.12.7 identifies the required impartible inward mover as soul.

The participatory conclusion restricts how ordinary self-motion should be understood. While soul is present, living bodies are borne “in a certain way” of their own accord and in varied directions. When it is absent, they require an external mover. Soul is self-moving properly; bodies acquire their derivative capacity through participation in it. A form dispersed through body cannot serve as the final source because it shares body’s quantitative conditions. The distinction is therefore between primary and derivative explanation, not a denial that animals move spontaneously in ordinary description.

The following objection about the integrity of a whole matters because it proposes a source beyond a bare sum of independently active pieces. Ficino answers through the separation of form’s activity and matter’s receptivity, then through the choice between extended and indivisible integrity. The subsequent clarification also blocks a mechanical picture of soul: its self-motion is not an agent sending action into itself as patient. It is inward vital succession. Those continuations preserve the result as an incorporeal source rather than a tiny bodily engine concealed at the end of division. They also leave the argument’s metaphysical premises visible instead of presenting it as a modern experimental law about physical systems.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.1, VI.12.2, VI.12.3; source PDF pp. 202, 203, 204, 205**. The primary whole self-mover is tested against actual infinity and the status of bodily parts.
- **VI.12.4, VI.12.5, VI.12.6; source PDF pp. 204, 205, 206, 207**. Four part/whole alternatives reduce to dependence on parts.
- **VI.12.7, VI.12.8; source PDF pp. 208, 209**. The regress terminates in an impartible inward soul and derivative participation.

In this edition.

In VI.12.8 intrinseco is retained against P1641’s extrinseco: the mover must be inward because the example excludes an external push. The apparatus emphasizes actual infinity and borrowed motion. “First” here is explanatory priority, not merely the earliest event in a chronological series.

See also.

Integrity of the whole; Vital motion, action and passion; Number and spiritual amplitude

Prime matter and enduring support

Latin: *materia prima*; *potentia pura*; *subiectum*; *susceptaculum*; *fundamentum*; *sustentaculum*; *informis*

The word.

Materia prima is primary matter, the underlying capacity for bodily forms, rather than an already identified element or lump. Informis means lacking form of its own. Subiectum, fundamentum and sustentaculum stress underlying subject, foundation and support; susceptaculum stresses receptivity.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.4 argues first that matter persists, then a fortiori that the soul ruling matter persists. Clay surviving its vessels offers a model, but prime matter is more radical than clay: it has no particular form of its own and is equally receptive of elemental and other bodily forms. God as pure act and matter as pure potency mark opposite limits of the hierarchy. If matter were naturally cold or moist, its own character would obstruct a contrary form.

Elemental transformation reveals the hidden subject. Earth's form cannot itself receive the opposed watery form; the same matter must underlie the replacement. Water's conversion to air, and air's to fire, similarly changes qualities without annihilating the underlying subject. Matter's unity follows both from one world's requiring one receptacle and from the absence of an intrinsic distinguishing form.

The preservation argument then tests possible destructions. Matter cannot dissolve into parts as though quantity constituted its own essence: it precedes quantity in the natural order. It cannot lose an external support, since it is the bodily order's first support. A form requiring matter cannot annihilate its own foundation; production independent of matter has no need to destroy it. Nor can matter survive only partly after a transformation, since its primary simplicity excludes that model.

Ficino's conclusion concerns prime matter, not the survival of a particular vessel, lion, fire or human body. In V.12 the very persistence of matter's indifference to different forms explains why particular bodily substances can perish. The argument thus combines enduring substrate with changing composites.

Places to Read.

- **V.4.1, V.4.3, V.4.4, PDF 16–21.** Universal receptivity and elemental transformation disclose the hidden subject.
- **V.4.5, V.4.6, V.4.8, V.4.9, V.4.10, PDF 20–25.** The foundation cannot be destroyed by dissolution, contrary form or independent production.
- **V.12.5, V.12.6, V.12.7, PDF 70–73.** The surviving potency of prime matter underlies the possible loss of a particular body.

In this edition.

"Primary matter" in the facing translation and the conventional "prime matter" identify the same expression. The apparatus records a corrected ad agendum at V.4.6, not the erroneous ad angelum in the body of the first printing. The occasional reference to spiritual matter in V.11 is an analogy for essence, not a retraction of the soul's freedom from this bodily subject.

See also.

Art and elemental transformation; Potency, possibility and the lion; Spiritual matter and identity

Proportion, health, strength and beauty

Latin: *ratio compositionis*; *proportio*; *sanitas*; *robur*; *pulchritudo*; *os*; *nervus*; *caro*

The word.

Ratio can name an account or a determinate relation; here *ratio compositionis* concerns the proportion of constituents. It is not simply the rational faculty. Health, strength and beauty are bodily perfections whose relevant proportions differ.

In the Platonic Theology.

The second reading of soul-as-concord makes soul a proportion within bodily composition. Ficino objects that different members have different proportions: bone, nerve and flesh would each possess a different soul. This fails to explain the one life of a single living creature, requiring one form, mover and ruler.

He then recognizes the proper domain of the proposal. Health is concord of humors; strength concord of bones and nerves; beauty, in a qualified way, concord of members and colors. Proportion does explanatory work in those bodily cases. Sensation and intellect, however, are simple acts whose alleged harmonious constituents have not been identified. Knowing a body's proportion therefore gives some understanding of its health, strength and beauty without yet revealing the soul's powers, affections, acts and habits.

The comparison of Aristotle and Hippocrates illustrates this difference of explanatory competence. Ficino says Aristotle knows sensing and understanding better, while Hippocrates examines bodily proportions more carefully. This is a local contrast offered by Ficino; it should not become a documented historical ranking of their complete sciences. Nor does he conclude that bodily proportion is irrelevant to cognition's instruments. His point is that the knowledge sufficient for the bodily qualities does not disclose the soul's substance.

Places to Read.

- **VII.12.1, PDF 274–275**. Different tissue proportions, one life, three bodily goods and the Aristotle–Hippocrates contrast form successive tests.

In this edition.

The first *ratio* in the chapter's dilemma is rendered "proportion"; later *rationes atque proportiones* preserves its pairing with explicit proportions. "In a certain way" retains *quodammodo* in the definition of beauty. *Os* here is bone, while *os clamat* at VII.5.1 concerns the mouth.

See also.

Composition and inward unity; Substance, qualities and degrees; Bodily constitution and temperament

Rational soul and irrational life

Latin: *anima rationalis*; *irrationales vitae*; *animus*; *animatum*; *anima vera*; *idolum*; *simulacrum*

The word.

Anima names soul; animus often names the same rational principle as mind. Animatum is a thing made alive or ensouled. Rationalis distinguishes the soul possessing rational self-

directed activity from derivative forms of bodily life. “Irrational life” is not simply a moral insult or an inability to speak.

In the Platonic Theology.

The opening “all souls” is explicitly limited in V.2.1: Ficino says that by soul he means the class of rational souls, while irrational lives are properly images and likenesses. This restriction controls the universality of the fifteen proofs. Their conclusions should not automatically be extended to every biological life-principle.

V.14.8 supplies the grounds of the distinction. True soul is subsistent life, source of motion and bodily animation, while irrational life acts with bodily instruments and is drawn by objects offered to sense. The rational soul’s approach to body pours out an irrational life as a shadow. Ficino thus distinguishes the abiding giver from its derivative animation of an organism; “image” need not mean a wholly unreal appearance.

The chapter then records an actual dispute rather than inventing agreement among Platonists. Xenocrates, Speusippus, Numenius and Plotinus are said to affirm the irrational soul’s immortality, while Porphyry, Proclus and many others deny it. The subsequent descent-of-souls explanation is attributed and set aside. V.13.18 separately reports a distinction between life impressed on a perpetual ethereal vehicle and life impressed on a perishable elemental body.

The life argument in V.14.1 and V.15.7–8 sharpens anima/animatum: a thing whose life departs is an ensouled recipient, whereas the life that departs is the soul. Ficino is arguing for the source’s persistence, not saying the abandoned body remains alive. V.15.27 finally refuses a conversion of rational soul into its own lower derivative life.

Places to Read.

- **V.2.1, PDF 12–13.** Ficino explicitly states the rational scope of anima in these proofs.
- **V.13.18, PDF 92–93.** Reported distinctions between rational source, irrational life and different vehicles.
- **V.14.1, V.14.8, V.14.9, PDF 94–95, 100–103.** Life, ensouled recipient and disagreements about lower souls are distinguished.
- **V.15.7, V.15.8, V.15.27, PDF 108–111, 124–125.** Departing life is distinguished from its recipient, and rational identity from lower animation.

In this edition.

The source deliberately preserves irrationales vitas as “irrational lives” and idola et simulacra as two image words. At V.14.8 the relative quam concerns irrational soul: the named disagreement is not a disagreement over rational immortality. Animus rendered “mind” does not create an additional soul alongside anima.

See also.

Life and vivification; Platonist disagreement and descent; Image, shadow and ranked truth

Receiving forms without losing one’s own

Latin: *induere*; *exuere*; *remittere*; *perficere*; *intellectualitas*; *forma propria*

The word.

Induere and exuere literally suggest putting on and taking off clothing. Remittere is a lessening or weakening, while perficere is bringing to greater completion. Intellectualitas is Ficino’s qualified name for mind’s natural form or character as intellectual.

In the Platonic Theology.

Water takes on fire’s heat by relinquishing its own coldness. Where one bodily quality remains while another is introduced, its strength can decline: water mixed with wine preserves some sweetness but dilutes it. These examples establish the contrast between bodily reception and intellectual reception.

Mind receives the forms of bodies by knowing them without losing or weakening its own form. Indeed, it becomes more accomplished through their reception. Ficino identifies the natural form of intellect from its activity: its characteristic operation is understanding, and a more perfect understanding makes its intellectuality more evident. The forms of other things therefore perfect rather than replace its own nature.

The chapter adds that mind can penetrate substances, compose mixed objects from principles and resolve mixtures into their simpler constituents. It is said to be all things in each through knowledge while also standing beyond bodily things in order to distinguish them from incorporeals. This language of presence is cognitive and explanatory, not the claim that a thinker materially becomes every body in the world.

The resistance-to-destruction inference depends on that peculiar mode of receiving: an external body’s contrary alteration cannot be assumed to describe what happens when mind knows it. The chapter’s powerful conclusion remains part of Ficino’s metaphysical argument, not a denial of fatigue or injury in embodied human experience.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.7.1, PDF pp. 344–345.** Heated water and diluted wine contrast bodily replacement with perfected intellectual reception.
- **VIII.13.2, PDF pp. 360–361.** Knowing water, fire and evils does not make mind materially water, fire or evil.

In this edition.

Ficino introduces intellectualitas with ut ita dixerim, “if I may speak so.” That modest lexical qualification is worth preserving. The forms “put on” and “put off” retain an image that a flat translation as “change” would lose.

See also.

Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance

Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors

Latin: *suscipere*; *accipere*; *capere*; *cera*; *sigillum*; *figura*; *imago*; *speculum*

The word.

The verbs mean receiving or taking in; *capere* can also mean containing or grasping. Their common object does not establish a common manner of reception. Wax receives an impressed figure spatially, whereas the disputed question is whether the soul receives perceptual content in that same bodily way.

In the Platonic Theology.

The first argument proceeds under the hypothesis that the soul is a body. A bodily receiver takes the parts of an object in its own parts. Wax cannot bear an impression larger than itself; a second impression either replaces the first or confuses it. The supposition that wax could judge the size it contains lets Ficino transfer those limitations to a hypothetical corporeal soul. Plato's image in Socrates' eye would be limited by the eye, then by the brain, and at most by Socrates' entire body. On the hypothesis, Socrates could never judge something larger than himself. Multiple people would similarly become either forgotten or indistinguishable impressions.

The sequence is a reductio, not a description of the position Ficino finally accepts. Its point is the difference between the size of a bodily trace and the magnitude judged through an image. The mirror comparison extends the objection: a face appears differently in a pupil and a larger mirror, whereas the soul can judge objects of immense magnitude and conceive something greater than any assigned body. The argument does not say that the soul is an infinitely large mirror. It denies that any assigned bodily magnitude adequately determines its cognitive capacity.

Ficino then expressly withdraws the literal picture of spiritual color-images being manufactured by bodies and stored in mirrors or brains. Reading the first comparison as his settled physiology would suppress that correction.

Places to Read.

- **VII.1.1, PDF 232–233**. Wax and seals introduce limits of scale and the confusion of multiple images.
- **VII.1.2, PDF 234–235**. The living-mirror comparison tests the soul's supposed proper magnitude.
- **VII.1.3, PDF 236–237**. The correction distinguishes spiritual images from bodily deposits.

In this edition.

The image of Plato is the perceived person's image, not a reference to a Platonic Idea. "Receiver," eye, brain and whole body are successive tests of the same hypothesis. The apparatus stresses their preservation rather than identifying any one of them as Ficino's final seat of perception.

See also.

Memory, rigidity and fluidity; Spiritual images and light; One comprehension and indivisible sensation

Reception and the receiver

Latin: *suscipere*; *capere*; *accipere*; *receptaculum*; *susceptaculum*; *pro captu*; *suscipiens*

The word.

Suscipere, capere and accipere mean receiving or taking, with differences determined by their objects. Pro captu concerns the receiver's capacity. Receiving need not imply a spatial interior, passivity in every respect, or injury.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.6 distinguishes destructive bodily reception from the reception of indivisible images. Water and a mirror receive appearances without being destroyed, and the soul receives through sense and reason. The point is the received mode, not a claim that mirrors themselves think.

V.7.2 then invokes the principle that whatever is received is received according to its receiver. Essence considered in itself is immortal; when a separate essence receives being in its own mode, Ficino infers immortal being. Bodily forms differ because their mode is contracted to a bodily subject. The receiver principle thus helps connect the essence/being distinction to particular kinds of subsistence.

V.8.3 applies the same reasoning against destructive external force. The soul receives spiritually. An eternal spiritual object has no need to consume its recipient for nutrition or to destroy it to reproduce itself. The argument does not deny that cognition changes what a person knows; it denies the material process that would destroy the subject's essence.

V.13.13 and V.13.15 apply reception in the opposite direction: a creature's power is bounded by the subject in which it inheres, and infinite creative power could not first be narrowed to a finite angel and still effect unlimited creation. The same general principle can therefore explain a receiver's stable act and the limit on a derived agent's operation. Its precise role depends on which receiver and which act are in question.

Places to Read.

- **V.6.1, V.8.3, PDF 32–33, 42–43.** Images illustrate nondestructive spiritual reception.
- **V.7.2, PDF 36–37.** The receiver's mode governs its reception of being.
- **V.13.13, V.13.15, V.13.16, PDF 86–89.** Finite recipients delimit operative power and cannot mediate infinite creation.

In this edition.

Captus can be capacity rather than captivity. Susceptio is not automatically "suffering." The article follows the book's comparisons without endorsing its historical physical account of images as modern optics.

See also.

Passivity and bodily affection; Essence and being; Instrument and creative mediation

Reflexive understanding and willing

Latin: *reflexio*; *animadversio*; *conscientia*; *intelligere*; *voluntas*; *velle*

The word.

Reflexio is a return of activity upon itself; animadversio is noticing or attentive awareness. Voluntas is rational appetite. Reflexive knowing and willing concern awareness of an act and a further act directed toward that act, rather than mere repetition of its original external object.

In the Platonic Theology.

Bodily action is presented as passing into external matter. Intellectual activity can remain within the agent: mind knows itself, knows its own knowing, and can recognize that recognition. An outward artwork may result when intelligence moves will and will moves the arms, but that mediated result is distinguished from understanding's proper terminus.

Ficino contrasts sensation, moved by external objects and directed toward an external end, with mind's free inward inspection. He then aligns essence, life and mind with repose, motion and reflection. Without life essence would be dormant; without mind life would flow outward. Mind holds life's movement within itself and turns it back to essence through self-awareness. These are an attributed Platonic ordering, not a modern taxonomy of conscious experiences.

The operation can be repeated without an assigned last level: understanding a thing, noticing that understanding, noticing that notice; willing something, willing to will, and willing the further willing. Ficino allows either a series of acts terminating in further acts or one act repeatedly folded upon itself. He does not resolve those alternatives into one obligatory mechanism.

This reflexivity supports incorporeality and later perpetuity. It must also be distinguished from VIII.1.5's reflexive return to a particular image: both are returns, but their immediate objects and explanatory tasks differ.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.15.1, PDF pp. 364–365.** Inward operation, essence–life–mind and recursive knowing and willing are developed together.
- **VIII.16.1, PDF pp. 370–371.** The recursive sequence is one source of the mind's qualified limitless power.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves either/or at the close: an endless sequence of operations or repeated self-folding of one operation. It also records the correction to eadem. "Infinite reflection" should not be paraphrased as infinitely many completed conscious thoughts at a single instant.

See also.

Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds

Relation and continuing dependence

Latin: *respectus*; *referri*; *respicere*; *relatio*; *pendere*; *similitudo*; *permanere*

The word.

Respectus and relatio concern directed relation; referri means being referred or related, while respicere retains the image of looking toward. Pendere means depending, sometimes pictured as hanging down. This dependence is a continuing relation of being, not only a past event of manufacture.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.10 follows the assertion that soul exists in its own right with an explicit question about its cause. All things remain in being insofar as they relate to the first cause. Their likeness to pure act comes through form rather than matter. A bodily composite therefore relates through one constitutive part, while a corporeal form itself relies upon a higher immaterial source.

The mirror image illustrates the latter dependence: the image hangs from the face whose presence makes it appear. Soul produces bodily qualities through its changing operation, so their relation is mediated through movement and their existence is unstable. By contrast, the soul is form itself and relates through its whole stable essence. The phrase “the essence causes its relation” means it is intrinsically the relational subject and medium; it does not say the soul first creates itself or creates God.

The conclusion combines two sides. God continually supplies, and soul continually receives. Stability thus belongs to a relation that does not depend on a removable bodily intermediary. This also explains why “self-subsisting” and “dependent on God” are compatible in Ficino’s usage.

V.13.17 adds that the power by which God creates is also the power by which he preserves. The soul needs no intermediary to be made and no such intermediary to remain. Its persistence is a continuous causal dependence, not a one-time gift subsequently detached from its source.

Places to Read.

- **V.10.1, V.10.2, V.10.3, PDF 54–59.** The complete chapter contrasts mediated mutable relation with intrinsic stable relation.
- **V.12.12, V.12.13, PDF 74–77.** Withdrawal of divine influx is posed as an objection and answered through stability.
- **V.13.17, PDF 90–91.** Creation and conservation are attributed to the same divine power.

In this edition.

Two variants matter directly. V.10.2 follows M1482’s mutabiliter rather than later mirabiliter: the bodily relation is mutable, not merely marvellous. V.10.3 retains relatio perfectionis rather than ratio perfectionis: the source understands an ellipsis in which relation causes perfection (PDF 391).

See also.

Fountains, drawing and infusion; Through itself and through another; First Cause

Rennet, magnet and clock

Latin: *coagulum*; *lac*; *magnes*; *ferrum*; *horologium*; *temperatio artis*; *temperare*

The word.

Coagulum is rennet or a curdling agent; its effect is coagulation of milk. Magnes draws and suspends iron. Horologium is a clock. Temperatio artis is the ordering or proportioning skill embodied in an artifact, distinct from the physiological temperament of humours.

In the Platonic Theology.

At the close of VI.9 the soul's power in body is compared with three agents or arrangements. Rennet gathers milk into curd; a magnet draws and suspends iron; ordering skill governs a clock's movement and sound. The comparisons distinguish binding, directed motion and coordinated operation. They do not assert that soul is a physical rennet, a magnetic stone or a mechanism.

Ficino immediately adds a restriction crucial to reading the examples. Soul itself is not a power or tempering of the humours; it is a simple indivisible substantial form that tempers spirits, humours and members by its natural power and art. The shift from "soul, or rather soul's power" prevents confusing the acting substance with its operative effect. The clock image, moreover, does not reduce life to clockwork: art supplies the explanatory order for the artifact, just as natural art supplies coordinated operations in the living body. The humours and spirits belong to the passage's historical physiology.

Places to Read.

- **VI.9.4; source PDF pp. 194, 195**. The three analogies are followed immediately by the distinction between substantial soul and its tempering power.

In this edition.

The translation differentiates temperatio artis, ordering skill, from temperatiove humorum, tempering of humours. The final verb temperat makes the causal direction explicit: the soul regulates these bodily constituents rather than being identical with their regulation.

See also.

Substantial form and the receiving subject; Temperament, flux and the stable ruler

Repose, motion, and contemplation

Latin: *status*; *motus*; *alteratio*; *quies*; *speculatio*; *stabilis*

The word.

Status is standing, settled state or repose; alteratio is the change by which a bodily form is introduced into matter. Speculatio is contemplative inquiry or vision. Physical motion and figurative intellectual movement are not automatically the same process.

In the Platonic Theology.

Bodies acquire new forms through change. Mind, Ficino argues, is perfected by freedom from the agitations of passions and affairs: the greater its repose, the better its contemplation of truth. This contrast supports a claim about the stable source of its being. What is perfected by standing still is said to depend on stability rather than on a process of bodily generation.

The brevity of VIII.11 should not hide its inferential step. Psychological quiet and metaphysical permanence are linked through the premise that a thing's natural perfection reveals the character of its source. This is a philosophical account, not an empirical claim that learning involves no bodily processes or that a person never needs rest.

Later, the mind is called reflection and intellectual activity is described as circular motion. Those passages do not simply retract this chapter. Their "movement" is inward operation and return, whereas VIII.11 denies bodily alteration as the mode by which understanding receives its forms. The local sense of motus changes with the comparison.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.11.1, PDF pp. 354–355.** Bodily acquisition through alteration is contrasted with contemplative perfection through repose.
- **VIII.15.1, PDF pp. 364–365.** Essence, life and mind are related to repose, motion and reflection.
- **VIII.16.1, PDF pp. 370–371.** Circular intellectual return introduces a different use of motion.

In this edition.

The edition indexes this as chapter VIII.11 because the rubric calls it the eleventh argument and it stands between VIII.10 and VIII.12, although the reported early chapter label erroneously says ten. The correction is editorial numbering, not an additional chapter.

See also.

Reflexive understanding and willing; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion

Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment

Latin: *scientiae*; *intelligentiae*; *habitus*; *exemplar*; *continere*; *elici*; *connexae*

The word.

Plural scientiae can mean distinct disciplines or bodies of knowledge. Intelligentiae in these passages are acts or conceptions of understanding, not separate angelic intellects. Containment is logical and cognitive, not spatial stacking.

In the Platonic Theology.

Many sciences and virtues coexist in one soul without displacing or confusing one another. A person can attend to one art's exemplar and make its appropriate work without producing the work of another. Ficino first uses this distinct coexistence against bodily mixture: such contents neither push each other out nor lose their identities through combination.

The next step is stronger. In an expert's geometry or theology, propositions lead to others; effects bear signs of causes, allowing inquiry backward as well as forward. Ficino describes each understanding as containing the others, since an acute knower can unfold the connected discipline from a proposition. This is a claim about ordered inferential implication and expert access, not an assurance that any novice instantly knows an entire subject after hearing one sentence.

Moral virtues similarly depend on one another. Justice fails under intimidation or servile appetite; courage requires resistance to enfeebling desire; temperance needs firmness against fear; and all need prudence's direction toward the proper end. Prudence in turn is obstructed by vice. Ficino presents perfected virtues as mutually implicated.

An extended bodily quality is distributed across different parts and is not whole in each. The alleged whole presence of connected knowledge and virtue therefore supplies another route to indivisibility. The chapter moves from distinct coexistence to mutual inclusion; these are related claims, not interchangeable descriptions.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.3.6, PDF pp. 310–311.** Arts and virtues remain united and distinct without collision or confusion.
- **VIII.3.7, PDF pp. 312–313.** Inferential connection among propositions and interdependence among virtues support whole-in-each containment.

In this edition.

VIII.3.7 retains the 1482 active quod docet, "what he teaches," against the later passive reported in the apparatus. The teaching analogy supports a claim that what makes another known must possess it in an explanatory sense; it is not a new doctrine about physical storage.

See also.

Virtue as an indivisible quality; The whole mind and the measure of equality; Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres

Seal, wax and restoration

Latin: *sigillum*; *cera*; *figura*; *imprimere*; *adaequare*; *redintegrare*; *confirmare*; *roborare*

The word.

Sigillum is a seal, cera wax and figura the impressed shape. Imprimere makes an impression. Adaequare brings into conformity, redintegrare restores wholeness, and confirmare or roborare makes firm or strengthens.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.11.6 answers the suggestion that the soul might be resolved into the power of its divine author. The impression in wax is not erased when brought fully into agreement with the seal; it is restored to its own form. Likewise, the soul's approach to the Idea through which God appointed its mode of being confirms rather than abolishes that being.

The comparison therefore opposes assimilation to annihilation. An exemplar perfects the derivative thing as the thing it is. It does not swallow the derivative into an undifferentiated source. The first act strengthens the subsequent act, and God as the efficient origin of production cannot simply be redescribed as the material terminus of corruption.

Ficino then exposes the illicit material model: if soul arose from divine potency plus an added act, it might be thought to dissolve back into God as into matter. But God is pure act and never occupies matter's role. The seal analogy is not permission to treat God as a physical stamp or soul as literal wax; its useful feature is determinate correspondence that restores identity.

Places to Read.

- **V.11.5, V.11.6, PDF 62–65.** Return to primal life is distinguished from loss of mind; the seal restores determinate form.
- **V.11.8, PDF 66–67.** The following analysis protects species and individual identity.

In this edition.

The argument uses terminus in two directions: the end toward which corruption would move and the efficient source from which production proceeds. The edition differentiates these rather than translating both as a spatial stopping point.

See also.

Spiritual matter and identity; Relation and continuing dependence; Ariston, sculptor and painter

Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause

Latin: *causa formalis*; *causa efficiens*; *ex se*; *in se*; *per se*; *principium*; *finis*

The word.

An efficient cause is a producer of being or action; a formal cause supplies the determining principle by which a thing is what it is. Ficino explicitly permits mind to be its own cause only in the formal sense in VIII.15.3. “From itself,” “upon itself” and “through itself” describe different relations within an operation.

In the Platonic Theology.

The language of intellectual renewal raises a question about causal scope. Mind forms and perfects itself by understanding and willing, conceiving accounts of itself and other things. Unlike natural generation, which preserves a kind through successive offspring, this intellectual generation keeps its products within the individual parent. Ficino also argues from being well to being: if intellect can provide the greater good of its own perfection through contemplation and conduct, it should sustain its being in the relevant respect. The text already restricts this inference with secundum formam, according to form. It does not infer original creation simply from the ability to improve oneself.

A stronger proposal is then reported from Proclus. Soul, as a principle of generation, is said to beget and vivify itself so as to have essence from itself; more generally, every indivisible substance existing in its own essence is said to produce and contain itself. Divisible substances, including heaven, instead require production and containment from elsewhere. Ficino says he passes over the claim and leaves Proclus to it. This is a substantive reservation. It is not a detailed refutation of Proclus, but neither does it permit the reported doctrine to be inserted as Ficino’s unqualified conclusion.

Ficino next considers the actual relations within self-operation. Intellect knows and loves its own operation, and through it its power and substance. The act is upon itself and through itself, with no bodily medium inserted between the intellect and the intellect. He also argues that acting upon itself shows acting from itself: source and terminus are both within the intellectual subject, and therefore so is the relevant medium. Ex se, in se and per se name different relations of one operation, not three spatial parts. The resulting question is whether a power whose operation is fulfilled inwardly can act and live apart from body.

VIII.15.3 clarifies the proof through origin and end. Since mind's operation terminates within mind, mind is in a certain manner its own operation's end. Beings seek their source as end; mind is therefore also the operation's principle. From self-operation Ficino passes to life, described as inward operation, and then to being, because life is the first act of existence. The sequence "as it operates, so it lives; as it lives, so it is" attempts to move from the character of an actual inward activity toward the mode of life and being that supports it. It is not an argument from a merely verbal self-reference.

At the point where he calls mind its own cause, Ficino supplies the controlling correction: not an efficient cause, but a formal cause, by whose power being is bestowed and preserved. The determining principle sustains the subject's formal integrity; the subject does not first efficiently manufacture itself out of nonbeing. Both this explicit exclusion and the earlier secundum formam must accompany a faithful explanation of the apparently unrestricted language of self-making. No chronology in which a nonexistent soul creates its own existence is asserted.

The relation to the First Cause becomes explicit in VIII.16.4. Ficino corrects the suggestion that mind possesses its limitless power solely by itself: more truly, it receives a divine enlargement. God's absolute infinity implants and continually preserves intellectual and vital infinity in dependent minds and souls. Mind's inward presence to its own perfection and its dependence on a higher source therefore answer different causal questions. Formal self-maintenance explains how the intellectual subject retains and perfects its nature; efficient first causality concerns the source from which that dependent subject and capacity arise. Book VIII's argument cannot be reduced either to wholly external bodily support or to an independently self-created human mind.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.15.2, PDF pp. 366–367.** The Proclean claim is reported with an explicit reservation, followed by the from/through/upon-itself argument.
- **VIII.15.3, PDF pp. 368–369.** Ficino expressly says formal cause, not efficient cause.
- **VIII.16.4, PDF pp. 376–377.** Qualified infinity depends on divine implantation and continuing preservation.

In this edition.

Sed hoc ipse viderit is preserved as "But let him see to that himself." It is not full agreement. Causa, inquam, non efficiens, sed formalis supplies the controlling correction; removing it would materially misrepresent the passage. This distinction should accompany any isolated quotation of sui ipsius est causa.

See also.

Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis

Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree

Latin: *vis seminaria*; *semen*; *instrumentum*; *pullulare*; *delitescere*; *radix*; *germen*; *contrahere*

The word.

Vis seminaria is the generative power conveyed in seed; it is called soul's instrument. Pullulare means springing or sprouting forth, delitescere lying hidden. Radix is root,

germen a shoot or germ. Expansion and contraction describe the extension of life's effects, not measurement of a soul-body.

In the Platonic Theology.

VI.10 argues from a whole formative power present in a small reproductive portion. Ficino claims that however many portions seed is divided into, so many animals arise, appealing especially to fish eggs. If an entire animal emerges from a drop, the complete seminal power must be there. Because this is an instrument serving generation, the whole soul is said to be present still more fully. A plant seed similarly contains the power to produce the entire plant.

The tree supplies a temporal version of the size contrast. Vegetative soul is first received in a tiny root or shoot, extends through all branches as the tree grows, and contracts back to the root when branches dry or are cut. Plotinus and Porphyry are named as holding such soul free of quantity because it fits the smallest and fills the greatest equally. The reproductive premise is historical natural philosophy and should not be offered as a verified rule about arbitrarily dividing gametes or embryos. The argumentative distinction between bodily seed, seminal instrument and soul must remain visible even where the inference passes rapidly from one to another.

Places to Read.

- **VI.10.1; source PDF pp. 196, 197**. Fish eggs, plant seeds and the growing or pruned tree argue for power without quantitative size.
- **VI.12.17; source PDF pp. 216, 217**. Successive seminal emergence later explains the soul's temporal productive activity.

In this edition.

The chapter is a single comparison unit and source paragraph. "Whole in each" concerns the completeness of formative power rather than a detached miniature organism. The proper names record Ficino's attribution without claiming an independent collation of Plotinus or Porphyry.

See also.

Nourishment and the life-giving form; Growth, amputation and soul-size

Sensation as attentive activity

Latin: *agere*; *pati*; *attentio*; *animadversio*; *non latere*; *vegetare*; *sensus*; *phantasia*

The word.

Agere is acting; *pati* is undergoing an affection. *Animadversio* means attentive awareness. The idiom *non latere* means not escaping awareness, not literally ceasing to hide behind something. *Vegetare* is animating or maintaining bodily vitality.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino invokes Augustine and Plotinus for an account in which soul does not suffer bodily affections but acts more attentively amid them. Its activities are easy where the instrument is congruent, difficult where it is incongruent; awareness of that activity constitutes sensing. The underlying sensory capacity remains even when nothing is presently sensed. Capacity, attentive exercise and awareness of exercise must therefore remain distinct.

The soul gives the bodily instrument an appropriate temperament. The account associates sight with a luminous medium, hearing with clear mobile air, smell with something misty, taste with moisture, and touch with something earthy and muddy. These are elements of the historical sensory physiology reported here. Quiet health is the harmonious coherence of the organism. An encounter with something unlike it provokes more attentive activity fitted to particular organs: congruent things are associated willingly and incongruent ones resisted painfully.

The ear makes the argument vivid. In silence soul already animates the organ; when sound strikes the airy spirit, it animates it more attentively. Acting more attentively is not itself undergoing the bodily impact. The soul knows its own activity, and that awareness is sensing. Ficino's final formulation offers sensation as awareness of attentive operation or judgement of bodily affection awakened by it. Earlier in the chapter *phantasia* named attending to and judging a perception. The closely connected descriptions should be retained, not forced into an inflexible taxonomy that the passage does not supply.

The surgical example gives the positive account a demanding task. It must preserve actual awareness of bodily disturbance without transferring the destructive bodily process unchanged into the knower. That is why Ficino does not stop at saying that the judge is impassible. An entirely inert principle would not yet explain why an injury becomes known, why the affected organ receives attention, or why a remedy is directed to that place. The answer is increased activity by the same soul that already sustains the organ's life.

"Even when nothing is sensed" qualifies the presence of the sensory power. The power is not generated anew each time a sound strikes or a color appears. There is an ongoing relation between soul and instrument, and the instrument has been tempered for an attentive response. Quiet animation and explicit sensing are thus related stages of activity rather than the presence and total absence of a soul. In the ear example, the contrast is not between a dead ear before sound and a living ear afterward; it is between its prior animation in silence and its more attentive animation under impact.

The five sensory media contribute to this account of fitted instruments. Luminous material is acted upon in the eyes; clear mobile air in the ears; a misty medium in the nostrils; moisture in the mouth; something earthy and muddy in touch. Each is described as what the soul activates. Their enumeration therefore does not merely catalogue the external objects of sight, hearing, smell, taste and touch. It specifies the differing bodily settings in which a common animating source operates. The differences belong to Ficino's inherited natural philosophy and should be preserved without substituting modern sensory anatomy.

Agreement and disagreement likewise concern the fit of an operation. While the bodily constituents cohere in health, the soul acts quietly. An affecting difference prompts activities accommodated to particular locations or instruments. Bringing like things together and repelling the noxious are directed responses, not passive copies of the stimulus. The pleasant association of congruent things and painful resistance to incongruent things show how the account can include feeling without making feeling identical with a lesion in the soul's substance.

The definition through awareness is deliberately reflexive: the attentive operation does not escape the operating soul. Yet the text does not say that every sensation requires an explicit verbal thought, "I am now attending." *Non latere* states that the activity is known or manifest to its subject. It should not be expanded into a demand for discursive reflection by a second separate subject, which would risk repeating the very regress of judges the preceding argument was meant to terminate.

The chapter's final alternatives require their own restraint. Sensation is described either as awareness of the attentive operation or as judgement of the bodily affection and quality awakened by that operation. These descriptions stress respectively the soul's activity and what it discerns through that activity. Earlier, attending to and judging perception was assigned to *phantasia*. The supplied passage does not explicitly reconcile these formulations into a fixed multi-stage chart. A useful reading preserves the local distinctions and the broader active account while leaving the precise boundaries between sensing, attending and imagination open to further textual comparison. It would be less accurate to enforce a rigid definition that suppresses one of Ficino's own concluding descriptions.

Places to Read.

- **VII.6.1, PDF 256–257**. Perception is distinguished from the attentive judgement called imagination.
- **VII.6.3, PDF 260–261**. An enduring capacity, more attentive activity and awareness of activity explain active sensation.

In this edition.

The attribution "Augustine and Plotinus confirm" introduces the ensuing account; the first-person "it seems to me" should not be used to claim an independently verified direct quotation. "Otherness" for *alteritas* names an affecting difference here, not an unrelated doctrine of metaphysical Otherness.

See also.

Injury and the uninjured judge; Bodily constitution and temperament; Spiritual images and light

Sensory error and corrective reason

Latin: *sensus*; *iudicium*; *ratio*; *emendare*; *redarguere*; *vaticinari*

The word.

Iudicium is judgement. Emendare corrects a mistake; redarguere exposes or refutes it. Vaticinari, to prophesy, gives reason's affirmation of incorporeal reality a heightened rhetorical force. Ratio here is the correcting rational power, not the bodily proportion called ratio elsewhere.

In the Platonic Theology.

The examples of apparent error are deliberately varied: the sun looks small, the rapidly turning heaven still, a straight oar bent in water, the shore moving from a ship; a voice appears to come from the wrong place and sweet things taste bitter. Ficino uses the correcting power's superiority to argue for reason's authority. His moving heaven belongs to the historical cosmology; the reader need not endorse that example to understand its place.

The argument then limits the senses' jurisdiction. Sight does not disclose sounds, hearing does not disclose colours, and smell does not disclose everything that exists. Their mutual correction supplies an analogy for reason's discovery beyond the whole sensible domain. Crucially, Ficino concedes that sensation truly establishes many corporeal things and says reason would err if it denied them. The target is exclusivism: from perceiving bodies it does not follow that only bodies exist. The legal vocabulary of condemnation and refutation

personifies faculties as competing witnesses, while “prophecy” marks a superior cognitive reach.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.7; source PDF pp. 140, 141**. The six sensory examples introduce reason as correcting and perfecting judgement.
- **VI.2.8; source PDF pp. 142, 143**. The reality of bodies is conceded while the senses’ exhaustive claim is rejected.
- **VI.2.9; source PDF pp. 144, 145**. The relative dignity of faculties leads into the argument about intellectual objects.

In this edition.

Reason’s reliability is argued through correction; it is not licensed to deny sensible reality. The edition retains the differing verbs of judgement, condemnation, refutation and prophecy rather than flattening them into a generic statement that reason knows better.

See also.

Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment

Separate forms and intellectual life

Latin: *forma segregata*; *subiectum formatum*; *ratio secum ipsa vivens*; *intellectus purus*; *veritas*; *gaudium*

The word.

Segregatus and separatus describe forms removed from composites. A subiectum formatum is a subject receiving form, not the subject matter of a discussion. Ratio here seeks truth discursively; intellectus purus names the pure intellect that already enjoys truth. Gaudium is joy, not appetite for an absent good.

In the Platonic Theology.

The inward experiment of VI.2.10 begins from a distinction within the human composite: life communicated to the body and life vigorous in the soul itself. By attending to the latter, the philosopher is to verify what Ficino calls the Socratic teaching that imperfect forms in subjects depend upon perfect forms in themselves. The argument is presented as a discipline of life and attention as well as an ontological thesis. “Separated” thinkers reach separated forms by withdrawing their mind from bodily engagements as far as they can.

The ascent has three carefully differentiated moments. The pure soul is reason living with itself and eagerly circling truth’s light. Angel is pure intellect rejoicing in truth already infused. When the soul comes to rejoice like an angel, it perceives God and the reciprocal expressions of self-shining truth, light and joy. Likeness to an angel in activity is not a new assertion that the soul ceases to be soul, and divine truth is not merely one more received mental form. VI.2.11 continues this crescendo in an exceptionally short unit.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.10; source PDF pp. 146, 147**. Socratic separate forms are approached through intellectual life and the soul–angel–God ascent.
- **VI.2.11; source PDF pp. 146, 147**. Truth, light and joy are reciprocally expressed at the ascent’s culmination.

- **VI.12.18; source PDF pp. 218, 219**. God and angels are later distinguished from soul's successive reasoning.

In this edition.

The edition's "look down upon the former" and "turn their gaze to the latter" preserve despiciant/aspiciant and their antecedents. It supplies "it will behold" in VI.2.11 because the Latin continues the previous grammatical sequence.

See also.

Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent

Severed animals and replacement souls

Latin: *frustum*; *secare*; *compago*; *interire*; *vita mundi*; *novae animae*; *instrumentum*

The word.

Frusta are severed pieces; *compago* is the organized structure joining a body. *Interire* means perishing, not dividing. New souls arising in suitable fragments are therefore not surviving numerical parts of the former soul.

In the Platonic Theology.

Moving and sensing animal fragments appear to challenge indivisibility: if a body divides into two living bodies, why not suppose its soul divides into two souls? Ficino's answer is strikingly qualified. The original soul perishes when the structure to which it was assigned dissolves. New souls arise immediately from the life of the world in fragments suited to receive them. A fragment can be suited because a lowly soul has few powers and operations and accordingly needs few bodily instruments. More perfect souls need diverse organs and do not live in detached single members.

The analogies preserve replacement rather than division. Cutting wood at a point destroys that point as the common boundary and produces new endpoints. Breaking a mirror removes the one image and yields two newly reflected images. Cutting the word *Lucifer* destroys its original meaning while leaving meaningful components. None makes one original indivisible entity numerically persist as two halves.

The final question explicitly invokes the Platonists and creeping creatures. The argument is therefore not a universal claim that every soul is deathless because indivisible, nor a modern account of regeneration. Within this passage, indivisibility is compatible with the disappearance of a low animal soul. That limitation is indispensable in a work devoted to immortality: the rational soul's case cannot be secured by silently attributing to every soul what this chapter denies of these examples.

Places to Read.

- **VII.5.4, PDF 254–255**. The objection, generation from world-life, organ requirement, and three replacement analogies occur together.

In this edition.

The base reading says *in singulis membris non vivunt*. Later witnesses omit *non*, reversing a crucial local qualification. This edition retains it: more perfect souls do not live in separate members. "Perishes" for *interit* must not be softened to "divides" or "withdraws" without textual warrant.

See also.

Lucifer and indivisible meaning; Whole presence and vital intensity; Soul as the body’s craftsman

Simplicity of human and numerical species

Latin: *species*; *rationalitas*; *animalitas*; *denarius*; *septenarius*; *magis minusve*

The word.

Species can name a determinate nature as well as the form representing it in mind. Simplicity here is often explicitly aspectual: a human being as human or ten as ten is not divided into several objects of that same species. It is not a denial that a human body has organs or ten can be partitioned into numbers.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino diagnoses a mistake prompted by knowledge of composites. Humans have genus and difference, and numbers can be gathered from units; one might infer that the corresponding intellectual species is a bodily composite. He replies that bodily division does not preserve the specific whole. A head, breast or thigh is a body, but none is a human being. Dividing ten yields numbers, not several tens. Under the account that makes each the definite thing it is, the species is one.

Animal and rational are not two separate forms in the human species. “Rationality” is described as animality brought into the act of reason. The distinction of concepts need not imply the coexistence of two spatially separate substantial forms. The species communicates itself whole to individuals; it is not apportioned into diminished shares.

The numerical example makes the absence of degrees exact. Add one to seven and the result is eight, not a more intense seven; subtract one and the result is six. Similarly, Ficino says a species cannot accept addition or subtraction without becoming another. Proper knowledge concerns such stable determinate natures, rather than unstable innumerable individuals or insufficiently differentiated genera.

Words and successive thoughts prepare or accompany knowledge. The achieved intellectual touch is described as one act or habit. This is a claim about the unity of the understood account, not a prohibition on analysing an argument into explanatory sentences.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.10, PDF pp. 332–333.** Humanity and ten remain indivisible under their specific accounts despite bodily or numerical partitions.
- **VIII.4.11, PDF pp. 334–335.** Seven, eight and six illustrate definite species; discursive preparations are distinguished from simple knowledge.

In this edition.

The compressed Talis autem forma simplex esse simplicis fundamentum species est is retained by the supplied Latin. The English makes an appositional interpretation explicit. This companion follows the surrounding argument without claiming that the awkward construction has been textually resolved.

See also.

Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts; First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles

Sleep and dreams

Latin: *somnus*; *dormire*; *vigilare*; *expergefieri*; *sopire*; *imago*; *verae rationes*; *praesentia*

The word.

Somnus is sleep; dormire sleeping; vigilare waking; expergefieri being awakened. Sopire lulls or puts to sleep. Images in dreams are distinguished from the truth of the intelligible reasoning that may occur within the dreamed setting.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.15.23 raises involuntary sleep as a possible analogue for a deterioration of soul into body. Ficino answers that bodily slackening does not imply loss of the mind's own power. What produces sleep acts in and upon the body, closing the bodily senses. The soul's yielding "with will" is connected to the change's natural restorative purpose, even though sleep can overtake someone against an immediate wish.

V.15.24 then supplies a more discriminating dream example. A person may seem to debate and, by true reasoning, learn something. On waking, the mathematical or rational truth remains true even if the alleged place, interlocutor and spoken words were fictitious. The reality of the rational content is therefore separable from the sensory scene.

Ficino also notes the vivid likeness of sensible images during sleep: at the time they may be indistinguishable from their objects. This is not an endorsement of every dream as revelation. The point is that sensory seeming can be false while intelligible validity remains unchanged.

The conclusion concerns the soul's power as distinguished from the bodily life and organs serving its operations. It does not establish a modern sleep physiology or justify ignoring medical effects of sleep deprivation.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.23, PDF 120–121.** Involuntary sleep is proposed and rejected as a model of ontological degradation.
- **V.15.24, PDF 120–121.** A dreamed argument distinguishes stable truth from false setting, person and words.

In this edition.

The edition retains both the involuntary opening and the later willingness, instead of hiding their difference. Praesentia at the close is lasting presence, contrasted with passing sensory events, not merely an unusually long duration.

See also.

Time, memory and expectation; Intelligible principles and reasoning; Conversion, desire and compulsion

Soul as the body’s craftsman

Latin: *artifex*; *fabricare*; *servare*; *reficere*; *connectere*; *pedissequa*; *species*; *genus*

The word.

An *artifex* is a skilled maker; a *pedissequa* is an attendant or handmaid. The contrast ranks causal roles. *Fabricare*, *servare* and *reficere* distinguish making, preserving and repairing, rather than treating animation as a single initial event.

In the Platonic Theology.

Soul gives the living being its determinate substantial kind: this animal is dog, that horse, another human. An accident arrives in a subject already complete in its species; soul instead makes its own body, maintains what it has made, restores it when it fails, and joins conflicting elements. On departure of soul the bodily organization collapses and its previous constitution and kind are not maintained. Ficino presents these functions as evidence of substantial rather than accidental status.

A possible escape makes a merely nutritive soul build the body and a sensitive soul arrive later as an accident. Ficino rejects the division of labor. The body appropriate to sensation must already possess organs for sensing and locomotion, not only nourishment. There cannot be two souls in the one body, with one making instruments for the other. The soul that nourishes is the soul that senses.

The interaction of imagination and nourishment makes this unity visible in the argument: sorrow weakens the nutritive work, joy strengthens it. This is a historical psychophysiological observation used to support one soul with multiple offices; the text does not supply a modern medical rule or claim that every illness is caused by emotion. The concluding craftsman–handmaid contrast summarizes the soul’s productive priority. It complements the preceding account of heat as an instrument without turning the body into an inert object with no contributory powers.

Places to Read.

- **VII.8.1, PDF 264–265**. The principal craftsman determines organic growth through instrumental heat.
- **VII.9.2, PDF 268–269**. Species, fabrication, maintenance, organ-making and affective interaction establish the soul’s substantial role.

In this edition.

The translation retains “craftsman” and “handmaid” to preserve the force of *artifex* and *pedissequa*. “The soul which is solely nutritive” belongs to the proposed two-soul explanation; it should not be printed as Ficino’s accepted division within the same animal.

See also.

Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Substance, qualities and degrees; Composition and inward unity

Soul as universal bond

Latin: *mundi nodus*; *vinculum*; *conciliare*; *connectere*; *continere*; *machina*; *dos*; *caput*; *membra*

The word.

Nodus is a knot and vinculum a bond; connectere joins, conciliare brings into accord and continere holds together. Machina is the world's constructed fabric. Dos names an endowment or gift, while head and members picture ranked organization.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.5.7 argues that a soul wholly submerged in matter could not connect the lowest to the highest. Its middle position therefore requires both access to divine things and agency toward bodies. It is an explanatory middle rather than a spatial midpoint.

V.15.2 names three endowments of this position: divine images shine in soul, soul forms and contains the bodily fabric, and soul reconciles divine and bodily levels. V.15.3–4 derives immortality from each. Images in soul outrank the everlasting shadows assumed in some bodies; the forming and containing source must preserve its own form and constancy; the source of universal binding cannot itself dissolve without undermining what it binds.

Head and members give the second argument an additional picture. If the bodily world has perpetual members, the superior order of souls must have a perpetual head comprising rational souls. Ficino calls part of this inference probable, so it should not be restated as a self-evident axiom.

V.15.25–27 finally makes mediation a defense against soul's conversion into body. Body receives form through soul only while soul remains itself. A supposed conversion that removed soul's form would destroy the very means by which the resulting body was to receive form. The bond must retain its characteristic rank to perform its work.

The chapter's opening a fortiori step is narrower than a complete proof of personal identity. V.15.1 says that a body, however altered or repeatedly divided, remains body: divisible bodily nature persists through the subdivisions. A superior rational life should therefore not cease to be life through change. This does not mean the same individual body never perishes; the persistence claimed is first at the level of bodily nature. Ficino develops the stronger conclusion through the three gifts and, later, by excluding a soul's movement between species or individual minds. V.15.6 expressly says soul does not pass from species to species as body can, because its relation to change is more stable and it lacks underlying material for such a transmutation. Those additional premises prevent an unnoticed inference from generic bodily persistence directly to personal immortality.

Places to Read.

- **V.5.7, PDF 30–31.** The world-knot requires access beyond matter.
- **V.15.1, PDF 104–105.** The initial a-fortiori comparison concerns body persisting as body, not an imperishable individual organism.
- **V.15.2, V.15.3, V.15.4, PDF 104–107.** The three gifts support distinct arguments, including head/members and bond/unbinding.
- **V.15.25, V.15.26, V.15.27, PDF 122–125.** The final mediation proof requires the giver's continuing identity.

In this edition.

Probabile est in V.15.4 signals Ficino's local assessment, not a probability calculated from data. Machina and sedes are metaphors of fabric and dwelling, not claims that immaterial essence has a physical address.

See also.

Inclination and independence; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Transmission of form and natural order

Spark, globe and luminous vehicles

Latin: *scintilla*; *flamma*; *orbis*; *evolvere*; *convolvere*; *implicare*; *explicare*; *corpus aethereum*

The word.

Scintilla is spark, flamma flame and orbis a circular figure or orb. The paired verbs unfold and enfold a relation between concentrated source and extended manifestation. Corpus aethereum remains an ethereal body; luminous subtlety does not remove its corporeality.

In the Platonic Theology.

The analogy between lowest fire and highest air prepares the claim that rational soul is "in a certain way" subtle heaven and heaven denser soul. These comparisons bridge adjacent levels without abolishing their differences. A point running in a circle then becomes an image of circumference unfolded from a centre; an invisible spark becoming a flaming orb supplies its luminous counterpart. Spark represents soul, flame ethereal body. Visible light follows spiritual light as a pale lunar halo follows moonlight.

Ficino distinguishes the souls of fixed stars and planets, surrounded by one luminous body, from other rational souls with two bodies, luminous and opaque, or one more and one less luminous. The spark senses without being sensed; the unfolded flame is sensed without itself sensing. The distinction therefore expressly prevents making every visible luminous globe a sensing thing simply qua flame. The jokes that a denier lacks sense or lacks soul intensify persuasion. The attached Heraclitean maxim gives this luminous psychology an authoritative cadence, but the account remains the chapter's preliminary excursion.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.24; source PDF pp. 162, 163**. Adjacent elemental levels furnish the qualified soul/heaven comparison.
- **VI.2.25; source PDF pp. 164, 165**. Point and spark are separately paired with circumference and flame; the halo image states dependence.
- **VI.2.26; source PDF pp. 164, 165**. The number of bodily vehicles and the senses of sensing/being sensed are carefully distinguished.

In this edition.

The edition preserves tamquam, quasi and quodammodo where Ficino qualifies the likeness. The Greek αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη is glossed by Ficino himself as lux sicca, anima sapientissima. Its "dry light" should not be silently replaced by another familiar text of Heraclitus.

See also.

Light, spirit and the unseen source; Point, dimension and substantial unity

Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre

Latin: *aequalitas*; *consonantia*; *temperare*; *quadrangularis*; *circularis*; *lyra*

The word.

Aequalitas can mean equality, evenness or proportionate order; consonantia is concord or harmony. Temperare a lyre means bringing it into tune. These are models of improved arrangement without increased size.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino attributes to the Magi the description of virtue as an equality through which the soul accords with itself, truth and goodness. He first imagines a four-angled line becoming circular. The imagined improvement concerns evenness, not extra length. He then imagines a lyre being tuned: it becomes more harmonious without becoming bigger.

The examples answer the habit of describing intellectual or moral advancement as if it were bodily enlargement. A young person can “grow” in virtue while the soul acquires spiritual order rather than quantity. The point is not that every circular object is ethically superior to every angular one, but that one and the same measured extent can be differently ordered. Similarly, the instrument’s sound illustrates the difference between more bulk and better proportion.

This use of equality prepares a later argument in which mind judges varying equalities by reference to equality itself. The two uses are related but not identical: the lyre explains nonquantitative improvement, while the later passage asks how a knower can measure greatest and least without becoming their size.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.4, PDF pp. 296–297.** The Magian attribution introduces the line and lyre as models of spiritual perfection.
- **VIII.6.1, PDF pp. 342–343.** Mind measures participation in supreme equality without spatial enlargement.

In this edition.

The English keeps “the true and the good” as substantive principles. Adolescens and adolescit create an age-and-maturation play; the explanatory conclusion is explicitly that soul does not grow quantitate.

See also.

Virtue as an indivisible quality; The whole mind and the measure of equality; Body, instruments, and vital spirit

Spiritual images and light

Latin: *spiritales colorum imagines*; *splendor*; *lumen*; *lux*; *species*; *significatio*

The word.

An image is “spiritual” here insofar as its cognitive presentation is not the material object or a bodily quality entering as matter. *Lumen* and *lux* both concern light; *splendores* are its manifestations. The wording does not make every occurrence of *spiritus* an incorporeal soul.

In the Platonic Theology.

After the wax and mirror hypotheses, Ficino says spiritual color-images are not produced by bodies or received in mirrors and the brain. They are splendors of light striking bodies. He traces visible light to an invisible light of heavenly souls, overflowing outward until perceptible; it is not fastened to bodies but joins the light of our spirit, which depends on our soul. This is a positive claim within his natural philosophy, not merely a modern metaphor for optical information. Its celestial explanation should be reported as his account, not validated as physical science.

Meanings reaching hearing supply a related example. Ficino calls them spiritual and makes their transmission and preservation depend on souls, rather than treating meaning as the corporeal sound itself. The word *Lucifer* later tests the distinction between an indivisible meaning and divisible sound.

A further qualification occurs in the discussion of partitioned sight: the *species* is not itself what is seen; the color is seen through it. The distinction separates cognitive means from the visible object. Chapter 13 likewise says that sight receives a wall’s color without receiving the wall. These formulations should stand beside chapter 6’s insistence that the soul is not passively shaped by bodily qualities. The texts distinguish cognition from material influx; they do not justify flattening all reception-language into one physical process.

Places to Read.

- **VII.1.3, PDF 236–237**. Invisible and visible light, the light of our spirit, and word-meanings are distinguished.
- **VII.4.2, PDF 246–247**. The visible color is seen through a species rather than the species being the ultimate object.
- **VII.13.1, PDF 276–277**. The wall and its spiritual color-image illustrate reception without the object’s matter.

In this edition.

“Spiritual” preserves *spiritalis*; it does not erase the explicitly bodily *spiritus* of VII.6.1. Chapter 6’s exclusion of forms received from bodies and chapter 13’s reception of forms without matter remain a qualified contrast, not an unnoticed contradiction repaired by changing either passage.

See also.

Bodily spirit and mediation; Sensation as attentive activity; Lucifer and indivisible meaning

Spiritual matter and identity

Latin: *materia spiritalis*; *potentia susceptiva*; *essentia*; *esse spiritale*; *materia propria*; *materia communis*; *species*

The word.

“Spiritual matter” names an analogy within separate beings: essence stands to being as a receptive potency stands to act. It is not bodily prime matter hidden inside the soul. Propria and communis distinguish a recipient specific to a form from material capacity common to different forms.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.11 permits essence to play the role of matter or receptive potency, and being the role of form or actuality, in a separate created soul. This is an analogy inside an immaterial substance. Its purpose is to test whether any intelligible route of corruption could remove the soul’s act while leaving a prior potency. The chapter ends by excluding both changes of psychic species and migration from this individual mind into another.

The reductio begins by preserving the normal material rule rather than discarding it. In ordinary corruption, act ceases while a recipient remains: a composite resolves into matter, and a materially educed form returns to matter’s tinder. That prevents ordinary corruption from becoming creation’s reverse, annihilation. Soul is tested by analogy because its created essence receives actuality even though it has no material constituents. Ficino says separate forms have scarcely another composition than essence and being, or something similar. The qualifications matter: he is not announcing a literal second species of elemental material.

The objection at V.11.4 is more subtle than “the soul dies.” It proposes that actual being could resolve into essence while essence ceased to exist actually, leaving only a potency somewhere. Ficino must identify where. It cannot be bodily matter because soul neither consists of matter nor springs from its potentiality. It cannot be a subordinate efficient source because only God creates it. God cannot be the material receiver of a withdrawn act because God is pure act. A return to first life, moreover, would be fatal only if it stopped being this mind, and the seal’s greater conformity illustrates confirmation of identity instead.

A further answer proposes that essence receives itself back into itself when the former being is removed. Ficino replies that bodily material cannot be without bodily actuality and the analogous spiritual recipient cannot be without spiritual actuality. That leaves the final proposal: exchange one spiritual being for another. Here the distinction between common and proper matter becomes decisive. Common matter can take alternative forms; the defining essence of this soul is not equally open to a wholly different act. It is directed to a certain psychic species and, within that species, cannot migrate from one individual mind to another.

The heavenly-material comparison is deliberately modest: if, as many hold, heavenly matter retains one form, an even more stable spiritual recipient should not be denied a single abiding act. It is an analogy within the author’s cosmology, not a separate contemporary proof of unchanged celestial matter. The accumulated conclusion protects both the life of soul and its determinate individuality. The later V.15 conversion argument broadens the same issue by examining worse forms of survival, such as supposed transformation into body.

Places to Read.

- **V.11.1, V.11.2, V.11.3, PDF 60–63.** The analogy of essence/potency and being/act supports a reductio of corruption.
- **V.11.4, V.11.5, V.11.7, PDF 62–65.** Alternative destinations for a supposedly withdrawn actuality are examined.
- **V.11.8, PDF 66–67.** Proper essence excludes exchange of species and migration between individual minds.

In this edition.

The edition intentionally keeps spiritalis as “spiritual” so the analogy remains visible. Its “animal being” for esse animale in V.11.8 should be read as psychic or ensouled being appropriate to a soul, not as a declaration that rational soul has become a beast. Ratio there is defining nature.

See also.

Essence and being; Seal, wax and restoration; Conversion, desire and compulsion

Stable craftsman and the river reflection

Latin: *figura*; *similitudo*; *artifex stabilissimus*; *faber*; *rationes et semina*; *reficere*; *depingere*

The word.

Figura is shape or configuration, not automatically a mental image. Reficere fashions anew; depingere paints or depicts. The inward artifex or faber is a productive craftsman. Rationes et semina are the patterns and seeds by which it arranges the body’s members.

In the Platonic Theology.

The objection appeals to bodily shape: flesh changes while the same figure seems to remain, so why could cognition not remain through replacement of soul-substance? Ficino first denies exact numerical sameness of bodily figure. The old figure departs with old flesh and a newly fashioned one resembles it in some measure. This recurring resemblance requires a supremely stable inward craftsman holding the formative patterns and seeds, capable of proportioning fresh humours and shaping fresh flesh.

A face looking down at a river then depicts itself in ever-new waves, making the same face seem to persist within the water. The stable face is distinct from the replacing reflections; apparent continuity in the stream depends on a source outside its flux. Ficino identifies the inward bodily craftsman as soul. If soul itself also flowed, neither continued bodily resemblance nor similar knowledge would be explained. The image therefore answers the objection rather than simply accepting that unchanged pattern can survive without an enduring agent.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.9; source PDF pp. 226, 227**. Numerical sameness and approximate reproduced likeness are distinguished through the internal craftsman.
- **VI.13.10; source PDF pp. 226, 227**. The face and new waves expose the stable source needed for recurrent reflections.

In this edition.

The apparatus preserves M1482's labat rather than the later labatur and emphasizes similes, "similar," throughout. The river analogy supplies a causal distinction between face and reflections, not a general assertion that all appearances are unreal.

See also.

Persistence, memory and recognition; Images, migration and the perfect agent

Substance, qualities and degrees

Latin: *substantia*; *subiectum*; *accidens*; *genus*; *contrarium*; *magis ac minus*; *intendere*; *remittere*

The word.

Substance is what a thing is, rather than an accidental condition inhering in it. *Subiectum* is the receiving subject. *Magis ac minus* concerns more and less of a quality; intensification and remission are not automatically changes in substantial identity.

In the Platonic Theology.

A constitution results when matter receives contrary qualities and they are mixed. The qualities do not simply receive one another, since they oppose one another. Their bodily subject is therefore indispensable. The constitution also has a contrary: an excessive foreign quality can disrupt its composition. Its nature, power and operation increase and decrease. Ficino uses all these features to distinguish it from substance.

The stone example gives the intended sense of "more and less." Once something is a stone, one stone is not more a stone than another by the manner in which a constitution is more intense. This does not mean that stones cannot differ in size, strength or other properties. Nor does the absence of a proper substantial contrary mean that substances cannot be destroyed. Ficino assigns contrariety, as such, to the genus of quality and denies that substantial identity itself is graded like a quality.

The chapter's logical joint deserves attention. The first unit concludes conditionally: if soul is substance, it is not constitution. The next unit supplies the positive argument from a living thing's determinate kind and the soul's making, maintaining and repairing its body. Treating the conditional conclusion alone as the entire proof would omit this essential work. Conversely, the body-building proof does not make every form called "substantial" in the preceding elemental discussion equivalent to soul.

Places to Read.

- **VII.9.1, PDF 266–267**. Material dependence, contrariety and more-and-less distinguish constitution from substance.
- **VII.9.2, PDF 268–269**. The soul's substantial status is argued positively through species and productive care.

In this edition.

The source paragraph is editorially divided between its negative and positive arguments. "This stone more or less a stone than that" concerns the stone's being what it is. The word *species* in the following unit names the living thing's kind, not the sensory species of VII.4.2.

See also.

Bodily constitution and temperament; Soul as the body’s craftsman; Moral concord and the robber

Substantial form and the receiving subject

Latin: *forma substantialis*; *accidens*; *subiectum*; *potentia*; *actus*; *recipere opposita*

The word.

A substantial form constitutes what the thing is; an accident is a dependent determination. Subiectum is the bearer in which a form or condition inheres, distinct from locus, the place a body occupies. Receiving opposites while remaining the same is a criterion of substance in the argument.

In the Platonic Theology.

The animal can be analysed as matter and form or as body and soul. Because body is not itself the form of something else, soul occupies the formal role: it is the internal principle of operation, motion and being, bringing the potentially living body into actual life. If soul itself were another matter–form body, a further unifying form would be needed. The hypothetical composition also prevents its whole essence from forming the body, assigns one form two matters of the same kind, and permits mutual transmutation between soul and lower bodies.

Ficino then distinguishes substantial from accidental form. Soul contains, steadies and turns body, surpassing what it governs; a mover as source of motion does not derive its being from the moved; and soul remains the same while opinions, knowledge, ignorance and affections change. Its identity is not identical with any one passing state. The closing postponed arguments concern resistance to bodily demands, self-reflection and knowledge of substance above accident. Their mention is not a full demonstration within this chapter.

Places to Read.

- **VI.7.1, VI.7.2; source PDF pp. 182, 183**. The matter/form analysis and three consequences test a bodily composition of soul.
- **VI.7.3, VI.7.4; source PDF pp. 184, 185**. Governance, causal independence and reception of opposites support substantial form.

In this edition.

The apparatus retains contineat without the later witnesses’ non in VI.7.3; that negation would conflict with the ruling soul’s containing role. VI.7.4’s “form insofar as form cannot be formed” concerns the formal aspect, not a denial that a created soul has a producer.

See also.

Unity, dispersion and the inward bond; Persistence, memory and recognition

Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare

Latin: *claritas*; *fervor*; *indago*; *lepus*; *discussio*; *scintilla*; *accendere*; *e vestigio*

The word.

Claritas is the realized lucidity of intellect; fervor is the stable heat of appetite ignited by it. Indago names a search, while discussio evokes both inquiry and repeated striking. E vestigio means immediately in the local conclusion.

In the Platonic Theology.

Preparation can take time even when the achieved act is indivisible. A hunter follows many tracks before suddenly seeing the hare. Inquiry likewise proceeds laboriously before the truth becomes evident. Ficino then changes images: a stone repeatedly struck yields a spark; breath repeatedly applied finally kindles a sufficient flame. Long moral habituation prepares the young person until appetite possesses the stable rational ardour that counts as virtue.

A mirror turned toward the sun receives light at once; prepared wool beneath it catches fire. The reflected light models intellectual clarity, and the wool's flame the appetite illuminated and moved by clarity. Each analogy has its own stages, so collapsing them into "knowledge is light" would lose the role of preparation and the relation between intellect and appetite.

Ficino adds reductios against partitioning realized virtue. If knowing one truth consisted in simultaneously possessing and lacking parts of the same knowledge, he says, one would know and not know the same thing together. If steadfast rational willing were similarly divided, one power would will and not will the same thing together. These arguments depend on his strong account of an integrated realized act; they should not be recast as a denial that a learner can know some facts while lacking others.

The gradual route and sudden completion therefore remain distinct. His argument does not remove instruction, exercise, investigation or custom; those are precisely what the images describe.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.3.2, PDF pp. 308–309.** Tracking and sighting the hare distinguish preparation from realization.
- **VIII.3.3, PDF pp. 308–309.** Spark, breath, mirror and wool develop the connection between insight and formed appetite.
- **VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5, PDF pp. 308–311.** Parallel knowledge/ignorance and will/not-will reductios argue against partitions within a completed virtue.

In this edition.

Constetur in VIII.3.4 is read as "were constituted," not simply "were known." The apparatus explicitly preserves donec … deficit as an interval in which something is still lacking. These choices prevent the translation from predetermining the argument by adding a final increment the Latin does not name.

See also.

Virtue as an indivisible quality; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Reflexive understanding and willing

Teaching without loss

Latin: *docere*; *oblivisci*; *transitus*; *ratio artificiosa*; *rationum coetus*; *separari*

The word.

Docere is to teach; oblivisci to forget; transitus a passage or transfer. The relevant contrast is between communicating knowledge and relocating a finite item so that its former possessor loses it.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.15.15 asks where rational art would go if it separated from its living subject. It cannot be nowhere, given the assumed permanence of its principles, nor in something lifeless, since life is said to ground reason. If it passed from one life to another, teaching would be the best candidate for such transfer.

But the teacher does not forget a truth by teaching it. Ficino takes this to show that the rational art does not travel out of one soul into another in the manner of a material object handed over. The image supplies an accessible test within the argument for inseparability. It is not the trivial claim that nobody ever forgets anything after giving a lesson; the asserted causal relation is that communicating a truth does not itself consume the teacher's possession.

The conclusion serves the first of V.15.12's alternatives, where principles are in the mind. V.15.17 explicitly moves to the others. This local role matters: the example supports immaterial communication and an enduring subject rather than establishing, by itself, the entire proof of immortality.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.12, V.15.17, PDF 112–115.** The example belongs to one member of the larger three-way division.
- **V.15.15, V.15.16, PDF 114–115.** Teaching without forgetfulness tests transfer and supports inseparable rational art.

In this edition.

The English "structured reason" for ratio artificiosa emphasizes ordered skill, not artificial falsity. No external pedagogical theory is required to follow the example; its force lies in the difference between sharing and losing.

See also.

Intelligible principles and reasoning; Transmission of form and natural order

Temperament and harmony

Latin: *temperatio*; *complexio*; *commixtio*; *humores*; *consonantia*; *harmonia*; *dissonare*

The word.

Temperatio and complexio concern a bodily constitution or mixture, not primarily mood or skin color. Humores are bodily humors in the historical physiological model. Consonantia and harmonia mean harmonious proportion; dissonare is to be out of accord.

In the Platonic Theology.

V.15.8 attributes to Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus the view that true life is bodily temperament or something consequent upon it. Ficino rejects this through the mind's purported capacity to withdraw attention from sense and become more effective at understanding unchangeable objects. A form wholly dependent on a bodily subject could not improve by turning from that very subject.

The next step contrasts a composite accident, the harmony of humors, with the principles of simple substances. If soul were merely the harmony, Ficino argues, it could not know, desire and grasp those principles. V.15.12–17 then tests three possible relations between mind and intelligibles rather than assuming one arrangement throughout: principles in mind, mind in principles, or both self-subsisting. Each is used to resist material-temperament identity.

V.15.18 adds a practical contrast. Mind may be disordered in thought or conduct while the body is harmonious, or harmonious while the body is disordered. The closing verbal play says anyone missing the distinction is out of harmony with truth. This is both an argument and rhetoric; it should not be turned into a clinical rule that mental state is never affected by bodily illness.

The crucial target is identity or total dependence, not every correlation of body and mind. Earlier V.3 expressly allows affection of the soul's operative faculty.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.8, V.15.9, V.15.10, PDF 110–111.** The reported temperament theory faces withdrawal and simple-object arguments.
- **V.15.12, V.15.13, V.15.16, V.15.17, PDF 112–115.** Three relations to intelligibles exclude reduction to bodily harmony.
- **V.15.18, PDF 116–117.** Mental and bodily concord can vary independently in Ficino's counterexample.

In this edition.

The edition's "bodily constitution" for complexio prevents a modern color-of-skin reading. Its musical vocabulary retains the consonare/dissonare play. The claims belong to Ficino's historical philosophical physiology and are not contemporary medical advice.

See also.

Intelligible principles and reasoning; Passivity and bodily affection; Sleep and dreams

Temperament, flux and the stable ruler

Latin: *complexio*; *humor*; *effluere*; *refluere*; *innumeralis unitas*; *ordinatrix*; *rector*; *terminus*

The word.

Complexio is humoral and bodily temperament. Effluere and refluere are flowing out and back. Innumeralis unitas is the organism's unity not reducible to a counted succession of material replacements. Ordinatrix and rector name the ordering power and ruler; terminus is the limit it imposes on growth.

In the Platonic Theology.

The identity argument applies not only to a soul-body but to soul identified with quality or temperament. Qualities change as humours change; nutrition would therefore make the supposed soul flow out and back with bodily matter. The animal would lack constancy in form as well as in matter, and its unity and the continuity of nourishment or growth would have no stable source.

Ficino requires a ruler that remains in itself, orders the sequence of these processes and fixes how far they should proceed. The conclusion is about a continuing source of organized change, not the absence of change in the living organism. It also differentiates soul from the temperament it establishes, as VI.9.4 already insisted. The measure and stopping point of growth matter as much as motion's initiation. Historical humours are the example through which Ficino states the general demand for stability in what coordinates a succession.

Places to Read.

- **VI.13.8; source PDF pp. 226, 227**. Qualitative flux threatens form, unity, continuity, order and the limit of growth.
- **VI.9.4; source PDF pp. 194, 195**. Soul is already distinguished from humoral tempering and named as its substantial source.

In this edition.

The apparatus retains innumeralis from M1482 and G1559 against P1641's innumerabilis. The English "unity beyond number" is an interpretive rendering, explained by the apparatus through the succession of counted material constituents; it is not a claim that the animal contains an actually infinite number of souls.

See also.

Unity, dispersion and the inward bond; Stable craftsman and the river reflection

Temporal discourse and psychic ascent

Latin: *discursus temporalis*; *ascensio*; *descensio*; *causae mediae*; *revolutio*; *per naturam ac vim propriam*

The word.

Discursus is successive passage, including movement from one cognition or affection to another. Ascensio and descensio name ordered reasoning between effects and principles through intermediate causes. Revolutio is a turning or circuit of thought, not necessarily a change of bodily place.

In the Platonic Theology.

The positive account follows the exclusion of bodily self-motion. Bodies nevertheless display an inward source of motion, which the Platonist identifies as soul. In the governing power, seeds arise successively to produce bodily effects. In cognition, the soul moves from one cognition and affection to another, ascending from effects through causes to highest principles and descending back through causes to effects. The two successions belong to different functions of the same psychic life.

Ficino assigns this discursive pattern to soul specifically. God and angels see and possess all together; bodies do not act through themselves; corporeal forms do not rise toward

incorporeal things. Soul's reasoned ascent beyond bodily nature is therefore used to show that it is neither body nor a divided bodily form. This does not make sequential reasoning superior to angelic simultaneity. It places soul at the intermediate grade: inwardly self-moving and capable of higher objects, yet temporally unfolding rather than possessing all at once.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.17; source PDF pp. 216, 217**. Productive seminal succession and cognitive-affective discourse are separately described.
- **VI.12.18; source PDF pp. 218, 219**. Discursive motion is proper to soul and distinguished from divine/angelic simultaneity and bodily inactivity.

In this edition.

The apparatus applies the authorial correction ad incorporalia in VI.12.18; the uncorrected ad corporalia would reverse the crucial object of ascent. Per se is immediately glossed per naturam ac vim propriam, anchoring its sense in the soul's nature and power.

See also.

Three offices and the order of proof; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul

The whole mind and the measure of equality

Latin: *se toto*; *comparare*; *referre*; *adaequatio*; *aequalitas summa*

The word.

Se toto means with its whole self. Adaequatio is an appropriate correspondence or matching, which can be quantitative for bodies but cognitive for mind. Supreme equality supplies a standard, not an unusually large body.

In the Platonic Theology.

A bodily container receives by dimensional correspondence: more of the container answers to more of its content. Mind, Ficino argues, knows the entire human body and each limb with the whole of its knowing power. Comparison supplies the test. If one isolated part knew only one limb and another only a different limb, neither could compare them or relate both to the whole. The same knower must have access to the terms it compares.

The examples of dog, ant, horse, elephant and sun make size disparity explicit. One body cannot be quantitatively equal to all these bodies at once. Mind nevertheless apprehends each without changing to its bulk. Its correspondence is therefore not the equality of containing volumes.

The argument ascends further: mind judges more and less equal things by their relation to equality itself. It thus stands cognitively between participants and the standard of participation. Ficino draws a consequence for its resistance to disproportionate bodily qualities. The phrase "in a certain manner" restricts the claim that mind equals supreme equality; it should not be turned into numerical identity with a divine principle.

The whole-in-each vocabulary in this passage explains the unity of comparing awareness. It differs from the preceding chapter's logical relations among propositions and from the following chapter's preservation of intellectual identity through reception.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.6.1, PDF pp. 342–343.** Limb comparison, dramatically different animal sizes and supreme equality form three steps in one chapter.

In this edition.

The correction non hoc pacto denies that intellect receives in the bodily way. The apparatus renders adaequari by “matched” or “commensurate”; the relevant kind of measure must be supplied from the argument.

See also.

Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment; Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre; Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres

Three offices and the order of proof

Latin: *officium*; *agit in corpore*; *agit per corpus*; *operatur per se ipsam*; *natura*; *intelligentia*

The word.

Officium is a function or characteristic task. The three prepositional constructions distinguish acting in body, through body, and through oneself. Intelligentia here is the activity of understanding, not a separate intelligence or merely a general capacity.

In the Platonic Theology.

Natural power generates, nourishes and grows the body: Peripatetics call it vegetative, while Ficino’s Platonists call it nature. External sense sees, hears, smells, tastes and touches. Internal sense turns over the images left by those encounters, so it too acts through body even when no external object is presently affecting an organ. Understanding investigates and finds what is neither body nor a bodily image. The developmental story assigns natural action to the fetus, sensation to birth and pure understanding only with difficulty to adulthood. This is Ficino’s philosophical and physiological account, not contemporary developmental science; his thirty-year-old “children” are a polemical judgement about intellectual practice.

VI.3 makes the triad determine the proof’s order. Natural power principally excludes body and partly excludes a form divided through body. Sensation is to show indivisibility and whole presence without fixation to one organ. Understanding is to confirm these and add freedom from material origin. This prevents reading every natural-power argument as an already complete demonstration of the human soul’s immortality. The later distinction between governing and cognitive succession in VI.12 also shows that natural productivity and explicit thought are not interchangeable activities.

Places to Read.

- **VI.2.1; source PDF pp. 134, 135**. The triad is defined through its operations and developmental order.
- **VI.3.1, VI.3.2; source PDF pp. 168, 169**. Different stages are assigned different burdens of proof.
- **VI.12.17; source PDF pp. 216, 217**. Seminal emergence and cognitive discourse supply two distinct temporal sequences.

In this edition.

The edition deliberately preserves all three constructions rather than translating each as “acts.” The Latin’s per se ipsam excludes reliance upon bodily images for this act; it does not deny that the same soul also acts in and through body.

See also.

Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree

Through itself and through another

Latin: *per se*; *per aliud*; *omnino per se*; *per sui naturam*; *per se subsistens*

The word.

Per se can mean through itself, by its own nature, or in its own right. Per aliud means through another. Their force must be specified by the dependence under discussion. Omnino intensifies the claim to wholly or without qualification in that respect.

In the Platonic Theology.

Per se operates in several closely related argumentative settings. V.5 counts kinds of causal dependence; V.9 asks how being belongs intrinsically to form; V.10 tests whether the soul’s relation to God defeats the resulting claim of self-subsistence. The circle and shaped-wood comparison introduces the second setting: a circle is necessarily round, whereas wood receives roundness through an artisan and can survive without it. The fire objection then asks whether soul too might have its intrinsic property only while it exists. Ficino’s answer requires the metaphysical distinction between materially conditional and separate subsistence, not merely a change in wording.

The change in apparent definition between V.5 and V.9 is especially worth slowing down. V.5 says that what is per se is understood without a cause, then immediately restricts complete absence of all four kinds of cause to God. It permits qualified per se as a cause-type is removed. V.9 examines what belongs to something through its own nature and is inseparable under that description. The statements are not safely combined into “whatever is per se has no cause.” The book itself explains both the qualification and the creature’s assigned nature. This is a lexical shift of argumentative emphasis within a related field, not grounds for silently replacing one passage with the other.

In V.9.1 the fountain-of-being argument proceeds by asking what would give a form its being if not form. Matter cannot do so, because matter does not explain the proper being of the composites already examined. Another form would simply restart the question. The regress must reach form as formally explanatory. But this establishes the priority of form in an explanation of determinate being; it does not erase the efficient source that gives a created form existence. The later inference to immortality needs the additional distinction between the materially inhering and the independently subsisting kinds.

V.9.2 spends considerable care on the apparently troublesome material case. A bodily form is genuinely form, so being follows its nature. Its nature nevertheless includes inhabiting matter. To say being follows it per se is to say being follows it as so inhabiting. Matter can receive an opposed form, and the first form loses the condition under which its being was assigned. There is no inconsistency in calling a form formally explanatory yet dependent in its existence. In the soul’s case, the corresponding adherence is to itself. The author regards that relation as incapable of interruption because nothing could stand between a thing and itself.

The unconditional language at the end of V.9 is thus intelligible only with its causal sequel. V.10 does not quietly retract divine dependence; it brings it forward as the anticipated objection. The relation is fulfilled through the soul's own nature. It is not an added material link that can break while the same nature remains. One may still question the metaphysical premises of the inference, but the article should not make Ficino defend an uncaused created soul that he explicitly excludes.

Places to Read.

- **V.5.1, V.5.3, V.5.4, V.5.5, PDF 26–29.** Wholly uncaused existence is distinguished from graded formal and material independence.
- **V.9.1, V.9.2, PDF 46–49.** Per se is explained through intrinsic nature and its assigned mode of subsistence.
- **V.9.3, V.9.4, PDF 50–53.** The fire objection tests the move from essential predication to perpetuity.
- **V.10.1, V.10.3, PDF 54–55, 58–59.** Self-subsistence remains compatible with continual causal dependence on God.

In this edition.

"In its own right" helps with predication; "through itself" retains causal or reflexive emphasis. These translations do not represent separate Latin terms. The maker-given nature in V.9.2 is decisive: Ficino does not make created essence the uncaused source of its own existence.

See also.

Four causes and graded dependence; Necessary predication and the fire objection; Relation and continuing dependence; First Cause

Time, memory and expectation

Latin: *tempus*; *simul*; *propositum*; *intentio*; *memoria*; *expectatio*; *futurum*; *praesens*; *praeteritum*

The word.

Simul means together or at once. Propositum is the purpose of a whole action; intentio is directed attention; memoria recalls what has passed; expectatio anticipates what is to come. These are distinguished orientations, not synonyms for a single present sensation.

In the Platonic Theology.

After invoking Augustine in V.15.5, Ficino contrasts a moving work with the mind directing it. Neither the movement nor the moved body possesses all its temporal phases together. It passes from future to present to past. The directing mind, however, can possess simultaneously the stable purpose of the entire work, attention to its present part, recollection of its completed part and expectation of its future part.

The mind therefore brings together things that do not yet exist and things no longer existent. Ficino infers that its relation to temporal movement is not identical with that movement. It is above time in attending to temporal things and immovable in attending to moving things. He asks why such a subject should not likewise be immortal while attending to mortal things.

This does not mean each particular psychological operation is timeless or that memory makes the past happen again. The book has already distinguished successive operation from stable essence. The example supports that distinction by showing a unifying relation to phases that the external work cannot possess all at once.

V.15.24 returns to permanence through dreams: true principles remain what they are when the dream's setting, persons and words prove false. The lasting presence of truth differs both from successive events and from merely enduring for a long interval.

Places to Read.

- **V.2.1, PDF 12–13.** The earlier essence/operation distinction controls the temporal claim.
- **V.15.5, V.15.6, PDF 106–109.** Purpose, attention, memory and expectation unite a temporally successive work.
- **V.15.24, PDF 120–121.** Immutable principles outlast a dream's transitory or fictitious setting.

In this edition.

The source distinguishes praesentia, presence, from duration in the dream passage. The word intentio does not merely mean a plan; the plan has its own term propositum. The Augustinian orientation is Ficino's explicit attribution, not a claim that the supplied passage reproduces an independently collated Augustine text.

See also.

Motion and substantial stability; Intelligible principles and reasoning; Sleep and dreams

Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact

Latin: *tactus*; *tangere*; *attingere*; *transcurrere*; *admovere*; *impartibilis*

The word.

Tactus can be bodily contact or the metaphorical "touch" of intellectual grasp. Transcurrere is traversing; admovere is bringing one thing up to another. Impartibilis means without separable parts. The argument depends on not importing the bodily sense of touch into understanding.

In the Platonic Theology.

Suppose mind were a body, or a form spread through a body. To reach its object it would have to touch and traverse it by points, by extent, or by both. A point reaches points rather than magnitude; an accumulation of points could never complete a traversal of the hypothesized infinitely many components. Extent alone reaches only other extended things, leaving simple objects unexplained. A mixed point-and-extent model inherits both difficulties.

The traversal hypothesis also generates an absurd multiplication of cognition. Each mental part would have to approach each part of the object in turn, producing endlessly repeated apprehensions instead of one understanding of the whole. These suppositions are the opponent's proposed bodily mechanism, not Ficino's positive description of an actual intellect assembled from points.

A Plotinian reply then cuts through the model: if only an indivisible component performs the knowing, that component alone deserves the name mind; the alleged nonknowing bodily remainder is irrelevant. Mind's ability to apprehend points without length, lines

without breadth, surfaces without depth, numbers without position and beauty without deformity displays the contrast. It also actively separates intelligible features from their material admixtures, rather than merely receiving purified objects ready-made.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.4.11, PDF pp. 334–335.** Simple intellectual touch is a positive metaphor, distinct from the rejected bodily mechanism.
- **VIII.5.1, PDF pp. 338–339.** Point, extent and their combination all fail to explain knowledge by physical traversal.
- **VIII.5.2, PDF pp. 340–341.** The Plotinian sufficiency argument removes the nonknowing remainder and emphasizes abstraction.

In this edition.

At VIII.5.1 the source correction tactu, replacing actu, is decisive: the hypothesis requires contact, not merely actuality. “Infinitely,” “almost innumerably” and “so to speak” preserve the deliberately excessive reductio rather than asserting a completed physical infinity.

See also.

Bodily points and the seat of understanding; The whole mind and the measure of equality; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction

Transmission of form and natural order

Latin: *tradere*; *adimere*; *sumere*; *species*; *naturae ordo*; *propinquitas*; *potentior*; *melior*; *moles*

The word.

Tradere transmits or hands on, adimere removes, and sumere receives or takes up. Propinquitas is nearness, here explicitly ordered by nature rather than spatial distance. Greater power and goodness concern form, not merely greater bodily bulk, moles.

In the Platonic Theology.

The book’s final argument excludes conversion into body by examining how body receives form through soul. V.15.25–27 presents the order as supreme essence or beauty, rational soul, derivative life and body. The argument must preserve both a real communication to lower beings and the identity of the higher giver.

The first premise carefully orders two relations often confused by a spatial picture. Soul joins a body occupying a place, but does not itself join by occupying an adjacent place or becoming a divisible segment. Eternal principles likewise are not situated in a spatial region. Soul’s being prior and nearer to them means greater participation in the natural order. Because of that priority it is affected more fully before body receives a mediated form. “Before” is explanatory priority here, not necessarily the claim that one event occurs several seconds earlier.

V.15.25 explicitly gives both universal and particular applications: the animated world and each animal within it. The proposed change into body must operate within that same order, since no body arises without receiving form through soul. The difficult formula “soul through soul would become body” makes the circular requirement audible. The agent whose identity is to be lost is also the necessary continuing agent of the proposed result.

Keeping the repeated anima is therefore philosophically useful rather than a stylistic blemish to remove.

The next unit tests whether a body could obtain its form without that dependence. If it receives none, it does not come to be; if it receives with the same immediacy as soul, it occupies soul's rank rather than the bodily rank under consideration. Ficino is relying on his hierarchy of modes of reception, so this is not a free-standing proof against every conceivable theory of matter. Within that hierarchy there is no fitting mediator between supreme immutable life and the last vivified term except vivifying soul.

Transmission and removal are consequently opposed causal descriptions. Soul gives form to a body while keeping the form by which it gives. Conversion into body would require stripping the soul of its own superior form. One act cannot both preserve and remove that mediating condition in the needed respect. The final extension to irrational life uses the same pattern: a lower effect cannot be produced by abolishing the higher source that its production presupposes.

The closing association of power and goodness does not reduce superiority to force. These natures are stronger through the form by which they are better; they do not grow more powerful by adding spatial volume. The distinction completes the book's contrast between divisible persistence of body and self-maintaining life of soul. It also supplies a useful cross-reference back to teaching: communicating an intelligible form need not be a material transfer that impoverishes the giver.

Places to Read.

- **V.15.25, PDF 122–123.** Natural priority and nonspatial nearness establish soul's mediation of bodily form.
- **V.15.26, PDF 122–123.** The alternatives of bypassing soul or removing its form both fail on Ficino's premises.
- **V.15.27, PDF 124–125.** The same protection extends against conversion into irrational life and excludes power-by-bulk.

In this edition.

The source treats ut anima per animam corpus fieret conditionally from its context: if soul became body, it would have to do so through soul. The difficult repetition is not silently deleted. The editorial subdivisions V.15.26–27 preserve the continuation of the source paragraph (PDF 403–404).

See also.

Soul as universal bond; Teaching without loss; Conversion, desire and compulsion

Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles

Latin: *veritas*; *ratio*; *scientia*; *punctum*; *linea*; *superficies*; *quantitas*; *immutabilis*

The word.

Veritas here concerns the genuine being and intelligible integrity of things as well as the correctness of knowing. Ratio can be a universal account or the reasoning power that judges. Mathematical point, line and surface are defined through the absence of respectively length, breadth and depth.

In the Platonic Theology.

Truth cannot be corporeal, Ficino argues, since God, angels and numbers are true without being bodies. He then makes the stronger claim that truth is not properly in bodies: matter supplies no determinate species, and form in matter has its power impaired by admixture and extraneous conditions. Mathematical exactness offers his example. A true circle on a true plane is said to roll continuously because it touches at an indivisible point. That historical physical inference should not be mistaken for a modern mechanics result; its local function is to contrast exact intelligible figures with sensed bodies.

A further argument separates the account of quantity from quantitative extent. The entire account of circle applies to a small circle as to a large one; the entire account of length applies to a short line as to a long one. Thus an account of an extended thing is not itself extended in the same manner. Universal principles are also described as immutable, whereas bodies change. Knowledge directed toward those principles and the truth it possesses are consequently classed as incorporeal.

Reason, rather than a particular sense, judges what truth is and what stands nearer to it. This does not imply that the chapter’s sensory examples disappear; it assigns them a limited evidential role. The subsequent description of truth as food depends on this argument about the character of its object.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.2.7, PDF pp. 302–303.** God, angels, numbers, exact geometry and universal accounts supply distinct arguments for incorporeal truth.
- **VIII.2.8, PDF pp. 304–305.** Reason judges truth and the soul is said to feed upon its incorruptibility.
- **VIII.4.11, PDF pp. 334–335.** Truth is defined through correspondence of things and minds.

In this edition.

Spiritibus at VIII.2.7 means incorporeal spirits, unlike spiritus at VIII.2.3. The qualifying forte and saltem quantum spectat ad sensum accompany the claim about geometrical principles in bodies. They should not be omitted to create a stronger unqualified statement.

See also.

Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Simplicity of human and numerical species; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences

Unity, dispersion and the inward bond

Latin: *dispersio*; *distantia*; *extensio*; *copula*; *compages*; *consonantia*; *substantia copulatrix*

The word.

Copula is a bond; compages a joined structure. Consonantia and concordia express agreement without requiring literal sound. Substantia copulatrix is a substance performing the binding, distinguishable from the copulatum, the thing bound.

In the Platonic Theology.

Body is described as dispersed in three ways: distance separates its parts, temporal succession changes its conditions, and contrary qualities resist one another. Extension,

perpetual motion and qualitative contrariety therefore undermine unity, constancy and concord. Yet actual bodies do possess a binding of parts. Ficino infers an additional power that unites distance, arrests flux and holds discordant qualities in simple concord.

If that binder were itself a body, it would need another binder, and so on. Soul is therefore identified as the inward binding substance or its power, rather than as the composite it binds. In an animal the concrete example is the joining of contrary humours and diverse members; departure of soul dissolves the arrangement. A form divided through body cannot supply the missing stability either, because, as the Platonists hold, it loses simplicity and constancy along with the body. The argument does not say no bodily unity exists; it argues that bodily nature considered by itself is insufficient to account for the unity that does exist.

Places to Read.

- **VI.8.1, VI.8.2, VI.8.3; source PDF pp. 186, 187**. Spatial, temporal and qualitative dispersions are distinguished.
- **VI.8.4, VI.8.5, VI.8.6; source PDF pp. 186, 187, 188, 189**. Actual cohesion requires an undispersed binder beyond body and divided bodily form.

In this edition.

The three verbs unit, sistit and continet answer three problems rather than merely repeating “unifies.” The apparatus reads VI.8.6’s quod with alio continente: the required containing principle stays one. Historical elemental physics and humoral physiology remain the premises of the example.

See also.

Earth, wood and severed stones; Rennet, magnet and clock

Universality, law, and material restriction

Latin: *universalis*; *singularis*; *regula*; *lex*; *astringere*; *alligare*; *insidiae*

The word.

Universal power applies across many individuals; singular conditions fix an object to this place, time and instance. A rule or law is universal by its scope, not because it is physically present as one inscription everywhere. Astringere and alligare describe restriction; insidiae gives matter the figurative role of a source of snares.

In the Platonic Theology.

Ficino reasons from the receiver’s mode: a body or a form extended through body is bound to particular circumstances. Even an intrinsically universal form would therefore become particularized in such a subject. Its operation would then produce only singular thinking. An intellect constituted in this way could picture Socrates or Plato but could not apprehend the humanity common to both.

Rules of conduct, arts and law make the consequence concrete. A principle that applies to many cases cannot be reduced to a picture of one case as such. The argument does not say that law contains no references to particular people or circumstances; it says the act of generalizing cannot be explained by material singularity alone.

The second unit adds that universal forms arise naturally, even without prior choice or habitual exercise. Mind is therefore their natural source and receptacle. Their

nonrestriction to a proper portion of matter supports the inference that mind too is not materially bound. Corruption is then associated with matter's snares. This inference belongs to Ficino's account of material dependence and does not establish that everything a person calls a general rule is true.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.8.1, PDF pp. 346–347.** The sequence receiver–form–operation–product leads from material singularity to the impossibility of universal rules.
- **VIII.8.2, PDF pp. 346–347.** Natural production and reception of universals is connected to incorruptibility.

In this edition.

"Even if" and "at least" preserve the counterfactual precision: forms universal in themselves would become particular at least in the proposed bodily receiver. Quotidie emphasizes their recurring natural production, rather than a single exceptional act.

See also.

Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement

Virtue as an indivisible quality

Latin: *virtus*; *qualitas*; *indivisibilis*; *individuus*; *speculativus*; *moralis*

The word.

Virtus here primarily means intellectual or ethical excellence, rather than merely effective power. It is a qualitas because its presence characterizes a soul while the soul can remain without it. Individuus and indivisibilis both mean indivisible in this argument, not an individual person.

In the Platonic Theology.

The proof starts with a dilemma: a bodily quality touching a divisible region would share its division; one touching only a point would be a quality of that point rather than of the body. Ficino then proposes that the soul is the subject of an indivisible quality, virtue, so cannot itself be a body.

He separates virtues in intellect from virtues in appetite, including rational and irrational appetite. His contemplative group comprises wisdom of divine things, knowledge of nature, civil prudence and skill in human works. His moral group comprises justice, which gives each what is due, courage, which removes fear's impediment, and temperance, which repels the softness of desire. These descriptions are attributed to Plato. The local classification should be preserved even where it differs from a reader's customary modern division of "theoretical" and "practical."

Magnitude is denied to both groups: a large person need not be wiser or more just, and knowledge of a large body is not simply a larger piece of knowledge. Subsequent arguments from sudden attainment, indivisible end and coexistence without spatial interference develop the premise of indivisibility. Finally, soul is not merely a passive subject receiving these qualities; it is also their principle. Ficino gives that productive role special weight in the immortality inference.

Places to Read.

- **VIII.3.1, PDF pp. 306–307.** The point-or-region dilemma is followed by the classification and definitions of virtues.
- **VIII.3.6, PDF pp. 310–311.** Indivisible origin and end are joined to coexistence without confusion.
- **VIII.3.8, PDF pp. 314–315.** Soul is both subject and source of virtues; its magnitude is rejected as a mistaken question.

In this edition.

The edition translates both individuus and indivisibilis as “indivisible” here. In VIII.3.8, speculativa fugit and moralis fugat deliberately differ: contemplation flees mortal things, while moral virtue drives them away.

See also.

Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre; Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare; Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment

Vital harmony and its producer

Latin: *harmonia*; *concinnitas*; *consonantia*; *contemperare*; *temperatrix*; *vivificus spiritus*

The word.

The local glosses distinguish harmony, fitting arrangement and concord. *Contemperare* is tempering constituents together in a definite manner. A *temperatrix* is the power that tempers; it is not the tempered concord itself.

In the Platonic Theology.

Every composite body has some agreement of its parts. If harmony as such were soul, every composite would live. The defender therefore narrows the claim to a harmony tempered in a proper, definite manner. Ficino replies that the qualification has introduced something not contained in the bare account of concord: otherwise all concord would already have that vital character.

The required determination comes from another principle. Ficino explicitly asks about an external source and answers affirmatively, but immediately adds that an external source alone is insufficient. Constant and natural tempering requires a superior power at work inwardly among the humors. This power renders their arrangement definite and distinct from that of other bodies. The resulting proper concord is called vital harmony, generated by a life-giving spirit hidden within.

The conclusion thus retains a real vital harmony as an effect. “Soul is not harmony” cannot be expanded into “living bodies have no harmony,” and “generated by life-giving spirit” cannot be inverted to make that spirit merely a product of humoral concord. The use of *spiritus* here requires caution. Chapter 6 explicitly describes a bodily spirit as medium; this chapter emphasizes an inward life-giving source and its superiority to the concord produced. The supplied wording does not by itself settle every ontological relation between these formulations.

Places to Read.

- **VII.6.1, PDF 256–257**. The earlier physiological spirit provides a comparison that must retain its separate context.

- **VII.11.1, PDF 272–273**. The general-composite objection and qualified-harmony reply lead to an inward tempering power.

In this edition.

The edition deliberately renders *harmonia*, *consonantia* and *concinnitas* differently. The explicit question and *Immo vero* prevent the movement from external principle to inward continuing agency from disappearing into a paraphrase. No Greek words are printed in this argument.

See also.

Harmony and the strings; Bodily spirit and mediation; Bodily constitution and temperament

Vital motion, action and passion

Latin: *vicissitudo*; *actio*; *passio*; *vita se generans*; *motus vitalis*; *adventitius*

The word.

Vicissitudo is alternation or succession. Actio and passio distinguish source-activity from received motion. Adventitius is acquired from outside or added, contrasted with life possessed through the soul's own nature. "Life generating itself" describes a qualified vital activity, not an uncaused creation of essence from nothing.

In the Platonic Theology.

After answering the integrated-whole objection, Ficino clarifies what psychic self-motion means. It is not soul acting upon itself and being acted upon as distinct poles of a transitive event. Motio here is the natural alternation of its essence through successive affections, with no other thing pushing it along. Fire's being hot provides the comparison: it is hot without an external heater or one part donating heat to another. The comparison concerns intrinsic exercise, not a claim that soul is literal fire.

The causal argument then distinguishes an agent's act within itself from its communication of act. If soul gives the animal power to pass from rest into activity, it must exercise that vital progression first and more fully in itself. Heat is hot before heating another matter; animate bodies conceive within themselves before bringing forth offspring. Causal priority and the temporal imagery of generation support the claim that the source possesses what it communicates. Soul's own unfolding from potency into act is consequently called self-motion, without making it the creator of its previously absent essence.

VI.12.11 explicitly attributes to the Platonists the distinction between action and passion. Motion in soul is action because it occurs in its source and forms and moves body. In body the movement is received and therefore passion. The relation is extended to universal soul and the world's body without turning cosmic matter into a primary self-mover. "Perfect" and "imperfect" in this comparison describe source and derivative activity within the genus of motion. They do not imply that every human judgement is infallible.

Asked by what kind of motion the soul is chiefly moved, the Platonists answer neither a corporeal motion, nor an imaginable motion, nor a cognitive motion, but one according to vital essence. The reasons correspond to the exclusions: soul is incorporeal, lacks bodily figure, and, in the source's stark wording, "does not know itself." The account must retain that last phrase rather than silently making primary life continuous reflective consciousness. It immediately goes on to contrast mind in potency with life in act. Particular understanding is not always being exercised, whereas the essence lives

throughout. Particular vital powers and acts can also vary, lapse or go astray while the soul remains alive.

This resolves the apparent contradiction that soul is always moved and not always moved. Essential vital actuality persists; intellectual and other determinate operations need not. The distinction is among essence, powers and acts, not among several separate souls. It also means that “perfect motion at its source” cannot be translated as every operation always correctly performed. The later catalogue includes explicit reflection on oneself as one psychic activity, so the local denial of cognitive primary motion should not be generalized into a denial of every possible self-knowledge throughout the work.

The expression “life generating and producing itself” is introduced as the Platonists’ own wording and read through this inward vital unfolding. It does not retract VI.1.6’s incorporeal producer. Nor is it identical with the finite self-generation rejected in VI.12.14, which would require the same thing both to possess and lack the being it creates and to precede itself as its own begetter. VI.12.20’s further qualifications concerning psychic generation and corruption likewise prevent a literal contradiction. The unresolved interpretive pressure of non cognitivo, ignorat enim se ipsam remains visible, but its immediate context supplies a disciplined limit on both overconfident self-transparency and overconfident denial of self-awareness.

Places to Read.

- **VI.12.10; source PDF pp. 210, 211**. Self-motion is natural succession rather than transitive self-affection.
- **VI.12.11; source PDF pp. 212, 213**. Action in soul and passion in body establish causal asymmetry.
- **VI.12.12; source PDF pp. 212, 213**. Essential vital activity is distinguished from intermittent and fallible powers and acts.

In this edition.

“Life generating and producing itself” is introduced as the Platonists’ words. The edition keeps the difficult non cognitivo, ignorat enim se ipsam without doctrinal expansion. Read it with the immediate contrast between life in act and mind in potency, rather than silently replacing it with a thesis of uninterrupted reflective consciousness.

See also.

Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent

Whole presence and vital intensity

Latin: *tota*; *adesse*; *localis diffusio*; *vitalis intensio*; *intensius*; *remissius*; *porrigere*

The word.

The repeated *tota* means the whole soul, not the aggregate of spatial soul-pieces. *Vitalis intensio* concerns life-giving intensity; *localis diffusio* is extension through places. Stronger activity in one organ does not make a larger fraction of soul reside there.

In the Platonic Theology.

A bodily part cannot equal the bodily whole, so a form spread dimensionally through body cannot be wholly present in each part. Ficino contrasts this limitation with the soul’s

awareness of a localized injury. The same soul turns eye, hand and mouth toward a hurt foot; it therefore senses there while remaining the source of life and action elsewhere.

The comparison with whiteness sharpens the distinction. A patch of white can be stained without all whiteness changing. In the living being, however, an occurrence in a tiny bodily part concerns the whole soul. Ficino invokes Augustine's account: soul extends by vital intensity rather than local diffusion, whole in all and whole in each, neither smaller in smaller parts nor larger in larger ones. More and less intensity are allowed without quantitative partition. Awareness of one touched spot does not require the touch to spread through the body, and attention there does not require abandonment of the other living parts.

This is not an assertion that every injury physically affects every organ. Its point is precisely the combination of localized bodily affection and unified awareness. The ensuing objection relocates a principal judge to the brain and proposes successive reports through soul-parts; the following unit rejects that division. "Whole everywhere" consequently belongs to a disputed account of the soul's presence, not a casual synonym for bodily omnipresence.

The force of "whole" can be missed if it is translated into a collective formula such as "all the soul's parts eventually learn of the injury." Ficino's claim is the opposite: the soul is not divided into spatially assigned knowers that must exchange their private experiences. The complete judging subject is already present where the event occurs. That same complete subject continues animating uninjured members, which is why eye, hand and mouth can cooperate without becoming parts of the foot's bodily lesion.

The Augustine passage adds a useful simultaneous case. If the touched event happened elsewhere as well, both would be known to the whole soul. The soul need not leave one location, travel to another and return with a report. Nor does one event's being known require that the physical event occur throughout the organism. This separates three claims that are easily confused: the affection has a determinate bodily site; awareness belongs to the whole soul; and the same soul remains present to the body's other living parts. The case of two events demonstrates why the account cannot be reduced to a temporary concentration of soul in a single location.

The language of intensity permits difference without division. An operation may be more vigorous or an organ better suited to its exercise, while soul is no larger there. The contrast is not between equal and unequal shares of a spatial substance; it is between ways of manifesting a power whose source is undivided. That is why the translation's paired *intensius* and *remissius* must remain beside the explicit denial of greater and smaller soul in greater and smaller members. Dropping either half would make the passage sound like either uniform bodily extension or an unexplained denial of all organic difference.

The later physiological account also prevents a false consequence. Whole soul in each member does not say that every member performs every sensory function in the same way. Chapter 6 calls touch universal throughout the members, while assigning hearing and vision their particular media and instruments. Whole presence of the animating and judging subject is compatible with differentiated organs. The precise explanation of how those roles fit together belongs to Ficino's account; one should not replace it with a flat claim that the foot literally sees because the whole soul is there.

This distinction is important when the text shifts to severed creatures. Whole presence in the organized animal and survival in a detached member are different questions. The next unit expressly denies that more perfect souls live in separate members lacking their

requisite organs. It also allows the original low animal soul to perish when its bodily framework dissolves. Thus the whole-presence argument concerns how a soul animates and knows within its living body; it does not, by itself, establish every soul's continued existence after that body is dismembered.

Places to Read.

- **VII.5.1, PDF 248–249**. Coordinated response to an injured foot introduces whole presence.
- **VII.5.2, PDF 250–251**. Whiteness and Augustine's vital intensity distinguish local change from unified awareness.
- **VII.5.3, PDF 252–253**. The reply to successive reporting concludes with whole immediate coordination.

In this edition.

The Augustine passage is an attribution made by Ficino, not an independently collated quotation here. *Aurelius* names the same authority at its close. The edition's "more intense" and "less intense" preserve a distinction from greater and smaller spatial extension.

See also.

Pain, location and reporting; Injury and the uninjured judge; Severed animals and replacement souls

Zoroaster and the mistress of life

Latin: *Zoroaster*; *immortalis manet*; *vitae domina*; *pedisequa*; *ἀθάνατος*; *δεσπότις*

The word.

The Greek quotation says that the soul remains immortal and is mistress of life. Despotis is feminine, corresponding to Latin domina. Ficino's own gloss makes life the soul's attendant, not a superior master that may abandon it.

In the Platonic Theology.

At V.14.6 Ficino attributes to Zoroaster a line he treats as summing up the preceding argument. Its authority reinforces the claim that soul departs at bodily death rather than perishes. He then expands the sense: soul remains immortal because life follows it as light follows the sun and streaming hair a comet.

The image complements the two permissible accounts in V.14.3. Whether soul is life itself or has life as its inseparable attendant, its essential relation to life differentiates it from a recipient that loses life. The quoted line therefore belongs within an argument already developed, not in place of the argument.

The next unit still gives the Strato/Epicurean objection. The quotation does not end debate by authority. The meaning of "does not receive death" must be clarified against the possibility that the soul simply disappears. The lexicon's attribution is consequently precise: this is a Greek line Ficino assigns to Zoroaster, printed and glossed in the supplied edition, rather than an independently authenticated historical utterance by Zoroaster.

Places to Read.

- **V.14.3, V.14.5, V.14.6, PDF 96–97.** The preferred life account, the fire distinction and the quoted summation.
- **V.14.7, PDF 98–99.** The subsequent objection shows that clarification remains necessary.

In this edition.

The apparatus says M1482 and G1559 have feminine δεσπότις and follows Ficino’s domina. The Greek quotation and its gloss are recorded separately in the Greek register. This is the only Greek-script quotation found in the Book V Latin units.

See also.

Life and vivification; Contraries, death and imperishability; Comets and defining accounts

Latin vocabulary register

Each record defines a lemma, lexical family, contrast or significant phrase and explains its local work. Headwords can be dictionary forms. Printed forms are attestations verified in the cited source units; they are not a claim to list every inflection or every occurrence. Several contextual explanations can belong to one grouped record.

a / b: geometrical labels. Printed forms: *a*; *b*.

Labels of the endpoints in the hypothetical model of a line-shaped comparing power. The labels distinguish cognitive access at separate endpoints; they are not the names of substances or Latin technical nouns. The letter a also occurs independently as a preposition. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

ab anima. Printed forms: *ab anima*.

From soul, with no following terrae in the corrected reading. The edition applies an authorial deletion; the terrestrial context does not license silently restoring the removed printed word. References: VI.8.7. See Earth, wood and severed stones.

abire / discedere. Printed forms: *abeunte*; *abit*; *Abit*; *discedit*.

To depart, leave or withdraw. A form leaving matter may perish, but soul’s departure from body is distinguished from loss of its own life. References: V.8.2, V.8.4, V.14.1, V.14.6. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

abluere; abstergere; caro. Printed forms: *Ablue*; *absterge*; *carnes*; *Carneum*.

To wash and wipe clean; flesh or fleshly. Removing the clods reveals the underlying body in the analogy for stripping away misleading psychic accretions. References: VI.2.2. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

absolute. Printed forms: *absoluta*; *absolutam*; *absolutas*; *absolute*; *absolutis*; *absolutum*; *absolutus*.

Without a specified restriction; sometimes free from matter or determinate modal qualification. Soul’s being without a bodily condition still depends on God; common absolute being is distinguished from a particular mode. References: V.8.3, V.9.3, V.9.4, V.10.1, V.11.1, V.12.14, V.13.3, V.13.4, V.13.5. See Through itself and through another.

absolutus. Printed forms: *absoluta*; *absolutam*; *absolutaque*; *absolutus*.

Released or unrestricted relative to the conditions specified in a passage. The abstract intellect’s freedom from material conditions differs from God’s absolute infinity, so the adjective alone does not establish divine identity. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

absque materia / paries. Printed forms: *absque rerum ipsarum materia*; *pariete*; *parietis*.

Reception without the objects’ own matter, illustrated by a wall. Sight receives the wall’s color-image without receiving the wall itself, distinguishing cognition from bodily incorporation. References: VII.13.1. See Spiritual images and light.

abstractio / abstrahere. Printed forms: *abstractione*; *abstrahit*.

Release of intelligible content from singular material restrictions. The abstract form first represents universal nature, and intellect actively abstracts rather than merely undergoing a bodily impression. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

absurdus / repugnare. Printed forms: *absurdissimum*; *absurdius*; *absurdum*; *repugnans*; *repugnantia*; *repugnat*.

Absurd or incompatible, a verdict supported locally by a contradiction or failed causal condition. The repeated objections test whether a hypothesis can preserve the nature it describes; the label is Ficino’s argumentative assessment. References: V.4.9, V.8.4, V.9.3, V.12.2, V.12.13, V.13.15. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

accedere; discedere. Printed forms: *accedente*; *accessum*; *discessum*.

To arrive or depart. Characteristic bodily operations occur with soul’s presence and cease upon departure, identifying it as their principle. References: VI.4.6. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

accendere / effulgere. Printed forms: *accendere*; *accensus*; *effulgeat*.

To kindle and to shine forth. A fiery vapor belongs to Ficino’s comet account, while actual shining distinguishes an existing comet from its definition. References: V.7.1, V.13.5. See Comets and defining accounts.

accidens. Printed forms: *accidens*; *accidens quoddam compositum*; *accidentibus*; *accidentis*.

An accident or dependent feature distinct from substance. Operative power is a quality/accident; bodily harmony is likewise a composite accident and is challenged as an account of rational soul. References: V.13.13, V.15.10. See Creature, power and operation.

An accidental determination inhering in a subject rather than constituting its essential account. A proper subject of an accident must actually exist, and extraneous accidents restrict form in matter; the word does not mean a chance mishap in these passages. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.13.1. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

accidens adveniens. Printed forms: *accidens*; *adveniat*; *advenit*.

An accident arriving in a subject already complete in its kind. Ficino denies that a sensitive soul arrives this way after a merely nutritive soul has made its organs. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

accidere. Printed forms: *accidat*; *accidere*; *accidit*.

To happen or follow as a consequence, without necessarily meaning a technical accident. The possible dissolution after a broken bond is a consequence considered and rejected for soul. References: V.9.4, V.12.2, V.15.9. See Conditions and the fashioner's law.

accipere. Printed forms: *accepta*; *accipere*; *accipit*.

To take in or receive a figure, image or content. The successive-impression argument contrasts reception of new content with loss or confusion of the old. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

accipere / concipere. Printed forms: *accipiat*; *accipiet*; *concipiat*; *concipiet*.

Receiving a presented form and conceiving an account from it. Ficino requires both stages for completed understanding and uses their distinction against a body fixed to one natural species. References: VIII.10.1. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

accipere / suscipere. Printed forms: *accepta*; *acceptas*; *acceptis*; *accipiendo*; *Accipit*; *accipit*; *suscipi*; *suscipiat*; *suscipiendis*; *suscipit*; *suscipitur*.

Receiving a form, whose result depends upon the recipient's mode of being. Water, mirror and intellect do not all receive in the same way; true intellectual reception need not change mind into a material object. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.5, VIII.7.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

acies / acute videre. Printed forms: *acies*; *acrius*; *acutior*; *acutius*.

Sharp sight or greater acuity of perception. Sharper sight is contrasted with larger eyes, and common sense's superior acuity with dependence on bodily quantity. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

acies mentis / caligo. Printed forms: *acies*; *caligine*; *obnubiletur*.

The mind's sharp gaze and the darkness that can cloud it. Vice obstructs prudence, completing the claim that the perfected moral virtues depend reciprocally upon one another. References: VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

actio / operatio / opus. Printed forms: *Actio*; *actio*; *actione*; *actionibus*; *operantem*; *operatio*; *operationes*; *operationis*; *operatur*; *operi*; *opus*.

Activity, an operation, and a work or function accomplished. An active sensory operation is distinguished from the bodily passion that occasions it; a nutritive work is distinguished from heat's contribution to it. References: VII.6.3, VII.8.1. See Sensation as attentive activity.

actio intima. Printed forms: *Vis actioque agenti alicui intima*.

A power and action inward to an agent. Such an operation is taken to require the agent's substance there, linking local life to soul's presence. References: VI.9.3. See Members, house and sinew.

actio; passio. Printed forms: *actione*; *actionem*; *passionem*.

Activity in its source and movement received in body. The Platonists distinguish these causal roles and extend them to universal soul and the world's body. References: VI.12.11. See Vital motion, action and passion.

actus. Printed forms: *actu*; *actui*; *actum*; *actus*.

Actuality or realized act, distinguished from the potency it actualizes. Being actualizes essence while operation actualizes power; God alone is unrestricted pure act. References: V.7.1, V.11.1, V.11.2, V.13.7, V.13.9, V.13.12. See Creature, power and operation.

actus / actu. Printed forms: *actu*; *actum*; *actus*.

Actuality or realized activity, as distinguished from merely potential availability. The actual point hypothesis fails; completed knowing is an act; God is infinite act in contrast to receptive matter. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.11, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

actus infinitus / potentia infinita. Printed forms: *infinitum actum*; *potentiam infinitam*; *subdita deo*.

Infinite act and infinite potency, with matter expressly subject to God. The contrast makes God productive and matter receptive, preventing their treatment as equal independent first principles. References: VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

actus proprius. Printed forms: *proprie existit actu*; *proprio existet actu*.

Independent actuality as a requirement of a proper subject of an accident. The detached-point hypothesis attributes just such actuality to a boundary, generating the dilemma over a line’s remaining limits. References: VIII.4.2. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

actus rectus / reflexus. Printed forms: *actum rectum*; *actum reflexum*.

The direct act is life; the reflexive act is cognition. Since mind apprehends its enduring species by knowing, Ficino argues that its prior living act has a corresponding enduring capacity. References: VIII.9.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

actus reflexus (return to the particular). Printed forms: *secundo quodam actu atque reflexo*; *sese reflectens*.

A second, reflexive act in which intellect turns back toward a particular object through its image. Ficino says that Platonists and Peripatetics largely hold that intellect first apprehends universal nature and then returns through its act and species to the phantastic image that prompted the conception. This local direct/reflexive contrast differs from VIII.9.1, where the direct act is life and the reflexive act cognition. References: VIII.1.5. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

actus simplex. Printed forms: *actus simplices*.

Simple acts, specifically sensing and understanding. The harmony theory has not identified the constituents whose proportion would explain these activities as it explains bodily goods. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

acuere; obtundere; aperire; claudere. Printed forms: *acuit, obtundit, aperit, claudit*.

To sharpen, blunt, open and close. These concrete regulatory verbs enlarge the evidence for variable psychic agency and should not disappear under a single abstract “control.” References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

ad incorporalia. Printed forms: *ad incorporalia*.

Toward incorporeal things, the corrected object of the denied bodily-form motion. The authorial correction is crucial to the inference that reasoning to higher realities exceeds corporeal nature. References: VI.12.18. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

adaequare. Printed forms: *adaequatur*.

To make equal or bring into complete conformity. The impressed figure’s full conformity to its seal restores the original shape rather than destroys it. References: V.11.6. See Seal, wax and restoration.

adaequatio. Printed forms: *adaequationem*.

An equal fitting or quantitative correspondence between a container and what it contains. The opening bodily model requires a whole to fit a whole and corresponding parts to fit parts. Ficino denies that intellect receives by that dimensional mechanism: the whole intellect apprehends both a whole body and each member. The later adaequatur describes cognitive correspondence, not equal bodily size. References: VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

adimere. Printed forms: *ademptione*; *adimentem*; *adimit*; *amittendo*.

To remove or take away; amittere supplies the corresponding loss. Making soul into body would remove the very form needed to communicate form to body, defeating the proposed change. References: V.15.25, V.15.26, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

adiungere / repellere. Printed forms: *adiungat*; *repellatque*.

To join together and repel. The soul’s activity joins like to like and resists what harms the living organization. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

adventitius. Printed forms: *adventitiam*; *ex se ipsa possidet vitam*.

Added or received from outside, contrasted with life possessed through oneself. The passage describes life as intrinsic to soul’s nature without retracting its dependence on an incorporeal producer. References: VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

advertere / admovere / clamare. Printed forms: *admovetur*; *advertitur*; *clamat*.

To turn toward, bring near and cry out. These ordinary actions supply evidence of coordinated response rather than a merely theoretical assertion of soul’s unity. References: VII.5.1. See Pain, location and reporting.

Aegyptii / Pythagorei. Printed forms: *Aegyptios*; *Pythagoreosque*.

Egyptians and Pythagoreans as the traditions behind the reported lower-soul permanence doctrine. The author describes an inherited explanatory scheme without making it the conclusion of his own present proof. References: V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

aequalis pars / totum. Printed forms: *aequalem*; *aequalis*; *pars*; *toti*.

The relation of part to whole in bodily magnitude. A bodily part cannot equal its whole, whereas the whole soul is argued to be present in each bodily part. References: VII.5.1. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

aequalitas / consonantia. Printed forms: *aequalior*; *aequalitas*; *aequalitate*; *aequalitatem*; *aequalitati*; *aequalitatis*; *consonantia*; *consonantior*; *consonat*.

Evenness, proportional agreement and harmony. The Magian account links the soul’s self-agreement to truth and goodness, illustrated by circularity and tuning. Later, equality itself is a standard used by mind when judging different participants, not an enlarged bodily measure. References: VIII.2.4, VIII.6.1. See Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

aequalitas summa. Printed forms: *aequalitatem summam*; *aequalitatis ipsius*; *summae aequalitati*.

Supreme equality as the standard of more and less equal things. Mind mediates cognitively between participants and equality itself; its qualified matching to the standard does not make it God. References: VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

aequaliter; aeque; aequare. Printed forms: *aequans*; *aequari*; *aeque*.

Equally, matching or coinciding, with the respect specified by context. Equal relation to all parts concerns the unlocated point, exact coincidence concerns bodies in place, and matching size belongs to the rejected quantitative soul hypothesis. References: VI.2.19, VI.9.1, VI.13.3. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

aequare in loco. Printed forms: *in eodem loco*; *invicem aequari*.

To coincide entirely in the same place. The proof denies exact bodily co-occupation, not merely ordinary mixing of parts. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

aequari / aequare. Printed forms: *aequabitur*; *aequantur*; *aequare*; *aequari*; *aequat*; *aequatur*.

Equalling or matching, by quantity or by cognitive correspondence according to context. Bodies cannot match every magnitude at once; mind matches different objects by understanding and is only qualifiedly matched to infinity. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.13, VIII.6.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.16.3. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

aequatio. Printed forms: *aequationem*.

A matching or correspondence, here between mind and what it knows. Ficino argues that knowledge is perfected through a certain correspondence and that knowing infinity therefore requires a qualified matching capacity. This is a premise of his philosophical argument, not a claim that defining infinity yields infinitely much information. References: VIII.16.3. See Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing.

aes / aeneus. Printed forms: *Aeneus*; *aeris*; *aes*.

Bronze and made of bronze, the common material of different representations. A bronze horse and human figure differ through impressed likeness, not through the bronze shared by both. References: V.8.1. See Form and formal being.

aetas perfecta. Printed forms: *aetate adulta*; *aetate perfecta*.

Perfected or adult age. The imagined person is mature immediately, removing the bodily disturbance Ficino assigns to childhood cognition. References: VI.2.12. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

aeternus / aeternitas. Printed forms: *aeternitas*; *aeternus*.

Eternal or eternity, here inferred from independence of nourishment or stable contemplative being. The no-food alternative is brief and conditional; the repose argument derives eternity from the mode of perfection. Neither cancels the elsewhere explicit future-only alternative. References: VIII.2.2, VIII.11.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

affectus; imaginatio. Printed forms: *affectu*; *imaginatione corporali*.

Affective engagement and bodily imagination. They are among the activities from which attention is to be withdrawn for the proposed intellectual experiment. References: VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

affigere / coniungere. Printed forms: *affigitur*; *coniungi*.

To fasten to, or join with. Light is said not to be fixed to a body but able to join the light of our spirit. The two relations are not interchangeable. References: VII.1.3. See Spiritual images and light.

affigere; avellere. Printed forms: *affiguntur terrae*; *avulsa*.

To be attached to earth and torn away. The reported Platonist account ties growth plus unity to attachment, while only unity persists after severance. References: VI.8.7. See Earth, wood and severed stones.

affigere; situs. Printed forms: *affixum*; *determinato situ*.

To attach; determinate position. The fourth theory removes attachment to any member while retaining causal dependence on body or matter. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

affirmare esse. Printed forms: *affirmabit esse se ipsam*; *esse se prorsus incorporalem*.

To affirm one’s existence, then one’s incorporeality. The second inference depends on Ficino’s account of uncorrupted natural judgement, not solely the first assertion. References: VI.2.12. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

affirmare; asserere; asseverare. Printed forms: *affirmabit*; *affirmare*; *affirmari*; *affirmat*; *affirmatur*; *affirmetur*; *asseras*; *asseres*; *asseri*; *asserit*; *asseritur*; *asseverabimus*; *asseverabit*; *asseveraret*.

To affirm, assert or maintain a proposition. The verbs can introduce an opponent’s hypothesis, the imagined adult’s self-affirmation, or Ficino’s own inference; who asserts and under what condition determines the force. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.8, VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.5.2, VI.5.4, VI.8.5, VI.12.4, VI.12.6, VI.12.7. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

agens; patiens. Printed forms: *ab agente in patiens*; *agat et patiatur*.

Agent and recipient in a transitive causal passage. Ficino denies that psychic self-motion requires acting upon oneself in this manner. References: VI.12.10. See Vital motion, action and passion.

agentis virtus. Printed forms: *agentis virtute solummodo*.

The agent’s or producer’s effective power. In the attested phrase, solummodo adds solely or alone; that exclusivity does not come from agentis virtus by itself. This excludes matter’s contributory beginning, capacity and tinder without excluding dependence on the higher producer. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

agere / efficere. Printed forms: *agendi*; *agens*; *agente*; *agentis*; *agit*; *efficit*; *efficitur*.

To act or bring about an effect, and the acting agent. The book distinguishes natural production, creation and inward activity rather than making every agent a creator from nothing. References: V.4.1, V.4.6, V.5.2, V.5.3, V.6.1, V.10.2, V.13.5, V.13.13. See Creature, power and operation.

agere / operari. Printed forms: *agendi*; *agit*; *operandi*; *operantur*; *operaretur*; *operari*; *operatur*; *operentur*; *operetur*.

Acting or operating from a principle, with the agent's form determining the activity's mode. The substance-operation arguments move from the breadth and inward character of intellectual activity toward the nature of the mind that acts. References: VIII.8.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3. See Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance.

agere / pati. Printed forms: *actiones*; *agendas*; *agere*; *Agit*; *agit*; *agitur*; *pati*.

To act and to undergo modification. The soul's heightened animating activity is distinguished from the bodily impact that occasions it. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

agere in corpore; per corpus; per se. Printed forms: *agit in corpore*; *agit per corpus*; *operatur etiam per se ipsam*.

The three modes of operation: within body, by bodily mediation and through the soul itself. The prepositions organize the book's programme and prevent conflating nutrition, sensation and understanding. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

agere; operari. Printed forms: *agant*; *agat*; *agente*; *agentem*; *agenti*; *agentis*; *agere*; *agit*; *agunt*; *operatur*; *operetur*.

To act or operate, with the mode and medium specified by the local construction. Acting in body, through body and through oneself differ; a bodily effect's action is derivative, whereas immanent psychic operation belongs to its inward source. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.10, VI.4.6, VI.9.3, VI.12.5, VI.12.10, VI.12.18, VI.13.11. See Three offices and the order of proof.

aggredi / exponere / ostendere. Printed forms: *aggrediemur*; *exposuerimus*; *ostenderimus*; *ostendimus*; *ostendit*.

Beginning an inquiry, setting out its structure and showing a conclusion. The opening explicitly announces a third proof-route through understanding and makes the account of cognitive faculties its preliminary task. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.5, VIII.3.1. See Four stages of cognition.

aggredi / spirare. Printed forms: *aggredietur*; *spirabit*.

To undertake or attack, and to breathe. Bold action and continued breathing extend the reductio across practical and elementary vital activities. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

agilis; agilitas; celeritas. Printed forms: *agile*; *agilia*; *agilis*; *celeritas*; *celeriter*; *facillime*.

Agile, swift or readily acting, and swiftness. The bodily soul hypothesis uses extreme subtlety and agility to explain permeation, then faces the objection that such a body would be too unstable for memory. References: VI.1.5, VI.13.1, VI.13.7. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

agnoscere / cognoscere. Printed forms: *agnoscat*; *agnoscit*; *cognoscere*; *cognoscet*; *cognosci*; *cognoscit*.

Recognizing or knowing, whose object and mode determine its philosophical force. The Platonists deny genuine knowledge of substance to phantasy, yet intellect's priority toward universals does not prevent knowledge of particulars. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.1. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

albedo / inficere / foedare. Printed forms: *albedini*; *albedinisque*; *foedari*; *infici*; *pollutis*.

Whiteness, staining, disfiguring and pollution as local changes of a bodily quality. One white region can be stained while the rest remains white; soul's whole awareness differs from this divided distribution. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

alere / nutrire. Printed forms: *alendum*; *ali*; *alitur*; *enutritur*; *nutriendi*; *nutriri*; *nutriuntur*.

Nourishing or feeding, literally bodily or analogically intellectual. The chapter distinguishes the food assimilated by body from the truth that nourishes mind, while allowing bodily condition to affect attention. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

alienare / purgare. Printed forms: *alienato*; *purgato*.

To estrange from and to purify. The philosophical discipline removes habitual bodily preoccupation so that mind can attend to stable intelligibles. References: V.15.9. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

alienus / extraneus. Printed forms: *aliena*; *alienis*; *extraneis*.

What is foreign, another's or externally added, relative to the nature under discussion. Bodily reception risks replacement or admixture by foreign qualities; the intellectual account can exclude accidental external conditions without losing essential content. References: VIII.7.1, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.3. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

alimentum / alere. Printed forms: *alat*; *alimento*.

Nourishment and nourishing. An eternal spiritual recipient or object does not need to destroy another for food; bodily hidden nutrition later tests deliberate control. References: V.8.3, V.14.2. See Reception and the receiver.

alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus. Printed forms: *alimenta*; *alimentis*; *Alimentum*; *alimonia*; *alimoniam*; *cibis*; *cibo*; *cibus*; *esca*; *Escam*; *escam*.

Nourishment, sustaining fare or food, with several near-synonymous Latin choices. The varied food vocabulary maintains the analogy from bodily assimilation to intellectual truth without making the processes physically identical. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.2, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum. Printed forms: *Alimentum*; *alimonia*; *nutrimentum*.

Food, nourishment and what feeds the hypothetical soul-body. The distinctions lead from whether food lives to how its nature is assimilated, rather than asserting ordinary eating consumes immortal souls. References: VI.13.3, VI.13.4. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

aliud aliud. Printed forms: *aliud potius aliud*.

One thing moving another, numerically distinct thing. This fails the strict identity required for primary self-motion even if both belong to one composite body. References: VI.12.4. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

alligare / addicere. Printed forms: *addicta*; *alligata*; *alligatur*.

To bind or subject to another's control. Freedom from bodily bonds is inferred from self-directed activity; the temperament objection imagines the mind bound to mutable body. References: V.5.8, V.15.13. See Inclination and independence.

alteratio; generatio; corruptio. Printed forms: *alteratio, generatio, corruptio*.

Change of quality, coming-to-be and corruption. These first three motions receive distinct refutations before several remaining motions are reduced to them. References: VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

alteritas. Printed forms: *alteritate*.

Otherness or affecting difference. The encounter with something unlike the body’s established condition calls forth more attentive organ-specific activity. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

alvus / fetus. Printed forms: *alvo*; *fetus*.

Womb and offspring, a maternal image for a quality drawn from material potentiality. The offspring is extended and divided with the material from which it is produced, marking the quality’s dependence. References: V.5.3. See Art and elemental transformation.

amens / mens. Printed forms: *amentibus*; *mens*.

Mindless and mind, forming a pointed verbal contrast. The prohibition against composing mind from mindless parts belongs to the specific reductio of a spatially divided intellectual form. References: VIII.4.5. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

amicitia / disciplina. Printed forms: *amicitia*; *amicitiae*; *disciplina*; *discipuli*; *discipulum*.

Friendship and the learning or pupil relation that recognition adds to a sensory portrait. These relations are not visible colours or shapes; they mark phantasy’s partial reach beyond sensation while remaining particularized. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

amittere. Printed forms: *amissum*; *amittat*; *amittere*; *amittit*.

To lose something previously possessed. Fire loses its form and proper being; the soul’s imagined loss of being is tested against the persistence of essence. References: V.8.1, V.8.2, V.11.2, V.11.3. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

To lose what was previously possessed. A new wax-like impression threatens to erase the older one, making the example a test of memory. References: VII.1.1. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

amittere / deicere. Printed forms: *amittere*; *amittit*; *deicitur*.

Losing a form or being cast down from a settled state. Mind’s reception of forms is argued to preserve its own nature, unlike heated water or a bodily recipient altered into something else. References: VIII.7.1, VIII.13.2. See Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

amittere; quaerere; fugere. Printed forms: *amittere*; *fugam*; *fugiat*; *quaerere*.

To lose, seek and flee. The language personifies perpetual change and qualitative conflict, not conscious decisions by bodily qualities. References: VI.8.3. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

amplexus / complecti / capere. Printed forms: *amplectitur*; *amplexibus*; *capiendo*; *capiunt*; *complectuntur*.

Embracing and receiving, extended to mutual intellectual apprehension. Each mind can consider another and the shared nature of minds without being a larger bodily container. References: VIII.9.1. See Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres.

amplificatio divina. Printed forms: *amplificata*; *amplificatione divina*.

Divine enlargement, the received expansion of mind’s intellectual and vital power. Ficino corrects the suggestion that the power is independently self-owned; God’s absolute infinity continuously supplies and maintains it. References: VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

amplitudo; angustia. Printed forms: *amplitudinem*; *angustiam*; *angustiis*.

Breadth and confinement, paradoxically opposed between spirit and body. Spiritual amplitude is not physical extension; the passage qualifies its infinite narrowness metaphor with ut ita loquar. References: VI.2.6. See Number and spiritual amplitude.

Anaximenes; Diogenes; Critias. Printed forms: *Anaximenes*; *Critias*; *Diogenes Apolloniates*.

Authorities named for the airy soul account. Diogenes is explicitly of Apollonia; the three names remain part of a reported classification. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

Angellerius; Arduinus. Printed forms: *Oliverio Arduino Florentino*; *Richardo Angellerio Anglariensi*.

Richard Angellerius of Anghiari and Oliviero Arduino of Florence, named Peripatetics. Cavalcanti reports that they reached the same conclusion about the required proof. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

angelus. Printed forms: *angelo*; *angelum*; *angelus*.

Angel or angelic mind, a created intellectual rank superior to rational soul. V.5 distinguishes freedom from material inclination, while V.13 denies that this finite being can create a soul, even as instrument. References: V.3.1, V.5.5, V.13.1, V.13.14, V.13.16. See Instrument and creative mediation.

angelus finitus. Printed forms: *angelos*; *angelum*; *finito*; *finitum*.

A finite angel or spirit, however elevated its conceived grade. The mind can think a higher grade than any finite one, prompting an ascent to an infinite terminus rather than an asserted actual infinity of angels. References: VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

angelus; Deus. Printed forms: *angelis*; *angelumve*; *angelus*; *Deo*; *Deum*.

Angel or angelic mind, and God as higher principles distinct from rational soul. The inward ascent and the contrast with temporal discourse preserve differences between soul’s succession, angelic intellect and the divine source. References: VI.2.10, VI.12.18, VI.12.19. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

angustus / amplus. Printed forms: *amplius*; *angustius*.

Narrower and more ample, spatial metaphors for restriction and intellectual reach. The more a form is bound to bodily matter, the more particular its operation becomes; universality has a wider scope without greater physical bulk. References: VIII.8.1. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

anima. Printed forms: *anima*; *animae*; *animam*; *animarum*; *animas*.

Soul as a life-giving principle, whose body, qualities, powers and operations must be distinguished. Book VI tests alternative identifications of soul and asks what human soul must be to occupy the immortal third essence; a conditional soul-body is an opponent’s

hypothesis, not Ficino’s conclusion. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6, VI.3.1, VI.13.1. See Divine production and the third essence.

Soul as the living subject and source of cognitive or ethical powers. It can remain while a virtue is absent and is argued to be more than a body or a form divided through a body. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.15.2. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

anima / animus. Printed forms: *anima*; *animae*; *Animam*; *animam*; *animi*; *animos*; *Animus*; *animus*.

The living and knowing principle; animus can emphasize its inward cognitive activity without naming a second substance. Mind compares sensory contents in chapter 2; soul and mind alternate for the same persisting subject in the final argument. References: VII.2.1, VII.15.1. See Comparison and common sense.

anima nutritiva / sensitiva. Printed forms: *anima nutritiva*; *anima sensitiva*; *nutriendi*; *nutrit*; *nutritiva*; *sensitiva*; *sensitivae*.

Nutritive and sensitive aspects or proposed kinds of soul. The two-soul division of labor is rejected for the same animal: the soul that nourishes also senses. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

anima rationalis. Printed forms: *anima*; *anima rationalis*; *animae*; *animam*; *animarum*; *animas*; *rationalem*; *rationales*; *rationali*; *rationalis anima*; *rationalium*.

The rational, self-subsisting source of life and self-directed motion; anima is expressly restricted to this class in the opening proofs. V.2 states the scope so the immortality conclusion is not silently extended to every lower life-principle. References: V.1.1, V.1.2, V.2.1, V.4.10, V.12.7, V.12.14, V.13.18. See Rational soul and irrational life.

anima solis. Printed forms: *solis anima*.

The soul of the sun in the cosmological account reported in this passage. Ficino traces spiritual light to the sun’s soul rather than to its bodily globe. Its inward invisible light is said to become visible when poured outward. This source-specific use is distinguished from the lexicon’s primary focus on rational human souls and from literal flame entering a mirror. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

anima universalis. Printed forms: *animae universalis*; *universi corporis*.

Universal soul and the body of the universe. The analogy scales the action/passion distinction to the cosmos while keeping the two distinct. References: VI.12.11. See Vital motion, action and passion.

animal / animans. Printed forms: *animal*; *animali*; *animalia*; *animalis*; *animantis*.

A living creature; related adjectival usage means living or animate. This differs from anima, the principle of the creature’s life. The argument compares the whole living being’s organization with the soul that animates and senses through it. References: VII.1.2, VII.5.2, VII.5.4, VII.9.2, VII.12.1. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

animal / rationale. Printed forms: *Animal*; *animal*; *animali*; *animalibus*; *rationale*; *rationali*.

Animal and rational, the genus and differentia in the working definition of humanity. The logical combination is not treated as a juxtaposition of two bodily objects inside mind. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

animale; vivens; vivificatum. Printed forms: *corpus animale*; *vivens*; *vivificatum*.

Animale means animal or animate in nature; vivens means living; vivificatum means made alive. The opponent's changed wording fails unless a nature beyond mere body supplies the relevant life. References: VI.5.4. See Animation, first light and regress.

animatum. Printed forms: *animatum*; *animatum quiddam*.

A thing made alive by soul, as distinct from the source of animation itself. If a supposed soul contained a nonliving part, Ficino says the whole would be an animated recipient; a life-abandoned recipient is not the departing life. References: V.14.1, V.15.7, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

animatum quiddam. Printed forms: *animatum quiddam*.

Something animated or animate. The matter joined to soul is life-participating, neither soul itself nor part of soul. References: VI.4.6. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

animatus; inanimis. Printed forms: *animatum*; *Animatumne*; *inanime*; *inanimis*.

Animated or lacking soul. Both answers fail when applied to soul as a supposed body: one cannot give life, the other demands another soul. References: VI.5.1, VI.5.2, VI.5.3. See Animation, first light and regress.

animi mortalium. Printed forms: *omnes mortalium pulsat animos*.

The souls of mortals: mortalium is a genitive identifying the people whose souls are assailed. The phrase describes the reach of discord among human beings; it does not itself assert that soul is mortal, despite the facing English's potentially ambiguous "every mortal soul." References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul's persistence.

animus. Printed forms: *animi*; *animis*; *animo*; *Animo*; *animum*; *Animus*; *animus*.

Mind, often the rational soul considered in its understanding, willing and individual identity. The return-to-God argument preserves mind as mind; the final conversion argument similarly protects rational identity rather than mere survival of some substance. References: V.11.6, V.15.19, V.15.20, V.15.21. See Rational soul and irrational life.

Soul or mind, with local emphasis on inward rational identity rather than a different physical constituent. The rational soul's location, self-discovery and enduring memory are often expressed through animus; local sense determines whether English uses mind or soul. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.9, VI.2.23, VI.13.6. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

Soul or mind with emphasis on inward cognitive and affective life. The food argument concerns its desire, intellectual strengthening and distinction from bodily growth; no rigid opposition to anima is imposed here. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.8. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

Antisthenes / Xenophon. Printed forms: *Antisthenes*; *Xenophon*.

Named comparators whose shared humanity extends the example beyond Plato alone. Ficino's illustrative grouping makes likeness and common predicates available for the ascent to universal humanity; it is not a biographical investigation. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

apis / ovis / sollertia. Printed forms: *apis*; *ove*; *sollertior*.

Bee and sheep contrasted in skill or resourcefulness. The smaller bee's supposed greater skill is an example against size necessarily improving the soul's gifts. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

apparere / videri / placere. Printed forms: *apparet*; *arbitrantur*; *existimant*; *placet*; *putant*; *videatur*; *videntur*; *videtur*.

To appear, seem, be held or be judged, marking different degrees of assertion or reported opinion. Ficino's attribution of heavenly persistence, irrational immortality and descent theories must retain these evidential qualifications. References: V.4.1, V.4.3, V.4.9, V.10.1, V.11.8, V.13.1, V.13.18, V.14.8, V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

appetere / cupere / affectare. Printed forms: *affectaret*; *affectat*; *appetant*; *appetit*; *appetunt*; *cupiat*; *cupit*; *cupitque*.

Seeking, desiring or aspiring toward an object or end. Natural desire for truth and inward life is distinguished from bodily appetite and from the endlessly repeated willing of one's own act. References: VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.15.3. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

appetitus / appetitio. Printed forms: *appetitio*; *appetitu*; *appetitus*.

Appetite or directed desire, including rational and nonrational forms. The stable appetite for truth differs from changing sensory appetite, while formed moral appetite is illuminated by intellect. References: VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.2, VIII.16.1. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

appetitus naturalis. Printed forms: *appetitio*; *appetitu*; *appetitum naturalem*.

Natural directed striving toward a good or a likeness-producing act. Its source in the supreme good supports the denial that nature intends annihilation, and its return completes a causal circuit. References: V.4.6, V.4.7. See Art and elemental transformation.

appetitus; proclivis. Printed forms: *appetitum*; *proclivem*.

Appetite or inclination, here leaning toward bodies. Its direction contributes to mind's misleading view of a soul wrapped in bodily engagements. References: VI.2.2. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

apprehendere. Printed forms: *apprehendat*; *apprehendit*.

To receive or grasp cognitively. The senses supply no qualities, while the soul's own substance remains available to thought. References: VI.2.12. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

aptus / ineptus. Printed forms: *apta*; *inepta*; *ineptior*.

Suited or unsuited to a proposed work. Different material readiness establishes nearer or farther potency-to-act transitions, with correspondingly different demands on agency. References: V.12.4, V.13.5. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

aqua / aer / terra. Printed forms: *aere*; *aerem*; *aeris*; *Aqua*; *aqua*; *aquae*; *aquam*; *terrae*; *terram*.

Water, air and earth, elemental bodies within the historical transformation model. The same material subject is followed through replacement of coldness, moisture and dryness; the analysis is not modern chemistry. References: V.4.1, V.4.3, V.4.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

aqua / ignis / calor / frigus. Printed forms: *aqua*; *aquae*; *aquam*; *caliditatem*; *calidum*; *calorem*; *frigiditatem*; *frigus*; *ignem*; *igneum*; *ignis*.

Water, fire, heat and cold, recurring elemental examples with different explanatory jobs. Water drops illustrate homogeneous parts; heating water illustrates replacement of

qualities; knowing heat and cold together illustrates reception without material contrariety. References: VIII.4.3, VIII.7.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

aquaticus / terrestris / aereus. Printed forms: *aerea*; *aereis*; *aquatica*; *aqueis*; *terrenis*; *terrestria*.

Water-, earth- and air-related beings and their correspondingly classified foods. The historical natural example introduces likeness between feeder and food before the corporeal/incorporeal distinction. References: VIII.2.1. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

aquila. Printed forms: *aquilam*.

An eagle, the animal that does not arise from human seed in the example. It extends the argument about determinate natural generation beyond plants. References: V.4.3. See Art and elemental transformation.

aquila / bos. Printed forms: *aquilae*; *bove*; *bovis*.

Eagle and ox as animal comparators. The eagle illustrates keener sight in smaller eyes; the ox later supplies the comparison for the lion’s boldness. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

ardor / ardere / ardenter. Printed forms: *ardentius*; *ardet*; *ardor*.

Ardor is burning intensity or ardour; ardere means to burn; ardentius means more ardently. Mind’s desire is not satisfied by finite acquisitions and is said to burn more intensely as it approaches infinite God. The burning image is compared with the return of fire and a falling stone, while the mind’s capacity is ultimately described as divinely enlarged. These related words are a semantic family, not inflections of one noun. References: VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

argumentatio / demonstratio. Printed forms: *argumentatio*; *argumentatione*; *argumentationem*; *demonstratio*.

An articulated argument or demonstration, distinct from the immediate act whose nature it explains. The proof of the universal Idea need not precede every apprehension of a universal; later chapters offer cumulative but nonidentical routes to immortality. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.15.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Ariston. Printed forms: *Ariston*.

Plato’s father in the text’s individual-generation example. A determinate human begets another human in matter rather than producing absolute humanity. References: V.13.5. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

Aristoteles / Hippocrates. Printed forms: *Aristoteles*; *Hippocrates*.

Authorities contrasted in knowledge of cognitive acts and bodily proportions. Ficino attributes superior understanding of sensing and intellect to Aristotle, more careful consideration of the proportions to Hippocrates. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

Aristoteles / Platonici. Printed forms: *Aristotelis*; *Platonici*; *Platonicis*.

Aristotle and the Platonists, whose agreement and additions are explicitly differentiated. Ficino attributes the bodily-restriction argument to Aristotle, then marks further claims as

Platonic additions rather than a single undifferentiated consensus. References: VIII.10.2. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Aristoxenus / Dicaearchus. Printed forms: *Aristoxenus*; *Dicaearchus*.

The named proponents of life as temperament or something following temperament in Ficino’s report. The subsequent withdrawal and intelligible-principles arguments target this reduction of soul to bodily mixture. References: V.15.8. See Temperament and harmony.

Aristoxenus / musici. Printed forms: *Aristoxeno*; *musicis*.

Aristoxenus and other musicians as the attributed proponents of soul-as-harmony. The attribution is Ficino’s report; the musical dependence argument is his reason for rejecting the doctrine. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

ars. Printed forms: *ars*; *Ars*; *artibus*.

Art or craft, an organized practice of making. Pottery and sculpture illustrate receiving form and realizing a prepared potency; rational art later has a cognitive rather than manual object. References: V.4.1, V.8.1, V.13.5. See Art and elemental transformation.

ars / instrumentum. Printed forms: *Ars*; *artificiosam*; *artis*; *instrumenta*.

Art or skill and the tools through which it is exercised. One art can remain unchanged while its instruments become more or less fitted to its operation, as soul’s bodily organs do. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

ars ratiocinandi. Printed forms: *ars consistit ratiocinandi*; *ars rationalis*; *ratio illa artificiosa*; *rationum coetus*.

The art of reasoning, an organized gathering of intelligible principles. Its alleged inseparability from mind supports the first alternative in the mind/intelligibles division. References: V.15.15. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

artifex / pedissequa / officium. Printed forms: *artifex*; *officia*; *pedissequa*.

Craftsman, handmaid and function or office. Soul is the productive maker of body with nutritive and sensory offices, rather than a dependent attendant arriving after bodily formation. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

artifex stabilissimus. Printed forms: *artifice stabilissimo*; *interius fabricante*.

A supremely stable craftsman working within. The repeated bodily likeness is explained by a source that remains the same while the matter is renewed. References: VI.13.9. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

ascendere / descendere. Printed forms: *ascendamus*; *ascendere*; *ascendimus*; *ascendit*; *descendit*; *gradatim*; *gradibus*.

To ascend or descend, spatially in elemental examples and hierarchically in soul’s relation to Ideas or body. Natural order and cognitive ascent do not require a literal journey to a physically higher place. References: V.4.4, V.5.4, V.12.14, V.15.6. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

Ascending and descending through ordered grades or levels of generality. Mind moves from many individuals toward divine unity and back toward multiplicity; the process is explanatory rather than bodily travel. References: VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

ascendere / surgere / evolare. Printed forms: *ascendimus*; *ascendit*; *Ascendit*; *evolat*; *surgendum*; *surgimus*; *Surgitque*.

Ascending, rising and soaring, spatial images for increased freedom from material restriction. The faculties progress from body toward spirit, but phantasy has not yet wholly soared beyond matter. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3. See Four stages of cognition.

ascensio; descensio. Printed forms: *causas medias*; *descensio*; *temporalis ascensio*.

An ascent and descent through intermediate causes. Thought goes from lowest effects to highest principles and back, preserving causal order in both directions. References: VI.12.17. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

aspectus / respectus. Printed forms: *aspectu*; *aspectum*; *respectibus*; *respectus*; *respiciat*.

The regard or reference by which an intellectual form represents an essence. The threefold test asks whether no parts, some parts or all parts refer, then whether their references duplicate or divide the object. References: VIII.4.9. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

aspicere; despicere. Printed forms: *aspiciant*; *despiciant*.

Aspicere means to look toward; despicere means to look down upon. Despicere refers to looking down upon life communicated to the body; aspicere refers to looking toward the soul’s own inward life. The specific antecedents govern the paired verbs in VI.2.10. References: VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

assentiri; opinari; arbitrari. Printed forms: *Arbitror*; *Assentior*; *Opinor*.

To assent, hold an opinion, or judge; here they mark different degrees of commitment. Cavalcanti accepts the general hierarchy, regards the human soul’s placement as probable, and withholds firm assertion pending refutation of rivals. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

assidue / naturaliter / interius. Printed forms: *assidue*; *interius*; *latente*; *naturaliter*.

Continually, naturally and inwardly. These qualifiers explain why the vital organization requires an operative inner power, not merely a one-time external arrangement. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

assignare (assigned nature). Printed forms: *assignata*; *assignavit*.

To assign or allot a nature or mode of subsistence. The maker assigns material form the nature of inhering in matter, while separate form has the nature of adhering to itself. What belongs per se consequently depends upon the particular nature assigned; the expression does not remove dependence on the maker. References: V.9.2. See Conditions and the fashioner’s law.

assignare; residere; gubernare. Printed forms: *assignatum*; *gubernans*; *residens*.

To assign a seat, reside there, and govern from it. The sequence gives the localized principle its place and delegated control over other members. References: VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

astringere / alligare. Printed forms: *alligatur*; *astricta*; *astrictum*; *astringuntur*.

Binding or restricting something to material conditions. Even a universal form would be particularized in a corporeal receiver; natural universality is used to deny such

confinement of mind. References: VIII.8.1, VIII.8.2. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

attentio / attentior. Printed forms: *attentione*; *Attentior*; *attentiore*; *attentiores*; *attentioris*; *attentius*.

Attention and heightened attentive activity. Soul already animates the healthy organ; stimulation calls forth an activity that it apprehends more distinctly. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

attingere. Printed forms: *attingat*; *attingere*; *attinget*; *attingit*.

Reaching or apprehending, literal or cognitive according to its object. Sight reaches an image without the object's matter; intellect reaches common principles, so the verb alone does not imply bodily contact. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.

attingere / penetrare. Printed forms: *attingent*; *penetrabunt*.

To touch or reach, and to penetrate inward. Surface contact and deep bodily penetration are alternative material explanations, each with a distinct consequence for cognition. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

attingere / persentire. Printed forms: *attingit*; *persentiat*.

To apprehend or reach an object, and thoroughly perceive it. Specialized sight reaches colors; in the line model either endpoint must perceive both contents to perform comparison. References: VII.2.1, VII.2.2. See Comparison and common sense.

attingere; percipere. Printed forms: *attigerunt*; *attingenda*; *attingit*; *perceperimus*; *percipimus*; *percipiunt*; *Percipiunt*.

To reach or make cognitive contact with; to perceive or apprehend. Contact can be sensible or intellectual; taking a body or an incorporeal object as its terminus does not imply the same physical touching. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.9, VI.2.10, VI.2.13. See Three offices and the order of proof.

auctor / conditor / opifex. Printed forms: *auctor*; *auctore*; *conditor*; *Opifex*; *opifex*; *opificem*.

Author, founder or maker, emphasizing productive origin or exemplary ordering. Different Latin titles do not introduce different Gods; the context specifies creation, assignment of nature or cosmic making. References: V.4.8, V.7.2, V.9.2, V.12.9, V.13.18. See Creation and generation.

auctor; producere. Printed forms: *incorporeo auctore*; *productum*.

An incorporeal originating agent; to bring forth or produce. The soul is created or produced through an agent's power, so freedom from matter does not make it uncaused. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum. Printed forms: *augent*; *auget*; *augetur*; *augmentum*; *decrementum*; *incremento*; *incrementum*.

Increasing, increase and decrease, whose quantitative or intellectual mode must be distinguished. Adding homogeneous grains or drops changes amount, while receiving forms can increase intellectual perfection without making mind physically larger. References: VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.6, VIII.4.3, VIII.16.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

augmentum. Printed forms: *augmenti*; *augmentum*; *Augmentum*.

Organic growth through nourishment. Its definite magnitude and shape require a principal agent; it is not just indefinite spreading of heat through available matter. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

augmentum; decrementum. Printed forms: *augmentum, decrementum*.

Increase and decrease in bodily magnitude. Growth and decline require changes of qualities and the generation or corruption of bodily parts. References: VI.12.13, VI.12.15. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

augurari / suspicari / somniare. Printed forms: *auguratur*; *somniare*; *somniaret*; *suspicatur*.

Conjecturing, surmising or dreaming rather than possessing a clear account. These verbs qualify phantasy's relation to substance and incorporeal predicates; the drunken dream later supplies a polemical reductio. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.3.4. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Augustinus / Aurelius. Printed forms: *Augustinus*; *Aurelius*.

Augustine, cited under both his familiar name and Aurelius. Ficino invokes his account of the soul's nonlocal whole presence; the citation has not been independently collated here. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

auris / nares / os. Printed forms: *auribus*; *auris*; *aurium*; *naribus*; *ore*.

Ear, nostrils and mouth as distinct sensory organs. The reported active account assigns airy, misty and moist media to their respective activities; the nouns name organs rather than powers themselves. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

avertere / subducere. Printed forms: *avertere*; *averterit*; *removere*; *subducere*.

To turn away, remove or withdraw attention. The mind's improved understanding through withdrawal is presented against the claim that it is merely an inseparable bodily form. References: V.15.9, V.15.10, V.15.11. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

Avicenna; educatio ficta. Printed forms: *Avicenna*; *Avicenna narravisse*; *educationem fictam*.

Avicenna and the imagined upbringing attributed to him. The thought experiment is Ficino's version, not silently a replacement with another account of the flying man. References: VI.2.12, VI.2.14. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

aviditas / cupiditas. Printed forms: *avida*; *aviditas*; *cupiditate*.

Eager desire for oneself, the motive sustaining inward intellectual return. Ficino treats mind's desire for its own nature as enduring; this technical self-relation is not a clinical description of narcissism. References: VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

avis; volare. Printed forms: *avis*; *volans*; *volare*.

Bird and flying. The bird's shadow lies on earth while it flies in air, illustrating the same error of self-location without repeating the well's setting. References: VI.2.5. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

Bembus; Chronico; Demetrius. Printed forms: *Antonio Chronico Veneto*; *Bernardum Bembum*; *Demetrio Attico*.

Bernardo Bembo, Antonio Cronico of Venice and Demetrius of Attica, figures named in the dinner recollection. Bembo is described as a knight and Venetian envoy, while the other two are acute disputants; these are Ficino's local descriptions. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

bene esse / simpliciter esse. Printed forms: *bene esse*; *simpliciter esse*.

Being well and simply being, a distinction in degrees of perfection. Ficino reasons that a mind able to confer the higher good of formal self-perfection should also sustain its being in the relevant formal respect. References: VIII.15.2. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

beneficus. Printed forms: *benefica*; *beneficus*.

Beneficent, communicating a preserving or perfecting power. The superior causes' infusion is contrasted with destructive bodily qualities and cannot be made a corruption of soul. References: V.6.1, V.11.2. See Reception and the receiver.

bibere. Printed forms: *bibit*.

To drink. The soul's drinking of being is a metaphor for continuous reception, not bodily nutrition. References: V.10.3. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

bicubitus. Printed forms: *bicubitum*.

Two cubits in apparent measure. The sun's apparently small size is contrasted with its supposed true size as an example of deceptive vision. References: VI.2.7. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

Boethus; Epicurus; Xenophantes. Printed forms: *Boethus*; *Epicurus*; *Xenophantes*.

Names attached to mixed-element accounts of soul. Boethus and Epicurus are linked with fire and air, Xenophantes with water and earth; Xenophantes is not silently merged with Xenophanes below. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

bonitas naturae. Printed forms: *bonitas naturae*.

The goodness attributed to nature's ordered activity. It functions as a teleological premise against the proposed destruction of many souls to preserve one. References: VI.13.4. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

bonum / bonitas. Printed forms: *bonitate*; *bonitatis*; *bono*; *bonum*.

Bonum names the good or what is good; bonitas names goodness. The source invokes goodness as the source and end toward which natural desire is directed. Life and being count as goods; divine goodness is invoked against a destructive withdrawal of the soul's own life. References: V.4.2, V.4.7, V.12.12, V.13.17, V.14.9. See Relation and continuing dependence.

bonum / malum. Printed forms: *bona*; *bonam*; *boni*; *bonis*; *bonum*; *mala*; *malis*; *malum*.

Good and evil as evaluative objects, whose nature differs from the benefit of knowing them. The natural-desire argument seeks true good, while the contrary-reception argument makes accurate knowledge of evil an intellectual good without approving the evil itself. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

bracchium; crus. Printed forms: *brachia et crura*; *brachiis et cruribus amputatis*.

Arms and legs, including amputated members. The allegedly diminished soul's dullness and forgetfulness are rejected consequences of materialism, not Ficino's view of amputees. References: VI.13.1, VI.13.2. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

brachium / opus extra. Printed forms: *brachiis*; *extra*; *opus*; *voluntatem*.

Arms and an outward work produced through will's bodily action. Understanding may initiate external production through will and limbs, although its proper act can remain within mind. References: VIII.15.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

caducus. Printed forms: *caduca*; *caduco*.

Perishable or liable to fall away. Soul governs passing things, while a perishable elemental body differs from the reported perpetual ethereal vehicle. References: V.12.13, V.13.18. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

caecus; noctua. Printed forms: *caecus*; *noctuae oculum*.

Blindness and the owl's eye as images of limited access to an object. They explain why what is clear in itself may be difficult for a particular knower; these are comparisons, not diagnoses. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl's eye.

caecutire; titubare; aegrotare. Printed forms: *aegrotare*; *caecutire*; *titubare*.

To grope blindly, stumble and be ill. The descent reverses the ascent's adaptation to light and dramatizes the effects of sudden change. References: VI.2.17. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

caelum; terra; mundus. Printed forms: *caeli*; *caelis*; *caelo*; *caelum*; *mundi*; *mundo*; *mundum*; *terra*; *terrae*.

Heaven, earth and world, as spatial, cosmological or analogically intelligible domains. The visible and invisible worlds in the cave application differ from the physical sphere hierarchy; "beyond the world" can concern cognitive scope rather than bodily travel. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.3, VI.2.16, VI.2.22, VI.2.24, VI.8.2, VI.8.7. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

calefacere; calefieri. Printed forms: *calefacere*; *calefacit*; *calefit*.

To heat and to become heated. A supposed body heating itself would both have and lack the heat in the same respect, producing the initial aporia. References: VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

calefactio. Printed forms: *calefactio*.

Heating as an activity passing from an agent toward another subject. It differs from the agent's being, which does not flow outward in the same way. References: V.13.10. See Creature, power and operation.

calere. Printed forms: *calere*; *Calere*; *calerent*; *calet*.

To be hot, distinct from simply being. If hotness and existence were identical, everything existent would be hot; the absurd consequence blocks a simple transfer of the fire analogy. References: V.9.4. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

calere; lucere; collustrare. Printed forms: *calens*; *collustret*; *fervet*; *fulget*; *lucens*.

To be warm, shine and illuminate together. The staged predicates lead from an indivisible active form to life and sensation, then conditionally to self-reflective understanding. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

caliditas / siccitas / frigus. Printed forms: *caliditatem*; *frigus*; *siccitatemque*; *siccumque*.

Heat, dryness and cold as elemental qualities. Heat with dryness would yield bodily fire, cold with dryness earth; neither mixture is the spiritual image needed for cognition. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

calidus; frigidus; siccus; humidus. Printed forms: *calidum vel frigidum*; *siccum vel humidum*.

Hot/cold and dry/moist as opposed elementary qualities. They begin the sequence of bodily determinations to which an alleged soul-body would be confined. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

caligare; dolere. Printed forms: *caligabit*; *caligamus*; *dolebit*; *dolemus*.

To have clouded sight and suffer pain. Sudden exposure to brighter objects motivates the necessity of gradual education. References: VI.2.15, VI.2.16. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

calor / caliditas. Printed forms: *Caliditas*; *caliditate*; *caliditatem*; *caliditati*; *calor*; *calorem*; *caloris*.

Heat or warmth; sometimes provisionally the unnamed substantial form of fire. V.8.2 expressly qualifies the naming, so sensible heat and substantial form must not be uncritically identified. References: V.8.2, V.9.4, V.14.3. See Form and formal being.

calor / penetrare / dissolvere. Printed forms: *calor*; *calorem*; *caloris*; *Caloris*; *dissolvere*; *dissolvit*; *penetrare*.

Heat and its proper actions of penetrating and dissolving. Heat contributes to nutrition as an instrument but does not itself specify living flesh or the animal’s final dimensions. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

calor; calere. Printed forms: *calens*; *calet*; *calor*; *calorem*; *caloris*.

Heat and being hot, either quality or the illustrative activity of fire. The distributed warm-constitution account, concentrated fiery form and self-heating contradiction use heat in different argumentative roles. References: VI.1.3, VI.2.21, VI.12.9, VI.12.10, VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

canis / agnus / sagacitas. Printed forms: *agno*; *canis*; *sagacior*.

Dog and lamb contrasted in discernment. The example belongs to the second series, showing that smaller size is not always cognitively preferable. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

canis / equus / homo. Printed forms: *canis*; *equus*; *homo*.

Dog, horse and human as examples of determinate living kinds. The soul supplies each animal’s substantial nature, not merely an accidental ornament of an already complete subject. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol. Printed forms: *canis*; *elephantis*; *equi*; *formicae*; *solis*.

Dog, ant, horse, elephant and sun, illustrating extreme disparity of bodily size. One body cannot be dimensionally equal to all, but mind understands each with its whole power. Solis here is the sun, not restrictive ‘alone’. References: VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

capacitas / implere. Printed forms: *capacitatem*; *impleat*; *impleretur*; *impletur*.

Capacity and filling, expressing the relation between desire and its adequate object. Finite created knowledge fails to satisfy; infinite God is said to fill the capacity that flows from him. References: VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

capacitas; fomentum. Printed forms: *capacitate*; *fomento*.

Capacity and tinder or supporting generative resource. The fifth account excludes these material prerequisites; their denial distinguishes it from a merely unlocated but materially derived soul. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

capere. Printed forms: *capere*; *capit*; *cepit*.

To contain or grasp; context decides whether the capacity is spatial or cognitive. A supposed bodily soul is tested against the size and variety of the things it would contain. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

capere / comprehendere. Printed forms: *apprehendet*; *apprehendit*; *capere*; *caperet*; *capiat*; *capit*; *capiunt*; *comprehendat*; *comprehenderet*; *comprehendimus*; *comprehendit*; *comprehenditur*; *comprehenduntur*.

Receiving or grasping, without an automatic implication of spatial enclosure. Bodily containment is quantitative; mind can apprehend a whole and each part with its whole power, including contraries and incorporeals. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.11, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.12.1, VIII.16.3. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

captus. Printed forms: *captu*.

The receiving capacity or mode of a recipient. Being is received according to the mode of the essence receiving it; ‘capacity’ here does not mean captivity. References: V.7.2. See Reception and the receiver.

caput / finis / terminus lineae. Printed forms: *caput*; *finem*; *termini*; *terminos*; *terminum*.

Beginning, end and boundary of the hypothetical line. The terms mark cognitive separation in the model, not a literal route for colors or voices traveling inside soul. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

caput / membrum. Printed forms: *caput*; *membra*; *membris*.

Head and members, a ranked-organism image for the orders of souls and bodies. Perpetual bodily members support the claim that the superior soul-order has a perpetual head. References: V.15.4. See Soul as universal bond.

caput / pectus / femur. Printed forms: *caput*; *femur*; *pectus*.

Head, breast and thigh, bodily parts that are not themselves humans. Dividing a human body yields bodies, not multiple humans; the distinction establishes aspectual simplicity of the specific account. References: VIII.4.10. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

carere / deficere / abesse. Printed forms: *abesse*; *abest*; *absit*; *carent*; *carere*; *Caret*; *caret*; *deficerent*; *deficiet*; *deficit*.

Lacking, failing or being absent, distinguished from positive presence. An unfinished preparation still lacks completed virtue, while a point or line is defined by lacking a higher dimension. The absence is not always a destructive privation. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.8, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

carere / privari. Printed forms: *careat*; *carere*; *caret*; *privari*; *privatur*.

To lack or be deprived of a defining possession. God lacks causal dependence; soul lacks matter; a body deprived of life is distinct from the life-source that cannot lack itself. References: V.5.4, V.5.9, V.14.8, V.15.6, V.15.7, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

casus / casu. Printed forms: *Casu*; *casu*; *casus*.

Chance as a proposed explanation for order or mental union. It is rejected both for the regular common nature and for the dependable union of genus and difference in knowledge. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.4.5. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

causa. Printed forms: *causa*; *Causa*; *causarum*; *causis*.

An explanatory source, whose specific kind must be identified rather than assumed. The divine exemplar causes common nature; mind’s alleged self-causation is expressly formal, not efficient. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.3.7, VIII.12.1, VIII.15.3. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

causa communis. Printed forms: *communem omnium causam*; *communis causa*; *unam causam*.

A cause common to all the effects under consideration. God is common cause of their being; particular agents explain their differing modes. References: V.13.1, V.13.2. See Participation, common and proper.

causa efficiens. Printed forms: *causa*; *causae*; *causam*; *causarum*; *causas*; *causis*; *effector*; *Efficiens*; *efficiens*; *efficiente*; *efficientem*.

An efficient cause, the productive source of an effect. The human example names universal nature and human parent together; soul retains an efficient source even when independent of matter. References: V.4.2, V.5.1, V.5.4, V.5.5. See Four causes and graded dependence.

causa non efficiens sed formalis. Printed forms: *causa*; *Causa*; *non efficiens*; *sed formalis*.

Formal rather than efficient cause, the express limit of mind’s self-causation. The clause governs the immediately preceding claim that mind is its own cause; it does not confer divine first causality on created intellect. References: VIII.15.3. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

causa prima. Printed forms: *a prima sit causa*; *causam primam*; *prima rerum causa*; *primam causam*.

First cause: the universal source on which the being of effects depends. V.10 relates both bodies and soul to this source by different modes; V.13 matches the first cause with the gift of being itself. The referent is God, not the earliest member of a temporal chain. References: V.10.1, V.13.4. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

causa principalis. Printed forms: *causa principali*; *principalem*; *principalem augmenti fabrum*; *principali*; *principali agente*.

The principal cause, agent or craftsman determining organic growth. Heat is rejected in this role and retained as instrument; principal here is a relative causal rank, not the absolute First Cause. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

causae sequentes. Printed forms: *sequentibus causis*.

Subsequent causes, sources of further determinations within a dependent order. The printed wording attributes second or third gifts to subsequent causes after the first gift of being. “Secondary causes” is an explanatory label here, not this sentence’s exact Latin phrase. References: V.13.4. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

cavillatio. Printed forms: *cavillatio*; *obiectio*.

A polemically named quibble or objection. Ficino’s judgement labels a specifically reported proposal; it is not a neutral category for every account of emergence. References: VI.12.9. See Integrity of the whole.

centrum (concentration). Printed forms: *centro*; *centrum*.

A centre at which an extended figure or rays are gathered. The exercise first concentrates the imagined fiery form into the heart’s centre and compares the increased power with sunlight collected at the centre of a concave bronze mirror. It is a preparatory image, not the final assertion that soul is a tiny extended object. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

centrum / vis interior. Printed forms: *centrum*; *interior animae*.

The center-like inward power common to the senses. The image describes integrated comparison and judgement, without itself locating a material center in the brain. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

cera. Printed forms: *cera*; *cerae*.

Wax as the recipient of a seal’s figure. Its comparison is limited to restoration through conformity; the soul is not thereby said to be bodily wax. References: V.11.6. See Seal, wax and restoration.

Wax, capable of receiving a seal’s impressed figure. Its bounded surface and altered impressions make bodily reception concrete under the corporeal-soul hypothesis. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

certa / certus. Printed forms: *Certa*; *certa*; *certam*; *certo*; *certum*.

Determinate or definite, and sometimes certain, according to context. A determinate material situation or a defined power of reasoning is not merely a psychologically confident belief; singular restrictions are central to the universal contrast. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.11, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.16.3. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

certus / talis. Printed forms: *certa*; *certam*; *certo*; *certum*; *tale*; *talem*; *tales*; *tali*; *talis*; *Talis*.

Determinate or of a specified kind, often restricting an essence or mode. A thing’s being this or such differs from being simply; these qualifiers are part of the argument for limited secondary causes. References: V.4.9, V.7.1, V.9.2, V.9.4, V.11.7, V.13.3, V.13.5. See Participation, common and proper.

cervix; columna. Printed forms: *cervicem*; *columnis*.

Neck and pillars in the cave's staging. Bodily constraints explain why the prisoners only see what lies before them rather than its sources behind. References: VI.2.14. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

chaos. Printed forms: *chaos*.

The term for the disappearance of the previous elemental form when its replacement arrives. The earth-form passes into chaos, but the matter receiving water survives; the wording does not establish annihilation of all being. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

Chrysippus; Archelaus; Heraclides. Printed forms: *Archelaum*; *Chrysippum*; *Heraclidem Ponticum*.

Authorities associated here with the locally seated luminous point. Ficino's reported grouping should not be treated as evidence that all three held an identical detailed physiology. References: VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro. Printed forms: *carnis*; *cibos*; *nutrimentum*; *vivae carnis*.

Food, nourishment and living flesh. The nutritive transformation's definite living product makes the distinction between instrumental heating and formative agency visible. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

circuitus. Printed forms: *circuitum*; *circuitus*; *Circuitus*; *circuituum*.

A circuit or returning course whose motion is interpreted as gathering back into its source. The spiritual circuit conserves power and the soul's return into itself supports material independence. References: V.1.4, V.1.5, V.5.8. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

circulus. Printed forms: *circulo*; *circulum*; *circulus*.

A circle or circular course; in one context a form with intrinsic roundness, in another a model of returning movement. V.1's movement and V.9's predication example use circularity for different argumentative purposes. References: V.1.1, V.1.3, V.9.1. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

circumferentia; cardo. Printed forms: *cardine*; *circumferentia*.

Circumference and stable hinge or pivot. The moving point and enfolded circle provide a geometrical counterpart to the spark–flame image. References: VI.2.25. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

claritas / fervor. Printed forms: *ardorem*; *claritas*; *Claritas*; *claritate*; *fervor*.

Intellectual clarity and the stable ardour it kindles in appetite. The relation organizes the mirror-and-wool analogy: insight illuminates, and prepared appetite is ignited into moral virtue. References: VIII.3.2, VIII.3.3. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

coagulum / conglutinare. Printed forms: *coagulo*; *conglutinentur*.

An inward binder or glue, and being glued together. The concrete image explains unification by an indwelling one without making soul a physical adhesive. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

coagulum; lac; coagulare. Printed forms: *coagulatur*; *coaguli*; *lacte*.

Rennet, milk and curdling. The first analogy concerns the soul's binding power, not identity between soul and a physical curdling agent. References: VI.9.4. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

coalescere. Printed forms: *coalescere*; *coalesceret*.

Growing together or developing in conjunction. The Epicureans are reported as inferring parallel growth of soul and body; the instrument analogy challenges that inference. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

coalescere; virere. Printed forms: *coalescunt*; *virentes*.

To grow together and flourish green. The opening natural-power proof contrasts flourishing life with uprooted logs and stones sharing the same corporeal matter. References: VI.4.1. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

cogere. Printed forms: *coactus*; *cogatur*; *cogens*; *cogente*; *cogi*; *Cogit*; *cogit*; *cogitur*.

To compel or force, here tested as a route to ontological change. The analysis considers bodily and psychic agents; it is not a general claim that victims consent to real-world coercion. References: V.15.20, V.15.21, V.15.22. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

cogere in unum. Printed forms: *coactis in unum*.

Forcing or bringing previously separate things into one composite. The soul's lack of parts excludes assembly from antecedently distinct materials. References: V.13.1. See Creation and generation.

cogere; compellere. Printed forms: *cogantur*; *cogatur*; *cogeris*; *cogit*; *cogitur*; *compelleris*; *compellimur*; *compellit*; *compellitur*; *compulsos*.

To force or compel, by bodily conditions, habit or argumentative necessity. Cogere is not the verb cogitare: habit can compel error, while a dilemma compels an admission; their object and agency distinguish these uses. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.2, VI.2.15, VI.2.17, VI.5.2, VI.8.3, VI.12.3, VI.12.4, VI.12.7. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

cogitare. Printed forms: *cogitare*; *cogitaret*; *cogitat*; *cogitationum*; *cogitet*.

To think of something, including an object no longer present. A mere mirror-like surface reception cannot account for thinking of absent bodies, because it does not retain their images. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

Thinking or entertaining a content, which can be true, hypothetical or invented. Ficino distinguishes common intellectual accounts from singular images and allows thoughts of possible or impossible objects without asserting their external existence. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.3.6, VIII.4.11, VIII.8.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.1. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

cogitare; considerare. Printed forms: *cogitabit*; *cogitare*; *Cogitate*; *cogitatio*; *cogitatione*; *considerare*; *considerarent*; *consideratione*; *considerationem*.

To think, conceive or consider, including deliberately staged thought experiments. A point separated in thought is distinguished from real release, and the imagined adult's self-consideration is compared with ordinary acquired habits. References: VI.2.10, VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.2.19, VI.2.20, VI.2.25. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

cogitatione separari. Printed forms: *cogitatione*; *cogitatione saltem*; *re ipsa*.

At least in thought; contrasted with separation in reality. Ficino explicitly marks the transition from conceptual release of a point to claimed actual substantial unity. References: VI.2.19, VI.2.20. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

cognitio. Printed forms: *cognitio*; *cognitione*; *cognitionem*.

Knowledge or knowing, including acts that can be directed toward other acts. The direct life/reflexive cognition distinction prevents this word from being treated as a synonym for the whole source of living being. References: VIII.3.4, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.8, VIII.9.1, VIII.12.1, VIII.16.3. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

cognitio / voluntas. Printed forms: *cognitio*; *voluntas*.

Cognition and will, inward operations named against outward heating. Their immanence does not identify them with essence or being; their range of objects exceeds the creature's own species. References: V.13.10, V.13.11. See Creature, power and operation.

cognoscere (additional forms). Printed forms: *cognoscat*; *cognoscendi*; *cognoscendo*; *cognoscendum*; *cognosceret*; *Cognoscimus*; *cognoscimus*.

Knowing, stated in different temporal, hypothetical and purposive constructions. Counterfactual clauses describe what a bodily mind could not know; they should not be quoted as positive limits on the actual intellect. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.3.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.16.1. See Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance.

cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere. Printed forms: *agnoscit*; *cognosceret*; *cognoscit*; *noscit*.

To know or recognize the content at issue. The comparison argument repeatedly distinguishes a power's acquaintance with its own object from knowledge of both compared objects. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

colligere. Printed forms: *collegerat*; *collegit*; *colligit*.

Gathering distinct contributions into a single cognitive or explanatory unity. Imagination combines the five senses' contributions; later intellect gathers individuals under a species and times in a common regard. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.2. See Mind's transformation of material conditions.

colligere / conciliare. Printed forms: *colligit*; *conciliat*; *conciliat invicem*.

To gather scattered things and bring opposed terms into agreement. The stable soul collects and reconciles what is unstable below it; these actions support its middle, ordering role. References: V.12.13, V.15.2. See Soul as universal bond.

colligere / impartibilis. Printed forms: *colligi*; *impartibile*.

To gather into one; not capable of partition. The gathering of a vast visible image into the pupil prepares the inference toward an impartible sensory power. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

colligere; unio. Printed forms: *collecti*; *colligite*; *unione*.

To gather into one; union. Ficino compares increased power through concentration with the convergence of solar rays in a mirror. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

collocare. Printed forms: *collocabimus*.

To place or locate an explanatory function in a power. Conceding an indivisible common form places comprehension in an indivisible power; this is an argumentative allocation, not proof of a tiny anatomical seat. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

color / figura. Printed forms: *colore*; *figura*; *figuris*.

Colour and figure, distinct species of sensible presentation. Figure is not a constituent species contained within colour; this comparison rejects an alternative model of a species' alleged parts. References: VIII.4.7, VIII.4.8. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

color / vox / odor. Printed forms: *colorem*; *colores*; *colorum*; *odorem*; *odores*; *vocem*; *voces*.

Color, voice and odor as distinct sensory contents. Their comparison requires joint cognitive access, not merely three separate reports. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

coma. Printed forms: *comam*.

Hair or streaming tail, the visible attendant of a comet. The comet/hair analogy parallels sun/light in the claim that life follows soul. References: V.14.6. See Comets and defining accounts.

comes; pedisequa. Printed forms: *comitem*; *pedisequam*.

Companion and attendant. Soul may be described either as life or as having life following it; both formulations explain bodies receiving life through soul. References: VI.11.1. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

commixtio. Printed forms: *commixtione*.

Mixture or blending, the constitution of the body from four natures in the historical model. A mixture-dependent form cannot, Ficino argues, turn away from its own material subject to grasp immaterial principles. References: V.15.10. See Temperament and harmony.

commodum / utilitas. Printed forms: *commodum*; *conducere*; *utilitatis*.

Bodily advantage or usefulness arising from truth's discovery. Ficino distinguishes a secondary bodily benefit from the mind's pursuit of truth for its own sake. References: VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

communicare / infundere. Printed forms: *communicat*; *infundit*.

Communicating a nature to many without dividing it into diminished portions. Humanity is shared by persons, places and times; the common nature and its higher exemplar remain distinct explanatory levels. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.4.10. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

communis (additional forms). Printed forms: *commune*; *communi*.

Shared or common, in contrast with what belongs exclusively to one instance. The form's power extends to many cases, while the nature's commonness does not by itself identify it with its separate divine exemplar. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.8.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

communis sensus. Printed forms: *communi sensu*.

The inward common sensory power coordinating individual senses. Its superiority and greater sufficiency prepare the ascent to the soul’s substance and finally to reason. References: VII.3.1. See Comparison and common sense.

commutare. Printed forms: *commutet*.

To alter or change something. An alteration of one region of bodily whiteness need not change all the other regions, unlike the whole soul’s awareness of a local event. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

commutare / transmutare. Printed forms: *commutabit*; *commutata*; *permutari*; *transmutabit*.

To transform one condition or thing into another. The matter proof tests annihilation and transformation as alternatives, then excludes a surviving fragment as a model for prime matter’s loss. References: V.4.6, V.4.9, V.4.10. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

commutatio. Printed forms: *commutatio*; *commutationem*; *commutationi*.

Transformation or change, whose subject and endpoint determine whether it concerns qualities or substance. Elemental change preserves matter; the final book section tests the stronger possibility of mind becoming body. References: V.4.1, V.15.6, V.15.22, V.15.23. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

commutatio; transmutatio. Printed forms: *commutaretur*; *commutatio*; *transmutatio*.

Mutual transformation between things. A shared matter would allow soul and lower bodies to change into each other, a consequence Ficino rejects. References: VI.7.2, VI.7.3. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

compages; devincire. Printed forms: *compagem*; *devincire*; *diffluunt*.

A joined structure; to bind firmly; to flow apart. Humours and members form one animal through soul, then disperse when that principle departs. References: VI.8.5. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

compago / resolvere. Printed forms: *compago*; *resolvitur*.

An organized bodily framework and its dissolution. The original low animal soul is said to perish when its assigned bodily organization dissolves. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

comparare. Printed forms: *comparabit*; *comparare*; *comparat*; *comparationis*; *comparatura*; *comparet*.

To compare several contents with one another. A power must apprehend both objects to judge their difference; isolated reception by two powers is insufficient. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

comparare / referre. Printed forms: *adaequatur*; *comparat*; *refert*.

Comparing, relating and matching, as intellectual rather than dimensional operations. Whole and parts must be available to the same knower, whose correspondence to large and small objects is not equality of bulk. References: VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

comparatio. Printed forms: *comparatio*.

A ratio or relation between quantities. Two to four and four to eight illustrate an immutable proportional truth distinct from the addition example. References: V.15.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

compati / consonare / concurrere. Printed forms: *compatiantur*; *compatiatur*; *concurrant*; *consonet*.

To suffer together, accord and act in concert. This positive language of concord describes coordinated soul, without identifying its substance with a humoral harmony. References: VII.5.3. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

complexio. Printed forms: *complexio*; *complexionem*; *complexionis*.

Bodily constitution produced from interacting qualities. Ficino distinguishes it from a simple quality, its dependent form, and the soul that orders its operations. References: VII.7.1, VII.8.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

complexio calida. Printed forms: *complexio calida*.

A warm bodily constitution or temperament. This describes the second reported account more precisely than mere temperature and is not skin complexion. References: VI.1.3. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

complexio humorum. Printed forms: *complexio aliqua humorum atque membrorum*.

A temperament of humours and members. The final reductio extends from a literal soul-body to the subtler theory that soul is a bodily quality. References: VI.13.8. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

componere. Printed forms: *componant*; *componatur*; *composita*.

To compose, with active and passive constructions distinguished. The retained active componant asks how individual powers compose the soul; later passive readings ask how they are composed. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

componere / compositum. Printed forms: *componitur*; *componuntur*; *composita*; *compositam*; *compositi*; *compositis*; *compositum*.

To compose or a composite constituted from distinguishable principles. Bodily matter/form composition differs from the analogy of created essence receiving being; the latter does not put bodily parts in soul. References: V.8.2, V.9.2, V.11.1, V.12.2, V.12.5, V.13.7. See Spiritual matter and identity.

componere; constituere. Printed forms: *componi*; *componitur*; *composita*; *compositi*; *compositis*; *compositum*; *constitutum*; *constitutus*.

To compose or constitute, and what is composed or constituted. A living composite, its elemental constituents and a hypothesis posed as a whole’s integrity receive distinct analyses; composed does not itself mean alive. References: VI.2.4, VI.2.10, VI.7.1, VI.11.1, VI.12.9. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

compos; ferme. Printed forms: *compos*; *omnes ferme effectus*.

Compos means having command over or capacity for; ferme means almost. In omnes ferme effectus, omnes supplies all and effectus supplies effects, yielding almost all effects. The final rhetoric grants wide opposed powers but its ferme qualification prevents an unlimited claim of psychic omnipotence. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

compositio. Printed forms: *Compositio*; *compositio*; *compositionem*.

Composition as the union of bodily constituents. It is the first of two interpretations of soul-as-concord rejected in chapter 12; proportion within composition is the second. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

compositio / mixtum. Printed forms: *compositionem*; *mixta*; *mixtis*; *resolutionem*.

Composition and mixtures, paired with analysis of simple constituents. Mind sees mixtures through their principles and principles in mixtures; its operation does not reproduce their material blending. References: VIII.7.1. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

compositum. Printed forms: *composita*; *compositi*; *compositis*; *compositum*.

A whole constituted from matter and corporeal form. Its being and operation belong properly to the composite, while intellect can consider its constituents separately and so exceed that mode of operation. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

compositum / forma communis. Printed forms: *communem partibus*; *compositi*; *formam quandam*.

A composite and the form alleged to be common to its parts. If that form is divisible the original problem returns; if indivisible, the required nonpartitioned power is conceded. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

comprehendere. Printed forms: *comprehendens*; *comprehensa*; *continet*.

To contain or embrace, actively rather than passively. Soul perfects and guides body; body does not enclose it as a place encloses a material occupant. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

comprimere; profundere. Printed forms: *compressa*; *profusa*.

Compressed and poured forth. The spark is described as concentrated flame and flame as outpoured spark within the analogy. References: VI.2.25. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

concedere / donare. Printed forms: *concessa*; *concessa sibi*; *donatus*.

Granting or bestowing, the vocabulary governing the soul’s enlarged dignity. The final limitless power of living is inferred from powers of understanding and willing already granted, not claimed as efficient self-creation. References: VIII.16.4. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

concentus / concinere. Printed forms: *concentu*; *concinentibus*; *concinit*.

Concord and greater or lesser harmonizing. Degrees of musical agreement produce the reductio from more harmony to more soul and more life. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

conceptus / conceptio. Printed forms: *conceptio*; *conceptionisque*; *conceptus*.

Conceived intellectual content or the act/product of conceiving it. A defining judgment counts as conception and knowledge; it cannot be explained by materially separated portions. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.13. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

conciliare / pax. Printed forms: *conciliat*; *conciliet*; *inimica*; *pace*.

Reconciling and peace, metaphors for the co-presence of contrary intelligible forms. Mind removes their destructive opposition in knowing without eliminating their distinction in the objects themselves. References: VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

concinnitas / consonantia. Printed forms: *concinnitas*; *concinnitate*; *concinnitatem*; *consonantia*; *consonantiae*; *consonantiam*.

Fitting arrangement and concord, locally used to explain harmony. The defender qualifies the proposed soul-harmony as a specific arrangement, requiring an explanation beyond concord in general. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

concipere / comprehendere. Printed forms: *comprehendat*; *comprehendens*; *comprehendente*; *comprehensionem*; *concipitve*.

To conceive or grasp; an integrated comprehension and its grasper. A divided sensory apparatus would assign a different piece of color to each part without explaining one grasp of the whole. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

concipere / excogitare. Printed forms: *concepit*; *concepta*; *conceptas*; *conciperet*; *concipiatur*; *concipit*; *excogitaret*; *excogitat*; *excogitata*.

Conceiving or bringing an intelligible content into thought. Immediate common-nature apprehension, a proposition in a connected science and a fabricated possible object are distinct products of this activity. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.3.7, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.1. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

concludere / inferre / sequi. Printed forms: *concludendum*; *concludit*; *inferemus*; *sequerentur*; *sequeretur*; *sequitur*.

Concluding, inferring and following as a consequence. These markers distinguish a provisional hypothesis from the result claimed against it; the consequence may be an absurdity rather than Ficino’s positive doctrine. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.13, VIII.10.1. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

concludere / probare. Printed forms: *Concluditur*; *concluditur*; *probandum*; *probavimus*.

To infer a conclusion or establish a thesis through argument. The three conclusions about soul’s relation to qualities in the growth chapter must remain distinct; earlier proofs do not eliminate the need for arguments proper to a further claim. References: VII.7.1, VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

concludere; respondere; quaerere. Printed forms: *concludamus*; *concludendumque*; *concludimus*; *quaeram*; *Quaeremus*; *quaerere*; *quaeritur*; *respondebit*; *Respondemus*; *responderet*; *respondet*.

To draw a conclusion, answer and inquire. Questions, replies and conclusions delimit the dialectic; a premise inside an objection must not be taken as Ficino’s settled assertion. References: VI.2.2, VI.4.4, VI.4.6, VI.5.2, VI.6.3, VI.6.4, VI.8.3, VI.12.16, VI.13.9. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

concoquere / digerere. Printed forms: *concoquit*; *digeritque*.

To cook or bring to digestive readiness, and digest or distribute in an ordered process. These actions are coupled with producing living flesh; they are more than the mere dissolution heat can accomplish. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

concoquere / generare prolem. Printed forms: *concoquet*; *generabit prolem*.

To digest food and produce offspring. The robber’s supposed inferiority in these vital acts exposes the implausibility of deriving degree of life from moral concord. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

condensatio; rarefactio; progressio. Printed forms: *condensatio, rarefactio, progressio*.

Condensation, rarefaction and progression or locomotion. They complete the eightfold historical taxonomy, which is broader than change of place alone. References: VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

condicio. Printed forms: *condicio*; *condiciones*; *condicionibus*; *conditionibus*.

A condition or restriction qualifying a thing’s occurrence or operation. Phantasy retains singular conditions; intellect’s distinct mode is argued from its ability to apprehend accounts beyond them. The supplied Latin has spelling variants with t/c. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.3.1, VIII.5.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.15.3. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

conditio humorum / imperium. Printed forms: *humorum conditionem*; *illorum imperium*.

The condition and governing reach of the humors. Soul-as-harmony could not explain activities exceeding those bodily powers, which Ficino says his earlier arguments establish. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

condolere / compassio / condolentia. Printed forms: *compassio*; *condolentia*; *condolet*.

To share pain, with the related names for shared suffering. The account assigns these responses to imagination while reserving bodily injury for flesh and spirit. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

conducere / nocere. Printed forms: *conducat*; *conduceret*; *noceat*; *noceret*.

To benefit and to harm or hinder. Both necessary dependence on greater size and necessary disadvantage from it are tested and rejected by opposite animal examples. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

conflare / peragere. Printed forms: *conflata*; *peragitur*.

To compose together and carry an operation through. A constitution’s activity is performed through the powers of its component qualities, setting the limit tested by nutrition. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

conflatus; concursus. Printed forms: *concursionis*; *concursu*; *conflata*.

Composed together; conjunction of constituents. Mere assembly is distinguished from the determinate order through which a living effect is supposedly produced. References: VI.11.1. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

conformatio. Printed forms: *conformationemque*.

An ordered shaping or configuration, here the artful arrangement of bodily members. Ficino attributes bodily efficacy to natural proportion and artful configuration rather than sheer weight of flesh; he relates these conditions more closely to vital spirit than to bulk. This historical physiological claim serves the distinction between an art and its instruments. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

confundere. Printed forms: *confundat*; *confundentur*; *confusas*.

To mingle in a way that obscures distinctions. Confused images cannot distinguish the represented people; mixed qualities likewise lack a discriminating judge. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

confutare; reprobare; approbare. Printed forms: *approbaveris*; *confutatis*; *reprobatis*.

To refute, reject, and establish the acceptable alternative. The fifth position must survive examination of the four predecessors before immortality is applied to us. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

congregatio / momentum. Printed forms: *congregatione*; *congregationem*; *congregentur*; *momento*; *momentorum*.

Assembling distinct parts and an accumulation of moments. Ficino associates composite production with temporal aggregation and contrasts it with supposedly immediate sensing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

congregatum; domus; paries. Printed forms: *congregatum*; *domus*; *parietibus*.

Aggregate, house and walls. If each member had a different form, the result would resemble an artificial assembly rather than one natural organism. References: VI.9.3. See Members, house and sinew.

congruere / quadrare / aptare. Printed forms: *aptabis*; *congruet*; *quadrabit*.

To fit, correspond or match one thing to another. No fixed size of sensory power can match every sensible object; equal-part assignment therefore does not explain universal perception. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

congruus / incongruus / obsistere. Printed forms: *congrua*; *incongruis*; *obsistit*.

Congenial and uncongenial, and opposing what is uncongenial. The soul associates the former gladly and resists the latter painfully through its active responses. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

coniectura. Printed forms: *coniecturam*.

An indication or supporting inference. Ficino introduces the prepared body’s immediate animation as a further indication, then tests cognition, appetite and being as possible causes. References: V.14.2. See Life and vivification.

coniicere; coniectari. Printed forms: *coniectamur*; *coniicimus*.

To infer or conjecture from an effect or image. The seen splendor indicates unseen radiance, and stellar light similarly suggests spiritual light in celestial souls. References: VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

connectere / labi / abire. Printed forms: *abeunte*; *connectit*; *labitur*.

To bind together, collapse and depart. Soul joins conflicting elements; its departure accompanies loss of the former bodily constitution and kind. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

connexus. Printed forms: *connexae*.

Connected or interlinked; connexae describes feminine plural things linked with one another. The virtues are said to be so connected that each is wholly present in each, in parallel with the mutual implication of propositions. The claimed connection is ethical and

intelligible rather than a spatial fastening of bodily parts. References: VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

conscius / animadversio. Printed forms: *agnoscit*; *animadversione*; *animadvertat*; *animadvertit*; *conscius*.

Self-aware, attentive noticing and recognition of one’s own act. Reflexive mind knows its knowing and willing, unlike sensation as characterized in this argument; recursive levels need not be simultaneously completed. References: VIII.15.1, VIII.16.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

consensio stabilis. Printed forms: *consensio*; *convenire*; *stabilis*.

Stable agreement of minds in their shared desire for truth. It is contrasted with appetites varying with bodily constitution and change, not with every difference of opinion between people. References: VIII.2.6. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

consensio; concordia; conglutinare. Printed forms: *conglutinentur*; *consensio et concordia*.

Mutual coordination and agreement; being bound together. The concord of diverse members supports one soul present throughout rather than a form confined to one organ. References: VI.9.3. See Members, house and sinew.

consentire. Printed forms: *consentit*.

To agree or accord with what came before. The question asks how a newly arrived soul could share the previous soul’s dispositions and knowledge. References: VI.13.5. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

conservare / servare. Printed forms: *conservatorem*; *conservatrix*; *conservet*; *servat*; *servatur*.

To preserve or maintain an effect in being. God’s conserving power is the power that created; preservation is therefore not merely the absence of an external attack. References: V.4.2, V.6.1, V.12.12, V.13.17. See Relation and continuing dependence.

conservator / servator. Printed forms: *admovet*; *causis*; *conservatoribus*; *servatoribus*.

Preserving causes or preservers to which a dependent being remains related. The second anti-corruption argument concerns separation from these sources, distinct from destruction by an opposite. References: VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere. Printed forms: *aspicitur*; *considerando*; *considerat*; *contemplatur*; *inspiciet*; *inspicit*; *prospicit*; *respicit*; *spectat*; *speculando*; *speculatio*; *speculatur*.

Considering, contemplating and intellectual inspection. The verbs name different descriptions of mind’s attention, which can take bodies, common natures, its own acts or divine things as objects. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.2, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.9, VIII.5.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1. See Repose, motion, and contemplation.

consilium. Printed forms: *consilio*.

Deliberation or counsel, a proposed but rejected immediate basis of bodily animation. If every hidden bodily process required such cognition, everyone would know its workings; Ficino instead locates vivification in natural power. References: V.14.2. See Life and vivification.

consonantia / harmonia. Printed forms: *consonantia*; *harmonia*; *harmoniae*.

Concord or harmony, used as a proposed bodily explanation of mind. The argument tests its dependence on mutable body, then contrasts bodily and mental concord in experience. References: V.15.10, V.15.12, V.15.16, V.15.18. See Temperament and harmony.

consonantia; dissonus. Printed forms: *concordiam*; *consonantiam*; *dissonas*.

Concord, discordant and agreement. A simple binder coordinates opposed bodily qualities without itself repeating their discord. References: VI.8.5. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

consonare / dissonare. Printed forms: *consonante*; *consonet*; *dissonante*; *dissonat*; *dissonet*.

To be in harmony or discord, used of body, mind and agreement with truth. Their cross-combinations resist reducing mental order to bodily order and produce the paragraph’s closing wordplay. References: V.15.18. See Temperament and harmony.

conspirare; damnare; redarguere. Printed forms: *conspirantes*; *damnantur*; *redarguuntur*.

To act together, condemn and refute. The faculties are personified as witnesses whose restricted claims are corrected by others and by reason. References: VI.2.8. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

conspiratio / concinere / coalescere. Printed forms: *coalescent*; *concinunt*; *conspiratione*; *mutua*.

Mutual accord, harmonizing and growing or holding together. Some agreement exists in every composite body, so agreement as such cannot distinguish living bodies from all composites. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

constare / exstare. Printed forms: *constat*; *exstat*.

To be constituted from and, in this local contrast, to come forth from. The soul neither consists of matter nor arises from its latent resources; the supplied translation makes the contrast explicit. References: V.12.7. See Creation and generation.

construere / constituere. Printed forms: *constituent*; *constituta*; *constitutam*; *construere*.

To build or constitute a whole from its components. The body-building proposal must explain organs suited for sensation; simply combining nonsensing parts does not explain a sensing subject. References: VII.4.2, VII.8.1, VII.9.1, VII.9.2. See Composition and inward unity.

consuetudo. Printed forms: *consuetudine*; *consuetudine in hanc sententiam compulsos*; *consuetudinem*.

Familiarity or habitual association. Bodily familiarity can distract attention; withdrawal from it is used as evidence against identity with bodily temperament. References: V.14.2, V.15.9. See Temperament and harmony.

Long habit or familiarity that shapes judgement. Ficino attributes corporealist conviction to bodily habituation rather than rational persuasion. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

contemperare / temperatrix. Printed forms: *contemperans*; *contemperatam*; *temperat*; *temperatrix*.

To temper together and the power performing that tempering. The producer of vital concord is superior to the concord produced, preserving a causal distinction within the harmony vocabulary. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

continere. Printed forms: *contineantur*; *continere*; *contineri*; *continet*; *continetur*.

Containing or holding, quantitatively in bodies but intellectually or causally in other contexts. Propositions contain implications, minds mutually contain known natures, and bodies enclose smaller bodies; the repeated verb does not establish one uniform spatial relation. References: VIII.3.7, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.8, VIII.6.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.2. See Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres.

continere; sistere; torquere. Printed forms: *contineat*; *sistat*; *torqueat*.

To hold together, steady and turn. The three operations explicate the soul’s governance; the reading correctly lacks the later witnesses’ negation before containing. References: VI.7.3. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

contingere / concursus. Printed forms: *concursu*; *concursum*; *contingant*.

Touching or coincidence in the three-point demonstration. A nonextended middle point cannot keep the outer points apart by distinct contact surfaces without becoming divisible. References: VIII.4.2. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

continuatio molis. Printed forms: *continuationem molis*.

Continuity of bodily bulk through which a physical affection might propagate. Ficino objects that pain is not always present everywhere, so bodily continuity alone fails to explain unified awareness. References: VII.5.1. See Pain, location and reporting.

continuatio; ordinatrix. Printed forms: *continuatio*; *ordinatrix*.

Continuity and an ordering power. Nourishment and growth require a stable principle that coordinates their sequence through change. References: VI.13.8. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

contrahere / coarctare. Printed forms: *coarctatur*; *contrahitur*.

To restrict, contract or confine to a determinate condition. The being of bodily forms is narrowed to bodily place and time, and their essence follows those limits. References: V.7.2. See Conditions and the fashioner’s law.

contrahere; fundere. Printed forms: *se fundit*; *sese contrahit*.

To contract back and diffuse outward. These describe soul’s relation to root and branches, not proportional increase and decrease in its own bodily size. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

contraria elementa. Printed forms: *contraria*; *contrariorum*; *elementorum*; *interimunt*.

Contrary elements and their destructive opposition in material coexistence. Their forms can be known together without fighting in mind; this difference of reception supports incorporeality. References: VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

contrariae qualitates / medium. Printed forms: *contrariis*; *medium*; *qualitatibus*.

Contrary qualities and the intermediate condition arising from their mixture. A constitution occupies this middle, rather than subsisting independently as a substance. References: VII.9.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

contrarius; oppositus; repugnans. Printed forms: *contraria*; *contrariam*; *contrariis*; *contrarios*; *contrarium*; *opposita*; *oppositas*; *oppositum*; *repugnantes*; *repugnantia*.

Contrary, opposed or conflicting. Opposed bodily qualities, successive opinions and contrary effects have different roles; the same enduring soul can receive or govern opposites without being a fixed bodily contrary. References: VI.2.17, VI.7.3, VI.11.2, VI.12.14. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

convenientia / inconvenientia. Printed forms: *convenientiam*; *inconvenientiam*.

Congruence and incongruence between what affects the body and its appropriate operation. These mark easy and difficult activities, rather than simply pleasure and pain as separate bodily substances. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

convenire / conciliare. Printed forms: *conciliet*; *congruat*; *conveniunt*.

Agreeing, being suited or bringing into common accord. Persons agree through humanity, and an Idea is said to unite them in that common nature; the source is not a chance assemblage of their differences. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

converti / convertere. Printed forms: *convertat*; *convertatur*; *convertit*.

Being converted or converting another into oneself, literally or through assimilation. The food argument leaves two alternatives for truth and soul; later cognition converts harmful objects into beneficial knowledge without changing the objects’ moral status. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

convivium; discumbere. Printed forms: *convivio*; *discumberemus*.

A dinner gathering; reclining or taking one’s place at table. The second social scene is recalled as support for the demand to establish the human soul’s proper classification. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

copula; copulatrix. Printed forms: *copula*; *copulantem*; *copulatum*; *substantia copulatrix*.

Bond, binding power, what is bound and binding substance. Soul or its power performs the binding; it must not be identified with the composite already bound. References: VI.8.5. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

copulare / insinuare / cognatus. Printed forms: *cognatissimo*; *copulatur*; *insinuans*.

To join, enter intimately, and be most akin to. Soul engages a medium suited to itself and governs the body through it; affinity does not identify medium and soul. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

cor / sanguis / calor. Printed forms: *calore*; *cordis*; *sanguinis*.

Heart, blood and heat in the historical production of bodily spirit. Ficino says the heart’s heat generates spirit from the finest blood; the explanation is not adopted as contemporary physiology. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

cor; cerebrum. Printed forms: *cerebro*; *corde*.

Heart and brain as rival proposed ruling seats. They are examples of a nobler bodily part in the localized-point theory, not a final anatomical localization endorsed by Ficino. References: VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

corporeus / corporalis. Printed forms: *corporali*; *corporalibus*; *corporalis*; *corporea*; *corporeum*.

Bodily in being, location or mode of operation; the adjective's particular contrast must be supplied locally. Bodily nourishment, extended forms and corporeal reception are different applications of a shared material restriction, not interchangeable physical mechanisms. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.5.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus. Printed forms: *corporale*; *corporalem*; *corporali*; *corporalia*; *corporalis*; *corporalium*; *corporea*; *corpoream*; *corporeis*; *corporeum*; *incorporale*; *incorporalem*; *incorporali*; *incorporalia*; *incorporalis*; *incorporea*; *incorpoream*; *incorporeum*.

Bodily and nonbodily predicates, whose scope is distinct from visible versus invisible. A subtle invisible body remains bodily; incorporeality also needs to be distinguished from the stronger conclusion of independence from material origin. References: VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.2.1, VI.2.2, VI.2.6, VI.2.8, VI.2.13, VI.3.1, VI.4.1, VI.6.3, VI.12.13, VI.12.18. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

corpus. Printed forms: *corpora*; *corpore*; *corpori*; *corporibus*; *corporis*; *corporum*; *corpus*.

Body as extended corporeal reality, and in context the visible organism or a hypothetical subtle animating body. The arguments often isolate body precisely as body, not the whole living composite including soul; quantity, division and causal passivity are tested on that basis. References: VI.1.2, VI.2.1, VI.2.2, VI.4.1, VI.9.1. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

Body considered as extended, divisible and materially conditioned. The point-and-extension dilemmas concern the proposed bodily status of mind, while food and instrument examples concern its relation to the organism. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

corpus / corporalis. Printed forms: *corporales*; *Corporales*; *corporali*; *corporalia*; *corporalis*; *corporalium*; *corpore*; *corporea*; *corporeo*; *corpori*; *corporibus*; *corporis*; *corporum*; *corpus*; *Corpus*.

Body and bodily, the extended and temporally changing order contrasted with separate form. A body can persist generically while its individual form perishes; bodily dependence does not determine the rational soul's essence. References: V.3.1, V.7.2, V.10.2, V.11.7, V.11.8, V.13.18, V.15.1, V.15.2, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

Body, or belonging to bodily magnitude and modification. Receiving parts in parts is the hypothesized bodily mode whose restrictions Ficino denies of cognition. References: VII.1.1, VII.4.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

corpus / corporalis (further forms). Printed forms: *corporale*; *corporalem*; *corporales*; *corporalia*; *corporalium*; *corpori*; *Corporum*; *corporum*.

Bodily or belonging to bodies; the noun forms retain the same bodily reference. The proof distinguishes bodies known by mind from the proposed bodily constitution of the knowing subject; they must not be inferred to share one reception mode. References: VIII.1.1,

VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

corpus aethereum; corpus geminum. Printed forms: *corporibus geminis*; *corpus aethereum*; *lucido et opaco*.

Ethereal body; a pair of luminous and opaque bodily vehicles. Ficino distinguishes the one luminous surrounding body of stellar souls from the two bodies attributed to other rational souls. References: VI.2.25, VI.2.26. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

corpusculum. Printed forms: *corpusculi*; *corpusculo*; *corpusculum*.

A small or exceptionally subtle body posited as the animating constituent. The diminutive belongs to the rejected corporealist account and does not mean an incorporeal point. References: VI.1.2, VI.1.3. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

A little body, specifically the subtle bodily thing popularly supposed to be soul. The diminutive belongs to a hypothesis Ficino rejects, not his positive definition of soul. References: VIII.2.1. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

corrumpere / interire / perdere. Printed forms: *corrumpetur*; *corrumpi*; *corrumpitur*; *interimatur*; *perdat*.

Being corrupted, destroyed or lost, distinct from merely changing one’s attention. Ficino argues that mind’s mode of reception excludes the material contrariety and loss of preservative causes that would explain its destruction. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.8.2, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

corrumpere / perdere / interire. Printed forms: *corrumpi*; *corrumpit*; *corrumpitur*; *interibit*; *interire*; *interit*; *perdere*; *perditur*; *perierit*.

To corrupt, destroy or perish, usually loss of a determinate thing rather than total annihilation. The fate of fire differs from that of its matter; soul’s alleged destruction is tested against its separate form. References: V.4.9, V.4.10, V.6.1, V.8.2, V.11.1, V.11.3. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

corruptio. Printed forms: *corruptio*; *corruptione*; *corruptionem*.

Corruption, loss of a constituted thing or form. A composite can perish while its matter remains, so the term does not automatically mean reduction to absolute nothing. References: V.8.1, V.11.1, V.11.3. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

crassus; subtilis; rarus. Printed forms: *crassa*; *crassum*; *subtile rarumque*.

Dense, fine and rarefied as bodily textures. Dense bodies seem unfit for permeation, but rarefaction does not itself explain life or become incorporeality. References: VI.6.1. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

creare / creatio. Printed forms: *creant*; *creantur*; *creat*; *creata*; *creatio*; *Creatio*; *creatione*; *creationem*; *creationis*; *creatur*; *creavit*.

To create and creation, strictly production without a preexisting subject in V.13. The infinite work belongs only to God; an angel cannot serve as a finite instrument that does the same work. References: V.6.1, V.11.6, V.13.13, V.13.14, V.13.15, V.13.17. See Creation and generation.

creatio / interitus. Printed forms: *creationem*; *esse*; *Esse*; *interitum*; *non esse*.

Creation from nonbeing and destruction in the reverse direction. Mind conceptually spans both termini; the immeasurable interval is not physical space, and understanding creation is not efficiently creating. References: VIII.16.3. See Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing.

creatura. Printed forms: *creatura*; *creaturae*; *creaturam*.

A creature, any being other than God in the theological terminology Ficino adopts. Created essence, being, power and operation are distinct; none possesses unrestricted act through itself. References: V.13.7, V.13.11, V.13.13. See Creature, power and operation.

crescere; decrescere; adolescere. Printed forms: *adolescat*; *adolescet*; *crescet*; *decrescet*.

To grow, diminish and mature. The reductio falsely makes soul-size track body-size and asks what additional material would nourish it. References: VI.13.3. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

crinita. Printed forms: *crinita*; *crinitae*; *crinitis*.

A comet, literally the hairy celestial appearance. Its historical definition distinguishes essence from current existence; its hair later illustrates an inseparable attendant. References: V.7.1, V.14.6. See Comets and defining accounts.

cruciatus / molestia / persensio. Printed forms: *cruciatum*; *cruciatus*; *molesta*; *molestia*; *molestiam*; *persensio*.

Torment, distress and awareness of torment. The intermediate members' distress is distinguished from the foot's original pain in the proposed relay. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

crus / femur / pectus / collum. Printed forms: *collo*; *crure*; *femore*; *pectore*.

Lower leg, thigh, breast and neck as successive regions of the proposed reporting chain. The model distributes soul-parts through the body and reserves principal judgement for the brain; this is an objection to be rejected. References: VII.5.2. See Pain, location and reporting.

cumulus / continuum. Printed forms: *continuum*; *cumulus*; *numerosum*.

A heap, a continuous quantity or a numbered aggregate. A species assembled from identical spatial parts would amount to quantitative accumulation, closer to imagination than intellectual definition. References: VIII.4.3. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

cupiditas. Printed forms: *cupiditatem*; *cupiditates*; *cupiditatibus*; *cupiditatis*.

A directed desire through which one mind may exercise leverage over another in this account. Ficino denies that becoming mere body could satisfy desire, because the change would abolish the capacity to desire. References: V.15.21, V.15.22. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

dare / tribuere. Printed forms: *dare*; *dent*; *detur*; *praestare*; *praestatur*; *tribuit*; *tribuitur*.

Giving, granting or bestowing, either a causal gift or a premise conceded in argument. A granted hypothesis is different from the being or power bestowed by a source; divine communication and formal self-preservation require the causal sense to be specified.

References: VIII.2.3, VIII.2.4, VIII.3.1, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.9, VIII.13.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

dare / tribuere / praestare. Printed forms: *dabit*; *dat*; *datur*; *praebet*; *praestat*; *tribuere*; *tribuit*.

To give, bestow or supply a perfection or act. Giving life, form and being differ by agent and scope; communication need not remove the giver’s own possession. References: V.1.1, V.4.10, V.13.2, V.13.4, V.14.1, V.15.25. See Transmission of form and natural order.

dare; concedere. Printed forms: *Si primum detur*.

If the first alternative is granted. The conditional introduces a temporary premise for reductio and must not be converted into Ficino’s own conclusion. References: VI.6.3. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

dare; tribuere; praestare. Printed forms: *dat*; *praestare*; *praestat*; *tribuat*; *tribuere*; *tribuit*.

To give, impart or supply; praestare can also mean surpass in excellence. The source gives life or being to a recipient, whereas the comparative claim that reason surpasses beasts uses a different construction and must not be translated as donation. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.12, VI.5.1, VI.6.4, VI.9.2. See Essential presence and containment.

De republica; Divinorum. Printed forms: *secundo Divinorum*; *septimo De republica*.

The work and book references by which Ficino invokes Plato and Aristotle. The edition preserves his references descriptively without independently importing an ancient-source apparatus. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

declinare; attollere. Printed forms: *attolli*; *declinare*.

To tend down toward and be raised up toward. Lowest fire and highest air approach one another as the analogy for adjacent levels of heaven and rational soul. References: VI.2.24. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

deficere; perficere. Printed forms: *deficit*; *imperfecta*; *perficere*.

To fail, to perfect, and incomplete. The dying prior soul and newly born soul lack the relevant causal completeness for the proposed image-production. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

definitio. Printed forms: *definitio*; *Definitio*; *definitione*; *definitionem*; *definitiones*.

An account identifying what a thing is, especially through genus and difference. One mind knows one thing through one definition; an unbounded partition of its supposed bodily pieces would destroy the bounded account. References: VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

delabi / prolabi. Printed forms: *delapsas*; *lapsas*; *prolapsas*.

To fall down or descend into a lower exercise of life. The reported doctrine distinguishes descent into reason/sense, sense/generation, and generation alone; Ficino sets it aside. References: V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

Democritus; Leucippus; Hipparchus. Printed forms: *Democritus*; *Hipparchus*; *Leucippus*.

Authorities to whom Ficino attributes a fiery soul-body. The record reports this edition’s doxography and does not independently certify those ancient doctrines. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius. Printed forms: *denarios*; *denarium*; *denarius*; *Denarius*; *octonarium*; *senarium*; *septenario*; *Septenarius*.

Ten, seven, eight and six, treated as determinate numerical species. Dividing ten gives numbers but not more tens; adding or subtracting one from seven changes the species rather than intensifying seven. References: VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

densitas / densare. Printed forms: *densatur*; *densitate*.

Density or condensation, the thickening associated with descent through air, water and earth. The opposite movement to rarefaction displays one matter receiving successive forms. References: V.4.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

dependere / pendere. Printed forms: *dependeat*; *dependent*; *dependet*; *pendeat*; *pendet*.

Both verbs can mean to depend; pendere also means to hang, an image used for continuing causal dependence. Soul does not depend on matter but depends on God; corporeal forms hang from a superior source like a mirror image from a face. References: V.5.5, V.9.2, V.10.1, V.10.2, V.12.13. See Relation and continuing dependence.

depingere. Printed forms: *depicta*; *depingit*; *Picta*.

Painting or depicting an inward presentation. Phantasy paints Plato under singular conditions; the painted particular is present when intellect immediately apprehends the common nature. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

depingere; effigies. Printed forms: *depingit*; *effigies et figuras*.

To depict; likenesses and shapes. Successive images can resemble one another because the stable source continuously produces them. References: VI.13.10. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

deserere. Printed forms: *deserit*.

To abandon or leave. The soul does not leave uninjured members in order to be wholly aware at the touched place; they continue living through its presence. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

designare / discernere. Printed forms: *designaret*; *discernere*; *discernit*.

Indicating whom an image represents, or discriminating objects and relations. The first requires recognitive phantasy beyond imaginative collection; later discrimination of whole and parts tests intellectual adequacy. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.13.2. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

desinere / cessare. Printed forms: *cessat*; *cesset*; *desinat*; *desineret*; *desinet*; *desinit*; *desinunt*.

To cease an activity or existence, with the object determining the scope. Ceasing to be hot, ceasing to be fire and ceasing to be altogether are kept distinct in the objections and replies. References: V.1.1, V.1.4, V.8.2, V.9.4, V.12.12, V.12.13. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

determinare. Printed forms: *determinat*; *determinatur*; *determinet*.

To determine or restrict something to a particular mode or outcome. At V.7.2 the maker determines some forms to bodily being, with its temporal and spatial conditions. At V.12.6 a higher agent determines receptive matter to being a lion without abolishing prime

matter’s capacity for another outcome. Determination does not itself mean creation from nothing. References: V.7.2, V.12.6. See Conditions and the fashioner’s law.

determinata operatio. Printed forms: *certa et determinata natura*; *determinata operatio*.

Activity restricted by a definite nature. Ficino assumes bodily quality produces its corresponding effect rather than the contrary, and tests soul against that restriction. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

Deus. Printed forms: *Dei*; *Deo*; *Deum*; *Deus*.

God, the uncaused source of being, final end and continual preserver in Ficino’s argument. Soul’s self-subsistence does not make it independent of God; the four-cause analysis reserves complete causal exemption to God alone. References: V.5.1, V.10.1, V.10.3, V.13.17. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Deus / divinus. Printed forms: *dei*; *Dei*; *deo*; *Deo*; *deum*; *deus*; *divina*; *divinam*; *divino*; *divinorum*.

God and the divine, especially the infinite source and object of intellectual return. Human intellectual range and formal self-preservation remain dependent on divine implantation and continuing conservation; knowledge of God is not identity with God. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.4.9, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

dextera; sinistra; ante; retro. Printed forms: *Ad dexteram*; *ante et retro*; *sinistram*.

Right/left and forward/backward as intellectual directions. The former mark opposed differences within a kind, the latter natural causes and effects. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

dextra / sinistra. Printed forms: *dextera*; *dextra*; *dextrae*; *sinistra*; *sinistram*.

Right and left sides in the opponent’s spatial model of intellectual contents. No intrinsic reason places genus on one side and difference on the other; the unified definition cannot be known through isolated regions. References: VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

dicere / loqui / vocare. Printed forms: *dicam*; *dicitur*; *dictu*; *dixerit*; *Dixerit*; *diximus*; *loquar*; *vocant*; *vocantur*; *vocatur*; *Vocatur*.

Saying, speaking and naming, whose speaker and qualification determine the assertion’s force. The text can report an opponent, refine a technical name, invoke an authority or qualify a metaphor. These speech acts should not all be treated as direct endorsements. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

dicere; nominare; appellare. Printed forms: *appellabat*; *appellabimus*; *appellatur*; *dicam*; *dicat*; *dicatur*; *dicendum*; *dicere*; *dices*; *dici*; *dicitur*; *dixeris*; *dixerit*; *Dixerit*; *nominamus*; *nominant*; *nominatur*.

To say, call or assign a name, in report or definition. Naming the life-giving form soul and reporting what an opponent calls soul are different acts; a change of words alone does not solve the causal problem. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.1, VI.2.2, VI.2.13, VI.2.20, VI.4.5, VI.5.1, VI.5.3, VI.5.4, VI.9.4, VI.11.1, VI.12.12, VI.12.13, VI.12.16, VI.13.11. See Animation, first light and regress.

dictio / supervivere. Printed forms: *dictiones*; *supervivunt*.

Meaningful expressions and their continued existence through meaning. The components survive as expressions through distinct meanings, analogously to fragments sustained by new souls. References: VII.5.4. See Lucifer and indivisible meaning.

differentia. Printed forms: *differentia*; *differentiae*; *differentiam*; *differentias*.

The specifying distinction that marks one species within a genus. Rational differentiates human from nonrational animals, but does not become a bodily left-hand piece of a definition. References: VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.10. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

diffundere / spargere / porrigere. Printed forms: *diffusa*; *fusa*; *porrectam*; *porrigitur*; *sparsae*; *sparsam*.

To diffuse, scatter or extend, with bodily distribution distinguished from the soul’s presence. Whiteness and other diffused forms have divided regions; the whole soul’s vital presence is expressly not such local distribution. References: VII.2.2, VII.5.2, VII.5.3, VII.7.1. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

dignitas. Printed forms: *dignitatem*.

A thing’s proper worth or rank. The soul’s preservation of its form and dignity is one reason it cannot displace itself from self-subsistence. References: V.8.4. See Form and formal being.

diiudicare. Printed forms: *diiudicat*.

To discriminate and adjudicate among contents or activities. The one inward power judges both the objects and operations of the separate external senses. References: VII.2.1, VII.2.2. See Comparison and common sense.

dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere. Printed forms: *dilaniatio*; *discerptemus*; *disperdemus*; *lacerentur*.

Mangling, tearing and scattering, contrasted with reasoned analysis. If universal contents were bodily pieces, subdividing them would destroy the account rather than illuminate it. References: VIII.4.6. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

Dionysius / Origenes / Augustinus. Printed forms: *Aurelium Augustinum*; *Dionysium Areopagitam*; *Origenem*.

The named authorities Ficino prefers for the soul’s creation by God alone. Their designation as excellent Platonists is Ficino’s own philosophical alignment, not a claim of agreement in every doctrine. References: V.13.1. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

discernere. Printed forms: *discernantur*; *discernat*; *discerni*; *discernimus*.

To distinguish or discriminate between appearances or kinds. Vivid dream images may at the time be indistinguishable from their objects, unlike the later recognition of false scenery. References: V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

To distinguish contents or properties from one another. The verb marks what mere coexistence of impressions does not explain, and what knowing bodily proportion still fails to reveal about soul. References: VII.1.1, VII.12.1. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

disciplina / usus. Printed forms: *disciplina*; *usu*.

Instruction and practice. The soul is said to produce separate intelligible forms naturally even without these acquired aids, supporting its intrinsic aptitude for Ideas. References: V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

discretio. Printed forms: *discretionis*.

Discrimination or the ability to keep contents apart. Bodily qualities would mingle without this judgement if sensation were merely their penetration into a material soul. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

discurrere; distrahi. Printed forms: *discurrit*; *distrahitur*.

To range successively and be scattered among many things. The two uses give rarefaction an intellectual or attentional counterpart, not an unequivocally negative sense in every instance. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

discursio; revolutio. Printed forms: *discursiones*; *revolutiones*.

Courses and turnings of thought. They are real motions of soul’s activity without being the eight bodily motions or physical changes of place. References: VI.12.18. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

discursus / discurrere. Printed forms: *discurrendi*; *discurrendo*; *discurrit*; *discursione*; *discursu*.

Successive intellectual movement or reasoning; in a bodily hypothesis it can describe traversal. Immediate universality does not require discourse, whereas return to particulars involves it; bodily traversal is a separate rejected model. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.4, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

discursus temporalis. Printed forms: *cognitione affectioneque*; *discursus temporalis*.

Temporal passage between cognitions and affections. Discursive cognition is not identified with the simultaneously complete knowledge attributed to God and angels. References: VI.12.17. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

discussio. Printed forms: *discussione*.

Examination or inquiry, resonating locally with striking or shaking apart. It connects the philosophical search with the repeatedly struck stone; the realized light is sudden although its preparation is not. References: VIII.3.3. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

disiungere / copulare incorporeis. Printed forms: *disiunctum*; *incorporeis copulabit*.

To separate from bodily objects and join to incorporeal ones. The rejected theory lacks an independent subject capable of this cognitive orientation beyond humoral states. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

dispersus; distantia. Printed forms: *dispersum*; *distantiam partium*.

Dispersed; distance between parts. Spatial separation is the first bodily feature requiring an account of the unity nevertheless present. References: VI.8.1. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

disputare. Printed forms: *disputando*; *disputare*; *disputari*; *disputatio*.

To argue or conduct a discussion. A dreamed debate may contain valid reasoning even when its interlocutor, location and words never occurred as waking events. References: V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

disputatio; disputare. Printed forms: *disputatione*; *disputaveram*; *disseras*; *disseruisti*.

A sustained philosophical discussion or examination by argument. Cavalcanti distinguishes the preceding common proof from a requested examination specifically of our own soul. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

dissentire / pugnare / appetitus. Printed forms: *appetitus*; *Dissentit*; *Pugnant*.

Disagreement with reason and conflict among appetites. These mark the wicked soul's moral discord while leaving it a soul and a principle of ordinary life. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

dissonantia / discordia / dissensio. Printed forms: *discordia*; *Dissensio*; *dissensio*; *dissonantia*; *dissonantibus*; *dissonat*; *dissonent*; *dissonum*.

Dissonance or disagreement, with its domain supplied by context. Opinions and affections, humors and elements, and parts of soul and body are three distinct domains in the final argument. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul's persistence.

distribuere / partiri / secare. Printed forms: *distribues*; *dividitur*; *partiri*; *partiturum*; *secabis*.

To distribute or divide into portions. Finite natural minima and mathematical infinite division are successive tests of a partitioned sensory image. References: VII.4.1, VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

dividere / secare / partiri. Printed forms: *dividas*; *dividi*; *dividimus*; *dividitur*; *partiamur*; *partiri*; *secabit*; *secas*; *secatur*.

Dividing, cutting and partitioning, bodily or conceptual according to context. A body can be cut into bodies while humanity is not thereby cut into humans; the difference limits the claim of specific simplicity. References: VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.12. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

dividere; divisio. Printed forms: *dividendo*; *dividi*; *dividitur*; *dividuntur*; *divisa*; *divisam*; *divisibile*; *divisibiles*; *divisibilis*; *divisionem*; *divisionis*.

To divide; division either of bodies or of alternatives in an argument. Potential bodily division, a form dispersed with body and the logical fourfold division are distinct senses; the last does not assert four physical parts. References: VI.2.20, VI.3.1, VI.6.4, VI.8.5, VI.9.1, VI.12.2, VI.12.4, VI.12.7. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

dividuum / divisibilis. Printed forms: *dividua*; *divisibile*; *divisibilem*; *divisibilis*.

Divisible, admitting quantitative parts. A divisible contact would require corresponding divisible parts in the thing touched, contrary to the hypothesis about soul. References: V.6.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

divisibilis / dividuus. Printed forms: *dividua*; *dividuis*; *divisibile*; *divisibilem*; *divisibili*; *divisibilis*.

Divisible, particularly as an extended body or a quality distributed through it. The contrast with indivisible intellectual content motivates the location, definition and knowledge arguments; it does not deny that objects known can be physically divided. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.9, VIII.10.2, VIII.15.2. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

divisio / membrum. Printed forms: *divisionis*; *membro*; *membrum*.

A logical division and one of its alternatives. The relation between mind and intelligibles has three possibilities; the argument proceeds through each rather than selecting one unannounced. References: V.15.17, V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo. Printed forms: *amplitudo*; *cumulus*; *divitiarum*; *imperii*.

An accumulation of riches and extent of rule, examples of unsatisfied human ambition. Ficino compares their unending appetite with desire for divine knowledge; the example is diagnostic within his argument, not praise of conquest. References: VIII.16.3. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

docere. Printed forms: *docendo*; *docet*.

To teach or communicate understanding to another. Teaching does not itself make the teacher forget, so the principles do not relocate away from their original living subject. References: V.15.15. See Teaching without loss.

docilitas / acumen. Printed forms: *acumen*; *docilitas*.

Capacity to learn and keenness of cognition. A soul too solid to be impressed would lose both; they are not identified with sheer material softness. References: VII.1.2. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

domina / dominari. Printed forms: *domina*; *Domina*; *dominatur*.

Mistress or ruler, and ruling, describing causal superiority rather than legal ownership. Soul’s rule over matter supports independence from its subject; mistress of life expresses the inseparability of life from soul. References: V.4.10, V.5.9, V.14.6. See Life and vivification.

dominari / vigere / astringere. Printed forms: *astricta*; *dominatur*; *viget*.

To predominate, prevail in activity, and be tied to a determinate mode. A constitution still has a ruling quality; soul’s activity is not bound to one quality’s proper motion. References: VII.7.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

dormire / vigilare / expergefieri. Printed forms: *dormienti*; *expergefacto*; *vigilanti*; *vigilantibus*.

Sleeping, waking and being awakened. A truth grasped through valid reasoning remains true across these states despite the dream’s fictitious scene. References: V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

dos. Printed forms: *dotes*; *dotes ex eo*.

An endowment or gift attached to the soul’s middle position. The three gifts are divine images, forming/containing body, and reconciling divine and bodily orders. References: V.15.2, V.15.3. See Soul as universal bond.

dulce / amarum / utile / inutile. Printed forms: *amarum*; *dulce*; *inutilia*; *utilia*.

Sweet and bitter, useful and useless, further contrary objects of joint knowledge. The range moves from bodily qualities to evaluative distinctions while preserving the same nonhostile cognitive reception. References: VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

dum est. Printed forms: *dum est*; *Dum scilicet est*; *dum scilicet est*.

While it exists, the condition attached to fire’s always being hot. The objector proposes the same qualification for soul’s being; Ficino replies by distinguishing being from hotness and excluding material mediation. References: V.9.3, V.9.4. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

duo / quattuor / sex / octo. Printed forms: *duo*; *duorum*; *octo*; *quattuor*; *sex*.

Two, four, six and eight, the actual numbers in the reasoning example. Two plus four equals six; two relates to four as four to eight. These are distinct demonstrations of invariant rational content. References: V.15.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

e vestigio. Printed forms: *e vestigio*.

Immediately or on the instant. The phrase marks the whole realized illumination of contemplative virtue, after the extended distinction between preparation and completion. References: VIII.3.5. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

ebrius / monstrum. Printed forms: *ebrius*; *monstro*.

Drunken or monstrous, the polemical comparisons attached to reductios. Ficino rejects knowing and not knowing, or willing and not willing, the same thing by the same power in the same respect. References: VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

educere; eruere; addicere. Printed forms: *addixerit*; *eduxerit*; *eruerit*.

To bring out, extract into light, and bind over or assign entirely. The first two express origin from matter; the last its continued subjection to matter. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

effectrix / conservatrix / corruptrix. Printed forms: *conservatrix*; *corruptrix*; *effectrix*.

Producing, preserving and destroying cause, presented as contrasting roles. Ficino challenges whether the cause of life and preservation could also be its destroyer; the question belongs to his argument from divine goodness. References: V.12.12. See Relation and continuing dependence.

effectus proprius. Printed forms: *effectibus*; *effectus proprios*; *propriis*.

A determinate effect belonging to its corresponding cause. The causal method distinguishes these from being common to every effect, which requires a common cause. References: V.13.1. See Participation, common and proper.

efficere / causa / effectus. Printed forms: *causa*; *effectus*; *efficit*.

Producing, producer as cause, and the produced effect. The chapter premises that a productive cause is more excellent and freer from matter than its effect. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

efficere / producere / generare. Printed forms: *efficiatur*; *efficit*; *efficitur*; *efficiunt*; *generant*; *generat*; *procreat*; *produci*; *producit*.

Bringing about, producing or generating, whose kind of causality must be determined. Natural offspring, conceptual products and formal self-preservation are not interchangeable with efficient creation of one’s own essence. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.4, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.5, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

effluere / diffluere / defluere. Printed forms: *defluat*; *defluere*; *diffluendo*; *effluendo*; *effluit*.

Flowing outward, dispersing and ebbing away, distinct images of dependent life. Outward effluence needs support, weakens, takes contamination and eventually loses its proper condition in the four-stage account. References: VIII.15.3. See Outward flow and rational life’s return.

effluere; refluere. Printed forms: *effluet refluetque*; *fluit*.

To flow out and back; to flow. Qualitative as well as material replacement would deprive the animal of an enduring formal source. References: VI.13.8. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

effundere. Printed forms: *effundit*; *effusio*.

To pour out or let flow away; effusio names an outpouring. Circular movement does not dissipate its powers, while divine radiance is positively described as life’s outpouring; loss and communication are distinct uses. References: V.1.4, V.15.3. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

egenus / egere / indigere. Printed forms: *egeat*; *egena*; *egeret*; *eget*; *indigent*; *indiget*; *indigus*.

To need or lack a necessary support or cause. Prime matter needs form, bodily work needs a substrate, and soul needs God but no bodily foundation for its essence. References: V.4.1, V.5.9, V.12.3, V.13.5, V.13.13, V.13.17. See Relation and continuing dependence.

egere; pati. Printed forms: *eget patiturque*; *indiget*.

To need and to undergo, a double measure of dependence. Body’s dimensions and divisibility make it more dependent than surface, line, point and ultimately substantial unity. References: VI.2.20. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

elementum. Printed forms: *elementa*; *elementis*; *elemento*; *elementorum*; *elementum*.

An element of bodily nature; in V.13 the four creaturely ‘elements’ are expressly analogical constituents. Elemental transformation presupposes matter; the Pythagorean analogy does not make spirits composites of literal earth, water, air and fire. References: V.4.1, V.4.6, V.13.7. See Art and elemental transformation.

An elemental constituent of natural body. The hypothesis of a soul made of several elements is separated from the case of one element still composed of matter and form. References: VI.11.1. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

elementum / mixtum. Printed forms: *elementi*; *mixti*.

An element or mixed body considered through its determinate natural form. The final argument contrasts its movement toward a single terminus with organic growth extending in every direction. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

elephas / equus / prudentia. Printed forms: *elephas*; *equo*; *prudentior*.

Elephant and horse contrasted in practical intelligence. The larger elephant reverses the earlier pattern, blocking the rule that size necessarily harms the soul’s abilities. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

emergere. Printed forms: *emergentium*.

Arising or emerging successively. The seeds emerge in varying manners to generate corporeal effects; their sequence is a motion proper to soul. References: VI.12.17. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

emergere; immergere. Printed forms: *Emergite*; *immersae*.

To emerge and to be immersed. The exhortation answers the preceding image of souls engulfed in bodily darkness. References: VI.2.18. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

emicare / exuberare / evadere. Printed forms: *emicet*; *evaditque*; *exuberat*.

To shine forth, overflow abundantly and issue outward. These verbs describe the account of visible light proceeding from invisible celestial light; they report Ficino’s natural philosophy. References: VII.1.3. See Spiritual images and light.

Empedocles / Timaeus Locrus. Printed forms: *Empedocles*; *Timaeus Locrus*.

Named figures who seem, in Ficino’s report, to intimate the descent and possible return of souls. The qualification videntur and the concluding reservation prevent an unqualified endorsement. References: V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

enervare / nervosus. Printed forms: *enervamus*; *enervato*; *nervosior*.

Weakening the body’s sinews and becoming more sinewy in soul. The wordplay dramatizes occasions when bodily depletion accompanies intellectual strengthening; it does not prescribe deprivation. References: VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

Epicurei. Printed forms: *Epicurei*; *Epicureis*; *Epicureos*; *Epicureus*.

The opponents to whom Ficino attributes bodily models of soul and cognition. Their positions are presented polemically by Ficino; these entries explain his argument rather than independently establishing every historical Epicurean doctrine. References: VIII.2.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.7, VIII.10.2. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

equus / homo. Printed forms: *equi*; *equum*; *equus*; *hominem*; *hominibus*; *hominis*; *homo*.

Horse and human, distinguishable kinds or depicted figures. The bronze and painter examples use their formal difference; the latter includes Ficino’s aesthetic ranking of the exemplars. References: V.8.1, V.13.3, V.13.16. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

esse. Printed forms: *esse*; *Esse*; *essendi*.

Being or existing; the act of essence rather than its definition alone. Common being and a particular mode of being are separated; soul’s being is repeatedly identified with living. References: V.7.1, V.11.3, V.13.2, V.13.3. See Essence and being.

To be, either as an ordinary predication or as substantive being when used absolutely. The analysis of substance reaches being, and the self-causation passage distinguishes being-well from being according to form; those technical uses must not be imposed on every copula. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

esse proprium. Printed forms: *esse proprium*; *esse totius compositi*.

A part's own being versus the composite whole's being. Actual independent agency would make each supposed part a self-subsisting whole, undermining its status as a part. References: VI.12.3. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

esse proprium / commune esse. Printed forms: *commune esse*; *esse commune*; *esse proprium*; *proprium suum esse*.

Proper being belongs to something in the relevant mode; common being here is the being of a composite shared by its dependent constituents. Form gives a thing its determinate nature and proper being. In the fire example, however, the form provisionally called heat has no being proper to itself: it exists through the common being of the whole fire and perishes when that composite dissolves. Proper does not mean uncreated. References: V.8.1, V.8.2. See Form and formal being.

esse; existere. Printed forms: *esse*; *existere*; *existit*.

Being or to be; existing. Affirming one's being in the Avicennian experiment differs from predicating corporeal qualities; giving substantial being to members differs from merely moving them. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.12, VI.2.23, VI.9.2. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

esse; habere; fieri. Printed forms: *erit*; *erunt*; *es*; *essent*; *esset*; *est*; *fiat*; *fieri*; *fiet*; *fit*; *fiunt*; *fore*; *foret*; *fuisse*; *habeant*; *habeat*; *habebit*; *habent*; *habere*; *haberet*; *habet*; *Habetis*; *sint*; *sit*; *sunt*.

Being, having and becoming, distinguished by their grammatical constructions. To be soul, to possess life, and to become living are not interchangeable claims; the animate/inanimate and act/potency arguments repeatedly depend on those relations. References: VI.1.6, VI.2.3, VI.2.6, VI.2.9, VI.2.10, VI.2.13, VI.2.19, VI.4.6, VI.5.1, VI.5.2, VI.5.4, VI.6.3, VI.7.1, VI.7.2, VI.7.3, VI.9.1, VI.11.1. See Animation, first light and regress.

essentia. Printed forms: *essentia*; *Essentia*; *essentiae*; *Essentiam*; *essentiam*; *essentias*.

Essence, what a thing is as grasped in its defining account. V.7 distinguishes this from actual presence; V.13 denies that a creature's essence is identical with its received being. References: V.7.1, V.7.2, V.13.7. See Essence and being.

Essence, what a thing is; as intelligible it is distinguished from mind's representing form. The simplicity of the known essence constrains its intellectual image; later essence is related to life and reflexive mind. References: VIII.4.9, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

essentia; esse; virtus; operatio. Printed forms: *a virtute operatio*; *ab essentia fluit esse*.

Being proceeds from essence and operation from power. The causal distinction grounds the inference that giving each member being and activity requires presence of the soul's essence and power there. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

essentia–vita–mens. Printed forms: *essentia*; *mens*; *Mens*; *motus*; *reflexio*; *status*; *vita*.

The triad essence, life and mind, correlated with repose, activity and self-return. Ficino attributes the ordering to Plato: life activates essence, and mind prevents vital activity from being wholly effluent into an external work. References: VIII.15.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

esurire / sitire. Printed forms: *esurienti*; *esurit*; *sitis*; *sitit*; *sititque*.

Hungering and thirsting, extended to the desire for truth or the infinite good. A bodily meal can be complete while intellectual desire continues, and finite attainment can even intensify it. References: VIII.2.5, VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

evolvere; convolvere. Printed forms: *convoluta*; *evolutumque*.

To unfold outward and roll together. The paired participles express the relation of circumference to point without making the point an extended body. References: VI.2.25. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

ex nihilo in lucem. Printed forms: *ex nihilo processit in lucem*.

Coming from nothing into light, a birth-image for creation. No preexisting material ingredient is implied; the following units locate the power of production in God. References: V.12.8. See Creation and generation.

ex otio in actum. Printed forms: *a potentia in actum*; *ex otio in actum*.

From rest into activity; from potentiality into act. Soul must first exercise inwardly the vital progression it communicates to the animal. References: VI.12.10. See Vital motion, action and passion.

ex se / in se / per se. Printed forms: *ex se*; *in se*; *per se*; *Per se*; *per se ipsum*.

From itself, upon or within itself, and through itself: distinct relations of an inward act. Source, terminus and medium are all within intellectual self-operation; that is not the same as being efficiently uncaused. References: VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

excessus / extraneus / dissociare. Printed forms: *dissociantis*; *excessum*; *extraneae*.

An excess of foreign quality that separates or breaks a composition. The constitution’s vulnerability to a contrary excess marks its status as a variable quality. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

excitare / promere / adita. Printed forms: *aditis*; *excitata*; *latent*; *promit*.

Awakening, bringing forth and the hidden inner recesses of mind. Bodily images prompt mind to bring out latent forms, according to the expressly attributed Platonic explanation. References: VIII.13.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

excitatum iudicium. Printed forms: *excitatum*; *iudicium*.

A judgement awakened or elicited by a more attentive action. The final account defines sensation through awareness of activity or judgement of bodily affection prompted by that activity. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

excursio; praeludium. Printed forms: *excursio*; *praeludium*.

An exploratory excursion and a preliminary exercise. Ficino expressly limits the chapter’s geometric and luminous persuasion before the ordered proofs begin. References: VI.2.27. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

exemplar. Printed forms: *exemplar*; *exemplares*; *exemplaria*; *motionum corporalium exemplaria*.

An exemplary pattern, whether in the painter’s mind or in the account of divine Ideas. The image explains determination by a pattern without making the pattern a bodily ingredient. References: V.13.16, V.13.18. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

A higher pattern or counterpart of bodily motion. Psychic generation, increase and movement are analogical activities, not literal bodily processes within soul. References: VI.12.19, VI.12.20. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

exemplar / fabricare. Printed forms: *artificiorum*; *exemplar*; *exemplaria*; *fabricare*; *fabricat*.

A model for a distinct art and the work made according to it. The mind can follow one artistic conception without producing the work proper to another, showing unity without confusion. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.2. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

eximere / liberare. Printed forms: *eximit*; *liberet*.

Removing from restrictions or freeing in the mode of understanding. Mind abstracts individuals from place and time and other material affections; the external body is not thereby rendered physically immortal. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

existentia. Printed forms: *existentiae*; *existentiam*.

Existence or subsistence, the fact or mode of being rather than merely the defining account. At V.4.9 matter is said not to require an aggregate of determinate parts for its existence because it is naturally prior to quantitative dimensions. The noun is related in meaning to esse, but existentiam is not an inflection of the verb esse. References: V.4.9. See Essence and being.

Existence or the state of being; existentiae means of existence. Vita est primus existentiae actus calls life the first act of existence. The ensuing self-cause is explicitly formal, not efficient. References: VIII.15.3. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

expellere / depellere. Printed forms: *depellitur*; *depulsus*; *expellere*; *expulsa*.

To drive out or expel. Cold expels heat from the matter supporting it; the ejected dependent form ceases instead of persisting independently. References: V.8.2, V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

expergisci. Printed forms: *expergiscatur*.

To awaken into ordinary sensory life. After sensory isolation the imagined adult would retain an easier route toward self-contemplation than ordinary upbringing provides. References: VI.2.13. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

experiri; experientia. Printed forms: *Experiantur*; *experientia*.

To make trial; experience that tests a philosophical claim. Ficino asks thinkers to examine their own inward life as an approach to separate forms. References: VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

expers. Printed forms: *expers*; *expertem*.

Without a share in something or devoid of it. Soul’s essence is without bodily passion; prime matter is devoid of forms of its own. The privation has a different object in each case. References: V.3.1, V.4.1. See Passivity and bodily affection.

exsultare / illuminare / adolescere. Printed forms: *adolescit*; *exsultat*; *gaudet*; *illuminatur*.

Exulting, becoming illuminated and maturing through possession of truth. These predicates describe intellectual delight and growth rather than a literal increase in size. References: VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

extensio; contrarietas. Printed forms: *contrarietas*; *Extensio*; *qualitatibus*.

Extension and opposition of qualities. One separates parts spatially; the other drives incompatible qualities apart within a composite. References: VI.8.2, VI.8.3. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

extenuare. Printed forms: *extenuat*; *extenuata*.

To thin or attenuate. The sun thins seawater, and rarefaction thins matter toward the elemental form of fire. References: V.4.1, V.4.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

extrinsecum principium. Printed forms: *extrinsecone principio*; *extrinsecum*.

A principle from outside the concord considered in itself. Ficino affirms the need for a source beyond bare concord but says an external source alone does not explain constant inward tempering. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

exuberare. Printed forms: *exuberat*.

To overflow abundantly. God’s constant overflow is paired with the soul’s constant drawing, distinguishing source and recipient. References: V.10.3. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

faber intimus. Printed forms: *Intimus autem ille faber corporis atque stabilis*.

The inward stable craftsman of body. Ficino identifies this source with soul and argues that if it too flowed, bodily likeness and retained knowledge would lose their explanation. References: VI.13.10. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

fabricare / servare / reficere. Printed forms: *fabricat*; *fabricet*; *reficit*; *servat*.

To fashion, preserve and repair. The soul’s productive relation to its body extends beyond original formation to continuing maintenance and restoration. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

fabricare; aedificium. Printed forms: *aedificia*; *fabricat*.

To fashion; constructed works or structures. The intellectual works in the second branch are incorporeal, so the building metaphor does not make intellect a bodily craftsman. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

facere / fieri. Printed forms: *facere*; *facit*; *factae*; *Factae*; *fiat*; *Fit*; *fit*.

Making and becoming, active and passive descriptions that must not be interchanged. Mind produces forms and grows in perfection; the report of efficient self-production is expressly distinguished from Ficino’s formal self-causation. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.3.8, VIII.15.2. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

facere / fieri (further forms). Printed forms: *facta*; *facti*; *fiat*; *fieret*; *fieri*; *fiet*; *Fiet*; *fiunt*; *Fiunt*.

Making or becoming, including resultative and passive forms rather than a single doctrine of production. Natural generation, conceptual formation and intellectual perfection differ; no occurrence alone authorizes efficient self-creation of mind. References: VIII.1.2,

VIII.1.3, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.4, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.9, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

facies / profundum. Printed forms: *faciem*; *profundam*.

Surface and depth as rival receiving sites. The closing sensory dilemma contrasts an image touching the surface with qualities penetrating deep into a supposed material soul. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

facilis / difficilis. Printed forms: *difficile*; *Facile*; *Facilius*.

Easy and difficult, measuring relative demands on an agent’s power. Producing from a prepared material is easier than creation from nothing; elemental readiness provides the comparison. References: V.4.2, V.13.5. See Creation and generation.

facultas; capacitas. Printed forms: *capacitatem*; *facultatem*.

Capacity or operative ability, including a recipient’s limit. Earthly sight cannot receive excess intelligible radiance, while living bodies acquire the ability to act through soul’s presence. References: VI.2.23, VI.12.8, VI.12.20. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

felicitas. Printed forms: *felicitas*.

Happiness, the stated end of a human being in the four-cause example. The supplied edition distinguishes this word from beatitudo rather than treating all blessedness-language as one Latin term. References: V.5.1. See Four causes and graded dependence.

fetus; adultus. Printed forms: *adulto*; *fetu*; *trigesimo aetatis anno*.

Fetus, mature body and the thirtieth year of age. These mark Ficino’s developmental and polemical narrative; they are not endorsed modern developmental thresholds. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

fides / chorda. Printed forms: *chordas*; *chordis*; *fidibus*.

Strings of a musical instrument. Fides is not faith here. Strings moved from elsewhere produce harmony; harmony does not independently set them moving. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

fieri / facere. Printed forms: *facit*; *facitque*; *factum*; *fieri*; *fiet*; *fiunt*; *Fiunt*.

To come about or be made, and to make or do. The passive/active contrast matters when a harmony is produced by moved strings, while soul is assigned the productive role in bodily organization. References: VII.1.3, VII.5.4, VII.6.1, VII.7.1, VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

figmentum / machinatio. Printed forms: *figmento*; *figmentum*; *machinatione*.

A fabrication or contrivance unsupported by the thing it purports to know. False union and arbitrarily multiplied genera differ from genuine intellectual analysis; not every imaginative fiction claims scientific truth. References: VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

figulus. Printed forms: *figulo*.

A potter who imparts successive vessel shapes to clay. The potter supplies a familiar model of differing forms received by persistent matter. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

figura / figurare. Printed forms: *figura*; *figurae*; *figuram*; *figuras*; *figuratur*.

A determinate shape, or being impressed with one. In wax it is an imposed bodily pattern; difficulty receiving it illustrates how rigidity threatens learning. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

figura artificiosa / dispositio. Printed forms: *dispositio*; *figura artificiosa*.

Artfully formed shape and ordered disposition. These organized bodily results require an active arranger, not a harmony wholly dependent on already arranged constituents. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

figura eadem; similis. Printed forms: *eandem prorsus*; *figuram eandem*; *similem*.

The same figure, distinguished from a similar one newly produced. The reply denies exact numerical persistence of the bodily figure as its material constituents change. References: VI.13.9. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

figurare; perfectus agens. Printed forms: *Figurare*; *perfectum requirit agentem*.

To fashion an image; requiring an operatively complete agent. A former soul in the act of failing cannot perfect a replacement by impressing a similar image. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

fingere / figere. Printed forms: *figuntur*; *fingi*.

To imagine or invent, contrasted with fixing or fastening. The impossible partitioned perception cannot even be imagined; word-meanings are not fixed in a body. These similar-looking forms belong to distinct verbs. References: VII.1.3, VII.4.2. See Spiritual images and light.

fingere; machinari; effingere. Printed forms: *effingere*; *fingere*; *machinari*.

To imagine, devise and fashion a conception. The objection that the isolated soul invents an unfamiliar body is answered by restricting imaginative construction to prior materials. References: VI.2.13. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

finis (end and absence of end). Printed forms: *fine*; *finem*; *finibus*; *finis*.

An end, goal or limit, including the negation of a final limit. Infinity as endless continuation differs from the infinite end that stops the ascent beyond finite angels; both uses appear in the closing chapter. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.4, VIII.10.2, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

finis / causa finalis. Printed forms: *finalem*; *fine*; *finem*; *finis*.

An end or final cause, that toward which an agent directs its work. Happiness is the human example; God is the end of all, so created soul does not lose final causality. References: V.5.1, V.5.3, V.5.4, V.5.5. See Four causes and graded dependence.

finis; limes; terminus. Printed forms: *fine*; *finem*; *fines*; *limite*; *terminos*; *terminum*; *terminus*.

End, boundary or limit, spatial, causal or purposive as context requires. A point bounds a line, body has finite dimensions, growth has a governing limit, and God is the soul’s beginning and end; these are not one spatial relation. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.6, VI.2.18, VI.2.19, VI.12.16, VI.12.19, VI.13.8. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

finita natura. Printed forms: *in natura finita*; *secundum finitam naturam*.

Within finite nature, the explicit restriction on the generation argument. This scope must accompany the denial that one can be one's own begetter and begotten. References: VI.12.14. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

flatus; evanescere. Printed forms: *evanescens*; *flatus alicuius instar*.

Like a breath; vanishing. The image makes the materialist soul too unstable to retain knowledge even for a day. References: VI.13.7. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

fluere. Printed forms: *confluentibus*; *effluat*; *effluet*; *effluit*; *fluentes*; *fluit*; *influat*; *influenti*; *influentibus*; *influit*.

To flow, flow out, flow in or flow together. The book uses flux for changing matter and alleged soul-substance, and flowing also pictures causal communication; local causal direction prevents a single literal hydrodynamic reading. References: VI.9.2, VI.11.1, VI.13.6, VI.13.8, VI.13.9, VI.13.10, VI.13.11. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

fluxus; labilis; solidare. Printed forms: *fluxum et labile*; *solidaret*.

Fluid and unstable; to consolidate. A fluid soul-body fails to bind firmly and therefore requires another stable principle. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

fluxus; solidus; albus; niger. Printed forms: *fluxum, solidum, album, nigrum*.

Fluid, solid, white and black. The catalogue extends beyond elemental temperature to consistency and colour, illustrating determinate bodily ranges. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

fomes. Printed forms: *fomite*; *fomitem*.

Tinder or combustible ground, figuratively matter's latent productive resource. A bodily form is drawn from and can return to this material resource; soul is not generated from it. References: V.8.2, V.11.1, V.13.1. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

fons / receptaculum naturale. Printed forms: *fons*; *parit*; *receptaculum naturale*.

Natural source and recipient of universally applicable forms. The mind's regular production of universals is described as innate capacity, not solely the outcome of chosen practice. References: VIII.8.2. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

fons / subiectum virtutis. Printed forms: *fons*; *subiectum*.

Source and bearer of a power. The soul is both the origin and the subject of indivisible sensory power; subject does not mean perceived object here. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

fons essendi. Printed forms: *Fons*; *fontem essendi*.

The fountain or source of being, here form's role in giving determinate existence. The formal explanation is not an assertion that every form is the absolutely uncaused God. References: V.4.10, V.9.1. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

fons; receptaculum. Printed forms: *fons et receptaculum motionis*.

Source and receptacle of motion. The two poles name activity and reception in the one primary self-mover, later clarified as nontransitive vital succession. References: VI.12.1. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

forma. Printed forms: *Forma*; *forma*; *formae*; *Formae*; *formam*; *formarum*; *formas*; *formis*.

A determining principle through which a thing has its proper nature and being. A material form belongs to a composite's common being, while rational soul is form subsisting in itself. References: V.8.1, V.8.2, V.8.3, V.9.2. See Form and formal being.

A determining form, ranging from life-giving substantial principle to divided bodily form or separate intelligible form. The local adjective and causal role govern its sense: rejecting body does not automatically show that a form is indivisible, substantial or free from material origin. References: VI.2.10, VI.3.1, VI.7.3, VI.9.3, VI.12.18. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

Determining form, or the form through which a knower apprehends an object. A form in bodily matter differs in mode from an intellectual representation; the argument cannot be read by assigning all forms one material location. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.9, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

forma / qualitas. Printed forms: *formae*; *formam*; *formas*; *qualitates*; *qualitatum*.

Form and quality, whose scope depends on whether the passage concerns sensory reception, an accidental condition or substantial organization. The growth argument's accidental forms and elemental substantial forms are separate candidates; reception of cognitive forms without matter is another use. References: VII.8.1, VII.13.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

forma accidentalis / substantialis. Printed forms: *accidentalem*; *accidentalibus*; *formam accidentalem*; *formis accidentalibus*; *substantialem*; *substantialem aliquam formam*.

An accidental form or a substantial form, with different exclusions argued separately. Soul is denied to be an accidental form, an aggregate of them, and an elemental or mixed substantial form restricted to one terminal movement. References: VII.8.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

forma segregata; subiectum. Printed forms: *formas*; *informia subiecta*; *segregatas*; *subiectis formatis*.

Separate forms and the subjects receiving determinate form. The reported Socratic teaching makes imperfect immanent forms depend on perfect forms existing in themselves. References: VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

forma substantialis; accidentalis. Printed forms: *accidens*; *non accidentalis*; *substantialis*.

Substantial form as opposed to dependent accident. The soul's ruling role, causal priority and endurance under contrary states support the former classification. References: VI.7.3. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

forma vivifica. Printed forms: *formam*; *vivificam*.

The form giving life, rather than matter receiving life. Ficino assigns the name soul to the causal principle, not to the whole body that it animates. References: VI.4.5. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

formabile / formator. Printed forms: *formabile*; *formantis*; *formator*; *formatore*.

What can receive form and the source imparting it. The one receptacle of the universe is paired with a single formative beginning; the fashioner's law sets a form's mode of subsistence. References: V.4.5, V.8.2, V.8.4. See Conditions and the fashioner's law.

formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation). Printed forms: *format*; *formetur*; *perficiatur*; *perficit*.

To form and perfect; here intellectual activity gives its own subject further determination and perfection. Intellect forms and perfects itself through understanding, willing, contemplation and conduct. The inference to sustaining being is qualified secundum formam. It must be distinguished from efficient production of oneself from nothing and from the stronger claim left to Proclus. References: VIII.15.2. See Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

formare se ipsam. Printed forms: *Formare vero se ipsam anima nova nequit*.

The new soul cannot form itself at its origin. This third exclusion is distinct from quality migration and from copying by the disappearing earlier subject. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

formari. Printed forms: *formari non potest*.

Cannot be formed, insofar as it is form. The statement isolates the formal explanatory aspect; it does not deny that a substantial soul is produced by a higher cause. References: VI.7.4. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

formari a corpore. Printed forms: *formatur a corpore*.

To be shaped or modified by a body. Ficino denies this passive formation of the final judge, while elsewhere retaining cognitive reception of forms without matter. References: VII.6.3. See Spiritual images and light.

forsitan / forsan / fortasse. Printed forms: *Forsan*; *forsitan*; *fortasse*.

Perhaps, marking a proposed possibility rather than an endorsed conclusion. The surface-image account, partition escapes and divided-soul objection are entertained as possibilities to be examined. References: VII.1.3, VII.4.2, VII.5.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

forte / forsitan / si modo. Printed forms: *forsitan*; *forte*; *si modo*.

Perhaps and provided that, marking conjecture or a stated condition. The text qualifies mathematical bodies, the possibility of invented objects and the premise that knowledge matches its object; these are not flat unconditional assertions. References: VIII.2.7, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.3. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

fortitudo / timor. Printed forms: *formidini*; *fortis*; *fortiter*; *fortitudo*; *metus*; *timeat*; *timoris*.

Courage, fear and the obstacles fear presents to honourable action. Courage removes an impediment; perfected justice and temperance also require resistance to fear, illustrating the virtues’ mutual dependence. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.7. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

fovere. Printed forms: *foveretur*.

To cherish, warm or sustain. Heat persists only while supported in matter’s bosom, so expulsion removes the condition of its being. References: V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

frangere. Printed forms: *frangeret frangereturque*.

To break and be broken reciprocally. A solid soul filling the whole body would injure it and itself, the opposed side of the painless-presence test. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere. Printed forms: *contractio*; *contrahatur*; *contrahitur*; *discindi*; *dissolvitur*; *frangitur*; *soluta*; *solutio*; *solvatur*; *suffusus*.

To break, sever, loosen and contract. Flesh is cut and bodily spirit loosens or retreats inward; these material alterations are not passed unchanged into soul’s substance. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

frangere / recreare. Printed forms: *fregeris*; *recreantur*.

To break and to create anew. A broken mirror produces two new images after the first disappears; its original image is not itself cut in two. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

frangere / reparare. Printed forms: *fractis*; *reparentur*.

To break and to make or repair again. The pot’s form is lost in breakage, yet the surviving clay permits another vessel, illustrating material persistence. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

frangere; inficere. Printed forms: *frangit*; *inficitur*.

To shatter and to be stained or affected by admixture. Light is said to penetrate bodies without either breaking them or receiving contamination. References: VI.2.22. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

frigefieri; scaturire. Printed forms: *frigefieri*; *scaturiat*.

To be cooled and to spring forth from a source. Cooling may be external; alternatively productive quality flows from power and ultimately incorporeal substance in the Platonist reply. References: VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

frigiditas / frigus. Printed forms: *frigiditas*; *frigiditatem*; *frigore*; *frigus*.

Coldness or cold, a contrary to heat within the elemental model. Cold may replace heat in matter, but cannot become a cold heat or cold fire that retains the original form. References: V.4.1, V.4.3, V.8.2, V.14.4. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

frigiditas secundum virtutem. Printed forms: *frigiditatem quandam secundum virtutem*; *frigiditatem secundum actum*.

Coldness virtually in a productive power versus coldness actually present. The water objection preserves a native power after heating; the reply distinguishes that power from actual quality and its substantial source. References: VI.12.13. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

frui. Printed forms: *fruitur*.

To enjoy or find fulfillment in an attained object. Ficino links intellectual perfection with truer understanding, calmer desire and fuller, safer enjoyment. References: V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

frustum / secare. Printed forms: *frusta*; *frustis*; *secantur*; *secari*; *secatur*; *secetur*.

A cut fragment and the action of severing. Moving animal fragments motivate the objection that dividing body seems to divide soul. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

frustum; secare. Printed forms: *frusta*; *membris sectis*.

A severed piece and cut members. The reductio assumes soul is body, then asks why each bodily piece would not retain a little soul. References: VI.13.1. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

fugare / fugere. Printed forms: *fugant*; *fugatur*; *fugiunt*.

To drive away and to flee, contrasting active expulsion with withdrawal. Opposed qualities reject one another, but common matter brings them together and permits a dependent form’s expulsion. References: V.8.2, V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

fugere / fugare. Printed forms: *fugat*; *fugit*.

To flee and to put to flight, deliberately contrasted verbs. Contemplative virtue withdraws from mortal things; moral virtue actively repels their disordered rule. The Latin assigns distinct roles. References: VIII.3.8. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

fulgor; splendor. Printed forms: *fulgor*; *splendor*; *splendore*.

Radiance and its visible splendor. Ficino distinguishes the sun’s own light from the vapor-mixed manifestation through which we infer its source. References: VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

fundamentum. Printed forms: *fundamento*; *fundamentum*.

A foundation or necessary underlying support. Removing matter would remove the basis for a new material work, whereas a separate work does not require that foundation. References: V.4.5, V.4.6, V.4.8, V.13.5. See Prime matter and enduring support.

fundere / diffundere / permanare. Printed forms: *diffusum*; *fundit*; *permanat*.

To diffuse, pour through, and pass onward. Spirit spreads through body; what passes into it is perceived by soul. The imagery does not require the soul itself to be spatially divided. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

fundere; movere. Printed forms: *Fundatur*; *moveat*.

Let it be diffused and let it move the parts. These jussives belong to the guided construction of an unlocated animating point, not an observed physical event. References: VI.2.19. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

fundere; solidare. Printed forms: *fundit et solidat*.

To liquefy or pour out and make solid. The opposed effects concern the governing power’s bodily products, not alternating liquid and solid substance of soul itself. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

furor / arma ministrare. Printed forms: *arma*; *furor*; *ministrat*.

Frenzy and the vivid image of supplying weapons or resources for action. A sudden arousal of courage illustrates mental effectiveness arising more rapidly than bodily strength grows; it is not ethical endorsement of frenzy. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

futurum / praesens / praeteritum. Printed forms: *futuri*; *futuro*; *praesens*; *praeteriti*; *praeteritum*.

Future, present and past, the successive phases of an external work. The mind can relate to what is not yet and no longer while the body passes through the phases. References: V.15.5, V.15.6. See Time, memory and expectation.

geminus / apprehendere. Printed forms: *apprehendat*; *apprehendit*; *geminae*; *geminas*; *geminis*.

A pair of powers and their apprehension of objects. If both apprehend both, one is redundant; if each apprehends only one, neither compares them. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

generare; nutrire; augere. Printed forms: *auget*; *generat*; *nutritque*.

To generate, nourish and increase. These natural operations form the first class of evidence for a principle beyond bare corporeal bulk. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

generatio. Printed forms: *generatio*; *Generatio*; *generatione*.

Generation or coming-to-be, usually by receiving form in a subject here. It proceeds toward a thing’s proper being and differs from creation without preexisting matter. References: V.8.1, V.8.2, V.11.1. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

generatio / genitrix / successio. Printed forms: *generationis*; *genitrice*; *nascentium*; *successione*.

Generation, generating parent and succession of offspring. Natural reproduction preserves a kind through later beings; intellectual generation keeps its accounts within the individual mind that produces them. References: VIII.15.2. See Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

genitor; genitum. Printed forms: *genito*; *genitor*; *genitum*; *genitus*.

Begetter and what is begotten. Finite self-generation would require both possession and reception of the same being and priority/posteriority to oneself. References: VI.12.14. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

genu / lapillus. Printed forms: *genu*; *lapillum*.

Knee and small stone. The knee marks another hypothetical reporting station; the pebble is the concrete occasion of the foot’s injury. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

genus. Printed forms: *genera*; *genere*; *generis*; *genus*.

A broader kind or a logical genus predicated of subordinate species. Animal is humanity’s genus; its logical contribution cannot occupy the mind’s right side as a spatial fragment. References: VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.10.1. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

genus substantiae / genus qualitatis. Printed forms: *contrarietas*; *genere qualitatis*; *qualitatis*; *substantiae*.

The categories of substance and quality and the contrariety proper to quality. The claim that substance has no proper contrary concerns categorical identity, not a denial that substances perish. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

gradus. Printed forms: *gradatim*; *gradibus*; *gradu*; *gradum*; *gradus*.

A degree or rank; gradatim means by stages. The movement from four causes to three and two describes graded dependency, while angel's added distinction concerns inclination. References: V.3.1, V.5.3, V.5.4. See Four causes and graded dependence.

A degree, rank or step in an ordered ascent or perfection. The four cognitive grades and the imagined hierarchy above finite angels have distinct structures; a higher grade need not mean higher physical altitude. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.13, VIII.10.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

gradus; paulatim. Printed forms: *congruis educationis disciplinarumque gradibus*; *convenientibus gradibus*; *paulatim*.

Gradual stages fitted to a learner's condition. The sequence of reflections, objects, night and daylight structures the ascent rather than a single leap to the sun. References: VI.2.15, VI.2.16. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

Graeci Platonici / Arabes Platonici. Printed forms: *Graeci*; *Platonicorum Arabum*.

The Greek and Arab Platonists named in the introduction to the form argument. Ficino groups authorities to support a doctrine of universal representation; no unnamed individual's precise doctrine is independently attributed here. References: VIII.4.1. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

gremium / detrudere / pellere. Printed forms: *detrudant*; *gremio*; *pellantque*.

The soul's bosom and the pushing out associated with competing bodily occupants. Sciences and virtues coexist without displacing or blending into one another, so their containment is not spatial crowding. References: VIII.3.6. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

gutta / triticum / granum. Printed forms: *granis*; *guttis*; *tritici*.

Water drops and wheat grains, homogeneous units whose aggregation increases amount. They illustrate why wholly similar hypothetical parts add number or magnitude rather than a distinct intelligible structure. References: VIII.4.3. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

guttula; ova piscium. Printed forms: *guttula seminis*; *piscium ovis*.

A drop of seed and fish eggs. These are Ficino's reproductive examples; the text's general claim about division is historical natural philosophy, not a verified embryological rule. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

habere. Printed forms: *habeant*; *habeat*; *habent*; *habere*; *haberet*; *habet*; *habuerit*.

To have or possess a property, capacity or received act. Having life as a proper attendant is allowed as an alternative to being life itself; the distinction matters in the death argument. References: V.1.5, V.4.1, V.5.9, V.6.1, V.13.17, V.14.3, V.14.5, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.

habere / possidere. Printed forms: *habeant*; *habeat*; *habebitur*; *habemus*; *habentur*; *habere*; *habet*; *habetur*; *habituram*; *possidet*; *possidetur*.

Having or possessing, whose mode may be habitual, actual, cognitive or bodily. Possession of a form in mind need not be material containment; the virtue arguments also distinguish preparation from already having the completed quality. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.12.1,

VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

habitus. Printed forms: *habitum*; *habitus*.

Settled possession or condition, rather than always a momentary act. Knowledge may be one act or habit; in the mental-union argument habitus names the incorporeal condition into which received forms are brought. References: VIII.3.8, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.11, VIII.7.1. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

haerere. Printed forms: *divinis haeret*; *mortalibus*.

To cleave or adhere to an object. Attachment to divine things exemplifies generation, attachment to mortal things corruption, in the psychic mapping. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

haerere / inhaerere. Printed forms: *haerent*; *haerentem*; *haerere*; *haeret*; *inhaerentem*; *inhaerere*; *inhaeret*.

To adhere or inhere, with materially dependent and reflexive uses. A bodily form adheres to matter; a separate form adheres to itself. The identity of the object matters to the argument. References: V.3.1, V.9.2, V.9.4, V.10.2, V.13.13. See Through itself and through another.

harmonia. Printed forms: *harmonia*.

An ordered proportion or concord of bodily parts. It names one formulation of the fourth position, alongside bodily motive power; it need not mean audible musical sound. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

harmonia / progenitus. Printed forms: *harmonia*; *harmoniam*; *progenitam*.

Harmony and its being generated from another condition. The disputed view makes soul an outcome of constituted humors, which would leave it an accident dependent on them. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

haurire. Printed forms: *hauriatur*; *haurientis*; *haurire*; *haurit*; *hausti*.

To draw or drink in a supply. The soul continually draws being or life; the withdrawal objection asks whether receiver or giver could stop. References: V.8.3, V.10.3, V.12.12. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

haurire; perdere; servare. Printed forms: *hauriuntur*; *perdentur*; *servetur*.

To draw in, destroy and preserve. The hypothesis makes many incoming souls perish to maintain one, which Ficino rejects by natural goodness. References: VI.13.4. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

Heraclitus; lux sicca. Printed forms: *anima sapientissima*; *Heraclitus*; *lux sicca*.

Heraclitus and the maxim glossed as dry light, wisest soul. The local Greek supports Ficino’s luminous analogy; its wording is retained rather than replaced with a different familiar fragment. References: VI.2.26. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

hic / ibi. Printed forms: *hic*; *ibi*.

Here and there, deictic indications of a particular place. If a common definition included one such coordinate, every instance would be confined to the same place. References: V.7.1. See Comets and defining accounts.

Hippias; Hesiodus; Pronopides. Printed forms: *Hesiodus*; *Hippias*; *Pronopides*.

The names attached to watery soul and to earthy soul respectively. Ficino assigns water to Hippias, earth to Hesiod and Pronopides; no silent correction of the unusual name is made. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

hodie / cras. Printed forms: *cras*; *hodie*.

Today and tomorrow, examples of particular temporal coordinates. They specify an occurrence rather than the unrestricted defining account of a comet. References: V.7.1. See Comets and defining accounts.

homo / humanus. Printed forms: *homine*; *Hominem*; *hominem*; *homines*; *hominis*; *hominum*; *homo*; *humana*; *Humana*; *humanae*; *humanam*; *humanus*.

A human being, or what belongs to human nature. The opening distinguishes Plato as a particular human from humanity, while the division examples distinguish human bodily parts from a human as such. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.12, VIII.6.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

homo; animal; animans. Printed forms: *animal*; *animali*; *animalia*; *animalis*; *animalium*; *animantibus*; *homine*; *homines*; *hominis*; *hominum*; *homo*.

Human being and living animal or creature. The argument aims to classify our human soul, while natural examples often range across animals and plants without establishing that every soul is rational. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.1, VI.2.9, VI.2.12, VI.2.14, VI.4.1, VI.4.3, VI.7.1, VI.8.5, VI.10.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

horologium; sonare. Printed forms: *horologio*; *sonat*.

Clock and sounding. The third analogy exhibits coordinated motion and sound through art’s ordering proportion. References: VI.9.4. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

hostilis / noxius. Printed forms: *hostile*; *noxiam*; *noxium*.

Hostile or harmful, qualifying the destructive kind of reception under discussion. The argument does not exclude all reception; it excludes a material openness to something that would destroy the soul’s essence. References: V.5.9, V.8.3. See Passivity and bodily affection.

humanitas. Printed forms: *humanitas*; *Humanitas*; *humanitate*; *humanitatem*; *humanitatis*.

Humanity, the common defining nature rather than an individual human being. Humanity is not confined to Plato’s time or place, and Ariston does not generate humanity itself when begetting Plato. References: V.7.1, V.13.5. See Participation, common and proper.

Humanity, the nature by which human individuals are human. Its communication across persons, times and places supplies the opening example of universality and the ascent to an Idea. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

humiditas / humor. Printed forms: *humiditas*; *Humiditas*; *humiditatem*; *humiditati*; *humor*.

Moisture, shared by air and water in the Platonic account reported here. Its persistence during water-to-air transformation signals a continuing material subject; it is not the same use as plural bodily humors. References: V.4.1, V.4.3, V.4.4, V.9.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

humidus / terreus / lutulentus. Printed forms: *humidum*; *lutulentum*; *terreum*.

Moist, earthy and muddy. The first describes the mouth’s medium, the latter pair touch’s medium; they should not be modernized into anatomical discoveries. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

humor / mixtio / procreare. Printed forms: *humores*; *Humores*; *mixtione*; *procreare*.

Bodily humors, their mixture, and producing offspring or effects. Ficino denies that their mixing or concord can generate powers freer from matter, much less the soul as their source. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

humor; membrum; spiritus. Printed forms: *humor*; *humores*; *humoribus*; *humorum*; *membris*; *membrorum*; *spiritus*; *spirituum*.

Humours, bodily members and physiological spirits in the natural account. Soul’s governing power regulates these instruments; the spiritual reality called spiritus in the light exercise must not be mechanically equated with physiological spirits. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.26, VI.9.2, VI.9.4, VI.11.2, VI.13.8. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

humor; tabes; pinguedo. Printed forms: *pinguedine*; *quattuor humorum*; *tabe*.

The four humours, corrupt matter and fat in the historical physiological picture. These describe the natural power’s entanglement and should not be treated as modern medical mechanisms. References: VI.2.2. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

humores. Printed forms: *humorum*.

Bodily humors, whose concord constitutes a physiological mixture in the reported account. Their harmony is classified as a composite accident, contrasted with the simple principles understood by mind. References: V.15.10. See Temperament and harmony.

hypothetical concession. Printed forms: *Esto, si vis*; *forsitan*; *Si dixeris*; *Sint, si vis*.

Granting a position for examination rather than affirming it. The divided-soul, line and harmony proposals are opponent positions or temporary suppositions; their rejected consequences must not be reported as doctrines. References: VII.2.1, VII.2.2, VII.4.1, VII.11.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

idea. Printed forms: *idea*; *ideae*; *ideam*; *ideaque*; *ideas*; *ideis*.

An exemplary intelligible principle through which God produces a determinate nature. Ideas supply the stable patterns of soul and angel; the soul’s cognition of Ideas supports its aptitude for eternal life. References: V.11.6, V.12.14, V.12.15, V.13.16, V.13.18. See Creation and generation.

An intelligible exemplar or principle; context distinguishes the divine source from an exemplar possessed by mind. The divine Idea grounds shared humanity, while artistic ideas within mind guide distinct acts of making. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.13.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

idolum / simulacrum. Printed forms: *idola*; *simulacra*; *simulacrorum*; *simulacrum*.

An image or likeness rather than the original subsisting source. Irrational lives are called images of souls; mirror images illustrate reception without destructive alteration. References: V.2.1, V.8.3, V.15.8. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

idoneus / vilis / perfectior. Printed forms: *idoneis*; *perfectioribus*; *viles*.

Suitable, lowly in powers, and more perfect or functionally richer. Few-power souls need few instruments; more perfect souls require the differentiated organs absent from detached members. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur. Printed forms: *ergo*; *Ergo*; *Igitur*; *igitur*; *Itaque*; *itaque*; *Quamobrem*; *Quapropter*; *Quare*; *Quocirca*; *sequitur*.

Therefore, consequently, and it follows: markers of inference. These connect a specific conclusion to preceding premises, including conclusions drawn only within an opponent's hypothesis. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.6, VI.2.12, VI.2.15, VI.3.2, VI.4.2, VI.4.5, VI.7.1, VI.8.5, VI.11.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

ignavia / torpere. Printed forms: *ignavia*; *torpent*.

Idleness and sluggish inactivity. The idle person can grow bodily without making intellectual progress, exposing the weakness of the parallel-growth inference. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus. Printed forms: *aereum*; *aqueum*; *igneum*; *terreum*.

Fiery, airy, watery and earthy: elemental composition predicates. These are different reported answers to what the hypothesized soul-body consists of. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

ignis. Printed forms: *ignem*; *igneum*; *igni*; *ignis*; *Ignis*.

Fire, the elemental substance used repeatedly to distinguish intrinsic heat, material support and loss of form. Fire cannot become cold while remaining fire but may perish; soul's argument therefore needs more than the mere exclusion of a contrary predicate. References: V.8.2, V.9.1, V.9.4, V.14.4, V.14.5. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre. Printed forms: *defertur*; *descendit*; *ignis*; *lapis*; *propinquior*.

Ignis is fire and lapis a stone; descendere means to descend and deferre to carry downward here. Their natural movements provide historical examples of return toward an end. Their accelerated return illustrates desire intensifying near its end; the passage does not offer modern quantitative mechanics. References: VIII.16.4. See Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

ignis / terra / lapis. Printed forms: *ignis*; *lapis*; *terra*; *terram*.

Fire, earth and stone in the material-reception reductio. If receiving through bodily qualities sufficed for sensing, earth and stone would sense like soul. This is a rejected consequence. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

ignis; aer; aqua. Printed forms: *aer*; *aere*; *aerem*; *aeris*; *aqua*; *aquam*; *igne*; *ignem*; *ignis*.

Fire, air and water as elements and illustrative bodies in Ficino's natural philosophy. They occur in rejected soul-body theories, adjacent-sphere analogies and the cold-water objection; not every mention is an endorsed identification of soul with an element. References: VI.1.2, VI.2.24, VI.6.2, VI.12.13. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

ignitus. Printed forms: *ignita*.

Fiery or affected by fire. If fire precisely as fire were soul, every fiery thing would be alive, the unwanted consequence of the hypothesis. References: VI.6.2. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

ignorare se ipsam. Printed forms: *ignorat enim se ipsam*.

It does not know itself, the text's stated reason for excluding cognitive primary motion. The phrase is preserved without silently adding uninterrupted self-awareness; the following contrast concerns essential life and intermittent cognition. References: VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

illecebra. Printed forms: *illecebras*.

An enticement or alluring temptation. The bodily-food hypothesis would predict that feeding and fatness improve resistance to shameful bodily attractions, a prediction Ficino rejects. References: VIII.2.1. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

imaginatio. Printed forms: *imaginatio*; *Imaginatio*; *imaginationem*; *imaginationi*.

The faculty collecting and retaining sensory likenesses, distinct here from recognitive phantasy. Socrates can imagine absent Plato, combining the five senses, but this collection alone does not identify the person or know substance. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.4.3. See Four stages of cognition.

imaginem aliam suae similem. Printed forms: *imaginem aliam suae similem*.

Another image like the former soul's own. Copying is distinguished from the first strategy's transfer of the same quality; the edition retains suae against the later sive. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

imago. Printed forms: *imaginem*; *imagines*; *imaginibus*; *imaginum*; *imago*.

An image or likeness; an inferior manifestation can remain genuine at its own level. Mirrors model dependence, the ranked ladder distinguishes image from original, and divine images shine in soul. References: V.6.1, V.10.2, V.12.12, V.14.9, V.15.4. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

An image or representation, sensible or mental according to context. Internal sense handles bodily residues; the cave displays projected likenesses; the closing memory proof tests images retained by or allegedly transferred between subjects. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.7, VI.2.14, VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

An image through which something is represented or perceived. Plato's image is the image of a visible person; it is not a technical reference to a separate Platonic Idea. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

immensus / ingens. Printed forms: *immensae*; *immensum*; *ingens*; *ingentem*.

Immeasurably large or very great. The soul's conception of such bodies and of a still greater body challenges any assigned spatial size of the soul itself. References: VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

immergere / emergere. Printed forms: *emergeret*; *immersa*.

To immerse and to emerge, images of being bound within matter or rising beyond it. A materially immersed essence could not reach divine things and function as the world's bond. References: V.5.7, V.10.2. See Inclination and independence.

immo / tamen / non tamen. Printed forms: *Atqui*; *immo*; *Immo*; *Non tamen*; *non tamen*; *tamen*.

Indeed or rather, nevertheless and corrective transitions. Non tamen at VIII.1.4 limits the necessity of the preceding discursive argument; other corrections sharpen conclusions rather than adding interchangeable connective filler. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.5, VIII.3.7, VIII.10.2. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

immo; tamen; nihilominus. Printed forms: *immo*; *Immo*; *Nihilominus*; *tamen*; *Verumtamen*.

Rather or indeed, nevertheless and yet, marking correction or qualification. Ficino often strengthens a preceding claim or introduces a reply; the adversative must be preserved to avoid joining objection and answer into one view. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.8, VI.2.17, VI.13.5. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

immobilis / stabilis. Printed forms: *immobile*; *immobilis*; *stabilem*; *stabilia*; *stabilis*.

Unmoved or stable, especially the abiding essence contrasted with changing operations. The soul can direct a moving task without being dissolved into the task's successive phases. References: V.10.3, V.12.13, V.15.5, V.15.6. See Motion and substantial stability.

immortalis / immortalitas. Printed forms: *immortalem*; *immortales*; *immortali*; *immortalis*; *Immortalis*; *immortalitas*; *immortalitatem*; *immortalitatis*.

Immortalis means immortal or deathless; immortalitas means immortality, the conclusion sought for rational souls and a recurrent attribute of higher principles. The life argument must explain why nonreception of death entails survival, rather than relying solely on the word. References: V.1.1, V.2.1, V.4.1, V.4.10, V.14.1, V.14.5. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

Not subject to death, or the corresponding enduring condition. The immortality of truth, species and an individual mind are connected but remain distinct subjects; intellectual generation is contrasted with biological succession. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus. Printed forms: *immortalis*; *immortalitate*; *immortalitatem*; *perpetua*; *perpetuaque*; *perpetuo*; *perpetuus*; *sempiterna*; *Sempiternum*.

Immortal, perpetual and everlasting, with the subject and mode of duration specified. The inquiry aims at the soul's immortality, while perpetual bodily motion or pain may occur only inside a hypothetical reductio; duration words alone do not identify their subjects. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6, VI.2.3, VI.3.2, VI.9.4, VI.13.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

impartibile; internus agitator. Printed forms: *impartibile aliquid*; *Internus autem corporis agitator*.

An impartible principle; the body's inward mover. The regress terminates in soul, whose presence enables spontaneous bodily movement while its absence leaves a need for an external mover. References: VI.12.7. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

impartibilis. Printed forms: *impartibile*; *impartibili*.

Indivisible or without separable parts, naming the sufficient knower in the Plotinian reply. If this alone performs understanding, the alleged remainder of a bodily intellect has no explanatory role in being mind. References: VIII.5.2. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.

impedire / cohibere / claudere. Printed forms: *claudi*; *clauditur*; *cohibent*; *impediat*; *impedimentum*.

Impeding, restraining or enclosing, bodily or explanatory according to context. Fear obstructs action, a middle point cannot create distance, and spatial intervals do not enclose intellectual comparison in the way they bound bodies. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.14.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

imperdibilis. Printed forms: *imperdibile*; *imperdibilis*.

Imperishable or incapable of destruction. Ficino identifies this with deathlessness for soul, then answers the objection that mere nonreception of death might still allow disappearance. References: V.14.5, V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

imperium / adhibere. Printed forms: *adhibeat*; *imperio*; *imperium*.

Command and directed employment. The whole soul calls its powers and bodily members to aid the wounded part. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

implere / consummare. Printed forms: *consumiturque*; *consummatur*; *implere*; *implet*.

Bringing to fullness or completion, contrasted with being consumed. Ficino says fuller rational motion fills the range of living; similar-looking consummation and consumption verbs have opposite roles in the life/death contrast. References: VIII.15.3. See Outward flow and rational life’s return.

implicare; explicare. Printed forms: *explicatas*; *explicatur*; *implicatos*.

To enfold and unfold. Souls are called enfolded luminous globes and globes unfolded souls, with the sensing/sensed distinction still preserved. References: VI.2.26. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

imponere; implere; continere. Printed forms: *contineat*; *contineatur*; *continet*; *implere*; *impleret*; *implet*; *imponat*; *imponit*.

To impose a limit, fill, or contain. A body fills place quantitatively, while soul’s whole presence and containment are causal and essential; imposing growth’s limit is a governing act. References: VI.2.3, VI.4.4, VI.6.1, VI.6.4, VI.9.4, VI.13.8. See Essential presence and containment.

imprimere. Printed forms: *impressa*; *impressam*; *imprimentem*; *imprimit*.

To impress or stamp a form upon a recipient. Craft impresses matter, a seal stamps wax, and the soul is said to impress life upon a vehicle; dependence differs with the recipient. References: V.4.1, V.11.6, V.13.18. See Seal, wax and restoration.

in deteriorem essentiam. Printed forms: *in deteriorem commutetur essentiam*.

Being transformed into a worse kind of essence. Ficino explicitly recognizes that excluding annihilation does not yet exclude the soul’s degradation into body. References: V.15.19. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

in nihilum. Printed forms: *Ex nihilo*; *ex nihilo*; *in nihil*; *In nihilum*; *in nihilum*.

Into nothing and from nothing, marking annihilation and creation rather than ordinary alteration. Natural agents cannot perform either operation upon being as such; the soul’s origin is reserved to God. References: V.4.2, V.4.8, V.4.10, V.12.8, V.13.1. See Creation and generation.

in se / in alio / in multis. Printed forms: *in alio*; *in multis*; *in se ipso*.

In itself, in another and in many, different modes of dependence and unity. The passage from an immanent common nature to an independent exemplar depends on these distinctions, not merely on counting individuals. References: VIII.1.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

inanimis / mortuus. Printed forms: *inanime*; *mortua*; *mortuum*.

Without soul and dead, here applied to what can receive life but is deprived of it. The distinction keeps the recipient of life separate from the life that leaves it. References: V.15.7. See Life and vivification.

inchoatio. Printed forms: *inchoatione*.

An initial beginning or seed-stage of formation. Ficino denies that soul consists of a material beginning completed by an added act. References: V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

incitare. Printed forms: *incitante*.

Prompting an intellectual conception without being identical to its resulting universal form. The phantastic image occasions the form and becomes the destination of the later reflexive return to a particular. References: VIII.1.5. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

inclinari. Printed forms: *inclinationem*; *inclinatur*; *inclinetur*.

To incline toward matter, here an orientation to animation. Soul’s inclination explains its lower relation without making matter a cause of its essence. References: V.5.5. See Inclination and independence.

incolumis; servare. Printed forms: *incolumes*; *servat*; *servatur*; *serventur*.

Intact; to preserve and be preserved. Ficino asks how retained contents persist if the retaining subject does not itself remain. References: VI.13.6. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

incommutabilis / immutabilis. Printed forms: *immutabiles*; *immutabilibus*; *immutabilis*; *incommutabilia*; *incommutabiliter*.

Unchangeable, remaining the same in the relevant rational content. Arithmetic and proportional truths are used to challenge a mind reduced to mutable bodily temperament. References: V.15.9, V.15.15, V.15.16, V.15.18, V.15.24, V.15.25. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

incorporeus / incorporalis. Printed forms: *incorporales*; *incorporalia*; *incorporalium*; *incorporea*; *incorporealem*; *incorporeas*; *incorporeis*; *incorporeum*.

Not bodily; the degree and respect of freedom from material conditions can vary in the opening ascent. The image received by sense, phantasy’s qualified intentions and the fully incorporeal principles of intellect must not be collapsed into one mode. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.5, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.15.2. See Four stages of cognition.

indicium / rimari. Printed forms: *indiciis*; *rimari*.

A sign or clue, and searching out what is disclosed through it. Later propositions and effects can help discover earlier principles and causes, so inferential passage need not run in only one direction. References: VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

indifferens. Printed forms: *indifferens*; *indifferens ad utrumque*.

Undetermined between opposed outcomes. Prime matter remains open to other forms after becoming this lion’s matter; the forming agent determines it to an act. References: V.12.6, V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

indissolubilis. Printed forms: *indissolubile*; *indissolubilem*; *indissolubilis*.

Not liable to dissolution, inferred from simplicity rather than merely asserted from the name soul. Ficino relates simplicity in knowing to stable living through the priority of life over its reflective operation. References: VIII.4.13. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

individua; magnitudo. Printed forms: *individua*; *magnitudinem*.

Indivisibles and extended magnitude. Ficino denies that adding dimensionless indivisibles yields an extended body, one branch of the coincidence argument. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

individuum. Printed forms: *individuum*.

An indivisible reality, not an extended atom or merely a named person. The fifth position combines indivisibility with whole presence and an origin independent of matter. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

individuus / indivisibilis. Printed forms: *Individua*; *individua*; *individuam*; *individuamque*; *individuas*; *individuis*; *individuum*; *individuumque*; *individuus*; *indivisibile*; *indivisibilem*; *indivisibili*; *indivisibilis*.

Without divisible parts in the respect under consideration; individuus is not necessarily a personal individual. Virtue, intellectual form and simple concept are called indivisible, and this status is then attributed to their subject. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.6, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.2. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

indivisibilis / individuum. Printed forms: *individua*; *individuam*; *individuum*; *indivisibile*; *indivisibilem*; *indivisibili*; *indivisibilis*; *indivisibilium*.

Indivisible, without separable quantitative parts. The contact dilemma turns on this property; individuum here should not be mistaken for the modern notion of a person. References: V.6.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis. Printed forms: *divisa*; *individuum*; *indivisibiles*; *indivisibilis*; *partibilem*.

Undivided or divisible into parts. The successful comparing power cannot distribute its compared contents among mutually ignorant portions. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

indivisibilis; impartibilis. Printed forms: *impartibilem*; *indivisibilem*.

Indivisible and incapable of partition. The sensory and intellectual proofs are promised to establish these characteristics together with whole presence. References: VI.3.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

induere / exuere. Printed forms: *exuerit*; *exuit*; *induet*; *indui*; *induitur*.

To put on and to take off, clothing metaphors for receiving or relinquishing a mode. Matter clothes itself in forms; the soul’s supposed exchange of spiritual being is raised and rejected. References: V.4.4, V.11.7, V.13.12. See Spiritual matter and identity.

Putting on and taking off, the clothing verbs applied to bodily qualities. Water takes on heat by relinquishing coldness, establishing the contrast with mind's reception of forms without loss of its own nature. References: VIII.7.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

industria / usus / affectus. Printed forms: *affectu*; *industria*; *usu*.

Active exertion, practice and engaged ardour in mental development. Soul's progress depends on these activities rather than merely on a body's increase in bulk. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

inesse. Printed forms: *inerit*; *inesse*; *inesset*; *inest*; *insunt*.

Being in or inhering in a subject, without necessarily occupying a bodily space. Virtue's presence characterizes soul, and forms coexist within mind; the mode of inherence is exactly what the bodily-quality arguments test. References: VIII.2.3, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.5, VIII.3.7. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

infectio / puritas. Printed forms: *infectionem*; *infectis*; *puritate*; *puritatem*.

Taint or admixture and purity, applied to material restriction and intelligible release. Mind's ability to restore an account's purity is used to argue that its own intellectual nature stands beyond the relevant admixture. References: VIII.5.2, VIII.13.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

infinitae partes actu. Printed forms: *infinita quaedam multitudo*; *infinitae partes in actu*.

Actually infinite acting parts or multitude. The reductio arises from granting autonomous motion to every infinitely divisible part, not simply from potential divisibility alone. References: VI.12.2, VI.12.3. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

infinitus / immensus. Printed forms: *immensa*; *immensam*; *infinita*; *infinitam*; *infinitus*.

Infinite or immeasurable, particularly unrestricted creative power. A finite receiver would bound that power, which is why the angelic-instrument proposal fails. References: V.13.6, V.13.7, V.13.13, V.13.15. See Creation and generation.

infinitus / infinitas. Printed forms: *infinita*; *infinitam*; *infinitas*; *infinitate*; *infinitatem*; *infinitati*; *infinite*; *infinitis*; *infinito*; *infinitos*; *Infinitum*; *infinitum*; *infinitus*.

Without the relevant limit; the word's mode must be distinguished in each argument. Simultaneous actual infinity is rejected in the point hypothesis, while recursive range and received intellectual infinity are defended with qualifications. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

infinitus / innumerabilis. Printed forms: *infinitas*; *infinite*; *infiniti*; *infinitos*; *innumerabiles*.

Infinite or countless plurality generated by the partition hypothesis. The multiplication of senses, colors and visions is an unacceptable consequence, not Ficino's accepted account of perception. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

influxus. Printed forms: *influxu*; *influxum*; *influxus*.

Influx, the continuing communication of divine life and being. The objection of withdrawing it is presented and answered; it should not be mistaken for Ficino's settled conclusion. References: V.4.2, V.11.2, V.12.12. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

informis. Printed forms: *informe*; *informi*; *informis*.

Formless, lacking its own determining form rather than merely shapeless to sight. Matter cannot form itself; a superior agent must determine it, and the soul is not drawn from such an unformed material seed. References: V.4.1, V.12.3, V.13.1. See Prime matter and enduring support.

informis materia. Printed forms: *informis materia*.

Matter considered without determining form. It cannot provide life either to another or itself, so even a living element would live through its form. References: VI.11.1. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

infrigescibilis. Printed forms: *infrigescibile*; *infrigescibilis*.

Incapable of becoming cold while remaining what it is. Fire possesses this property yet can perish, so it is not equivalent to indestructibility; Ficino explicitly marks the limit. References: V.14.5. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

infundere. Printed forms: *infundendo*; *infundendum*; *infundere*; *infundit*; *infundunt*.

To pour into or communicate. Beneficent power is infused into soul, and life is continually communicated to its essence. References: V.6.1, V.12.12, V.12.13. See Fountains, drawing and infusion.

ingenium. Printed forms: *ingenii*; *ingenio*; *ingenium*.

Native capacity, mental acuteness or resourcefulness. Food and wine would sharpen it under the rejected material hypothesis; disciplined ingenuity enables rapid inferences among scientific propositions. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

innotescere; circumscribere. Printed forms: *circumscribitur*; *innotescere*.

To become known to sense and be enclosed by a figure or boundary. The short arguments contrast body’s sensible bounded character with soul’s absence of such a bodily profile. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

innumerabilis. Printed forms: *Innumerabiles*; *innumerabiles*; *innumerabilia*; *innumerabilibus*; *innumerabilis*; *innumerabiliter*; *innumere*.

Countless or indefinitely many; often emphasizing a range rather than a counted completed total. It describes the many individuals under a universal and the excessive repetitions generated by the bodily cognition hypothesis. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.5.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.2. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

innumeralis unitas. Printed forms: *innumeralis unitas animalis*.

The animal’s unity beyond a succession of numbered material constituents. The reading is innumeralis, not the later innumerabilis; it concerns stable organic identity rather than an actual infinity. References: VI.13.8. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

inquam. Printed forms: *inquam*; *inquit*.

I say; he or she says, marking clarification or reported speech. Cavalcanti’s speech and Ficino’s emphatic restat/formam clarifications must be attributed to their proper voices rather than flattened into one undifferentiated assertion. References: VI.1.1, VI.4.5. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

inquinare. Printed forms: *inquinabitur*; *inquinat*.

To stain or defile by receiving something alien. A contrary quality may stain matter-bound forms, but cannot enter and corrupt the separate rational essence. References: V.5.9, V.14.8. See Passivity and bodily affection.

inscitia. Printed forms: *inscitiis*.

Ignorance, used in the plural for alleged nonknowing constituents. A proposed composition of knowledge from parts that are not knowledge is compared to producing whiteness from figures. References: VIII.4.8. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

inserere / servare / revocare. Printed forms: *inserit*; *pendentibus*; *revocat*; *servatque*.

Implanting, preserving, recalling and depending upon a source. God’s continuing action supplies qualified infinity to dependent minds and souls; their formal self-preservation does not abolish higher causality. References: VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

insidiae materiae. Printed forms: *materiae insidiis*.

The snares of matter, a figurative account of the source of corruption. Ficino argues that a mind not materially bound escapes the dependency through which such corruption arises. References: VIII.8.2. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

insinuare; transire. Printed forms: *in subiectum novum de vetere subiecto transire*; *insinuare*.

To insert or pass from an old subject into a new one. The first rejected strategy makes the same image migrate numerically, contrary to the rule about qualities and their subjects. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

inspirare / flagrare / aestus. Printed forms: *aestus*; *flagrantia*; *flagrat*; *inspirando*.

Blowing upon a fire, bursting into flame and its heat. Repeated preparation brings appetite to the sufficient rational ardour that Ficino calls virtue, without gradual bodily partitions of the final act. References: VIII.3.3. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

instinctus. Printed forms: *instinctu*.

Natural prompting, not a modern technical biological reflex. It accompanies the perpetual effort by which things preserve themselves as far as possible. References: V.8.3. See Form and formal being.

instinctus; nixus. Printed forms: *instinctus*; *nixus*.

Natural impulse and striving. These tend to preservation rather than nonbeing as their own proper end; they need not be conscious choices. References: VI.12.14. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

instrumentum. Printed forms: *instrumenta*; *instrumentis*; *instrumentum*.

An instrument carrying a principal agent’s action to a recipient. Bodily qualities serve soul instrumentally, but creation is said to lack the subject, motion and time required for instrumental action. References: V.4.10, V.13.14, V.14.8. See Instrument and creative mediation.

An organ or instrument fitted to a power’s activity. External senses, the bodily medium and nutritive heat are instruments in different contexts; none is simply the source of its own ordered use. References: VII.2.1, VII.6.3, VII.8.1, VII.9.2. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

instrumentum; subservire. Printed forms: *instrumentum generationi subserviens*.

An instrument serving generation. Seminal power is distinguished from soul before the argument infers that soul is whole in each still more fully. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

integra / perfecta. Printed forms: *integra*; *integritatem*; *perfecta*.

Whole or complete in its defining form, not assembled from incomplete material pieces. Soul is called a complete simple form; the completion contrasts with prime matter's openness to replacement forms. References: V.12.1, V.12.2, V.13.18. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

integritas / puritas / supervacuum. Printed forms: *integritate*; *necessaria*; *puritate*; *supervacua*.

Completeness, purity, necessities and superfluities in the account of an intelligible form. A notion is more adequate when it retains essential content while setting aside material admixture and accidental restrictions. References: VIII.13.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

intellectualis / intelligibilis. Printed forms: *intellectuale*; *intellectualem*; *intellectuali*; *intellectualis*; *intelligibiles*; *intelligibili*; *intelligibilia*.

Intellectual refers to mind or its forms; intelligible properly refers to what is known. Ficino allows overlapping usage but explicitly refines the distinction between essence and mental representation in VIII.4.9. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.4.9, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

intellectualitas. Printed forms: *intellectualitas*.

Natural intellectuality, a qualified name for intellect's own form. Its perfection is indicated by more accomplished understanding, so receiving more forms strengthens rather than replaces it. References: VIII.7.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

intellectus. Printed forms: *intellectu*; *intellectum*; *Intellectus*; *intellectus*.

Intellect, distinguished locally from discursive reason and sensory imagination. Ficino reasons from its objects, its incorporeal constructions and angelic pure exercise; no single use makes every intellectual act uninterrupted. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

The intellectual faculty or knower able to apprehend universal and incorporeal accounts. It first knows universal nature and then returns to particulars; its unity and nonextended reception drive the later arguments. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.6, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.3. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

intellectus / sensus / appetitus. Printed forms: *appetitu*; *intellectu*; *intellectus*; *intelligendi*; *intelligere*; *sensu*.

Intellect, sensation and appetite as powers of soul. The difficulty of explaining how these compose a soul is not solved by knowing the bodily parts' mixture. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

intellectus purus. Printed forms: *intellectus purus*.

Pure intellect in the angelic stage of the ascent. The soul's later angel-like enjoyment is a likeness of activity, not its promotion into an uncreated being. References: VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

intelligentia. Printed forms: *intelligentia*; *intelligentia pura*; *intelligentiae*; *intelligentiam*.

Understanding as the soul’s activity directed to incorporeal objects. The passage treats pure exercise as difficult and late, not as continuously actual in every human being. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

Understanding as a still freer mode of cognition. Its superiority is announced but deferred to later demonstration; this unit does not complete the promised intellectual proof. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

Understanding as an act or activity; plural forms can designate acts or conceptions rather than separate minds. It names the highest stage of the opening ascent and later the acts whose hypothetical simultaneous infinity is rejected. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

intelligere / intellectio. Printed forms: *intellectio*; *intellectis*; *intelligat*; *intelligendae*; *intelligendi*; *intelligendo*; *intelligendum*; *intelligere*; *intelliget*; *Intelligit*; *intelligit*; *intelliguntur*.

Understanding as an intellectual operation, not simply receiving a sensory impression. It includes universal apprehension, definition, comparison, knowledge of particulars and self-reflection, and is used to infer the nature of the active subject. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Four stages of cognition.

intelligere / intelligentia. Printed forms: *intellexisse*; *intelligentia*; *intelligentiam*; *intelligit*; *intelliguntur*.

To understand and understanding, an operation directed to intelligibles rather than only sensory appearances. The mind’s stable objects and instrument-free contemplation support Ficino’s anti-temperament argument. References: V.15.9, V.15.11, V.15.12, V.15.24. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

intelligibilis (additional forms). Printed forms: *intelligibilem*; *intelligibili*; *intelligibilis*.

Intelligible, capable of being intellectually known, with a refined distinction from intellectual representation. Ficino sometimes uses the term for a mental form but calls the known essence intelligible in the more precise Platonic distinction. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.9. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

intelligibilis; intelligens. Printed forms: *intelligentem*; *intelligibilem*.

Intelligible, available to intellect; intelligent, itself understanding. Both predicates describe the imagined invisible light, and neither should be used as a substitute for the other. References: VI.2.26. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

intensius / remissius. Printed forms: *intensius*; *remissius*.

More intensely and less intensely. Different organs can manifest different intensity without the soul being spatially larger in one and smaller in another. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

intentio. Printed forms: *intentio*; *intentionem*; *intentionem mentis*; *intentiones*; *intentionum*.

Directed attention, distinct from the overarching plan. Its relation to present work and its withdrawal from bodily senses illustrate the mind’s different orientations. References: V.15.5, V.15.9. See Time, memory and expectation.

A meaningful particular content discerned through an image, such as this person’s goodness or friendship. It is called incorporeal only in a qualified manner at the phantasy stage, which does not yet recognize that status. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

intercidere / interponere. Printed forms: *intercidet*; *intercidit*.

To fall or stand between two terms as an intermediary. Nothing can be closer to the soul’s form than its own essence, so no middle term can sever the supposed bond. References: V.8.4, V.9.2, V.13.17. See Form and formal being.

interire / perire / abire. Printed forms: *abit*; *interit*; *perit*.

To perish or cease, and to depart or disappear. The old soul, cutting-point and mirror-image cease in their respective examples; none is simply divided into surviving halves. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

interminatus. Printed forms: *interminatam*.

Unbounded or without a determinate limit in the specified respect. Ficino introduces the description cautiously, ut ita loquar, for mind’s power as it discovers and defines infinity. The subsequent conclusion remains qualified: intellectual scope is not identical with God’s absolute infinity or with a completed infinite multitude. References: VIII.16.3. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

intermittere; aberrare. Printed forms: *aberrare*; *intermitti*.

To be interrupted and to go astray. These possibilities apply to powers and acts while the essence’s vital activity continues. References: VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

internuntius / mora. Printed forms: *internuntio*; *mora*.

Intermediary messenger and delay. The soul’s whole co-awareness is described as immediate, without a relay of mutually isolated soul-parts. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

intervallum / distantia. Printed forms: *Distantia*; *distantia*; *Distantiam*; *intervallum*.

An interval or distance, spatial in imagery but explanatory in the creation argument. The greater the gap between potentiality and result, the greater the power required; nothing-to-being is then described as infinite. References: V.13.5, V.13.6. See Creation and generation.

intervallum temporis. Printed forms: *momento temporis*; *temporis intervallo*.

An interval and an instant of time. Bodily divisibility is contrasted with the soul’s claimed capacity for instantaneous operation. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

intimus ordinator. Printed forms: *intimus ordinator*.

The inward source ordering the conjunction. If life follows a particular arrangement, Ficino assigns explanatory priority to its orderer rather than to lifeless elements as such. References: VI.11.1. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

intimus; absque medio. Printed forms: *absque medio*; *intima*.

Inward or intimate; without an intermediary. The source of substantial being must be immediately united to the body and parts it animates. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

intrinsecus; extrinsecus. Printed forms: *externo*; *intrinseco*; *sui met agitatricem*.

Inward and external; a nature moving itself. The text requires an inward soul rather than another external push; P1641's opposing reading is not adopted. References: VI.12.7, VI.12.8. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

intueri. Printed forms: *intueri*; *intuetur*.

To contemplate or behold intellectually. The mind's seeing of stable objects is explicitly without a bodily instrument and not a local conjunction. References: V.15.9, V.15.12. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

intueri; colligere. Printed forms: *intuetur*; *sese colligit*.

To behold directly and gather oneself together. Sudden insight and collected attention furnish psychic counterparts of condensation. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

intuitus / intueri / conspicere. Printed forms: *conspiciat*; *conspicit*; *conspicitur*; *intueri*; *intuetur*; *intuitum*; *intuitus*.

A directed intellectual gaze or apprehension, frequently described through visual language. The mind's unified regard can embrace simple content, a composite under one aspect or its own act; the metaphor does not make the intellect a bodily eye. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.3.2, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.11, VIII.7.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.14.1. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

intuitus; essentia. Printed forms: *ipsius essentia*; *primo offeretur intuitu*.

Immediate presentation to awareness; the soul's own essence. The isolated mind first affirms its existence without attaching sensory predicates. References: VI.2.12. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

invenire / reminisci / loqui. Printed forms: *inveniet*; *loquetur*; *reminiscetur*.

To discover, remember and speak. Acute discovery, firm memory and elegant speech are capacities that need not coincide with the agent's moral goodness. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

invenire / reperire. Printed forms: *inveniendum*; *invenies*; *invenimus*; *invenire*; *invenit*; *invenitur*; *inventa*; *reperisse*; *reperit*; *reperitur*; *reperiunt*; *reperta*.

To find or discover a structure or explanation. Finding bodily proportion does not amount to discovering sensing and understanding; the object discovered matters to the claim. References: VII.4.1, VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

Finding or discovering, in inquiry, analysis and the enlargement of thought. Mathematical principles are not found by sense in matter, whereas mind discovers principles and can conceive a higher finite grade before reaching the infinite source. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing.

investigare; invenire. Printed forms: *invenit*; *investigat*.

To investigate and discover. The bare incorporeal power seeks what is neither body nor a bodily image; understanding is characterized through this activity. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

invicem / vicissim. Printed forms: *invicem*; *Vicissim*; *vicissim*.

Reciprocally or in turn, marking a two-way relation. Minds know one another and virtues imply one another; the reciprocity contrasts with the one-way quantitative containment of celestial spheres. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.9.1, VIII.12.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.2. See Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres.

ipsi viderint. Printed forms: *haec ipsi viderint*.

Let those thinkers answer for these matters, a distancing formula. Ficino ends the descent report and resumes his own purpose, so the report must not be silently turned into his settled teaching. References: V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

irrationalis vita. Printed forms: *irrationalem*; *irrationales vitas*; *irrationali anima vel vita*; *Irrationalis*.

Irrational or derivative life associated with bodily animation and sense rather than independent rational activity. Ficino distinguishes this from true soul and reports disagreement over its immortality; the final chapter denies that rational soul becomes such lower life. References: V.2.1, V.14.8, V.15.27. See Rational soul and irrational life.

iudex liber passione. Printed forms: *iudex*; *iudicem*; *iudicem quendam liberum passione*; *liberum*.

A judge free of the bodily affection it knows. The regress terminates in such a judge, excluding a subtle body, bodily affection and a point of an affection. References: VII.6.3. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

iudicare. Printed forms: *iudicantur*; *iudicaret*; *iudicat*.

To judge or determine something about what appears. Hypothetical wax would judge only the size of its impression; the soul judges objects through images. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

iudicare / pronuntiare. Printed forms: *iudicare*; *iudicat*; *iudicet*; *Iudicium*; *pronuntiat*.

Judging or explicitly declaring what an object is or how it is related. Phantasy identifies Plato; intellect defines humanity and evaluates truth. The same judgment vocabulary can therefore operate at different cognitive levels. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.16.2. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

iudicare; discernere. Printed forms: *discernere*; *discernet*; *discernimus*; *iudicabitur*; *iudicat*; *iudicaverat*; *iudicaverint*; *iudicet*; *iudicium*.

To judge and discriminate among objects or claims. Reason corrects sensory judgements, the trained cave-prisoner distinguishes objects, and the enduring soul preserves what it once judged. References: VI.2.7, VI.2.8, VI.2.15, VI.2.17, VI.3.2, VI.12.20, VI.13.6. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

iudicium passionis. Printed forms: *iudicio*; *iudicium*; *iudicium passionis*; *passivum iudicium*.

Judgement of an affection, distinguished from the affection itself. A judgement passively altered in the same way would require another judge; repeating passivity recreates the regress. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

iudicium; emendare. Printed forms: *emendat*; *emendentur*; *iudicium*.

Judgement and correction of error. Reason corrects sense, but would itself err if it denied that bodily things exist. References: VI.2.7, VI.2.8. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

iustitia / suum cuique. Printed forms: *distribuet*; *iustitia*; *suum cuique*; *tribuit*.

Justice, defined through rendering or distributing what belongs to each. The definition becomes an interdependence argument: a just distributor must also resist intimidation and disordered desire. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

Kalendae; laurus. Printed forms: *Kalendis Martiis*; *sub lauro*.

The first day of March; beneath a laurel tree. These expressions set the recalled discussion’s date and setting, without specifying a year in this passage. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

laesio / noxius. Printed forms: *laesio*; *laesione*; *laesionem*; *noxiam*.

Injury that harms or corrupts a substance. Ficino asks whether the same harmful alteration can pass from flesh and spirit into the soul. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

lampas; ignis. Printed forms: *ignem*; *lampadem*; *lampas*.

Lamp and fire as names of the cave’s artificial light-source. They must remain distinct from the sun reached in the later ascent. References: VI.2.14, VI.2.15. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

Landinus; Nuthius; Vespuccius. Printed forms: *Bernardus Nuthius*; *Christophorus Landinus*; *Georgius Antonius Vespuccius*.

Cristoforo Landino, Bernardo Nuzzi and Giorgio Antonio Vespucci, the named associates present. Their integrity and learning locate the debate within Ficino’s circle; their presence is not itself a premise proving immortality. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

lapides / prima vita. Printed forms: *lapides*; *primam*; *vitam*; *vivos*.

Lifeless stones and their reference to the first life as their source. Mind possesses stones as living in the sense of referring their intelligible account to that cause, not by physically animating the stone. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

lapis. Printed forms: *lapis*; *lapis iste*.

Stone as the example of nongraded substantial identity. One stone is not more stone than another as a quality is more intense; this does not exclude differences in size or strength. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

lapis / scintilla / collidere. Printed forms: *colliso*; *lapide*; *scintilla*.

Stone, spark and repeated striking. The spark analogy couples the sudden light of truth with a long process of inquiry rather than spontaneous unsupported insight. References: VIII.3.3. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

latere / delitescere. Printed forms: *delitescit*; *latet*; *latuerat*; *latuit*.

To lie hidden or remain concealed. Matter is hidden beneath changing sensible qualities, while potential fire is pictured as concealed in matter before manifestation. References: V.4.3, V.9.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

latere / lucere. Printed forms: *latent*; *latet*; *Latet*; *lucent*; *lucet*.

Lying concealed and shining forth, images of implicit and explicit intelligible content. A discipline’s implications lie within propositions, while principles and latent forms become evident to reflective intellect. References: VIII.3.5, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.12, VIII.13.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

latitudo / extensio. Printed forms: *extensio*; *latitudine*; *latitudinem*; *latitudinis*; *latitudo*.

Bodily breadth or extension distributed in parts. The proposed form spread through extension would share its division; intellect’s correspondence to objects cannot be measured this way. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.5.1. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

leo. Printed forms: *leo*; *leone*; *leonem*; *leonis*.

A lion, the generated animal used to distinguish determinate form from underlying prime matter. The lion’s actuality does not abolish prime matter’s capacity to receive a nonlion form later. References: V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

leo / audacia. Printed forms: *audentior*; *leo*.

Lion and greater boldness. Boldness is one of several animal gifts and should not be merged with reasoning, acuity or moral virtue. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

lepus / vestigium / indago. Printed forms: *indaginem*; *investigationem*; *lepus*; *vestigia*.

Hare, tracks and the prolonged search that precedes a sudden sighting. The hunt models the difference between gradually preparing for knowledge and actually apprehending its truth. References: VIII.3.2. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

levis; gravis; rarus; densus. Printed forms: *leve vel grave*; *rarum vel densum*.

Light/heavy and rare/dense as physical contraries. The directional argument then asks how soul moves light spirits down and heavy humours up against these natural inclinations. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

lex formantis. Printed forms: *formantis lege*; *lege*.

The law or determination of a forming agent, specifying a form’s mode of existence. A material form must remain in its subject; soul is created to stand in itself. The law is ontological, not a moral prohibition on heat. References: V.8.2, V.8.4. See Conditions and the fashioner’s law.

liber / libere / libertas. Printed forms: *libera*; *liberam*; *libere*; *libertate*; *liberum*.

Liber means free, libere freely, and libertas freedom, particularly freedom from material dependence or forced movement. Primary movement is called free; irrational life is said to lack this freedom because sensory objects draw it. References: V.4.8, V.5.8, V.8.3, V.10.2, V.10.3, V.14.8. See Inclination and independence.

liber a materia. Printed forms: *a materia libera*; *a materia liberior*; *a materia liberius*; *libera*; *liberae*; *liberior*; *liberius*; *materia*; *materiae*.

Freedom from matter and immersion in matter as modes of dependence. The degrees of nutrition, sensing and understanding are used to deny their production by wholly bodily humors. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

liber; solutus; separatus. Printed forms: *libere*; *liberius*; *liberum*; *seorsum*; *separata*; *separatas*; *soluta*; *solutum*.

Free, released, separated and apart, whose respect must be specified. Conceptual release from position differs from actual freedom from material origin; separated limbs in a reductio do not imply quantitatively severed souls. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.5, VI.2.10, VI.2.13, VI.2.19, VI.2.20, VI.13.1. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

ligare; vincire. Printed forms: *alligatos*; *vincti*; *vinctus*.

To bind or fasten. The prisoners cannot turn or move to correct their restricted view of projected shadows. References: VI.2.14, VI.2.15. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

lignum. Printed forms: *Ligno*; *lignum*.

Wood, a material that may acquire and lose circular shape. Its continued existence after losing roundness demonstrates that the property is not intrinsic to wood as wood. References: V.9.1. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

lignum / extremum punctum. Printed forms: *extrema*; *lignum*; *puncta*; *puncto*; *punctum*.

Wood and the new terminal points produced at its cut. The original indivisible cutting-point perishes; two endpoints arise, illustrating replacement rather than splitting an indivisible thing. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

lignum / flamma / flammula. Printed forms: *Flamma*; *flamma*; *flammam*; *flammula*; *ligno*; *lignum*.

Wood, flame and the diminutive flame-image reflected in a mirror. Real fire heats wood, while the remote reflection does not; the difference motivates Ficino’s account of the image’s spiritual medium. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

localis diffusio / vitalis intensio. Printed forms: *diffusione*; *intensione*; *locali*; *locali diffusione*; *porrectam*; *porrigitur*; *sparsae*; *vitali*; *vitali intensione*.

Spatial diffusion contrasted with life-giving intensity. The soul’s extension through the body is described by intensity of animation, not by larger and smaller pieces of soul. References: VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

loculus; corpusculum. Printed forms: *corpuscula*; *loculis*.

Little places and little bodies. Divisible mixed parts remain separate bodies at separate sites, not two whole bodies in one position. References: VI.9.1. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

locus / situs / tempus. Printed forms: *locis*; *loco*; *locum*; *situ*; *tempore*; *tempori*; *tempus*.

Place, position and time as conditions individuating a material presentation. Phantasy pictures this person under these circumstances; intellect considers a common nature not confined to any one of them. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

locus / tempus. Printed forms: *loco*; *locum*; *locumque*; *tempore*; *temporis*; *tempus*.

Place and time, bodily conditions of extension and succession. A definition is not tied to one here and now, whereas a corporeal instance and a form contracted to body are. References: V.7.1, V.7.2, V.10.2. See Essence and being.

locus; situs. Printed forms: *loci*; *locis*; *loco*; *locum*; *locus*; *situ*; *situm*.

Place and determinate position. Dimensionlessness does not remove a point's positional attachment; soul's presence is not occupation of another bodily place. References: VI.1.5, VI.2.3, VI.2.19, VI.2.25, VI.9.1, VI.10.1. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

longitudo / latitudo / profunditas. Printed forms: *latitudine*; *latitudinis*; *lineae*; *longitudine*; *longitudinem*; *longitudinis*; *longitudo*; *profunditate*; *profunditatis*; *superficies*.

Length, breadth and depth as dimensions whose accounts are separable in thought. An exact point lacks length, a line breadth, a surface depth; the corresponding intelligible principles are not themselves measured bodily spans. References: VIII.2.7, VIII.4.2, VIII.5.2, VIII.10.2. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

longitudo; latitudo; profunditas. Printed forms: *latitudo*; *longitudine*; *longitudo*; *profunditatis*.

Length, breadth and depth. Their ordered removal organizes the first three approaches to incorporeality; bodily magnitude is not reduced to a single length. References: VI.2.19. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

lucere / perspicuus. Printed forms: *lucent*; *lucere*; *perspicuae*.

To shine or be manifest; clear to apprehension. The many clear images shining in the soul contrast with what a tiny material mirror could contain. References: VII.1.2. See Spiritual images and light.

lucere; rutilare. Printed forms: *lucere*; *rutilabit*; *rutilare*.

To shine or glow brilliantly. Light's activity is identified with shining and imagined as intensified through separation from dense matter. References: VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

luci / fer / latio. Printed forms: *fer*; *lationis*; *luci*; *lucis*.

The segmented expressions and their associations with light and bearing. Ficino assigns the pieces meanings after the original Venus-designation ceases; he does not claim that original meaning was divided. References: VII.5.4. See Lucifer and indivisible meaning.

Lucifer / Venus. Printed forms: *Lucifer*; *Venus*.

The name Lucifer and the Venus it designates in this passage. The example is the morning-star name's semantic structure, not a reference to a demonic figure. References: VII.5.4. See Lucifer and indivisible meaning.

lucrari. Printed forms: *lucrari*; *lucratur*.

Gaining or profiting, even through knowledge of harmful things. Discernment of privation and evil perfects understanding more than ignorance does, without converting mind into those defects. References: VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

lumen / lux. Printed forms: *lucem*; *Lumen*; *lumen*; *lumine*; *lux*.

Light, with inward invisible and outward visible modes distinguished in the solar-soul account. The sun's soul is said to produce outward light; images are traced to that spiritual

medium rather than to bodies producing incorporeals. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

lumen; lux. Printed forms: *luce*; *lucem*; *lucis*; *lumen*; *lumine*; *luminis*; *luminum*; *lux*.

Light, ranging from visible illumination to analogical intelligible source. The prelude follows rays, vapor-mixed appearance, spiritual source and intelligent light; no invariant distinction between the two Latin nouns replaces attention to those referents. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.15, VI.2.22, VI.2.23, VI.2.26. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

lumen; spiritus. Printed forms: *lumen*; *spiritale*; *spiritum*.

Light and spiritual reality in the visual exercise. The rhetoric invites readers to recognize a nonbodily mode through light's supposedly instantaneous and harmless presence. References: VI.2.22. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

luminosus / aereus / caliginosus. Printed forms: *aereum*; *aereus*; *caliginosum*; *luminosum*.

Luminous, airy and misty sensory media. These are assigned respectively to sight, hearing and smell in the reported historical account. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

lutum. Printed forms: *lutum*.

Clay, the enduring material of different vessels. Clay survives a broken pot and can receive another shape; the analogy prepares, without identifying clay with, prime matter. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

lutum; testa; gleba. Printed forms: *glebis*; *lutea testa*; *luteum*; *luto*.

Mud, an earthen crust and clods. A child encrusted from birth mistakes the acquired mud-covering for his body's own flesh. References: VI.2.2. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium. Printed forms: *lucem*; *silentium*; *tenebras*; *vocem*.

Light and darkness, voice and silence, examples of contraries known together. Knowing one sharpens judgment of the other, rather than one mental content physically destroying the other. References: VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

lyra / temperare. Printed forms: *lyra*; *temperetur*.

Lyre and its tuning into better proportion. An improved instrument need not be larger; greater concord illustrates the soul's advancement in virtue. References: VIII.2.4. See Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

machina. Printed forms: *machina*; *machinam*.

A constructed fabric or machinery, here the bodily world held together by its principles. Matter is the foundation whose removal would collapse the fabric; soul forms and contains that fabric. References: V.4.5, V.15.2. See Soul as universal bond.

Magi. Printed forms: *Magi*.

The authorities to whom the account of virtue as equality is attributed. Their claim is reported by Ficino and applied through the line-and-lyre comparisons, not independently verified here. References: VIII.2.4. See Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

magis ac minus / intensio / remissio. Printed forms: *intenditur*; *Intenditur*; *magis*; *magis ac minus*; *minus*; *remittitur*.

More and less, intensification and diminution. Constitution varies in nature, power and operation, while substantial identity is not intensified in that same way. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

magis anima / magis vita. Printed forms: *anima magis*; *magis vita*.

More soul and more life as proposed consequences of more harmony. The graded-harmony account illegitimately converts moral accord into degree of the living principle itself. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

magis indivisibilis. Printed forms: *magis indivisibilis*.

More indivisible, expressing superiority to geometrical dependence. Soul surpasses even a point because a point remains in a bodily subject and at a determinate site. References: VI.6.5. See Essential presence and containment.

magis minusve. Printed forms: *addi*; *demi*; *magis minusve*.

More or less, adding and taking away in the test for a species' fixed account. A determinate species does not gain intensity by acquiring an extra constituent; its defining identity changes, as the numerical examples show. References: VIII.4.11. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

magistra sensuum. Printed forms: *magistra sensuum*.

Mistress or governing judge of the senses. This epithet names the common inward power's adjudication, not a sixth specialized sense with one narrow object. References: VII.2.2. See Comparison and common sense.

magnanimitas / pusillanimitas. Printed forms: *magnanimitas*; *magnanimitatemque*; *pusillanimitas*.

Greatness and littleness of soul, not large and small physical volume. The food reductio would absurdly allocate magnanimity by bodily bulk; experience of a small person overcoming a larger supports the distinction. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

magnes / ferrum / trahere / suspendere. Printed forms: *ferro*; *magnetis*; *trahitur et suspenditur*.

Magnes is a magnet and ferrum iron; trahere means to draw and suspendere to suspend. In trahitur et suspenditur, the iron is drawn and suspended. The second analogy concerns effective directed action, distinct from the rennet's consolidation. References: VI.9.4. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

magnificentior; divinior. Printed forms: *divinior*; *magnificentior*.

More magnificent and more divine. These comparative predicates expose the absurdity of treating a larger body as the measure of a better soul. References: VI.13.3. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

magnitudo. Printed forms: *magnitudine*; *magnitudinem*; *magnitudinis*; *magnitudo*.

Magnitude or spatial size. Ficino distinguishes an image's bodily dimensions from the magnitude correctly judged through it. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

magnitudo; crescere; decrescere. Printed forms: *augmenti*; *crescunt*; *decrementi*; *decrescunt*; *Magnitudo*.

Magnitude and increase or decrease. Numbers increase indefinitely but terminate downward at unity; finite magnitude has no terminal minimum of division in Ficino’s contrast. References: VI.2.6. See Number and spiritual amplitude.

maior / minor. Printed forms: *maior*; *maiora*; *maiorem*; *maiores*; *maiori*; *maius*; *minora*; *minoresve*.

Greater or smaller in the specified respect, usually bodily magnitude in the mirror argument. The soul’s ability to conceive a greater body than an assigned one does not make the soul itself infinitely large. References: VII.1.1, VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

mancipare. Printed forms: *mancipatus*.

To enslave or subject as under another’s ownership. Mind is denied to be enslaved to bodily harmony when its relation to intelligibles is considered. References: V.15.12. See Temperament and harmony.

manere; permanere; constare. Printed forms: *constabit*; *constare*; *constat*; *constet*; *maneat*; *manere*; *manet*; *permanebunt*; *permanere*; *permanet*.

To remain or persist; to stand established, consist, or be evident, according to construction. Persistence of the knowing subject differs from constare used for an inference being established or a body consisting of constituents. References: VI.1.2, VI.1.6, VI.4.5, VI.7.3, VI.8.2, VI.13.6, VI.13.7, VI.13.9. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

manifestissimus. Printed forms: *manifestissima*.

Most evident in itself in the order of reality. The Aristotelian comparison contrasts intrinsic clarity with the weakness of our intellectual sight. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

manus mentis. Printed forms: *manibus*; *mentis nostrae*.

The mind’s hands, a metaphor for active conceptual fashioning and handling. The present proof is itself an example: it articulates an incorporeal object of thought rather than manipulating a bodily shape. References: VIII.10.2. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

mare. Printed forms: *mare*; *mari*.

The sea, the watery body from which a portion is drawn by solar action. The example follows the same portion through change so that the question of persistence is concrete. References: V.4.1, V.4.3. See Art and elemental transformation.

materia. Printed forms: *materia*; *materiae*; *materiam*; *materiarum*.

Matter as recipient, common bodily constituent or alleged latent source of soul. The disputed question is not whether soul animates matter, but whether its nature depends upon or originates from material potentiality. References: VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.7.1, VI.7.2. See Divine production and the third essence.

The receptive material principle and source of bodily particularization in these arguments. Common nature needs a material foundation in its instances; intellect considers forms apart from it; infinite potency remains subject to God. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.8.1, VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

materia (additional forms). Printed forms: *materiam*.

Matter as the receiver from which intellect separates its accounts. Mental separation does not physically destroy material objects; the concluding infinite potency is matter under God rather than an independent rival principle. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.12, VIII.11.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

materia / suscipi / misceri. Printed forms: *materia*; *mixtae*; *susceptae*.

Matter, being received and being mingled. Contrary qualities do not receive one another; they are received in matter and mingled to generate constitution. References: VII.9.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

materia communis / propria. Printed forms: *Materia quidem communis*; *materia vero propria*.

Common matter can receive different acts; proper matter is directed to its own act. Soul's defining essence is used as the latter analogy to exclude migration between species or individual minds. References: V.11.8. See Spiritual matter and identity.

materia et forma. Printed forms: *anima atque corpore*; *materia et forma*.

Matter and form, compared with soul and body as analyses of a living composite. The parallel makes soul, not body, occupy the formal constitutive role. References: VI.7.1. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

materia prima. Printed forms: *materia*; *materia prima*; *materiae*; *materiam*.

Primary matter, the form-neutral underlying potency for changing bodily forms. Its persistence does not make individual composites imperishable; its retained openness helps explain their corruption. References: V.4.1, V.4.9, V.12.2, V.12.6. See Prime matter and enduring support.

materia propinqua / secunda. Printed forms: *materia non propinqua leoni*; *prima*; *secundaque*.

Proximate or secondary matter, distinguished from primary matter beneath the determinate organism. The capacity relevant to later corruption is retained at the prime-matter level, not assigned indiscriminately to every already formed organ. References: V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

materia spiritalis. Printed forms: *materia spiritalium*; *materiam animi spiritalem*; *spiritalis*.

Spiritual matter, analogically essence as recipient of spiritual being. The argument rejects treating God as material potency and rejects exchanges of spiritual acts analogous to changing bodily forms. References: V.11.7, V.11.8. See Spiritual matter and identity.

materiae potentia. Printed forms: *materiae potentia*.

Matter's latent capacity from which a form might be drawn. The rejected fourth account permits a producer distinct from temperament but still makes soul arise from material resources. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

materialis. Printed forms: *materialem*; *materialia*; *materialis*.

Material or bound to matter's conditions of reception. A material intellect would particularize its forms and confine its operations; the hypothesis is contrasted with universal cognition. References: VIII.8.1, VIII.10.2. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

mathematici / circulus / planum. Printed forms: *circuli*; *circulus*; *mathematici*; *plano*; *planum*.

Mathematicians, an exact circle and an exact plane. Their ideal figures support the contrast between intelligible exactness and sensed material shapes; the rolling claim is historical reasoning, not current mechanics. References: VIII.2.7. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

maxime quae sunt. Printed forms: *maxime quae sunt*.

Things that are most fully or supremely real. Ficino predicates this of incorporeal intelligibles because they remain unchangeable, not because they are visually largest. References: V.15.11, V.15.12. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

medicus / cutis / caro. Printed forms: *carne*; *caro*; *cutem*; *medicus*.

Physician, skin and flesh in the example of a cut. The concrete surgery separates physical severing from the soul’s sensing and judgement of it. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare. Printed forms: *aegrotat*; *gravatur*; *languescit*; *mediocriter*; *occupatur*.

Moderate nourishment, burden, weakness, sickness and occupation of attention. The reply concedes that bodily well-being helps mind, then explains this by the soul’s freedom from distracting bodily care. References: VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

medium. Printed forms: *medio*; *medium*; *medius*.

A middle term, intermediary or mean between extremes. The causal hierarchy requires mediating degrees, but immediate creation excludes an angelic instrument between soul and God. References: V.5.1, V.8.4, V.13.14, V.13.17, V.14.7. See Instrument and creative mediation.

membrum. Printed forms: *membra*; *membrorum*; *membrum*.

A bodily member or limb, serving both as instrument and as a part compared with a whole. Changing fitness of limbs need not change the art using them; comparison of each limb with others requires a single knower. References: VIII.2.3, VIII.4.10, VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

membrum / particula. Printed forms: *membra*; *membris*; *membro*; *particula*; *particulae*; *particulas*.

Member, organ or small bodily portion. Different organs perform different offices while one soul senses each local event and coordinates assistance. References: VII.5.1, VII.5.2, VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

memoria / expectatio. Printed forms: *expectationemque*; *memoriam*.

Memory and expectation, directed respectively toward past and future phases. Their simultaneous presence in the mind unifies phases absent from one another in external motion. References: V.15.5. See Time, memory and expectation.

memoria; agnoscere. Printed forms: *agnoscimus*; *decennium*; *memoria*.

Memory and recognition after ten years. The temporal example requires a preserver identical with the knower that formerly received and judged the image. References: VI.13.6. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

memoriter tenere. Printed forms: *imagines scientiasque tenere memoriter*.

To retain images and knowledge in memory. The conclusion links stable cognitive contents to an enduring bearer rather than a soul flowing like body or quality. References: VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

mens. Printed forms: *mens*; *Mens*; *mente*; *mentem*; *mentes*; *menti*; *mentibus*; *mentis*; *mentium*.

Mind, especially the cognitive power directed to intelligible reality. Mind can inspect a soul obscured by bodily habit, or attend inwardly to its substance; its operations need not be constantly actual. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.12, VI.2.16, VI.12.12. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

Mind considered as an intellectual subject, power or nature. Its reception, comparison, inward operation and divinely enlarged range are distinguished from bodily extension; it is not identified with the First Cause. References: VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

mens (additional inflections). Printed forms: *menti*.

To or for mind, the dative form in claims about its objects, contraries and fitting end. The recipient’s intellectual mode governs why bodily forms or evils known by it need not alter it as a body. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.6, VIII.12.1. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

mensura / magnitudo. Printed forms: *longitudinem*; *longitudo*; *magnitudine*; *magnitudinem*; *magnitudines*; *magnitudinis*; *magnitudo*; *mensura*; *mensurae*.

Measured extent or magnitude, as distinct from the nonextended account through which it is known. A point limits magnitude; later mind knows large and small objects without equalling either in bulk. References: VIII.2.5, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.12, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.2. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare. Printed forms: *aequatur*; *mensuram*; *metitur*; *proportionem*.

Measure, measuring, proportion and correspondence in knowing. Ficino argues that apprehending infinity requires a qualified matching power; this premise is not a modern theorem equating a definition with infinite information. References: VIII.16.3. See Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing.

mera forma. Printed forms: *mera forma*; *mera quaedam forma*.

Pure form in the sense of not being composed with or lodged in bodily matter. The soul’s identity with its own form excludes separation from a detachable formal part without excluding efficient creation. References: V.8.3, V.8.4. See Form and formal being.

mergere; suffocare. Printed forms: *mergitur*; *suffocatam*.

To submerge and smother. The verbs intensify the picture of bodily conditions obscuring the soul’s power without becoming its essence. References: VI.2.2. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis. Printed forms: *affectio*; *mersum*; *punctum quoddam affectionis*.

An immersed fine body, a bodily condition, or a point of such a condition. All three candidates are rejected as unable to supply the unmodified judging power. References: VII.6.3. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

metiri; numerare. Printed forms: *metiantur*; *numerentque*.

To measure and to number. These functions concern form and apply across bodily and incorporeal objects in the mathematical analogy. References: VI.2.6. See Number and spiritual amplitude.

migrare. Printed forms: *migrabit*.

To migrate from one bearer or identity into another. Ficino expressly denies that the same soul-essence moves from this mind into another within the same species. References: V.11.8. See Spiritual matter and identity.

milium / ficus. Printed forms: *ficus*; *milio*.

Millet and figs, a second mismatched pair of seed and product. Ficus later supplies a tree whose determinate nature is explained by form rather than common matter. References: V.4.3, V.8.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

mitto / ipse viderit. Printed forms: *Mitto*; *Sed hoc ipse viderit*.

I pass over it; let him see to that himself: explicit distancing formulas. They qualify the Proclean claim that soul produces its own essence and prevent the report from becoming Ficino’s unreserved assertion. References: VIII.15.2. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

mixtio / miscere. Printed forms: *misceantur*; *Misceantur*; *miscentur*; *misceri*; *mixtio*; *mixtionem*; *unita*.

Mixing or joining, whose cognitive sense must be distinguished from bodily blending. Genus and difference require a real intelligible union; chance mixture and separated spatial placement fail as explanations of knowledge. References: VIII.4.5. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

mixtus / sincerus. Printed forms: *mixta*; *mixtum*; *separatum*; *sincera*.

Mixed and pure or separate, describing different modes of reception. A form bound to a bodily quality would be restricted like sight through an eye and could not explain grasp of pure incorporeal objects. References: VIII.10.2. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

modus / pactum. Printed forms: *modo*; *modos*; *modum*; *modus*; *pacto*.

Manner, mode or way; adverbial modo can also mean only or now, including repeated now-at-one-time/now-at-another alternatives. The comparison of bodily and intellectual reception depends on mode of operation. In VIII.2.3, modo … modo instead marks changing ease and difficulty of an art using its instruments; pacto names the way something occurs. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.4, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.4, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.13, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

modus essendi. Printed forms: *essendi modos*; *essendi modum*; *essendi naturam*.

A mode of being, the way in which an already dependent being is determinate. Secondary agents produce this or that qualification by divine power rather than produce being from nothing. References: V.13.2, V.13.5. See Participation, common and proper.

moles. Printed forms: *mole*; *molibus*; *molis*.

Bodily bulk or mass. Form and unity rather than sheer bulk explain a body's degree of organization, and greater psychic power need not mean spatial swelling. References: V.15.6, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

moles / distendere. Printed forms: *distentus*; *mole*.

Bodily bulk and being spread out through it. The hypothesis of an inward sight extended in bulk is granted temporarily so that its consequences can be tested. References: VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

moles; affectio. Printed forms: *affectionem*; *molem*; *superadditam*.

Corporeal bulk and an added qualifying condition. A body's being this particular kind requires more than the common matter of all bodies. References: VI.4.4. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

mollities / ariditas. Printed forms: *ariditatem*; *mollitiem*.

Excessive softness or dryness that impedes bodily firmness and flexibility. These are limitations of limbs as instruments; they do not establish a quantitatively altered intellectual substance. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

mollities appetitus. Printed forms: *mollitiem*.

Enfeebling softness of appetite, the moral impediment countered by temperance. This moral sense in the virtue definitions differs from excessive bodily softness of limbs in the earlier art-and-instruments comparison. References: VIII.3.1. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

momentum. Printed forms: *momento*.

An instant without a bodily interval of traversal. Ficino uses the instantaneous diffusion of light as part of the case for its noncorporeal mode. References: VI.2.22. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

mores; doctrina; tempus. Printed forms: *doctrinarum*; *morum*; *temporis*.

Character, learning and time as dimensions of education. All three qualify the ascent; intellectual information alone is not the whole discipline. References: VI.2.17. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

moribundus; carcer. Printed forms: *carcere caeco*; *moribundi corporis*.

A dying body and blind prison. Ficino's stronger mortal image maps the visible world onto the cave without reducing "dying" to a neutral bodily location. References: VI.2.16. See Plato's cave and gradual education.

mors. Printed forms: *mors*; *morte*; *mortem*; *mortis*.

Death, clarified as deprivation or nonbeing rather than a literal received object. The significant claim is that no death-bearing quality can enter soul and terminate its life. References: V.12.12, V.14.3, V.14.6, V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

mortalis / corruptibilis. Printed forms: *corruptibile*; *corruptibilem*; *corruptibilia*; *corruptibilis*; *mortalem*; *mortalibus*; *mortalis*.

Subject to death or corruption, in contrast with the intellect's alleged proper nature. The predicates describe bodies and also a rejected view of mind; the completed immortality inference must be distinguished from the hypothesis it refutes. References: VIII.1.5,

VIII.2.8, VIII.3.8, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

mortifer. Printed forms: *mortifera*; *mortiferam*.

Death-bearing or destructive of life. The Epicurean challenge and Ficino’s answer concern whether such a quality can enter an immaterial essence. References: V.14.3, V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

mos / consuetudo. Printed forms: *consuetudine*; *more*; *mores*; *moribus*.

Conduct, custom and habituated character. Moral virtues are prepared through repeated practice, even though the fulfilled rational orientation is described as an indivisible attainment. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.3, VIII.15.2. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

motio. Printed forms: *motionem*; *motionis*.

Movement, particularly as an effect requiring a primary moving source. The fountain of motion supplies the movement of matter and remains distinct from its instrumental qualities. References: V.1.2, V.4.10, V.15.5. See Motion and substantial stability.

motor. Printed forms: *motor*; *motore*; *motori*.

A mover or source of movement. A derivative movable continues while attached to its mover; the self-mover is identical with its mover and cannot be abandoned by it. References: V.1.1. See Motion and substantial stability.

motor / rector / una forma. Printed forms: *formam*; *motorem*; *rectorem*.

One form, mover and ruler of the living being. The three roles converge on one soul as the explanation of one life amid different bodily members. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

motus / alteratio / quies. Printed forms: *alterationem*; *motionem*; *motionum*; *motu*; *motum*; *movetur*; *quietem*; *stando*; *statu*; *statum*.

Motion, alteration, repose and standing still as contrasting modes of perfection. The bodily acquisition of form occurs through change; mind is said to contemplate better when freed from agitation and distracting affairs. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.7.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.3. See Repose, motion, and contemplation.

motus / movere. Printed forms: *motam*; *motis*; *motu*; *motui*; *motum*; *motus*; *movebit*; *moventur*; *movet*.

Motus is motion or activity, ranging from bodily movement to inward living self-motion; movere is to move, and motam means moved in rem motam, the thing moved, at V.15.5. The first proof identifies inward movement with life, while V.2 distinguishes motion of operation from stable substance. References: V.1.1, V.1.5, V.2.1, V.12.13, V.15.5. See Motion and substantial stability.

Movement and the action of moving. The severed-fragment objection uses apparent continued movement; the harmony critique distinguishes moving constituents from the outcome they produce. References: VII.5.4, VII.6.1, VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

motus internus / externus. Printed forms: *Internus motus*; *motum internum atque externum*.

Inward and outward movement, distinguishing the soul's own life from movement communicated beyond it. Ficino expressly calls inward motion life before reasoning from self-supply to unceasing living. References: V.1.1. See Motion and substantial stability.

motus vitalis. Printed forms: *motu secundum essentiam vitalem*; *non intellectuali*; *sed vitali*.

Motion belonging to the essence as life, rather than continuous thought. Essential living persists while cognitive and other powers may lapse or err. References: VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

movere / immobilis. Printed forms: *immobili*; *mobilem*; *mobiles*; *mobili*; *motionem*; *motrice*.

Motion and its absence as conditions relevant to causal stability. Everlasting natural species are traced to an immutable world-moving mind rather than a moving bodily or merely animate cause. References: VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

movere et moveri. Printed forms: *moveat*; *moveatur*; *per formam*; *per materiam*.

Moving through form and being moved through matter. The opponent distributes activity and receptivity, while Ficino demands a single primary principle rather than different roots. References: VI.12.9. See Integrity of the whole.

movere; motus. Printed forms: *motor*; *motores*; *motu*; *motum*; *motus*; *motuum*; *moveant*; *moveantur*; *moveat*; *moveatur*; *movent*; *moventur*; *movere*; *moveri*; *movet*; *movetur*.

To move or be moved; movement ranging from bodily change to psychic activity. Primary self-motion, derivative animal motion, received bodily motion and temporal discourse have different senses and causal relations; movement need not be spatial traversal. References: VI.2.7, VI.2.10, VI.2.20, VI.12.1, VI.12.2, VI.12.3, VI.12.4, VI.12.8, VI.12.10, VI.12.17, VI.13.8. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

mundi nodus. Printed forms: *mundi nodus*.

The world's knot or bond, joining lower and higher levels. The soul must reach divine and material orders if it is to perform this mediating function. References: V.5.7. See Soul as universal bond.

mutabilis / immutabilis. Printed forms: *immutabiles*; *mutabilia*.

Capable or incapable of change in the relevant nature or account. Universal principles are said to be unable to be otherwise, whereas bodily instances are subject to alteration. References: VIII.2.7. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

mutare / mutatio. Printed forms: *Mutabile*; *Mutabiles*; *mutabili*; *mutabiliter*; *mutatio*; *mutationis*; *mutatur*; *mutetur*.

To change and changeability, whether in operation, material constitution or essence. The stable-essence/mobile-operation distinction prevents every altered bodily or cognitive condition from counting as soul's destruction. References: V.2.1, V.10.2, V.12.13, V.15.13. See Motion and substantial stability.

mutare speciem. Printed forms: *mutant speciem*.

To change the kind or substantial character. The members' change upon removal of soul is offered as evidence that soul imparts substantial being. References: VI.9.2. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

mutatio / mutare. Printed forms: *mutatio*; *mutationem*; *mutet*; *permutatur*; *variatur*.

Change or alteration of state, distinguished from stable intelligible content. Bodily conditions alter sensory appetite, while reason's immutable accounts are used to establish a different mode of cognitive being. References: VIII.2.6, VIII.4.3, VIII.13.2. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

mutuare vitam. Printed forms: *vitam ab anima mutuari*; *vitam animae mutuet*.

Lending life to soul and borrowing life from soul. Lifeless food cannot first give the very life it must receive from the soul it is supposed to nourish. References: VI.13.3. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

mutuari. Printed forms: *mutuari*; *mutuatur*.

To borrow or receive from something else. A composite said to move itself only because its parts do so possesses motion derivatively, not through its own primary nature. References: VI.12.6. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

Naldius; Fontius; Bonisegnius. Printed forms: *Bartholomaeus Fontius*; *Ioannes Baptista Bonisegnius*; *Naldus Naldius*.

Naldo Naldi, Bartolomeo Fonzio and Giovanni Battista Boninsegni, learned witnesses in the narrative. They are named as friends present when the Peripatetic agreement was reached. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

nascendi potentia. Printed forms: *nascendi potentia*; *potentia essendi*.

The capacity for the soul's coming-to-be. It is absent from the not-yet-existent soul, any part, matter and nothing, so Ficino locates it in divine productive power. References: V.12.10. See Creation and generation.

natura. Printed forms: *natura*; *Natura*; *naturae*; *naturam*; *Naturam*.

Nature, either a thing's proper constitution or the productive order of natural agents. Nature as artisan forms a substrate; a form's own nature also means the determinate mode assigned by its maker. References: V.4.1, V.9.2, V.13.5. See Art and elemental transformation.

A thing's defining nature or characteristic way of being and acting. The book distinguishes common nature, particular embodiment and the natural mode of an intellectual power; naturalness concerns explanatory fitness, not merely frequency. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.2, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

natura / naturalis. Printed forms: *natura*; *naturalem*; *naturali*.

A thing's nature or a condition proper to its kind. The source distinguishes the natural structure of fragments, the nature of bodily constitution and the soul's natural state; natural does not always mean elemental or material. References: VII.4.1, VII.5.4, VII.9.1, VII.15.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

natura communis. Printed forms: *communem*; *communes*; *communia*; *communis*.

A nature or intelligible content shared across many individuals without restriction to one instance. Humanity is common to Plato and others; the common nature in instances is then distinguished from its self-subsisting divine exemplar. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.4.6. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

natura praeter corporis rationem. Printed forms: *natura praeter corporis rationem*.

A further nature beyond the defining account of body. The conclusion names this life-giving nature soul and life, completing the reply to the opponent’s change from animated to animal body. References: VI.5.5. See Animation, first light and regress.

natura; naturalis. Printed forms: *natura*; *naturae*; *naturale*; *naturalem*; *naturali*; *naturalis*; *naturam*.

Nature or a thing’s defining native constitution; natural. Natura can name the vegetative power, the defining character of a body, or the order of nature invoked in a reply; the reference must be specified locally. References: VI.2.1, VI.7.1, VI.11.2, VI.13.4. See Three offices and the order of proof.

naturale iudicium. Printed forms: *iudicium naturale*.

A judgement following unadulterated nature rather than acquired external images. Ficino expressly gives this as the warrant for the thought experiment’s conclusion about soul. References: VI.2.13. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

naturalis. Printed forms: *naturale*; *naturalem*; *naturali*; *naturalis*; *naturaliter*; *naturalium*.

Natural, belonging to the characteristic constitution or operation of a being. Natural appetite is taken to disclose a possible proper end, while natural intellectual universality precedes deliberate training; these are specific teleological claims. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

naturalis habitus / dissipare. Printed forms: *dissipabit*; *dissiparetur*; *habitum*; *naturalem*; *naturalem habitum*; *statu*.

The soul’s natural state and its possible dissolution. Ficino denies that humoral discord dissolves soul as such; if soul were merely humoral concord, slight discord would undo it. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul’s persistence.

naturaliter insitus. Printed forms: *naturaliter insita*.

Naturally implanted, describing the Idea from which a mental notion is produced. The account includes what is necessary and excludes superfluous circumstances; it is not merely a sensory copy. References: VIII.13.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

necessarium / impossibile. Printed forms: *impossibile*; *necessarium*.

Necessary and impossible, the two extremes excluded in the material-production trilemma. Matter neither imposes a finished work by itself nor makes it impossible, so the work remains possible relative to it. References: V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

necesse / oportere. Printed forms: *necessario*; *necesse*; *Oportere*; *oportet*.

Necessary or required within an argument. The necessity follows the stated conditions; the final conversion argument carefully denies that willing or compulsion is sufficient for the

change. References: V.4.1, V.5.2, V.12.2, V.13.18, V.15.20. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

necessitas / oportet. Printed forms: *necessario*; *oportet*; *Oportet*.

Necessity or what an argument says is required. The animal examples contest a necessary relation of size to capacity; the one-comprehension argument requires a unified grasper. References: VII.3.1, VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

nectere; conspirare. Printed forms: *conspirantibus*; *nectitur*.

To bind together and cooperate toward one result. Actual bodily cohesion is conceded, then explained through a principle beyond dispersed bodily nature. References: VI.8.4. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

negare; fateri; confiteri. Printed forms: *confiteri*; *fateberis*; *fatebitur*; *fatendum*; *negabis*; *negabitis*; *negant*; *negaret*; *negat*; *negaverit*.

To deny, acknowledge or confess assent. The sensory exclusivism debate and the reductios depend on what the interlocutor is compelled to admit after a branch fails. References: VI.2.8, VI.2.9, VI.2.20, VI.2.22, VI.2.26, VI.8.5, VI.12.5. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

nequam / probus / iustus / latro. Printed forms: *iusti*; *latronis*; *nequissimi*; *probi*.

Wicked, good, just, and robber as moral contrasts. The example does not infer that moral goodness guarantees bodily vigor or cognitive skill; that is the absurd consequence being tested. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

nervus; articulus; tractus. Printed forms: *articuli*; *contrahuntur*; *nervi*; *tractum*.

Sinew, joint and pull; contraction. The same sinew through the joints illustrates common movement requiring one connecting principle. References: VI.9.3. See Members, house and sinew.

nix / albedo. Printed forms: *albedinem*; *albedo*; *nivis*.

Snow and whiteness, illustrating a bodily quality divided with its subject. The physical example introduces the claim that a form received in extended matter inherits the receiver’s divisibility. References: VIII.4.3, VIII.4.8. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

nixus / niti. Printed forms: *nititur*; *nixuque*; *nixus*.

Striving or a sustaining impulse, and the act of striving. Self-preservation is a continuing effort; V.12.11 uses one sustaining act for divine establishing and the soul’s subsistence. References: V.6.1, V.8.3, V.12.11. See Relation and continuing dependence.

nobilior. Printed forms: *nobiliorem*.

Nobler or higher in explanatory rank. Ficino rejects a theory that would make the soul’s indivisible power superior to the substance that possesses and produces it. References: VII.2.2. See Comparison and common sense.

non efficiens sed formalis. Printed forms: *formalis*; *non efficiens, sed*.

Not efficient but formal: the expressly limited sense in which mind is called its own cause. Reflexive self-perfection and formal possession of being do not make mind its own efficient creator. The restriction governs the strong self-making language nearby. References: VIII.15.3. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

non latere. Printed forms: *latere*; *latet*; *non eam latere*; *Non latere*; *non latet*.

Not to escape awareness. Ficino uses this idiom to describe the soul knowing its own activity, and hence sensing. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

non localiter. Printed forms: *non localiter*; *non secundum locum*.

Not by spatial location, describing soul's conjunction with body and intelligibles. Nearness to eternal principles is explicitly a matter of natural order rather than physical distance. References: V.15.12, V.15.25. See Transmission of form and natural order.

notio / perceptio. Printed forms: *notio*; *notione*; *notionem*; *perceptio*; *perceptionem*.

An apprehended account or cognitive grasp, with no automatic implication of sensory perception. Simple perception follows simple intellectual content, and innate principles produce notions including necessities while excluding superfluities. References: VIII.4.13, VIII.13.1, VIII.16.3. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

numen invocare. Printed forms: *divino numine invocato*.

Calling upon divine power at the start of the proof. The invocation introduces the first argumentative stage and does not replace its reasons. References: VI.3.2. See Three offices and the order of proof.

numerus / figura / proportio. Printed forms: *comparationes*; *figura*; *figurae*; *Figurarum*; *figurarum*; *figuras*; *lineam*; *numeri*; *numeris*; *numerorum*; *Numeros*; *numeros*; *proportiones*.

Numbers, figures, proportions, comparisons and an indefinitely extended line. The catalogue displays mental operations without an assigned final bound, not the completed calculation of an actual infinite set of results. References: VIII.2.7, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

numerus; replicatio. Printed forms: *Numeri*; *numeri*; *replicationes*.

Numbers and repeated expressions of unity. Numbers lack position and number bodily and incorporeal objects, so they approach spiritual nature. References: VI.2.6. See Number and spiritual amplitude.

nuntiare. Printed forms: *nuntiantur*; *nuntiat*.

To report or convey awareness. The five sensory instruments are likened to reporters to one center; the later foot example tests how such reporting can be understood. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

nutritiva potentia. Printed forms: *nutritiva potentia*.

The soul's power of nourishment. It uses heat but directs food toward living flesh and the determinate human figure, exceeding heat's own characteristic work. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

obfuscare. Printed forms: *obfuscantur*.

To darken or obscure each other. Successively received figures would cease to be distinguishable if their bodily impressions overlaid one another. References: VII.1.2. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

obiectum. Printed forms: *mentis obiectum*; *obiecta*; *obiecta mentis*; *obiecto*; *obiectum*; *sensus obiecto*.

Object, what an operation is directed toward and from which it takes its species. Truth and good allow inward operations to range beyond the single species in which the creature itself exists. References: V.13.11, V.13.12. See Creature, power and operation.

The object toward which mind or sense is directed. Ficino tests whether intellectual objects move mind, or whether intellect independently fashions incorporeal structures. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

An object of a sensory power, distinguished from that power’s operation. The inward comparing power judges both the external senses’ objects and their activities. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

oblivisci. Printed forms: *obliviscitur*.

To forget. The denial concerns loss caused by the act of teaching, not an assertion that no person ever forgets any fact. References: V.15.15. See Teaching without loss.

oculus / cerebrum. Printed forms: *cerebrum*; *oculo*; *oculum*; *oculus*.

Eye and brain, bodily candidates for receiving or judging sensory images. The argument expands the proposed image-container from eye to brain to the whole body, retaining each hypothetical limit. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

offendere / dolere. Printed forms: *doleat*; *dolor*; *offensus*.

To strike or be hurt and to feel pain. An accidentally hurt foot introduces the problem of recognizing a localized bodily lesion. References: VII.5.1. See Pain, location and reporting.

offensio; dolor. Printed forms: *dolor*; *offensione*.

Disturbance or injury and pain. The bodily hypothesis predicts continual painful disruption from a soul-body’s penetration, which the argument rejects. References: VI.9.4. See Place, coincidence and painless penetration.

officium. Printed forms: *officia*.

A characteristic task or function. The soul’s three offices define acting in body, through body and through itself, rather than three separate souls. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias. Printed forms: *Gorgiaque*; *Olympiodori*; *Phaedone*.

The named Platonist and dialogues invoked for a confirmation from natural desire. Ficino attributes the argument’s Pythagorean and Platonic materials to this line of reception; no separate ancient-source collation is claimed. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

omnino. Printed forms: *omnino*.

Wholly or altogether, intensifying the scope of a claim. Wholly through oneself belongs to God, whereas a created form may be per se only with respect to formal or material dependence. References: V.5.1, V.5.2. See Through itself and through another.

operatio / actio. Printed forms: *actio*; *actionem*; *actionis*; *operatio*; *Operatio*; *operatione*; *operationem*; *operationis*.

An activity whose origin, mode and terminus reveal the nature of its agent. Bodily operation passes to external matter; understanding can terminate within the mind and

support a distinct claim about its formal preservation. References: VIII.7.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

operatio / operari. Printed forms: *operabatur*; *operantem*; *operari*; *operatio*; *Operatio*; *operatione*; *operationem*; *operatur*; *operetur*.

Operatio is an operation or activity, the actual exercise of a power; operari means to operate or act. Changing operation does not necessarily change essence; V.13 distinguishes operation both from being and from the power exercised. References: V.2.1, V.5.8, V.10.2, V.12.14, V.13.8, V.13.9, V.13.10, V.13.12, V.13.13. See Creature, power and operation.

operatio quae effluit / quae manet. Printed forms: *effluit extra operantem*; *manet intus*; *Quae effluit*; *Quae manet*.

Immanent operation remains within its agent; effluent operation passes outward beyond it. Knowing and willing exemplify immanent activity; heating exemplifies effluent activity. Both are distinguished from the creature’s own being. References: V.13.10, V.13.11. See Creature, power and operation.

operatio; actus. Printed forms: *actu*; *actum*; *actus*; *operatio*; *operationem*; *operationes*; *operationum*.

Operation and act or actuality, distinguishable from the essence and power producing them. Some acts occur successively or lapse while essential vital actuality remains; the movement from potency to act must not be equated with adding a physical piece. References: VI.2.12, VI.4.6, VI.7.1, VI.9.2, VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

opinio / affectus / distrahere. Printed forms: *affectibus*; *distrahi*; *opinionibus*; *opinionum*.

Opinions, affections and being pulled apart by their disagreement. The soul remains a true, vital soul despite its internal conflicts, unlike harmony qua harmony. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul’s persistence.

opinio / sententia. Printed forms: *opinantur*; *putant*; *sententia*; *sententiam*.

A stated teaching, position or opinion with an identifiable source or speaker. Platonist, Peripatetic, Epicurean and Proclean claims are not all adopted with equal force; attribution and reservation remain part of their meaning. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.5, VIII.5.2, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

opinio; sententia. Printed forms: *opiniones*; *sententiam*.

An articulated position or judgement, which may be reported rather than endorsed. The fivefold classification is a programme for adjudicating rival accounts, and the dinner guests are reported as agreeing with its demand. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.5, VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

oportere / necesse / debere. Printed forms: *debent*; *debet*; *necesse*; *Oportet*; *oportet*.

It must be so, it is necessary, or something ought to follow, according to the premise being used. These modal expressions can state a necessary consequence within an opponent’s hypothesis. They do not always announce an unconditionally endorsed doctrine. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.6.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

opponere / oppositum. Printed forms: *opponitur*; *opponuntur*; *opposita*; *oppositi*; *oppositum*.

To oppose and an opposed term, including contrary qualities and contradictory being/nonbeing. The specific opposition matters: cold and heat share matter, whereas nothing is not a substrate for being. References: V.5.4, V.8.1, V.12.2, V.12.10, V.13.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

opposita / contraria. Printed forms: *contraria*; *opposita*.

Opposed or contrary effects. A simple quality produces one characteristic kind of result; soul produces many and contrary effects. References: VII.7.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

opposita suscipere. Printed forms: *opposita suscipit*; *permanet idem*; *repugnantes affectus*.

Receiving contrary states while remaining the same bearer. Changing opinions, knowledge/ignorance and affects supply a test for substance rather than identifying soul with any transient state. References: VI.7.3. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

opprimere / marcescere. Printed forms: *marcescunt*; *opprimit*.

To overwhelm and to grow slack. Sleep overtakes people and relaxes limbs, but Ficino denies that this by itself weakens the mind’s essential power. References: V.15.23. See Sleep and dreams.

opus. Printed forms: *opera*; *operibus*; *operis*; *opus*.

A work, product or task made or performed by an agent. A completed artifact, natural product and the whole task held in mind use the same family without making them identical kinds of effect. References: V.4.1, V.4.8, V.12.3, V.13.2, V.15.5. See Art and elemental transformation.

orbis in puncto. Printed forms: *intervalla*; *orbem*; *puncto*; *spatia*.

The world seen in a point, an image of nonextended intellectual survey. Mind can consider spatially distant objects together without its gaze being confined to their bodily distances. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

orbis pallidus. Printed forms: *pallidus orbis in nubibus*.

A pale circle in clouds, the lunar halo. Its following moonlight illustrates visible light’s dependence on spiritual source rather than identity with it. References: VI.2.25. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

ordinare / ordo. Printed forms: *ordinatae*; *ordinatur*; *ordine*; *ordinem*.

Ordering and ordered relation among principles, parts or operations. The regular coordination of natural species supports a common cause; ordered reasoning differs from chance assembly of spatial mental fragments. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10, VIII.5.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.2. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

ordinare; ordo. Printed forms: *ordinantis*; *ordinat*; *ordinator*; *ordinatrix*; *ordine*; *ordinem*.

To order; order or the source of coordination. Determinate conjunction, bodily regulation and limited growth require an orderer in Ficino’s causal account; order is not merely where objects stand spatially. References: VI.1.6, VI.11.1, VI.13.8. See Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

ordo / ordinare. Printed forms: *ordinat*; *ordinem*; *ordo*.

Order or ordering, here the angel’s contribution in the reported Platonist triad. The term concerns determinate arrangement, distinguished from God’s giving unity and soul’s giving life by movement. References: V.4.10. See Four causes and graded dependence.

ordo naturae / effectus. Printed forms: *effectibus*; *effectu*; *ordine*.

Natural order, and actual realization or effect. Ordo names the ordered constitution of nature; effectus names its actual realization or an effect, as distinguished locally from an invented conceptual multiplication. The genus-and-difference argument rejects actually innumerable natural constituents; elsewhere effects reveal images of causes. Effectu is not always simply an external product. References: VIII.3.7, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

oriens / occidens. Printed forms: *occidente*; *oriente*.

East and West, paired regions illustrating a common nature’s geographic nonrestriction. Humanity can occur in either; the pair supports a claim about definition rather than a travel description. References: V.7.1. See Comets and defining accounts.

origo. Printed forms: *origine*; *originem*; *origo*.

Origin or source, whether productive or explanatory. Soul is denied an origin from bodies; an irrational life’s mediated origin differs from rational soul’s immediate source. References: V.5.9, V.12.12, V.13.18, V.15.18. See Creation and generation.

origo a materia. Printed forms: *nullam trahat originem a materia*.

Deriving no origin from matter. Ficino assigns this additional conclusion to the intellectual stage, beyond what natural power establishes. References: VI.3.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

origo; principium; causa. Printed forms: *causa*; *causam*; *causas*; *originem*; *origo*; *principia*; *principiis*; *principium*.

Origin, principle and cause, each naming an explanatory beginning in context. Material origin, the source of nutrition and reasoning through causes are distinct applications; a first explanatory principle need not be first merely in elapsed time. References: VI.3.1, VI.4.1, VI.12.5, VI.12.7, VI.12.10, VI.12.17. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

Orphici / Heraclitus. Printed forms: *Heraclito*; *Orphicis*.

The named authorities for light as visible soul and soul as invisible light. The attribution belongs to Ficino’s report; the lexicon does not claim direct verification against separate ancient witnesses. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

ortus / finis virtutis. Printed forms: *finem*; *finis*; *originem*; *ortus*.

The origin and end of virtue, treated as evidence of its nature. An indivisible attainment and nonbodily goal together support the inference that the virtue itself is indivisible. References: VIII.3.6. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

os / nervus / caro. Printed forms: *caro*; *nervorum*; *nervus*; *os*; *ossium*.

Bone, nerve or sinew, and flesh as differently constituted tissues. Their differing proportions cannot each supply a different soul if one animal is to have one life. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

ossa / caro / nervi. Printed forms: *carnes*; *nervos*; *ossa*.

Bones, flesh and sinews, examples of unlike bodily constituents. The analogy prompts the alternative that an intellectual form has unlike parts, which Ficino next tests as genus and difference. References: VIII.4.4. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

ossa; nervi; caro. Printed forms: *caro*; *ossa et nervi*.

Bones, sinews and flesh. In the historical physical comparison these endure longer than a supposed exceptionally subtle soul-body. References: VI.13.7. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

ovis / ignis. Printed forms: *ignis*; *ovem*.

Sheep and fire in two distinct examples concerning specific form. A dog does not beget a sheep; fire already possesses its own form and cannot receive that same determination as something lacking. References: VIII.10.1. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

panis / caro. Printed forms: *carnis*; *caro*; *panis*.

Bread and flesh, the elementary example of bodily assimilation. Bread is eaten so that it becomes flesh; this sets the premise that food must be akin to the substance it sustains. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

pars. Printed forms: *partem*; *partes*; *partibus*.

A part, especially one region of an extended body or a proposed partition of a sensory power. The account asks how individually bounded parts could yield one grasp of a whole. References: VII.1.1, VII.4.1. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

pars / particula. Printed forms: *pars*; *parte*; *partem*; *Partes*; *partes*; *partibus*; *particulas*; *partium*.

A part, or smaller part, of a quantitatively divisible whole. Matter’s own nature precedes quantitative parts, while bodily parts can be divided without ceasing to belong to the bodily order. References: V.4.5, V.4.9, V.6.1, V.15.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

pars / totum. Printed forms: *dimidia*; *dimidium*; *Pars*; *pars*; *partem*; *partes*; *partibus*; *particula*; *particulas*; *partium*; *tota*; *totius*; *toto*; *totum*.

Part and whole, with relations that cannot be reduced to mere numerical repetition. The intellect distinguishes whole from parts, compares limbs and knows each with its whole self; hypothetical spatial parts fail to explain this unity. References: VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.7, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.16.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

pars / totum (further forms). Printed forms: *parte*; *partimur*; *partis*; *partium*; *totam*; *toti*.

Part, a partitioning action and whole, with the grammatical distinctions kept visible. Physical parts, logical constituents and the whole knower play different roles; an intact species in each alleged part defeats the spatial hypothesis. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.5, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

pars et totum. Printed forms: *ab omnibus partibus partes omnes*; *partem corporis alteram*; *totum a toto*.

Part and whole in the four possibilities for bodily self-motion. Part-by-part, part-to-whole, whole-to-part and whole-to-whole relations are tested distinctly before returning to self-moving parts. References: VI.12.4. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

pars quaelibet semetipsam agitans. Printed forms: *pars quaelibet eius agitat semetipsam*.

Every part of the supposed self-moving whole moving itself. The fourth part–whole alternative makes the composite's self-motion depend on each part, preparing the renewed regress through divisibility. References: VI.12.5. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

pars; membrum. Printed forms: *membra*; *membris*; *membro*; *membrorum*; *membrum*; *pars*; *parte*; *partem*; *partes*; *parti*; *partibus*; *partium*.

Part and organic member; parts of an argument are also called members in the fourfold division. Bodily composition, whole presence of soul and division of a logical alternative are different uses; a self-moving source cannot simply be assumed from a constituent part. References: VI.1.4, VI.1.5, VI.2.2, VI.9.3, VI.12.4. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

partes novae; veteres. Printed forms: *novae in nobis partes*; *veteres corrumpuntur*.

New bodily parts generated and old parts corrupted. This supplies Ficino's stated account of growth and diminution, rather than a separate proof from nutrition alone. References: VI.12.15. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

participatio. Printed forms: *participatione*; *participes*.

Participation in a common perfection or principle without numerical identity with it. Humans derive humanity through participation or likeness, and mind judges things participating in equality by reference to equality itself. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.6.1. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

participatio / particeps. Printed forms: *particeps*; *participatione*; *participationem*.

Participation, a derived or limited possession of a nature. A participant cannot generate the absolute source on which it depends, since this would reverse causal priority and make it cause itself. References: V.13.4, V.13.5, V.13.7. See Participation, common and proper.

participatio; praesentia. Printed forms: *participatione atque praesentia*.

Participation and presence of a primary source. These explain a body's derivative apparent self-motion rather than making it the primary inward mover. References: VI.12.2. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

particula vivere. Printed forms: *partes eius vivant*; *tota anima in singulis*.

The proposed life of each part and whole soul's presence in each. If division leaves the complete vital nature, quantity is not necessary to its activity. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

partiri; secare. Printed forms: *partiemur*; *secuimus*.

To divide into parts and cut conceptually. Repeating the analysis of a supposedly self-moving part resumes the same regress through ever smaller divisible parts. References: VI.12.6. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

parvipendere; horrere. Printed forms: *horres*; *parvipendis*.

To value lightly and recoil in aversion. Disdain for temporal things and ugliness supplies signs in the fourfold exhortation toward greatness, goodness, beauty and eternity. References: VI.2.3. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

passio. Printed forms: *passionem*; *passioni*; *passionis*; *passionum*.

An undergoing or being affected, especially destructive material alteration in these proofs. Ficino permits bodily affection in operative capacity but excludes it from the soul’s essence; not every reception is such a passion. References: V.3.1, V.5.9, V.8.3. See Passivity and bodily affection.

passio / affectio. Printed forms: *affectiones*; *afficiunt*; *passio*; *passionem*; *passiones*; *passionibus*; *patitur*.

A condition undergone or an affection, especially bodily modification. Ficino distinguishes being bodily affected from judging that affection, and both from the soul’s sympathetic distress. References: VII.6.1, VII.6.2, VII.6.3, VII.13.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

passivus / activus. Printed forms: *activa*; *activi*; *passiva*; *passivum*.

Passive and active, marking capacities to undergo or to originate action. Matter and quantity occupy the passive extreme, God and angel the active; quality and soul differ in their intermediate participation. References: V.3.1. See Passivity and bodily affection.

patera. Printed forms: *pateram*.

A bowl, presented as Plato’s mixing-bowl of souls. The image names the seat or order of souls, without making them quantitatively mixed bodily ingredients. References: V.5.9. See Inclination and independence.

paulatim / subito. Printed forms: *paulatim*; *subito*.

Gradually and at once. The temporal opposition supports an indivisible sensing power in Ficino’s argument, not an experimentally established account of neural timing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

Paulus apostolus. Printed forms: *apostolus*; *Paulus*.

Paul the apostle, named for the language of daily renewal. The reference supports Ficino’s interpretation of inward perfection; this contribution does not supply an independently collated biblical quotation. References: VIII.15.2. See Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

pedetentim / paulatim / subito. Printed forms: *gradatim*; *momento*; *paulatim*; *pedetentim*; *sensim*; *Subito*; *subito*.

Stepwise or gradual progress contrasted with sudden or instantaneous completion. The verbs qualify different stages of inquiry and habituation; gradual preparation is not denied by the claim that full insight is indivisible. References: VIII.3.2, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

pedisequa. Printed forms: *pedisequam*.

A female attendant following another, figuratively life’s inseparable accompaniment of soul. The image allows the argument even under the alternative formulation that soul has life properly rather than simply being life. References: V.14.5, V.14.6. See Life and vivification.

pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci. Printed forms: *nascitur*; *orietur*; *pendebit*; *sustinebunt*.

To depend, arise, sustain, and be born or come into being, respectively. If soul were humoral harmony, the humors would generate and sustain it rather than receiving governance from it. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

penetrare; implere. Printed forms: *implere*; *penetrare*.

To penetrate and fill. These are required animating functions used to test the suitability of a hypothetical soul-body. References: VI.6.1. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

per aliud. Printed forms: *per aliud*.

Through another, denoting dependence on a cause, constituent or intermediary. Natural body has all four causal dependencies; a bodily form is related upward through a higher form. References: V.5.1, V.9.1, V.10.1, V.10.2. See Through itself and through another.

per essentiam; per quantitatem. Printed forms: *per essentiam*; *per quantitatem*.

Presence by essence rather than filling place through extension. Soul gives being where present, so its relation to body is not the placement of another body within a container. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

per naturam ac vim propriam. Printed forms: *per naturam ac vim propriam*.

Through one’s own nature and power. The phrase explicitly glosses per se in the account of soul’s discursive self-motion. References: VI.12.18. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

per omnia. Printed forms: *per omnia*.

Through all things, marking an unrestricted range across kinds of objects. The repeated phrase contrasts intellect with sight restricted to colours and hearing restricted to sounds. Its scope includes present, past and future things, unrealized possibilities and imagined impossibilities; representation does not establish external actuality or possibility. References: VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

per se. Printed forms: *per se*; *per se ipsam*; *per seipsam*; *per semet ipsam*.

Through itself or in its own right, with the relevant independence specified by context. God alone excludes all causal dependence; the created soul excludes bodily support while remaining dependent on its efficient source. References: V.5.1, V.5.8, V.9.4, V.10.3. See Through itself and through another.

per se convenire. Printed forms: *per se congruit*; *per se conveniat*; *per se convenit*.

To belong in its own right or according to a thing’s nature. Ficino applies the formula both to intrinsic predicates and to being, then must distinguish materially conditional from self-subsisting forms. References: V.9.1, V.9.2. See Through itself and through another.

per se et primo. Printed forms: *per se ipsum mobile*; *primo*; *secundum se totum*.

Primarily self-moving throughout one’s nature. The source and recipient must be the same whole reality, not a collection borrowing movement from a special part. References: VI.12.1. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

per se exsistere / operari. Printed forms: *exsistit*; *extiterit*; *operabitur*; *per se aliquid operabitur*; *per se exsistit*; *per se ipsum*.

To exist or act through oneself. The closing inference links independent activity with independent existence, a relation lost if soul is merely an effect of strings or humors. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

per se; quodammodo; proprie. Printed forms: *ceu*; *per se*; *proprie*; *quasi*; *quodammodo*; *revera*; *tamquam*.

Through oneself, in a qualified manner, properly, in truth and as if: markers of mode and qualification. Ficino distinguishes primary self-motion from bodily apparent self-motion and analogies from literal identity; these small modifiers carry the limit of the claim. References: VI.1.5, VI.2.9, VI.5.4, VI.12.8, VI.12.20. See Vital motion, action and passion.

per sui naturam. Printed forms: *per naturam suam*; *per sui naturam*; *secundum naturam suam*.

According to or through its own nature, Ficino’s explicit explanation of per se. A form’s own nature includes the mode assigned by its maker, whether material inherence or self-subsistence. References: V.9.2. See Through itself and through another.

perceptio / animadversio / phantasia. Printed forms: *animadversionem*; *animadvertit*; *perceptionem*; *percipit*; *phantasiam*.

Perception, attentive awareness and imagination. The passage first calls perception sensation, then calls attending to and judging that perception imagination. References: VII.6.1. See Sensation as attentive activity.

percipere (undergoing affection). Printed forms: *percipit*.

To receive or undergo an affection in this construction, rather than necessarily to apprehend an object cognitively. The soul receives a certain bodily passion in its operative capacity while its essence remains exempt. The sense is controlled by corporalem aliquam percipit passionem and differs from the cognitive use of percipere elsewhere. References: V.3.1. See Passivity and bodily affection.

perdere / laedere. Printed forms: *laederetur*; *perdit*.

To destroy or impair. If the soul were cut as the flesh is cut, its power and operation would be impaired when they should be accurately perceiving the cut. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

perfectus; imperfectus; perficere. Printed forms: *imperfecta*; *imperfectae*; *imperfectum*; *perfecta*; *perfecte*; *perfectissima*; *perfectum*; *perficere*; *perficit*; *perficitur*.

Complete or perfected, incomplete, and bringing to completion. A complete agent is required to form an image, while form perfects matter and reason corrects sense; this is usually operative or metaphysical completion, not moral perfection. References: VI.2.7, VI.2.10, VI.2.12, VI.2.20, VI.7.2, VI.12.1, VI.12.11, VI.13.11. See Images, migration and the perfect agent.

permanere / manere / remanere. Printed forms: *manent*; *manet*; *permanens*; *permanere*; *remanente*; *remanet*.

Remaining or persisting through an alteration of circumstance or possession. Art can remain while tools change, soul while virtue is absent, and forms together within mind without displacement. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.6, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.6, VIII.7.1. See Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

permanere / perseverare. Printed forms: *permanere*; *permanet*; *perseveret*.

To remain or persist as what one is. The contrast concerns persistence of soul amid discord, not a claim that bodily disorder has no harmful consequences. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul’s persistence.

permanere / restare / superesse. Printed forms: *permanent*; *permanet*; *restat*; *superest*; *supersit*.

To remain or survive, after a change or through dependence on a conserving source. Matter remains after a form is lost; a hypothetically surviving soul-essence would still have being and life. References: V.4.3, V.4.9, V.10.1, V.10.3, V.11.3. See Generation, corruption and annihilation.

permanere; stabilire; stabilis. Printed forms: *consistent*; *consistere*; *stabili*; *stabiliat*; *stabilis*; *stabilissimo*; *stabilitate*; *stabunt*; *stante*; *stare*.

Stable, establishing stability and remaining firm. The inward craftsman and ruler must endure while bodily material changes; stability of substance does not deny successive activity. References: VI.2.25, VI.9.4, VI.13.6, VI.13.7, VI.13.8, VI.13.9, VI.13.10. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

pernicies / diligere opus. Printed forms: *diligunt*; *perniciem*.

Destruction or ruin, and loving one’s own work. The soul grieves at damage to body and spirit because they are its work; impassibility does not mean emotional indifference. References: VII.6.1. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

perpetuus. Printed forms: *perpetua*; *perpetuam*; *perpetuis*; *perpetuo*; *perpetuum*; *perpetuus*.

Perpetual or continuous, with the relevant object specifying whether the claim concerns duration or repeated activity. V.12 distinguishes continual activity toward everlasting objects from perpetual fulfilled activity within them. References: V.1.1, V.4.1, V.12.14, V.15.4. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

perpetuus / sempiternus. Printed forms: *perpetua*; *perpetuam*; *perpetuo*; *sempiternae*; *sempiternus*.

Perpetual or everlasting, without thereby settling whether existence began. The future-only alternative of VIII.9.1 and the granted power of life at VIII.16.4 limit what can be inferred about pre-existence. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.10.2, VIII.11.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

persona. Printed forms: *personae*; *personarum*; *personis*.

An individual person as the bearer of a common nature under distinguishing conditions. The opening argument distinguishes humanity shared across persons from any one person’s private properties or productive action. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

persona / verba. Printed forms: *persona*; *verba*.

The interlocutor and words within the dream scene. They are distinguished from rational truth, which survives the falsity of the surrounding sensory narrative. References: V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

perspicere; prospicere; pervidere. Printed forms: *perspicere*; *perspiciet*; *pervidere*; *prospicit*; *prospicitur*.

To discern, look forth or see through an obscuring condition. The edition retains distinct printed verbs, including corrected pervidere in the Avicennian argument and prospicitur in the unseen-light passage. References: VI.2.4, VI.2.6, VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

persuasio. Printed forms: *persuasiones*.

A brief persuasive argument, here reported from unnamed others. The group of tests ranges over living parts, perceptibility, boundaries, timing, presence and containment. References: VI.6.4. See Essential presence and containment.

perturbatio / impedire / augere. Printed forms: *augent*; *impediunt*; *perturbationes*.

Disturbances, hindering and increasing an activity. Sensory disturbances affect nutrition, illustrating the unity of the soul’s different offices. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

perturbatio / negotium. Printed forms: *negotiorum*; *perturbationum*.

Agitations and practical affairs that disturb contemplative attention. Their absence helps mental activity, and Ficino moves from this natural perfection to a claim about the stability of mind’s substance. References: VIII.11.1. See Repose, motion, and contemplation.

pervenire / transire / concurrere. Printed forms: *concurrere*; *pervenit*; *transit*.

To arrive, cross over and converge. The dilemma contrasts one content reaching one endpoint with both contents converging on both endpoints. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

pervidere. Printed forms: *pervidere*.

To discern fully or see through an obscuring condition. The printed correction concerns the ordinary soul’s inability to see itself apart from bodily contamination. References: VI.2.13. See Avicenna’s imagined adult.

pes / manus / os. Printed forms: *manus*; *os*; *pede*; *pedis*; *pes*.

Foot, hand and mouth in the coordinated response to injury. The eye turns, the hand approaches and the mouth cries out; the soul’s unified command links these distinct organs. References: VII.5.1. See Pain, location and reporting.

Petrus Leo Spoletinus. Printed forms: *Petri Leonis Spoletini*.

Pier Leone of Spoleto, praised as joining Platonic with Peripatetic teaching. His reported judgement reinforces the cross-school framing, not a claim that all doctrines of both schools are identical. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

phantasia. Printed forms: *phantasia*; *Phantasia*; *phantasiae*; *phantasiam*.

Imagination, identified here with internal sense. Its material consists of bodily figures and qualities received through sense, explaining why it cannot alone define incorporeal soul. References: VI.2.2. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

Imagination as an attending and judging sensory power. It judges bodily events and shares distress; its sorrow or joy can affect the same soul’s nourishment. References: VII.6.1, VII.6.2, VII.9.2. See Sensation as attentive activity.

Particularizing recognition and judgment operating upon an imagined presentation. It recognizes Plato as this good or beautiful friend but remains bound to his singular circumstances and does not recognize its intentions as incorporeal. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

philosophari. Printed forms: *philosophamur*.

To philosophize, engage in reflective intellectual inquiry. The mind’s eager and fruitful commerce with stable principles while leaving mutable bodily concerns behind supplies an experiential argument. References: V.15.18. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

phrenesis; somnus; ebrietas. Printed forms: *ebrietatem*; *phrenesim*; *somnum*.

Frenzy, sleep and intoxication as comparisons for deceptive imagery. They illustrate the soul’s disorientation on descent in Ficino’s historical account, not clinical advice. References: VI.2.17. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

physicus Aristoteles; plurimum. Printed forms: *physicus Aristoteles*; *plurimum*.

Aristotle as natural philosopher; for the most part or to a great extent. The qualifier restricts the statement that Aristotle follows the ancient theologians’ footsteps. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

pictor / pictura. Printed forms: *picti*; *pictor*; *pictore*; *picturam*.

Painter, painting and painted, the exemplification of unequal products from one agent. A human figure and horse can differ because the painter uses different exemplars; immediate divine source does not equalize angel and soul. References: V.13.16. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

pingere in se / aere / pariete. Printed forms: *aere*; *linguam*; *manum*; *pariete*; *pingit*.

Painting inwardly, speaking in air and making an image on a wall. Ficino grants inward representations a reality as products, comparable to outward signs; this does not make their depicted objects actual. References: VIII.16.2. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus. Printed forms: *grandi*; *grandiorem*; *parvo*; *pingui*; *pusillus*; *tenui*.

Stout, slender, large or small bodily conditions. The examples break the supposed proportional relation between bodily size and mental greatness or effective courage. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

Plato / Socrates. Printed forms: *Plato*; *Platonem*; *Platonis*; *Socrates*; *Socratici*; *Socratico*; *Socratis*.

Named individual humans whose existence requires particular temporal and local conditions. Their individuality contrasts with common humanity; Plato later serves as Ariston’s determinate offspring. References: V.7.1, V.8.1, V.13.5. See Comets and defining accounts.

Named persons serving as perceived object and perceiver in the optical thought experiment. Socrates judges Plato through an image; the dimensions of that image are compared with Socrates’ organs and body. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

Platonici; Peripatetici. Printed forms: *Peripatetici*; *Peripateticis*; *Platonici*; *Platonicus*.

Platonists and Peripatetics as the schools named or represented by Ficino. The text attributes particular vocabulary and replies to a school, while its opening social frame also stresses agreement across schools; a local attribution is not a universal historical claim. References: VI.1.6, VI.2.1, VI.8.6, VI.12.13, VI.12.17. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

plebeus; minutus. Printed forms: *minuti philosophi*; *plebeos philosophos*.

Polemical descriptions of common or narrow philosophers. The labels criticize an intellectual dependence on sense; they are Ficino's rhetoric, not neutral classifications of social worth. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

Plotinus / Augustinus. Printed forms: *Augustinus*; *Plotinusque*.

Authorities invoked for the active, nonpassive account of sensation. The source attributes confirmation to both; the lexicon does not claim an independent verification of the quotation's historical wording. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

Plotinus / Proclus. Printed forms: *Plotini*; *Plotinus*; *Proculus*; *Proculusque*.

Named Platonist authorities whose claims receive different local qualifications. Analysis of being is tentatively attributed to them; the later Proclean self-generation claim is expressly left at a distance. References: VIII.4.12, VIII.5.2, VIII.15.2. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

Plotinus / Proculus. Printed forms: *Plotinus*; *Proculus*.

Plotinus and Proclus as Ficino's reported Platonist interlocutors. He attributes angelic production to them here, while later naming differences over irrational soul; the particular thesis determines the alignment. References: V.13.1, V.14.8. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

Plotinus; Porphyrius. Printed forms: *Plotinus Porphyriusque*.

The authorities named for vegetative soul's freedom from quantity. Ficino attributes their conclusion to the same soul filling the smallest and largest; no independent textual collation is claimed. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

ponere / concedere / admittere. Printed forms: *admittendum*; *Concedent*; *conceditur*; *ponatur*; *ponere*.

Positing, granting and admitting a premise for examination. The point-and-extension and genus-and-difference arguments repeatedly grant an opponent's proposal temporarily to expose its consequences, not to endorse it. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.6.1. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

Porphyrius. Printed forms: *Porphyrius*.

Porphyry, named with Proclus and others as denying irrational soul's immortality. The contrast concerns lower soul, not denial of the rational immortality Ficino is presently defending. References: V.14.8. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

portiuncula. Printed forms: *portiunculam*; *portiunculam istam*.

A little portion, here of water removed from the sea. The diminutive isolates a concrete test case: did this portion become nothing, or did something of it remain? References: V.4.1, V.4.2. See Art and elemental transformation.

portiuncula; plurimi. Printed forms: *in plurimis*; *portiuncula*.

A small bodily portion; in most parts. Life is asserted in every tiny portion, but movement and sensation only in most, a qualification easily lost in summary. References: VI.9.3. See Members, house and sinew.

posse / fingere / excogitare. Printed forms: *excogitat*; *fingit*; *numquam*; *possent*; *possunt*.

Posse means to be able or possible; fingere means to fashion a representation, and excogitare to devise in thought. Numquam, never, qualifies the possibility of what is conceived. Conceiving an object demonstrates cognitive range, but does not verify its external possibility or actuality. References: VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

posse; valere; oportere. Printed forms: *debet*; *nequeant*; *nequeat*; *nequeunt*; *nequit*; *oporteat*; *oportebit*; *oporteret*; *oportet*; *posse*; *posset*; *possint*; *possit*; *possunt*; *poterit*; *potest*; *valeat*; *valent*; *valet*.

Can or is able, cannot, and must or ought in a necessary inference. These modal verbs distinguish an allowed hypothetical possibility from what an argument requires or excludes; “must” often expresses logical dependence rather than a moral command. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.9, VI.2.10, VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.2.14, VI.11.1, VI.12.1, VI.12.2, VI.12.3, VI.12.7, VI.12.11, VI.12.14, VI.12.18, VI.13.3. See Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

possibile. Printed forms: *possibile*; *Possibile*; *potuisset*.

Possible or capable of occurring; V.12 defines the modal possibility at issue as open to being and nonbeing. The inference concerns a work viewed from matter before determination, not every use of can throughout the book. References: V.12.3, V.12.4, V.12.5, V.12.9. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

possibile / utile / impotentia. Printed forms: *impossibile*; *impotentia*; *inutile*; *possibile*; *possibilia*; *possibilis*.

Possible and useful, with impotence as the contrary of effective power. The Olympiodoran confirmation argues that a genuinely good natural end must be attainable; it is not a guarantee that every individual wish will occur. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

possidere / consulere / imperare. Printed forms: *consulat*; *consulere*; *consulit*; *imperare*; *possideat*.

To possess, care for or rule, different relations one agent may seek toward another. Desire for bodily possession or care requires soul’s agency; a ruler’s interest in another mind does not support turning it into mere body. References: V.15.20, V.15.22. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

potentia. Printed forms: *potentia*; *potentiam*.

Power or potentiality, with the act/potency contrast determining the latter sense. Materia’s potentiality for a form differs from the soul’s named vegetative power; translation must not force one English equivalent into both constructions. References: VI.1.5, VI.2.1, VI.7.1. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

Capacity or potency; the context distinguishes active power from receptive possibility. Potential bodily points cannot be privileged as a cognitive subject; matter’s infinite potency

is receptivity subject to God. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.10.2, VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

potentia ad non esse. Printed forms: *potentia ad esse pariter atque non esse*; *potentia ad non esse*; *potentiam ad non esse*.

Capacity not to be, or material openness to both being and nonbeing as a given thing. The retained potency of prime matter explains a lion’s corruptibility; the soul lacks that kind of material ground. References: V.12.1, V.12.2, V.12.5, V.12.6. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

potentia susceptiva. Printed forms: *potentia*; *potentia aliqua susceptiva*; *potentiae*; *potentiam*.

A receptive capacity underlying an act. Essence is analogically receptive of being without being bodily matter open to a contrary form. References: V.5.9, V.11.1. See Spiritual matter and identity.

potentia; actus. Printed forms: *actu*; *potentia*.

Potentiality and actuality. Soul makes the potentially living body actually living; this formal role is not merely adding another bodily component. References: VI.7.1. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

potentior / melior. Printed forms: *melior*; *meliora*; *melius*; *Potentior*; *potentior*; *potentiora*; *potentiorem*.

More powerful and better in the hierarchy of forms. The final argument links strength to formal excellence, not to greater local magnitude or swelling bulk. References: V.13.5, V.15.8, V.15.21, V.15.25, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

potestas. Printed forms: *potestas*; *potestate*; *potestatem*; *potestati*.

Power or control over an action or another being. The coercion analysis asks what a stronger mind can actually control and through what dependence. References: V.15.21, V.15.22. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

potissimum; partim. Printed forms: *partim*; *potissimum*.

Principally and in part, specifying the scope of a proof. Natural power principally rules out body and only partly a divided form; later stages have further work to do. References: VI.3.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

praeceptor; sophista. Printed forms: *magistram*; *praeceptoribus*; *sophistis*.

Teacher, sophist and mistress or instructor. Natural power and two senses are inadequate teachers of soul’s essence; mind becomes the alternative instructor. References: VI.2.2. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

praeparatio / pedisequa. Printed forms: *pedisequae*; *Praeparationes*.

Preparations and attendants, describing discourse’s relation to realized knowledge. Many words and thoughts can lead to or accompany a simple act without becoming bodily parts of that act. References: VIII.4.11. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

praescribere / ordinare / vagari. Printed forms: *ordinare*; *praescribi*; *rationaliter*; *vagantur*.

To prescribe, order and move without a determinate direction or limit. Qualities lacking an organism’s definite plan require an agent to direct them to its proper shape and growth. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

praesens / absens. Printed forms: *absentia*; *praesentia*.

Present and absent relative to the perceiver. The ability to think an absent object tests the difference between retained content and a transient surface appearance. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

praesentia. Printed forms: *praesens*; *praesentia*; *praesentiam*.

Presence, especially essence’s actual occurrence in the world or truth’s abiding presence. The comet’s being is actual presence; the dream passage contrasts sensory succession with everlasting rational presence. References: V.7.1, V.14.1, V.15.24. See Time, memory and expectation.

praesentia / absentia. Printed forms: *absens*; *absente*; *adsit*; *praesens*; *praesente*; *praesentia*.

Being present or absent to a bodily event or member. Whole presence is used to explain awareness without abandonment of other living members; it must not be reduced to spatial filling. References: VII.5.1, VII.5.2, VII.6.1. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

Presence or absence of the original bodily object to the faculty’s activity. Sight needs Plato present, whereas imagination can retain and combine his features when he is absent. References: VIII.1.1. See Four stages of cognition.

praesentire / praesentia. Printed forms: *praesentiat*.

To apprehend something immediately as present. The whole judging soul perceives the event without an intermediary, then directs assistance to the injured part. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

praestans; excellens; nobilis. Printed forms: *excellentiore*; *excellentius*; *nobilius*; *praestantior*; *praestantiores*; *praestantissima*; *praestantius*.

Superior, more excellent or nobler in the relevant hierarchy. These comparative judgements support priority of correcting reason, ruling soul and indivisibility; they do not simply mean larger physical size. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.22, VI.6.4, VI.6.5, VI.7.3. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

praestantior / sublimior. Printed forms: *praestantius*; *sublimius*.

More excellent and higher in rank. The causal argument connects excellence with freedom from matter; it is a metaphysical premise, not a measurement of physical energy. References: VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

praestare vitam / vitalis. Printed forms: *praestat*; *vitalem*; *vitam*.

To bestow life and make living. Soul gives spirit life and motion before governing the larger body through that medium. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

praeteritum / futurum / praesens. Printed forms: *futurum*; *praesenti*; *praeteritum*; *temporis*.

Past, future and present as related objects of a single intellectual regard. Mind gathers flowing temporal parts in thought; this does not make past events physically simultaneous with present ones. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

primo moveri. Printed forms: *primo*; *primo moventur*; *primo movetur*.

Moving primarily, with causal or hierarchical priority rather than simply earlier on a clock. Primary self-motion supports freedom from an outside mover and, in V.5, independence from matter. References: V.1.1, V.5.8. See Motion and substantial stability.

primum / deinde / prius / secundo. Printed forms: *deinde*; *postquam*; *Primum*; *primum*; *Prius*; *prius*; *secundo*.

First, next and prior, marking explanatory or cognitive order that may differ from chronology. Universal knowledge precedes reflective particular knowledge; life precedes intelligence in the final proof. A sequence of reasons is not automatically a temporal production story. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.10.1, VIII.16.4. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

primum lumen. Printed forms: *illuminatum*; *obscurum*; *primum lumen*.

First light, illuminated and dark. The analogy distinguishes source from derivative illumination, just as soul is distinguished from what receives animation. References: VI.5.3. See Animation, first light and regress.

primum principium. Printed forms: *primum principium*.

First principle, source or ground. In the argument of V.10 this names the same divine source called the first cause; it does not introduce an additional entity. References: V.10.1, V.10.2. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

primus / prior. Printed forms: *prima*; *primam*; *primum*; *primus*; *prius*.

First or prior, which may mean causal or natural priority rather than earlier clock-time. The first actuality, first matter and first gift belong to different relations; the reader must retain the noun and argumentative scope. References: V.1.1, V.4.1, V.12.13, V.13.4. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

principale propositum. Printed forms: *principali*; *proposito*; *ut ita loquar*.

A guiding or primary intention, qualified by ‘so to speak.’ The immediate divine work ought to resemble its agent; this phrase is not a technical substitute for First Cause. References: V.5.2. See Four causes and graded dependence.

principalis / agens principale. Printed forms: *causa principali*; *principali agente*; *principalis agentis*.

Principal or chief; a principal agent directs an operation in contrast to its instrument. Soul rather than heat determines the figure and limit of growth. The creative-instrument proposal in V.13 is rejected because an instrument acts upon a subject through motion and time. A principal agent in one operation need not be the first cause of all being. References: V.13.14, VII.8.1. See First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

principalis agens. Printed forms: *principalis agentis*.

The principal agent in a proposed instrumental operation. This relative causal term in the angel-as-instrument objection must not automatically be equated with the absolute title First Cause. References: V.13.14. See Instrument and creative mediation.

principium / finis. Printed forms: *fine*; *finem*; *finis*; *principia*; *principiis*; *Principio*; *principio*; *principium*.

Beginning or principle and end, with temporal scope in the soul’s duration alternative. Ficino allows either no beginning and no end or a beginning without an end; the proof does not require preexistence. References: V.13.17. See Creation and generation.

Source or principle, and end or goal; priority and return connect them without making them spatial pieces. Mind is its operation’s source and end; divine infinity recalls dependent minds from an infinite principle toward an infinite end. References: VIII.2.7,

VIII.4.12, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.4. See Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

principium alimenti. Printed forms: *anima nutritiva*; *principium alimenti*.

A source of nourishment; the nutritive soul. The power explaining living growth is distinguished from the matter common to growing and nongrowing bodies. References: VI.4.1, VI.4.2. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

prior; posterior. Printed forms: *posterior*; *posterius*; *primo*; *primum*; *prior*; *priorem*; *prius*.

Prior and posterior, first or primary, with causal and temporal senses distinguished locally. The geometric point's qualified priority, the cause's prior possession of act and the impossibility of finite self-generation are different uses of priority. References: VI.2.10, VI.2.19, VI.5.3, VI.12.10, VI.12.14, VI.13.9. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

prisci theologi. Printed forms: *Aglaophemus*; *Mercurius*; *Orpheus*; *Plato*; *prisci theologi*; *Pythagoras*; *Zoroaster*.

The ancient theologians Ficino names as teaching the fifth position. The list supplies an attributed tradition of incorporeal soul; Mercurius is translated Hermes. References: VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris. Printed forms: *defectus*; *mala*; *malis*; *noxia*; *privationes*; *salubria*.

Privatio is a lack, defectus a defect, and malum an evil. Noxius means harmful and salubris wholesome or beneficial; the printed neuter plurals noxia and salubria characterize what is known. Their becoming intellectual goods does not declare the original harms morally good; it contrasts knowing an evil with undergoing it. References: VIII.13.2. See Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

pro viribus. Printed forms: *pro viribus*.

As far as its powers permit. Natural self-preservation and production of likeness are bounded by an agent's actual capacity, not asserted as unlimited achievements. References: V.4.6, V.8.3, V.8.4. See Reception and the receiver.

probabile. Printed forms: *probabile*.

Probable or reasonable, Ficino's local assessment rather than a calculated statistical value. The phrase qualifies one inference from everlasting bodies to everlasting souls within the three-gifts argument. References: V.15.4. See Soul as universal bond.

probabilis; affirmare. Printed forms: *affirmari*; *probabile*.

Probable or plausible; to establish or assert positively. The human soul's location in the third grade is initially only probable, not already demonstrated by the general immortality proof. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

procella / tempestas. Printed forms: *procella*; *tempestate*.

A storm, metaphor for conflicting bodily qualities. The soul stands above the elemental storm, while forms contracted to body are disturbed by it. References: V.5.9, V.7.2. See Passivity and bodily affection.

procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus. Printed forms: *aquilino*; *fronte*; *glaucis*; *humeris*; *ore*; *procero*; *supercilio*; *voce*.

The concrete visual and auditory attributes gathered in Plato's recognizable portrait. Tall body, broad forehead and shoulders, grey eyes, brow, aquiline nose, small mouth and pleasant voice illustrate the sensory ingredients of the composite image. References: VIII.1.1. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

producere / gignere / generare. Printed forms: *generare*; *generat*; *genuit*; *gigneret*; *gignit*; *producere*; *producit*; *productus*.

To bring forth, beget or generate, whose mechanism depends on the subject and context. A natural agent uses prior material resources, while soul's simple origin is argued to be creation; the verb alone does not collapse this distinction. References: V.4.3, V.4.8, V.8.2, V.13.1, V.13.4, V.13.5, V.14.7. See Creation and generation.

proficere / crescere / decrescere. Printed forms: *crescente*; *Crescente*; *crescimus*; *crescit*; *Decrescente*; *decrescimus*; *Proficit*; *proficit*.

Advancing, growing and diminishing, whose quantitative or qualitative mode matters. Body may grow while mind stagnates, or body may decline while soul advances; intellectual reception can perfect without enlargement. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.2. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

progredi / servire. Printed forms: *progrediendi*; *servitura*.

To advance or move from place to place, and serve a power's use. An animal requires organs of locomotion and sensation as well as nutrition; their formation cannot be assigned to a merely nutritive maker for a later soul. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body's craftsman.

progressio in infinitum. Printed forms: *in infinitum*; *progressio*.

An endless explanatory regress. Ficino refuses an infinite sequence of further forms or conditional acts of being without a first ground. References: V.9.1, V.9.3. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

proles. Printed forms: *prolem*; *proles quaedam*.

Offspring, literal and figurative. A natural impulse is called offspring of essence and being and is therefore supposed to accord with its source. References: VI.12.14. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

proles / parturire. Printed forms: *parit*; *parturiet*; *procreabit*; *prolem*.

Offspring, birth and begetting as causal-likeness images. Natural agents generate within their kind; intellectual conception likewise produces content suited to mind's nonbodily nature. References: VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

propagare / propagatio. Printed forms: *propagandae*; *propagatione*; *propagationem*; *propaget*.

To propagate or communicate one's nature through production. Natural agents produce likenesses rather than aim at sheer nothingness; an eternal spiritual form has no reproductive need to consume its recipient. References: V.4.6, V.6.1, V.8.3. See Reception and the receiver.

propinquitas / naturae ordo. Printed forms: *naturae ordine*; *naturali ordine*; *propinquitas*.

Nearness and the order of nature, marking causal rank rather than physical adjacency. Soul receives form more immediately than body and communicates it downward while remaining itself. References: V.15.25, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

proportio. Printed forms: *proportio*; *proportione*; *proportionem*.

Proportion or commensurability. Nothing has no proportion to being, so Ficino argues that only power not proportioned to finite powers can create. References: V.13.6. See Creation and generation.

propositio / docere. Printed forms: *docet*; *propositione*; *propositionem*.

Proposition and its power to make another proposition known. Ficino models scientific connectedness on teaching and inferential possession, retaining the active ‘what he teaches’ in the source reading. References: VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

propositum. Printed forms: *proposito*; *propositum*.

A stable purpose or plan encompassing the whole work. It coexists in mind with present attention, past memory and future expectation while the external work unfolds successively. References: V.5.2, V.15.5. See Time, memory and expectation.

proprium. Printed forms: *propria*; *proprium*.

What belongs specifically to a faculty or kind. The proper object of one sense does not exhaust reality, and the rational power proper to humanity motivates the next argument. References: VI.2.8, VI.2.9. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

proprius. Printed forms: *propria*; *propriae*; *propriam*; *proprie*; *proprio*; *proprium*; *proprius*.

Proper or characteristic, either exclusive to an individual or belonging to a thing’s nature. A bodily instance restricts humanity to this person’s embodiment, whereas mind’s proper activity can be universal; in technical definitions proprie marks a narrower usage. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.11, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.2, VIII.10.1, VIII.12.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

proprius / communis. Printed forms: *commune*; *communi*; *communis*; *propria*; *propriae*; *propriam*; *proprium*.

Proper to a specified nature and common across specified bearers. Fire’s proper being, the composite’s common being and being common to all are different scopes; the adjective alone must not settle the referent. References: V.1.1, V.4.6, V.8.2, V.11.8, V.13.2. See Participation, common and proper.

proprius / intimus / alienior. Printed forms: *alienior*; *intima*; *Propria*; *propria intimaque*.

Proper and inward, contrasted with more foreign. Ficino ranks psychic discord as closer to soul than humoral discord and argues from the former’s failure to destroy soul to the latter. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul’s persistence.

proprius; communis. Printed forms: *communem*; *communi*; *communis*; *propria*; *propriae*; *propriam*; *propriis*; *proprium*; *proprius*.

Proper or specific to a thing, contrasted with common or shared. The inquiry moves from common immortality to arguments proper to human soul, and from matter common to bodies to a proper life-giving cause. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.9, VI.4.1, VI.4.4, VI.7.1, VI.12.18. See Three offices and the order of proof.

prospicere / effingere / fingere. Printed forms: *effingendam*; *effingeremus*; *fingimus*; *finximus*; *prospeximus*.

Foreseeing a concept to be made and then fashioning it. The argument presupposes access to some incorporeal mode before it attempts to show that soul belongs there; it does not create an external soul from nothing. References: VIII.10.2. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

prospicere / intueri / excogitare. Printed forms: *excogitare*; *excogitato*; *intueri*; *prospexeris*.

To look at, behold or conceive through thought. The passage moves from inspecting a visible reflection to conceiving bodies beyond any assigned magnitude. References: VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

provenire. Printed forms: *proveniat*.

To arise or result from composition. The proposed new whole-nature is an objection, not Ficino’s own explanation of soul’s origin. References: VI.12.9. See Integrity of the whole.

proxime. Printed forms: *proxima*; *proximae*; *proxime*.

Immediately or most nearly in causal order, not necessarily in space. The nearest effect resembles its source most; direct creation of soul is contrasted with life mediated through soul. References: V.5.2, V.13.16, V.13.17, V.13.18. See Creation and generation.

pulchritudo / bonitas. Printed forms: *bonitas*; *bonitatem*; *bonitatis*; *pulchritudinem*; *pulchritudinis*; *Pulchritudo*; *pulchritudo*.

Beauty and goodness as recognized perfections, then as common intelligible natures. Phantasy judges this beautiful or good Plato; intellect reaches the common account beyond this person’s circumstances. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

pullulare; delitescere. Printed forms: *delitescit*; *pullulat*.

To spring forth and lie hidden. The whole animal’s emergence is taken to show that complete seminal power was present in the small source. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

punctum. Printed forms: *puncta*; *Puncta*; *punctis*; *puncto*; *punctorum*; *punctum*; *Punctum*.

A point, the indivisible boundary invoked in the contact argument. If only a point touches the indivisible, the divisible body as such is not the contacting term. References: V.6.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

A nonextended limit of magnitude; it is not an independently actual microscopic body. The three-point dilemma shows why juxtaposed points cannot supply extension or an independent bodily seat for intelligence. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.5.1. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

punctum / linea. Printed forms: *linea*; *lineae*; *lineam*; *punctum*.

An indivisible point and an extended line used as rival models. The a–b model asks whether separate or shared access at endpoints can explain one comparison. A point is not thereby identified with soul. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

punctum lucidum. Printed forms: *punctum aliquod lucidum*.

A luminous point within a privileged qualitative and bodily seat. The third position makes it govern other members from heart or brain, preserving local dependence despite its apparent purity. References: VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

pura potentia. Printed forms: *prima informisque potentia*; *pura potentia*.

Pure receptive potency without a form proper to itself. Prime matter stands opposite God as pure act and receives forms without possessing their opposed qualities by its own nature. References: V.4.1, V.4.9. See Prime matter and enduring support.

purificare; purus. Printed forms: *pura*; *puram*; *Purificentur*.

To purify and to be free from bodily or vicious admixture in the relevant act. The discipline is offered as a change in conditions of cognition, not as a physical procedure for removing the body. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

purus / crassus / terrenus. Printed forms: *crasso*; *purissima*; *terreno*.

Pure, gross and earthly as terms marking distance between soul and body. Their opposition motivates a mediating spirit rather than a direct equivalence of soul and bodily material. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

purus / unus / stabilis (intellectual consideration). Printed forms: *pura*; *stabilia*; *unum*.

Pure, one and stable as ways in which intellect considers objects otherwise impure, many or moving. Mind distinguishes mixed qualities under their proper accounts, understands many humans under one species, and gathers past and future with the present. These contrasts concern intellectual apprehension; they do not make material things physically pure, numerically one or motionless. References: VIII.14.1. See Mind’s transformation of material conditions.

pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus. Printed forms: *hebes*; *obliviosa*; *pusillanimis*.

Small-souled, dull and forgetful. Literal smallness of soul is made to yield absurd mental consequences under the bodily-quantity hypothesis. References: VI.13.2. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

putare; existimare; arbitrari. Printed forms: *arbitrantes*; *arbitretur*; *existimabit*; *existimabunt*; *existimant*; *existimet*; *existimo*; *putamus*; *putanda*; *putant*; *putaret*; *putas*.

To think, judge or suppose, with degrees of commitment determined by context. Ficino’s judgements, ancient attributions and the mistaken beliefs of shadow-viewers use these verbs differently; none automatically means an established demonstration. References: VI.1.2, VI.2.1, VI.2.3, VI.2.4, VI.2.9, VI.2.13, VI.2.14, VI.2.15, VI.8.6, VI.11.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

puteus; fundus. Printed forms: *fundo putei*; *puteum*.

A well and its bottom. The boy standing above mistakes his shadow below for his own position; the direction of dependence drives the analogy. References: VI.2.4. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

Pythagoras. Printed forms: *Pythagorae*.

Pythagoras as Ficino's named authority for an argument from the sphere's lack of beginning and end. Ficino says he passes over the argument while briefly reporting it; the attribution is not an independently checked quotation. References: V.1.4. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

qua ratione. Printed forms: *alia quadam ratione*; *qua corpus est*.

In virtue of being body or in virtue of a different explanatory account. The repeated test distinguishes what belongs to corporeality as such from the source of animal life. References: VI.5.4. See Animation, first light and regress.

qua ratione / quatenus. Printed forms: *qua ratione*; *quatenus*.

Insofar as, or under the particular account specified. Mind as mind, humanity as humanity and a form as universal are aspectual claims; their qualifiers prevent conclusions from being generalized to every respect. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.4.10, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

quadrangularis / circularis. Printed forms: *circularis*; *linea*; *quadrangularis*.

Four-angled and circular, applied to a hypothetical line whose order changes. The comparison concerns increased evenness without greater length, illustrating nonquantitative perfection. References: VIII.2.4. See Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

quaerere / interrogare / percontari. Printed forms: *interrogabimus*; *interrogat*; *percontamur*; *quaeremus*; *quaerit*; *sciscitabimur*.

Asking, interrogating and pressing a question through alternatives. The repeated questions organize dialectical tests of a bodily intellect and distinguish successive hypotheses rather than merely adding rhetorical ornament. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.7. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

quaerere; interrogare; percontari. Printed forms: *interrogate*; *interroges*; *interrogo*; *percontabor*; *percontandum*; *percontatus*; *quaeram*; *quaeras*; *quaere*; *Quaeremus*; *quaeritur*; *rogaretur*; *rogaveris*; *sciscitabimur*; *sciscitamur*.

To seek or question, with interrogation of faculties and opponents as distinct uses. The soul searches for itself, questions sense and mind, and tests a philosophical account through alternatives; inquiry is not itself endorsement of an answer. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.3, VI.4.4, VI.5.2, VI.5.4, VI.6.3, VI.6.4, VI.11.1. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

qualitas. Printed forms: *qualitas*; *Qualitas*; *qualitate*; *qualitatem*; *qualitates*; *Qualitates*; *qualitati*; *qualitatibus*; *qualitatis*; *qualitatum*.

Quality, a form or power inhering in a subject and, when bodily, extended and altered with it. Quality has three causes in V.5's analysis and serves as an instrument of natural action; it is not automatically a moral quality. References: V.3.1, V.4.10, V.5.3, V.5.4, V.5.9, V.14.9. See Four causes and graded dependence.

A determination qualifying an underlying body. The second theory replaces bodily bulk by a quality spread through it; the third localizes a point belonging to that quality. References: VI.1.3, VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

A characterizing quality whose mode of inherence matters for the subject possessing it. A divisible body's quality is spatially distributed; indivisible virtue is therefore used to

establish a nonbodily subject. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.8, VIII.10.2, VIII.14.1. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

qualitas / affectio corporis. Printed forms: *affectionem corporis*; *qualitas*; *qualitatem*; *qualitati*.

A bodily quality or condition, in the Platonist terminology adopted here. Chapter 7 announces arguments specifically against soul as a diffused bodily form, beyond the earlier rejection of body itself. References: VII.7.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

quantitas. Printed forms: *quantitas*; *quantitate*; *quantitatem*; *quantitati*; *quantitatis*.

Quantity, the bodily extension through which parts and division arise. Matter precedes quantity in the order of dependence, and soul lacks the quantitative parts whose dissolution could destroy a body. References: V.3.1, V.4.5, V.4.6, V.5.9. See Prime matter and enduring support.

Quantity or measured extent, different from an intelligible account and from intensity of perfection. The soul does not become larger through virtue; the account of quantity itself is whole in different amounts and is not another extended quantity. References: VIII.2.4, VIII.2.7, VIII.3.7, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.12, VIII.6.1, VIII.9.1. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

quantitas / dimensio. Printed forms: *dimensionibus*; *quantitas*; *quantitate*; *quantitatis*.

Bodily quantity and the dimensions composing extended size. The book repeatedly asks whether quantitative extension is necessary to acuity or one comprehension; inward power is not equated with a smaller bodily piece. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

quantitas; qualitas. Printed forms: *qualitas*; *qualitatem*; *qualitates*; *qualitatibus*; *qualitatis*; *quantitate*; *quantitatem*; *quantitatis*.

Quantity as measurable extent and quality as determination. Body’s extension differs from the qualities it bears; rejecting one soul-body model does not automatically refute quality or temperament models. References: VI.1.3, VI.1.4, VI.2.2, VI.4.4, VI.6.4, VI.8.3, VI.8.5, VI.13.8. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

quantitate protendi. Printed forms: *indivisibilis*; *quantitate protenditur*.

Being extended quantitatively, contrasted with indivisibility. The whole’s integrity either inherits bodily difficulties or concedes the incorporeal reality sought. References: VI.12.9. See Integrity of the whole.

quantum; quatenus; respectus. Printed forms: *prout*; *quanto*; *quantum*; *Quantum*; *tanto*; *tantum*.

Insofar as, as much as, and according as: measures of degree or qualifying respect. The spirit/body analogies and soul’s different functions require the specified respect; a comparison of power is not necessarily a comparison of spatial size. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.8, VI.2.20, VI.12.17, VI.12.19. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

quatenus / eatenus. Printed forms: *eatenus*; *quatenus*.

Insofar as and to that extent, correlating a condition with what follows. A thing remains in being insofar as it relates to the source; soul’s self-adherence is used to explain its continuous act. References: V.9.2, V.10.1. See Relation and continuing dependence.

quatuor elementa. Printed forms: *essentia, esse, virtute et actione*; *quatuor elementa*.

The qualified fourfold constituents of a creature: essence, being, power and action. The Pythagorean label is analogical and includes spirits; it does not assert literal elemental matter in soul. References: V.13.7. See Creature, power and operation.

quies / valitudo / consensio. Printed forms: *consensione*; *quiete*; *valitudinis*.

Quiet activity, health and coordinated agreement. The soul already animates cohering organs in quiet health before a stimulus increases its attention. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

quiescere. Printed forms: *quiescendo*; *quiescere*; *quiescit*.

To rest or remain settled. Rest in Ideas is the proposed fulfillment of natural ascent; matter by contrast never rests permanently under one determinate form. References: V.12.2, V.12.13, V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

quinque capita. Printed forms: *quinque capita*.

Five principal headings under which different theories are reduced. The reduction aims at exhaustive alternatives; it does not identify each heading with one uniform historical school. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

quintum corpusculum. Printed forms: *quintum aliquod tenuissimumque corpusculum*.

A fifth exceptionally subtle body beyond the four elements. The proposed escape repeats the problem of whether matter or a superadded power explains animation. References: VI.6.3. See Dense, subtle and fifth body.

quodammodo. Printed forms: *quodammodo*.

In a certain respect or manner, explicitly qualifying a proposition. It limits claims about matter’s priority, soul’s inclination and the mode in which contraries or analogies are predicated. References: V.5.5, V.12.2, V.12.3, V.14.3. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

In a certain manner or respect, limiting an identification. Soul is called subtle heaven only under the comparison, not asserted to be literally an extended celestial body. References: VI.2.24. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar. Printed forms: *quasi*; *quodammodo*; *ut ita dixerim*; *ut ita loquar*.

In a certain manner, as if, and if one may speak so: qualifications of an image or claim. They moderate phantasy’s incorporeality, mind’s infinitude and several spatial metaphors, rather than licensing their removal in summary. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.5.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.3. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

quodammodo; quasi. Printed forms: *quasi corrumpit*; *quodammodo*; *ut ita dixerim*.

In a manner, so to speak, as though corrupting. These stacked qualifications constrain the psychic analogues of generation and corruption rather than asserting literal self-creation or destruction. References: VI.12.20. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

radius. Printed forms: *radiis*.

A ray, the sun’s means of acting upon the sea in the historical account. The rays introduce the vapor/air example used to test whether natural change can annihilate its substrate. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

radix essendi. Printed forms: *essendi radicem*; *radicem essendi*.

A root or first ground of being. The repeated conditional ‘while it is’ cannot, Ficino argues, replace an actual explanatory ground with endless qualification. References: V.9.3. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

radix; germen; ramus. Printed forms: *germine*; *radice*; *ramis*; *ramos*.

Root, shoot and branches. The growing and pruned tree contrasts the small receiving site with the wide reach of vegetative soul’s effects. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

raptus caelorum. Printed forms: *raptu caelorum*.

The sweep or rapid carrying motion of the heavens. Ficino’s historical cosmology explains intensified variation in elemental bodies by celestial motion. References: VI.8.2. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

rarefacere; condensare. Printed forms: *rarefacit, condensat*.

To rarefy and condense. Soul’s contrary operations are later distinguished from its analogical mental rarefaction and condensation. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

rarefactio. Printed forms: *rarefactione*.

Rarefaction, a thinning associated with ascent through the elements. Matter acquires the fire form without becoming a different underlying subject. References: V.4.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

ratio. Printed forms: *ratio*; *ratione*; *rationem*; *rationes*; *rationibus*; *rationis*.

Reason, an explanatory account or aspect, an argument, and in appropriate settings a formative pattern. Correcting reason in VI.2 differs from qua ratione in the causal tests and the inward craftsman’s rationes; these senses cannot all be replaced by rational thought. References: VI.1.1, VI.2.7, VI.2.8, VI.5.4, VI.5.5, VI.13.9. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

ratio (account or principle). Printed forms: *Ratio*; *ratio*; *rationem*; *rationes*; *Rationes*; *rationibus*.

An intelligible account, defining principle or explanatory structure of a thing. The common account of humanity and the complete account of a circle are not extended like particular humans or circles. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.2.7, VIII.16.3. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

ratio (additional inflections). Printed forms: *ratione*; *rationibus*; *rationis*.

Reason, account or intelligible principle according to its governing construction. A reasoned proof, a universal object’s account and the phrase ‘insofar as’ are not interchangeable senses; the local syntax decides. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.13, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.3. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

ratio (reasoning power). Printed forms: *ratio*; *Ratio*.

Reason as the judging or directing intellectual power, rather than an object’s account. Reason directs courageous action, determines the content of moral choice and judges truths beyond the competence of a particular sense. References: VIII.2.3, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.5. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

ratio / definitio. Printed forms: *definitio*; *definitione*; *definitionem*; *ratio*; *ratione*; *rationem*; *rationes*; *rationibus*; *rationis*; *rationum*.

Ratio can name an argument or reason, a defining account, or an intelligible principle; definitio specifically supplies the defining account. These senses are not interchangeable. V.7.1 uses ratio with definitio for the comet's defining account. The additional exact attestations in the earlier proofs use reason or argument, while later rationes can name stable intelligible principles. The context, not the shared spelling, controls the sense. References: V.1.1, V.5.5, V.7.1, V.13.18, V.15.15. See Comets and defining accounts.

ratio / transcendere. Printed forms: *rationem*; *transcendit*.

Reason as the power going beyond bodily quantity. The chapter reserves its fuller treatment for later and distinguishes it from the senses whose objects remain bodily. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

ratio animae. Printed forms: *rationem animae*.

The defining account of soul. It differs from concord's bare account once the theory needs a special further determination to distinguish living harmony. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

ratio as argument. Printed forms: *argumentatione*; *argumentationibus*; *disputationis*; *rationibus*.

A reasoned argument or proof, distinct from a proportion or rational faculty. The book marks its transition from earlier arguments to proofs proper against a bodily form, and then tests the consequences of suppositions. References: VII.1.1, VII.7.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

ratio compositionis / proportio. Printed forms: *compositionis rationes*; *proportione*; *proportionem*; *proportiones*; *ratio*; *rationem*.

A determinate ratio or proportion among bodily constituents. Different tissues have different proportions; identifying each proportion with a soul would divide one living being into many souls. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

ratio secum vivens. Printed forms: *ratio secum ipsa vivens*.

Reason living with itself in inward intellectual activity. This describes pure soul seeking truth, distinguished from angelic intellect already enjoying infused light. References: VI.2.10. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

rationalis. Printed forms: *rationalemque*; *rationali*; *rationalique*; *rationalis*.

Rational, belonging to reason or governed by its direction. It differentiates the human species, qualifies steady moral appetite and describes self-returning life; those uses share rational form without becoming the same argument. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.10, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

rationalitas / animalitas. Printed forms: *animalitas*; *rationalitas*; *Rationalitas*.

Rationality and animality, conceptually distinct but united in the human form. Rationality is described as animality actualized in reason, not a second spatial thing attached to a nonrational bodily piece. References: VIII.4.10. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

rationes et semina. Printed forms: *rationes et semina*.

Formative patterns and seeds for arranging members. These reside in the stable maker and explain recurrent shaping of fresh humours and flesh. References: VI.13.9. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

rationis oculus. Printed forms: *rationis oculo*.

The eye of reason, a metaphor for rational apprehension of intelligible reality. Ficino contrasts what reason beholds with what the senses perceive and argues against treating reason’s objects as nonexistent. This metaphorical eye differs from the actual owl’s eye used later in the unit to compare difficulty of seeing with difficulty of understanding. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye.

recipere; accipere. Printed forms: *acceperat*; *accepistis*; *accepit*; *accipimus*; *accipit*; *recipit*.

To receive or take in. Reception of bodily images, reception of contrary mental states and reception of being are different relations; their shared verb does not make every reception material passion. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.7.3, VI.12.6, VI.13.6. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

recolligere. Printed forms: *recolligit*.

To gather back together into oneself. Circular motion conserves rather than dissipates its powers by gathering what belongs to it into its own circuit. References: V.1.4. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

rectrix; motrix; pedisequa. Printed forms: *motrixque*; *pedisequa corporis*; *rectrix*.

Ruler, mover and the body’s handmaid. The soul governs and is not a dependent attendant deriving its being from the body it moves. References: VI.7.3. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

rectum; obliquum; circulus. Printed forms: *In circulum*; *In obliquum*; *in rectum*.

Straight, oblique and circular psychic directions. They map respectively outward/bodily attention, self or angel, and God as beginning and end in the second scheme. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

rectus / reflexus. Printed forms: *rectam lineam*; *reflexam*.

Direct and reflected, two proposed routes of bodily contact or disturbance. Ficino excludes both direct reception of a contrary and indirect capture by qualities raging in body. References: V.6.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

reddere. Printed forms: *redderetur*; *reddit*.

Making or rendering something a certain way, with the result specified by its complement. Bodily form makes a recipient materially like its source, while mind makes represented content simple or turns knowledge of evils into an intellectual good. References: VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.16.2. See Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

redintegrare / confirmare / roborare. Printed forms: *confirmatur*; *redintegratur*; *roboratur*.

To restore wholeness, confirm and strengthen. The sequence makes return to an exemplar a perfection of the derivative act, not absorption into an undifferentiated source. References: V.11.6. See Seal, wax and restoration.

refellere / confutare / redarguere. Printed forms: *confutatum*; *confutatur*; *confutaverimus*; *redarguemus*; *redarguitur*; *refellimus*.

Refuting or exposing an error by its consequences. Each verb appears in renewed attacks on the bodily location, numerical composition or divided knower hypotheses. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.12, VIII.6.1. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

referre / enuntiare. Printed forms: *enuntiat*; *referunt*.

To convey or report an event to another judging station. These verbs belong to the objection of sensory reporting through successive soul-parts, whose adequacy the next unit denies. References: VII.5.2. See Pain, location and reporting.

referre; quiescere. Printed forms: *quiescam*; *referam*.

To refer to a further cause and come to rest at a conclusion. The regress must terminate in a principle animating through itself rather than another animated body. References: VI.5.3. See Animation, first light and regress.

reficere. Printed forms: *refici*; *reficit*.

To restore or refresh after exertion. Sleep’s natural restorative role explains the soul’s yielding to the bodily change in this account. References: V.15.23. See Sleep and dreams.

To fashion afresh. A new shape resembling the former one is made in new flesh, rather than the old shape migrating numerically. References: VI.13.9. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

reflecti. Printed forms: *in se angelumve reflectitur*; *in se ipsam considerandam reflectitur*.

To turn back in consideration of oneself or an angel. The object and argumentative setting distinguish this psychic turning from mechanical bending. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

reflecti / ferri. Printed forms: *feruntur*; *reflectiturque*.

To turn back and to be borne toward a destination. The chain from source, through movement, back to good depicts the directional relation of natural desire and action. References: V.4.7. See Relation and continuing dependence.

reflexio / reflectere. Printed forms: *reflectens*; *reflectit*; *reflexio*; *reflexo*; *reflexum*.

Turning an activity back toward its source or a prior object. The return to a particular image differs from mind’s later inward knowing of its own act; both are nonspatial intellectual returns. References: VIII.1.5, VIII.4.13, VIII.9.1, VIII.15.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

regere / curare. Printed forms: *curando*; *regendo*; *regit*.

Governing and caring for the body. These tasks absorb attention when the body is unwell, explaining impaired inquiry without making bodily food the mind’s proper nourishment. References: VIII.2.5. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

regere / movere. Printed forms: *movetque*; *regit*.

To govern and move. These active relations oppose the later theory that soul is an outcome governed wholly by humors. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

regere; ducere; gubernare. Printed forms: *ducentes*; *ducit*; *ducitur*; *gubernans*; *regendum*; *regeretur*; *regitur*.

To govern, lead or guide. The soul directs body and intellectual activity leads to higher principles; a ruling organ in a reported theory is not the same as soul's unlocated whole presence. References: VI.1.4, VI.2.17, VI.2.19, VI.6.4, VI.9.4, VI.12.17, VI.12.18. See Three offices and the order of proof.

Regnanum; Cavalcantes. Printed forms: *Ioannem Cavalcantem*; *Ioannes*; *Regnano*.

Regnano and Giovanni Cavalcanti, the place and host of the framing conversation. Ficino presents Cavalcanti as his uniquely dear friend and gives him the request that structures Book VI. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

regula / lex. Printed forms: *conderet*; *legem*; *regulam*; *statueret*.

Rule and law, principles established to govern many cases. Their cross-instance scope is the practical evidence that mind does more than picture this single Socrates or Plato. References: VIII.8.1. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

relabi / redundare. Printed forms: *influit*; *profluere*; *redundat*; *relabitur*.

Flowing back, overflowing back, flowing forth and flowing into another. Rational life's return is contrasted with wholly outward expenditure; the contrast does not prohibit all external action. References: VIII.15.3. See Outward flow and rational life's return.

relatio. Printed forms: *relatio*; *relationis*.

Relation, especially the soul's intrinsic orientation to its preserving cause. The adopted reading makes relation the cause of perfection; later witnesses' ratio would change this local articulation. References: V.10.3. See Relation and continuing dependence.

relinquere / dimittere. Printed forms: *dimisso*; *relinquetur*; *relinquit*.

Leaving behind, setting aside or leaving a remainder. Intellect sets aside this determinate man to know humanity; in a rejected bodily model, literal halves of genus would be left in different regions. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.4.6. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

reliquiae sensuum. Printed forms: *reliquias sensuum*.

Remnants or vestiges left by sensory perception. Internal sense revolves these bodily images; their retained presence differs from pure intellectual apprehension. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

reminisci; oblivisci. Printed forms: *obliviscitur*; *reminiscitur*.

To recollect and forget. These supply exemplars of increase and decrease without enlarging or shrinking the soul's substance physically. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

remittere / perficere. Printed forms: *perfecta*; *perfectior*; *perfectissima*; *perficit*; *remittit*.

Weakening or bringing to greater perfection. Unlike a bodily mixture, intellectual reception need not lessen the recipient; it can increase the excellence of the mind's proper operation. References: VIII.7.1, VIII.13.2. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

remus; litus; navis. Printed forms: *litus*; *navis*; *remum*.

Oar, shore and ship, objects in two distinct visual examples. Water makes a straight oar appear crooked; a moving ship makes the shore appear to run. References: VI.2.7. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

renovare. Printed forms: *renovat*.

To renew or restore fresh activity. The apparent failure of circular motion becomes renewal, supporting the image of a self-sustaining circuit. References: V.1.4. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

renovare / renovatio. Printed forms: *cotidianae*; *renovare*; *renovationis*.

Renewal and daily renovation, the activity of intellectual self-perfection. Ficino invokes Paul’s language while explaining how understanding and willing keep mind related to its own formal perfecter. References: VIII.15.2. See Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

renovare; labi. Printed forms: *labitur*; *renovatur*.

To be renewed and slip away. Daily bodily renewal is the proposed model whose inadequacy for enduring personal cognition the chapter tests. References: VI.13.7. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

reperire; invenire. Printed forms: *inveniemus*; *inveniet*; *invenimus*; *invenire*; *inveniri*; *invenistis*; *invenit*; *reperietis*; *reperitur*; *reperiuntur*.

To find or discover in inquiry. The preliminary imaginative exercises announce a discovery pedagogically, while the formal self-motion proof seeks a sufficient first inward source. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.8, VI.2.18, VI.2.20, VI.2.22, VI.12.7, VI.12.17. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

replicare. Printed forms: *replicatur*.

Folding back or repeating an intellectual operation. Ficino allows either a succession of higher-order acts or one act repeatedly returning upon itself; no final level is assigned. References: VIII.15.1, VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

reptilia / secundum Platonicos. Printed forms: *reptilia*; *secundum Platonicos*.

Creeping animals and the explicit attribution to the Platonists. The closing question qualifies the scope of the animal-soul explanation rather than declaring every soul both indivisible and imperishable. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

repugnare / reflectere. Printed forms: *reflectet*; *repugnabit*.

To resist and to turn back upon oneself. Resistance to bodily affect and self-reflection are among the soul’s activities that the humoral-harmony hypothesis cannot explain. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

repugnare; reflecti; definire. Printed forms: *definiret*; *discernere*; *metiri*; *reflecteretur*; *repugnare*.

To resist, reflect upon oneself, define, distinguish and measure. These briefly postponed arguments would show that soul exceeds a necessarily dependent accident; they are not fully developed here. References: VI.7.4. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

res. Printed forms: *re*; *rebus*; *rei*; *rem*; *rerum*; *Res*; *res*.

A thing or reality, whose exact ontological level must be learned from context. The word can refer to a composite, its form, soul or a hypothetical subject; ‘thing’ itself does not settle whether the referent is bodily. References: V.8.3, V.11.1, V.12.1, V.13.1. See Essence and being.

A thing or object under consideration, bodily or incorporeal according to its predicates. The phrase ‘things known’ does not by itself restrict knowledge to bodies, while a thing’s account is distinguished from the particular mode of its material occurrence. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.3.1, VIII.3.2, VIII.3.3, VIII.3.4, VIII.3.5, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7, VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.6.1, VIII.7.1, VIII.8.1, VIII.9.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

resilire; accendere; consumere. Printed forms: *accendant*; *consumant*; *resilientes*.

To rebound, ignite and consume. The sequence describes the concentrated rays’ supposed burning power and supplies an analogy for intensified unity. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

resolutio / divisio. Printed forms: *divisio*; *divisionem*; *resolutio*; *resolutionem*; *resolvendo*; *resolvimus*.

Explanatory analysis and division, distinguished from mutilating a spatial object. The analysis of a composite seeks principles; its stopping point indicates simplicity, whereas unlimited bodily cutting ruins a definition. References: VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.12, VIII.5.2. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

resolvere; deducere. Printed forms: *a causa deducit effectum*; *effectum resolvit in causam*.

To resolve an effect into its cause and derive an effect from a cause. These reciprocal reasonings form one kind of circular activity alongside reflection upon oneself. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

resolvi. Printed forms: *resolvatur*; *resolvi*; *resolvitur*.

To dissolve or resolve into a prior or underlying principle. Ficino tests whether soul could return to matter, a cause or its own essence; no permitted route makes it cease to live. References: V.11.1, V.11.4, V.11.5, V.11.6, V.11.7. See Spiritual matter and identity.

respectus / referri. Printed forms: *referendo*; *Refertur*; *refertur*; *referuntur*; *Referuntur*; *relata*; *respectum*.

Directed relation to a source, and being related through one’s nature or through an intermediary. Bodily forms relate through mobile production, while soul relates through stable essence to God. References: V.10.1, V.10.2, V.10.3. See Relation and continuing dependence.

respicere. Printed forms: *respiciant*; *respiciat*; *respiciunt*; *Respiciunt*.

To look toward or have directed reference to. The visual verb describes formal likeness and a capacity’s orientation to its proper act, rather than literal bodily sight. References: V.10.1, V.13.12. See Relation and continuing dependence.

respondere / fateor / negare. Printed forms: *confiteri*; *Fateantur*; *fatebuntur*; *Negandum*; *negans*; *respondeant*; *respondeatur*.

Answering, admitting and denying in the argumentative exchange. The text forces alternatives from opponents and then uses a conceded union or unity to infer a nonbodily mode of mind. References: VIII.4.2, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.7, VIII.4.9, VIII.10.2. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

retinere / servare. Printed forms: *retinetur*; *servabimus*; *servatur*.

To retain or preserve what would otherwise disappear. The former bodily constitution is not retained after soul departs; preservation of cognitive images and visible light is discussed in other causal contexts. References: VII.1.3, VII.9.2. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

revertere; respicere. Printed forms: *respice*; *revertere*.

To return and look back or beyond. The exhortation moves attention from bodily shadow toward the soul itself, not toward a larger bodily interior. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.6. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

reviviscere. Printed forms: *reviviscunt*.

Reviving or coming to life again. Ficino associates the world’s revival through light with the account attributed to Orphics and Heraclitus; this is part of the soul-light comparison. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

revolutio / orbicularis. Printed forms: *circumeundo*; *circumvolutus*; *orbicularis*; *Revolutio*; *revolvitur*.

Revolution, circular and circling, images of intellectual activity returning to itself. No external acquisition supplies a final resting point; the model concerns inward self-knowledge rather than the literal rotation of a brain or soul. References: VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

revolvere; recolligere. Printed forms: *recolligit*; *revolvit*.

To turn over and gather again. These verbs describe the internal sense’s handling of bodily images, not necessarily the soul’s higher self-reflection. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

rotunditas. Printed forms: *rotunditas*; *Rotunditas*; *rotunditate*; *rotunditatem*.

Roundness, an intrinsic feature of a circle but an acquired feature of shaped wood. The example distinguishes a subject surviving a property loss from a form whose identity includes that property. References: V.9.1. See Necessary predication and the fire objection.

sagacitas / elicere / delitescere. Printed forms: *delitescit*; *eliciantur*; *sagacitatem*.

Acute discernment, drawing out implicit content and lying concealed. An expert can unfold a connected science from a proposition; the vocabulary does not imply that a novice instantly possesses every theorem. References: VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

saltem. Printed forms: *saltem*.

At least, preserving a minimum that the argument claims. A soul with a beginning must at least have no end; this does not establish absence of a beginning. References: V.13.17. See Creation and generation.

saltem futura sit semper. Printed forms: *saltem futura sit semper*.

At least it will always exist hereafter, preserving a weaker temporal conclusion. The alternative prevents an inference that the passage unconditionally proves every mind’s beginningless existence. References: VIII.9.1. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

sanitas / robur / pulchritudo. Printed forms: *pulchritudinem*; *Pulchritudo*; *Robur*; *robur*; *Sanitas*; *sanitatem*.

Health, strength and beauty as bodily perfections. Humoral concord explains health; bones and nerves strength; members and colors beauty in a qualified sense. These do not define soul. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

sapere. Printed forms: *sapiens*; *sapientior*; *sapit*.

Knowing or discerning; the related wisdom vocabulary adds an attained intellectual excellence. Imagination knows only what sense receives or conceives, while the virtue argument denies that greater bulk makes a person wiser. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.3.1. See Four stages of cognition.

sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars. Printed forms: *ars*; *prudentia*; *prudentiam*; *sapientia*; *scientia*.

Wisdom, knowledge, practical discernment and skill as the intellectual virtues enumerated here. Their respective objects are divine things, natural things, civic matters and human works; preserve this local classification rather than imposing another scheme. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.7. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

sapientia; sapiens. Printed forms: *insipientem*; *sapientem*; *sapientia*.

Wisdom, wise and unwise. The deliberately jarring predicates illustrate the difference between a principle and what is qualified through that principle. References: VI.5.2. See Animation, first light and regress.

sapor / odor / aqua. Printed forms: *aquam*; *odores*; *sapores*.

Taste, odor and water as a receiving medium. Their mixture exemplifies penetrating physical qualities whose mingling does not itself provide discriminating judgement. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera. Printed forms: *Iovis*; *Saturni*; *sphaera*; *sphaeram*.

Saturn, Jupiter and their spheres in the inherited cosmological containment model. Saturn’s sphere contains Jupiter’s, not reciprocally; this one-way bodily relation contrasts with minds mutually knowing each other. References: VIII.9.1. See Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres.

saxum; lignum. Printed forms: *ligna*; *lignis aridis*; *saxa*.

Stone and wood, particularly dry or severed materials. They share bodily matter with organisms but lack the same nourishment and growth when detached. References: VI.4.1, VI.4.3, VI.8.7. See Earth, wood and severed stones.

scientia. Printed forms: *scientia*; *Scientia*; *scientiae*; *scientiam*; *scientiarum*; *scientias*.

Settled knowledge; in the plural, distinct sciences or connected bodies of knowledge. It may mean a defining act, a discipline such as geometry, or an alleged part of knowledge whose object must be specified. References: VIII.3.6, VIII.4.1, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

scientia et ignorantia. Printed forms: *cognitu*; *ignarus*; *ignota*; *manifesta*.

Knowing, ignorance and manifestness as contrasts of explanatory access. A specialized sense does not know another sense's object; known bodily composition does not yet reveal the soul's activities or powers. References: VII.2.1, VII.12.1. See Comparison and common sense.

scintilla; flamma. Printed forms: *flamma*; *scintilla*; *scintillam*.

Spark and flame as concentrated source and extended manifestation. The spark stands for soul and the flame for ethereal body, with distinct relations to sensation. References: VI.2.25, VI.2.26. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

scitum / obiectum. Printed forms: *obiecta*; *obiecto*; *obiectum*; *sciti*; *scitum*.

The object known, by reference to which a branch of knowledge is differentiated. If supposed component sciences have the same complete object, they duplicate the whole; if different, their relation to knowledge of the whole remains to be explained. References: VIII.4.8. See Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

sculptor / statua / lapis. Printed forms: *lapide*; *Sculptor*; *statuam*.

A sculptor, statue and stone, illustrating actualization of a prepared material capacity. The stone is already suited to a statue in potency; craft therefore differs from creation with no substrate. References: V.13.5. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

se recipere. Printed forms: *in se recipere*; *in seipsam se recipit*.

To return or withdraw into oneself. Circular return supports material independence; a later hypothetical return of essence into itself is tested as an alleged corruption. References: V.5.8, V.11.7. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

se toto. Printed forms: *se tota*; *se toto*.

With its whole self, describing the undivided knower's reception. The same intellect knows the human body and each limb and can compare them; different isolated knowing parts could not perform that comparison. References: VIII.6.1. See The whole mind and the measure of equality.

secernere. Printed forms: *Secernite*.

To separate or distinguish away. The imperative advances a conceptual light exercise, not a physical operation for extracting an immortal soul. References: VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

secernere / discernere. Printed forms: *discernere*; *Penetrat*; *secernere*.

Separating, discriminating and penetrating into the substance of objects. Mind must distinguish bodily from incorporeal things to perform the comparison, supporting the claim that its mode is not merely bodily. References: VIII.7.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

secundum se. Printed forms: *Secundum se*; *secundum se*; *secundum se ipsam*.

Considered in itself, abstracting from further conditions or support. Essence as such is called immortal, while derivative life is naturally mutable even when continuously maintained in a reported perpetual vehicle. References: V.7.1, V.13.18. See Essence and being.

secundum totam essentiam. Printed forms: *secundum totam sui essentiam*; *totam perficere materiam*.

Through the whole essence, perfecting the whole proper matter. A matter–form composite soul would fail to form through its material part, contradicting the role of proper form. References: VI.7.2. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

sedes. Printed forms: *sede*; *sedes*.

Seat or supporting place, often metaphorical. Soul's essence is called the seat of souls; matter's lack of a deeper seat excludes collapse through removal of external support. References: V.4.6, V.5.9, V.15.2. See Prime matter and enduring support.

sedes / fundamentum. Printed forms: *fundamentum*; *sedem*; *sedes*.

Seat or sustaining basis, in the question of where an intellectual form could exist. The bodily point must be more than a dependent boundary if it is to serve as the independent subject proposed by the opponent. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

segregare / restituere. Printed forms: *restituere*; *restituit*; *Segrega*; *segregat*.

Setting aside or restoring, used of the mind's analytic power. Mind sets aside nonknowing parts in the argument and restores pure intelligible content from admixture in its objects. References: VIII.5.2. See Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

semel. Printed forms: *semel*.

Once, in the claim that God preserves what he has given. It marks the completed bestowal without implying that conservation later becomes causally independent. References: V.4.2. See Relation and continuing dependence.

semen. Printed forms: *semine*.

Seed or generative resource, literal in biological examples and figurative in matter's latent capacity. The restricted products of wheat, millet and human seed establish the limits of natural production. References: V.4.3, V.8.2, V.13.5. See Art and elemental transformation.

semen; incohatio; proportio. Printed forms: *incohatione*; *proportione*; *semine*.

Seed, beginning and proportion as alternative descriptions of latent material preparation. These are the resources from which the fourth account draws its supposed soul; they do not supply the fifth position's causal independence. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

semet ipsum deserere. Printed forms: *deserat semet ipsam*; *se ipsam non deserit*; *se ipsum*.

To abandon oneself, an impossible separation of soul from the source of its own living activity in these arguments. The body's abandonment by life is contrasted with life never abandoning itself. References: V.1.1, V.14.8, V.15.8. See Life and vivification.

semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque. Printed forms: *aliquando*; *diu*; *diutissime*; *numquam*; *quandoque*; *saepe*; *saepenumero*; *semper*; *umquam*.

Always, never, often, sometimes and for a long time: scope of a temporal claim. The essential life always present differs from thought sometimes exercised, while ordinary persistence over time is not identical with absolute immutability. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.7, VI.2.10, VI.2.16, VI.12.12, VI.13.6, VI.13.9. See Vital motion, action and passion.

sempiternus. Printed forms: *sempiterna*; *sempiternae*; *sempiternam*; *sempiternas*; *sempiterno*.

Everlasting, used of life or duration without end. Its application to a soul can allow a beginning, and its application to an ethereal vehicle is within reported Platonist doctrine. References: V.12.15, V.13.18, V.14.9, V.15.3. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

sensus. Printed forms: *sensibus*; *sensum*; *Sensus*; *sensus*; *sensuum*.

Bodily sensation or the sensory faculty, restricted to particular objects and conditions of reception. Sensation requires the presented body, while intellect can compare sensory classes and reach universal accounts; receiving an incorporeal likeness does not erase this difference. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.2.8, VIII.16.1. See Four stages of cognition.

sensus / sentire. Printed forms: *sensum*; *Sensus*; *sensus*; *sentiendi*; *sentient*; *sentire*; *sentiremus*; *sentit*; *sentitur*.

Sensory power, its exercise, or sensing itself according to construction. Chapter 6 distinguishes an enduring capacity from attentive sensing and awareness of that activity; this is not one unchanging use of sensus. References: VII.4.2, VII.6.2, VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

sensus exterior; sensus interior. Printed forms: *interiorem sensum*; *sensum tum exteriorem*.

Outward sensation and inward handling of sensory images. Both act through body, even when internal sense considers residues of absent objects. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

sensus; sentire. Printed forms: *sensu*; *sensum*; *sensus*; *sensuum*; *sentiat*; *sentiendi*; *sentient*; *sentire*; *sentit*; *sentitur*; *sentiunt*.

Sense, sensing and being sensed, with external and internal functions distinguished. Sensation can disclose bodily reality while failing to exhaust what exists; the light exercises distinguish an active sensing source from a sensible manifestation. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.2, VI.2.8, VI.2.13, VI.2.26, VI.3.1, VI.13.1. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

sentire / sensus. Printed forms: *Sensibilia*; *sensibilium*; *sensibus*; *sensum*; *sensus*; *sentiendi*; *sentit*.

Sense and sensing, sensation exercised through bodily organs, contrasted with instrument-free intellection. Sleep closes bodily senses while images persist; irrational life is drawn by presented sensible objects. References: V.6.1, V.14.8, V.15.23, V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

sentire / sentiens / expers sensus. Printed forms: *sentiendi expertes*; *sentiens*; *sentient*; *sentiente*; *sentientem*.

To sense; a sensing subject; absence of sensing capacity. The question is whether non-sensing parts could produce a sensing whole without a superior unifying sentient source. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

sentire; sentiri. Printed forms: *sentientem*; *Sentiet*; *sentietur*.

To sense and to be sensed. A light construed as source of sensation need not itself be a sensible object; the distinction is central to the soul/flame comparison. References: VI.2.23, VI.2.26. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

separabilis. Printed forms: *separabilis*.

Separable, capable of independence from matter. The explicit potentia separabilis qualifies ‘separated’ without denying embodied relation. References: V.5.9. See Inclination and independence.

separare / segregare. Printed forms: *segregari*; *segregat*; *separat*; *separata*; *Separatam*; *separationem*.

Separating or setting apart, intellectually or with respect to mode of life. Mind separates forms from matter and desires a truth-directed life apart from the perishable body; these are metaphysical claims rather than practical instructions. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.5.2. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

separare / seiungere / disiungere. Printed forms: *disiungitur*; *disiunguntur*; *seiuncta*; *seiungitur*; *separari*; *separata*; *separatur*.

To separate or sever, physically, causally or in subsistence according to context. A bodily composite can lose its form; the separate soul cannot be divided from its own essence as if it were an attached part. References: V.4.3, V.7.2, V.8.2, V.8.3, V.8.4, V.15.13, V.15.15. See Form and formal being.

separare; sevocare. Printed forms: *pro viribus*; *separatam*; *Separati*; *sevocare*.

To separate or withdraw, as far as one’s powers permit. The mind is withdrawn from motion, sense, affect and bodily imagination, explaining what “render oneself incorporeal” means here. References: VI.2.10. See Habit, purification and intellectual experiment.

sequi. Printed forms: *sequens*; *sequentibus*; *sequi*; *Sequitur*; *sequitur*.

To follow in inference, causal order or temporal succession. The word can mark a conclusion or the dependence of being on a form’s nature; ‘follows’ must not always be read as later in time. References: V.4.7, V.9.1, V.9.2, V.11.6, V.13.4, V.15.24. See Relation and continuing dependence.

serenus / mobilis. Printed forms: *mobilissimum*; *serenissimum*.

Very clear and very mobile. The qualities of the ear’s airy medium help explain its responsiveness to sound in this physiology. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

servare; non esse. Printed forms: *ad non esse*; *se ipsam servandam*.

Servare means to preserve; non esse means not to be or nonbeing. The opposition grounds the argument against bodily self-corruption and should not be mistaken for a medical denial of self-destructive processes. References: VI.12.14. See Generation, corruption and self-preservation.

si; sin; nisi; licet. Printed forms: *licet*; *nisi*; *quamvis*; *Quamvis*; *si*; *Si*; *Sin*.

If, but if, unless, and although: markers of conditional branches and concessions. The repeated soul-body propositions belong inside tests and reductios; granting a branch temporarily does not endorse its conclusion. References: VI.1.5, VI.2.6, VI.4.4, VI.8.4, VI.9.1, VI.13.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

siccitas. Printed forms: *siccitas*; *siccitatem*.

Dryness, opposed to moisture in the elemental example. Its acquisition during the passage from air to fire shows one quality replacing another without destroying matter. References: V.4.1, V.4.4, V.14.3. See Art and elemental transformation.

sigillum. Printed forms: *sigillo*.

A seal supplying an impressed model. Returning an impression toward complete conformity with its seal restores it, illustrating the soul's confirmation by its Idea. References: V.11.6. See Seal, wax and restoration.

A seal or stamping device. The seal's image cannot be impressed in wax as a figure exceeding its receiver's size. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

significatio / vox. Printed forms: *significatio*; *significationem*; *Significationes*; *significationes*; *vocum*; *vox*.

Meaning and voiced sound. Meanings are transmitted through souls; in the Lucifer analogy, divisible sound plays body while meaning plays soul. References: VII.1.3, VII.5.4. See Lucifer and indivisible meaning.

simia / asinus / ingenium. Printed forms: *asino*; *ingeniosior*; *simia*.

Ape and ass contrasted in ingenuity. This is another counterexample to a necessary positive correlation between bodily bulk and cognitive aptitude. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

similis; idem. Printed forms: *eadem*; *earundem*; *eiusdem*; *idem*; *iisdem*; *simile*; *similem*; *similes*; *similia*; *similis*; *similiter*.

Similar and the same, with the distinction between resemblance and numerical identity decisive locally. Reproduced bodily figures may resemble their predecessors without being numerically identical; the memory argument asks for an enduring receiver, not only a similar successor. References: VI.2.2, VI.8.2, VI.9.1, VI.13.3, VI.13.6, VI.13.9, VI.13.10. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

similitudo. Printed forms: *dissimiles*; *dissimillimas*; *simile*; *similes*; *similis*; *similitudine*; *similitudinem*; *similitudinemque*; *simillima*; *simillimas*.

Likeness, the resemblance by which an image or effect answers to a source. The bronze figure resembles its model, and the relation to God in V.10 is expressed through formal likeness. References: V.8.1, V.10.1. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

Likeness or resemblance, whose role can be representational, causal or comparative. Shared likeness supports comparison, but perfectly similar hypothetical parts create redundancy rather than an articulated account of a whole. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.4.3, VIII.4.4, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.4. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

simplex. Printed forms: *Simplex*; *simplex*; *simplicium*.

Simple, not composed from the sorts of parts relevant to the argument. Prime matter lacks form and quantitative assembly of its own; soul's simplicity excludes material construction, while created essence still receives being. References: V.4.9, V.12.1, V.12.5, V.13.1, V.15.10. See Spiritual matter and identity.

simplex / simplicitas. Printed forms: *simplex*; *simplicem*; *simplices*; *simplici*; *simplicia*; *simplicis*; *simplicitas*; *simplicitate*; *simplicitatem*; *simplicitatis*; *simplicium*.

Simplicity or absence of constitutive division, sometimes expressly under a particular aspect. Ten as ten and humanity as humanity are simple in their defining account; the conclusion must not deny bodily or numerical partition in another respect. References:

VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.2. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

simplex qualitas / forma astricta. Printed forms: *forma istis astricta*; *forma sequens complexionem*; *simplex qualitas*.

A simple quality and a form bound to quality or constitution. The classification does not let a dependent form evade the limits of the qualities it follows. References: VII.7.1. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

simplicitas; constantia. Printed forms: *consistat*; *simplicitatis et constantiae*.

Simplicity and stability in itself. A divided bodily form lacks these in the requisite way and therefore needs an undispersed containing principle. References: VI.8.6. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

simpliciter. Printed forms: *simpliciter*.

Simply or without the further determination this or that; it does not always describe absence of composite parts. In the creation argument esse simpliciter precedes determinate modes in explanatory order. The adverb must not be merged indiscriminately with simplex as material incomposition. References: V.13.3, V.13.5. See Participation, common and proper.

simul. Printed forms: *simul*.

Together or at once. The mind’s unified purpose and temporal orientations contrast with the succession of the moved work; the word does not deny all successive mental operations. References: V.15.5. See Time, memory and expectation.

simul possidere et videre. Printed forms: *simul omnia possident atque vident*.

Possessing and seeing everything together. This differentiates God and angels from temporally discursive soul without making them inactive. References: VI.12.18. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

simul; vicissim; invicem. Printed forms: *invicem*; *simul*; *vicissim*.

Together or simultaneously; in return; reciprocally. Simultaneous knowledge differs from sequential discourse, while reciprocal transformation or part-to-part action is not primary identical self-motion. References: VI.7.2, VI.12.4, VI.12.18. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

simulachrum; resultare. Printed forms: *resultant*; *simulachra*.

A representation carried by walkers; to project or rebound as a shadow. The prisoners confuse the shadow cast by a representation with the thing itself. References: VI.2.14. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

simulacrum. Printed forms: *simulacra*.

An image or likeness, considered here as possibly touching a surface. Surface contact could explain a present appearance on the hypothesis, but not retained thought of an absent object. References: VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

simulacrum / imago / effigies. Printed forms: *effigiem*; *effigies*; *imagines*; *imago*; *simulacro*; *simulacrorum*; *simulacrum*.

A likeness or presented image, distinguishable from the material object and from its intellectual account. Imagination gathers Plato’s portrait, while phantasy identifies whose

image it is and intellect apprehends common nature. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

sincere discernere. Printed forms: *discernet*; *discernimus*; *sincere*.

To distinguish without distortion or admixture. The adverb describes undeceived cognition after ordered preparation, not merely honesty of intention. References: VI.2.15, VI.2.17. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

sine medio. Printed forms: *absque medio*; *nihil inter eam et Deum*; *sine medio*.

Without an intermediary in the relevant causal relation. Soul’s creation and preservation are immediately divine; the claim does not preclude every other kind of superior influence. References: V.12.13, V.13.16, V.13.17. See Creation and generation.

singularis / particularis. Printed forms: *particulare*; *particularem*; *particulares*; *singulares*; *singularis*; *singulas*; *singulis*.

Individualized or restricted to this instance; neither adjective means intrinsically unknowable. Intellect knows particulars through a reflexive return even though its first mode is universal; bodily recipients would particularize their forms. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.8.1. See Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

sinus / gremium. Printed forms: *gremio*; *sinu*; *sinum*.

Bosom or womb, personifying matter’s receptive support. Matter opens to cold and displaces heat; a force entering its womb affects dependent forms but not the separate soul. References: V.9.4, V.14.7, V.14.8. See Prime matter and enduring support.

sistere / subsistere. Printed forms: *sistat*; *sistit*; *subsistat*; *subsistens*; *subsistit*.

To establish or cause to stand, and to subsist or stand in one’s nature. The same sustaining act is described from the divine side as establishing and from the soul’s side as subsisting. References: V.12.1, V.12.11, V.12.12. See Relation and continuing dependence.

sistere; movere; contrahere; extendere. Printed forms: *Sistit, movet, contrahit, extendit*.

To stop, move, contract and extend. The first regulatory pairs exemplify soul’s command over opposed effects rather than possession of one fixed bodily quality. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

Socrates / Plato. Printed forms: *Plato*; *Platonem*; *Platonis*; *Socrates*; *Socratis*.

The observer and observed person in the staged cognitive example. Their familiar relationship permits a shift from visible features to recognition of a friend and pupil, then to the humanity shared by others. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2. See Four stages of cognition.

sol. Printed forms: *Sol*; *sol*; *sole*; *solem*; *soli*; *solis*.

The sun, a natural agent and source of light in these examples. Solar rays thin water, solar formation supplies the fire example, and inseparable light illustrates a proper attendant. References: V.4.1, V.8.2, V.9.1, V.14.6. See Art and elemental transformation.

The sun, a physical light-source or an intelligible analogue according to the passage. Solis in the ray and radiance examples belongs to sun, whereas auribus solis means ears alone; identical printed forms require syntactic disambiguation. References: VI.2.7, VI.2.15, VI.2.16, VI.2.21, VI.2.23. See Light, spirit and the unseen source.

sola (subject). Printed forms: *sola*.

Alone, feminine singular, qualifying mind as the subject that grasps incorporeals in the stated way. In et capit sola summa cum voluptate it does not restrict the objects to incorporeals alone; the chapter also gives mind knowledge of bodies. References: VIII.10.2. See Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

soli et omni. Printed forms: *soli et omni animo*.

Belonging only to soul and to every soul in the argument’s scope. The phrase qualifies the inner discord of opinions and affections, distinguishing it from alterations of lifeless bodies. References: VII.15.1. See Discord and the soul’s persistence.

solidus / fluxus / labilis. Printed forms: *fluxum*; *labile*; *solidum*.

Solid, fluid or unstable as possible physical constitutions of a corporeal soul. Rigidity obstructs new impressions; instability prevents retaining them. The opposed difficulties form one dilemma. References: VII.1.2. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

solus (restrictive). Printed forms: *Sola*; *sola*; *solis*; *solo*; *solum*.

Only or alone, restricting a subject, instrument or class of objects as syntax determines. Point alone, extent alone and sight confined to colours illustrate distinct restrictions. Solis can also be the sun’s genitive elsewhere, and VIII.10.2 sola qualifies mind. References: VIII.5.1, VIII.10.2, VIII.16.1. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

solus; omnis; nullus. Printed forms: *nulla*; *nullam*; *nulli*; *nullo*; *nullum*; *nullus*; *omne*; *omnem*; *omnes*; *omni*; *omnibus*; *omnis*; *omnium*; *sola*; *solam*; *solis*; *solius*; *solum*; *solus*.

Only or alone, every/all, and none, with context determining their scope. Exhaustive conclusions are often restricted to a faculty, class or hypothesis; solis can also be the genitive of sol, the sun, and must not be mechanically assigned to solus. References: VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.2.2, VI.2.3, VI.2.6, VI.2.8, VI.2.9, VI.4.5, VI.6.3, VI.9.3, VI.11.1, VI.12.7, VI.12.16. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

solutus. Printed forms: *solutus*.

Released or free from bodily subjection in the local argument. It does not mean destroyed or dissolved; the disembodied state is invoked in one branch of the coercion dilemma. References: V.15.22. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

solvere; retro versus. Printed forms: *retro versus*; *solvatur*.

To release; turned backward. Release initially forces painful attention to the source of the earlier appearances rather than instantly producing clear vision. References: VI.2.15. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

somniare. Printed forms: *somniare*.

To dream or imagine, used dismissively. Ficino’s polemical verb marks his rejection of the claim that soul is harmony generated by bodily constitution. References: VII.10.1. See Harmony and the strings.

somnus. Printed forms: *somno*; *somnum*; *somnus*.

Sleep, a bodily change introduced as an apparent model of involuntary mental weakening. Ficino distinguishes inhibition of bodily sensation from loss of psychic power or conversion into body. References: V.15.23, V.15.24. See Sleep and dreams.

sonus / percussio / silentium. Printed forms: *percussionem*; *silentio*; *sono*.

Sound, its impact, and silence. The organ is already animated in silence; impact produces more attentive animation, not the first existence of sensory capacity. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

sopire / claudere. Printed forms: *claudit*; *sopit*.

To lull and to close, descriptions of the bodily senses in sleep. The change is located in the body and its sense organs rather than an extinction of the soul’s power. References: V.15.23. See Sleep and dreams.

sortiri. Printed forms: *sortiantur*; *Sortitur*; *sortitur*.

To obtain an allotted mode or possession. Forms receive being in matter or in themselves, so the mode allotted by the maker controls the consequence. References: V.7.2, V.9.1, V.9.4. See Conditions and the fashioner’s law.

spargere. Printed forms: *sparsa*.

To scatter or spread across parts. The quality of the second theory is distributed with the little body’s parts rather than wholly present without division. References: VI.1.3. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

species. Printed forms: *specie*; *speciebus*; *speciei*; *speciem*; *species*.

Kind, determinate form or intelligible appearance, depending upon context. Form differentiates species; operation takes its species from its object; the meaning is not always the modern biological species. References: V.4.1, V.8.1, V.11.8, V.13.12. See Form and formal being.

A determinate nature or an intelligible representing form, according to context. Human and numerical species remain one under their defining accounts; the species received by mind is not a spatial parcel. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11. See Simplicity of human and numerical species.

species / genus / cognomen. Printed forms: *cognomen*; *generisque*; *specie*; *speciei*; *species*.

Kind, genus and the corresponding name. Soul makes this living body a dog, horse or human; these taxonomic uses differ from sensory species. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

species absolutae. Printed forms: *species absolutas*.

Separate or unrestricted forms produced within rational cognition. They provide the nearer route toward eternal Ideas; the phrase does not itself say every human concept is eternally infallible. References: V.12.14. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

species sensibilis. Printed forms: *speciem*; *species*.

The perceptual form through which the color is seen. Ficino expressly distinguishes the species as cognitive means from color as the object seen. References: VII.4.2. See Spiritual images and light.

speciosus / deformis. Printed forms: *deformius*; *foedius*; *pulchrius*; *speciosius*.

More well-formed or beautiful, and more ugly or deformed. The body’s organization can be diminished by loss of form rather than by removing material bulk. References: V.15.6. See Form and formal being.

speculativus / moralis. Printed forms: *morales*; *moralibus*; *Moralis*; *moralis*; *speculativa*; *speculativae*.

Contemplative and moral, distinguishing virtues of intellect from virtues formed in appetite. The first arise and operate in contemplation; the second through custom and conduct, although the local contemplative list includes civic prudence and art. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.5, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.7, VIII.3.8. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

speculum / aqua. Printed forms: *aqua*; *speculis*; *speculo*; *speculum*.

Mirror and water, reflective recipients used to illustrate nondestructive images or continuous dependence. The argument selects a relation of image and recipient; it does not attribute cognition to the mirror itself. References: V.6.1, V.8.3, V.10.2, V.12.12. See Reception and the receiver.

speculum / distantia. Printed forms: *distante*; *distantiam*; *speculi*; *speculo*; *speculum*.

Mirror and distance as conditions distinguishing image from received material flame. The absence of heating is used to deny that the reflected flame is materially present in the mirror’s body. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

speculum / lana / accendere. Printed forms: *accendendum*; *accenditur*; *lana*; *speculo*.

Mirror, wool and ignition, paired as two stages of one explanatory image. Light appears in a mirror turned toward the sun; prepared wool catches fire, modelling intellect’s clarity and appetite’s consequent ardour. References: VIII.3.3. See Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

speculum / specillum. Printed forms: *specillo*; *speculo*; *speculorum*.

Mirror, including the diminutive little mirror. Differences of apparent scale in mirrors test the supposed dimensional limits of the soul’s living mirror. References: VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

speculum concavum aeneum. Printed forms: *concavi aeneique speculi*.

A concave bronze mirror. The authorially corrected metal matters: the example concerns concentrated solar rays, not a fiery mirror. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

speculum sempiternum. Printed forms: *speculo sempiterno*.

An everlasting mirror, the analogy for continuous life-impression upon the ethereal vehicle. The image distinguishes an enduring recipient’s animation from that of the perishable elemental body. References: V.13.18. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

spelunca; specus; caverna. Printed forms: *cavernam*; *specu*; *speluncam*.

Cave or subterranean enclosure. The overlapping words name the restricted educational setting and later the comparison for descent into bodily darkness. References: VI.2.14, VI.2.15, VI.2.17. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

sphaera. Printed forms: *sphaera*; *sphaerae*; *sphaeram*; *sphaerarum*; *sphaeras*.

A sphere, used literally for visible bodies and analogically for rational souls. Spiritual spheres are not spatially extended soul-bodies; their invisible circuits are said to have visible shadows. References: V.1.4, V.1.5. See Circularity and spiritual spheres.

spiritalis. Printed forms: *spiritale*; *spiritalem*; *spiritales*; *spiritali*; *Spiritalia*; *Spiritalis*; *spiritalis*; *spiritalium*.

Spiritual, marking a mode distinct from bodily extension and material receptivity. The word qualifies spheres, reception and the analogical matter of separate beings; these uses should not be flattened into one physical picture. References: V.1.5, V.8.3, V.11.7, V.11.8. See Spiritual matter and identity.

Spiritual, marking an image or meaning distinguished from bodily matter and modification. The color-image and the wall's matter are not received in the same way; bodily spirit remains a separate concept. References: VII.1.3, VII.13.1. See Spiritual images and light.

spiritalis (optical). Printed forms: *spiritali*; *spiritalis*.

Spiritual in Ficino's account of light and the reflected image. The image is said to be borne in surrounding light rather than fixed in the material mirror; this is historical optics, not current physical explanation. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

spiritus. Printed forms: *spiritibus*.

Spirit or incorporeal created being, distinct here from both body and the uncreated God. V.13.7 reports that the Pythagoreans posit four elements in spirits in a certain manner: essence, being, power and action. The qualification concerns these distinct created constituents, not four material elements or the fine physiological spirit mediating soul and body. References: V.13.7. See Creature, power and operation.

spiritus (incorporeal). Printed forms: *spiritibus*; *spiritum*.

An incorporeal being or spiritual mode, as distinct from physiological vital spirit. Truth is located in spirits; the ascent from finite angels reaches an infinite spirit. The meaning follows its predicate and context. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.7, VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

spiritus (vital mediator). Printed forms: *spiritum*.

The subtle bodily mediator associated with organic proportion and skilful formation. This physiological usage in the instrument argument differs from incorporeal spirits in the truth argument and from the ascent's nonbodily endpoint. References: VIII.2.3. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

spiritus / corpusculum. Printed forms: *corpusculum*; *spiritum*; *Spiritus*; *spiritus*.

The extremely fine luminous bodily medium joining soul to the gross body. Chapter 6 explicitly calls it a little body generated from blood; it must not be identified with the incorporeal soul. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

spiritus leves; humores graves. Printed forms: *graves humores*; *leves spiritus*.

Light physiological spirits and heavy humours. Their directed movement against supposed elemental tendencies supports the distinction between controller and bodily constituents. References: VI.11.2. See Contrary powers and directed movement.

splendor / lumen / lux. Printed forms: *luci*; *lumen*; *lumine*; *luminis*; *splendores*.

Splendor, light and its shining manifestation. Ficino derives visible light from heavenly souls' invisible light and relates it to the light of our spirit. References: VII.1.3. See Spiritual images and light.

splendor / reflexio. Printed forms: *reflexio*; *splendor*.

Radiance and reflection, effects or manifestations of life. Life is declared prior to its divine radiance, supporting the soul’s reception of immortal life before the splendor of images. References: V.15.3, V.15.4. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

spontaneus. Printed forms: *spontaneus*.

Spontaneous or self-originated, describing the movement that accompanies a self-mover. The positive statement that such movement is a constant companion is the reading adopted against a later inserted negation. References: V.1.1. See Motion and substantial stability.

spontaneus; gradi. Printed forms: *gradiantur*; *gradiendum*; *spontaneus motus*.

Spontaneous movement and proceeding or walking. Living bodies derive the capacity to move according to judgement through soul; the final statement remains qualified by quasi. References: VI.12.20. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

sponte. Printed forms: *sponte*.

Of one’s own accord. Ficino denies that soul voluntarily departs from its own form and separately excludes external compulsion. References: V.8.3, V.8.4. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

statim / e vestigio / absque mora. Printed forms: *absque mora*; *e vestigio*; *statim*.

Immediately or without delay. The rapid coordinated response to injury is central to Ficino’s contrast with successive isolated reports. References: VII.5.1, VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

statim; subito; paulatim. Printed forms: *paulatim*; *protinus*; *repente*; *statim*; *subito*; *tandem*; *vix*.

Immediately, suddenly, gradually, at last and scarcely, distinguishing temporal manners. The educational ascent cannot be made suddenly; immediate awareness in the Avicennian experiment and gradual material flux have different roles. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.12, VI.2.15, VI.13.11. See Plato’s cave and gradual education.

status. Printed forms: *statu*; *statum*.

Stability or abiding condition, as distinguished from changing operation. The second proof uses stability as a separate route to immortality; later arguments deny that body dislodges soul from its own state. References: V.2.1, V.14.8. See Motion and substantial stability.

Strato / Epicureus. Printed forms: *Epicuree*; *Epicureus*; *Strato*.

Strato or an Epicurean interlocutor staged as objecting to the deathlessness inference. The objection says soul might disappear without receiving anything; Ficino clarifies the intended destructive-quality claim. References: V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability.

subiectum. Printed forms: *subiecta*; *subiectam*; *subiecti*; *subiecto*; *subiectum*; *Subiectum*.

An underlying subject in which a form or actuality inheres, not a grammatical subject in these passages. Matter is subject to bodily forms; essence is subject to being; the argument must identify which dependence is intended. References: V.4.1, V.4.6, V.12.2, V.13.13. See Reception and the receiver.

subiectum / receptaculum. Printed forms: *receptaculum*; *subiecto*; *subiectum*.

Subject of inherence or receptacle, not necessarily a spatial container. Soul bears indivisible virtues but is also their source; its role exceeds merely receiving a quality from elsewhere. References: VIII.3.8, VIII.4.1. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

subiectum; locus. Printed forms: *loco*; *subiecto*.

A bearer of form or qualities; a spatial place. Natural form is in a formed subject, while a body is in a place; the difference blocks treating body as form. References: VI.7.1. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

sublimior. Printed forms: *sublimior*; *sublimiorem*.

More elevated in explanatory or ontological rank, not merely higher in place. An operation cannot surpass its own producing substance in the way universal incorporeal cognition would surpass a merely bodily mind. References: VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

subsistere / consistere. Printed forms: *consistat*; *consistunt*; *subsistentem*; *subsistere*; *subsistit*.

Standing in being or persisting as a determinate subject. The common nature in material individuals requires a foundation, while the higher Idea is said to stand in itself. References: VIII.1.2, VIII.1.3, VIII.1.4. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

subsistere / subiectum. Printed forms: *subiectum*; *subsistit*.

To subsist and the subject in which something inheres. The constitution depends on the body receiving its qualities; it does not subsist in itself. References: VII.9.1. See Substance, qualities and degrees.

substantia. Printed forms: *Substantia*; *substantia*; *substantiae*; *substantiam*; *Substantiam*; *substantiarum*; *substantias*; *substantiis*.

Substance or subsisting nature, contrasted locally with its operations and accidents. Soul remains in substance while operating successively; in creatures operative power is distinct from substance. References: V.1.5, V.2.1, V.12.2, V.13.13, V.15.6, V.15.10. See Motion and substantial stability.

Substance or the underlying nature whose form and operation are being explained. Phantasy conjectures it without its account; definition seeks what it is; operation is not allowed to outrank its producing substance. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.4.4, VIII.10.1, VIII.10.2. See Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

substantia / virtus / operatio. Printed forms: *operationem*; *substantia*; *substantiae*; *substantiaeque*; *substantiam*; *virtus*; *virtutem*; *virtutis*.

Substance, its power, and the exercise of that power. The dependence runs in order: destroying substance undermines power and then activity, which would obstruct sensing and judging injury. References: VII.6.2. See Injury and the uninjured judge.

substantia; essentia. Printed forms: *essentia*; *essentiae*; *essentiam*; *substantia*; *substantiae*; *substantiam*.

Substance and essence, used for the enduring reality and what it is. The text distinguishes substantial bearer from changing accidents and essence from the being and operations it communicates; the two nouns are related but not a uniform translation formula. References: VI.2.9, VI.7.3, VI.9.2, VI.13.5. See Substantial form and the receiving subject.

substantialis unitas. Printed forms: *substantialis quaedam unitas*; *substantialis unitas*.

Unity existing as a substantial principle, not as a merely positioned geometrical limit. The liberated point is renamed through a reality free of dimensions and position and capable of higher activity. References: VI.2.20, VI.2.27. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

subterfugere; adsciscere. Printed forms: *adsciscere*; *subterfugiat*.

To slip away and recruit or adopt replacements. A continually flowing soul-body would need new souls and lose the original subject it was meant to preserve. References: VI.13.5. See Food, lending and borrowing life.

subtrahere / auferre. Printed forms: *auferendo*; *subtrahendo*; *subtraheretur*; *subtrahit*.

To withdraw or take away. The objector suggests destruction by withdrawing influx, while Ficino denies withdrawal of what belongs properly to soul’s nature. References: V.4.2, V.12.12, V.12.13. See Relation and continuing dependence.

subtrahere; deprimere. Printed forms: *deprimitur*; *Subtrahite*.

To remove and to be weighed down. The remaining portion of heart is removed in thought so that the fiery form is no longer locally burdened. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

succedere; momenta. Printed forms: *momenta succedunt*; *variantur*.

Successive moments and changing conditions. Temporal dispersion is distinguished from spatial distance; stable bodily unity cannot simply be assumed from either. References: VI.8.1. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

successio / gradatim. Printed forms: *gradatim*; *successione*.

Successive passage or a process occurring by stages. A report relayed through affected members would be a series of local states rather than immediate awareness of the original injury. References: VII.5.2, VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

succurrere / medela. Printed forms: *medelam*; *succurrendum*.

To give assistance and the remedy or care offered. Correct sensation matters practically because it identifies where bodily members must be directed to help. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

sufficere / supervacuus. Printed forms: *sufficiat*; *sufficit*; *supervacuis*.

To suffice for a work; superfluous beyond what that work requires. Nature’s avoiding needless duplication supports the rejection of two equally comprehensive comparing powers. References: VII.2.1, VII.2.2. See Comparison and common sense.

sufficientia / indigere. Printed forms: *egeat*; *indigeat*; *indigere*; *indiget*; *sufficientior*.

Adequacy in one’s activity and needing something to perform it. The superior power is said to be more sufficient if it needs no quantitative bodily extent. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

sufficientia subsistendi. Printed forms: *sufficientiam subsistendi*.

The sufficiency or capacity for standing in being, paired with being in the analysis of substance. The phrase names an intelligible explanatory constituent, not a measurable amount of matter. References: VIII.4.12. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

suffundere. Printed forms: *suffusa*; *suffusum*.

To pour or diffuse throughout. The first theory and later reductio imagine the subtle soul-body dispersed through the coarser organism and organs. References: VI.1.2, VI.13.7. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

sumere. Printed forms: *sumeret*; *sumit*.

To take or receive from a source. If body received as immediately as soul, Ficino argues, it would no longer have the lower mode defined as body. References: V.15.26. See Transmission of form and natural order.

super et praeter ordinem elementorum. Printed forms: *super et praeter ordinem elementorum*.

Above and beyond the elemental order. Both relations characterize the nutritive activity whose distinct principal agency was explained through growth and digestion. References: VII.13.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

superare / excedere / excellere. Printed forms: *excedit*; *excellat*; *excellit*; *superat*; *supereminet*; *superet*.

Surpassing in power, scope or excellence rather than necessarily in bodily size. A small person can overcome a large one, phantasy exceeds imagination, and intellectual power exceeds bodily restriction without becoming God. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.10.2, VIII.14.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.4. See Four stages of cognition.

superare / praestare. Printed forms: *praestantior*; *praestantiores*; *praestantissimae*; *praestantius*; *Superat*; *superat*; *superet*.

To surpass in rank or explanatory excellence. Soul’s superiority to quality is material independence; superiority need not mean greater bodily bulk. References: V.5.3, V.5.4, V.11.2, V.15.3, V.15.4, V.15.27. See Four causes and graded dependence.

superficies / pictura. Printed forms: *exterioremque*; *picturam*; *superficiem*.

The surface and external picture available to imagination. The vocabulary emphasizes the difference between assembling sensible appearance and knowing what the represented thing is. References: VIII.1.1. See Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

superficies; linea; punctum. Printed forms: *lineam*; *punctum*; *superficiem*.

Surface, line and point as successively less dimensional limits. The geometric ascent subtracts depth, breadth and length without yet removing a point’s determinate position. References: VI.2.19. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

supervenire. Printed forms: *superveniunt*.

Coming upon something already explanatory prior. Individualizing properties supervene upon the simpler shared nature to constitute distinct persons; the priority need not be temporal. References: VIII.1.3. See Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

sursum; deorsum; extra; intra. Printed forms: *Deorsum*; *deorsum*; *extra*; *extrinsecus*; *interius*; *intrinsecus*; *superne*; *Sursum*; *sursum*.

Upward, downward, beyond, inwardly and outwardly, as physical or analogical directions. The same directions can describe elemental movement, attention to universals or bodily things, and inward causal presence; they do not always locate soul spatially. References: VI.2.1, VI.2.3, VI.2.14, VI.11.2, VI.12.12, VI.12.19, VI.13.9. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

susceptaculum. Printed forms: *susceptaculum*; *susceptaculum suum*.

A receptacle or bearer capable of receiving. Universal matter receives forms; the spiritual-reception argument asks why an eternal object would destroy its recipient. References: V.4.1, V.8.3. See Reception and the receiver.

suscipere. Printed forms: *suscipiens*; *suscipiet*; *suscipit*.

To receive something into a subject, with the mode of reception determined by that subject. Wax receives a figure spatially; the argument asks whether soul must receive an image in the same manner. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

suscipere / capere / accipere. Printed forms: *accipere*; *accipiat*; *accipit*; *accipitur*; *capere*; *capit*; *capitur*; *capiuntur*; *susceptio*; *Susceptio*; *suscipi*; *suscipiat*; *suscipiendas*; *suscipit*.

To receive, take or admit, with the receiver’s mode governing what follows. Matter admits contrary forms, while soul receives spiritually; receptive language by itself does not imply destructive material passivity. References: V.4.1, V.5.9, V.6.1, V.7.2, V.8.3, V.12.2, V.12.13, V.13.13. See Reception and the receiver.

sustentaculum. Printed forms: *sustentaculo*; *sustentaculum*.

Support or sustaining base. Matter is the first bodily support, while soul does not need a bodily prop whose withdrawal could cause its collapse. References: V.4.6, V.5.9. See Prime matter and enduring support.

sustentaculum / inquinatio. Printed forms: *debilitatem*; *indigentiam*; *inquinationemque*; *inquinatur*; *sustentaculo*.

External support, contamination, weakness and need. These are the four vulnerabilities developed through the flow metaphor, against which self-returning rational life is contrasted. References: VIII.15.3. See Outward flow and rational life’s return.

sustinere / vibrare. Printed forms: *sustinebit vibrabitque*.

To support bodily members and set them moving. Both operations belong to the continuing subject, the robber’s soul, in the catalogue of rejected predictions. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

tactus. Printed forms: *tactu*; *tactus*.

Touch as the soul’s sense universal throughout bodily members. Touch senses the surgical event while imagination judges and shares distress. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

talis; sic affectus. Printed forms: *sic affectum*; *tale quiddam*.

A body of such a determinate kind and so disposed. This is the opponent’s qualification, which prompts Ficino to ask what additional determination makes the body special. References: VI.4.3. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

tangere. Printed forms: *tangatur*; *tangi*; *tangit*; *tangitur*.

To touch, the proposed physical route by which a bodily quality could affect soul. Ficino tests point-contact and divisible-part contact before distinguishing nondestructive reception of images. References: V.6.1. See Indivisibility and contact.

To touch or make contact. Contact at a line’s endpoints is hypothetical; a touch at a tiny bodily point supplies the whole-awareness example. References: VII.2.2, VII.5.2. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

temperantia / libido. Printed forms: *cupiditates*; *libidine*; *libidini*; *libidinis*; *libidinis mollitiem*; *temperantia*.

Temperance and the enfeebling softness of desire, libidinis mollitiem, which it counteracts. The virtue removes desire’s impediment to honourable action and depends upon courage against fear, as the unity-of-virtues argument shows. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.7. See Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment.

temperare spiritus et humores. Printed forms: *spiritus, humores membraque temperat*.

To regulate spirits, humours and members. Soul as substantial form performs the regulation through power and natural art; it is not identical with bodily temperament. References: VI.9.4. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

temperatio. Printed forms: *temperatione*.

An appropriate tempering of the bodily instrument. The soul prepares its instrument for attentive action; the instrument’s temperament is not thereby the soul’s essence. References: VII.6.3. See Bodily constitution and temperament.

temperatio / complexio. Printed forms: *complexione*; *complexionem*; *temperatio*; *temperationem*; *temperationi*.

Bodily temperament or constitution formed from mixture. Ficino denies that rational mind is identical with this bodily organization or wholly dependent upon it. References: V.8.1, V.15.8, V.15.9, V.15.10, V.15.17, V.15.18. See Temperament and harmony.

temperatio artis. Printed forms: *temperatio artis*.

The ordering skill or proportioning of an art. A clock’s orderly work illustrates the relation of a coordinating source to its effects. References: VI.9.4. See Rennet, magnet and clock.

temporis intervallum. Printed forms: *temporis intervallum*.

An interval of time through which an instrumental operation proceeds. An instrument is moved by another, acts on a subject and conveys its principal agent’s form over time. Ficino invokes this structure to reject angelic instrumental creation, since creation requires neither a prior subject nor motion or time. References: V.13.14. See Instrument and creative mediation.

tenere / memoria. Printed forms: *memoria*; *memoriam*; *tenet*.

To retain; memory as preserved, usable content. Fluid instability threatens retention, while a mere surface image cannot account for thinking of something absent. References: VII.1.2, VII.1.3. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

tenuare / purgare. Printed forms: *purgentur*; *tenuentur*.

Refining and purifying supposed bodily food to fit a subtle material soul. These operations occur inside the reductio: even refined nourishment would leave the false prediction that bulk and feeding improve intellect. References: VIII.2.1. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

tenuis / lucidus. Printed forms: *lucidissimumque*; *tenuissima*; *tenuissimum*.

Extremely fine and luminous. The superlatives describe a subtle bodily spirit and its source in the finest blood; fineness does not make it incorporeal. References: VII.6.1. See Bodily spirit and mediation.

tenuis; crassus. Printed forms: *crassiori*; *tenuissimum*.

Physically fine or subtle; comparatively coarse. The initial contrast distinguishes two bodily textures and does not yet distinguish body from soul. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

termini proprii; alieni. Printed forms: *terminos alienos*; *terminos proprios*.

The body's own internal termini and externally directed termini. Ficino infers incapacity for the more remote movement from incapacity for internal self-change; the inferential step remains explicit. References: VI.12.16. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

terminus. Printed forms: *terminis*; *termino*; *terminos*; *terminus*.

An endpoint, boundary or originating term, according to the direction specified. God is denied as corruption's endpoint and affirmed as production's efficient source; temporal bounds separately limit embodied instances. References: V.1.5, V.7.1, V.11.6. See Seal, wax and restoration.

terminus / gradus / proportio / figura. Printed forms: *figura*; *figuram*; *gradu*; *proportione*; *termino*; *terminum*.

Limit, degree, proportion and shape as determinations imposed on natural activity. The soul orders otherwise wandering qualities toward the organized result; these terms do not all mean mere size. References: VII.8.1. See Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

terminus / terminare. Printed forms: *terminabitur*; *terminat*; *terminatur*; *termino*; *terminum*; *terminus*.

Boundary or endpoint; its sense ranges from spatial limit to the limit of a sequence or act. A point bounds magnitude, definition has limits, and inward intellectual motion lacks an externally acquired stopping point. References: VIII.4.1, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.1, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds.

terminus praescriptus. Printed forms: *praescriptum magnitudinis terminum*.

An assigned boundary of size. The argument denies a prescribed bodily magnitude for the soul's range or substance; it does not assign the soul endless spatial extension. References: VII.1.2. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

terminus; rector. Printed forms: *ordinat sistitque mobilia*; *rectorem*; *terminum*.

Limit and ruler that orders and arrests moving things. The source must determine not only motion but how far nourishment and growth should proceed. References: VI.13.8. See Temperament, flux and the stable ruler.

terminus; situs. Printed forms: *certum habet situm*; *lineae terminus*.

A line's limit and a determinate position. The point is still tied to bodily location even though it lacks dimensions, so geometrical indivisibility is insufficient. References: VI.2.19. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

tertia essentia. Printed forms: *tertiae essentiae*; *tertiam illam essentiam*.

The third grade of the fivefold hierarchy, understood as free from matter and everlasting. The task is to demonstrate that our human soul belongs here, rather than assume it from the immortality of rational souls generally. References: VI.1.1, VI.1.6. See Divine production and the third essence.

tertius. Printed forms: *tertia*; *tertiae*.

Third, identifying soul's intermediate essence in the established five-level hierarchy. The numeral is a rank, not a count of parts within a soul or an assertion that there are only three kinds of being. References: V.1.2, V.3.1, V.5.4, V.10.3. See Rational soul and irrational life.

tota adesse. Printed forms: *adest tota*; *Tota*; *tota*; *Tota igitur*; *tota sentit*; *totam*.

Whole presence and whole awareness. The repeated tota denies that only one fraction of the soul senses the injury occurring in one bodily part. References: VII.5.1. See Whole presence and vital intensity.

totius integritas. Printed forms: *totius integritas*.

The completeness or integrated nature arising from a whole. The opponent proposes an emergent nature beyond material constituents as a source of self-motion. References: VI.12.9. See Integrity of the whole.

totus. Printed forms: *tota*; *totam*; *toti*; *totius*; *toto*; *totum*.

Whole or entire, whose mode depends on the thing described. Soul whole in each member is not a body's distributed entirety; the self-motion proofs require activity throughout the primary principle rather than only in one part. References: VI.1.6, VI.3.1, VI.6.4, VI.8.4, VI.9.2, VI.12.1. See Essential presence and containment.

tradere. Printed forms: *tradendo*; *tradit*; *traditione*; *traditur*; *Tradunt*; *tradunt*.

To transmit or hand on a form. The higher nature gives what it receives without losing it; the soul's continued identity is required for the body's reception. References: V.15.26, V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

traducere. Printed forms: *traducat*.

To convey or carry across into another subject. An instrument transfers the principal agent's form over time, a structure Ficino denies to creation from nothing. References: V.13.14. See Instrument and creative mediation.

transcurrere. Printed forms: *transcurrendo*; *transcurrere*.

To run or pass across a stretch, here to traverse a magnitude bodily. Traversal belongs to the hypothesis that mind is a body or a form extended through bodily magnitude. Ficino tests the successive contact of parts and the resulting repetition of cognition; he does not endorse bodily traversal as the actual mechanism of understanding. References: VIII.5.1. See Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact.

transferre. Printed forms: *transferetur*.

To transfer from one place to another. The image's imagined transfer from eye to brain is a concession within the material-reception hypothesis, not a final physiological explanation. References: VII.1.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

transire / migrare / commutare. Printed forms: *commutent*; *migrat*; *pertransire*; *transeat*; *transit*.

Passing into another nature, migrating or being transformed into one another. Ficino denies bodily-spiritual interconversion through common matter, because those orders lack such a shared material substrate. References: VIII.2.1. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

transitus. Printed forms: *transit*; *transitus*.

Passage or transfer from one bearer to another. Ficino tests but rejects a material-style transfer of rational art from one life to another through teaching. References: V.15.15. See Teaching without loss.

transitus; circuitus. Printed forms: *circuitum atque transitum*; *transitum vel circuitum*.

Passage from place to place and circular motion. The last bodily alternatives are external relative to prior internal alterations and generation. References: VI.12.16. See Eight motions and the cold-water objection.

transmittere / conservare. Printed forms: *conservantur*; *transmittuntur*.

To send across and preserve. Meanings are said to pass from soul to soul and persist by the power of souls, rather than as bodily inscriptions alone. References: VII.1.3. See Spiritual images and light.

tria puncta / medium / extrema. Printed forms: *extrema*; *extremorum*; *intervallum*; *medium*; *tria*.

Three points, their middle member and outer members, used to test the production of length. If the middle separates the others it has parts; if it does not, their conjunction yields no interval. The hypothetical does not make points atoms. References: VIII.4.2. See Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

tricubitus. Printed forms: *tricubita*; *tricubito*.

Three cubits in measure. The fiery form initially matches the body’s extension before the imagined gathering into the heart’s centre. References: VI.2.21. See Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare. Printed forms: *debilitat*; *laetitia*; *roborat*; *Tristitia*.

Sorrow, joy, weakening and strengthening. Imagination’s sorrow and joy are said to affect nourishment; this is evidence in Ficino’s argument, not a universal medical rule. References: VII.9.2. See Soul as the body’s craftsman.

triticum / pyrum. Printed forms: *pyra*; *tritico*.

Wheat and pears, the first mismatched seed and product in the natural-generation example. The point is that a natural agent cannot produce any kind from any seed, supporting the stronger exclusion of creation from nothing. References: V.4.3. See Art and elemental transformation.

tumor. Printed forms: *tumore*.

Swelling or bulk, here denied as the measure of incorporeal power. Higher natures act more powerfully through form without occupying larger space. References: V.15.27. See Transmission of form and natural order.

turgere; concipere; edere. Printed forms: *concipiunt*; *partus edant*; *turgent*.

To swell with seed, conceive and bring forth offspring. The birth sequence illustrates a cause's prior internal unfolding before its outward effect, not creation of soul's essence by itself. References: VI.12.10. See Vital motion, action and passion.

turgescere / gravescere. Printed forms: *gravescit*; *turgescit*.

To swell and to become heavy. These bodily verbs mark stages of the descending elemental sequence rather than moral increase or decline. References: V.4.4. See Art and elemental transformation.

ubique totus. Printed forms: *totam per singula*; *ubique totam*.

Whole throughout each part; whole everywhere. This is not quantitative scattering of fractions and is paired with the denial of confinement to one member. References: VI.3.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

umbra. Printed forms: *umbrae*; *umbram*; *umbram tuam*.

A shadow, a derivative image of a higher source. Visible circuits shadow spiritual ones; irrational life is pictured as an outflowing shadow, not as absolutely nonexistent. References: V.1.5, V.14.8, V.15.3. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

A shadow dependent on what casts it. Body is called the soul's shadow, and the well and bird examples expose mistaken identification with its location. References: VI.2.3, VI.2.4, VI.2.5. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

unde / inde / illuc. Printed forms: *illuc*; *inde*; *Unde*.

Unde means from where or from which source; inde means from there or from that source; illuc means toward there. In the coordinated sentence at V.4.7 the source from which things have being is also that from which they are moved and toward which they are borne. The adverbs articulate origin, impulse and return to the good; unde here should not be flattened into a mere inferential "therefore." References: V.4.7. See Natural striving, source and return.

unio et augmentum. Printed forms: *non augmentum amplius*; *unionem et augmentum*.

Cohesion and growth, with growth denied after severance. The distinction prevents reading the account as saying every detached stone lives like an animal. References: VI.8.7. See Earth, wood and severed stones.

unio plurium / vis insita. Printed forms: *insita*; *unio fit membrorum*; *unio plurium*; *uniuntur*; *vis insita*.

Union of many and the inwardly implanted power producing that union. The one source unites the members; soul is identified with that source rather than the union resulting from it. References: VII.12.1. See Composition and inward unity.

unire; sistere; continere. Printed forms: *continet*; *sistit*; *Sistit*; *unit*; *Unit*.

To unite, stabilize and hold together. The three verbs respectively answer distance, flux and qualitative discord; their functions are not identical. References: VI.8.4, VI.8.5. See Unity, dispersion and the inward bond.

unitas / multitudo. Printed forms: *multitudinem*; *multitudo*; *unitas*; *unitatem*.

Unity and multiplicity, whether within an account, among instances or in an explanatory hierarchy. Mind gathers many under one universal; simplicity of unity marks analysis's limit, while divine unity is the terminus of a larger ascent. References: VIII.1.3, VIII.3.6,

VIII.4.4, VIII.4.6, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.12, VIII.16.2. See First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis.

unitas / unire. Printed forms: *unitas*; *unitatem*; *unitque*.

Unity and uniting, the divine contribution named at the close of the matter proof. The triad assigns producing/unifying to God, stabilizing/ordering to angel, moving/forming to soul. References: V.4.10. See Four causes and graded dependence.

unius naturae. Printed forms: *anima unius sit tota naturae*.

The whole soul is of one nature. The hyperbaton is read as one unifying nature capable of binding diverse members, not many heterogeneous soul-pieces. References: VI.13.1. See Growth, amputation and soul-size.

universale; particulare. Printed forms: *particularia*; *universalia*.

Universal and particular objects of consideration. Upward and downward name movement between these levels rather than physical altitude. References: VI.12.19. See Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

universalis. Printed forms: *universalem*; *universales*; *universali*; *universalibus*.

Applicable across indefinitely many instances rather than confined to a singular material situation. Universal intellectual forms support laws and rules, and collect many individuals under one intelligible nature. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.2.7, VIII.8.1, VIII.16.2. See Universality, law, and material restriction.

universalis / totus. Printed forms: *totam*; *totum*; *universae*; *universali*; *universalis*.

Universal or whole, with the whole order or entire individual specified by context. Universal matter and universal nature differ from the whole soul, whose entire essence is said to be life. References: V.4.1, V.4.10, V.5.1, V.14.1. See Prime matter and enduring support.

ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus. Printed forms: *ut alias ostendemus*; *ut in sequentibus apparebit*; *ut in superioribus enarravimus*.

Explicit references backward or forward to further argumentative work. The indivisibility of meanings and understanding’s superior freedom receive promises, while the soul’s operations beyond humors appeal to earlier demonstrations. References: VII.5.4, VII.10.1, VII.13.1. See Freedom from matter and causal priority.

ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur. Printed forms: *Platonici tamen*; *ut Platonici opinantur*; *ut quidam putant*.

As some think, as Platonists think, and yet the Platonists: attribution and contrast markers. The opening substance claim is not universally endorsed, and latent-form self-reception is expressly attached to a Platonic explanation. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.13.1. See Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

utrum; an; numquid; num. Printed forms: *an*; *An*; *Num*; *Numquid*; *numquid*; *utrum*.

Question markers distinguishing alternatives and challenging a premise. The animate/inanimate, dense/subtle and motion arguments stage choices before rejecting them; rhetorical questions are part of their dialectic, not unqualified assertions. References: VI.2.12, VI.4.4, VI.5.1, VI.6.1, VI.6.4, VI.12.4. See Animation, first light and regress.

vacare. Printed forms: *Vacat altera*.

The other power is idle or redundant. One endpoint’s comprehensive perception would do as much as both, so a second contributes no additional comparative work. References: VII.2.2. See Point, line and the comparing power.

valere. Printed forms: *valere*; *valet*.

To have efficacy or count in producing a result. Bodily size is denied decisive explanatory force for cognitive gifts; harmony lacks power to act on its strings. References: VII.3.1, VII.10.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

vapor / fumus. Printed forms: *fumos*; *vapor*.

Vapor or fumes, products or constituents within Ficino’s historical natural philosophy. Solar thinning produces vapors; a dry upper-air vapor belongs to the comet’s defining account. References: V.4.1, V.7.1. See Comets and defining accounts.

vas. Printed forms: *vasis*.

A vessel or pot, the artifact whose form may be lost while clay remains. Its breakage distinguishes destruction of a formed object from annihilation of its material. References: V.4.1. See Art and elemental transformation.

vaticinari. Printed forms: *vaticinatur*.

To prophesy or announce a reality beyond the senses’ jurisdiction. Ficino gives reason’s judgement that incorporeal things exist a deliberately heightened, affirmative voice. References: VI.2.8. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

vegetare. Printed forms: *vegetabat*; *vegetat*.

To animate or sustain a bodily organ’s living activity. The same soul animates the ear before and during sound, doing so more attentively when sound strikes. References: VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

vegetatrix; natura. Printed forms: *naturam*; *vegetatricem*; *vegetatrix*.

The life-giving power of generation, nourishment and growth. Peripatetic and Platonic names differ; the function is distinguished from sensation and intellectual inquiry. References: VI.2.1, VI.10.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

vehiculum aethereum. Printed forms: *aethereo*; *aethereum corpus*; *vehiculo*.

An ethereal vehicle or body, reported as the rational soul’s enduring immediate bodily associate. Its animation is distinguished from intermittent life in a composite elemental body; the report is qualified as Platonic opinion. References: V.13.18. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

vel; sive; seu; aut. Printed forms: *aut*; *Aut*; *nec*; *neque*; *Neque*; *seu*; *sive*; *vel*.

Alternative conjunctions and negative coordination. The five positions and subsequent dilemmas depend on whether a list supplies rival possibilities, paired descriptions, or negated options. References: VI.1.2, VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.2.1, VI.2.22, VI.5.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

velle / voluntas. Printed forms: *velit*; *velle*; *vellet*; *volet*; *voluntate*.

To will and willing, one proposed cause of conversion into body. The argument distinguishes the necessary cause of a hypothetical conversion from a sufficient condition

for its possibility. References: V.14.2, V.15.20, V.15.21, V.15.22, V.15.23. See Conversion, desire and compulsion.

verberare. Printed forms: *verberantis*; *verberatur*.

To strike or beat upon. Light strikes bodies and sound strikes the ear’s airy spirit; neither bodily impact is identified with the soul’s own passive deformation. References: VII.1.3, VII.6.3. See Sensation as attentive activity.

veritas / verum. Printed forms: *vera*; *veram*; *verior*; *veriora*; *Veritas*; *veritas*; *veritate*; *veritatem*; *veritatis*; *verius*; *verum*.

Truth or genuine intelligible integrity, not only a sentence’s correctness. It is the soul’s food and the stable object of knowledge; genuine figures and unchanging accounts contrast with materially restricted instances. References: VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.11, VIII.13.1, VIII.16.4. See Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles.

veritas; gaudium. Printed forms: *gaudentem*; *gaudium*; *veritate*; *veritatem*.

Truth and joy, reciprocally linked with light. The ascent culminates in self-shining truth, light rejoicing in truth and joy shining through it. References: VI.2.10, VI.2.11. See Separate forms and intellectual life.

versari / volutari / vagari. Printed forms: *vagatur*; *versatur*; *volutat*.

Being occupied with, turning over and ranging among objects. Ficino allocates different object-domains to sense, imagination, phantasy and intellect; the movement is often figurative rather than spatial. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.4, VIII.7.1. See Four stages of cognition.

verum / bonum. Printed forms: *bonum*; *verum*; *Verum*.

The true and the good as the objects of understanding and enjoyment. Their scope is at least as wide as being, supporting the distinction between inward operation and the agent’s limited mode of existence. References: V.13.11. See Intelligible principles and reasoning.

verus / falsus. Printed forms: *falsas*; *vera*; *veras*; *verum*; *verus*.

True or genuine and derivative or false relative to a specified rank. The ladder allows angel to image goodness while being true intellect, and irrational soul to image soul while being true nature. References: V.14.8, V.14.9. See Image, shadow and ranked truth.

vesci / pasci. Printed forms: *pascitur*; *pascuntur*; *vesceretur*; *vescitur*.

Feeding upon or being nourished, extended from bodies to intellectual truth. The food analogy distinguishes the nature of the nourished subject and the nourishment appropriate to it, while acknowledging practical bodily conditions. References: VIII.2.1, VIII.2.2, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.6, VIII.2.8. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

vestis; involvere. Printed forms: *corporali veste*; *involutam*.

A bodily garment; being wrapped or enveloped. Mind sees the soul under bodily accretions and may mistake that appearance for its nature. References: VI.2.2. See Garment, mud and misleading shadows.

vicissim. Printed forms: *vicissim*.

In turn or by alternating succession. Matter receives and loses opposing forms by turns; circular renewal and spiritual persistence must not be confused with such material exchange. References: V.4.1, V.4.4, V.12.7. See Potency, possibility and the lion.

vicissitudo generationis. Printed forms: *generationis vicissitudinem*; *successione perpetua*.

Successive change or alternation in generation. The possibility of unending generation concerns a series of new individuals, distinct from the personal permanence claimed for mind. References: VIII.16.2. See Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

vicissitudo seminum. Printed forms: *temporalis vicissitudo seminum*.

Temporal succession of productive seeds or principles. This belongs to the soul's bodily governing activity, distinguished from successive cognition and affection. References: VI.12.17. See Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

vicissitudo; vices. Printed forms: *affectionum variat vices*; *naturalem essentiae illius vicissitudinem*.

Natural alternation of essence in successive affections. Self-motion names soul's inward unfolding, without a separate agent pushing a recipient part. References: VI.12.10. See Vital motion, action and passion.

videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere. Printed forms: *audit*; *gustat*; *olfacit*; *tangit*; *videt*.

To see, hear, smell, taste and touch. The complete five-sense list specifies the outward mode rather than treating all perception as vision. References: VI.2.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

videre; cernere; intueri. Printed forms: *cernebat*; *cernit*; *cernitis*; *cernuntur*; *intueatur*; *intuemur*; *intuentur*; *intueri*; *videamus*; *videat*; *videatur*; *videbitur*; *videmus*; *vident*; *videramus*; *videre*; *videretur*; *videt*; *videtur*.

To see, discern or contemplate; passive videri can also mean to seem. Bodily seeing and intellectual vision coexist as different modes; "seems" may qualify attribution or appearance rather than certify a doctrine. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.9, VI.2.15, VI.2.16, VI.2.22, VI.2.23, VI.2.24, VI.2.26, VI.4.6, VI.6.2, VI.12.18, VI.13.6. See Intellectual objects and the owl's eye.

videri / apparere / patere / constare. Printed forms: *Apparet*; *apparet*; *Constat*; *constat*; *patet*; *videantur*; *videatur*; *videtur*.

Seeming, appearing, being evident and being established, distinct strengths of presentation. Ficino moves among illustrative appearances, explicit demonstrations and provisional formulations; a sentence's marker should not be silently upgraded to certainty. References: VIII.1.1, VIII.1.2, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.2.5, VIII.2.7, VIII.2.8, VIII.4.2, VIII.4.4, VIII.4.8, VIII.4.9, VIII.4.10, VIII.4.11, VIII.4.13, VIII.5.1, VIII.5.2, VIII.7.1, VIII.11.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.13.2, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

videri velle. Printed forms: *voluisse videntur*.

To appear to have intended a position. Ficino qualifies the attribution to the named Stoic figures; it is not an unreserved claim of a direct quotation. References: VI.1.3. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

vinculum. Printed forms: *vinculi*; *vinculum*.

A bond joining terms or connecting the world. V.9 denies a removable bond between soul's essence and being; V.15 uses the bond image positively for soul's universal mediation. References: V.9.4, V.15.4. See Soul as universal bond.

vinum / dulcedo / sapor. Printed forms: *dulcedo*; *dulcis*; *sapor*; *vino*.

Wine, sweetness and flavour in the example of dilution. Water mixed with wine can share sweetness while making the flavour weaker; cognitive reception instead improves intellectuality. References: VIII.7.1. See Receiving forms without losing one's own.

violentia. Printed forms: *violentia*; *violentiam*.

Violence or externally imposed force. The matter proof tests whether any agent can destroy the underlying foundation; the soul proof excludes a bodily force separating essence from itself. References: V.4.2, V.4.6, V.4.8, V.8.3. See Passivity and bodily affection.

vires / affectus / actus / habitus. Printed forms: *actus*; *affectus*; *habitus*; *vires*; *viribus*.

Powers, affections, acts and settled states of soul. Knowing bodily proportions still leaves these psychic features unexplained; they must not be flattened into one physiological variable. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

virtus. Printed forms: *vi*; *vim*; *vires*; *viribus*; *virtus*; *virtute*; *virtutem*; *virtutes*; *virtuti*; *virtutibus*; *virtutis*; *Virtutum*; *virtutum*; *vis*.

Effective power, the capacity whose act is operation. Creaturely power inheres in essence and is limited by that subject, unlike divine infinite creative power. References: V.1.4, V.4.1, V.4.2, V.4.6, V.4.10, V.13.7, V.13.9, V.13.12, V.13.13. See Creature, power and operation.

Excellence or effective power; the chapter on virtue specifies intellectual and moral perfection. Virtue is an indivisible quality of soul, while the closing book uses the same noun for enlarged powers of knowing, willing and living. References: VIII.3.1, VIII.3.6, VIII.3.8, VIII.16.4. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

virtus; vis. Printed forms: *vi*; *vim*; *vires*; *viribus*; *virtus*; *virtute*; *virtutem*; *vis*.

Effective power or capacity, distinct from moral virtue and sometimes from potency not yet actual. The agent's power, natural formative activity and seminal instrument are specific uses; possession of power does not itself identify the soul with a bodily quality. References: VI.1.5, VI.1.6, VI.2.8, VI.2.10, VI.3.1, VI.6.3, VI.10.1, VI.11.1. See Three offices and the order of proof.

virtute; quantitate. Printed forms: *quantitate*; *virtute magnum*.

Greatness in power contrasted with measurable size. Soul's efficacy need not imply extension; the closing question answers the fear that a nonbody would be nothing. References: VI.2.20. See Point, dimension and substantial unity.

vis. Printed forms: *vi*; *vim*; *Vim*; *vires*; *viribus*; *Vis*; *vis*.

Effective power or force, including bodily strength and intellectual capacity. Bodily strength, the unity of a knowing power and divinely enlarged intellectual reach are different applications; magnitude alone does not measure them. References: VIII.1.4, VIII.1.5, VIII.2.1, VIII.2.3, VIII.3.5, VIII.3.8, VIII.5.2, VIII.8.1, VIII.10.1, VIII.13.1, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.16.1, VIII.16.2, VIII.16.3, VIII.16.4. See Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

vis / potentia / virtus. Printed forms: *potentiam*; *vires*; *virtus*; *vis*.

Effective capacity or power, with different nouns used in overlapping ways. Soul's power of sensing is the announced route of proof, while the eye's small size does not measure the strength of inward sense. References: VII.1.1, VII.2.1, VII.3.1, VII.6.2. See Comparison and common sense.

vis agilis. Printed forms: *vis quaedam corporis agilis ad movendum*.

An active bodily power for producing motion. This is the other formulation paired with harmony, still dependent on bodily nature. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

vis in si vis. Printed forms: *si vis*.

If you wish, the second-person form of willing in a hypothetical invitation. Ficino grants genus and difference as alleged parts for the sake of the argument. This vis is not the noun for power. References: VIII.4.4. See Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

vis iudiciaria. Printed forms: *vim illam iudiciariam*; *vis illa iudiciaria*.

The judging power able to locate an affection and direct action. A divided cerebral judge would know only its own state; the positive account makes the whole judging power present to each member. References: VII.5.3. See Pain, location and reporting.

vis naturalis. Printed forms: *vi naturali*; *vis ea efficiens*; *vis ipsa naturalis*.

Natural effective power, the agent by which matter is moved or formed. V.4.10 orders productive power, rational soul and instrumental qualities; power here is not sheer bodily size. References: V.4.1, V.4.10. See Four causes and graded dependence.

vis seminaria. Printed forms: *seminaria virtus*; *Vis seminaria*.

The complete formative power within seed. Its supposed presence in each productive portion is used to argue for a power undivided by bodily quantity. References: VI.10.1. See Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

viscera. Printed forms: *visceribus*.

Entrails or internal organs, literal or metaphorical according to context. Soul is not torn from matter's entrails; hidden bodily nutrition instead uses organs literally in the vivification argument. References: V.13.1, V.14.2. See Creation and generation.

viscera; gremium. Printed forms: *naturali gremio*; *visceribus*.

Entrails and natural womb or lap, used as images of matter's generative interior. The language depicts dependence on the material source, not anatomical organs of a literal substance called matter. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

visibilis / invisibilis. Printed forms: *conspicua*; *invisibilis*; *visibilis*.

Visible, invisible and manifest, marking the light's inward source and outward disclosure. The reading visibilis after effusa longius is the supplied edition's explicit emendation against unanimous invisibilis, not a silently settled witness reading. References: VIII.13.1. See Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

visio. Printed forms: *visionem*; *visiones*.

An act of seeing or complete vision. The proposed shared whole vision is tested as an attempted escape from fragmented sensing. References: VII.4.2. See One comprehension and indivisible sensation.

visus / auditus / olfactus. Printed forms: *auditus*; *olfactus*; *Visus*.

Sight, hearing and smell, differentiated external senses. Each receives its proper kind of object; none alone compares color, voice and odor as different. References: VII.2.1. See Comparison and common sense.

vita. Printed forms: *vita*; *vitae*; *vitam*.

Life, identified with the soul's essence in the argument rather than merely an acquired property. The soul gives life while a body receives it; the distinction between life and its recipient drives the immortality proof. References: V.14.1, V.14.2, V.15.7. See Life and vivification.

vita / vivere. Printed forms: *Vita*; *vita*; *vitae*; *vitam*; *vivendi*; *vivendo*; *viventia*; *vivere*; *vivet*; *vivificare*; *Vivit*; *vivit*.

Life or living activity; inward operation is called life's act, prior to reflective intelligence. The proof moves from intellectual self-operation to life and being, then to a received limitless power of continued living. References: VIII.2.8, VIII.4.13, VIII.14.1, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3, VIII.16.4. See Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

vita mundi / novae animae. Printed forms: *novae animae*; *vita mundi*.

New souls arising from the life of the world. Ficino's Platonist answer replaces the vanished animal soul with new souls in suitable severed pieces. References: VII.5.4. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

vita se generans. Printed forms: *anima est vita se generans et producens*.

Soul as life generating and producing itself, in the reported Platonist formulation. Read with inward vital progression, not as a finite thing creating its own previously absent being. References: VI.12.12. See Vital motion, action and passion.

vita; vivere. Printed forms: *vita*; *vitae*; *vitam*; *vivant*; *vivens*; *viventia*; *vivere*; *viveret*; *vivit*; *vivunt*.

Life and living, distinguished from receiving life through another. Soul is a source of bodily life and possesses intrinsic vital activity, while the tests of an allegedly living soul-body expose its dependence on a further principle. References: VI.5.1, VI.6.2, VI.6.4, VI.11.1, VI.12.12. See Animation, first light and regress.

vivax / audens / robustus. Printed forms: *audentior*; *robustior*; *Vivacior*.

Livelier, bolder and more robust. These are predicted advantages of the just person only within the rejected reductio, not promises made by Ficino to virtuous readers. References: VII.14.1. See Moral concord and the robber.

vivere. Printed forms: *vivant*; *vivat*; *vivendi*; *vivens*; *vivent*; *vivente*; *viventem*; *viventium*; *vivere*; *vivit*; *Vivunt*; *vivunt*; *vixerat*; *vixit*.

To live, the actuality corresponding to soul's essence as life. For soul, being is living; loss of life would therefore not leave the same soul as a lifeless thing. References: V.11.3, V.11.8, V.12.12, V.12.14, V.13.18, V.14.3, V.14.7, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.

To live, with the source of life under dispute. Living fragments motivate a Platonist replacement account; all composites would live if mere harmony were soul, a rejected consequence. References: VII.5.2, VII.5.4, VII.11.1. See Severed animals and replacement souls.

vivificare. Printed forms: *vivifica*; *vivificam*; *vivificat*; *vivificatum*; *vivificet*; *vivificum*.

To give life; life-giving or made alive according to the form. The life-giving source is distinguished from the body made alive; the visible body's participation does not make its matter a part of soul. References: VI.2.21, VI.2.27, VI.4.5, VI.4.6, VI.5.3, VI.13.7. See Nourishment and the life-giving form.

vivificare / vivificatio. Printed forms: *vivificando*; *Vivificare*; *vivificare*; *vivificat*; *vivificatio*; *vivificationemque*; *vivificet*.

To give life and the giving of life, soul's proper activity toward body. Its constancy and independence from conscious bodily knowledge support Ficino's identification of soul with natural life. References: V.14.1, V.14.2, V.14.8. See Life and vivification.

vivificus spiritus / vitalis harmonia. Printed forms: *vitalis harmonia*; *vivifico spiritu*.

A life-giving spirit and the vital harmony generated by it. The text retains harmony as a real product while denying its identity with the producing life-giving principle. References: VII.11.1. See Vital harmony and its producer.

voluntas / velle. Printed forms: *nolemus*; *nolumus*; *nolunt*; *velit*; *velle*; *volemus*; *volumus*; *volunt*; *voluntas*; *voluntatem*; *voluntatis*; *vult*.

Rational appetite and willing; the same will can take its own act as an object. Steadfast moral choice follows reason, and recursive willing accompanies recursive knowing without becoming an infinite simultaneous collection of acts. References: VIII.3.5, VIII.4.5, VIII.4.8, VIII.15.1, VIII.16.1. See Reflexive understanding and willing.

voluntas constans. Printed forms: *constans*; *dictaverit*; *eligendi*; *voluntas*.

Steadfast will to choose what reason dictates. This definition supplies the ethical counterpart to the indivisible intellectual act; divided assent would fail to be the completed virtue described. References: VIII.3.5. See Virtue as an indivisible quality.

voluntas; mos; opinio; scientia. Printed forms: *Idem mos*; *opinio eadem et scientia*; *voluntas eadem*.

Same will, character, opinion and knowledge. The coordinated list supplies several kinds of continuity that a changing-substance account must explain. References: VI.13.6. See Persistence, memory and recognition.

voluptas. Printed forms: *voluptas*.

Pleasure or enjoyment, paired with understanding in V.13.11. The printed change from voluntas in the preceding unit is retained; pleasure's object is the good itself. References: V.13.11. See Creature, power and operation.

voluptas / fastidium / dolor. Printed forms: *dolorem*; *fastidium*; *molestiam*; *voluptate*.

Pleasure, disgust, pain and distress as contrasting conditions of reception. The soul's alleged pure delight in truth supports the claim that its proper intellectual nourishment does not generate bodily satiety or contrary corruption. References: VIII.2.8. See Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

vox; odor; sapor. Printed forms: *amara*; *dulcia*; *odores*; *saporem*; *vocem*.

Voice, odour and flavour, together with sweet and bitter predicates. The examples diversify sensory error beyond sight and show each sense's restricted field. References: VI.2.2, VI.2.7, VI.2.8. See Sensory error and corrective reason.

vulpes / sus / astutia. Printed forms: *astutior*; *sue*; *vulpes*.

Fox and pig contrasted in cunning. The comparison is Ficino's illustrative animal lore, not a measured contemporary intelligence ranking. References: VII.3.1. See Animal acuity and bodily size.

vultus / pupilla. Printed forms: *pupilla*; *pupillam*; *pupillis*; *vultum*.

Face and pupil of the eye. A face reflected in a pupil and a mirror supplies the scale example; the tiny pupil also motivates gathered, impartible reception. References: VII.1.2, VII.3.1. See Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors.

vultus; flumen; unda. Printed forms: *flumen*; *undas*; *vultus*.

Face, river and waves. The enduring face paints ever-new reflections in changing waters, distinguishing stable source from apparent persistence in a stream. References: VI.13.10. See Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

Xenocrates / Speusippus / Numenius. Printed forms: *Numenius*; *Speusippus*; *Xenocrates*.

Thinkers named with Plotinus as affirming irrational soul's immortality in Ficino's report. Their placement concerns this specific question; it does not establish unanimity on the soul's origin or every Platonist doctrine. References: V.14.8. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus. Printed forms: *Aristoxenus*; *Asclepiades*; *Critolausque*; *Xenophanes Colophonius*.

The thinkers reported under the matter-dependent power or harmony account. The correction Critolausque supplies the conjunction; Xenophanes is explicitly of Colophon and differs from VI.1.2's printed Xenophantes. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

Xenophon / Alcibiades / Phaedrus. Printed forms: *Alcibiadis*; *Phaedri*; *Xenophontis*.

Additional named persons whose images test memory and discrimination. Their reception would erase Plato's image or confuse all the images if soul behaved simply like impressed wax. References: VII.1.1. See Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius. Printed forms: *Antipater*; *Cleantes*; *Posidonius*; *Zeno Cittieus*.

The thinkers associated with a distributed warm quality. The reading text retains Cittieus and Cleantes as printed orthographic forms rather than creating different philosophical persons. References: VI.1.3. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

Zoroaster. Printed forms: *Zoroastris*.

The authority to whom Ficino attributes the Greek statement about remaining immortal and ruling life. The quoted attribution is recorded without claiming independent authentication of a historical saying. References: V.14.6. See Zoroaster and the mistress of life.

Greek expressions in the Latin text

The following records explain Greek expressions actually printed in the supplied Latin. They follow Ficino's accompanying Latin gloss and the edition's notes. They do not claim a new verification of the attributed ancient sources.

Immortal and mistress of life

ἀθάνατός τε μένει καὶ ζωῆς δεσπότις ἐστί

Ficino's Latin gloss is *immortalis manet ac vitae domina est*. The supplied English renders it "It remains immortal and is mistress of life."

Ficino attributes this line to Zoroaster and takes it to summarize soul's essential possession of life. The feminine δεσπότις agrees with domina; life follows soul as light the sun and hair the comet. The next unit still raises the Epicurean disappearance objection, so this authority does not replace the argument.

ἀθάνατός: Immortal or deathless; the final acute in this printed context reflects the following enclitic. *τε*: Connective particle linking the first predicate with the following καί. *μένει*: Remains or abides, stressing continued rather than momentary possession. *καὶ*: And, joining immortality with mistresshood of life. *ζωῆς*: Of life, the genitive dependent on mistress. *δεσπότις*: Mistress, a feminine noun for the ruling source of life. *ἐστί*: Is, linking the subject to mistress of life.

The apparatus at PDF 399 states that M1482 and G1559 read feminine δεσπότις. The supplied normalized quotation is reported; no independent ancient-source authentication is claimed.

Place. V.14.6, source PDF pp. 96–97. See Zoroaster and the mistress of life.

Dry light and the wisest soul

αὐγὴ ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη

Ficino's Latin gloss is *lux sicca, anima sapientissima*. The supplied English renders it "A dry light is the wisest soul."

The four Greek words mean radiance/light (αὐγή), dry (ξηρή), soul (ψυχή), and wisest (σοφωτάτη). Ficino's own Latin gloss controls the local reading. The compressed nominal statement has no expressed verb. He places it after the spark–flame and enfolded–unfolded globe comparisons, reinforcing the conception of soul as invisible sensing and intelligent light. It is not a modern medical assertion about literal dryness, nor should another familiar wording of Heraclitus be silently substituted. The forms intelligibilem and intelligentem in the same unit distinguish being intelligible from actively understanding.

Place. VI.2.26, source PDF pp. 164–165. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles.

Original form lookup

Printed forms and phrases lead to their defined Latin records. These routes are additional finding aids, not additional lexical explanations.

a. a / b: geometrical labels.

a causa deducit effectum. resolvere; deducere.

a materia libera. liber a materia.

a materia liberior. liber a materia.

a materia liberius. liber a materia.

a potentia in actum. ex otio in actum.

a prima sit causa. causa prima.

a virtute operatio. essentia; esse; virtus; operatio.

ab agente in patiens. agens; patiens.

ab anima. ab anima.

ab essentia fluit esse. essentia; esse; virtus; operatio.

ab omnibus partibus partes omnes. pars et totum.

aberrare. intermittere; aberrare.

abesse. carere / deficere / abesse.

abest. carere / deficere / abesse.

abeunte. abire / discedere; connectere / labi / abire.

abit. abire / discedere; interire / perire / abire.

Abit. abire / discedere.

Ablue. abluere; abstergere; caro.

absens. praesentia / absentia.

absente. praesentia / absentia.

absentia. praesens / absens.

absit. carere / deficere / abesse.

absoluta. absolute; absolutus.

absolutam. absolute; absolutus.

absolutaque. absolutus.

absolutas. absolute.

absolute. absolute.

absolutis. absolute.

absolutum. absolute.

absolutus. absolute; absolutus.

absque medio. intimus; absque medio; sine medio.

absque mora. statim / e vestigio / absque mora.

absque rerum ipsarum materia. absque materia / paries.

absterge. abluere; abstergere; caro.

abstractione. abstractio / abstrahere.

abstrahit. abstractio / abstrahere.

absurdissimum. absurdus / repugnare.

absurdius. absurdus / repugnare.

absurdum. absurdus / repugnare.

accedente. accedere; discedere.

accendant. resilire; accendere; consumere.

accendendum. speculum / lana / accendere.

accendere. accendere / effulgere.

accenditur. speculum / lana / accendere.

accensus. accendere / effulgere.

acceperat. recipere; accipere.

accepistis. recipere; accipere.

accepit. recipere; accipere.

accepta. accipere; accipere / suscipere.

acceptas. accipere / suscipere.

acceptis. accipere / suscipere.

accessum. accedere; discedere.

accidat. accidere.

accidens. accidens; accidens adveniens; forma substantialis; accidentalis.

accidens quoddam compositum. accidens.

accidentalem. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

accidentalibus. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

accidentibus. accidens.

accidentis. accidens.

accidere. accidere.

accidit. accidere.

accipere. accipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

accipiat. accipere / concipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

accipiendo. accipere / suscipere.

accipiet. accipere / concipere.

accipimus. recipere; accipere.

accipit. accipere; accipere / suscipere; recipere; accipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

Accipit. accipere / suscipere.

accipitur. suscipere / capere / accipere.

acies. acies / acute videre; acies mentis / caligo.

acrius. acies / acute videre.

Actio. actio / operatio / opus.

actio. actio / operatio / opus; operatio / actio.

actione. actio / operatio / opus; actio; passio.

actionem. actio; passio; operatio / actio.

actiones. agere / pati.

actionibus. actio / operatio / opus.

actionis. operatio / actio.

activa. passivus / activus.

activi. passivus / activus.

actu. actus; actus / actu; operatio; actus; potentia; actus.

actui. actus.

actum. actus; actus / actu; operatio; actus.

actum rectum. actus rectus / reflexus.

actum reflexum. actus rectus / reflexus.

actus. actus; actus / actu; operatio; actus; vires / affectus / actus / habitus.

actus simplices. actus simplex.

acuit, obtundit, aperit, claudit. acuere; obtundere; aperire; claudere.

acumen. docilitas / acumen.

acutior. acies / acute videre.

acutius. acies / acute videre.

Ad dexteram. dextera; sinistra; ante; retro.

ad incorporalia. ad incorporalia.

ad non esse. servare; non esse.

adaequationem. adaequatio.

adaequatur. adaequare; comparare / referre.

addi. magis minusve.

addicta. alligare / addicere.

addixerit. educere; eruere; addicere.

ademptione. adimere.

adest tota. tota adesse.

adhibeat. imperium / adhibere.

adimentem. adimere.

adimit. adimere.

aditis. excitare / promere / adita.

adiungat. adiungere / repellere.

admittendum. ponere / concedere / admittere.

admovet. conservator / servator.

admovetur. advertere / admovere / clamare.

adolescat. crescere; decrescere; adolescere.

adolescet. crescere; decrescere; adolescere.

adolescit. exsultare / illuminare / adolescere.

adsciscere. subterfugere; adsciscere.

adsit. praesentia / absentia.

adulto. fetus; adultus.

adveniat. accidens adveniens.

advenit. accidens adveniens.

adventitiam. adventitius.

advertitur. advertere / admovere / clamare.

aedificia. fabricare; aedificium.

aegrotare. caecutire; titubare; aegrotare.

aegrotat. mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare.

Aegyptios. Aegyptii / Pythagorei.

Aeneus. aes / aeneus.

aequabitur. aequari / aequare.

aequalem. aequalis pars / totum.

aequalior. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalis. aequalis pars / totum.

aequalitas. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalitate. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalitatem. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalitatem summam. aequalitas summa.

aequalitati. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalitatis. aequalitas / consonantia.

aequalitatis ipsius. aequalitas summa.

aequans. aequaliter; aeque; aequare.

aequantur. aequari / aequare.

aequare. aequari / aequare.

aequari. aequaliter; aeque; aequare; aequari / aequare.

aequat. aequari / aequare.

aequationem. aequatio.

aequatur. aequari / aequare; mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare.

aeque. aequaliter; aeque; aequare.

aer. ignis; aer; aqua.

aere. aqua / aer / terra; ignis; aer; aqua; pingere in se / aere / pariete.

aerea. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

aereis. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

aerem. aqua / aer / terra; ignis; aer; aqua.

aereum. igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus; luminosus / aereus / caliginosus.

aereus. luminosus / aereus / caliginosus.

aeris. aes / aeneus; aqua / aer / terra; ignis; aer; aqua.

aes. aes / aeneus.

aestus. inspirare / flagrare / aestus.

aetate adulta. aetas perfecta.

aetate perfecta. aetas perfecta.

aeternitas. aeternus / aeternitas.

aeternus. aeternus / aeternitas.

aethereo. vehiculum aethereum.

aethereum corpus. vehiculum aethereum.

affectaret. appetere / cupere / affectare.

affectat. appetere / cupere / affectare.

affectibus. opinio / affectus / distrahere.

affectio. mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis.

affectionem. moles; affectio.

affectionem corporis. qualitas / affectio corporis.

affectiones. passio / affectio.

affectionum variat vices. vicissitudo; vices.

affectu. affectus; imaginatio; industria / usus / affectus.

affectus. vires / affectus / actus / habitus.

afficiunt. passio / affectio.

affigitur. affigere / coniungere.

affiguntur terrae. affigere; avellere.

affirmabit. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

affirmabit esse se ipsam. affirmare esse.

affirmare. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

affirmari. affirmare; asserere; asseverare; probabilis; affirmare.

affirmat. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

affirmatur. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

affirmetur. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

affixum. affigere; situs.

agant. agere; operari.

agat. agere; operari.

agat et patiatur. agens; patiens.

agendas. agere / pati.

agendi. agere / efficere; agere / operari.

agens. agere / efficere.

agente. agere / efficere; agere; operari.

agentem. agere; operari.

agenti. agere; operari.

agentis. agere / efficere; agere; operari.

agentis virtute solummodo. agentis virtus.

agere. agere / pati; agere; operari.

aggrediemur. aggredi / exponere / ostendere.

aggredietur. aggredi / spirare.

agile. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

agilia. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

agilis. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

agit. agere / efficere; agere / operari; agere / pati; agere; operari.

Agit. agere / pati.

agit in corpore. agere in corpore; per corpus; per se.

agit per corpus. agere in corpore; per corpus; per se.

agitur. agere / pati.

Aglaophemus. prisci theologi.

agno. canis / agnus / sagacitas.

agnoscat. agnoscere / cognoscere.

agnoscimus. memoria; agnoscere.

agnoscit. agnoscere / cognoscere; cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere; conscius / animadversio.

agunt. agere; operari.

alat. alimentum / alere.

albedinem. nix / albedo.

albedini. albedo / inficere / foedare.

albedinisque. albedo / inficere / foedare.

albedo. nix / albedo.

Alcibiadis. Xenophon / Alcibiades / Phaedrus.

alendum. alere / nutrire.

ali. alere / nutrire.

alia quadam ratione. qua ratione.

aliena. alienus / extraneus.

alienato. alienare / purgare.

alienior. proprius / intimus / alienior.

alienis. alienus / extraneus.

alimenta. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

alimentis. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

alimento. alimentum / alere.

Alimentum. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum.

alimonia. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum.

alimoniam. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

aliquando. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

alitur. alere / nutrire.

aliud potius aliud. aliud aliud.

alligata. alligare / addicere.

alligatos. ligare; vincire.

alligatur. alligare / addicere; astringere / alligare.

alteratio, generatio, corruptio. alteratio; generatio; corruptio.

alterationem. motus / alteratio / quies.

alteritate. alteritas.

alvo. alvus / fetus.

amara. vox; odor; sapor.

amarum. dulce / amarum / utile / inutile.

amentibus. amens / mens.

amicitia. amicitia / disciplina.

amicitiae. amicitia / disciplina.

amissum. amittere.

amittat. amittere.

amittendo. adimere.

amittere. amittere; amittere / deicere; amittere; quaerere; fugere.

amittit. amittere; amittere / deicere.

amplectitur. amplexus / complecti / capere.

amplexibus. amplexus / complecti / capere.

amplificata. amplificatio divina.

amplificatione divina. amplificatio divina.

amplitudinem. amplitudo; angustia.

amplitudo. divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo.

amplius. angustus / amplus.

an. utrum; an; numquid; num.

An. utrum; an; numquid; num.

Anaximenes. Anaximenes; Diogenes; Critias.

angelis. angelus; Deus.

angelo. angelus.

angelos. angelus finitus.

angelum. angelus; angelus finitus.

angelumve. angelus; Deus.

angelus. angelus; angelus; Deus.

angustiam. amplitudo; angustia.

angustiis. amplitudo; angustia.

angustius. angustus / amplus.

anima. anima; anima / animus; anima rationalis.

anima atque corpore. materia et forma.

anima est vita se generans et producens. vita se generans.

anima magis. magis anima / magis vita.

anima nutritiva. anima nutritiva / sensitiva; principium alimenti.

anima rationalis. anima rationalis.

anima sapientissima. Heraclitus; lux sicca.

anima sensitiva. anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

anima unius sit tota naturae. unius naturae.

animadversione. conscius / animadversio.

animadversionem. perceptio / animadversio / phantasia.

animadvertat. conscius / animadversio.

animadvertit. conscius / animadversio; perceptio / animadversio / phantasia.

animae. anima; anima / animus; anima rationalis.

animae universalis. anima universalis.

animal. animal / animans; animal / rationale; homo; animal; animans.

Animal. animal / rationale.

animali. animal / animans; animal / rationale; homo; animal; animans.

animalia. animal / animans; homo; animal; animans.

animalibus. animal / rationale.

animalis. animal / animans; homo; animal; animans.

animalitas. rationalitas / animalitas.

animalium. homo; animal; animans.

animam. anima; anima / animus; anima rationalis.

Animam. anima / animus.

animantibus. homo; animal; animans.

animantis. animal / animans.

animarum. anima; anima rationalis.

animas. anima; anima rationalis.

animatum. animatum; animatus; inanimis.

animatum quiddam. animatum; animatum quiddam.

Animatumne. animatus; inanimis.

animi. anima / animus; animus.

animis. animus.

animo. animus.

Animo. animus.

animos. anima / animus.

animum. animus.

Animus. anima / animus; animus.

animus. anima / animus; animus.

ante et retro. dextera; sinistra; ante; retro.

Antipater. Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius.

Antisthenes. Antisthenes / Xenophon.

Antonio Chronico Veneto. Bembus; Chronico; Demetrius.

apis. apis / ovis / sollertia.

apostolus. Paulus apostolus.

apparet. apparere / videri / placere; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

Apparet. videri / apparere / patere / constare.

appellabat. dicere; nominare; appellare.

appellabimus. dicere; nominare; appellare.

appellatur. dicere; nominare; appellare.

appetant. appetere / cupere / affectare.

appetit. appetere / cupere / affectare.

appetitio. appetitus / appetitio; appetitus naturalis.

appetitu. appetitus / appetitio; appetitus naturalis; intellectus / sensus / appetitus.

appetitum. appetitus; proclivis.

appetitum naturalem. appetitus naturalis.

appetitus. appetitus / appetitio; dissentire / pugnare / appetitus.

appetunt. appetere / cupere / affectare.

apprehendat. apprehendere; geminus / apprehendere.

apprehendet. capere / comprehendere.

apprehendit. apprehendere; capere / comprehendere; geminus / apprehendere.

approbaveris. confutare; reprobare; approbare.

apta. aptus / ineptus.

aptabis. congruere / quadrare / aptare.

Aqua. aqua / aer / terra.

aqua. aqua / aer / terra; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; ignis; aer; aqua; speculum / aqua.

aquae. aqua / aer / terra; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus.

aquam. aqua / aer / terra; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; ignis; aer; aqua; sapor / odor / aqua.

aquatica. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

aqueis. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

aqueum. igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus.

aquilae. aquila / bos.

aquilam. aquila.

aquilino. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

arbitrantes. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

arbitrantur. apparere / videri / placere.

arbitretur. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

Arbitror. assentiri; opinari; arbitrari.

Archelaum. Chrysippus; Archelaus; Heraclides.

ardentius. ardor / ardere / ardenter.

ardet. ardor / ardere / ardenter.

ardor. ardor / ardere / ardenter.

ardorem. claritas / fervor.

argumentatio. argumentatio / demonstratio.

argumentatione. argumentatio / demonstratio; ratio as argument.

argumentationem. argumentatio / demonstratio.

argumentationibus. ratio as argument.

ariditatem. mollities / ariditas.

Ariston. Ariston.

Aristoteles. Aristoteles / Hippocrates.

Aristotelis. Aristoteles / Platonici.

Aristoxeno. Aristoxenus / musici.

Aristoxenus. Aristoxenus / Dicaearchus; Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus.

arma. furor / arma ministrare.

ars. ars; sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars.

Ars. ars; ars / instrumentum.

ars consistit ratiocinandi. ars ratiocinandi.

ars rationalis. ars ratiocinandi.

artibus. ars.

articuli. nervus; articulus; tractus.

artifex. artifex / pedissequa / officium.

artifice stabilissimo. artifex stabilissimus.

artificiorum. exemplar / fabricare.

artificiosam. ars / instrumentum.

artis. ars / instrumentum.

ascendamus. ascendere / descendere.

ascendere. ascendere / descendere.

ascendimus. ascendere / descendere; ascendere / surgere / evolare.

ascendit. ascendere / descendere; ascendere / surgere / evolare.

Ascendit. ascendere / surgere / evolare.

Asclepiades. Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus.

asino. simia / asinus / ingenium.

aspectu. aspectus / respectus.

aspectum. aspectus / respectus.

aspiciant. aspicere; despicere.

aspicitur. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

Assentior. assentiri; opinari; arbitrari.

asseras. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseres. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseri. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asserit. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseritur. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseverabimus. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseverabit. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

asseveraret. affirmare; asserere; asseverare.

assidue. assidue / naturaliter / interius.

assignata. assignare (assigned nature).

assignatum. assignare; residere; gubernare.

assignavit. assignare (assigned nature).

astricta. astringere / alligare; dominari / vigere / astringere.

astrictum. astringere / alligare.

astringuntur. astringere / alligare.

astutior. vulpes / sus / astutia.

Atqui. immo / tamen / non tamen.

attentione. attentio / attentior.

Attentior. attentio / attentior.

attentiore. attentio / attentior.

attentiores. attentio / attentior.

attentioris. attentio / attentior.

attentius. attentio / attentior.

attigerunt. attingere; percipere.

attingat. attingere.

attingenda. attingere; percipere.

attingent. attingere / penetrare.

attingere. attingere.

attinget. attingere.

attingit. attingere; attingere / persentire; attingere; percipere.

attolli. declinare; attollere.

auctor. auctor / conditor / opifex.

auctore. auctor / conditor / opifex.

audentior. leo / audacia; vivax / audens / robustus.

audit. videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere.

auditus. visus / auditus / olfactus.

auferendo. subtrahere / auferre.

augent. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; perturbatio / impedire / augere.

auget. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; generare; nutrire; augere.

augetur. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum.

augmenti. augmentum; magnitudo; crescere; decrescere.

augmentum. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; augmentum.

Augmentum. augmentum.

augmentum, decrementum. augmentum; decrementum.

auguratur. augurari / suspicari / somniare.

Augustinus. Augustinus / Aurelius; Plotinus / Augustinus.

Aurelium Augustinum. Dionysius / Origenes / Augustinus.

Aurelius. Augustinus / Aurelius.

auribus. auris / nares / os.

auris. auris / nares / os.

aurium. auris / nares / os.

aut. vel; sive; seu; aut.

Aut. vel; sive; seu; aut.

avertere. avertere / subducere.

averterit. avertere / subducere.

Avicenna. Avicenna; educatio ficta.

Avicenna narravisse. Avicenna; educatio ficta.

avida. aviditas / cupiditas.

aviditas. aviditas / cupiditas.

avis. avis; volare.

avulsa. affigere; avellere.

b. a / b: geometrical labels.

Bartholomaeus Fontius. Naldius; Fontius; Bonisegnius.

bene esse. bene esse / simpliciter esse.

benefica. beneficus.

beneficus. beneficus.

Bernardum Bembum. Bembus; Chronico; Demetrius.

Bernardus Nuthius. Landinus; Nuthius; Vespuccius.

bibit. bibere.

bicubitum. bicubitus.

Boethus. Boethus; Epicurus; Xenophantes.

bona. bonum / malum.

bonam. bonum / malum.

boni. bonum / malum.

bonis. bonum / malum.

bonitas. pulchritudo / bonitas.

bonitas naturae. bonitas naturae.

bonitate. bonum / bonitas.

bonitatem. pulchritudo / bonitas.

bonitatis. bonum / bonitas; pulchritudo / bonitas.

bono. bonum / bonitas.

bonum. bonum / bonitas; bonum / malum; verum / bonum.

bove. aquila / bos.

bovis. aquila / bos.

brachia et crura. bracchium; crus.

brachiis. brachium / opus extra.

brachiis et cruribus amputatis. bracchium; crus.

caduca. caducus.

caduco. caducus.

caecus. caecus; noctua.

caecutire. caecutire; titubare; aegrotare.

caeli. caelum; terra; mundus.

caelis. caelum; terra; mundus.

caelo. caelum; terra; mundus.

caelum. caelum; terra; mundus.

calefacere. calefacere; calefieri.

calefacit. calefacere; calefieri.

calefactio. calefactio.

calefit. calefacere; calefieri.

calens. calere; lucere; collustrare; calor; calere.

calere. calere.

Calere. calere.

calerent. calere.

calet. calere; calor; calere.

Caliditas. calor / caliditas.

caliditate. calor / caliditas.

caliditatem. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; caliditas / siccitas / frigus; calor / caliditas.

caliditati. calor / caliditas.

calidum. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus.

calidum vel frigidum. calidus; frigidus; siccus; humidus.

caligabit. caligare; dolere.

caligamus. caligare; dolere.

caligine. acies mentis / caligo.

caliginosum. luminosus / aereus / caliginosus.

calor. calor / caliditas; calor / penetrare / dissolvere; calor; calere.

calore. cor / sanguis / calor.

calorem. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; calor / caliditas; calor / penetrare / dissolvere; calor; calere.

caloris. calor / caliditas; calor / penetrare / dissolvere; calor; calere.

Caloris. calor / penetrare / dissolvere.

canis. canis / agnus / sagacitas; canis / equus / homo; canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol.

capacitate. capacitas; fomentum.

capacitatem. capacitas / implere; facultas; capacitas.

capere. capere; capere / comprehendere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

caperet. capere / comprehendere.

capiat. capere / comprehendere.

capiendo. amplexus / complecti / capere.

capit. capere; capere / comprehendere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

capitur. suscipere / capere / accipere.

capiunt. amplexus / complecti / capere; capere / comprehendere.

capiuntur. suscipere / capere / accipere.

captu. captus.

caput. caput / finis / terminus lineae; caput / membrum; caput / pectus / femur.

carcere caeco. moribundus; carcer.

cardine. circumferentia; cardo.

careat. carere / privari.

carent. carere / deficere / abesse.

carere. carere / deficere / abesse; carere / privari.

Caret. carere / deficere / abesse.

caret. carere / deficere / abesse; carere / privari.

carne. medicus / cutis / caro.

carnes. abluere; abstergere; caro; ossa / caro / nervi.

Carneum. abluere; abstergere; caro.

carnis. cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro; panis / caro.

caro. medicus / cutis / caro; os / nervus / caro; ossa; nervi; caro; panis / caro.

Casu. casus / casu.

casu. casus / casu.

casus. casus / casu.

causa. causa; causa efficiens; causa non efficiens sed formalis; efficere / causa / effectus; origo; principium; causa.

Causa. causa; causa non efficiens sed formalis.

causa principali. causa principalis; principalis / agens principale.

causae. causa efficiens.

causam. causa efficiens; origo; principium; causa.

causam primam. causa prima.

causarum. causa; causa efficiens.

causas. causa efficiens; origo; principium; causa.

causas medias. ascensio; descensio.

causis. causa; causa efficiens; conservator / servator.

cavernam. spelunca; specus; caverna.

cavillatio. cavillatio.

celeritas. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

celeriter. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

centro. centrum (concentration).

centrum. centrum (concentration); centrum / vis interior.

cepit. capere.

cera. cera.

cerae. cera.

cerebro. cor; cerebrum.

cerebrum. oculus / cerebrum.

cernebat. videre; cernere; intueri.

cernit. videre; cernere; intueri.

cernitis. videre; cernere; intueri.

cernuntur. videre; cernere; intueri.

Certa. certa / certus.

certa. certa / certus; certus / talis.

certa et determinata natura. determinata operatio.

certam. certa / certus; certus / talis.

certo. certa / certus; certus / talis.

certum. certa / certus; certus / talis.

certum habet situm. terminus; situs.

cervicem. cervix; columna.

cessat. desinere / cessare.

cesset. desinere / cessare.

ceu. per se; quodammodo; proprie.

chaos. chaos.

chordas. fides / chorda.

chordis. fides / chorda.

Christophorus Landinus. Landinus; Nuthius; Vespuccius.

Chrysippum. Chrysippus; Archelaus; Heraclides.

cibis. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

cibo. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

cibos. cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro.

cibus. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

circuitum. circuitus.

circuitum atque transitum. transitus; circuitus.

circuitus. circuitus.

Circuitus. circuitus.

circuituum. circuitus.

circularis. quadrangularis / circularis.

circuli. mathematici / circulus / planum.

circulo. circulus.

circulum. circulus.

circulus. circulus; mathematici / circulus / planum.

circumeundo. revolutio / orbicularis.

circumferentia. circumferentia; cardo.

circumscribitur. innotescere; circumscribere.

circumvolutus. revolutio / orbicularis.

clamat. advertere / admovere / clamare.

claritas. claritas / fervor.

Claritas. claritas / fervor.

claritate. claritas / fervor.

claudi. impedire / cohibere / claudere.

claudit. sopire / claudere.

clauditur. impedire / cohibere / claudere.

Cleantes. Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius.

coactis in unum. cogere in unum.

coactus. cogere.

coagulatur. coagulum; lac; coagulare.

coaguli. coagulum; lac; coagulare.

coagulo. coagulum / conglutinare.

coalescent. conspiratio / concinere / coalescere.

coalescere. coalescere.

coalesceret. coalescere.

coalescunt. coalescere; virere.

coarctatur. contrahere / coarctare.

cogantur. cogere; compellere.

cogatur. cogere; cogere; compellere.

cogens. cogere.

cogente. cogere.

cogeris. cogere; compellere.

cogi. cogere.

Cogit. cogere.

cogit. cogere; cogere; compellere.

cogitabit. cogitare; considerare.

cogitare. cogitare; cogitare; considerare.

cogitaret. cogitare.

cogitat. cogitare.

Cogitate. cogitare; considerare.

cogitatio. cogitare; considerare.

cogitatione. cogitare; considerare; cogitatione separari.

cogitatione saltem. cogitatione separari.

cogitationum. cogitare.

cogitet. cogitare.

cogitur. cogere; cogere; compellere.

cognatissimo. copulare / insinuare / cognatus.

cognitio. cognitio; cognitio / voluntas.

cognitione. cognitio.

cognitione affectioneque. discursus temporalis.

cognitionem. cognitio.

cognitu. scientia et ignorantia.

cognomen. species / genus / cognomen.

cognoscat. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscendi. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscendo. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscendum. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscere. agnoscere / cognoscere.

cognosceret. cognoscere (additional forms); cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere.

cognoscet. agnoscere / cognoscere.

cognosci. agnoscere / cognoscere.

Cognoscimus. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscimus. cognoscere (additional forms).

cognoscit. agnoscere / cognoscere; cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere.

cohibent. impedire / cohibere / claudere.

collecti. colligere; unio.

collegerat. colligere.

collegit. colligere.

colligi. colligere / impartibilis.

colligit. colligere; colligere / conciliare.

colligite. colligere; unio.

colliso. lapis / scintilla / collidere.

collo. crus / femur / pectus / collum.

collocabimus. collocare.

collustret. calere; lucere; collustrare.

colore. color / figura.

colorem. color / vox / odor.

colores. color / vox / odor.

colorum. color / vox / odor.

columnis. cervix; columna.

comam. coma.

comitem. comes; pedisequa.

commixtione. commixtio.

commodum. commodum / utilitas.

commune. communis (additional forms); proprius / communis.

commune esse. esse proprium / commune esse.

communem. natura communis; proprius; communis.

communem omnium causam. causa communis.

communem partibus. compositum / forma communis.

communes. natura communis.

communi. communis (additional forms); proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

communi sensu. communis sensus.

communia. natura communis.

communicat. communicare / infundere.

communis. natura communis; proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

communis causa. causa communis.

commutabit. commutare / transmutare.

commutaretur. commutatio; transmutatio.

commutata. commutare / transmutare.

commutatio. commutatio; commutatio; transmutatio.

commutationem. commutatio.

commutationi. commutatio.

commutent. transire / migrare / commutare.

commutet. commutare.

compagem. compages; devincire.

compago. compago / resolvere.

comparabit. comparare.

comparare. comparare.

comparat. comparare; comparare / referre.

comparatio. comparatio.

comparationes. numerus / figura / proportio.

comparationis. comparare.

comparatura. comparare.

comparet. comparare.

compassio. condolere / compassio / condolentia.

compatiantur. compati / consonare / concurrere.

compatiatur. compati / consonare / concurrere.

compelleris. cogere; compellere.

compellimur. cogere; compellere.

compellit. cogere; compellere.

compellitur. cogere; compellere.

complectuntur. amplexus / complecti / capere.

complexio. complexio.

complexio aliqua humorum atque membrorum. complexio humorum.

complexio calida. complexio calida.

complexione. temperatio / complexio.

complexionem. complexio; temperatio / complexio.

complexionis. complexio.

componant. componere.

componatur. componere.

componi. componere; constituere.

componitur. componere / compositum; componere; constituere.

componuntur. componere / compositum.

compos. compos; ferme.

composita. componere; componere / compositum; componere; constituere; compositum.

compositam. componere / compositum.

compositi. componere / compositum; componere; constituere; compositum; compositum / forma communis.

Compositio. compositio.

compositio. compositio.

compositionem. compositio; compositio / mixtum.

compositionis rationes. ratio compositionis / proportio.

compositis. componere / compositum; componere; constituere; compositum.

compositum. componere / compositum; componere; constituere; compositum.

comprehendat. capere / comprehendere; concipere / comprehendere.

comprehendens. comprehendere; concipere / comprehendere.

comprehendente. concipere / comprehendere.

comprehenderet. capere / comprehendere.

comprehendimus. capere / comprehendere.

comprehendit. capere / comprehendere.

comprehenditur. capere / comprehendere.

comprehenduntur. capere / comprehendere.

comprehensa. comprehendere.

comprehensionem. concipere / comprehendere.

compressa. comprimere; profundere.

compulsos. cogere; compellere.

concavi aeneique speculi. speculum concavum aeneum.

Concedent. ponere / concedere / admittere.

conceditur. ponere / concedere / admittere.

concentu. concentus / concinere.

concepit. concipere / excogitare.

concepta. concipere / excogitare.

conceptas. concipere / excogitare.

conceptio. conceptus / conceptio.

conceptionisque. conceptus / conceptio.

conceptus. conceptus / conceptio.

concessa. concedere / donare.

concessa sibi. concedere / donare.

conciliat. colligere / conciliare; conciliare / pax.

conciliat invicem. colligere / conciliare.

conciliet. conciliare / pax; convenire / conciliare.

concinentibus. concentus / concinere.

concinit. concentus / concinere.

concinnitas. concinnitas / consonantia.

concinnitate. concinnitas / consonantia.

concinnitatem. concinnitas / consonantia.

concinunt. conspiratio / concinere / coalescere.

conciperet. concipere / excogitare.

concipiat. accipere / concipere.

concipiatur. concipere / excogitare.

concipiet. accipere / concipere.

concipit. concipere / excogitare.

concipitve. concipere / comprehendere.

concipiunt. turgere; concipere; edere.

concludamus. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

concludendum. concludere / inferre / sequi.

concludendumque. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

concludimus. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

concludit. concludere / inferre / sequi.

Concluditur. concludere / probare.

concluditur. concludere / probare.

concoquet. concoquere / generare prolem.

concoquit. concoquere / digerere.

concordiam. consonantia; dissonus.

concurrant. compati / consonare / concurrere.

concurrere. pervenire / transire / concurrere.

concursionis. conflatus; concursus.

concursu. conflatus; concursus; contingere / concursus.

concursum. contingere / concursus.

condensatio, rarefactio, progressio. condensatio; rarefactio; progressio.

conderet. regula / lex.

condicio. condicio.

condiciones. condicio.

condicionibus. condicio.

conditionibus. condicio.

conditor. auctor / conditor / opifex.

condolentia. condolere / compassio / condolentia.

condolet. condolere / compassio / condolentia.

conducat. conducere / nocere.

conducere. commodum / utilitas.

conduceret. conducere / nocere.

confirmatur. redintegrare / confirmare / roborare.

confiteri. negare; fateri; confiteri; respondere / fateor / negare.

conflata. conflare / peragere; conflatus; concursus.

confluentibus. fluere.

conformationemque. conformatio.

confundat. confundere.

confundentur. confundere.

confusas. confundere.

confutatis. confutare; reprobare; approbare.

confutatum. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

confutatur. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

confutaverimus. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

conglutinentur. coagulum / conglutinare; consensio; concordia; conglutinare.

congregatione. congregatio / momentum.

congregationem. congregatio / momentum.

congregatum. congregatum; domus; paries.

congregentur. congregatio / momentum.

congrua. congruus / incongruus / obsistere.

congruat. convenire / conciliare.

congruet. congruere / quadrare / aptare.

congruis educationis disciplinarumque gradibus. gradus; paulatim.

coniectamur. coniicere; coniectari.

coniecturam. coniectura.

coniicimus. coniicere; coniectari.

coniungi. affigere / coniungere.

connectit. connectere / labi / abire.

connexae. connexus.

conscius. conscius / animadversio.

consensio. consensio stabilis.

consensio et concordia. consensio; concordia; conglutinare.

consensione. quies / valitudo / consensio.

consentit. consentire.

conservantur. transmittere / conservare.

conservatorem. conservare / servare.

conservatoribus. conservator / servator.

conservatrix. conservare / servare; effectrix / conservatrix / corruptrix.

conservet. conservare / servare.

considerando. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

considerare. cogitare; considerare.

considerarent. cogitare; considerare.

considerat. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

consideratione. cogitare; considerare.

considerationem. cogitare; considerare.

consilio. consilium.

consistat. simplicitas; constantia; subsistere / consistere.

consistent. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

consistere. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

consistunt. subsistere / consistere.

consonante. consonare / dissonare.

consonantia. aequalitas / consonantia; concinnitas / consonantia; consonantia / harmonia.

consonantiae. concinnitas / consonantia.

consonantiam. concinnitas / consonantia; consonantia; dissonus.

consonantior. aequalitas / consonantia.

consonat. aequalitas / consonantia.

consonet. compati / consonare / concurrere; consonare / dissonare.

conspiciat. intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

conspicit. intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

conspicitur. intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

conspicua. visibilis / invisibilis.

conspirantes. conspirare; damnare; redarguere.

conspirantibus. nectere; conspirare.

conspiratione. conspiratio / concinere / coalescere.

constabit. manere; permanere; constare.

constans. voluntas constans.

constare. manere; permanere; constare.

constat. constare / exstare; manere; permanere; constare; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

Constat. videri / apparere / patere / constare.

constet. manere; permanere; constare.

constituent. construere / constituere.

constituta. construere / constituere.

constitutam. construere / constituere.

constitutum. componere; constituere.

constitutus. componere; constituere.

construere. construere / constituere.

consuetudine. consuetudo; mos / consuetudo.

consuetudine in hanc sententiam compulsos. consuetudo.

consuetudinem. consuetudo.

consulat. possidere / consulere / imperare.

consulere. possidere / consulere / imperare.

consulit. possidere / consulere / imperare.

consumant. resilire; accendere; consumere.

consumiturque. implere / consummare.

consummatur. implere / consummare.

contemperans. contemperare / temperatrix.

contemperatam. contemperare / temperatrix.

contemplatur. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

contineantur. continere.

contineat. continere; sistere; torquere; imponere; implere; continere.

contineatur. imponere; implere; continere.

continere. continere.

contineri. continere.

continet. comprehendere; continere; imponere; implere; continere; unire; sistere; continere.

continetur. continere.

contingant. contingere / concursus.

continuatio. continuatio; ordinatrix.

continuationem molis. continuatio molis.

continuum. cumulus / continuum.

contractio. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

contrahatur. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

contrahitur. contrahere / coarctare; frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

contrahuntur. nervus; articulus; tractus.

contraria. contraria elementa; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; opposita / contraria.

contrariam. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

contrarietas. extensio; contrarietas; genus substantiae / genus qualitatis.

contrariis. contrariae qualitates / medium; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

contrariorum. contraria elementa.

contrarios. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

contrarium. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

convenientiam. convenientia / inconvenientia.

convenientibus gradibus. gradus; paulatim.

convenire. consensio stabilis.

conveniunt. convenire / conciliare.

convertat. converti / convertere.

convertatur. converti / convertere.

convertit. converti / convertere.

convivio. convivium; discumbere.

convoluta. evolvere; convolvere.

copula. copula; copulatrix.

copulantem. copula; copulatrix.

copulatum. copula; copulatrix.

copulatur. copulare / insinuare / cognatus.

corde. cor; cerebrum.

cordis. cor / sanguis / calor.

corpora. corpus.

corporale. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corporalem. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corporales. corpus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

Corporales. corpus / corporalis.

corporali. corporeus / corporalis; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis.

corporali veste. vestis; involvere.

corporalia. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corporalibus. corporeus / corporalis.

corporalis. corporeus / corporalis; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis.

corporalium. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corpore. corpus; corpus / corporalis.

corporea. corporeus / corporalis; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus / corporalis.

corpoream. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

corporeis. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

corporeo. corpus / corporalis.

corporeum. corporeus / corporalis; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

corpori. corpus; corpus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corporibus. corpus; corpus / corporalis.

corporibus geminis. corpus aethereum; corpus geminum.

corporis. corpus; corpus / corporalis.

corporum. corpus; corpus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms).

Corporum. corpus / corporalis (further forms).

corpus. corpus; corpus / corporalis.

Corpus. corpus / corporalis.

corpus aethereum. corpus aethereum; corpus geminum.

corpus animale. animale; vivens; vivificatum.

corpuscula. loculus; corpusculum.

corpusculi. corpusculum.

corpusculo. corpusculum.

corpusculum. corpusculum; spiritus / corpusculum.

corrumpetur. corrumpere / interire / perdere.

corrumpi. corrumpere / interire / perdere; corrumpere / perdere / interire.

corrumpit. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

corrumpitur. corrumpere / interire / perdere; corrumpere / perdere / interire.

corruptibile. mortalis / corruptibilis.

corruptibilem. mortalis / corruptibilis.

corruptibilia. mortalis / corruptibilis.

corruptibilis. mortalis / corruptibilis.

corruptio. corruptio.

corruptione. corruptio.

corruptionem. corruptio.

corruptrix. effectrix / conservatrix / corruptrix.

cotidianae. renovare / renovatio.

cras. hodie / cras.

crassa. crassus; subtilis; rarus.

crassiori. tenuis; crassus.

crasso. purus / crassus / terrenus.

crassum. crassus; subtilis; rarus.

creant. creare / creatio.

creantur. creare / creatio.

creat. creare / creatio.

creata. creare / creatio.

creatio. creare / creatio.

Creatio. creare / creatio.

creatione. creare / creatio.

creationem. creare / creatio; creatio / interitus.

creationis. creare / creatio.

creatur. creare / creatio.

creatura. creatura.

creaturae. creatura.

creaturam. creatura.

creavit. creare / creatio.

crescente. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

Crescente. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

crescet. crescere; decrescere; adolescere.

crescimus. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

crescit. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

crescunt. magnitudo; crescere; decrescere.

crinita. crinita.

crinitae. crinita.

crinitis. crinita.

Critias. Anaximenes; Diogenes; Critias.

Critolausque. Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus.

cruciatum. cruciatus / molestia / persensio.

cruciatus. cruciatus / molestia / persensio.

crure. crus / femur / pectus / collum.

cumulus. cumulus / continuum; divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo.

cupiat. appetere / cupere / affectare.

cupiditate. aviditas / cupiditas.

cupiditatem. cupiditas.

cupiditates. cupiditas; temperantia / libido.

cupiditatibus. cupiditas.

cupiditatis. cupiditas.

cupit. appetere / cupere / affectare.

cupitque. appetere / cupere / affectare.

curando. regere / curare.

cutem. medicus / cutis / caro.

dabit. dare / tribuere / praestare.

damnantur. conspirare; damnare; redarguere.

dare. dare / tribuere.

dat. dare / tribuere / praestare; dare; tribuere; praestare.

datur. dare / tribuere / praestare.

debent. oportere / necesse / debere.

debet. oportere / necesse / debere; posse; valere; oportere.

debilitat. tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare.

debilitatem. sustentaculum / inquinatio.

decennium. memoria; agnoscere.

declinare. declinare; attollere.

decrementi. magnitudo; crescere; decrescere.

decrementum. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum.

Decrescente. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

decrescet. crescere; decrescere; adolescere.

decrescimus. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

decrescunt. magnitudo; crescere; decrescere.

defectus. privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

defertur. ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre.

deficerent. carere / deficere / abesse.

deficiet. carere / deficere / abesse.

deficit. carere / deficere / abesse; deficere; perficere.

definiret. repugnare; reflecti; definire.

definitio. definitio; ratio / definitio.

Definitio. definitio.

definitione. definitio; ratio / definitio.

definitionem. definitio; ratio / definitio.

definitiones. definitio.

defluat. effluere / diffluere / defluere.

defluere. effluere / diffluere / defluere.

deformius. speciosus / deformis.

Dei. Deus; Deus / divinus.

dei. Deus / divinus.

deicitur. amittere / deicere.

deinde. primum / deinde / prius / secundo.

delapsas. delabi / prolabi.

delitescit. latere / delitescere; pullulare; delitescere; sagacitas / elicere / delitescere.

Demetrio Attico. Bembus; Chronico; Demetrius.

demi. magis minusve.

Democritus. Democritus; Leucippus; Hipparchus.

demonstratio. argumentatio / demonstratio.

denarios. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

denarium. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

denarius. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

Denarius. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

densatur. densitas / densare.

densitate. densitas / densare.

dent. dare / tribuere.

Deo. angelus; Deus; Deus; Deus / divinus.

deo. Deus / divinus.

Deorsum. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

deorsum. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

depellitur. expellere / depellere.

dependeat. dependere / pendere.

dependent. dependere / pendere.

dependet. dependere / pendere.

depicta. depingere.

depingit. depingere; depingere; effigies.

deprimitur. subtrahere; deprimere.

depulsus. expellere / depellere.

descendit. ascendere / descendere; ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre.

descensio. ascensio; descensio.

deserat semet ipsam. semet ipsum deserere.

deserit. deserere.

designaret. designare / discernere.

desinat. desinere / cessare.

desineret. desinere / cessare.

desinet. desinere / cessare.

desinit. desinere / cessare.

desinunt. desinere / cessare.

despiciant. aspicere; despicere.

determinat. determinare.

determinata operatio. determinata operatio.

determinato situ. affigere; situs.

determinatur. determinare.

determinet. determinare.

detrudant. gremium / detrudere / pellere.

detur. dare / tribuere.

Deum. angelus; Deus; Deus.

deum. Deus / divinus.

Deus. Deus.

deus. Deus / divinus.

devincire. compages; devincire.

dextera. dextra / sinistra.

dextra. dextra / sinistra.

dextrae. dextra / sinistra.

Dicaearchus. Aristoxenus / Dicaearchus.

dicam. dicere / loqui / vocare; dicere; nominare; appellare.

dicat. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dicatur. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dicendum. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dicere. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dices. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dici. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dicitur. dicere / loqui / vocare; dicere; nominare; appellare.

dictaverit. voluntas constans.

dictiones. dictio / supervivere.

dictu. dicere / loqui / vocare.

differentia. differentia.

differentiae. differentia.

differentiam. differentia.

differentias. differentia.

difficile. facilis / difficilis.

diffluendo. effluere / diffluere / defluere.

diffluunt. compages; devincire.

diffusa. diffundere / spargere / porrigere.

diffusione. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

diffusum. fundere / diffundere / permanare.

digeritque. concoquere / digerere.

dignitatem. dignitas.

diiudicat. diiudicare.

dilaniatio. dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere.

diligunt. pernicies / diligere opus.

dimensionibus. quantitas / dimensio.

dimidia. pars / totum.

dimidium. pars / totum.

dimisso. relinquere / dimittere.

Diogenes Apolloniates. Anaximenes; Diogenes; Critias.

Dionysium Areopagitam. Dionysius / Origenes / Augustinus.

discedit. abire / discedere.

discernantur. discernere.

discernat. discernere.

discernere. designare / discernere; iudicare; discernere; repugnare; reflecti; definire; secernere / discernere.

discernet. iudicare; discernere; sincere discernere.

discerni. discernere.

discernimus. discernere; iudicare; discernere; sincere discernere.

discernit. designare / discernere.

discerptemus. dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere.

discessum. accedere; discedere.

discindi. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

disciplina. amicitia / disciplina; disciplina / usus.

discipuli. amicitia / disciplina.

discipulum. amicitia / disciplina.

discordia. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

discretionis. discretio.

discumberemus. convivium; discumbere.

discurrendi. discursus / discurrere.

discurrendo. discursus / discurrere.

discurrit. discurrere; distrahi; discursus / discurrere.

discursione. discursus / discurrere.

discursiones. discursio; revolutio.

discursu. discursus / discurrere.

discursus temporalis. discursus temporalis.

discussione. discussio.

disiunctum. disiungere / copulare incorporeis.

disiungitur. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

disiunguntur. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

disperdemus. dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere.

dispersum. dispersus; distantia.

dispositio. figura artificiosa / dispositio.

disputando. disputare.

disputare. disputare.

disputari. disputare.

disputatio. disputare.

disputatione. disputatio; disputare.

disputationis. ratio as argument.

disputaveram. disputatio; disputare.

Dissensio. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

dissensio. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

Dissentit. dissentire / pugnare / appetitus.

disseras. disputatio; disputare.

disseruisti. disputatio; disputare.

dissimiles. similitudo.

dissimillimas. similitudo.

dissipabit. naturalis habitus / dissipare.

dissiparetur. naturalis habitus / dissipare.

dissociantis. excessus / extraneus / dissociare.

dissolvere. calor / penetrare / dissolvere.

dissolvit. calor / penetrare / dissolvere.

dissolvitur. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

dissonante. consonare / dissonare.

dissonantia. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

dissonantibus. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

dissonas. consonantia; dissonus.

dissonat. consonare / dissonare; dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

dissonent. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

dissonet. consonare / dissonare.

dissonum. dissonantia / discordia / dissensio.

distante. speculum / distantia.

Distantia. intervallum / distantia.

distantia. intervallum / distantia.

Distantiam. intervallum / distantia.

distantiam. speculum / distantia.

distantiam partium. dispersus; distantia.

distentus. moles / distendere.

distrahi. opinio / affectus / distrahere.

distrahitur. discurrere; distrahi.

distribues. distribuere / partiri / secare.

distribuet. iustitia / suum cuique.

diu. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

diutissime. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

dividas. dividere / secare / partiri.

dividendo. dividere; divisio.

dividi. dividere / secare / partiri; dividere; divisio.

dividimus. dividere / secare / partiri.

dividitur. distribuere / partiri / secare; dividere / secare / partiri; dividere; divisio.

dividua. dividuum / divisibilis; divisibilis / dividuus.

dividuis. divisibilis / dividuus.

dividuntur. dividere; divisio.

divina. Deus / divinus.

divinam. Deus / divinus.

divinior. magnificentior; divinior.

divinis haeret. haerere.

divino. Deus / divinus.

divino numine invocato. numen invocare.

divinorum. Deus / divinus.

divisa. dividere; divisio; indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis.

divisam. dividere; divisio.

divisibile. dividere; divisio; dividuum / divisibilis; divisibilis / dividuus.

divisibilem. dividuum / divisibilis; divisibilis / dividuus.

divisibiles. dividere; divisio.

divisibili. divisibilis / dividuus.

divisibilis. dividere; divisio; dividuum / divisibilis; divisibilis / dividuus.

divisio. resolutio / divisio.

divisionem. dividere; divisio; resolutio / divisio.

divisionis. dividere; divisio; divisio / membrum.

divitiarum. divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo.

dixeris. dicere; nominare; appellare.

dixerit. dicere / loqui / vocare; dicere; nominare; appellare.

Dixerit. dicere / loqui / vocare; dicere; nominare; appellare.

diximus. dicere / loqui / vocare.

docendo. docere.

docet. docere; propositio / docere.

docilitas. docilitas / acumen.

doctrinarum. mores; doctrina; tempus.

doleat. offendere / dolere.

dolebit. caligare; dolere.

dolemus. caligare; dolere.

dolor. offendere / dolere; offensio; dolor.

dolorem. voluptas / fastidium / dolor.

domina. domina / dominari.

Domina. domina / dominari.

dominatur. domina / dominari; dominari / vigere / astringere.

domus. congregatum; domus; paries.

donatus. concedere / donare.

dormienti. dormire / vigilare / expergefieri.

dotes. dos.

dotes ex eo. dos.

ducentes. regere; ducere; gubernare.

ducit. regere; ducere; gubernare.

ducitur. regere; ducere; gubernare.

dulce. dulce / amarum / utile / inutile.

dulcedo. vinum / dulcedo / sapor.

dulcia. vox; odor; sapor.

dulcis. vinum / dulcedo / sapor.

dum est. dum est.

Dum scilicet est. dum est.

dum scilicet est. dum est.

duo. duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

duorum. duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

e vestigio. e vestigio; statim / e vestigio / absque mora.

eadem. similis; idem.

eandem prorsus. figura eadem; similis.

earundem. similis; idem.

eatenus. quatenus / eatenus.

ebrietatem. phrenesis; somnus; ebrietas.

ebrius. ebrius / monstrum.

educationem fictam. Avicenna; educatio ficta.

eduxerit. educere; eruere; addicere.

effectibus. effectus proprius; ordo naturae / effectus.

effector. causa efficiens.

effectrix. effectrix / conservatrix / corruptrix.

effectu. ordo naturae / effectus.

effectum resolvit in causam. resolvere; deducere.

effectus. efficere / causa / effectus.

effectus proprios. effectus proprius.

efficiatur. efficere / producere / generare.

Efficiens. causa efficiens.

efficiens. causa efficiens.

efficiente. causa efficiens.

efficientem. causa efficiens.

efficit. agere / efficere; efficere / causa / effectus; efficere / producere / generare.

efficitur. agere / efficere; efficere / producere / generare.

efficiunt. efficere / producere / generare.

effigiem. simulacrum / imago / effigies.

effigies. simulacrum / imago / effigies.

effigies et figuras. depingere; effigies.

effingendam. prospicere / effingere / fingere.

effingere. fingere; machinari; effingere.

effingeremus. prospicere / effingere / fingere.

effluat. fluere.

effluendo. effluere / diffluere / defluere.

effluet. fluere.

effluet refluetque. effluere; refluere.

effluit. effluere / diffluere / defluere; fluere.

effluit extra operantem. operatio quae effluit / quae manet.

effulgeat. accendere / effulgere.

effundit. effundere.

effusio. effundere.

egeat. egenus / egere / indigere; sufficientia / indigere.

egena. egenus / egere / indigere.

egeret. egenus / egere / indigere.

eget. egenus / egere / indigere.

eget patiturque. egere; pati.

eiusdem. similis; idem.

elementa. elementum.

elementi. elementum / mixtum.

elementis. elementum.

elemento. elementum.

elementorum. contraria elementa; elementum.

elementum. elementum.

elephantis. canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol.

elephas. elephas / equus / prudentia.

eliciantur. sagacitas / elicere / delitescere.

eligendi. voluntas constans.

emendat. iudicium; emendare.

emendentur. iudicium; emendare.

emergentium. emergere.

emergeret. immergere / emergere.

Emergite. emergere; immergere.

emicet. emicare / exuberare / evadere.

Empedocles. Empedocles / Timaeus Locrus.

enervamus. enervare / nervosus.

enervato. enervare / nervosus.

enuntiat. referre / enuntiare.

enutritur. alere / nutrire.

Epicuree. Strato / Epicureus.

Epicurei. Epicurei.

Epicureis. Epicurei.

Epicureos. Epicurei.

Epicureus. Epicurei; Strato / Epicureus.

Epicurus. Boethus; Epicurus; Xenophantes.

equi. canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol; equus / homo.

equo. elephas / equus / prudentia.

equum. equus / homo.

equus. canis / equus / homo; equus / homo.

ergo. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

Ergo. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

erit. esse; habere; fieri.

eruerit. educere; eruere; addicere.

erunt. esse; habere; fieri.

es. esse; habere; fieri.

esca. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

Escam. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

escam. alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus.

esse. creatio / interitus; esse; esse; existere.

Esse. creatio / interitus; esse.

esse commune. esse proprium / commune esse.

esse proprium. esse proprium; esse proprium / commune esse.

esse se prorsus incorporalem. affirmare esse.

esse totius compositi. esse proprium.

essendi. esse.

essendi modos. modus essendi.

essendi modum. modus essendi.

essendi naturam. modus essendi.

essendi radicem. radix essendi.

essent. esse; habere; fieri.

essentia. essentia; essentia–vita–mens; substantia; essentia.

Essentia. essentia.

essentia, esse, virtute et actione. quatuor elementa.

essentiae. essentia; substantia; essentia.

Essentiam. essentia.

essentiam. essentia; substantia; essentia.

essentias. essentia.

esset. esse; habere; fieri.

est. esse; habere; fieri.

Esto, si vis. hypothetical concession.

esurienti. esurire / sitire.

esurit. esurire / sitire.

evaditque. emicare / exuberare / evadere.

evanescens. flatus; evanescere.

evolat. ascendere / surgere / evolare.

evolutumque. evolvere; convolvere.

Ex nihilo. in nihilum.

ex nihilo. in nihilum.

ex nihilo processit in lucem. ex nihilo in lucem.

ex otio in actum. ex otio in actum.

ex se. ex se / in se / per se.

ex se ipsa possidet vitam. adventitius.

excedit. superare / excedere / excellere.

excellat. superare / excedere / excellere.

excellentiore. praestans; excellens; nobilis.

excellentius. praestans; excellens; nobilis.

excellit. superare / excedere / excellere.

excessum. excessus / extraneus / dissociare.

excitata. excitare / promere / adita.

excitatum. excitatum iudicium.

excogitare. prospicere / intueri / excogitare.

excogitaret. concipere / excogitare.

excogitat. concipere / excogitare; posse / fingere / excogitare.

excogitata. concipere / excogitare.

excogitato. prospicere / intueri / excogitare.

excursio. excursio; praeludium.

exemplar. exemplar; exemplar / fabricare.

exemplares. exemplar.

exemplaria. exemplar; exemplar / fabricare.

eximit. eximere / liberare.

existentiae. existentia.

existentiam. existentia.

existere. esse; existere.

existimabit. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

existimabunt. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

existimant. apparere / videri / placere; putare; existimare; arbitrari.

existimet. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

existimo. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

existit. esse; existere.

expectationemque. memoria / expectatio.

expellere. expellere / depellere.

expergefacto. dormire / vigilare / expergefieri.

expergiscatur. expergisci.

Experiantur. experiri; experientia.

experientia. experiri; experientia.

expers. expers.

expertem. expers.

explicatas. implicare; explicare.

explicatur. implicare; explicare.

exposuerimus. aggredi / exponere / ostendere.

expulsa. expellere / depellere.

exsistit. per se exsistere / operari.

exstat. constare / exstare.

exsultat. exsultare / illuminare / adolescere.

Extensio. extensio; contrarietas.

extensio. latitudo / extensio.

extenuat. extenuare.

extenuata. extenuare.

exterioremque. superficies / pictura.

externo. intrinsecus; extrinsecus.

extiterit. per se exsistere / operari.

extra. brachium / opus extra; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

extraneae. excessus / extraneus / dissociare.

extraneis. alienus / extraneus.

extrema. lignum / extremum punctum; tria puncta / medium / extrema.

extremorum. tria puncta / medium / extrema.

extrinsecone principio. extrinsecum principium.

extrinsecum. extrinsecum principium.

extrinsecus. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

exuberat. emicare / exuberare / evadere; exuberare.

exuerit. induere / exuere.

exuit. induere / exuere.

fabricare. exemplar / fabricare.

fabricat. exemplar / fabricare; fabricare / servare / reficere; fabricare; aedificium.

fabricet. fabricare / servare / reficere.

facere. facere / fieri.

faciem. facies / profundum.

Facile. facilis / difficilis.

Facilius. facilis / difficilis.

facillime. agilis; agilitas; celeritas.

facit. facere / fieri; fieri / facere.

facitque. fieri / facere.

facta. facere / fieri (further forms).

factae. facere / fieri.

Factae. facere / fieri.

facti. facere / fieri (further forms).

factum. fieri / facere.

facultatem. facultas; capacitas.

falsas. verus / falsus.

fastidium. voluptas / fastidium / dolor.

Fateantur. respondere / fateor / negare.

fateberis. negare; fateri; confiteri.

fatebitur. negare; fateri; confiteri.

fatebuntur. respondere / fateor / negare.

fatendum. negare; fateri; confiteri.

felicitas. felicitas.

femore. crus / femur / pectus / collum.

femur. caput / pectus / femur.

fer. luci / fer / latio.

ferro. magnes / ferrum / trahere / suspendere.

feruntur. reflecti / ferri.

fervet. calere; lucere; collustrare.

fervor. claritas / fervor.

fetu. fetus; adultus.

fetus. alvus / fetus.

fiat. esse; habere; fieri; facere / fieri; facere / fieri (further forms).

ficus. milium / ficus.

fidibus. fides / chorda.

fieret. facere / fieri (further forms).

fieri. esse; habere; fieri; facere / fieri (further forms); fieri / facere.

fiet. esse; habere; fieri; facere / fieri (further forms); fieri / facere.

Fiet. facere / fieri (further forms).

figmento. figmentum / machinatio.

figmentum. figmentum / machinatio.

figulo. figulus.

figuntur. fingere / figere.

figura. color / figura; figura / figurare; numerus / figura / proportio; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura.

figura artificiosa. figura artificiosa / dispositio.

figurae. figura / figurare; numerus / figura / proportio.

figuram. figura / figurare; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura.

figuram eandem. figura eadem; similis.

Figurare. figurare; perfectus agens.

Figurarum. numerus / figura / proportio.

figurarum. numerus / figura / proportio.

figuras. figura / figurare; numerus / figura / proportio.

figuratur. figura / figurare.

figuris. color / figura.

finalem. finis / causa finalis.

fine. finis (end and absence of end); finis / causa finalis; finis; limes; terminus; principium / finis.

finem. caput / finis / terminus lineae; finis (end and absence of end); finis / causa finalis; finis; limes; terminus; ortus / finis virtutis; principium / finis.

fines. finis; limes; terminus.

fingere. fingere; machinari; effingere.

fingi. fingere / figere.

fingimus. prospicere / effingere / fingere.

fingit. posse / fingere / excogitare.

finibus. finis (end and absence of end).

finis. finis (end and absence of end); finis / causa finalis; ortus / finis virtutis; principium / finis.

finito. angelus finitus.

finitum. angelus finitus.

finximus. prospicere / effingere / fingere.

fit. esse; habere; fieri; facere / fieri.

Fit. facere / fieri.

fiunt. esse; habere; fieri; facere / fieri (further forms); fieri / facere.

Fiunt. facere / fieri (further forms); fieri / facere.

flagrantia. inspirare / flagrare / aestus.

flagrat. inspirare / flagrare / aestus.

Flamma. lignum / flamma / flammula.

flamma. lignum / flamma / flammula; scintilla; flamma.

flammam. lignum / flamma / flammula.

flammula. lignum / flamma / flammula.

flatus alicuius instar. flatus; evanescere.

fluentes. fluere.

fluit. effluere; refluere; fluere.

flumen. vultus; flumen; unda.

fluxum. solidus / fluxus / labilis.

fluxum et labile. fluxus; labilis; solidare.

fluxum, solidum, album, nigrum. fluxus; solidus; albus; niger.

foedari. albedo / inficere / foedare.

foedius. speciosus / deformis.

fomento. capacitas; fomentum.

fomite. fomes.

fomitem. fomes.

fons. fons / receptaculum naturale; fons / subiectum virtutis.

Fons. fons essendi.

fons et receptaculum motionis. fons; receptaculum.

fontem essendi. fons essendi.

fore. esse; habere; fieri.

foret. esse; habere; fieri.

Forma. forma.

forma. forma.

forma istis astricta. simplex qualitas / forma astricta.

forma sequens complexionem. simplex qualitas / forma astricta.

formabile. formabile / formator.

formae. forma; forma / qualitas.

Formae. forma.

formalis. non efficiens sed formalis.

formam. forma; forma / qualitas; forma vivifica; motor / rector / una forma.

formam accidentalem. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

formam quandam. compositum / forma communis.

formantis. formabile / formator.

formantis lege. lex formantis.

Formare vero se ipsam anima nova nequit. formare se ipsam.

formari non potest. formari.

formarum. forma.

formas. forma; forma / qualitas; forma segregata; subiectum.

format. formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation).

formator. formabile / formator.

formatore. formabile / formator.

formatur a corpore. formari a corpore.

formetur. formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation).

formicae. canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol.

formidini. fortitudo / timor.

formis. forma.

formis accidentalibus. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

Forsan. forsitan / forsan / fortasse.

forsitan. forsitan / forsan / fortasse; forte / forsitan / si modo; hypothetical concession.

fortasse. forsitan / forsan / fortasse.

forte. forte / forsitan / si modo.

fortis. fortitudo / timor.

fortiter. fortitudo / timor.

fortitudo. fortitudo / timor.

foveretur. fovere.

fractis. frangere / reparare.

frangeret frangereturque. frangere.

frangit. frangere; inficere.

frangitur. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

fregeris. frangere / recreare.

frigefieri. frigefieri; scaturire.

frigiditas. frigiditas / frigus.

frigiditatem. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; frigiditas / frigus.

frigiditatem quandam secundum virtutem. frigiditas secundum virtutem.

frigiditatem secundum actum. frigiditas secundum virtutem.

frigore. frigiditas / frigus.

frigus. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; caliditas / siccitas / frigus; frigiditas / frigus.

fronte. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

fruitur. frui.

frusta. frustum / secare; frustum; secare.

frustis. frustum / secare.

fugam. amittere; quaerere; fugere.

fugant. fugare / fugere.

fugat. fugere / fugare.

fugatur. fugare / fugere.

fugiat. amittere; quaerere; fugere.

fugit. fugere / fugare.

fugiunt. fugare / fugere.

fuisse. esse; habere; fieri.

fulget. calere; lucere; collustrare.

fulgor. fulgor; splendor.

fumos. vapor / fumus.

fundamento. fundamentum.

fundamentum. fundamentum; sedes / fundamentum.

Fundatur. fundere; movere.

fundit. fundere / diffundere / permanare.

fundit et solidat. fundere; solidare.

fundo putei. puteus; fundus.

furor. furor / arma ministrare.

fusa. diffundere / spargere / porrigere.

futuri. futurum / praesens / praeteritum.

futuro. futurum / praesens / praeteritum.

futurum. praeteritum / futurum / praesens.

gaudentem. veritas; gaudium.

gaudet. exsultare / illuminare / adolescere.

gaudium. veritas; gaudium.

geminae. geminus / apprehendere.

geminas. geminus / apprehendere.

geminis. geminus / apprehendere.

genera. genus.

generabit prolem. concoquere / generare prolem.

generant. efficere / producere / generare.

generare. producere / gignere / generare.

generat. efficere / producere / generare; generare; nutrire; augere; producere / gignere / generare.

generatio. generatio.

Generatio. generatio.

generatione. generatio.

generationis. generatio / genitrix / successio.

generationis vicissitudinem. vicissitudo generationis.

genere. genus.

genere qualitatis. genus substantiae / genus qualitatis.

generis. genus.

generisque. species / genus / cognomen.

genito. genitor; genitum.

genitor. genitor; genitum.

genitrice. generatio / genitrix / successio.

genitum. genitor; genitum.

genitus. genitor; genitum.

genu. genu / lapillus.

genuit. producere / gignere / generare.

genus. genus.

Georgius Antonius Vespuccius. Landinus; Nuthius; Vespuccius.

germine. radix; germen; ramus.

gigneret. producere / gignere / generare.

gignit. producere / gignere / generare.

glaucis. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

glebis. lutum; testa; gleba.

Gorgiaque. Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias.

gradatim. ascendere / descendere; gradus; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; successio / gradatim.

gradiantur. spontaneus; gradi.

gradibus. ascendere / descendere; gradus.

gradiendum. spontaneus; gradi.

gradu. gradus; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura.

gradum. gradus.

gradus. gradus.

Graeci. Graeci Platonici / Arabes Platonici.

grandi. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

grandiorem. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

granis. gutta / triticum / granum.

gravatur. mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare.

graves humores. spiritus leves; humores graves.

gravescit. turgescere / gravescere.

gremio. gremium / detrudere / pellere; sinus / gremium.

gubernans. assignare; residere; gubernare; regere; ducere; gubernare.

gustat. videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere.

guttis. gutta / triticum / granum.

guttula seminis. guttula; ova piscium.

habeant. esse; habere; fieri; habere; habere / possidere.

habeat. esse; habere; fieri; habere; habere / possidere.

habebit. esse; habere; fieri.

habebitur. habere / possidere.

habemus. habere / possidere.

habent. esse; habere; fieri; habere.

habentur. habere / possidere.

habere. esse; habere; fieri; habere; habere / possidere.

haberet. esse; habere; fieri; habere.

habet. esse; habere; fieri; habere; habere / possidere.

Habetis. esse; habere; fieri.

habetur. habere / possidere.

habitum. habitus; naturalis habitus / dissipare.

habituram. habere / possidere.

habitus. habitus; vires / affectus / actus / habitus.

habuerit. habere.

haec ipsi viderint. ipsi viderint.

haerent. haerere / inhaerere.

haerentem. haerere / inhaerere.

haerere. haerere / inhaerere.

haeret. haerere / inhaerere.

harmonia. consonantia / harmonia; harmonia; harmonia / progenitus.

harmoniae. consonantia / harmonia.

harmoniam. harmonia / progenitus.

hauriatur. haurire.

haurientis. haurire.

haurire. haurire.

haurit. haurire.

hauriuntur. haurire; perdere; servare.

hausti. haurire.

hebes. pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus.

Heraclidem Ponticum. Chrysippus; Archelaus; Heraclides.

Heraclito. Orphici / Heraclitus.

Heraclitus. Heraclitus; lux sicca.

Hesiodus. Hippias; Hesiodus; Pronopides.

hic. hic / ibi.

Hipparchus. Democritus; Leucippus; Hipparchus.

Hippias. Hippias; Hesiodus; Pronopides.

Hippocrates. Aristoteles / Hippocrates.

hodie. hodie / cras.

homine. homo / humanus; homo; animal; animans.

hominem. equus / homo; homo / humanus.

Hominem. homo / humanus.

homines. homo / humanus; homo; animal; animans.

hominibus. equus / homo.

hominis. equus / homo; homo / humanus; homo; animal; animans.

hominum. homo / humanus; homo; animal; animans.

homo. canis / equus / homo; equus / homo; homo / humanus; homo; animal; animans.

horologio. horologium; sonare.

horres. parvipendere; horrere.

hostile. hostilis / noxius.

humana. homo / humanus.

Humana. homo / humanus.

humanae. homo / humanus.

humanam. homo / humanus.

humanitas. humanitas.

Humanitas. humanitas.

humanitate. humanitas.

humanitatem. humanitas.

humanitatis. humanitas.

humanus. homo / humanus.

humeris. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

humiditas. humiditas / humor.

Humiditas. humiditas / humor.

humiditatem. humiditas / humor.

humiditati. humiditas / humor.

humidum. humidus / terreus / lutulentus.

humor. humiditas / humor; humor; membrum; spiritus.

humores. humor / mixtio / procreare; humor; membrum; spiritus.

Humores. humor / mixtio / procreare.

humoribus. humor; membrum; spiritus.

humorum. humor; membrum; spiritus; humores.

humorum conditionem. conditio humorum / imperium.

ibi. hic / ibi.

idea. idea.

ideae. idea.

ideam. idea.

ideaque. idea.

ideas. idea.

ideis. idea.

idem. similis; idem.

Idem mos. voluntas; mos; opinio; scientia.

idola. idolum / simulacrum.

idoneis. idoneus / vilis / perfectior.

Igitur. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

igitur. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

ignarus. scientia et ignorantia.

ignavia. ignavia / torpere.

igne. ignis; aer; aqua.

ignem. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; ignis; ignis; aer; aqua; lampas; ignis.

igneum. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus; ignis.

igni. ignis.

ignis. aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; ignis; ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre; ignis / terra / lapis; ignis; aer; aqua; ovis / ignis.

Ignis. ignis.

ignita. ignitus.

ignorat enim se ipsam. ignorare se ipsam.

ignota. scientia et ignorantia.

iisdem. similis; idem.

illecebras. illecebra.

illorum imperium. conditio humorum / imperium.

illuc. unde / inde / illuc.

illuminatum. primum lumen.

illuminatur. exsultare / illuminare / adolescere.

imaginatio. imaginatio.

Imaginatio. imaginatio.

imaginatione corporali. affectus; imaginatio.

imaginationem. imaginatio.

imaginationi. imaginatio.

imaginem. imago.

imaginem aliam suae similem. imaginem aliam suae similem.

imagines. imago; simulacrum / imago / effigies.

imagines scientiasque tenere memoriter. memoriter tenere.

imaginibus. imago.

imaginum. imago.

imago. imago; simulacrum / imago / effigies.

immensa. infinitus / immensus.

immensae. immensus / ingens.

immensam. infinitus / immensus.

immensum. immensus / ingens.

immersa. immergere / emergere.

immersae. emergere; immergere.

immo. immo / tamen / non tamen; immo; tamen; nihilominus.

Immo. immo / tamen / non tamen; immo; tamen; nihilominus.

immobile. immobilis / stabilis.

immobili. movere / immobilis.

immobilis. immobilis / stabilis.

immortalem. immortalis / immortalitas.

immortales. immortalis / immortalitas.

immortali. immortalis / immortalitas.

immortalis. immortalis / immortalitas; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus.

Immortalis. immortalis / immortalitas.

immortalitas. immortalis / immortalitas.

immortalitate. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus.

immortalitatem. immortalis / immortalitas; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus.

immortalitatis. immortalis / immortalitas.

immutabiles. incommutabilis / immutabilis; mutabilis / immutabilis.

immutabilibus. incommutabilis / immutabilis.

immutabilis. incommutabilis / immutabilis.

impartibile. colligere / impartibilis; impartibilis.

impartibile aliquid. impartibile; internus agitator.

impartibilem. indivisibilis; impartibilis.

impartibili. impartibilis.

impediat. impedire / cohibere / claudere.

impedimentum. impedire / cohibere / claudere.

impediunt. perturbatio / impedire / augere.

imperare. possidere / consulere / imperare.

imperdibile. imperdibilis.

imperdibilis. imperdibilis.

imperfecta. deficere; perficere; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

imperfectae. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

imperfectum. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

imperii. divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo.

imperio. imperium / adhibere.

imperium. imperium / adhibere.

impleat. capacitas / implere.

implere. implere / consummare; imponere; implere; continere; penetrare; implere.

impleret. imponere; implere; continere.

impleretur. capacitas / implere.

implet. implere / consummare; imponere; implere; continere.

impletur. capacitas / implere.

implicatos. implicare; explicare.

imponat. imponere; implere; continere.

imponit. imponere; implere; continere.

impossibile. necessarium / impossibile; possibile / utile / impotentia.

impotentia. possibile / utile / impotentia.

impressa. imprimere.

impressam. imprimere.

imprimentem. imprimere.

imprimit. imprimere.

in alio. in se / in alio / in multis.

In circulum. rectum; obliquum; circulus.

in deteriorem commutetur essentiam. in deteriorem essentiam.

in eodem loco. aequare in loco.

in infinitum. progressio in infinitum.

in multis. in se / in alio / in multis.

in natura finita. finita natura.

in nihil. in nihilum.

In nihilum. in nihilum.

in nihilum. in nihilum.

In obliquum. rectum; obliquum; circulus.

in plurimis. portiuncula; plurimi.

in rectum. rectum; obliquum; circulus.

in se. ex se / in se / per se.

in se angelumve reflectitur. reflecti.

in se ipsam considerandam reflectitur. reflecti.

in se ipso. in se / in alio / in multis.

in se recipere. se recipere.

in seipsam se recipit. se recipere.

in subiectum novum de vetere subiecto transire. insinuare; transire.

inanime. animatus; inanimis; inanimis / mortuus.

inanimis. animatus; inanimis.

inchoatione. inchoatio.

incitante. incitare.

inclinationem. inclinari.

inclinatur. inclinari.

inclinetur. inclinari.

incohatione. semen; incohatio; proportio.

incolumes. incolumis; servare.

incommutabilia. incommutabilis / immutabilis.

incommutabiliter. incommutabilis / immutabilis.

incongruis. congruus / incongruus / obsistere.

inconvenientiam. convenientia / inconvenientia.

incorporale. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

incorporalem. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

incorporales. incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporali. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

incorporalia. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporalis. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

incorporalium. incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporea. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporealem. incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorpoream. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus.

incorporeas. incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporeis. incorporeus / incorporalis.

incorporeis copulabit. disiungere / copulare incorporeis.

incorporeo auctore. auctor; producere.

incorporeum. corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; incorporeus / incorporalis.

incremento. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum.

incrementum. augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum.

indaginem. lepus / vestigium / indago.

inde. unde / inde / illuc.

indiciis. indicium / rimari.

indifferens. indifferens.

indifferens ad utrumque. indifferens.

indigeat. sufficientia / indigere.

indigent. egenus / egere / indigere.

indigentiam. sustentaculum / inquinatio.

indigere. sufficientia / indigere.

indiget. egenus / egere / indigere; egere; pati; sufficientia / indigere.

indigus. egenus / egere / indigere.

indissolubile. indissolubilis.

indissolubilem. indissolubilis.

indissolubilis. indissolubilis.

individua. individua; magnitudo; individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum.

Individua. individuus / indivisibilis.

individuam. individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum.

individuamque. individuus / indivisibilis.

individuas. individuus / indivisibilis.

individuis. individuus / indivisibilis.

individuum. individuum; individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum; indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis.

individuumque. individuus / indivisibilis.

individuus. individuus / indivisibilis.

indivisibile. individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum.

indivisibilem. individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum; indivisibilis; impartibilis.

indivisibiles. indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis.

indivisibili. individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum.

indivisibilis. individuus / indivisibilis; indivisibilis / individuum; indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis; quantitate protendi.

indivisibilium. indivisibilis / individuum.

induet. induere / exuere.

indui. induere / exuere.

induitur. induere / exuere.

industria. industria / usus / affectus.

inepta. aptus / ineptus.

ineptior. aptus / ineptus.

inerit. inesse.

inesse. inesse.

inesset. inesse.

inest. inesse.

infectionem. infectio / puritas.

infectis. infectio / puritas.

inferemus. concludere / inferre / sequi.

infici. albedo / inficere / foedare.

inficitur. frangere; inficere.
infinita. infinitus / immensus; infinitus / infinitas.
infinita quaedam multitudo. infinitae partes actu.
infinitae partes in actu. infinitae partes actu.
infinitam. infinitus / immensus; infinitus / infinitas.
infinitas. infinitus / infinitas; infinitus / innumerabilis.
infinitate. infinitus / infinitas.
infinitatem. infinitus / infinitas.
infinitati. infinitus / infinitas.
infinite. infinitus / infinitas; infinitus / innumerabilis.
infiniti. infinitus / innumerabilis.
infinitis. infinitus / infinitas.
infinito. infinitus / infinitas.
infinitos. infinitus / infinitas; infinitus / innumerabilis.
Infinitum. infinitus / infinitas.
infinitum. infinitus / infinitas.
infinitum actum. actus infinitus / potentia infinita.
infinitus. infinitus / immensus; infinitus / infinitas.
influat. fluere.
influenti. fluere.
influentibus. fluere.
influit. fluere; relabi / redundare.
influxu. influxus.
influxum. influxus.
influxus. influxus.
informe. informis.
informi. informis.
informia subiecta. forma segregata; subiectum.
informis. informis.
informis materia. informis materia.
infrigescibile. infrigescibilis.
infrigescibilis. infrigescibilis.
infundendo. infundere.
infundendum. infundere.
infundere. infundere.

infundit. communicare / infundere; infundere.

infundunt. infundere.

ingenii. ingenium.

ingenio. ingenium.

ingeniosior. simia / asinus / ingenium.

ingenium. ingenium.

ingens. immensus / ingens.

ingentem. immensus / ingens.

inhaerentem. haerere / inhaerere.

inhaerere. haerere / inhaerere.

inhaeret. haerere / inhaerere.

inimica. conciliare / pax.

innotescere. innotescere; circumscribere.

innumerabiles. infinitus / innumerabilis; innumerabilis.

Innumerabiles. innumerabilis.

innumerabilia. innumerabilis.

innumerabilibus. innumerabilis.

innumerabilis. innumerabilis.

innumerabiliter. innumerabilis.

innumeralis unitas animalis. innumeralis unitas.

innumere. innumerabilis.

inquam. inquam.

inquinabitur. inquinare.

inquinat. inquinare.

inquinationemque. sustentaculum / inquinatio.

inquinatur. sustentaculum / inquinatio.

inquit. inquam.

inscitiis. inscitia.

inserit. inserere / servare / revocare.

insinuans. copulare / insinuare / cognatus.

insinuare. insinuare; transire.

insipientem. sapientia; sapiens.

insita. unio plurium / vis insita.

inspiciet. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

inspicit. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

inspirando. inspirare / flagrare / aestus.

instinctu. instinctus.

instinctus. instinctus; nixus.

instrumenta. ars / instrumentum; instrumentum.

instrumentis. instrumentum.

instrumentum. instrumentum.

instrumentum generationi subserviens. instrumentum; subservire.

insunt. inesse.

integra. integra / perfecta.

integritate. integritas / puritas / supervacuum.

integritatem. integra / perfecta.

intellectio. intelligere / intellectio.

intellectis. intelligere / intellectio.

intellectu. intellectus; intellectus / sensus / appetitus.

intellectuale. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intellectualem. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intellectuali. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intellectualis. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intellectualitas. intellectualitas.

intellectum. intellectus.

Intellectus. intellectus.

intellectus. intellectus; intellectus / sensus / appetitus.

intellectus purus. intellectus purus.

intellexisse. intelligere / intelligentia.

intelligat. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligendae. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligendi. intellectus / sensus / appetitus; intelligere / intellectio.

intelligendo. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligendum. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligentem. intelligibilis; intelligens.

intelligentia. intelligentia; intelligere / intelligentia.

intelligentia pura. intelligentia.

intelligentiae. intelligentia.

intelligentiam. intelligentia; intelligere / intelligentia.

intelligere. intellectus / sensus / appetitus; intelligere / intellectio.

intelliget. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligibilem. intelligibilis (additional forms); intelligibilis; intelligens.

intelligibiles. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intelligibili. intellectualis / intelligibilis; intelligibilis (additional forms).

intelligibilia. intellectualis / intelligibilis.

intelligibilis. intelligibilis (additional forms).

Intelligit. intelligere / intellectio.

intelligit. intelligere / intellectio; intelligere / intelligentia.

intelliguntur. intelligere / intellectio; intelligere / intelligentia.

intenditur. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

Intenditur. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

intensione. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

intensius. intensius / remissius.

intentio. intentio.

intentionem. intentio.

intentionem mentis. intentio.

intentiones. intentio.

intentionum. intentio.

intercidet. intercidere / interponere.

intercidit. intercidere / interponere.

interibit. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

interimatur. corrumpere / interire / perdere.

interimunt. contraria elementa.

interior animae. centrum / vis interior.

interiorem sensum. sensus exterior; sensus interior.

interire. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

interit. corrumpere / perdere / interire; interire / perire / abire.

interitum. creatio / interitus.

interius. assidue / naturaliter / interius; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

interius fabricante. artifex stabilissimus.

interminatam. interminatus.

intermitti. intermittere; aberrare.

internuntio. internuntius / mora.

Internus autem corporis agitator. impartibile; internus agitator.

Internus motus. motus internus / externus.

interrogabimus. quaerere / interrogare / percontari.

interrogat. quaerere / interrogare / percontari.

interrogate. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

interroges. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

interrogo. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

intervalla. orbis in puncto.

intervallum. intervallum / distantia; tria puncta / medium / extrema.

intima. intimus; absque medio; proprius / intimus / alienior.

Intimus autem ille faber corporis atque stabilis. faber intimus.

intimus ordinator. intimus ordinator.

intrinseco. intrinsecus; extrinsecus.

intrinsecus. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

intueatur. videre; cernere; intueri.

intuemur. videre; cernere; intueri.

intuentur. videre; cernere; intueri.

intueri. intueri; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; prospicere / intueri / excogitare; videre; cernere; intueri.

intuetur. intueri; intueri; colligere; intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

intuitum. intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

intuitus. intuitus / intueri / conspicere.

inutile. possibile / utile / impotentia.

inutilia. dulce / amarum / utile / inutile.

inveniemus. reperire; invenire.

inveniendum. invenire / reperire.

invenies. invenire / reperire.

inveniet. invenire / reminisci / loqui; reperire; invenire.

invenimus. invenire / reperire; reperire; invenire.

invenire. invenire / reperire; reperire; invenire.

inveniri. reperire; invenire.

invenistis. reperire; invenire.

invenit. invenire / reperire; investigare; invenire; reperire; invenire.

invenitur. invenire / reperire.

inventa. invenire / reperire.

investigat. investigare; invenire.

investigationem. lepus / vestigium / indago.

invicem. invicem / vicissim; simul; vicissim; invicem.

invicem aequari. aequare in loco.

invisibilis. visibilis / invisibilis.

involutam. vestis; involvere.

Ioannem Cavalcantem. Regnanum; Cavalcantes.

Ioannes. Regnanum; Cavalcantes.

Ioannes Baptista Bonisegnius. Naldius; Fontius; Bonisegnius.

Iovis. Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera.

ipsius essentia. intuitus; essentia.

irrationalem. irrationalis vita.

irrationales vitas. irrationalis vita.

irrationali anima vel vita. irrationalis vita.

Irrationalis. irrationalis vita.

Itaque. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

itaque. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

iudex. iudex liber passione.

iudicabitur. iudicare; discernere.

iudicantur. iudicare.

iudicare. iudicare / pronuntiare.

iudicaret. iudicare.

iudicat. iudicare; iudicare / pronuntiare; iudicare; discernere.

iudicaverat. iudicare; discernere.

iudicaverint. iudicare; discernere.

iudicem. iudex liber passione.

iudicem quendam liberum passione. iudex liber passione.

iudicet. iudicare / pronuntiare; iudicare; discernere.

iudicio. iudicium passionis.

iudicium. excitatum iudicium; iudicare; discernere; iudicium passionis; iudicium; emendare.

Iudicium. iudicare / pronuntiare.

iudicium naturale. naturale iudicium.

iudicium passionis. iudicium passionis.

iusti. nequam / probus / iustus / latro.

iustitia. iustitia / suum cuique.

Kalendis Martiis. Kalendae; laurus.

labile. solidus / fluxus / labilis.

labitur. connectere / labi / abire; renovare; labi.

lacerentur. dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere.

lacte. coagulum; lac; coagulare.

laederetur. perdere / laedere.

laesio. laesio / noxius.

laesione. laesio / noxius.

laesionem. laesio / noxius.

laetitia. tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare.

lampadem. lampas; ignis.

lampas. lampas; ignis.

lana. speculum / lana / accendere.

languescit. mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare.

lapide. lapis / scintilla / collidere; sculptor / statua / lapis.

lapides. lapides / prima vita.

lapillum. genu / lapillus.

lapis. ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre; ignis / terra / lapis; lapis.

lapis iste. lapis.

lapsas. delabi / prolabi.

latent. excitare / promere / adita; latere / lucere.

latente. assidue / naturaliter / interius.

latere. non latere.

latet. latere / delitescere; latere / lucere; non latere.

Latet. latere / lucere.

lationis. luci / fer / latio.

latitudine. latitudo / extensio; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas.

latitudinem. latitudo / extensio.

latitudinis. latitudo / extensio; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas.

latitudo. latitudo / extensio; longitudo; latitudo; profunditas.

latronis. nequam / probus / iustus / latro.

latuerat. latere / delitescere.

latuit. latere / delitescere.

lege. lex formantis.

legem. regula / lex.

leo. leo; leo / audacia.

leone. leo.

leonem. leo.

leonis. leo.

lepus. lepus / vestigium / indago.

Leucippus. Democritus; Leucippus; Hipparchus.

leve vel grave. levis; gravis; rarus; densus.

leves spiritus. spiritus leves; humores graves.

libera. liber / libere / libertas; liber a materia.

liberae. liber a materia.

liberam. liber / libere / libertas.

libere. liber / libere / libertas; liber; solutus; separatus.

liberet. eximere / liberare.

liberior. liber a materia.

liberius. liber a materia; liber; solutus; separatus.

libertate. liber / libere / libertas.

liberum. iudex liber passione; liber / libere / libertas; liber; solutus; separatus.

libidine. temperantia / libido.

libidini. temperantia / libido.

libidinis. temperantia / libido.

libidinis mollitiem. temperantia / libido.

licet. si; sin; nisi; licet.

ligna. saxum; lignum.

lignis aridis. saxum; lignum.

Ligno. lignum.

ligno. lignum / flamma / flammula.

lignum. lignum; lignum / extremum punctum; lignum / flamma / flammula.

limite. finis; limes; terminus.

linea. punctum / linea; quadrangularis / circularis.

lineae. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; punctum / linea.

lineae terminus. terminus; situs.

lineam. numerus / figura / proportio; punctum / linea; superficies; linea; punctum.

linguam. pingere in se / aere / pariete.

litus. remus; litus; navis.

locali. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

locali diffusione. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

loci. locus; situs.

locis. locus / situs / tempus; locus; situs.

loco. locus / situs / tempus; locus / tempus; locus; situs; subiectum; locus.

loculis. loculus; corpusculum.

locum. locus / situs / tempus; locus / tempus; locus; situs.

locumque. locus / tempus.

locus. locus; situs.

longitudine. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; longitudo; latitudo; profunditas.

longitudinem. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; mensura / magnitudo.

longitudinis. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas.

longitudo. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; longitudo; latitudo; profunditas; mensura / magnitudo.

loquar. dicere / loqui / vocare.

loquetur. invenire / reminisci / loqui.

luce. lumen; lux.

lucem. lumen / lux; lumen; lux; lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium.

lucens. calere; lucere; collustrare.

lucent. latere / lucere; lucere / perspicuus.

lucere. lucere / perspicuus; lucere; rutilare.

lucet. latere / lucere.

luci. luci / fer / latio; splendor / lumen / lux.

lucidissimumque. tenuis / lucidus.

lucido et opaco. corpus aethereum; corpus geminum.

Lucifer. Lucifer / Venus.

lucis. luci / fer / latio; lumen; lux.

lucrari. lucrari.

lucratur. lucrari.

Lumen. lumen / lux.

lumen. lumen / lux; lumen; lux; lumen; spiritus; splendor / lumen / lux.

lumine. lumen / lux; lumen; lux; splendor / lumen / lux.

luminis. lumen; lux; splendor / lumen / lux.

luminosum. luminosus / aereus / caliginosus.

luminum. lumen; lux.

lutea testa. lutum; testa; gleba.

luteum. lutum; testa; gleba.

luto. lutum; testa; gleba.

lutulentum. humidus / terreus / lutulentus.

lutum. lutum.

lux. lumen / lux; lumen; lux.

lux sicca. Heraclitus; lux sicca.

lyra. lyra / temperare.

machina. machina.

machinam. machina.

machinari. fingere; machinari; effingere.

machinatione. figmentum / machinatio.

Magi. Magi.

magis. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

magis ac minus. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

magis indivisibilis. magis indivisibilis.

magis minusve. magis minusve.

magis vita. magis anima / magis vita.

magistra sensuum. magistra sensuum.

magistram. praeceptor; sophista.

magnanimitas. magnanimitas / pusillanimitas.

magnanimitatemque. magnanimitas / pusillanimitas.

magnetis. magnes / ferrum / trahere / suspendere.

magnificentior. magnificentior; divinior.

magnitudine. magnitudo; mensura / magnitudo.

magnitudinem. individua; magnitudo; magnitudo; mensura / magnitudo.

magnitudines. mensura / magnitudo.

magnitudinis. magnitudo; mensura / magnitudo.

magnitudo. magnitudo; mensura / magnitudo.

Magnitudo. magnitudo; crescere; decrescere.

maior. maior / minor.

maiora. maior / minor.

maiorem. maior / minor.

maiores. maior / minor.

maiori. maior / minor.

maius. maior / minor.

mala. bonum / malum; privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

malis. bonum / malum; privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

malum. bonum / malum.

mancipatus. mancipare.

maneat. manere; permanere; constare.

manent. permanere / manere / remanere.

manere. manere; permanere; constare.

manet. manere; permanere; constare; permanere / manere / remanere.

manet intus. operatio quae effluit / quae manet.

manibus. manus mentis.

manifesta. scientia et ignorantia.

manifestissima. manifestissimus.

manum. pingere in se / aere / pariete.

manus. pes / manus / os.

marcescunt. opprimere / marcescere.

mare. mare.

mari. mare.

materia. liber a materia; materia; materia / suscipi / misceri; materia prima.

materia et forma. materia et forma.

materia non propinqua leoni. materia propinqua / secunda.

materia prima. materia prima.

Materia quidem communis. materia communis / propria.

materia spiritalium. materia spiritalis.

materia vero propria. materia communis / propria.

materiae. liber a materia; materia; materia prima.

materiae insidiis. insidiae materiae.

materiae potentia. materiae potentia.

materialem. materialis.

materialia. materialis.

materialis. materialis.

materiam. materia; materia (additional forms); materia prima.

materiam animi spiritalem. materia spiritalis.

materiarum. materia.

mathematici. mathematici / circulus / planum.

maxime quae sunt. maxime quae sunt.

medelam. succurrere / medela.

medicus. medicus / cutis / caro.

medio. medium.

mediocriter. mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare.

medium. contrariae qualitates / medium; medium; tria puncta / medium / extrema.

medius. medium.

melior. potentior / melior.

meliora. potentior / melior.

melius. potentior / melior.

membra. caput / membrum; membrum; membrum / particula; pars; membrum.

membris. caput / membrum; humor; membrum; spiritus; membrum / particula; pars; membrum.

membris sectis. frustum; secare.

membro. divisio / membrum; membrum / particula; pars; membrum.

membrorum. humor; membrum; spiritus; membrum; pars; membrum.

membrum. divisio / membrum; membrum; pars; membrum.

memoria. memoria; agnoscere; tenere / memoria.

memoriam. memoria / expectatio; tenere / memoria.

mens. amens / mens; essentia–vita–mens; mens.

Mens. essentia–vita–mens; mens.

mensura. mensura / magnitudo.

mensurae. mensura / magnitudo.

mensuram. mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare.

mente. mens.

mentem. mens.

mentes. mens.

menti. mens; mens (additional inflections).

mentibus. mens.

mentis. mens.

mentis nostrae. manus mentis.

mentis obiectum. obiectum.

mentium. mens.

mera forma. mera forma.

mera quaedam forma. mera forma.

Mercurius. prisci theologi.

mergitur. mergere; suffocare.

mersum. mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis.

metiantur. metiri; numerare.

metiri. repugnare; reflecti; definire.

metitur. mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare.

metus. fortitudo / timor.

migrabit. migrare.

migrat. transire / migrare / commutare.

milio. milium / ficus.

ministrat. furor / arma ministrare.

minora. maior / minor.

minoresve. maior / minor.

minus. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

minuti philosophi. plebeus; minutus.

misceantur. mixtio / miscere.

Misceantur. mixtio / miscere.

miscentur. mixtio / miscere.

misceri. mixtio / miscere.

Mitto. mitto / ipse viderit.

mixta. compositio / mixtum; mixtus / sincerus.

mixtae. materia / suscipi / misceri.

mixti. elementum / mixtum.

mixtio. mixtio / miscere.

mixtione. humor / mixtio / procreare.

mixtionem. mixtio / miscere.

mixtis. compositio / mixtum.

mixtum. mixtus / sincerus.

mobilem. movere / immobilis.

mobiles. movere / immobilis.

mobili. movere / immobilis.

mobilissimum. serenus / mobilis.

modo. modus / pactum.

modos. modus / pactum.

modum. modus / pactum.

modus. modus / pactum.

mole. moles; moles / distendere.

molem. moles; affectio.

molesta. cruciatus / molestia / persensio.

molestia. cruciatus / molestia / persensio.

molestiam. cruciatus / molestia / persensio; voluptas / fastidium / dolor.

molibus. moles.

molis. moles.

mollitiem. mollities / ariditas; mollities appetitus.

momenta succedunt. succedere; momenta.

momento. congregatio / momentum; momentum; pedetentim / paulatim / subito.

momento temporis. intervallum temporis.

momentorum. congregatio / momentum.

monstro. ebrius / monstrum.

mora. internuntius / mora.

morales. speculativus / moralis.

moralibus. speculativus / moralis.

Moralis. speculativus / moralis.

moralis. speculativus / moralis.

more. mos / consuetudo.

mores. mos / consuetudo.

moribundi corporis. moribundus; carcer.

moribus. mos / consuetudo.

mors. mors.

mortalem. mortalis / corruptibilis.

mortalibus. haerere; mortalis / corruptibilis.

mortalis. mortalis / corruptibilis.

morte. mors.

mortem. mors.

mortifera. mortifer.

mortiferam. mortifer.

mortis. mors.

mortua. inanimis / mortuus.

mortuum. inanimis / mortuus.

morum. mores; doctrina; tempus.

motam. motus / movere.

motionem. motio; motus / alteratio / quies; movere / immobilis.

motionis. motio.

motionum. motus / alteratio / quies.

motionum corporalium exemplaria. exemplar.

motis. motus / movere.

motor. motor; movere; motus.

motore. motor.

motorem. motor / rector / una forma.

motores. movere; motus.

motori. motor.

motrice. movere / immobilis.

motrixque. rectrix; motrix; pedisequa.

motu. motus / alteratio / quies; motus / movere; movere; motus.

motu secundum essentiam vitalem. motus vitalis.

motui. motus / movere.

motum. motus / alteratio / quies; motus / movere; movere; motus.

motum internum atque externum. motus internus / externus.

motus. essentia–vita–mens; motus / movere; movere; motus.

motuum. movere; motus.

moveant. movere; motus.

moveantur. movere; motus.

moveat. fundere; movere; movere et moveri; movere; motus.

moveatur. movere et moveri; movere; motus.

movebit. motus / movere.

movent. movere; motus.

moventur. motus / movere; movere; motus.

movere. movere; motus.

moveri. movere; motus.

movet. motus / movere; movere; motus.

movetque. regere / movere.

movetur. motus / alteratio / quies; movere; motus.

multitudinem. unitas / multitudo.

multitudo. unitas / multitudo.

mundi. caelum; terra; mundus.

mundi nodus. mundi nodus.

mundo. caelum; terra; mundus.

mundum. caelum; terra; mundus.

musicis. Aristoxenus / musici.

Mutabile. mutare / mutatio.

Mutabiles. mutare / mutatio.

mutabili. mutare / mutatio.

mutabilia. mutabilis / immutabilis.

mutabiliter. mutare / mutatio.

mutant speciem. mutare speciem.

mutatio. mutare / mutatio; mutatio / mutare.

mutationem. mutatio / mutare.

mutationis. mutare / mutatio.

mutatur. mutare / mutatio.

mutet. mutatio / mutare.

mutetur. mutare / mutatio.

mutua. conspiratio / concinere / coalescere.

mutuari. mutuari.

mutuatur. mutuari.

Naldus Naldius. Naldius; Fontius; Bonisegnius.

naribus. auris / nares / os.

nascendi potentia. nascendi potentia.

nascentium. generatio / genitrix / successio.

nascitur. pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci.

natura. natura; natura / naturalis; natura; naturalis.

Natura. natura.

natura praeter corporis rationem. natura praeter corporis rationem.

naturae. natura; natura; naturalis.

naturae ordine. propinquitas / naturae ordo.

naturale. natura; naturalis; naturalis.

naturalem. natura / naturalis; natura; naturalis; naturalis; naturalis habitus / dissipare.

naturalem essentiae illius vicissitudinem. vicissitudo; vices.

naturalem habitum. naturalis habitus / dissipare.

naturali. natura / naturalis; natura; naturalis; naturalis.

naturali gremio. viscera; gremium.

naturali ordine. propinquitas / naturae ordo.

naturalis. natura; naturalis; naturalis.

naturaliter. assidue / naturaliter / interius; naturalis.

naturaliter insita. naturaliter insitus.

naturalium. naturalis.

naturam. natura; natura; naturalis; vegetatrix; natura.

Naturam. natura.

navis. remus; litus; navis.

nec. vel; sive; seu; aut.

necessaria. integritas / puritas / supervacuum.

necessario. necesse / oportere; necessitas / oportet.

necessarium. necessarium / impossibile.

necesse. necesse / oportere; oportere / necesse / debere.

nectitur. nectere; conspirare.

negabis. negare; fateri; confiteri.

negabitis. negare; fateri; confiteri.

Negandum. respondere / fateor / negare.

negans. respondere / fateor / negare.

negant. negare; fateri; confiteri.

negaret. negare; fateri; confiteri.

negat. negare; fateri; confiteri.

negaverit. negare; fateri; confiteri.

negotiorum. perturbatio / negotium.

neque. vel; sive; seu; aut.

Neque. vel; sive; seu; aut.

nequeant. posse; valere; oportere.

nequeat. posse; valere; oportere.

nequeunt. posse; valere; oportere.

nequissimi. nequam / probus / iustus / latro.

nequit. posse; valere; oportere.

nervi. nervus; articulus; tractus.

nervorum. os / nervus / caro.

nervos. ossa / caro / nervi.

nervosior. enervare / nervosus.

nervus. os / nervus / caro.

nihil inter eam et Deum. sine medio.

Nihilominus. immo; tamen; nihilominus.

nisi. si; sin; nisi; licet.

nititur. nixus / niti.

nivis. nix / albedo.

nixuque. nixus / niti.

nixus. instinctus; nixus; nixus / niti.

nobiliorem. nobilior.

nobilius. praestans; excellens; nobilis.

noceat. conducere / nocere.

noceret. conducere / nocere.

noctuae oculum. caecus; noctua.

nolemus. voluntas / velle.

nolumus. voluntas / velle.

nolunt. voluntas / velle.

nominamus. dicere; nominare; appellare.

nominant. dicere; nominare; appellare.

nominatur. dicere; nominare; appellare.

non accidentalis. forma substantialis; accidentalis.

non augmentum amplius. unio et augmentum.

non eam latere. non latere.

non efficiens. causa non efficiens sed formalis.

non efficiens, sed. non efficiens sed formalis.

non esse. creatio / interitus.

non intellectuali. motus vitalis.

Non latere. non latere.

non latet. non latere.

non localiter. non localiter.

non secundum locum. non localiter.

Non tamen. immo / tamen / non tamen.

non tamen. immo / tamen / non tamen.

noscit. cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere.

notio. notio / perceptio.

notione. notio / perceptio.

notionem. notio / perceptio.

novae animae. vita mundi / novae animae.

novae in nobis partes. partes novae; veteres.

noxia. privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

noxiam. hostilis / noxius; laesio / noxius.

noxium. hostilis / noxius.

nulla. solus; omnis; nullus.

nullam. solus; omnis; nullus.

nullam trahat originem a materia. origo a materia.

nulli. solus; omnis; nullus.

nullo. solus; omnis; nullus.

nullum. solus; omnis; nullus.

nullus. solus; omnis; nullus.

Num. utrum; an; numquid; num.

Numenius. Xenocrates / Speusippus / Numenius.

numerentque. metiri; numerare.

numeri. numerus / figura / proportio; numerus; replicatio.

Numeri. numerus; replicatio.

numeris. numerus / figura / proportio.

numerorum. numerus / figura / proportio.

Numeros. numerus / figura / proportio.

numeros. numerus / figura / proportio.

numerosum. cumulus / continuum.

numquam. posse / fingere / excogitare; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

Numquid. utrum; an; numquid; num.

numquid. utrum; an; numquid; num.

nuntiantur. nuntiare.

nuntiat. nuntiare.

nutriendi. alere / nutrire; anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

nutrimentum. alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum; cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro.

nutriri. alere / nutrire.

nutrit. anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

nutritiva. anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

nutritiva potentia. nutritiva potentia.

nutritque. generare; nutrire; augere.

nutriuntur. alere / nutrire.

obfuscantur. obfuscare.

obiecta. obiectum; scitum / obiectum.

obiecta mentis. obiectum.

obiectio. cavillatio.

obiecto. obiectum; scitum / obiectum.

obiectum. obiectum; scitum / obiectum.

obliviosa. pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus.

obliviscitur. oblivisci; reminisci; oblivisci.

obnubiletur. acies mentis / caligo.

obscurum. primum lumen.

obsistit. congruus / incongruus / obsistere.

occidente. oriens / occidens.

occupatur. mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare.

octo. duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

octonarium. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

oculo. oculus / cerebrum.

oculum. oculus / cerebrum.

oculus. oculus / cerebrum.

odorem. color / vox / odor.

odores. color / vox / odor; sapor / odor / aqua; vox; odor; sapor.

offensione. offensio; dolor.

offensus. offendere / dolere.

officia. artifex / pedissequa / officium; officium.

olfacit. videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere.

olfactus. visus / auditus / olfactus.

Oliverio Arduino Florentino. Angellerius; Arduinus.

Olympiodori. Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias.

omne. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnem. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnes. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnes ferme effectus. compos; ferme.

omnes mortalium pulsat animos. animi mortalium.

omni. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnibus. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnino. omnino.

omnis. solus; omnis; nullus.

omnium. solus; omnis; nullus.

opera. opus.

operabatur. operatio / operari.

operabitur. per se exsistere / operari.

operandi. agere / operari.

operantem. actio / operatio / opus; operatio / operari.

operantur. agere / operari.

operaretur. agere / operari.

operari. agere / operari; operatio / operari.

operatio. actio / operatio / opus; operatio / actio; operatio / operari; operatio; actus.

Operatio. operatio / actio; operatio / operari.

operatione. operatio / actio; operatio / operari.

operationem. operatio / actio; operatio / operari; operatio; actus; substantia / virtus / operatio.

operationes. actio / operatio / opus; operatio; actus.

operationis. actio / operatio / opus; operatio / actio.

operationum. operatio; actus.

operatur. actio / operatio / opus; agere / operari; agere; operari; operatio / operari.

operatur etiam per se ipsam. agere in corpore; per corpus; per se.

operentur. agere / operari.

operetur. agere / operari; agere; operari; operatio / operari.

operi. actio / operatio / opus.

operibus. opus.

operis. opus.

Opifex. auctor / conditor / opifex.

opifex. auctor / conditor / opifex.

opificem. auctor / conditor / opifex.

opinantur. opinio / sententia.

opinio eadem et scientia. voluntas; mos; opinio; scientia.

opiniones. opinio; sententia.

opinionibus. opinio / affectus / distrahere.

opinionum. opinio / affectus / distrahere.

Opinor. assentiri; opinari; arbitrari.

oporteat. posse; valere; oportere.

oportebit. posse; valere; oportere.

Oportere. necesse / oportere.

oporteret. posse; valere; oportere.

oportet. necesse / oportere; necessitas / oportet; oportere / necesse / debere; posse; valere; oportere.

Oportet. necessitas / oportet; oportere / necesse / debere.

opponitur. opponere / oppositum.

opponuntur. opponere / oppositum.

opposita. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; opponere / oppositum; opposita / contraria.

opposita suscipit. opposita suscipere.

oppositas. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

oppositi. opponere / oppositum.

oppositum. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; opponere / oppositum.

opprimit. opprimere / marcescere.

opus. actio / operatio / opus; brachium / opus extra; opus.

orbem. orbis in puncto.

orbicularis. revolutio / orbicularis.

ordinantis. ordinare; ordo.

ordinare. praescribere / ordinare / vagari.

ordinat. ordinare; ordo; ordo / ordinare.

ordinat sistitque mobilia. terminus; rector.

ordinatae. ordinare / ordo.

ordinator. ordinare; ordo.

ordinatrix. continuatio; ordinatrix; ordinare; ordo.

ordinatur. ordinare / ordo.

ordine. ordinare / ordo; ordinare; ordo; ordo naturae / effectus.

ordinem. ordinare / ordo; ordinare; ordo; ordo / ordinare.

ordo. ordo / ordinare.

ore. auris / nares / os; procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

oriente. oriens / occidens.

orietur. pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci.

Origenem. Dionysius / Origenes / Augustinus.

origine. origo.

originem. origo; origo; principium; causa; ortus / finis virtutis.

origo. origo; origo; principium; causa.

Orpheus. prisci theologi.

Orphicis. Orphici / Heraclitus.

ortus. ortus / finis virtutis.

os. os / nervus / caro; pes / manus / os.

ossa. ossa / caro / nervi.

ossa et nervi. ossa; nervi; caro.

ossium. os / nervus / caro.

ostenderimus. aggredi / exponere / ostendere.

ostendimus. aggredi / exponere / ostendere.

ostendit. aggredi / exponere / ostendere.

ove. apis / ovis / sollertia.

ovem. ovis / ignis.

pace. conciliare / pax.

pacto. modus / pactum.

pallidus orbis in nubibus. orbis pallidus.

panis. panis / caro.

pariete. absque materia / paries; pingere in se / aere / pariete.

parietibus. congregatum; domus; paries.

parietis. absque materia / paries.

parit. fons / receptaculum naturale; proles / parturire.

pars. aequalis pars / totum; pars / particula; pars / totum; pars; membrum.

Pars. pars / totum.

pars quaelibet eius agitat semetipsam. pars quaelibet semetipsam agitans.

parte. pars / particula; pars / totum (further forms); pars; membrum.

partem. pars; pars / particula; pars / totum; pars; membrum.

partem corporis alteram. pars et totum.

partes. pars; pars / particula; pars / totum; pars; membrum.

Partes. pars / particula.

partes eius vivant. particula vivere.

parti. pars; membrum.

partiamur. dividere / secare / partiri.

partibilem. indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis.

partibus. pars; pars / particula; pars / totum; pars; membrum.

particeps. participatio / particeps.

participatione. participatio; participatio / particeps.

participatione atque praesentia. participatio; praesentia.

participationem. participatio / particeps.

participes. participatio.

particula. membrum / particula; pars / totum.

particulae. membrum / particula.

particulare. singularis / particularis.

particularem. singularis / particularis.

particulares. singularis / particularis.

particularia. universale; particulare.

particulas. membrum / particula; pars / particula; pars / totum.

partiemur. partiri; secare.

partim. potissimum; partim.

partimur. pars / totum (further forms).

partiri. distribuere / partiri / secare; dividere / secare / partiri.

partis. pars / totum (further forms).

partiturum. distribuere / partiri / secare.

partium. pars / particula; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); pars; membrum.

parturiet. proles / parturire.

partus edant. turgere; concipere; edere.

parvipendis. parvipendere; horrere.

parvo. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

pascitur. vesci / pasci.

pascuntur. vesci / pasci.

passio. passio / affectio.

passionem. actio; passio; passio; passio / affectio.

passiones. passio / affectio.

passioni. passio.

passionibus. passio / affectio.

passionis. passio.

passionum. passio.

passiva. passivus / activus.

passivum. passivus / activus.

passivum iudicium. iudicium passionis.

pateram. patera.

patet. videri / apparere / patere / constare.

pati. agere / pati.

patitur. passio / affectio.

paulatim. gradus; paulatim; paulatim / subito; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; statim; subito; paulatim.

Paulus. Paulus apostolus.

pectore. crus / femur / pectus / collum.

pectus. caput / pectus / femur.

pede. pes / manus / os.

pedetentim. pedetentim / paulatim / subito.

pedis. pes / manus / os.

pedisequa corporis. rectrix; motrix; pedisequa.

pedisequae. praeparatio / pedisequa.

pedisequam. comes; pedisequa; pedisequa.

pedissequa. artifex / pedissequa / officium.

pellantque. gremium / detrudere / pellere.

pendeat. dependere / pendere.

pendebit. pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci.

pendentibus. inserere / servare / revocare.

pendet. dependere / pendere.

penetrabunt. attingere / penetrare.

penetrare. calor / penetrare / dissolvere; penetrare; implere.

Penetrat. secernere / discernere.

per aliud. per aliud.

per essentiam. per essentiam; per quantitatem.

per formam. movere et moveri.

per materiam. movere et moveri.

per naturam ac vim propriam. per naturam ac vim propriam.

per naturam suam. per sui naturam.

per omnia. per omnia.

per quantitatem. per essentiam; per quantitatem.

per se. ex se / in se / per se; per se; per se; quodammodo; proprie.

Per se. ex se / in se / per se.

per se aliquid operabitur. per se exsistere / operari.

per se congruit. per se convenire.

per se conveniat. per se convenire.

per se convenit. per se convenire.

per se exsistit. per se exsistere / operari.

per se ipsam. per se.

per se ipsum. ex se / in se / per se; per se exsistere / operari.

per se ipsum mobile. per se et primo.

per seipsam. per se.

per semet ipsam. per se.

per sui naturam. per sui naturam.

peragitur. conflare / peragere.

perceperimus. attingere; percipere.

perceptio. notio / perceptio.

perceptionem. notio / perceptio; perceptio / animadversio / phantasia.

percipimus. attingere; percipere.

percipit. perceptio / animadversio / phantasia; percipere (undergoing affection).

percipiunt. attingere; percipere.

Percipiunt. attingere; percipere.

percontabor. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

percontamur. quaerere / interrogare / percontari.

percontandum. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

percontatus. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

percussionem. sonus / percussio / silentium.

perdat. corrumpere / interire / perdere.

perdentur. haurire; perdere; servare.

perdere. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

perdit. perdere / laedere.

perditur. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

perfecta. integra / perfecta; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; remittere / perficere.

perfecte. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

perfectior. remittere / perficere.

perfectioribus. idoneus / vilis / perfectior.

perfectissima. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; remittere / perficere.

perfectum. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

perfectum requirit agentem. figurare; perfectus agens.

perficere. deficere; perficere; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

perficiatur. formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation).

perficit. formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation); perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; remittere / perficere.

perficitur. perfectus; imperfectus; perficere.

perierit. corrumpere / perdere / interire.

Peripatetici. Platonici; Peripatetici.

Peripateticis. Platonici; Peripatetici.

perit. interire / perire / abire.

permanat. fundere / diffundere / permanare.

permanebunt. manere; permanere; constare.

permanens. permanere / manere / remanere.

permanent. permanere / restare / superesse.

permanere. manere; permanere; constare; permanere / manere / remanere; permanere / perseverare.

permanet. manere; permanere; constare; permanere / perseverare; permanere / restare / superesse.

permanet idem. opposita suscipere.

permutari. commutare / transmutare.

permutatur. mutatio / mutare.

perniciem. pernicies / diligere opus.

perpetua. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; perpetuus; perpetuus / sempiternus.

perpetuam. perpetuus; perpetuus / sempiternus.

perpetuaque. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus.

perpetuis. perpetuus.

perpetuo. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; perpetuus; perpetuus / sempiternus.

perpetuum. perpetuus.

perpetuus. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; perpetuus.

persensio. cruciatus / molestia / persensio.

persentiat. attingere / persentire.

perseveret. permanere / perseverare.

persona. persona / verba.

personae. persona.

personarum. persona.

personis. persona.

perspicere. perspicere; prospicere; pervidere.

perspiciet. perspicere; prospicere; pervidere.

perspicuae. lucere / perspicuus.

persuasiones. persuasio.

pertransire. transire / migrare / commutare.

perturbationes. perturbatio / impedire / augere.

perturbationum. perturbatio / negotium.

pervenit. pervenire / transire / concurrere.

pervidere. perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; pervidere.

pes. pes / manus / os.

Petri Leonis Spoletini. Petrus Leo Spoletinus.

Phaedone. Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias.

Phaedri. Xenophon / Alcibiades / Phaedrus.

phantasia. phantasia.

Phantasia. phantasia.

phantasiae. phantasia.

phantasiam. perceptio / animadversio / phantasia; phantasia.

philosophamur. philosophari.

phrenesim. phrenesis; somnus; ebrietas.

physicus Aristoteles. physicus Aristoteles; plurimum.

Picta. depingere.

picti. pictor / pictura.

pictor. pictor / pictura.

pictore. pictor / pictura.

picturam. pictor / pictura; superficies / pictura.

pingit. pingere in se / aere / pariete.

pinguedine. humor; tabes; pinguedo.

pingui. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

piscium ovis. guttula; ova piscium.

placet. apparere / videri / placere.

plano. mathematici / circulus / planum.

planum. mathematici / circulus / planum.

Plato. Plato / Socrates; prisci theologi; Socrates / Plato.

Platonem. Plato / Socrates; Socrates / Plato.

Platonici. Aristoteles / Platonici; Platonici; Peripatetici.

Platonici tamen. ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur.

Platonicis. Aristoteles / Platonici.

Platonicorum Arabum. Graeci Platonici / Arabes Platonici.

Platonicus. Platonici; Peripatetici.

Platonis. Plato / Socrates; Socrates / Plato.

plebeos philosophos. plebeus; minutus.

Plotini. Plotinus / Proclus.

Plotinus. Plotinus / Proclus; Plotinus / Proculus.

Plotinus Porphyriusque. Plotinus; Porphyrius.

Plotinusque. Plotinus / Augustinus.

plurimum. physicus Aristoteles; plurimum.

pollutis. albedo / inficere / foedare.

ponatur. ponere / concedere / admittere.

ponere. ponere / concedere / admittere.

Porphyrius. Porphyrius.

porrectam. diffundere / spargere / porrigere; localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

porrigitur. diffundere / spargere / porrigere; localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

portiuncula. portiuncula; plurimi.

portiunculam. portiuncula.

portiunculam istam. portiuncula.

Posidonius. Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius.

posse. posse; valere; oportere.

possent. posse / fingere / excogitare.

posset. posse; valere; oportere.

possibile. possibile; possibile / utile / impotentia.

Possibile. possibile.

possibilia. possibile / utile / impotentia.

possibilis. possibile / utile / impotentia.

possideat. possidere / consulere / imperare.

possidet. habere / possidere.

possidetur. habere / possidere.

possint. posse; valere; oportere.

possit. posse; valere; oportere.

possunt. posse / fingere / excogitare; posse; valere; oportere.

posterior. prior; posterior.

posterius. prior; posterior.

postquam. primum / deinde / prius / secundo.

potentia. potentia; potentia susceptiva; potentia; actus.

potentia ad esse pariter atque non esse. potentia ad non esse.

potentia ad non esse. potentia ad non esse.

potentia aliqua susceptiva. potentia susceptiva.

potentia essendi. nascendi potentia.

potentiae. potentia susceptiva.

potentiam. potentia; potentia susceptiva; vis / potentia / virtus.

potentiam ad non esse. potentia ad non esse.

potentiam infinitam. actus infinitus / potentia infinita.

Potentior. potentior / melior.

potentior. potentior / melior.

potentiora. potentior / melior.

potentiorem. potentior / melior.

poterit. posse; valere; oportere.

potest. posse; valere; oportere.

potestas. potestas.

potestate. potestas.

potestatem. potestas.

potestati. potestas.

potissimum. potissimum; partim.

potuisset. possibile.

praebet. dare / tribuere / praestare.

praeceptoribus. praeceptor; sophista.

praeludium. excursio; praeludium.

Praeparationes. praeparatio / pedisequa.

praescribi. praescribere / ordinare / vagari.

praescriptum magnitudinis terminum. terminus praescriptus.

praesens. futurum / praesens / praeteritum; praesentia; praesentia / absentia.

praesente. praesentia / absentia.

praesenti. praeteritum / futurum / praesens.

praesentia. praesens / absens; praesentia; praesentia / absentia.

praesentiam. praesentia.

praesentiat. praesentire / praesentia.

praestantior. praestans; excellens; nobilis; superare / praestare.

praestantiores. praestans; excellens; nobilis; superare / praestare.

praestantissima. praestans; excellens; nobilis.

praestantissimae. superare / praestare.

praestantius. praestans; excellens; nobilis; praestantior / sublimior; superare / praestare.

praestare. dare / tribuere; dare; tribuere; praestare.

praestat. dare / tribuere / praestare; dare; tribuere; praestare; praestare vitam / vitalis.

praestatur. dare / tribuere.

praeteriti. futurum / praesens / praeteritum.

praeteritum. futurum / praesens / praeteritum; praeteritum / futurum / praesens.

prima. materia propinqua / secunda; primus / prior.

prima informisque potentia. pura potentia.

prima rerum causa. causa prima.

primam. lapides / prima vita; primus / prior.

primam causam. causa prima.

primo. per se et primo; primo moveri; prior; posterior.

primo moventur. primo moveri.

primo movetur. primo moveri.

primo offeretur intuitu. intuitus; essentia.

Primum. primum / deinde / prius / secundo.

primum. primum / deinde / prius / secundo; primus / prior; prior; posterior.

primum lumen. primum lumen.

primum principium. primum principium.

primus. primus / prior.

principalem. causa principalis.

principalem augmenti fabrum. causa principalis.

principali. causa principalis; principale propositum.

principali agente. causa principalis; principalis / agens principale.

principalis agentis. principalis / agens principale; principalis agens.

principia. origo; principium; causa; principium / finis.

principiis. origo; principium; causa; principium / finis.

Principio. principium / finis.

principio. principium / finis.

principium. origo; principium; causa; principium / finis.

principium alimenti. principium alimenti.

prior. prior; posterior.

priorem. prior; posterior.

prisci theologi. prisci theologi.

Prius. primum / deinde / prius / secundo.

prius. primum / deinde / prius / secundo; primus / prior; prior; posterior.

privari. carere / privari.

privationes. privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

privatur. carere / privari.

pro viribus. pro viribus; separare; sevocare.

probabile. probabile; probabilis; affirmare.

probandum. concludere / probare.

probavimus. concludere / probare.

probi. nequam / probus / iustus / latro.

procella. procella / tempestas.

procero. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

proclivem. appetitus; proclivis.

procreabit. proles / parturire.

procreare. humor / mixtio / procreare.

procreat. efficere / producere / generare.

Proculus. Plotinus / Proclus; Plotinus / Proculus.

Proculusque. Plotinus / Proclus.

producere. producere / gignere / generare.

produci. efficere / producere / generare.

producit. efficere / producere / generare; producere / gignere / generare.

productum. auctor; producere.

productus. producere / gignere / generare.

Proficit. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

proficit. proficere / crescere / decrescere.

profluere. relabi / redundare.

profundam. facies / profundum.

profunditate. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas.

profunditatis. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; longitudo; latitudo; profunditas.

profusa. comprimere; profundere.

progenitam. harmonia / progenitus.

progrediendi. progredi / servire.

progressio. progressio in infinitum.

prolapsas. delabi / prolabi.

prolem. proles; proles / parturire.

proles quaedam. proles.

promit. excitare / promere / adita.

Pronopides. Hippias; Hesiodus; Pronopides.

pronuntiat. iudicare / pronuntiare.

propagandae. propagare / propagatio.

propagatione. propagare / propagatio.

propagationem. propagare / propagatio.

propaget. propagare / propagatio.

propinquior. ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre.

propinquitas. propinquitas / naturae ordo.

proportio. proportio.

proportione. proportio; ratio compositionis / proportio; semen; incohatio; proportio; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura.

proportionem. mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare; proportio; ratio compositionis / proportio.

proportiones. numerus / figura / proportio; ratio compositionis / proportio.

propositione. propositio / docere.

propositionem. propositio / docere.

proposito. principale propositum; propositum.

propositum. propositum.

propria. proprium; proprius; proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

Propria. proprius / intimus / alienior.

propria intimaque. proprius / intimus / alienior.

propriae. proprius; proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

propriam. proprius; proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

proprie. per se; quodammodo; proprie; proprius.

proprie existit actu. actus proprius.

propriis. effectus proprius; proprius; communis.

proprio. proprius.

proprio existet actu. actus proprius.

proprium. proprium; proprius; proprius / communis; proprius; communis.

proprium suum esse. esse proprium / commune esse.

proprius. proprius; proprius; communis.

prospexeris. prospicere / intueri / excogitare.

prospeximus. prospicere / effingere / fingere.

prospicit. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere.

prospicitur. perspicere; prospicere; pervidere.

protinus. statim; subito; paulatim.

prout. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

proveniat. provenire.

proxima. proxime.

proximae. proxime.

proxime. proxime.

prudentia. sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars.

prudentiam. sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars.

prudentior. elephas / equus / prudentia.

Pugnant. dissentire / pugnare / appetitus.

pulchritudinem. pulchritudo / bonitas; sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

pulchritudinis. pulchritudo / bonitas.

Pulchritudo. pulchritudo / bonitas; sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

pulchritudo. pulchritudo / bonitas.

pulchrius. speciosus / deformis.

pullulat. pullulare; delitescere.

puncta. lignum / extremum punctum; punctum.

Puncta. punctum.

punctis. punctum.

puncto. lignum / extremum punctum; orbis in puncto; punctum.

punctorum. punctum.

punctum. lignum / extremum punctum; punctum; punctum / linea; superficies; linea; punctum.

Punctum. punctum.

punctum aliquod lucidum. punctum lucidum.

punctum quoddam affectionis. mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis.

pupilla. vultus / pupilla.

pupillam. vultus / pupilla.

pupillis. vultus / pupilla.

pura. purificare; purus; purus / unus / stabilis (intellectual consideration).

pura potentia. pura potentia.

puram. purificare; purus.

purgato. alienare / purgare.

purgentur. tenuare / purgare.

Purificentur. purificare; purus.

purissima. purus / crassus / terrenus.

puritate. infectio / puritas; integritas / puritas / supervacuum.

puritatem. infectio / puritas.

pusillanimis. pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus.

pusillanimitas. magnanimitas / pusillanimitas.

pusillus. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

putamus. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

putanda. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

putant. apparere / videri / placere; opinio / sententia; putare; existimare; arbitrari.

putaret. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

putas. putare; existimare; arbitrari.

puteum. puteus; fundus.

pyra. triticum / pyrum.

Pythagorae. Pythagoras.

Pythagoras. prisci theologi.

Pythagoreosque. Aegyptii / Pythagorei.

qua corpus est. qua ratione.

qua ratione. qua ratione / quatenus.

quadrabit. congruere / quadrare / aptare.

quadrangularis. quadrangularis / circularis.

Quae effluit. operatio quae effluit / quae manet.

Quae manet. operatio quae effluit / quae manet.

quaeram. concludere; respondere; quaerere; quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

quaeras. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

quaere. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

Quaeremus. concludere; respondere; quaerere; quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

quaeremus. quaerere / interrogare / percontari.

quaerere. amittere; quaerere; fugere; concludere; respondere; quaerere.

quaerit. quaerere / interrogare / percontari.

quaeritur. concludere; respondere; quaerere; quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

qualitas. qualitas; qualitas / affectio corporis; quantitas; qualitas.

Qualitas. qualitas.

qualitate. qualitas.

qualitatem. qualitas; qualitas / affectio corporis; quantitas; qualitas.

qualitates. forma / qualitas; qualitas; quantitas; qualitas.

Qualitates. qualitas.

qualitati. qualitas; qualitas / affectio corporis.

qualitatibus. contrariae qualitates / medium; extensio; contrarietas; qualitas; quantitas; qualitas.

qualitatis. genus substantiae / genus qualitatis; qualitas; quantitas; qualitas.

qualitatum. forma / qualitas; qualitas.

Quamobrem. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

quamvis. si; sin; nisi; licet.

Quamvis. si; sin; nisi; licet.

quandoque. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

quantitas. quantitas; quantitas / dimensio.

quantitate. quantitas; quantitas / dimensio; quantitas; qualitas; virtute; quantitate.

quantitate protenditur. quantitate protendi.

quantitatem. quantitas; quantitas; qualitas.

quantitati. quantitas.

quantitatis. quantitas; quantitas / dimensio; quantitas; qualitas.

quanto. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

quantum. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

Quantum. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

Quapropter. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

Quare. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

quasi. per se; quodammodo; proprie; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar.

quasi corrumpit. quodammodo; quasi.

quatenus. qua ratione / quatenus; quatenus / eatenus.

quattuor. duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

quattuor humorum. humor; tabes; pinguedo.

quatuor elementa. quatuor elementa.

quiescam. referre; quiescere.

quiescendo. quiescere.

quiescere. quiescere.

quiescit. quiescere.

quiete. quies / valitudo / consensio.

quietem. motus / alteratio / quies.

quinque capita. quinque capita.

quintum aliquod tenuissimumque corpusculum. quintum corpusculum.

Quocirca. igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur.

quodammodo. per se; quodammodo; proprie; quodammodo; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; quodammodo; quasi.

radice. radix; germen; ramus.

radicem essendi. radix essendi.

radiis. radius.

ramis. radix; germen; ramus.

ramos. radix; germen; ramus.

raptu caelorum. raptus caelorum.

rarefacit, condensat. rarefacere; condensare.

rarefactione. rarefactio.

rarum vel densum. levis; gravis; rarus; densus.

ratio. ratio; ratio (account or principle); ratio (reasoning power); ratio / definitio; ratio compositionis / proportio.

Ratio. ratio (account or principle); ratio (reasoning power).

ratio illa artificiosa. ars ratiocinandi.

ratio secum ipsa vivens. ratio secum vivens.

rationale. animal / rationale.

rationalem. anima rationalis.

rationalemque. rationalis.

rationales. anima rationalis.

rationali. anima rationalis; animal / rationale; rationalis.

rationalique. rationalis.

rationalis. rationalis.

rationalis anima. anima rationalis.

rationalitas. rationalitas / animalitas.

Rationalitas. rationalitas / animalitas.

rationaliter. praescribere / ordinare / vagari.

rationalium. anima rationalis.

ratione. ratio; ratio (additional inflections); ratio / definitio.

rationem. ratio; ratio (account or principle); ratio / definitio; ratio / transcendere; ratio compositionis / proportio.

rationem animae. ratio animae.

rationes. ratio; ratio (account or principle); ratio / definitio.

Rationes. ratio (account or principle).

rationes et semina. rationes et semina.

rationibus. ratio; ratio (account or principle); ratio (additional inflections); ratio / definitio; ratio as argument.

rationis. ratio; ratio (additional inflections); ratio / definitio.

rationis oculo. rationis oculus.

rationum. ratio / definitio.

rationum coetus. ars ratiocinandi.

re. res.

re ipsa. cogitatione separari.

rebus. res.

receptaculum. subiectum / receptaculum.

receptaculum naturale. fons / receptaculum naturale.

recipit. recipere; accipere.

recolligit. recolligere; revolvere; recolligere.

recreantur. frangere / recreare.

rectam lineam. rectus / reflexus.

rectorem. motor / rector / una forma; terminus; rector.

rectrix. rectrix; motrix; pedisequa.

redarguemus. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

redarguitur. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

redarguuntur. conspirare; damnare; redarguere.

redderetur. reddere.

reddit. reddere.

redintegratur. redintegrare / confirmare / roborare.

redundat. relabi / redundare.

refellimus. refellere / confutare / redarguere.

referam. referre; quiescere.

referendo. respectus / referri.

refert. comparare / referre.

Refertur. respectus / referri.

refertur. respectus / referri.

referunt. referre / enuntiare.

referuntur. respectus / referri.

Referuntur. respectus / referri.

refici. reficere.

reficit. fabricare / servare / reficere; reficere.

reflectens. reflexio / reflectere.

reflecteretur. repugnare; reflecti; definire.

reflectet. repugnare / reflectere.

reflectit. reflexio / reflectere.

reflectiturque. reflecti / ferri.

reflexam. rectus / reflexus.

reflexio. essentia–vita–mens; reflexio / reflectere; splendor / reflexio.

reflexo. reflexio / reflectere.

reflexum. reflexio / reflectere.

regendo. regere / curare.

regendum. regere; ducere; gubernare.

regeretur. regere; ducere; gubernare.

regit. regere / curare; regere / movere.

regitur. regere; ducere; gubernare.

Regnano. Regnanum; Cavalcantes.

regulam. regula / lex.

rei. res.

relabitur. relabi / redundare.

relata. respectus / referri.

relatio. relatio.

relationis. relatio.

relinquetur. relinquere / dimittere.

relinquit. relinquere / dimittere.

reliquias sensuum. reliquiae sensuum.

rem. res.

remanente. permanere / manere / remanere.

remanet. permanere / manere / remanere.

reminiscetur. invenire / reminisci / loqui.

reminiscitur. reminisci; oblivisci.

remissius. intensius / remissius.

remittit. remittere / perficere.

remittitur. magis ac minus / intensio / remissio.

removere. avertere / subducere.

remum. remus; litus; navis.

renovare. renovare / renovatio.

renovat. renovare.

renovationis. renovare / renovatio.

renovatur. renovare; labi.

reparentur. frangere / reparare.

repellatque. adiungere / repellere.

repente. statim; subito; paulatim.

reperietis. reperire; invenire.

reperisse. invenire / reperire.

reperit. invenire / reperire.

reperitur. invenire / reperire; reperire; invenire.

reperiunt. invenire / reperire.

reperiuntur. reperire; invenire.

reperta. invenire / reperire.

replicationes. numerus; replicatio.

replicatur. replicare.

reprobatis. confutare; reprobare; approbare.

reptilia. reptilia / secundum Platonicos.

repugnabit. repugnare / reflectere.

repugnans. absurdus / repugnare.

repugnantes. contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

repugnantes affectus. opposita suscipere.

repugnantia. absurdus / repugnare; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans.

repugnare. repugnare; reflecti; definire.

repugnat. absurdus / repugnare.

rerum. res.

Res. res.

res. res.

residens. assignare; residere; gubernare.

resilientes. resilire; accendere; consumere.

resolutio. resolutio / divisio.

resolutionem. compositio / mixtum; resolutio / divisio.

resolvatur. resolvi.

resolvendo. resolutio / divisio.

resolvi. resolvi.

resolvimus. resolutio / divisio.

resolvitur. compago / resolvere; resolvi.

respectibus. aspectus / respectus.

respectum. respectus / referri.

respectus. aspectus / respectus.

respice. revertere; respicere.

respiciant. respicere.

respiciat. aspectus / respectus; respicere.

respicit. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

respiciunt. respicere.

Respiciunt. respicere.

respondeant. respondere / fateor / negare.

respondeatur. respondere / fateor / negare.

respondebit. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

Respondemus. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

responderet. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

respondet. concludere; respondere; quaerere.

restat. permanere / restare / superesse.

restituere. segregare / restituere.

restituit. segregare / restituere.

resultant. simulachrum; resultare.

retinetur. retinere / servare.

retro versus. solvere; retro versus.

revera. per se; quodammodo; proprie.

revertere. revertere; respicere.

reviviscunt. reviviscere.

revocat. inserere / servare / revocare.

Revolutio. revolutio / orbicularis.

revolutiones. discursio; revolutio.

revolvit. revolvere; recolligere.

revolvitur. revolutio / orbicularis.

Richardo Angellerio Anglariensi. Angellerius; Arduinus.

rimari. indicium / rimari.

roborat. tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare.

roboratur. redintegrare / confirmare / roborare.

Robur. sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

robur. sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

robustior. vivax / audens / robustus.

rogaretur. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

rogaveris. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

rotunditas. rotunditas.

Rotunditas. rotunditas.

rotunditate. rotunditas.

rotunditatem. rotunditas.

rutilabit. lucere; rutilare.

rutilare. lucere; rutilare.

saepe. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

saepenumero. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

sagacior. canis / agnus / sagacitas.

sagacitatem. sagacitas / elicere / delitescere.

saltem. saltem.

saltem futura sit semper. saltem futura sit semper.

salubria. privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris.

sanguinis. cor / sanguis / calor.

Sanitas. sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

sanitatem. sanitas / robur / pulchritudo.

sapiens. sapere.

sapientem. sapientia; sapiens.

sapientia. sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars; sapientia; sapiens.

sapientior. sapere.

sapit. sapere.

sapor. vinum / dulcedo / sapor.

saporem. vox; odor; sapor.

sapores. sapor / odor / aqua.

Saturni. Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera.

saxa. saxum; lignum.

scaturiat. frigefieri; scaturire.

scientia. sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars; scientia.

Scientia. scientia.

scientiae. scientia.

scientiam. scientia.

scientiarum. scientia.

scientias. scientia.

scintilla. lapis / scintilla / collidere; scintilla; flamma.

scintillam. scintilla; flamma.

sciscitabimur. quaerere / interrogare / percontari; quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

sciscitamur. quaerere; interrogare; percontari.

sciti. scitum / obiectum.

scitum. scitum / obiectum.

Sculptor. sculptor / statua / lapis.

se fundit. contrahere; fundere.

se ipsam non deserit. semet ipsum deserere.

se ipsam servandam. servare; non esse.

se ipsum. semet ipsum deserere.

se tota. se toto.

se toto. se toto.

secabis. distribuere / partiri / secare.

secabit. dividere / secare / partiri.

secantur. frustum / secare.

secari. frustum / secare.

secas. dividere / secare / partiri.

secatur. dividere / secare / partiri; frustum / secare.

secernere. secernere / discernere.

Secernite. secernere.

secetur. frustum / secare.

secuimus. partiri; secare.

secundaque. materia propinqua / secunda.

secundo. primum / deinde / prius / secundo.

secundo Divinorum. De republica; Divinorum.

secundo quodam actu atque reflexo. actus reflexus (return to the particular).

secundum finitam naturam. finita natura.

secundum naturam suam. per sui naturam.

secundum Platonicos. reptilia / secundum Platonicos.

Secundum se. secundum se.

secundum se. secundum se.

secundum se ipsam. secundum se.

secundum se totum. per se et primo.

secundum totam sui essentiam. secundum totam essentiam.

sed formalis. causa non efficiens sed formalis.

Sed hoc ipse viderit. mitto / ipse viderit.

sed vitali. motus vitalis.

sede. sedes.

sedem. sedes / fundamentum.

sedes. sedes; sedes / fundamentum.

Segrega. segregare / restituere.

segregari. separare / segregare.

segregat. segregare / restituere; separare / segregare.

segregatas. forma segregata; subiectum.

seiuncta. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

seiungitur. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

semel. semel.

seminaria virtus. vis seminaria.

semine. semen; semen; incohatio; proportio.

semper. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

sempiterna. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; sempiternus.

sempiternae. perpetuus / sempiternus; sempiternus.

sempiternam. sempiternus.

sempiternas. sempiternus.

sempiterno. sempiternus.

Sempiternum. immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus.

sempiternus. perpetuus / sempiternus.

senarium. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

Sensibilia. sentire / sensus.

sensibilium. sentire / sensus.

sensibus. sensus; sentire / sensus.

sensim. pedetentim / paulatim / subito.

sensitiva. anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

sensitivae. anima nutritiva / sensitiva.

sensu. intellectus / sensus / appetitus; sensus; sentire.

sensum. sensus; sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire; sentire / sensus.

sensum tum exteriorem. sensus exterior; sensus interior.

Sensus. sensus; sensus / sentire.

sensus. sensus; sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire; sentire / sensus.

sensus obiecto. obiectum.

sensuum. sensus; sensus; sentire.

sententia. opinio / sententia.

sententiam. opinio / sententia; opinio; sententia.

sentiat. sensus; sentire.

sentiendi. sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire; sentire / sensus.

sentiendi expertes. sentire / sentiens / expers sensus.

sentiens. sentire / sentiens / expers sensus.

sentient. sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire; sentire / sentiens / expers sensus.

sentiente. sentire / sentiens / expers sensus.

sentientem. sentire / sentiens / expers sensus; sentire; sentiri.

Sentiet. sentire; sentiri.

sentietur. sentire; sentiri.

sentire. sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire.

sentiremus. sensus / sentire.

sentit. sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire; sentire / sensus.

sentitur. sensus / sentire; sensus; sentire.

sentiunt. sensus; sentire.

seorsum. liber; solutus; separatus.

separabilis. separabilis.

separari. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

separat. separare / segregare.

separata. liber; solutus; separatus; separare / segregare; separare / seiungere / disiungere.

Separatam. separare / segregare.

separatam. separare; sevocare.

separatas. liber; solutus; separatus.

Separati. separare; sevocare.

separationem. separare / segregare.

separatum. mixtus / sincerus.

separatur. separare / seiungere / disiungere.

septenario. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

Septenarius. denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius.

septimo De republica. De republica; Divinorum.

sequens. sequi.

sequentibus. sequi.

sequentibus causis. causae sequentes.

sequerentur. concludere / inferre / sequi.

sequeretur. concludere / inferre / sequi.

sequi. sequi.

sequitur. concludere / inferre / sequi; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; sequi.

Sequitur. sequi.

serenissimum. serenus / mobilis.

servabimus. retinere / servare.

servat. conservare / servare; fabricare / servare / reficere; incolumis; servare.

servatoribus. conservator / servator.

servatque. inserere / servare / revocare.

servatur. conservare / servare; incolumis; servare; retinere / servare.

serventur. incolumis; servare.

servetur. haurire; perdere; servare.

servitura. progredi / servire.

sese colligit. intueri; colligere.

sese contrahit. contrahere; fundere.

sese reflectens. actus reflexus (return to the particular).

seu. vel; sive; seu; aut.

sevocare. separare; sevocare.

sex. duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

si. si; sin; nisi; licet.

Si. si; sin; nisi; licet.

Si dixeris. hypothetical concession.

si modo. forte / forsitan / si modo.

Si primum detur. dare; concedere.

si vis. vis in si vis.

sic affectum. talis; sic affectus.

siccitas. siccitas.

siccitatem. siccitas.

siccitatemque. caliditas / siccitas / frigus.

siccum vel humidum. calidus; frigidus; siccus; humidus.

siccumque. caliditas / siccitas / frigus.

sigillo. sigillum.

significatio. significatio / vox.

significationem. significatio / vox.

Significationes. significatio / vox.

significationes. significatio / vox.

silentio. sonus / percussio / silentium.

silentium. lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium.

simia. simia / asinus / ingenium.

simile. similis; idem; similitudo.

similem. figura eadem; similis; similis; idem.

similes. similis; idem; similitudo.

similia. similis; idem.

similis. similis; idem; similitudo.

similiter. similis; idem.

similitudine. similitudo.

similitudinem. similitudo.

similitudinemque. similitudo.

simillima. similitudo.

simillimas. similitudo.

Simplex. simplex.

simplex. simplex; simplex / simplicitas.

simplex qualitas. simplex qualitas / forma astricta.

simplicem. simplex / simplicitas.

simplices. simplex / simplicitas.

simplici. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicia. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicis. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicitas. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicitate. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicitatem. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicitatis. simplex / simplicitas.

simplicitatis et constantiae. simplicitas; constantia.

simpliciter. simpliciter.

simpliciter esse. bene esse / simpliciter esse.

simplicium. simplex; simplex / simplicitas.

simul. simul; simul; vicissim; invicem.

simul omnia possident atque vident. simul possidere et videre.

simulachra. simulachrum; resultare.

simulacra. idolum / simulacrum; simulacrum.

simulacro. simulacrum / imago / effigies.

simulacrorum. idolum / simulacrum; simulacrum / imago / effigies.

simulacrum. idolum / simulacrum; simulacrum / imago / effigies.

Sin. si; sin; nisi; licet.

sincera. mixtus / sincerus.

sincere. sincere discernere.

sine medio. sine medio.

singulares. singularis / particularis.

singularis. singularis / particularis.

singulas. singularis / particularis.

singulis. singularis / particularis.

sinistra. dextra / sinistra.

sinistram. dextera; sinistra; ante; retro; dextra / sinistra.

sint. esse; habere; fieri.

Sint, si vis. hypothetical concession.

sinu. sinus / gremium.

sinum. sinus / gremium.

sistat. continere; sistere; torquere; sistere / subsistere.

sistit. sistere / subsistere; unire; sistere; continere.

Sistit. unire; sistere; continere.

Sistit, movet, contrahit, extendit. sistere; movere; contrahere; extendere.

sit. esse; habere; fieri.

sitis. esurire / sitire.

sitit. esurire / sitire.

sititque. esurire / sitire.

situ. locus / situs / tempus; locus; situs.

situm. locus; situs.

sive. vel; sive; seu; aut.

Socrates. Plato / Socrates; Socrates / Plato.

Socratici. Plato / Socrates.

Socratico. Plato / Socrates.

Socratis. Plato / Socrates; Socrates / Plato.

Sol. sol.

sol. sol.

sola. sola (subject); solus (restrictive); solus; omnis; nullus.

Sola. solus (restrictive).

solam. solus; omnis; nullus.

sole. sol.

solem. sol.

soli. sol.

soli et omni animo. soli et omni.

solidaret. fluxus; labilis; solidare.

solidum. solidus / fluxus / labilis.

solis. canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol; sol; solus (restrictive); solus; omnis; nullus.

solis anima. anima solis.

solius. solus; omnis; nullus.

sollertior. apis / ovis / sollertia.

solo. solus (restrictive).

solum. solus (restrictive); solus; omnis; nullus.

solus. solus; omnis; nullus.

soluta. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere; liber; solutus; separatus.

solutio. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

solutum. liber; solutus; separatus.

solutus. solutus.

solvatur. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere; solvere; retro versus.

somniare. augurari / suspicari / somniare; somniare.

somniaret. augurari / suspicari / somniare.

somno. somnus.

somnum. phrenesis; somnus; ebrietas; somnus.

somnus. somnus.

sonat. horologium; sonare.

sono. sonus / percussio / silentium.

sophistis. praeceptor; sophista.

sopit. sopire / claudere.

sortiantur. sortiri.

Sortitur. sortiri.

sortitur. sortiri.

sparsa. spargere.

sparsae. diffundere / spargere / porrigere; localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

sparsam. diffundere / spargere / porrigere.

spatia. orbis in puncto.

specie. species; species / genus / cognomen.

speciebus. species.

speciei. species; species / genus / cognomen.

speciem. species; species sensibilis.

species. species; species / genus / cognomen; species sensibilis.

species absolutas. species absolutae.

specillo. speculum / specillum.

speciosius. speciosus / deformis.

spectat. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

specu. spelunca; specus; caverna.

speculando. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

speculatio. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

speculativa. speculativus / moralis.

speculativae. speculativus / moralis.

speculatur. considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere.

speculi. speculum / distantia.

speculis. speculum / aqua.

speculo. speculum / aqua; speculum / distantia; speculum / lana / accendere; speculum / specillum.

speculo sempiterno. speculum sempiternum.

speculorum. speculum / specillum.

speculum. speculum / aqua; speculum / distantia.

speluncam. spelunca; specus; caverna.

Speusippus. Xenocrates / Speusippus / Numenius.

sphaera. Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera; sphaera.

sphaerae. sphaera.

sphaeram. Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera; sphaera.

sphaerarum. sphaera.

sphaeras. sphaera.

spirabit. aggredi / spirare.

spiritale. lumen; spiritus; spiritalis.

spiritalem. spiritalis.

spiritales. spiritalis.

spiritali. spiritalis; spiritalis (optical).

Spiritalia. spiritalis.

spiritalis. materia spiritalis; spiritalis; spiritalis (optical).

Spiritalis. spiritalis.

spiritalium. spiritalis.

spiritibus. spiritus; spiritus (incorporeal).

spiritum. lumen; spiritus; spiritus (incorporeal); spiritus (vital mediator); spiritus / corpusculum.

spiritus. humor; membrum; spiritus; spiritus / corpusculum.

Spiritus. spiritus / corpusculum.

spiritus, humores membraque temperat. temperare spiritus et humores.

spirituum. humor; membrum; spiritus.

splendor. fulgor; splendor; splendor / reflexio.

splendore. fulgor; splendor.

splendores. splendor / lumen / lux.

spontaneus. spontaneus.

spontaneus motus. spontaneus; gradi.

sponte. sponte.

stabilem. immobilis / stabilis.

stabili. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stabilia. immobilis / stabilis; purus / unus / stabilis (intellectual consideration).

stabiliat. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stabilis. consensio stabilis; immobilis / stabilis; permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stabilissimo. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stabilitate. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stabunt. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stando. motus / alteratio / quies.

stante. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

stare. permanere; stabilire; stabilis.

statim. statim / e vestigio / absque mora; statim; subito; paulatim.

statu. motus / alteratio / quies; naturalis habitus / dissipare; status.

statuam. sculptor / statua / lapis.

statueret. regula / lex.

statum. motus / alteratio / quies; status.

status. essentia–vita–mens.

Strato. Strato / Epicureus.

sub lauro. Kalendae; laurus.

subdita deo. actus infinitus / potentia infinita.

subducere. avertere / subducere.

subiecta. subiectum.

subiectam. subiectum.

subiecti. subiectum.

subiectis formatis. forma segregata; subiectum.

subiecto. subiectum; subiectum / receptaculum; subiectum; locus.

subiectum. fons / subiectum virtutis; subiectum; subiectum / receptaculum; subsistere / subiectum.

Subiectum. subiectum.

subito. paulatim / subito; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; statim; subito; paulatim.

Subito. pedetentim / paulatim / subito.

sublimior. sublimior.

sublimiorem. sublimior.

sublimius. praestantior / sublimior.

subsistat. sistere / subsistere.

subsistens. sistere / subsistere.

subsistentem. subsistere / consistere.

subsistere. subsistere / consistere.

subsistit. sistere / subsistere; subsistere / consistere; subsistere / subiectum.

Substantia. substantia.

substantia. substantia; substantia / virtus / operatio; substantia; essentia.

substantia copulatrix. copula; copulatrix.

substantiae. genus substantiae / genus qualitatis; substantia; substantia / virtus / operatio; substantia; essentia.

substantiaeque. substantia / virtus / operatio.

substantialem. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

substantialem aliquam formam. forma accidentalis / substantialis.

substantialis. forma substantialis; accidentalis.

substantialis quaedam unitas. substantialis unitas.

substantialis unitas. substantialis unitas.

substantiam. substantia; substantia / virtus / operatio; substantia; essentia.

Substantiam. substantia.

substantiarum. substantia.

substantias. substantia.

substantiis. substantia.

subterfugiat. subterfugere; adsciscere.

subtile rarumque. crassus; subtilis; rarus.

subtrahendo. subtrahere / auferre.

subtraheretur. subtrahere / auferre.

subtrahit. subtrahere / auferre.

Subtrahite. subtrahere; deprimere.

successione. generatio / genitrix / successio; successio / gradatim.

successione perpetua. vicissitudo generationis.

succurrendum. succurrere / medela.

sue. vulpes / sus / astutia.

sufficiat. sufficere / supervacuus.

sufficientiam subsistendi. sufficientia subsistendi.

sufficientior. sufficientia / indigere.

sufficit. sufficere / supervacuus.

suffocatam. mergere; suffocare.

suffusa. suffundere.

suffusum. suffundere.

suffusus. frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere.

sui met agitatricem. intrinsecus; extrinsecus.

sumeret. sumere.

sumit. sumere.

summae aequalitati. aequalitas summa.

sunt. esse; habere; fieri.

super et praeter ordinem elementorum. super et praeter ordinem elementorum.

superadditam. moles; affectio.

superat. superare / excedere / excellere; superare / praestare.

Superat. superare / praestare.

supercilio. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

supereminet. superare / excedere / excellere.

superest. permanere / restare / superesse.

superet. superare / excedere / excellere; superare / praestare.

superficiem. superficies / pictura; superficies; linea; punctum.

superficies. longitudo / latitudo / profunditas.

superne. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

supersit. permanere / restare / superesse.

supervacua. integritas / puritas / supervacuum.

supervacuis. sufficere / supervacuus.

superveniunt. supervenire.

supervivunt. dictio / supervivere.

surgendum. ascendere / surgere / evolare.

surgimus. ascendere / surgere / evolare.

Surgitque. ascendere / surgere / evolare.

Sursum. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

sursum. sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

susceptaculum. susceptaculum.

susceptaculum suum. susceptaculum.

susceptae. materia / suscipi / misceri.

susceptio. suscipere / capere / accipere.

Susceptio. suscipere / capere / accipere.

suscipi. accipere / suscipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

suscipiat. accipere / suscipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

suscipiendas. suscipere / capere / accipere.

suscipiendis. accipere / suscipere.

suscipiens. suscipere.

suscipiet. suscipere.

suscipit. accipere / suscipere; suscipere; suscipere / capere / accipere.

suscipitur. accipere / suscipere.

suspicatur. augurari / suspicari / somniare.

sustentaculo. sustentaculum; sustentaculum / inquinatio.

sustentaculum. sustentaculum.

sustinebit vibrabitque. sustinere / vibrare.

sustinebunt. pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci.

suum cuique. iustitia / suum cuique.

tabe. humor; tabes; pinguedo.

tactu. tactus.

tactus. tactus.

tale. certus / talis.

tale quiddam. talis; sic affectus.

talem. certus / talis.

tales. certus / talis.

tali. certus / talis.

talis. certus / talis.

Talis. certus / talis.

tamen. immo / tamen / non tamen; immo; tamen; nihilominus.

tamquam. per se; quodammodo; proprie.

tandem. statim; subito; paulatim.

tangatur. tangere.

tangi. tangere.

tangit. tangere; videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere.

tangitur. tangere.

tanto. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

tantum. quantum; quatenus; respectus.

temperantia. temperantia / libido.

temperat. contemperare / temperatrix.

temperatio. temperatio / complexio.

temperatio artis. temperatio artis.

temperatione. temperatio.

temperationem. temperatio / complexio.

temperationi. temperatio / complexio.

temperatrix. contemperare / temperatrix.

temperetur. lyra / temperare.

tempestate. procella / tempestas.

temporalis ascensio. ascensio; descensio.

temporalis vicissitudo seminum. vicissitudo seminum.

tempore. locus / situs / tempus; locus / tempus.

tempori. locus / situs / tempus.

temporis. locus / tempus; mores; doctrina; tempus; praeteritum / futurum / praesens.

temporis intervallo. intervallum temporis.

temporis intervallum. temporis intervallum.

tempus. locus / situs / tempus; locus / tempus.

tenebras. lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium.

tenet. tenere / memoria.

tenuentur. tenuare / purgare.

tenui. pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus.

tenuissima. tenuis / lucidus.

tenuissimum. tenuis / lucidus; tenuis; crassus.

terminabitur. terminus / terminare.

terminat. terminus / terminare.

terminatur. terminus / terminare.

termini. caput / finis / terminus lineae.

terminis. terminus.

termino. terminus; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura; terminus / terminare.

terminos. caput / finis / terminus lineae; finis; limes; terminus; terminus.

terminos alienos. termini proprii; alieni.

terminos proprios. termini proprii; alieni.

terminum. caput / finis / terminus lineae; finis; limes; terminus; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura; terminus / terminare; terminus; rector.

terminus. finis; limes; terminus; terminus; terminus / terminare.

terra. caelum; terra; mundus; ignis / terra / lapis.

terrae. aqua / aer / terra; caelum; terra; mundus.

terram. aqua / aer / terra; ignis / terra / lapis.

terrenis. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

terreno. purus / crassus / terrenus.

terrestria. aquaticus / terrestris / aereus.

terreum. humidus / terreus / lutulentus; igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus.

tertia. tertius.

tertiae. tertius.

tertiae essentiae. tertia essentia.

tertiam illam essentiam. tertia essentia.

Timaeus Locrus. Empedocles / Timaeus Locrus.

timeat. fortitudo / timor.

timoris. fortitudo / timor.

titubare. caecutire; titubare; aegrotare.

torpent. ignavia / torpere.

torqueat. continere; sistere; torquere.

tota. pars / totum; tota adesse; totus.

Tota. tota adesse.

tota anima in singulis. particula vivere.

Tota igitur. tota adesse.

tota sentit. tota adesse.

totam. pars / totum (further forms); tota adesse; totus; universalis / totus.

totam per singula. ubique totus.

totam perficere materiam. secundum totam essentiam.

toti. aequalis pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); totus.

totius. pars / totum; totus.

totius integritas. totius integritas.

toto. pars / totum; totus.

totum. pars / totum; totus; universalis / totus.

totum a toto. pars et totum.

tractum. nervus; articulus; tractus.

tradendo. tradere.

tradit. tradere.

traditione. tradere.

traditur. tradere.

traducat. traducere.

Tradunt. tradere.

tradunt. tradere.

trahitur et suspenditur. magnes / ferrum / trahere / suspendere.

transcendit. ratio / transcendere.

transcurrendo. transcurrere.

transcurrere. transcurrere.

transeat. transire / migrare / commutare.

transferetur. transferre.

transit. pervenire / transire / concurrere; transire / migrare / commutare; transitus.

transitum vel circuitum. transitus; circuitus.

transitus. transitus.

transmittuntur. transmittere / conservare.

transmutabit. commutare / transmutare.

transmutatio. commutatio; transmutatio.

tria. tria puncta / medium / extrema.

tribuat. dare; tribuere; praestare.

tribuere. dare / tribuere / praestare; dare; tribuere; praestare.

tribuit. dare / tribuere; dare / tribuere / praestare; dare; tribuere; praestare; iustitia / suum cuique.

tribuitur. dare / tribuere.

tricubita. tricubitus.

tricubito. tricubitus.

trigesimo aetatis anno. fetus; adultus.

Tristitia. tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare.

tritici. gutta / triticum / granum.

tritico. triticum / pyrum.

tumore. tumor.

turgent. turgere; concipere; edere.

turgescit. turgescere / gravescere.

ubique totam. ubique totus.

umbrae. umbra.

umbram. umbra.

umbram tuam. umbra.

umquam. semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque.

unam causam. causa communis.

undas. vultus; flumen; unda.

Unde. unde / inde / illuc.

unio fit membrorum. unio plurium / vis insita.

unio plurium. unio plurium / vis insita.

unione. colligere; unio.

unionem et augmentum. unio et augmentum.

unit. unire; sistere; continere.

Unit. unire; sistere; continere.

unita. mixtio / miscere.

unitas. unitas / multitudo; unitas / unire.

unitatem. unitas / multitudo; unitas / unire.

unitque. unitas / unire.

uniuntur. unio plurium / vis insita.

universae. universalis / totus.

universalem. universalis.

universales. universalis.

universali. universalis; universalis / totus.

universalia. universale; particulare.

universalibus. universalis.

universalis. universalis / totus.

universi corporis. anima universalis.

unum. purus / unus / stabilis (intellectual consideration).

usu. disciplina / usus; industria / usus / affectus.

ut alias ostendemus. ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus.

ut in sequentibus apparebit. ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus.

ut in superioribus enarravimus. ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus.

ut ita dixerim. quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; quodammodo; quasi.

ut ita loquar. principale propositum; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar.

ut Platonici opinantur. ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur.

ut quidam putant. ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur.

utilia. dulce / amarum / utile / inutile.

utilitatis. commodum / utilitas.

utrum. utrum; an; numquid; num.

Vacat altera. vacare.

vagantur. praescribere / ordinare / vagari.

vagatur. versari / volutari / vagari.

valeat. posse; valere; oportere.

valent. posse; valere; oportere.

valere. valere.

valet. posse; valere; oportere; valere.

valitudinis. quies / valitudo / consensio.

vapor. vapor / fumus.

variantur. succedere; momenta.

variatur. mutatio / mutare.

vasis. vas.

vaticinatur. vaticinari.

vegetabat. vegetare.

vegetat. vegetare.

vegetatricem. vegetatrix; natura.

vegetatrix. vegetatrix; natura.

vehiculo. vehiculum aethereum.

vel. vel; sive; seu; aut.

velit. velle / voluntas; voluntas / velle.

velle. velle / voluntas; voluntas / velle.

vellet. velle / voluntas.

Venus. Lucifer / Venus.

vera. veritas / verum; verus / falsus.

veram. veritas / verum.

veras. verus / falsus.

verba. persona / verba.

verberantis. verberare.

verberatur. verberare.

verior. veritas / verum.

veriora. veritas / verum.

Veritas. veritas / verum.

veritas. veritas / verum.

veritate. veritas / verum; veritas; gaudium.

veritatem. veritas / verum; veritas; gaudium.

veritatis. veritas / verum.

verius. veritas / verum.

versatur. versari / volutari / vagari.

verum. veritas / verum; verum / bonum; verus / falsus.

Verum. verum / bonum.

Verumtamen. immo; tamen; nihilominus.

verus. verus / falsus.

vesceretur. vesci / pasci.

vescitur. vesci / pasci.

vestigia. lepus / vestigium / indago.

veteres corrumpuntur. partes novae; veteres.

vi. virtus; virtus; vis; vis.

vi naturali. vis naturalis.

Vicissim. invicem / vicissim.

vicissim. invicem / vicissim; simul; vicissim; invicem; vicissim.

videamus. videre; cernere; intueri.

videantur. videri / apparere / patere / constare.

videat. videre; cernere; intueri.

videatur. apparere / videri / placere; videre; cernere; intueri; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

videbitur. videre; cernere; intueri.

videmus. videre; cernere; intueri.

vident. videre; cernere; intueri.

videntur. apparere / videri / placere.

videramus. videre; cernere; intueri.

videre. videre; cernere; intueri.

videretur. videre; cernere; intueri.

videt. videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere; videre; cernere; intueri.

videtur. apparere / videri / placere; videre; cernere; intueri; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

viget. dominari / vigere / astringere.

vigilanti. dormire / vigilare / expergefieri.

vigilantibus. dormire / vigilare / expergefieri.

viles. idoneus / vilis / perfectior.

vim. virtus; virtus; vis; vis.

Vim. vis.

vim illam iudiciariam. vis iudiciaria.

vincti. ligare; vincire.

vinctus. ligare; vincire.

vinculi. vinculum.

vinculum. vinculum.

vino. vinum / dulcedo / sapor.

violentia. violentia.

violentiam. violentia.

virentes. coalescere; virere.

vires. vires / affectus / actus / habitus; virtus; virtus; vis; vis; vis / potentia / virtus.

viribus. vires / affectus / actus / habitus; virtus; virtus; vis; vis.

virtus. substantia / virtus / operatio; virtus; virtus; vis; vis / potentia / virtus.

virtute. virtus; virtus; vis.

virtute magnum. virtute; quantitate.

virtutem. substantia / virtus / operatio; virtus; virtus; vis.

virtutes. virtus.

virtuti. virtus.

virtutibus. virtus.

virtutis. substantia / virtus / operatio; virtus.

Virtutum. virtus.

virtutum. virtus.

vis. virtus; virtus; vis; vis; vis / potentia / virtus.

Vis. vis.

Vis actioque agenti alicui intima. actio intima.

vis ea efficiens. vis naturalis.

vis illa iudiciaria. vis iudiciaria.

vis insita. unio plurium / vis insita.

vis ipsa naturalis. vis naturalis.

vis quaedam corporis agilis ad movendum. vis agilis.

Vis seminaria. vis seminaria.

visceribus. viscera; viscera; gremium.

visibilis. visibilis / invisibilis.

visionem. visio.

visiones. visio.

Visus. visus / auditus / olfactus.

vita. essentia–vita–mens; vita; vita / vivere; vita; vivere.

Vita. vita / vivere.

vita mundi. vita mundi / novae animae.

vitae. vita; vita / vivere; vita; vivere.

vitalem. praestare vitam / vitalis.

vitali. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

vitali intensione. localis diffusio / vitalis intensio.

vitalis harmonia. vivificus spiritus / vitalis harmonia.

vitam. lapides / prima vita; praestare vitam / vitalis; vita; vita / vivere; vita; vivere.

vitam ab anima mutuari. mutuare vitam.

vitam animae mutuet. mutuare vitam.

Vivacior. vivax / audens / robustus.

vivae carnis. cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro.

vivant. vita; vivere; vivere.

vivat. vivere.

vivendi. vita / vivere; vivere.

vivendo. vita / vivere.

vivens. animale; vivens; vivificatum; vita; vivere; vivere.

vivent. vivere.

vivente. vivere.

viventem. vivere.

viventia. vita / vivere; vita; vivere.

viventium. vivere.

vivere. vita / vivere; vita; vivere; vivere.

viveret. vita; vivere.

vivet. vita / vivere.

vivifica. vivificare.

vivificam. forma vivifica; vivificare.

vivificando. vivificare / vivificatio.

vivificare. vita / vivere; vivificare / vivificatio.

Vivificare. vivificare / vivificatio.

vivificat. vivificare; vivificare / vivificatio.

vivificatio. vivificare / vivificatio.

vivificationemque. vivificare / vivificatio.

vivificatum. animale; vivens; vivificatum; vivificare.

vivificet. vivificare; vivificare / vivificatio.

vivifico spiritu. vivificus spiritus / vitalis harmonia.

vivificum. vivificare.

Vivit. vita / vivere.

vivit. vita / vivere; vita; vivere; vivere.

vivos. lapides / prima vita.

vivunt. vita; vivere; vivere.

Vivunt. vivere.

vix. statim; subito; paulatim.

vixerat. vivere.

vixit. vivere.

vocant. dicere / loqui / vocare.

vocantur. dicere / loqui / vocare.

vocatur. dicere / loqui / vocare.

Vocatur. dicere / loqui / vocare.

voce. procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus.

vocem. color / vox / odor; lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium; vox; odor; sapor.

voces. color / vox / odor.

vocum. significatio / vox.

volans. avis; volare.

volare. avis; volare.

volemus. voluntas / velle.

volet. velle / voluntas.

voluisse videntur. videri velle.

volumus. voluntas / velle.

volunt. voluntas / velle.

voluntas. cognitio / voluntas; voluntas / velle; voluntas constans.

voluntas eadem. voluntas; mos; opinio; scientia.

voluntate. velle / voluntas.

voluntatem. brachium / opus extra; voluntas / velle.

voluntatis. voluntas / velle.

voluptas. voluptas.

voluptate. voluptas / fastidium / dolor.

volutat. versari / volutari / vagari.

vox. significatio / vox.

vulpes. vulpes / sus / astutia.

vult. voluntas / velle.

vultum. vultus / pupilla.

vultus. vultus; flumen; unda.

Xenocrates. Xenocrates / Speusippus / Numenius.

Xenophanes Colophonius. Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus.

Xenophantes. Boethus; Epicurus; Xenophantes.

Xenophon. Antisthenes / Xenophon.

Xenophontis. Xenophon / Alcibiades / Phaedrus.

Zeno Cittieus. Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius.

Zoroaster. prisci theologi.

Zoroastris. Zoroaster.

Passage index

Every numbered comparison unit appears below in source order. The source PDF page pair accompanies direct reading routes. A route does not assert that every word or every repetition in the unit has a separate definition.

Chapter V.1

V.1.1, source pp. 8–9. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Motion and substantial stability. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; circulus; dare / tribuere / praestare; desinere / cessare; immortalis / immortalitas; motor; motus / movere; motus internus / externus; perpetuus; primo moveri; primus / prior; proprius / communis; ratio / definitio; semet ipsum deserere; spontaneus.

V.1.2, source pp. 8–9. Articles: Motion and substantial stability. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; motio; tertius.

V.1.3, source pp. 8–9. Articles: Circularity and spiritual spheres. Vocabulary: circulus.

V.1.4, source pp. 10–11. Articles: Circularity and spiritual spheres. Vocabulary: circuitus; desinere / cessare; effundere; Pythagoras; recolligere; renovare; sphaera; virtus.

V.1.5, source pp. 10–11. Articles: Circularity and spiritual spheres; Image, shadow and ranked truth. Vocabulary: circuitus; habere; motus / movere; sphaera; spiritalis; substantia; terminus; umbra.

Chapter V.2

V.2.1, source pp. 12–13. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Motion and substantial stability; Rational soul and irrational life; Time, memory and expectation. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; idolum / simulacrum; immortalis / immortalitas; irrationalis vita; motus / movere; mutare / mutatio; operatio / operari; status; substantia.

Chapter V.3

V.3.1, source pp. 14–15. Articles: Motion and substantial stability; Passivity and bodily affection. Vocabulary: angelus; corpus / corporalis; expers; gradus; haerere / inhaerere; passio; passivus / activus; percipere (undergoing affection); qualitas; quantitas; tertius.

Chapter V.4

V.4.1, source pp. 16–17. Articles: Art and elemental transformation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; apparere / videri / placere; aqua / aer / terra; ars; chaos; commutatio; egenus / egere / indigere; elementum; expers; extenuare; figulus; frangere / reparare; frigiditas / frigus; habere; humiditas / humor; immortalis / immortalitas; imprimere; informis; lutum; mare; materia prima; natura; necesse / oportere; opus; perpetuus; portiuncula; primus / prior; pura potentia; radius; siccitas; sol; species; subiectum; susceptaculum; suscipere / capere / accipere; universalis / totus; vapor / fumus; vas; vicissim; virtus; vis naturalis.

V.4.2, source pp. 18–19. Articles: Art and elemental transformation; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Natural striving, source and return. Vocabulary: bonum /

bonitas; causa efficiens; conservare / servare; facilis / difficilis; in nihilum; influxus; portiuncula; semel; subtrahere / auferre; violentia; virtus.

V.4.3, source pp. 18–19. Articles: Art and elemental transformation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: apparere / videri / placere; aqua / aer / terra; aquila; frigiditas / frigus; humiditas / humor; latere / delitescere; mare; milium / ficus; permanere / restare / superesse; producere / gignere / generare; semen; separare / seiungere / disiungere; triticum / pyrum.

V.4.4, source pp. 20–21. Articles: Art and elemental transformation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: aqua / aer / terra; ascendere / descendere; densitas / densare; extenuare; humiditas / humor; induere / exuere; rarefactio; siccitas; turgescere / gravescere; vicissim.

V.4.5, source pp. 20–21. Articles: Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: formabile / formator; fundamentum; machina; pars / particula; quantitas.

V.4.6, source pp. 20–21. Articles: Natural striving, source and return; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; appetitus naturalis; commutare / transmutare; elementum; fundamentum; pro viribus; propagare / propagatio; proprius / communis; quantitas; sedes; subiectum; sustentaculum; violentia; virtus.

V.4.7, source pp. 22–23. Articles: Natural striving, source and return. Vocabulary: appetitus naturalis; bonum / bonitas; reflecti / ferri; sequi; unde / inde / illuc.

V.4.8, source pp. 22–23. Articles: Generation, corruption and annihilation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: auctor / conditor / opifex; fundamentum; in nihilum; liber / libere / libertas; opus; producere / gignere / generare; violentia.

V.4.9, source pp. 22–23. Articles: Generation, corruption and annihilation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: absurdus / repugnare; apparere / videri / placere; certus / talis; commutare / transmutare; corrumpere / perdere / interire; existentia; materia prima; pars / particula; permanere / restare / superesse; pura potentia; simplex.

V.4.10, source pp. 24–25. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Instrument and creative mediation; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; commutare / transmutare; corrumpere / perdere / interire; dare / tribuere / praestare; domina / dominari; fons essendi; immortalis / immortalitas; in nihilum; instrumentum; motio; ordo / ordinare; qualitas; unitas / unire; universalis / totus; virtus; vis naturalis.

Chapter V.5

V.5.1, source pp. 26–27. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Natural striving, source and return; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: causa efficiens; Deus; felicitas; finis / causa finalis; medium; omnino; per aliud; per se; universalis / totus.

V.5.2, source pp. 26–27. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; necesse / oportere; omnino; principale propositum; propositum; proxime.

V.5.3, source pp. 28–29. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; alvus / fetus; finis / causa finalis; gradus; qualitas; superare / praestare.

V.5.4, source pp. 28–29. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: ascendere / descendere; carere / privari; causa efficiens; finis / causa finalis; gradus; opponere / oppositum; qualitas; superare / praestare; tertius.

V.5.5, source pp. 28–29. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Inclination and independence; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: angelus; causa efficiens; dependere / pendere; finis / causa finalis; inclinari; quodammodo; ratio / definitio.

V.5.6, source pp. 28–29. Articles: Inclination and independence.

V.5.7, source pp. 30–31. Articles: Inclination and independence; Soul as universal bond. Vocabulary: immergere / emergere; mundi nodus.

V.5.8, source pp. 30–31. Articles: Circularity and spiritual spheres; Inclination and independence. Vocabulary: alligare / addicere; circuitus; liber / libere / libertas; operatio / operari; per se; primo moveri; se recipere.

V.5.9, source pp. 30–31. Articles: Inclination and independence; Indivisibility and contact; Passivity and bodily affection. Vocabulary: carere / privari; domina / dominari; egenus / egere / indigere; habere; hostilis / noxius; inquinare; origo; passio; patera; potentia susceptiva; procella / tempestas; qualitas; quantitas; sedes; separabilis; suscipere / capere / accipere; sustentaculum.

Chapter V.6

V.6.1, source pp. 32–33. Articles: Indivisibility and contact; Instrument and creative mediation; Passivity and bodily affection; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; beneficus; conservare / servare; corrumpere / perdere / interire; creare / creatio; dividuum / divisibilis; habere; imago; indivisibilis / individuum; infundere; nixus / niti; pars / particula; propagare / propagatio; punctum; rectus / reflexus; sentire / sensus; speculum / aqua; suscipere / capere / accipere; tangere.

Chapter V.7

V.7.1, source pp. 34–35. Articles: Comets and defining accounts; Essence and being. Vocabulary: accendere / effulgere; actus; certus / talis; crinita; esse; essentia; hic / ibi; hodie / cras; humanitas; locus / tempus; oriens / occidens; Plato / Socrates; praesentia; ratio / definitio; secundum se; terminus; vapor / fumus.

V.7.2, source pp. 36–37. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; Essence and being; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: auctor / conditor / opifex; captus; contrahere / coarctare; corpus / corporalis; determinare; essentia; locus / tempus; procella / tempestas; separare / seiungere / disiungere; sortiri; suscipere / capere / accipere.

Chapter V.8

V.8.1, source pp. 38–39. Articles: Form and formal being; Generation, corruption and annihilation. Vocabulary: aes / aeneus; amittere; ars; corruptio; equus / homo; esse proprium / commune esse; forma; generatio; milium / ficus; opponere / oppositum; Plato / Socrates; similitudo; species; temperatio / complexio.

V.8.2, source pp. 40–41. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; Form and formal being; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Participation, common and proper.

Vocabulary: abire / discedere; amittere; calor / caliditas; componere / compositum; corrumpere / perdere / interire; desinere / cessare; esse proprium / commune esse; expellere / depellere; fomes; forma; formabile / formator; frigiditas / frigus; fugare / fugere; generatio; ignis; lex formantis; producere / gignere / generare; proprius / communis; semen; separare / seiungere / disiungere; sol.

V.8.3, source pp. 42–43. Articles: Form and formal being; Indivisibility and contact; Passivity and bodily affection; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: absolute; alimentum / alere; forma; haurire; hostilis / noxius; idolum / simulacrum; instinctus; liber / libere / libertas; mera forma; nixus / niti; passio; pro viribus; propagare / propagatio; res; separare / seiungere / disiungere; speculum / aqua; spiritalis; sponte; susceptaculum; suscipere / capere / accipere; violentia.

V.8.4, source pp. 44–45. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; Form and formal being. Vocabulary: abire / discedere; absurdus / repugnare; dignitas; formabile / formator; intercidere / interponere; lex formantis; medium; mera forma; pro viribus; separare / seiungere / disiungere; sponte.

Chapter V.9

V.9.1, source pp. 46–47. Articles: Form and formal being; Fountains, drawing and infusion; Necessary predication and the fire objection; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: circulus; fons essendi; humiditas / humor; ignis; lignum; per aliud; per se convenire; progressio in infinitum; rotunditas; sequi; sol; sortiri.

V.9.2, source pp. 48–49. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; Form and formal being; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: assignare (assigned nature); auctor / conditor / opifex; certus / talis; componere / compositum; dependere / pendere; forma; haerere / inhaerere; intercidere / interponere; natura; per se convenire; per sui naturam; quatenus / eatenus; sequi.

V.9.3, source pp. 50–51. Articles: Necessary predication and the fire objection; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: absolute; absurdus / repugnare; dum est; progressio in infinitum; radix essendi.

V.9.4, source pp. 52–53. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; Necessary predication and the fire objection; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: absolute; accidere; calere; calor / caliditas; certus / talis; desinere / cessare; dum est; haerere / inhaerere; ignis; latere / delitescere; per se; sinus / gremium; sortiri; vinculum.

Chapter V.10

V.10.1, source pp. 54–55. Articles: Conditions and the fashioner’s law; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Necessary predication and the fire objection; Relation and continuing dependence; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: absolute; apparere / videri / placere; causa prima; dependere / pendere; Deus; per aliud; permanere / restare / superesse; primum principium; quatenus / eatenus; respectus / referri; respicere; similitudo.

V.10.2, source pp. 56–57. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Motion and substantial stability; Relation and continuing dependence. Vocabulary: agere / efficere; corpus / corporalis; dependere / pendere; haerere / inhaerere; imago; immergere / emergere; liber / libere / libertas; locus / tempus; mutare / mutatio; operatio / operari; per aliud; primum principium; respectus / referri; speculum / aqua.

V.10.3, source pp. 58–59. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Fountains, drawing and infusion; Motion and substantial stability; Relation and continuing dependence; Through itself and through another. Vocabulary: bibere; Deus; exuberare; haurire; immobilis / stabilis; liber / libere / libertas; per se; permanere / restare / superesse; relatio; respectus / referri; tertius.

Chapter V.11

V.11.1, source pp. 60–61. Articles: Essence and being; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: absolute; actus; componere / compositum; corrumpere / perdere / interire; corruptio; fomes; generatio; potentia susceptiva; res; resolvi.

V.11.2, source pp. 60–61. Articles: Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: actus; amittere; beneficus; influxus; superare / praestare.

V.11.3, source pp. 62–63. Articles: Essence and being; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: amittere; corrumpere / perdere / interire; corruptio; esse; permanere / restare / superesse; vivere.

V.11.4, source pp. 62–63. Articles: Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: resolvi.

V.11.5, source pp. 62–63. Articles: Generation, corruption and annihilation; Seal, wax and restoration; Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: resolvi.

V.11.6, source pp. 64–65. Articles: Generation, corruption and annihilation; Ideas, natural ascent and rest; Seal, wax and restoration. Vocabulary: adaequare; animus; cera; creare / creatio; idea; imprimere; redintegrare / confirmare / roborare; resolvi; sequi; sigillum; terminus.

V.11.7, source pp. 64–65. Articles: Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: certus / talis; corpus / corporalis; induere / exuere; materia spiritalis; resolvi; se recipere; spiritalis.

V.11.8, source pp. 66–67. Articles: Essence and being; Intelligible principles and reasoning; Participation, common and proper; Seal, wax and restoration; Spiritual matter and identity. Vocabulary: apparere / videri / placere; corpus / corporalis; materia communis / propria; materia spiritalis; migrare; proprius / communis; species; spiritalis; vivere.

Chapter V.12

V.12.1, source pp. 68–69. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: integra / perfecta; potentia ad non esse; res; simplex; sistere / subsistere.

V.12.2, source pp. 68–69. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: absurdus / repugnare; accidere; componere / compositum; integra / perfecta; materia prima; necesse / oportere; opponere / oppositum; potentia ad non esse; quiescere; quodammodo; subiectum; substantia; suscipere / capere / accipere.

V.12.3, source pp. 68–69. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: egenus / egere / indigere; informis; necessarium / impossibile; opus; possibile; quodammodo.

V.12.4, source pp. 70–71. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: aptus / ineptus; necessarium / impossibile; possibile.

V.12.5, source pp. 70–71. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: componere / compositum; necessarium / impossibile; possibile; potentia ad non esse; simplex.

V.12.6, source pp. 70–71. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: determinare; indifferens; leo; materia prima; materia propinqua / secunda; potentia ad non esse.

V.12.7, source pp. 72–73. Articles: Creation and generation; Potency, possibility and the lion; Prime matter and enduring support. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; constare / exstare; inchoatio; indifferens; vicissim.

V.12.8, source pp. 72–73. Articles: Creation and generation; Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: ex nihilo in lucem; in nihilum.

V.12.9, source pp. 72–73. Articles: Creation and generation; Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: auctor / conditor / opifex; possibile.

V.12.10, source pp. 72–73. Articles: Creation and generation; Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: nascendi potentia; opponere / oppositum.

V.12.11, source pp. 74–75. Articles: Potency, possibility and the lion. Vocabulary: nixus / niti; sistere / subsistere.

V.12.12, source pp. 74–75. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Relation and continuing dependence. Vocabulary: bonum / bonitas; conservare / servare; desinere / cessare; effectrix / conservatrix / corruptrix; haurire; imago; influxus; infundere; mors; origo; sistere / subsistere; speculum / aqua; subtrahere / auferre; vivere.

V.12.13, source pp. 76–77. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Ideas, natural ascent and rest; Relation and continuing dependence. Vocabulary: absurdus / repugnare; caducus; colligere / conciliare; dependere / pendere; desinere / cessare; immobilis / stabilis; infundere; motus / movere; mutare / mutatio; primus / prior; quiescere; sine medio; subtrahere / auferre; suscipere / capere / accipere.

V.12.14, source pp. 76–77. Articles: Ideas, natural ascent and rest. Vocabulary: absolute; anima rationalis; ascendere / descendere; disciplina / usus; idea; operatio / operari; perpetuus; quiescere; species absolutae; vivere.

V.12.15, source pp. 76–77. Articles: Ideas, natural ascent and rest. Vocabulary: idea; sempiternus.

Chapter V.13

V.13.1, source pp. 78–79. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Participation, common and proper; Platonist disagreement and descent. Vocabulary: angelus; apparere / videri / placere; causa communis; cogere in unum; Dionysius / Origenes / Augustinus; effectus proprius; fomes; in nihilum; informis; Plotinus / Proculus; producere / gignere / generare; res; simplex; viscera.

V.13.2, source pp. 78–79. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Participation, common and proper. Vocabulary: causa communis; dare / tribuere / praestare; esse; modus essendi; opus; proprius / communis.

V.13.3, source pp. 80–81. Articles: Creation and generation; Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Participation, common and proper. Vocabulary: absolute; certus / talis; equus / homo; esse; simpliciter.

V.13.4, source pp. 80–81. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Participation, common and proper. Vocabulary: absolute; causa prima; causae sequentes; dare / tribuere / praestare; participatio / particeps; primus / prior; producere / gignere / generare; sequi.

V.13.5, source pp. 82–83. Articles: Ariston, sculptor and painter; Art and elemental transformation; Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Participation, common and proper. Vocabulary: absolute; accendere / effulgere; agere / efficere; aptus / ineptus; Ariston; ars; certus / talis; egenus / egere / indigere; facilis / difficilis; fundamentum; humanitas; intervallum / distantia; modus essendi; natura; participatio / particeps; Plato / Socrates; potentior / melior; producere / gignere / generare; sculptor / statua / lapis; semen; simpliciter.

V.13.6, source pp. 82–83. Articles: Ariston, sculptor and painter; Art and elemental transformation; Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: infinitus / immensus; intervallum / distantia; proportio.

V.13.7, source pp. 84–85. Articles: Creation and generation; Creature, power and operation; Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: actus; componere / compositum; creatura; elementum; essentia; infinitus / immensus; opponere / oppositum; participatio / particeps; quatuor elementa; spiritus; virtus.

V.13.8, source pp. 84–85. Articles: Creature, power and operation; Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: operatio / operari.

V.13.9, source pp. 84–85. Articles: Creature, power and operation; Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: actus; operatio / operari; virtus.

V.13.10, source pp. 84–85. Articles: Creature, power and operation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Fountains, drawing and infusion. Vocabulary: calefactio; cognitio / voluntas; operatio / operari; operatio quae effluit / quae manet.

V.13.11, source pp. 86–87. Articles: Creature, power and operation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: cognitio / voluntas; creatura; obiectum; operatio quae effluit / quae manet; verum / bonum; voluptas.

V.13.12, source pp. 86–87. Articles: Creature, power and operation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence. Vocabulary: actus; induere / exuere; obiectum; operatio / operari; respicere; species; virtus.

V.13.13, source pp. 86–87. Articles: Creation and generation; Creature, power and operation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Life and vivification; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: accidens; agere / efficere; creare / creatio; creatura; egenus / egere / indigere; haerere / inhaerere; infinitus / immensus; operatio / operari; subiectum; substantia; suscipere / capere / accipere; virtus.

V.13.14, source pp. 88–89. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Instrument and creative mediation. Vocabulary: angelus; creare / creatio; instrumentum; medium; principalis / agens principale; principalis agens; temporis intervallum; traducere.

V.13.15, source pp. 88–89. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Instrument and creative mediation; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: absurdus / repugnare; creare / creatio; infinitus / immensus.

V.13.16, source pp. 88–89. Articles: Ariston, sculptor and painter; Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Ideas, natural ascent and rest; Instrument and creative mediation; Intelligible principles and reasoning; Reception and the receiver. Vocabulary: angelus; equus / homo; exemplar; idea; pictor / pictura; proxime; sine medio.

V.13.17, source pp. 90–91. Articles: Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Instrument and creative mediation; Relation and continuing dependence. Vocabulary: bonum / bonitas; conservare / servare; creare / creatio; Deus; egenus / egere / indigere; habere; intercidere / interponere; medium; principium / finis; proxime; saltem; sine medio.

V.13.18, source pp. 92–93. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Ideas, natural ascent and rest; Platonist disagreement and descent; Rational soul and irrational life. Vocabulary: anima rationalis; apparere / videri / placere; auctor / conditor / opifex; caducus; corpus / corporalis; exemplar; idea; imprimere; integra / perfecta; necesse / oportere; origo; proxime; ratio / definitio; secundum se; sempiternus; speculum sempiternum; vehiculum aethereum; vivere.

Chapter V.14

V.14.1, source pp. 94–95. Articles: Life and vivification; Rational soul and irrational life. Vocabulary: abire / discedere; animatum; dare / tribuere / praestare; immortalis / immortalitas; praesentia; universalis / totus; vita; vivificare / vivificatio.

V.14.2, source pp. 94–95. Articles: Creature, power and operation; Life and vivification; Natural striving, source and return. Vocabulary: alimentum / alere; coniectura; consilium; consuetudo; velle / voluntas; viscera; vita; vivificare / vivificatio.

V.14.3, source pp. 96–97. Articles: Contraries, death and imperishability; Life and vivification; Zoroaster and the mistress of life. Vocabulary: calor / caliditas; habere; mors; mortifer; quodammodo; siccitas; vivere.

V.14.4, source pp. 96–97. Articles: Contraries, death and imperishability. Vocabulary: frigiditas / frigus; ignis.

V.14.5, source pp. 96–97. Articles: Contraries, death and imperishability; Life and vivification; Zoroaster and the mistress of life. Vocabulary: habere; ignis; immortalis / immortalitas; imperdibilis; infrigescibilis; pedisequa.

V.14.6, source pp. 96–97. Articles: Comets and defining accounts; Life and vivification; Zoroaster and the mistress of life. Vocabulary: abire / discedere; coma; crinita; domina / dominari; mors; pedisequa; sol; Zoroaster; Immortal and mistress of life.

V.14.7, source pp. 98–99. Articles: Contraries, death and imperishability; Zoroaster and the mistress of life. Vocabulary: expellere / depellere; fovere; fugare / fugere; imperdibilis; medium; mors; mortifer; producere / gignere / generare; sinus / gremium; Strato / Epicureus; vivere.

V.14.8, source pp. 100–101. Articles: Contraries, death and imperishability; Fountains, drawing and infusion; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Platonist disagreement and descent; Rational soul and irrational life. Vocabulary: apparere / videri / placere; carere / privari; habere; inquinare; instrumentum; irrationalis vita; liber / libere / libertas; Plotinus / Proculus; Porphyrius; semet ipsum deserere; sentire / sensus; sinus / gremium; status; umbra; verus / falsus; vivere; vivificare / vivificatio; Xenocrates / Speusippus / Numenius.

V.14.9, source pp. 102–103. Articles: Image, shadow and ranked truth; Platonist disagreement and descent; Rational soul and irrational life. Vocabulary: Aegyptii / Pythagorei; apparere / videri / placere; bonum / bonitas; delabi / prolabi; Empedocles / Timaeus Locrus; imago; ipsi viderint; qualitas; sempiternus; verus / falsus.

Chapter V.15

V.15.1, source pp. 104–105. Articles: Soul as universal bond. Vocabulary: corpus / corporalis; pars / particula.

V.15.2, source pp. 104–105. Articles: Image, shadow and ranked truth; Soul as universal bond. Vocabulary: colligere / conciliare; corpus / corporalis; dos; machina; sedes.

V.15.3, source pp. 104–105. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Soul as universal bond. Vocabulary: dos; effundere; sempiternus; splendor / reflexio; superare / praestare; umbra.

V.15.4, source pp. 106–107. Articles: Fountains, drawing and infusion; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Soul as universal bond. Vocabulary: caput / membrum; imago; perpetuus; probabile; splendor / reflexio; superare / praestare; vinculum.

V.15.5, source pp. 106–107. Articles: Motion and substantial stability; Time, memory and expectation. Vocabulary: futurum / praesens / praeteritum; immobilis / stabilis; intentio; memoria / expectatio; motio; motus / movere; opus; propositum; simul.

V.15.6, source pp. 108–109. Articles: Motion and substantial stability; Soul as universal bond; Time, memory and expectation. Vocabulary: ascendere / descendere; carere / privari; commutatio; futurum / praesens / praeteritum; immobilis / stabilis; moles; speciosus / deformis; substantia.

V.15.7, source pp. 108–109. Articles: Life and vivification; Rational soul and irrational life. Vocabulary: animatum; carere / privari; inanimis / mortuus; vita.

V.15.8, source pp. 110–111. Articles: Image, shadow and ranked truth; Life and vivification; Rational soul and irrational life; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: animatum; Aristoxenus / Dicaearchus; carere / privari; idolum / simulacrum; potentior / melior; semet ipsum deserere; temperatio / complexio.

V.15.9, source pp. 110–111. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: accidere; alienare / purgare; avertere / subducere; consuetudo; incommutabilis / immutabilis; intelligere / intelligentia; intentio; intueri; temperatio / complexio.

V.15.10, source pp. 110–111. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: accidens; avertere / subducere; commixtio; consonantia / harmonia; humores; simplex; substantia; temperatio / complexio.

V.15.11, source pp. 112–113. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning. Vocabulary: avertere / subducere; intelligere / intelligentia; maxime quae sunt.

V.15.12, source pp. 112–113. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Teaching without loss; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: consonantia / harmonia; intelligere / intelligentia; intueri; mancipare; maxime quae sunt; non localiter.

V.15.13, source pp. 112–113. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: alligare / addicere; mutare / mutatio; separare / seiungere / disiungere.

V.15.14, source pp. 112–113. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: comparatio; duo / quattuor / sex / octo.

V.15.15, source pp. 114–115. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Teaching without loss; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: ars ratiocinandi; docere; incommutabilis / immutabilis; oblivisci; ratio / definitio; separare / seiungere / disiungere; transitus.

V.15.16, source pp. 114–115. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Teaching without loss; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: consonantia / harmonia; incommutabilis / immutabilis.

V.15.17, source pp. 114–115. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Teaching without loss; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: divisio / membrum; temperatio / complexio.

V.15.18, source pp. 116–117. Articles: Intelligible principles and reasoning; Temperament and harmony. Vocabulary: consonantia / harmonia; consonare / dissonare; divisio / membrum; frui; incommutabilis / immutabilis; origo; philosophari; temperatio / complexio.

V.15.19, source pp. 116–117. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Generation, corruption and annihilation. Vocabulary: animus; in deteriorem essentiam.

V.15.20, source pp. 116–117. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Generation, corruption and annihilation. Vocabulary: animus; cogere; necesse / oportere; possidere / consulere / imperare; velle / voluntas.

V.15.21, source pp. 118–119. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion. Vocabulary: animus; cogere; cupiditas; potentior / melior; potestas; velle / voluntas.

V.15.22, source pp. 118–119. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion. Vocabulary: cogere; commutatio; cupiditas; possidere / consulere / imperare; potestas; solutus; velle / voluntas.

V.15.23, source pp. 120–121. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Passivity and bodily affection; Sleep and dreams. Vocabulary: commutatio; opprimere / marcescere; reficere; sentire / sensus; somnus; sopire / claudere; velle / voluntas.

V.15.24, source pp. 120–121. Articles: Passivity and bodily affection; Sleep and dreams; Time, memory and expectation. Vocabulary: discernere; disputare; dormire / vigilare / expergefieri; incommutabilis / immutabilis; intelligere / intelligentia; persona / verba; praesentia; sentire / sensus; sequi; somnus.

V.15.25, source pp. 122–123. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Soul as universal bond; Transmission of form and natural order. Vocabulary: adimere; dare / tribuere / praestare; incommutabilis / immutabilis; non localiter; potentior / melior; propinquitas / naturae ordo.

V.15.26, source pp. 122–123. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Soul as universal bond; Transmission of form and natural order. Vocabulary: adimere; sumere; tradere.

V.15.27, source pp. 124–125. Articles: Conversion, desire and compulsion; Generation, corruption and annihilation; Rational soul and irrational life; Soul as universal bond; Transmission of form and natural order. Vocabulary: adimere; corpus / corporalis; irrationalis vita; moles; potentior / melior; propinquitas / naturae ordo; superare / praestare; tradere; tumor.

Chapter VI.1

VI.1.1, source pp. 128–129. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; anima; animus; assentiri; opinari; arbitrari; confutare; reprobare; approbare; dicere; nominare; appellare; disputatio; disputare; homo; animal; animans; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; inquam; Kalendae; laurus; Landinus; Nuthius; Vespuccius; liber; solutus; separatus; opinio; sententia; posse; valere; oportere; probabilis; affirmare; proprius; communis; quantum; quatenus; respectus; quinque capita; ratio; Regnanum; Cavalcantes; tertia essentia.

VI.1.2, source pp. 128–129. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Corporeal soul and elemental doxography. Vocabulary: Anaximenes; Diogenes; Critias; Boethus; Epicurus; Xenophantes; corpus; corpusculum; Democritus; Leucippus; Hipparchus; Hippias; Hesiodus; Pronopides; igneus; aereus; aqueus; terreus; ignis; aer; aqua; manere; permanere; constare; putare; existimare; arbitrari; suffundere; tenuis; crassus; vel; sive; seu; aut.

VI.1.3, source pp. 128–129. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Constitution, localized point and harmony. Vocabulary: calor; calere; complexio calida; corpusculum; qualitas; quantitas; qualitas; spargere; videri velle; Zeno; Cleantes; Antipater; Posidonius.

VI.1.4, source pp. 130–131. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Constitution, localized point and harmony; Members, house and sinew. Vocabulary: assignare; residere; gubernare; Chrysippus; Archelaus; Heraclides; cor; cerebrum; pars; membrum; punctum lucidum; qualitas; quantitas; qualitas; regere; ducere; gubernare.

VI.1.5, source pp. 130–131. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Constitution, localized point and harmony; Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Divine production and the third essence. Vocabulary: affigere; situs; agilis; agilitas; celeritas; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; educere; eruere; addicere; harmonia; liber; solutus; separatus; locus; situs; materia; materiae potentia; opinio; sententia; pars; membrum; per se; quodammodo; proprie; potentia; semen; incohatio; proportio; si; sin; nisi; licet; solus; omnis; nullus; vel; sive; seu; aut; virtus; vis; vis agilis; viscera; gremium; Xenophanes; Asclepiades; Aristoxenus; Critolaus.

VI.1.6, source pp. 132–133. Articles: Animation, first light and regress; Cavalcanti and the five positions; Divine production and the third essence; Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: agentis virtus; Angellerius; Arduinus; anima; auctor; producere; Bembus; Chronico; Demetrius; capacitas; fomentum; confutare; reprobare; approbare; convivium; discumbere; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; esse; habere; fieri; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; individuum; manere; permanere; constare; materia; Naldius; Fontius; Bonisegnius; opinio; sententia; ordinare; ordo; Petrus Leo Spoletinus; physicus Aristoteles; plurimum; Platonici; Peripatetici; prisci theologi; solus; omnis; nullus; tertia essentia; totus; vel; sive; seu; aut; virtus; vis.

Chapter VI.2

VI.2.1, source pp. 134–135. Articles: Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Three offices and the order of proof. Vocabulary: agere in corpore; per corpus; per se; agere; operari; attingere; percipere; cogere; compellere; consuetudo; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus; dicere; nominare; appellare; fetus; adultus; generare; nutrire; augere; homo; animal; animans; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; imago; intelligentia; investigare; invenire; natura; naturalis; officium; Platonici; Peripatetici; plebeus; minutus; potentia; putare; existimare; arbitrari; reliquiae sensuum; revolvere;

recolligere; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; sensus exterior; sensus interior; sensus; sentire; statim; subito; paulatim; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra; vegetatrix; natura; vel; sive; seu; aut; videre; audire; olfacere; gustare; tangere.

VI.2.2, source pp. 136–137. Articles: Garment, mud and misleading shadows; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment. Vocabulary: abluere; abstergere; caro; appetitus; proclivis; caelum; terra; mundus; cogere; compellere; concludere; respondere; quaerere; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus; dicere; nominare; appellare; humor; membrum; spiritus; humor; tabes; pinguedo; immo; tamen; nihilominus; lutum; testa; gleba; mens; mergere; suffocare; pars; membrum; phantasia; praeceptor; sophista; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; quantitas; qualitas; sensus; sentire; similis; idem; solus; omnis; nullus; vestis; involvere; videre; cernere; intueri; vox; odor; sapor.

VI.2.3, source pp. 138–139. Articles: Garment, mud and misleading shadows; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment. Vocabulary: caelum; terra; mundus; esse; habere; fieri; finis; limes; terminus; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; imponere; implere; continere; locus; situs; parvipendere; horrere; purificare; purus; putare; existimare; arbitrari; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; recipere; accipere; reperire; invenire; revertere; respicere; solus; omnis; nullus; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra; umbra.

VI.2.4, source pp. 138–139. Articles: Garment, mud and misleading shadows. Vocabulary: componere; constituere; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; putare; existimare; arbitrari; puteus; fundus; umbra.

VI.2.5, source pp. 138–139. Articles: Garment, mud and misleading shadows. Vocabulary: avis; volare; umbra.

VI.2.6, source pp. 140–141. Articles: Garment, mud and misleading shadows; Number and spiritual amplitude. Vocabulary: amplitudo; angustia; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; esse; habere; fieri; finis; limes; terminus; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; magnitudo; crescere; decrescere; metiri; numerare; numerus; replicatio; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; revertere; respicere; si; sin; nisi; licet; solus; omnis; nullus.

VI.2.7, source pp. 140–141. Articles: Sensory error and corrective reason. Vocabulary: bicubitus; imago; iudicare; discernere; iudicium; emendare; movere; motus; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; ratio; remus; litus; navis; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; sol; vox; odor; sapor.

VI.2.8, source pp. 142–143. Articles: Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Sensory error and corrective reason. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; conspirare; damnare; redarguere; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; immo; tamen; nihilominus; iudicare; discernere; iudicium; emendare; negare; fateri; confiteri; proprium; quantum; quatenus; respectus; ratio; reperire; invenire; sensus; sentire; solus; omnis; nullus; vaticinari; virtus; vis; vox; odor; sapor.

VI.2.9, source pp. 144–145. Articles: Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Sensory error and corrective reason. Vocabulary: animus; attingere; percipere; caecus; noctua; dare; tribuere; praestare; De republica; Divinorum; esse; existere; esse; habere; fieri; fabricare; aedificium; homo; animal; animans; intellectus; lumen; lux; manifestissimus; negare; fateri; confiteri; obiectum; per se; quodammodo; proprie; posse; valere; oportere; praestans; excellens; nobilis; proprium; proprius; communis; putare; existimare; arbitrari; rationis oculus; solus; omnis; nullus; substantia; essentia; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.10, source pp. 146–147. Articles: Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Separate forms and intellectual life. Vocabulary: affectus; imaginatio; agere; operari; angelus; Deus; aspicere; despicere; attingere; percipere; cogitare; considerare;

componere; constituere; consuetudo; esse; habere; fieri; experiri; experientia; forma; forma segregata; subiectum; intellectus; intellectus purus; liber; solutus; separatus; movere; motus; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; plebeus; minutus; posse; valere; oportere; prior; posterior; purificare; purus; ratio secum vivens; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; separare; sevocare; veritas; gaudium; virtus; vis.

VI.2.11, source pp. 146–147. Articles: Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Separate forms and intellectual life. Vocabulary: veritas; gaudium.

VI.2.12, source pp. 148–149. Articles: Avicenna’s imagined adult; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment. Vocabulary: aetas perfecta; affirmare esse; affirmare; asserere; asseverare; apprehendere; Avicenna; educatio ficta; cogitare; considerare; dare; tribuere; praestare; esse; existere; homo; animal; animans; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; intuitus; essentia; mens; operatio; actus; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; posse; valere; oportere; recipere; accipere; statim; subito; paulatim; utrum; an; numquid; num.

VI.2.13, source pp. 150–151. Articles: Avicenna’s imagined adult. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; attingere; percipere; cogitare; considerare; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; dicere; nominare; appellare; esse; habere; fieri; expergisci; fingere; machinari; effingere; liber; solutus; separatus; naturale iudicium; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; pervidere; posse; valere; oportere; putare; existimare; arbitrari; recipere; accipere; sensus; sentire.

VI.2.14, source pp. 152–153. Articles: Avicenna’s imagined adult; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Plato’s cave and gradual education. Vocabulary: Avicenna; educatio ficta; cervix; columna; homo; animal; animans; imago; lampas; ignis; ligare; vincire; posse; valere; oportere; putare; existimare; arbitrari; simulachrum; resultare; spelunca; specus; caverna; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

VI.2.15, source pp. 154–155. Articles: Plato’s cave and gradual education. Vocabulary: caligare; dolere; cogere; compellere; gradus; paulatim; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; iudicare; discernere; lampas; ignis; ligare; vincire; lumen; lux; putare; existimare; arbitrari; sincere discernere; sol; solvere; retro versus; spelunca; specus; caverna; statim; subito; paulatim; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.16, source pp. 154–155. Articles: Plato’s cave and gradual education. Vocabulary: caelum; terra; mundus; caligare; dolere; gradus; paulatim; mens; moribundus; carcer; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; sol; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.17, source pp. 156–157. Articles: Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Plato’s cave and gradual education. Vocabulary: caecutire; titubare; aegrotare; cogere; compellere; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; immo; tamen; nihilominus; iudicare; discernere; mores; doctrina; tempus; phrenesis; somnus; ebrietas; regere; ducere; gubernare; sincere discernere; spelunca; specus; caverna.

VI.2.18, source pp. 156–157. Articles: Plato’s cave and gradual education. Vocabulary: emergere; immergere; finis; limes; terminus; reperire; invenire.

VI.2.19, source pp. 158–159. Articles: Number and spiritual amplitude; Point, dimension and substantial unity. Vocabulary: aequaliter; aeque; aequare; cogitare; considerare; cogitatione separari; esse; habere; fieri; finis; limes; terminus; fundere; movere; liber; solutus; separatus; locus; situs; longitudo; latitudo; profunditas; prior; posterior; regere; ducere; gubernare; superficies; linea; punctum; terminus; situs.

VI.2.20, source pp. 158–159. Articles: Number and spiritual amplitude; Point, dimension and substantial unity. Vocabulary: cogitare; considerare; cogitatione separari; dicere; nominare; appellare; dividere; divisio; egere; pati; liber; solutus; separatus; movere; motus; negare; fateri; confiteri; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; quantum; quatenus; respectus; reperire; invenire; substantialis unitas; virtute; quantitate.

VI.2.21, source pp. 160–161. Articles: Bronze mirror and concentrated fire. Vocabulary: calere; lucere; collustrare; calor; calere; centrum (concentration); colligere; unio; resilire; accendere; consumere; sol; speculum concavum aeneum; subtrahere; deprimere; tricubitus; vivificare.

VI.2.22, source pp. 160–161. Articles: Bronze mirror and concentrated fire; Light, spirit and the unseen source. Vocabulary: caelum; terra; mundus; frangere; inficere; lumen; lux; lumen; spiritus; momentum; negare; fateri; confiteri; praestans; excellens; nobilis; reperire; invenire; vel; sive; seu; aut; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.23, source pp. 162–163. Articles: Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Light, spirit and the unseen source. Vocabulary: animus; coniicere; coniectari; esse; existere; facultas; capacitas; fulgor; splendor; lucere; rutilare; lumen; lux; perspicere; prospicere; pervidere; secernere; sentire; sentiri; sol; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.24, source pp. 162–163. Articles: Spark, globe and luminous vehicles. Vocabulary: caelum; terra; mundus; declinare; attollere; ignis; aer; aqua; quodammodo; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.2.25, source pp. 164–165. Articles: Spark, globe and luminous vehicles. Vocabulary: circumferentia; cardo; cogitare; considerare; comprimere; profundere; corpus aethereum; corpus geminum; evolvere; convolvere; locus; situs; orbis pallidus; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; scintilla; flamma.

VI.2.26, source pp. 164–165. Articles: Light, spirit and the unseen source; Spark, globe and luminous vehicles. Vocabulary: corpus aethereum; corpus geminum; Heraclitus; lux sicca; humor; membrum; spiritus; implicare; explicare; intelligibilis; intelligens; lumen; lux; negare; fateri; confiteri; scintilla; flamma; sensus; sentire; sentire; sentiri; videre; cernere; intueri; Dry light and the wisest soul.

VI.2.27, source pp. 166–167. Articles: Bronze mirror and concentrated fire; Light, spirit and the unseen source; Point, dimension and substantial unity. Vocabulary: excursio; praeludium; substantialis unitas; vivificare.

Chapter VI.3

VI.3.1, source pp. 168–169. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Divine production and the third essence; Three offices and the order of proof. Vocabulary: anima; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; dividere; divisio; forma; indivisibilis; impartibilis; origo a materia; origo; principium; causa; potissimum; partim; sensus; sentire; totus; ubique totus; virtus; vis.

VI.3.2, source pp. 168–169. Articles: Cavalcanti and the five positions; Divine production and the third essence; Three offices and the order of proof. Vocabulary: igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; iudicare; discernere; numen invocare.

Chapter VI.4

VI.4.1, source pp. 170–171. Articles: Earth, wood and severed stones; Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: coalescere; virere; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; corpus; homo; animal; animans; origo; principium; causa; principium alimenti; proprius; communis; saxum; lignum.

VI.4.2, source pp. 170–171. Articles: Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; principium alimenti.

VI.4.3, source pp. 170–171. Articles: Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: homo; animal; animans; saxum; lignum; talis; sic affectus.

VI.4.4, source pp. 170–171. Articles: Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: concludere; respondere; quaerere; imponere; implere; continere; moles; affectio; proprius; communis; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; quantitas; qualitas; si; sin; nisi; licet; utrum; an; numquid; num.

VI.4.5, source pp. 172–173. Articles: Earth, wood and severed stones; Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: dicere; nominare; appellare; forma vivifica; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; inquam; manere; permanere; constare; solus; omnis; nullus; vivificare.

VI.4.6, source pp. 172–173. Articles: Nourishment and the life-giving form. Vocabulary: accedere; discedere; agere; operari; animatum quiddam; concludere; respondere; quaerere; esse; habere; fieri; operatio; actus; videre; cernere; intueri; vivificare.

Chapter VI.5

VI.5.1, source pp. 174–175. Articles: Animation, first light and regress. Vocabulary: animatus; inanimis; dare; tribuere; praestare; dicere; nominare; appellare; esse; habere; fieri; utrum; an; numquid; num; vel; sive; seu; aut; vita; vivere.

VI.5.2, source pp. 174–175. Articles: Animation, first light and regress. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; animatus; inanimis; cogere; compellere; concludere; respondere; quaerere; esse; habere; fieri; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; sapientia; sapiens.

VI.5.3, source pp. 174–175. Articles: Animation, first light and regress. Vocabulary: animatus; inanimis; dicere; nominare; appellare; primum lumen; prior; posterior; referre; quiescere; vivificare.

VI.5.4, source pp. 176–177. Articles: Animation, first light and regress. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; animale; vivens; vivificatum; dicere; nominare; appellare; esse; habere; fieri; per se; quodammodo; proprie; qua ratione; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; ratio.

VI.5.5, source pp. 176–177. Articles: Animation, first light and regress. Vocabulary: natura praeter corporis rationem; ratio.

Chapter VI.6

VI.6.1, source pp. 178–179. Articles: Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Dense, subtle and fifth body. Vocabulary: crassus; subtilis; rarus; imponere; implere; continere; penetrare; implere; utrum; an; numquid; num.

VI.6.2, source pp. 178–179. Articles: Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Dense, subtle and fifth body. Vocabulary: ignis; aer; aqua; ignitus; videre; cernere; intueri; vita; vivere.

VI.6.3, source pp. 178–179. Articles: Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Dense, subtle and fifth body. Vocabulary: concludere; respondere; quaerere; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; dare; concedere; esse; habere; fieri; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; quintum corpusculum; solus; omnis; nullus; virtus; vis.

VI.6.4, source pp. 180–181. Articles: Essential presence and containment; Point, dimension and substantial unity. Vocabulary: comprehendere; concludere; respondere; quaerere; dare; tribuere; praestare; dividere; divisio; imponere; implere; continere; innotescere; circumscribere; intervallum temporis; particula vivere; per essentiam; per quantitatem; persuasio; praestans; excellens; nobilis; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; quantitas; qualitas; regere; ducere; gubernare; totus; utrum; an; numquid; num; vita; vivere.

VI.6.5, source pp. 180–181. Articles: Essential presence and containment; Point, dimension and substantial unity. Vocabulary: magis indivisibilis; praestans; excellens; nobilis.

Chapter VI.7

VI.7.1, source pp. 182–183. Articles: Substantial form and the receiving subject. Vocabulary: componere; constituere; esse; habere; fieri; homo; animal; animans; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; materia; materia et forma; natura; naturalis; operatio; actus; potentia; potentia; actus; proprius; communis; subiectum; locus.

VI.7.2, source pp. 182–183. Articles: Substantial form and the receiving subject. Vocabulary: commutatio; transmutatio; esse; habere; fieri; materia; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; secundum totam essentiam; simul; vicissim; invicem.

VI.7.3, source pp. 184–185. Articles: Substantial form and the receiving subject. Vocabulary: commutatio; transmutatio; continere; sistere; torquere; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; esse; habere; fieri; forma; forma substantialis; accidentalis; manere; permanere; constare; opposita suscipere; praestans; excellens; nobilis; recipere; accipere; rectrix; motrix; pedisequa; substantia; essentia.

VI.7.4, source pp. 184–185. Articles: Substantial form and the receiving subject. Vocabulary: formari; repugnare; reflecti; definire.

Chapter VI.8

VI.8.1, source pp. 186–187. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: dispersus; distantia; succedere; momenta.

VI.8.2, source pp. 186–187. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: caelum; terra; mundus; extensio; contrarietas; manere; permanere; constare; raptus caelorum; similis; idem.

VI.8.3, source pp. 186–187. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: amittere; quaerere; fugere; cogere; compellere; concludere; respondere; quaerere; extensio; contrarietas; quantitas; qualitas.

VI.8.4, source pp. 186–187. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: nectere; conspirare; si; sin; nisi; licet; totus; unire; sistere; continere.

VI.8.5, source pp. 188–189. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; compages; devincire; consonantia; dissonus; copula; copulatrix; dividere; divisio; homo; animal; animans; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; negare; fateri; confiteri; quantitas; qualitas; unire; sistere; continere.

VI.8.6, source pp. 188–189. Articles: Unity, dispersion and the inward bond. Vocabulary: Platonici; Peripatetici; putare; existimare; arbitrari; simplicitas; constantia.

VI.8.7, source pp. 188–189. Articles: Earth, wood and severed stones. Vocabulary: ab anima; affigere; avellere; caelum; terra; mundus; saxum; lignum; unio et augmentum.

Chapter VI.9

VI.9.1, source pp. 190–191. Articles: Place, coincidence and painless penetration. Vocabulary: aequaliter; aeque; aequare; aequare in loco; corpus; dividere; divisio; esse; habere; fieri; individua; magnitudo; loculus; corpusculum; locus; situs; si; sin; nisi; licet; similis; idem.

VI.9.2, source pp. 190–191. Articles: Essential presence and containment; Place, coincidence and painless penetration. Vocabulary: dare; tribuere; praestare; esse; existere; essentia; esse; virtus; operatio; fluere; humor; membrum; spiritus; intimus; absque medio; mutare speciem; operatio; actus; substantia; essentia; totus.

VI.9.3, source pp. 192–193. Articles: Essential presence and containment; Members, house and sinew. Vocabulary: actio intima; agere; operari; congregatum; domus; paries; consensio; concordia; conglutinare; forma; nervus; articulus; tractus; pars; membrum; portiuncula; plurimi; solus; omnis; nullus.

VI.9.4, source pp. 194–195. Articles: Place, coincidence and painless penetration; Rennet, magnet and clock; Temperament, flux and the stable ruler. Vocabulary: coagulum; lac; coagulare; dicere; nominare; appellare; fluxus; labilis; solidare; frangere; horologium; sonare; humor; membrum; spiritus; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; imponere; implere; continere; magnes / ferrum / trahere / suspendere; offensio; dolor; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; regere; ducere; gubernare; temperare spiritus et humores; temperatio artis.

Chapter VI.10

VI.10.1, source pp. 196–197. Articles: Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree. Vocabulary: contrahere; fundere; guttula; ova piscium; homo; animal; animans; instrumentum; subservire; locus; situs; Plotinus; Porphyrius; pullulare; delitescere; radix; germen; ramus; vegetatrix; natura; virtus; vis; vis seminaria.

Chapter VI.11

VI.11.1, source pp. 198–199. Articles: Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer. Vocabulary: comes; pedisequa; componere; constituere; conflatus; concursus; dicere; nominare; appellare; elementum; esse; habere; fieri; fluere; igitur; ergo; quapropter; sequitur; informis materia; intimus ordinator; ordinare; ordo; posse; valere; oportere; putare; existimare; arbitrari; quaerere; interrogare; percontari; solus; omnis; nullus; virtus; vis; vita; vivere.

VI.11.2, source pp. 200–201. Articles: Contrary powers and directed movement. Vocabulary: acuere; obtundere; aperire; claudere; calidus; frigidus; siccus; humidus;

compos; ferme; contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; determinata operatio; fluxus; solidus; albus; niger; fundere; solidare; humor; membrum; spiritus; levis; gravis; rarus; densus; natura; naturalis; rarefacere; condensare; sistere; movere; contrahere; extendere; spiritus leves; humores graves; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

Chapter VI.12

VI.12.1, source pp. 202–203. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: fons; receptaculum; movere; motus; per se et primo; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; posse; valere; oportere; totus.

VI.12.2, source pp. 202–203. Articles: Number and spiritual amplitude; Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: dividere; divisio; infinitae partes actu; movere; motus; participatio; praesentia; posse; valere; oportere.

VI.12.3, source pp. 204–205. Articles: Number and spiritual amplitude; Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: cogere; compellere; esse proprium; infinitae partes actu; movere; motus; posse; valere; oportere.

VI.12.4, source pp. 204–205. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; aliud aliud; cogere; compellere; dividere; divisio; movere; motus; pars et totum; pars; membrum; simul; vicissim; invicem; utrum; an; numquid; num.

VI.12.5, source pp. 206–207. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: agere; operari; negare; fateri; confiteri; origo; principium; causa; pars quaelibet semetipsam agitans.

VI.12.6, source pp. 206–207. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; mutuari; partiri; secare; recipere; accipere.

VI.12.7, source pp. 208–209. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: affirmare; asserere; asseverare; cogere; compellere; dividere; divisio; impartibile; internus agitator; intrinsecus; extrinsecus; origo; principium; causa; posse; valere; oportere; reperire; invenire; solus; omnis; nullus.

VI.12.8, source pp. 208–209. Articles: Primary self-motion and the regress of parts. Vocabulary: facultas; capacitas; intrinsecus; extrinsecus; movere; motus; per se; quodammodo; proprie.

VI.12.9, source pp. 210–211. Articles: Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer; Integrity of the whole. Vocabulary: calor; calere; cavillatio; componere; constituere; movere et moveri; provenire; quantitate protendi; totius integritas.

VI.12.10, source pp. 210–211. Articles: Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Integrity of the whole; Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: agens; patiens; agere; operari; calor; calere; ex otio in actum; movere; motus; origo; principium; causa; prior; posterior; turgere; concipere; edere; vicissitudo; vices.

VI.12.11, source pp. 212–213. Articles: Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: actio; passio; anima universalis; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; posse; valere; oportere.

VI.12.12, source pp. 212–213. Articles: Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: adventitius; dicere; nominare; appellare; ignorare se ipsam; intermittere; aberrare; mens; motus vitalis; operatio; actus; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra; vita se generans; vita; vivere.

VI.12.13, source pp. 214–215. Articles: Eight motions and the cold-water objection. Vocabulary: alteratio; generatio; corruptio; augmentum; decrementum; calefacere; calefieri; calor; calere; condensatio; rarefactio; progressio; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; dicere; nominare; appellare; frigefieri; scaturire; frigiditas secundum virtutem; ignis; aer; aqua; Platonici; Peripatetici.

VI.12.14, source pp. 214–215. Articles: Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: contrarius; oppositus; repugnans; finita natura; genitor; genitum; instinctus; nixus; posse; valere; oportere; prior; posterior; proles; servare; non esse.

VI.12.15, source pp. 216–217. Articles: Eight motions and the cold-water objection. Vocabulary: augmentum; decrementum; partes novae; veteres.

VI.12.16, source pp. 216–217. Articles: Eight motions and the cold-water objection. Vocabulary: concludere; respondere; quaerere; dicere; nominare; appellare; finis; limes; terminus; solus; omnis; nullus; termini proprii; alieni; transitus; circuitus.

VI.12.17, source pp. 216–217. Articles: Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent; Three offices and the order of proof. Vocabulary: ascensio; descensio; discursus temporalis; emergere; movere; motus; origo; principium; causa; Platonici; Peripatetici; quantum; quatenus; respectus; regere; ducere; gubernare; reperire; invenire; vicissitudo seminum.

VI.12.18, source pp. 218–219. Articles: Separate forms and intellectual life; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent. Vocabulary: ad incorporalia; agere; operari; angelus; Deus; corporeus; corporalis; incorporeus; discursio; revolutio; forma; per naturam ac vim propriam; posse; valere; oportere; proprius; communis; regere; ducere; gubernare; simul possidere et videre; simul; vicissim; invicem; videre; cernere; intueri.

VI.12.19, source pp. 218–219. Articles: Contrary powers and directed movement; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul; Generation, corruption and self-preservation. Vocabulary: angelus; Deus; dextera; sinistra; ante; retro; discurrere; distrahi; exemplar; finis; limes; terminus; haerere; intueri; colligere; quantum; quatenus; respectus; rectum; obliquum; circulus; reflecti; reminisci; oblivisci; resolvere; deducere; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra; universale; particulare.

VI.12.20, source pp. 220–221. Articles: Exemplars of bodily motion in soul; Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Vital motion, action and passion. Vocabulary: exemplar; facultas; capacitas; iudicare; discernere; per se; quodammodo; proprie; quodammodo; quasi; spontaneus; gradi.

Chapter VI.13

VI.13.1, source pp. 222–223. Articles: Growth, amputation and soul-size. Vocabulary: agilis; agilitas; celeritas; anima; bracchium; crus; frustum; secare; liber; solutus; separatus; sensus; sentire; si; sin; nisi; licet; unius naturae.

VI.13.2, source pp. 222–223. Articles: Growth, amputation and soul-size. Vocabulary: bracchium; crus; pusillanimis; hebes; obliviosus.

VI.13.3, source pp. 222–223. Articles: Food, lending and borrowing life; Growth, amputation and soul-size. Vocabulary: aequaliter; aeque; aequare; alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum; crescere; decrescere; adolescere; magnificentior; divinior; mutuare vitam; posse; valere; oportere; similis; idem.

VI.13.4, source pp. 222–223. Articles: Food, lending and borrowing life. Vocabulary: alimentum; alimonia; nutrimentum; bonitas naturae; haurire; perdere; servare; natura; naturalis.

VI.13.5, source pp. 224–225. Articles: Food, lending and borrowing life; Persistence, memory and recognition. Vocabulary: consentire; immo; tamen; nihilominus; substantia; essentia; subterfugere; adsciscere.

VI.13.6, source pp. 224–225. Articles: Images, migration and the perfect agent; Persistence, memory and recognition. Vocabulary: animus; fluere; immortalis; perpetuus; sempiternus; incolumis; servare; iudicare; discernere; manere; permanere; constare; memoria; agnoscere; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; recipere; accipere; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; similis; idem; videre; cernere; intueri; voluntas; mos; opinio; scientia.

VI.13.7, source pp. 224–225. Articles: Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Dense, subtle and fifth body; Persistence, memory and recognition. Vocabulary: agilis; agilitas; celeritas; flatus; evanescere; manere; permanere; constare; ossa; nervi; caro; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; renovare; labi; suffundere; vivificare.

VI.13.8, source pp. 226–227. Articles: Constitution, localized point and harmony; Temperament, flux and the stable ruler. Vocabulary: complexio humorum; continuatio; ordinatrix; effluere; refluere; finis; limes; terminus; fluere; humor; membrum; spiritus; imponere; implere; continere; innumeralis unitas; movere; motus; ordinare; ordo; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; quantitas; qualitas; terminus; rector.

VI.13.9, source pp. 226–227. Articles: Images, migration and the perfect agent; Persistence, memory and recognition; Stable craftsman and the river reflection. Vocabulary: artifex stabilissimus; concludere; respondere; quaerere; figura eadem; similis; fluere; manere; permanere; constare; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; prior; posterior; ratio; rationes et semina; reficere; semper; numquam; saepe; quandoque; similis; idem; sursum; deorsum; extra; intra.

VI.13.10, source pp. 226–227. Articles: Images, migration and the perfect agent; Stable craftsman and the river reflection. Vocabulary: depingere; effigies; faber intimus; fluere; permanere; stabilire; stabilis; similis; idem; vultus; flumen; unda.

VI.13.11, source pp. 228–229. Articles: Images, migration and the perfect agent; Persistence, memory and recognition. Vocabulary: agere; operari; deficere; perficere; dicere; nominare; appellare; figurare; perfectus agens; fluere; formare se ipsam; imaginem aliam suae similem; imago; insinuare; transire; memoriter tenere; perfectus; imperfectus; perficere; statim; subito; paulatim.

Chapter VII.1

VII.1.1, source pp. 232–233. Articles: Memory, rigidity and fluidity; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors. Vocabulary: accipere; amittere; capere; cera; confundere; corpus / corporalis; discernere; figura / figurare; imago; iudicare; magnitudo; maior / minor; oculus / cerebrum; pars; Plato / Socrates; ratio as argument; sigillum; suscipere; transferre; vis / potentia / virtus; Xenophon / Alcibiades / Phaedrus.

VII.1.2, source pp. 234–235. Articles: Memory, rigidity and fluidity; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors. Vocabulary: accipere; animal / animans; capere; docilitas / acumen; figura / figurare; immensus / ingens; iudicare; lucere / perspicuus; magnitudo; maior / minor; obfuscare; prospicere / intueri / excogitare; solidus / fluxus / labilis; speculum / specillum; tenere / memoria; terminus praescriptus; vultus / pupilla.

VII.1.3, source pp. 236–237. Articles: Lucifer and indivisible meaning; Memory, rigidity and fluidity; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Spiritual images and light. Vocabulary: affigere / coniungere; attingere / penetrare; cogitare; confundere; discretio; emicare / exuberare / evadere; facies / profundum; fieri / facere; fingere / figere; forsitan / forsan / fortasse; praesens / absens; retinere / servare; sapor / odor / aqua; significatio / vox; simulacrum; spiritalis; splendor / lumen / lux; tenere / memoria; transmittere / conservare; verberare.

Chapter VII.2

VII.2.1, source pp. 238–239. Articles: Comparison and common sense; Point, line and the comparing power. Vocabulary: anima / animus; attingere / persentire; centrum / vis interior; cognoscere / agnoscere / noscere; color / vox / odor; comparare; diiudicare; geminus / apprehendere; hypothetical concession; instrumentum; nuntiare; obiectum; scientia et ignorantia; sufficere / supervacuus; vis / potentia / virtus; visus / auditus / olfactus.

VII.2.2, source pp. 240–241. Articles: Comparison and common sense; Point, line and the comparing power. Vocabulary: a / b: geometrical labels; attingere / persentire; caput / finis / terminus lineae; diffundere / spargere / porrigere; diiudicare; hypothetical concession; indivisibilis / individuus / partibilis; magistra sensuum; nobilior; pervenire / transire / concurrere; punctum / linea; sufficere / supervacuus; tangere; vacare.

Chapter VII.3

VII.3.1, source pp. 242–243. Articles: Animal acuity and bodily size; Comparison and common sense. Vocabulary: acies / acute videre; apis / ovis / sollertia; aquila / bos; canis / agnus / sagacitas; colligere / impartibilis; communis sensus; conducere / nocere; elephas / equus / prudentia; leo / audacia; necessitas / oportet; quantitas / dimensio; ratio / transcendere; simia / asinus / ingenium; sufficientia / indigere; valere; vis / potentia / virtus; vulpes / sus / astutia; vultus / pupilla.

Chapter VII.4

VII.4.1, source pp. 244–245. Articles: One comprehension and indivisible sensation. Vocabulary: collocare; compositum / forma communis; concipere / comprehendere; congruere / quadrare / aptare; corpus / corporalis; distribuere / partiri / secare; hypothetical concession; invenire / reperire; moles / distendere; natura / naturalis; necessitas / oportet; pars.

VII.4.2, source pp. 246–247. Articles: One comprehension and indivisible sensation; Spiritual images and light; Substance, qualities and degrees. Vocabulary: congregatio / momentum; construere / constituere; distribuere / partiri / secare; fingere / figere; fons / subiectum virtutis; forsitan / forsan / fortasse; infinitus / innumerabilis; paulatim / subito; sensus / sentire; sentire / sentiens / expers sensus; species sensibilis; visio.

Chapter VII.5

VII.5.1, source pp. 248–249. Articles: Pain, location and reporting; Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Whole presence and vital intensity. Vocabulary: advertere / admovere / clamare; aequalis pars / totum; continuatio molis; membrum / particula; offendere /

dolere; pes / manus / os; praesentia / absentia; statim / e vestigio / absque mora; tota adesse.

VII.5.2, source pp. 250–251. Articles: Pain, location and reporting; Whole presence and vital intensity. Vocabulary: albedo / inficere / foedare; animal / animans; Augustinus / Aurelius; commutare; crus / femur / pectus / collum; deserere; diffundere / spargere / porrigere; forsitan / forsan / fortasse; intensius / remissius; localis diffusio / vitalis intensio; membrum / particula; praesentia / absentia; referre / enuntiare; successio / gradatim; tangere; vivere.

VII.5.3, source pp. 252–253. Articles: Pain, location and reporting; Point, line and the comparing power; Whole presence and vital intensity. Vocabulary: compati / consonare / concurrere; cruciatus / molestia / persensio; diffundere / spargere / porrigere; genu / lapillus; imperium / adhibere; internuntius / mora; membrum / particula; praesentire / praesentia; statim / e vestigio / absque mora; successio / gradatim; succurrere / medela; vis iudiciaria.

VII.5.4, source pp. 254–255. Articles: Lucifer and indivisible meaning; Severed animals and replacement souls. Vocabulary: animal / animans; compago / resolvere; dictio / supervivere; fieri / facere; frangere / recreare; frustum / secare; idoneus / vilis / perfectior; interire / perire / abire; lignum / extremum punctum; luci / fer / latio; Lucifer / Venus; motus / movere; natura / naturalis; reptilia / secundum Platonicos; significatio / vox; ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus; vita mundi / novae animae; vivere.

Chapter VII.6

VII.6.1, source pp. 256–257. Articles: Bodily spirit and mediation; Injury and the uninjured judge; Sensation as attentive activity; Spiritual images and light; Vital harmony and its producer. Vocabulary: condolere / compassio / condolentia; copulare / insinuare / cognatus; cor / sanguis / calor; fieri / facere; frangere / discindere / solvere / contrahere; fundere / diffundere / permanare; medicus / cutis / caro; motus / movere; passio / affectio; perceptio / animadversio / phantasia; pernicies / diligere opus; phantasia; praesentia / absentia; praestare vitam / vitalis; purus / crassus / terrenus; regere / movere; spiritus / corpusculum; tactus; tenuis / lucidus.

VII.6.2, source pp. 258–259. Articles: Bodily spirit and mediation; Injury and the uninjured judge. Vocabulary: iudicium passionis; laesio / noxius; passio / affectio; perdere / laedere; phantasia; sensus / sentire; substantia / virtus / operatio; vis / potentia / virtus.

VII.6.3, source pp. 260–261. Articles: Bodily constitution and temperament; Bodily spirit and mediation; Injury and the uninjured judge; Sensation as attentive activity. Vocabulary: actio / operatio / opus; adiungere / repellere; agere / pati; alteritas; attentio / attentior; auris / nares / os; congruus / incongruus / obsistere; convenientia / inconvenientia; excitatum iudicium; formari a corpore; humidus / terreus / lutulentus; instrumentum; iudex liber passione; luminosus / aereus / caliginosus; mersus / affectio / punctum affectionis; non latere; passio / affectio; Plotinus / Augustinus; quies / valitudo / consensio; sensus / sentire; serenus / mobilis; sonus / percussio / silentium; temperatio; vegetare; verberare.

Chapter VII.7

VII.7.1, source pp. 262–263. Articles: Bodily constitution and temperament. Vocabulary: complexio; concludere / probare; diffundere / spargere / porrigere; dominari / vigere /

astringere; fieri / facere; opposita / contraria; qualitas / affectio corporis; ratio as argument; simplex qualitas / forma astricta.

Chapter VII.8

VII.8.1, source pp. 264–265. Articles: Bodily constitution and temperament; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Freedom from matter and causal priority; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Soul as the body’s craftsman. Vocabulary: actio / operatio / opus; augmentum; calor / penetrare / dissolvere; causa principalis; cibus / nutrimentum / viva caro; complexio; concludere / probare; concoquere / digerere; conflare / peragere; construere / constituere; elementum / mixtum; forma / qualitas; forma accidentalis / substantialis; instrumentum; nutritiva potentia; praescribere / ordinare / vagari; principalis / agens principale; terminus / gradus / proportio / figura.

Chapter VII.9

VII.9.1, source pp. 266–267. Articles: Bodily constitution and temperament; Substance, qualities and degrees. Vocabulary: construere / constituere; contrariae qualitates / medium; excessus / extraneus / dissociare; genus substantiae / genus qualitatis; lapis; magis ac minus / intensio / remissio; materia / suscipi / misceri; natura / naturalis; subsistere / subiectum.

VII.9.2, source pp. 268–269. Articles: Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Soul as the body’s craftsman; Substance, qualities and degrees. Vocabulary: accidens adveniens; anima nutritiva / sensitiva; animal / animans; artifex / pedissequa / officium; canis / equus / homo; connectere / labi / abire; construere / constituere; fabricare / servare / reficere; instrumentum; perturbatio / impedire / augere; phantasia; progredi / servire; retinere / servare; species / genus / cognomen; tristitia / laetitia / debilitare / roborare.

Chapter VII.10

VII.10.1, source pp. 270–271. Articles: Harmony and the strings. Vocabulary: Aristoxenus / musici; conditio humorum / imperium; disiungere / copulare incorporeis; fides / chorda; fieri / facere; figura artificiosa / dispositio; harmonia / progenitus; motus / movere; pendere / oriri / sustinere / nasci; per se exsistere / operari; repugnare / reflectere; somniare; ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus; valere.

Chapter VII.11

VII.11.1, source pp. 272–273. Articles: Bodily spirit and mediation; Harmony and the strings; Vital harmony and its producer. Vocabulary: assidue / naturaliter / interius; concinnitas / consonantia; conspiratio / concinere / coalescere; contemperare / temperatrix; extrinsecum principium; hypothetical concession; ratio animae; vivere; vivificus spiritus / vitalis harmonia.

Chapter VII.12

VII.12.1, source pp. 274–275. Articles: Composition and inward unity; Proportion, health, strength and beauty. Vocabulary: actus simplex; animal / animans; Aristoteles / Hippocrates; coagulum / conglutinare; componere; compositio; discernere; intellectus /

sensus / appetitus; invenire / reperire; motor / rector / una forma; os / nervus / caro; ratio compositionis / proportio; sanitas / robur / pulchritudo; scientia et ignorantia; unio plurium / vis insita; vires / affectus / actus / habitus.

Chapter VII.13

VII.13.1, source pp. 276–277. Articles: Freedom from matter and causal priority; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Spiritual images and light. Vocabulary: absque materia / paries; caliditas / siccitas / frigus; efficere / causa / effectus; forma / qualitas; humor / mixtio / procreare; ignis / terra / lapis; intelligentia; liber a materia; passio / affectio; praestantior / sublimior; spiritalis; super et praeter ordinem elementorum; ut alias ostendemus / ut in sequentibus apparebit / ut in superioribus enarravimus.

Chapter VII.14

VII.14.1, source pp. 278–279. Articles: Harmony and the strings; Moral concord and the robber. Vocabulary: aggredi / spirare; concentus / concinere; concoquere / generare prolem; dissentire / pugnare / appetitus; invenire / reminisci / loqui; magis anima / magis vita; nequam / probus / iustus / latro; sustinere / vibrare; vivax / audens / robustus.

Chapter VII.15

VII.15.1, source pp. 280–281. Articles: Discord and the soul’s persistence; Moral concord and the robber. Vocabulary: anima / animus; animi mortalium; dissonantia / discordia / dissensio; natura / naturalis; naturalis habitus / dissipare; opinio / affectus / distrahere; permanere / perseverare; proprius / intimus / alienior; soli et omni.

Chapter VIII.1

VIII.1.1, source pp. 284–285. Articles: Four stages of cognition; Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; aggredi / exponere / ostendere; agnoscere / cognoscere; amicitia / disciplina; ascendere / surgere / evolare; attingere; augurari / suspicari / somniare; bonum / malum; cogitare; cognoscere (additional forms); colligere; conceptus / conceptio; concipere / excogitare; corpus / corporalis (further forms); designare / discernere; dicere / loqui / vocare; efficere / producere / generare; esse; gradus; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; imaginatio; incorporeus / incorporalis; intelligentia; intelligere / intellectio; intentio; iudicare / pronuntiare; materia (additional forms); modus / pactum; opinio / sententia; phantasia; praesentia / absentia; procerus / frons / humerus / glaucus / aquilinus; pulchritudo / bonitas; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; ratio (account or principle); res; sapere; sensus; simulacrum / imago / effigies; Socrates / Plato; spiritus (incorporeal); substantia; superare / excedere / excellere; superficies / pictura; ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur; versari / volutari / vagari; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.1.2, source pp. 286–287. Articles: Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Four stages of cognition; Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance. Vocabulary: agnoscere / cognoscere; amicitia / disciplina; Antisthenes / Xenophon; ascendere / surgere / evolare; bonum / malum; communicare / infundere; concipere / excogitare; condicio; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corpus / corporalis (further forms); depingere; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); homo / humanus; humanitas; idea; in se / in alio / in multis; incorporeus / incorporalis; innumerabilis; intellectus; intelligentia;

intentio; locus / situs / tempus; materia (additional forms); modus / pactum; natura; natura communis; oportere / necesse / debere; participatio; permanere / manere / remanere; persona; phantasia; proprius; pulchritudo / bonitas; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; ratio (account or principle); similitudo; singularis / particularis; Socrates / Plato; subsistere / consistere; versari / volutari / vagari; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.1.3, source pp. 288–289. Articles: Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea. Vocabulary: ascendere / surgere / evolare; carere / deficere / abesse; casus / casu; causa; communis (additional forms); concludere / inferre / sequi; convenire / conciliare; corporeus / corporalis; Deus / divinus; esse; exemplar / fabricare; facere / fieri; facere / fieri (further forms); finis (end and absence of end); homo / humanus; idea; immo / tamen / non tamen; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intelligibilis (additional forms); invicem / vicissim; locus / situs / tempus; materia; motus / alteratio / quies; movere / immobilis; natura; natura communis; naturalis; ordinare / ordo; pars / totum (further forms); perpetuus / sempiternus; persona; proprius; subsistere / consistere; supervenire; unitas / multitudo.

VIII.1.4, source pp. 290–291. Articles: Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Four stages of cognition; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars. Vocabulary: absolutus; argumentatio / demonstratio; attingere; certa / certus; cogitare; concipere / excogitare; corpus / corporalis (further forms); depingere; discursus / discurrere; homo / humanus; imaginatio; immo / tamen / non tamen; incorporeus / incorporalis; intellectus; intentio; locus / situs / tempus; natura; naturalis; phantasia; proprius; pulchritudo / bonitas; relinquere / dimittere; res; sensus; simulacrum / imago / effigies; singularis / particularis; subsistere / consistere; universalis; versari / volutari / vagari; vis.

VIII.1.5, source pp. 292–293. Articles: Four stages of cognition; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Innate forms and the stimulus of images; Reflexive understanding and willing. Vocabulary: absolutus; abstractio / abstrahere; actus reflexus (return to the particular); aggredi / exponere / ostendere; agnoscere / cognoscere; alere / nutrire; concipere / excogitare; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; discursus / discurrere; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); incitare; incorporeus / incorporalis; intellectus; intelligentia; intelligere / intellectio; intelligibilis (additional forms); intuitus / intueri / conspicere; invenire / reperire; invicem / vicissim; materia (additional forms); mens (additional inflections); modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; natura; naturalis; oportere / necesse / debere; phantasia; primum / deinde / prius / secundo; reflexio / reflectere; relinquere / dimittere; simulacrum / imago / effigies; singularis / particularis; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

Chapter VIII.2

VIII.2.1, source pp. 294–295. Articles: Food, truth, and the hungry mind. Vocabulary: alere / nutrire; alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; anima; animus; aquaticus / terrestris / aereus; coalescere; convenire / conciliare; corporeus / corporalis; corpus; corpus / corporalis (further forms); corpusculum; efficere / producere / generare; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); illecebra; incorporeus / incorporalis; ingenium; invenire / reperire; invicem / vicissim; magnanimitas / pusillanimitas; natura; oportere / necesse / debere; panis / caro; pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus; proficere / crescere / decrescere; ratio (additional inflections); res; tenuare / purgare; transire / migrare / commutare; vesci / pasci; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

VIII.2.2, source pp. 294–295. Articles: Food, truth, and the hungry mind. Vocabulary: aeternus / aeternitas; alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; vesci / pasci.

VIII.2.3, source pp. 296–297. Articles: Body, instruments, and vital spirit; Four stages of cognition; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles. Vocabulary: animus; ars / instrumentum; augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; coalescere; conformatio; dare / tribuere; Epicurei; esse; furor / arma ministrare; homo / humanus; ignavia / torpere; industria / usus / affectus; inesse; ingenium; magnanimitas / pusillanimitas; membrum; modus / pactum; mollities / ariditas; naturalis; panis / caro; permanere / manere / remanere; pinguis / tenuis / grandis / pusillus; proficere / crescere / decrescere; ratio (reasoning power); similitudo; spiritus (vital mediator); superare / excedere / excellere; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

VIII.2.4, source pp. 296–297. Articles: Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre. Vocabulary: aequalitas / consonantia; dare / tribuere; efficere / producere / generare; facere / fieri (further forms); lyra / temperare; Magi; modus / pactum; quadrangularis / circularis; quantitas.

VIII.2.5, source pp. 298–299. Articles: Body, instruments, and vital spirit; Food, truth, and the hungry mind. Vocabulary: alere / nutrire; alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; animus; appetere / cupere / affectare; augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; commodum / utilitas; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corpus / corporalis (further forms); Deus / divinus; enervare / nervosus; esse; esurire / sitire; exsultare / illuminare / adolescere; homo / humanus; immo / tamen / non tamen; mediocriter / gravari / languescere / aegrotare; mensura / magnitudo; motus / alteratio / quies; natura; perpetuus / sempiternus; regere / curare; res; similitudo; veritas / verum; vesci / pasci; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.2.6, source pp. 300–301. Articles: Food, truth, and the hungry mind. Vocabulary: alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; appetere / cupere / affectare; appetitus / appetitio; consensio stabilis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); Deus / divinus; homo / humanus; mutatio / mutare; natura; naturalis; permanere / manere / remanere; perpetuus / sempiternus; vesci / pasci.

VIII.2.7, source pp. 302–303. Articles: Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles. Vocabulary: bonum / malum; carere / deficere / abesse; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corporeus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); Deus / divinus; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); forte / forsitan / si modo; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; incorporeus / incorporalis; inesse; invenire / reperire; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; mathematici / circulus / planum; mutabilis / immutabilis; numerus / figura / proportio; pars / totum (further forms); principium / finis; proprius; quantitas; ratio (account or principle); ratio (additional inflections); ratio (reasoning power); res; spiritus (incorporeal); universalis; veritas / verum; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.2.8, source pp. 304–305. Articles: Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; alimentum / alimonia / esca / cibus; animus; appetere / cupere / affectare; appetitus / appetitio; argumentatio / demonstratio; augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; bonum / malum; converti / convertere; corporeus / corporalis; corrumpere / interire / perdere; Deus / divinus; efficere / producere / generare; esse; habere / possidere; immortalis / immortalitas; iudicare / pronuntiare; mens (additional inflections); modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; natura; naturalis; Olympiodorus / Phaedo / Gorgias; possibile / utile / impotentia; potentia; qua ratione / quatenus; ratio (additional inflections); ratio (reasoning power); res; sensus; separare /

segregare; veritas / verum; vesci / pasci; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vita / vivere; voluptas / fastidium / dolor.

Chapter VIII.3

VIII.3.1, source pp. 306–307. Articles: Virtue as an indivisible quality. Vocabulary: aequari / aequare; aggredi / exponere / ostendere; anima; appetitus / appetitio; argumentatio / demonstratio; carere / deficere / abesse; cognoscere (additional forms); condicio; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corporeus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dare / tribuere; Deus / divinus; dicere / loqui / vocare; divisibilis / dividuus; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); fortitudo / timor; homo / humanus; impedire / cohibere / claudere; individuus / indivisibilis; intellectus; iustitia / suum cuique; modus / pactum; mollities appetitus; mos / consuetudo; naturalis; permanere / manere / remanere; ponere / concedere / admittere; quaerere / interrogare / percontari; qualitas; rationalis; res; sapere; sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars; speculativus / moralis; temperantia / libido; virtus.

VIII.3.2, source pp. 308–309. Articles: Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare. Vocabulary: appetitus / appetitio; claritas / fervor; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; lepus / vestigium / indago; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; res.

VIII.3.3, source pp. 308–309. Articles: Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare. Vocabulary: carere / deficere / abesse; claritas / fervor; discussio; habere / possidere; inspirare / flagrare / aestus; intellectus; lapis / scintilla / collidere; mos / consuetudo; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; rationalis; res; speculum / lana / accendere.

VIII.3.4, source pp. 308–309. Articles: Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare. Vocabulary: augurari / suspicari / somniare; carere / deficere / abesse; cognitio; ebrius / monstrum; habere / possidere; modus / pactum; pedetentim / paulatim / subito; res.

VIII.3.5, source pp. 310–311. Articles: Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare. Vocabulary: carere / deficere / abesse; e vestigio; ebrius / monstrum; habere / possidere; inesse; latere / lucere; pars / totum (further forms); pedetentim / paulatim / subito; ratio (reasoning power); res; speculativus / moralis; vis; voluntas / velle; voluntas constans.

VIII.3.6, source pp. 310–311. Articles: Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment; Virtue as an indivisible quality. Vocabulary: augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; cogitare; divisibilis / dividuus; esse; exemplar / fabricare; finis (end and absence of end); gremium / detrudere / pellere; habere / possidere; idea; individuus / indivisibilis; intellectus; intelligentia; modus / pactum; natura; ortus / finis virtutis; permanere / manere / remanere; proprius; res; scientia; speculativus / moralis; unitas / multitudo; virtus.

VIII.3.7, source pp. 312–313. Articles: Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment. Vocabulary: acies mentis / caligo; causa; cognitio; concipere / excogitare; connexus; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; continere; divisibilis / dividuus; finis (end and absence of end); fortitudo / timor; habere / possidere; immo / tamen / non tamen; indicium / rimari; inesse; ingenium; intelligentia; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; invenire / reperire; invicem / vicissim; iustitia / suum cuique; latere / lucere; ordo naturae / effectus; propositio / docere; quantitas; res; sagacitas / elicere / delitescere; sapientia / scientia / prudentia / ars; speculativus / moralis; temperantia / libido.

VIII.3.8, source pp. 314–315. Articles: Virtue as an indivisible quality. Vocabulary: anima; corporeus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); definitio; dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; exemplar / fabricare; facere / fieri; fugere / fugare; habitus; incorporeus / incorporalis; modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; natura; naturalis; proprius; quaerere / interrogare / percontari; qualitas; ratio (additional inflections); res; speculativus / moralis; subiectum / receptaculum; virtus; vis.

Chapter VIII.4

VIII.4.1, source pp. 316–317. Articles: Bodily points and the seat of understanding; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; animal / rationale; conceptus / conceptio; corporeus / corporalis; corpus; definitio; dicere / loqui / vocare; divisibilis / dividuus; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); forma; Graeci Platonici / Arabes Platonici; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; intellectus; intelligere / intellectio; intelligibilis (additional forms); iudicare / pronuntiare; latitudo / extensio; mensura / magnitudo; natura; opinio / sententia; oportere / necesse / debere; punctum; res; scientia; sedes / fundamentum; species; subiectum / receptaculum; terminus / terminare.

VIII.4.2, source pp. 318–319. Articles: Bodily points and the seat of understanding; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds. Vocabulary: accidens; actus / actu; actus proprius; capere / comprehendere; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; contingere / concursus; dicere / loqui / vocare; divisibilis / dividuus; efficere / producere / generare; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); impedire / cohibere / claudere; infinitus / infinitas; intelligere / intellectio; intelligibilis (additional forms); intuitus / intueri / conspicere; invenire / reperire; invicem / vicissim; latitudo / extensio; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; mensura / magnitudo; oportere / necesse / debere; pars / totum (further forms); potentia; proprius; punctum; quaerere / interrogare / percontari; ratio (additional inflections); refellere / confutare / redarguere; res; respondere / fateor / negare; sedes / fundamentum; terminus / terminare; tria puncta / medium / extrema; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.4.3, source pp. 320–321. Articles: Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts. Vocabulary: aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; cognoscere (additional forms); concludere / inferre / sequi; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; cumulus / continuum; designare / discernere; dividere / secare / partiri; divisibilis / dividuus; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); gutta / triticum / granum; habere / possidere; imaginatio; intellectus; intelligere / intellectio; intelligibilis (additional forms); invicem / vicissim; latitudo / extensio; mensura / magnitudo; modus / pactum; mutatio / mutare; naturalis; nix / albedo; numerus / figura / proportio; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); ponere / concedere / admittere; res; respondere / fateor / negare; similitudo.

VIII.4.4, source pp. 322–323. Articles: Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds. Vocabulary: animal / rationale; capere / comprehendere; certa / certus; corpus / corporalis (further forms); definitio; dicere / loqui / vocare; differentia; discursus / discurrere; dividere / secare / partiri; esse; finis (end and absence of end); genus; homo / humanus; infinitus / infinitas; innumerabilis; intellectus; intelligibilis (additional forms); modus / pactum; natura; naturalis; ordinare / ordo; ordo naturae / effectus; ossa / caro / nervi; pars / totum (further forms); ratio (additional inflections); rationalis; res; resolutio / divisio; similitudo; substantia; terminus / terminare; unitas / multitudo; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis in si vis.

VIII.4.5, source pp. 324–325. Articles: Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; amens / mens; casus / casu; concludere / inferre / sequi; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; dare / tribuere; definitio; dextra / sinistra; dicere / loqui / vocare; differentia; efficere / producere / generare; Epicurei; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); figmentum / machinatio; genus; habere / possidere; habitus; incorporeus / incorporalis; intellectus; invicem / vicissim; mixtio / miscere; natura; opinio / sententia; oportere / necesse / debere; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); ponere / concedere / admittere; quaerere / interrogare / percontari; res; respondere / fateor / negare; veritas / verum; voluntas / velle.

VIII.4.6, source pp. 326–327. Articles: Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction. Vocabulary: certa / certus; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dextra / sinistra; differentia; dilaniatio / lacerare / discerpere; dividere / secare / partiri; facere / fieri (further forms); figmentum / machinatio; genus; mens (additional inflections); modus / pactum; natura; natura communis; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); quantitas; relinquere / dimittere; resolutio / divisio; unitas / multitudo.

VIII.4.7, source pp. 326–327. Articles: Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts. Vocabulary: carere / deficere / abesse; color / figura; continere; Epicurei; intelligibilis (additional forms); numerus / figura / proportio; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); quaerere / interrogare / percontari; respondere / fateor / negare.

VIII.4.8, source pp. 328–329. Articles: Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts. Vocabulary: aequari / aequare; carere / deficere / abesse; cognitio; color / figura; conceptus / conceptio; continere; dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; habere / possidere; inscitia; nix / albedo; oportere / necesse / debere; pars / totum (further forms); proprius; refellere / confutare / redarguere; scientia; scitum / obiectum; videri / apparere / patere / constare; voluntas / velle.

VIII.4.9, source pp. 330–331. Articles: Intellectual forms and intelligible essences. Vocabulary: actus / actu; aequari / aequare; aspectus / respectus; bonum / malum; cognoscere (additional forms); considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; dare / tribuere; Deus / divinus; divisibilis / dividuus; esse; essentia; facere / fieri (further forms); forma; habere / possidere; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intelligere / intellectio; intelligibilis (additional forms); modus / pactum; oportere / necesse / debere; pars / totum (further forms); proprius; res; respondere / fateor / negare; simplex / simplicitas; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.4.10, source pp. 332–333. Articles: Simplicity of human and numerical species. Vocabulary: animal / rationale; caput / pectus / femur; communicare / infundere; denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius; dicere / loqui / vocare; differentia; dividere / secare / partiri; esse; homo / humanus; membrum; natura; numerus / figura / proportio; ordinare / ordo; ordo naturae / effectus; pars / totum (further forms); qua ratione / quatenus; ratio (additional inflections); rationalis; rationalitas / animalitas; res; scientia; simplex / simplicitas; species; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.4.11, source pp. 334–335. Articles: Simplicity of human and numerical species; Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles. Vocabulary: actus / actu; capere / comprehendere; certa / certus; cogitare; denarius / septenarius / octonarius / senarius; gradus; habere / possidere; habitus; individuus / indivisibilis; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; magis minusve; modus / pactum; natura; numerus / figura / proportio; praeparatio / pedisequa; proprius; res; scientia; simplex / simplicitas; species; unitas / multitudo; veritas / verum; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.4.12, source pp. 334–335. Articles: First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis. Vocabulary: dividere / secare / partiri; esse; forte / forsitan / si modo; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; latere / lucere; materia (additional forms); mensura / magnitudo; natura; Plotinus / Proclus; principium / finis; quantitas; refellere / confutare / redarguere; res; resolutio / divisio; scientia; simplex / simplicitas; sufficientia subsistendi; unitas / multitudo.

VIII.4.13, source pp. 336–337. Articles: First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences. Vocabulary: aequari / aequare; cognoscere (additional forms); conceptus / conceptio; concludere / inferre / sequi; dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; forte / forsitan / si modo; gradus; indissolubilis; individuus / indivisibilis; intelligere / intellectio; modus / pactum; natura; notio / perceptio; ratio (additional inflections); reflexio / reflectere; res; simplex / simplicitas; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vita / vivere.

Chapter VIII.5

VIII.5.1, source pp. 338–339. Articles: Bodily points and the seat of understanding; Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact. Vocabulary: capere / comprehendere; cognoscere (additional forms); condicio; corporeus / corporalis; corpus; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dicere / loqui / vocare; discursus / discurrere; habere / possidere; infinitus / infinitas; innumerabilis; intelligere / intellectio; latitudo / extensio; mensura / magnitudo; ordinare / ordo; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); punctum; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; res; solus (restrictive); transcurrere; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

VIII.5.2, source pp. 340–341. Articles: Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact. Vocabulary: argumentatio / demonstratio; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corporeus / corporalis; dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); impartibilis; individuus / indivisibilis; infectio / puritas; intelligere / intellectio; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; natura; opinio / sententia; Plotinus / Proclus; resolutio / divisio; segregare / restituere; separare / segregare; simplex / simplicitas; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

Chapter VIII.6

VIII.6.1, source pp. 342–343. Articles: Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre; The whole mind and the measure of equality. Vocabulary: adaequatio; aequalitas / consonantia; aequalitas summa; aequari / aequare; agnoscere / cognoscere; canis / formica / equus / elephas / sol; capere / comprehendere; cognoscere (additional forms); comparare / referre; continere; corporeus / corporalis; corpus; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); habere / possidere; homo / humanus; intellectus; intelligere / intellectio; membrum; mens; modus / pactum; natura; oportere / necesse / debere; pars / totum; pars / totum (further forms); participatio; ponere / concedere / admittere; quantitas; refellere / confutare / redarguere; res; se toto.

Chapter VIII.7

VIII.7.1, source pp. 344–345. Articles: Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Receiving forms without losing one’s own. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; alienus / extraneus; amittere / deicere; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; compositio / mixtum; corporeus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); esse; habitus; induere / exuere; intellectualitas; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; mens; modus / pactum; motus / alteratio / quies; natura; naturalis; operatio / actio; permanere / manere / remanere; proprius;

quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; remittere / perficere; res; secernere / discernere; versari / volutari / vagari; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vinum / dulcedo / sapor.

Chapter VIII.8

VIII.8.1, source pp. 346–347. Articles: Universality, law, and material restriction. Vocabulary: agere / operari; angustus / amplus; astringere / alligare; cogitare; cognoscere (additional forms); communis (additional forms); concipere / excogitare; condicio; corporeus / corporalis; dicere / loqui / vocare; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; materia; materialis; natura; regula / lex; res; singularis / particularis; universalis; vis.

VIII.8.2, source pp. 346–347. Articles: Universality, law, and material restriction. Vocabulary: astringere / alligare; corrumpere / interire / perdere; fons / receptaculum naturale; insidiae materiae; naturalis; proprius.

Chapter VIII.9

VIII.9.1, source pp. 348–349. Articles: Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres. Vocabulary: actus rectus / reflexus; aequari / aequare; amplexus / complecti / capere; cognitio; continere; corporeus / corporalis; esse; immortalis / immortalitas; impedire / cohibere / claudere; intelligere / intellectio; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; invicem / vicissim; mens; natura; quantitas; reflexio / reflectere; res; saltem futura sit semper; Saturnus / Iuppiter / sphaera.

Chapter VIII.10

VIII.10.1, source pp. 350–351. Articles: Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding. Vocabulary: accipere / concipere; agere / operari; agnoscere / cognoscere; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; attingere; capere / comprehendere; certa / certus; concipere / excogitare; concludere / inferre / sequi; corpus / corporalis (further forms); efficere / producere / generare; facere / fieri (further forms); genus; homo / humanus; incorporeus / incorporalis; infinitus / infinitas; intelligere / intellectio; modus / pactum; natura; operatio / actio; oportere / necesse / debere; ordinare / ordo; ovis / ignis; primum / deinde / prius / secundo; proles / parturire; proprius; res; similitudo; sublimior; substantia; vis.

VIII.10.2, source pp. 352–353. Articles: Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding. Vocabulary: abstractio / abstrahere; appetere / cupere / affectare; Aristoteles / Platonici; attingere; capere / comprehendere; certa / certus; cognoscere (additional forms); condicio; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dicere / loqui / vocare; discursus / discurrere; divisibilis / dividuus; efficere / producere / generare; Epicurei; esse; finis (end and absence of end); gradus; habere / possidere; immo / tamen / non tamen; impedire / cohibere / claudere; incorporeus / incorporalis; intellectus; longitudo / latitudo / profunditas; manus mentis; materialis; mensura / magnitudo; mixtus / sincerus; modus / pactum; motus / alteratio / quies; natura; opinio / sententia; perpetuus / sempiternus; potentia; proles / parturire; prospicere / effingere / fingere; qualitas; res; respondere / fateor / negare; similitudo; sola (subject); solus (restrictive); sublimior; substantia; superare / excedere / excellere.

Chapter VIII.11

VIII.11.1, source pp. 354–355. Articles: Repose, motion, and contemplation. Vocabulary: aeternus / aeternitas; appetere / cupere / affectare; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; habere / possidere; materia (additional forms); motus / alteratio / quies; natura; perpetuus / sempiternus; perturbatio / negotium; proficere / crescere / decrescere; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

Chapter VIII.12

VIII.12.1, source pp. 356–357. Articles: Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil. Vocabulary: alienus / extraneus; bonum / malum; capere / comprehendere; causa; cognitio; conciliare / pax; conservator / servator; contraria elementa; corporeus / corporalis; corrumpere / interire / perdere; dulce / amarum / utile / inutile; esse; habere / possidere; invicem / vicissim; lux / tenebrae / vox / silentium; mens (additional inflections); modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; proprius.

Chapter VIII.13

VIII.13.1, source pp. 358–359. Articles: Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Innate forms and the stimulus of images; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun. Vocabulary: accidens; accipere / suscipere; alienus / extraneus; anima solis; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; condicio; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dare / tribuere; efficere / producere / generare; excitare / promere / adita; facere / fieri (further forms); forma; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; idea; incorporeus / incorporalis; infectio / puritas; integritas / puritas / supervacuum; invenire / reperire; latere / lucere; lignum / flamma / flammula; lumen / lux; modus / pactum; natura; naturalis; naturaliter insitus; notio / perceptio; opinio / sententia; Orphici / Heraclitus; proprius; reddere; res; reviviscere; speculum / distantia; spiritalis (optical); ut quidam putant / ut Platonici opinantur; veritas / verum; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis; visibilis / invisibilis.

VIII.13.2, source pp. 360–361. Articles: Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil; Receiving forms without losing one’s own. Vocabulary: accipere / suscipere; amittere / deicere; aqua / ignis / calor / frigus; bonum / malum; carere / deficere / abesse; converti / convertere; corporeus / corporalis; corpus / corporalis (further forms); corrumpere / interire / perdere; designare / discernere; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); forma; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intellectus; intelligere / intellectio; lucrari; modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; motus / alteratio / quies; mutatio / mutare; natura; privatio / defectus / malum / noxius / salubris; proficere / crescere / decrescere; reddere; remittere / perficere; res; videri / apparere / patere / constare.

Chapter VIII.14

VIII.14.1, source pp. 362–363. Articles: Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance; Mind’s transformation of material conditions. Vocabulary: agere / operari; carere / deficere / abesse; cogitare; colligere; compositum; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; corporeus / corporalis; dicere / loqui / vocare; efficere / producere / generare; esse; eximere / liberare; facere / fieri (further forms); habere / possidere; homo / humanus; impedire / cohibere / claudere; infinitus / infinitas; intellectus; intuitus / intueri / conspicere; invicem / vicissim; lapides / prima vita; materia (additional forms); modus / pactum; mortalis / corruptibilis; naturalis; numerus / figura / proportio; operatio / actio;

orbis in puncto; perpetuus / sempiternus; praeteritum / futurum / praesens; principium / finis; proprius; purus / unus / stabilis (intellectual consideration); qualitas; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; res; similitudo; superare / excedere / excellere; terminus / terminare; vis; vita / vivere.

Chapter VIII.15

VIII.15.1, source pp. 364–365. Articles: Outward flow and rational life's return; Reflexive understanding and willing; Repose, motion, and contemplation. Vocabulary: agere / operari; alienus / extraneus; brachium / opus extra; conscius / animadversio; considerare / contemplari / speculari / inspicere; dicere / loqui / vocare; essentia; essentia–vita–mens; facere / fieri (further forms); finis (end and absence of end); homo / humanus; innumerabilis; intelligere / intellectio; materia (additional forms); modus / pactum; motus / alteratio / quies; operatio / actio; proprius; ratio (additional inflections); reflexio / reflectere; replicare; res; terminus / terminare; voluntas / velle.

VIII.15.2, source pp. 366–367. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause. Vocabulary: agere / operari; anima; argumentatio / demonstratio; bene esse / simpliciter esse; carere / deficere / abesse; continere; dare / tribuere; divisibilis / dividuus; efficere / producere / generare; esse; essentia; ex se / in se / per se; facere / fieri; facere / fieri (further forms); finis (end and absence of end); formare / perficere (intellectual self-formation); generatio / genitrix / successio; habere / possidere; immortalis / immortalitas; incorporeus / incorporalis; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intellectus; intelligere / intellectio; latere / lucere; mitto / ipse viderit; mos / consuetudo; natura; naturalis; operatio / actio; Paulus apostolus; Plotinus / Proclus; renovare / renovatio; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis; vita / vivere.

VIII.15.3, source pp. 368–369. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Outward flow and rational life's return; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause. Vocabulary: actus / actu; agere / operari; alienus / extraneus; appetere / cupere / affectare; carere / deficere / abesse; causa; causa non efficiens sed formalis; condicio; dare / tribuere; effluere / diffluere / defluere; esse; ex se / in se / per se; exemplar / fabricare; existentia; finis (end and absence of end); implere / consummare; mens; motus / alteratio / quies; natura; non efficiens sed formalis; operatio / actio; principium / finis; proprius; rationalis; relabi / redundare; res; sustentaculum / inquinatio; terminus / terminare; vita / vivere.

Chapter VIII.16

VIII.16.1, source pp. 370–371. Articles: Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding; Reflexive understanding and willing; Repose, motion, and contemplation. Vocabulary: appetitus / appetitio; augere / augmentum / incrementum / decrementum; aviditas / cupiditas; carere / deficere / abesse; cogitare; cognoscere (additional forms); concipere / excogitare; conscius / animadversio; corpus / corporalis (further forms); dicere / loqui / vocare; efficere / producere / generare; esse; facere / fieri (further forms); finis (end and absence of end); forte / forsitan / si modo; gradus; habere / possidere; infinitus / infinitas; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intelligere / intellectio; invenire / reperire; latere / lucere; modus / pactum; numerus / figura / proportio; pars / totum; per omnia; perpetuus / sempiternus; posse / fingere / excogitare; principium / finis; proprius; qua

ratione / quatenus; rationalis; replicare; res; revolutio / orbicularis; sensus; solus (restrictive); terminus / terminare; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis; voluntas / velle.

VIII.16.2, source pp. 372–373. Articles: Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding. Vocabulary: actus / actu; actus infinitus / potentia infinita; angelus finitus; ascendere / descendere; colligere; Deus / divinus; esse; exemplar / fabricare; gradus; homo / humanus; infinitus / infinitas; innumerabilis; invenire / reperire; invicem / vicissim; iudicare / pronuntiare; materia; modus / pactum; natura; ordinare / ordo; perpetuus / sempiternus; pingere in se / aere / pariete; potentia; proprius; reddere; res; spiritus (incorporeal); superare / excedere / excellere; terminus / terminare; unitas / multitudo; universalis; vicissitudo generationis; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

VIII.16.3, source pp. 374–375. Articles: Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing. Vocabulary: aequari / aequare; aequatio; ardor / ardere / ardenter; capacitas / implere; capere / comprehendere; certa / certus; cognitio; creatio / interitus; Deus / divinus; dicere / loqui / vocare; divitiarum cumulus / imperii amplitudo; esse; forte / forsitan / si modo; gradus; habere / possidere; homo / humanus; infinitus / infinitas; intellectus; interminatus; invenire / reperire; mensura / metiri / proportio / aequare; modus / pactum; natura; notio / perceptio; oportere / necesse / debere; proprius; qua ratione / quatenus; quodammodo / quasi / ut ita loquar; ratio (account or principle); ratio (additional inflections); res; terminus / terminare; videri / apparere / patere / constare; vis.

VIII.16.4, source pp. 376–377. Articles: First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause. Vocabulary: absolutus; amplificatio divina; ardor / ardere / ardenter; capacitas / implere; concedere / donare; corpus / corporalis (further forms); Deus / divinus; dicere / loqui / vocare; esse; esurire / sitire; facere / fieri (further forms); finis (end and absence of end); habere / possidere; homo / humanus; ignis / lapis / descendere / deferre; infinitus / infinitas; inserere / servare / revocare; intellectualis / intelligibilis; intelligere / intellectio; mens; modus / pactum; operatio / actio; opinio / sententia; oportere / necesse / debere; primum / deinde / prius / secundo; principium / finis; proprius; qua ratione / quatenus; res; similitudo; superare / excedere / excellere; terminus / terminare; veritas / verum; virtus; vis; vita / vivere.

English lookup

Common alternative terms lead to relevant articles. The alphabetical article directory provides the full list of article titles; this lookup is supplementary and does not replace the explanations.

Absolute being. Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Abstraction. Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

Act and actuality. Creature, power and operation; Potency, possibility and the lion.

Activity and operation. Creature, power and operation; Vital motion, action and passion; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Affection and passivity. Passivity and bodily affection; Injury and the uninjured judge.

Angelic mind. Divine production and the third essence; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

Animal soul. Rational soul and irrational life; Severed animals and replacement souls.

Annihilation. Generation, corruption and annihilation; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Appetite and desire. Conversion, desire and compulsion; Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

Art and craftsmanship. Art and elemental transformation; Ariston, sculptor and painter; Soul as the body's craftsman.

Attention. Sensation as attentive activity.

Augustine and rational identity. Generation, corruption and annihilation; Conversion, desire and compulsion; Sleep and dreams.

Avicenna and self-awareness. Avicenna's imagined adult.

Being. Essence and being; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Being through oneself. Through itself and through another; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Bodily spirit. Bodily spirit and mediation; Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

Body and magnitude. Indivisibility and contact; Number and spiritual amplitude.

Cause. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence.

Cave. Plato's cave and gradual education.

Choice and compulsion. Conversion, desire and compulsion.

Circular motion. Circularity and spiritual spheres; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul.

Clock. Rennet, magnet and clock.

Common sense. Comparison and common sense.

Composition. Composition and inward unity; Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

Concord and discord. Vital harmony and its producer; Discord and the soul's persistence.

Conditions and necessities. Conditions and the fashioner's law; Necessary predication and the fire objection.

Conjecture and intentions. Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Corruption and death. Contraries, death and imperishability; Generation, corruption and annihilation.

Creation from nothing. Creation and generation; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Definition. Comets and defining accounts; Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

Dependence. Through itself and through another; Relation and continuing dependence.

Descent and transmigration. Platonist disagreement and descent; Images, migration and the perfect agent.

Difference and genus. Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

Digestion and growth. Nourishment and the life-giving form; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

Divisibility. Indivisibility and contact; Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts.

Dreams. Sleep and dreams.

Efficient cause. Four causes and graded dependence; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

Emanation and overflow. Fountains, drawing and infusion; Relation and continuing dependence.

Essence and existence. Essence and being; Creature, power and operation.

Evil and privation. Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil.

Exemplar and Idea. Participation, common and proper; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Final cause. Four causes and graded dependence; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

First Cause. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

First principle. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Fish eggs. Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

Form. Form and formal being; Substantial form and the receiving subject.

Formal cause. Form and formal being; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

Formal self-causation. Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Freedom from matter. Inclination and independence; Freedom from matter and causal priority.

God. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

Goodness and return. Conversion, desire and compulsion; Outward flow and rational life’s return.

Habit and education. Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

Hare. Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare.

Harmony theory of soul. Constitution, localized point and harmony; Harmony and the strings; Vital harmony and its producer.

Humours and temperament. Temperament and harmony; Bodily constitution and temperament.

Identity through change. Spiritual matter and identity; Persistence, memory and recognition.

Image and mirror. Image, shadow and ranked truth; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

Imagination. Four stages of cognition; Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Immortality. Rational soul and irrational life; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Incorporeal and immaterial. Divine production and the third essence; Avicenna’s imagined adult; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Individual and species. Intellectual generation and daily renewal; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Infinite capacity. Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement.

Infinity of God. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

Instrument. Instrument and creative mediation; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

Intellect. Four stages of cognition; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

Intellectual and intelligible. Intellectual forms and intelligible essences.

Intention in cognition. Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Judgement of pain. Pain, location and reporting; Injury and the uninjured judge.

Knowledge of particulars. Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

Learning and recollection. Teaching without loss; Persistence, memory and recognition; Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

Life and vital motion. Life and vivification; Vital motion, action and passion.

Light and spirit. Light, spirit and the unseen source; Spiritual images and light; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

Lion. Potency, possibility and the lion; Animal acuity and bodily size.

Lucifer. Lucifer and indivisible meaning.

Magnet. Rennet, magnet and clock.

Material cause. Prime matter and enduring support; Four causes and graded dependence.

Matter. Prime matter and enduring support; Spiritual matter and identity.

Measurement of infinity. Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing.

Memory. Time, memory and expectation; Persistence, memory and recognition; Memory, rigidity and fluidity.

Mind and intellect. Four stages of cognition; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences; Reflexive understanding and willing.

Mirror. Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun; Bronze mirror and concentrated fire.

Mixture. Bodily constitution and temperament; Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer.

Natural powers. Three offices and the order of proof; Nourishment and the life-giving form.

Natural self-motion. Primary self-motion and the regress of parts.

Nourishment. Nourishment and the life-giving form; Food, lending and borrowing life.

Pain and bodily injury. Injury and the uninjured judge; Pain, location and reporting; Sensation as attentive activity.

Participation. Participation, common and proper; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Phantasy. Four stages of cognition; Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Plato and the cave. Plato’s cave and gradual education.

Point and soul. Point, dimension and substantial unity; Point, line and the comparing power; Bodily points and the seat of understanding.

Potency and possibility. Potency, possibility and the lion; Spiritual matter and identity.

Power and substance. Creature, power and operation; Substance, qualities and degrees.

Preservation. Creation and generation; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Primary cause. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Prime matter. Prime matter and enduring support.

Principal cause. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent.

Proclus and self-production. Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Platonist disagreement and descent.

Rational soul. Rational soul and irrational life.

Reason and reasoning. Intelligible principles and reasoning; Sensory error and corrective reason.

Reception of forms. Reception and the receiver; Receiving forms without losing one’s own.

Reflection and reflexivity. Reflexive understanding and willing; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars.

Rest and stability. Motion and substantial stability; Repose, motion, and contemplation.

River. Stable craftsman and the river reflection.

Secondary causes. First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Participation, common and proper.

Sensation. One comprehension and indivisible sensation; Sensation as attentive activity; Four stages of cognition.

Soul. Rational soul and irrational life; Divine production and the third essence.

Soul as body. Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

Spiritual magnitude. Number and spiritual amplitude.

Spiritual matter. Spiritual matter and identity.

Substance and accident. Creature, power and operation; Substance, qualities and degrees.

Substantial form. Form and formal being; Substantial form and the receiving subject.

Time. Time, memory and expectation; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent.

Truth. Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles; Food, truth, and the hungry mind.

Unity and whole presence. Unity, dispersion and the inward bond; Whole presence and vital intensity; The whole mind and the measure of equality.

Universals. Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Universality, law, and material restriction.

Vegetative power. Three offices and the order of proof; Nourishment and the life-giving form.

Virtue and power. Virtue as an indivisible quality; Creature, power and operation.

Will. Conversion, desire and compulsion; Reflexive understanding and willing.

Thematic index

These reading routes bring together connected arguments without identifying their terms as synonyms. An article may belong to more than one route.

First Cause and kinds of causal dependence

Begin with the extended First Cause article, then distinguish constitutive causes, the gift of being, created operations, principal agents, instruments and the formal sense of self-causation.

First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence; Four causes and graded dependence; Through itself and through another; Relation and continuing dependence; Creation and generation; Instrument and creative mediation; Creature, power and operation; Participation, common and proper; Divine production and the third essence; Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Freedom from matter and causal priority; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause.

Being form matter and reception

These articles separate essence, being, form and operative power, and distinguish material reception from the qualified receptivity of incorporeal substances.

Prime matter and enduring support; Essence and being; Form and formal being; Reception and the receiver; Spiritual matter and identity; Potency, possibility and the lion; Substantial form and the receiving subject; Receiving forms without losing one’s own; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences; Mind’s transformation of material conditions; Kind, generation, and operation’s dependence on substance.

Rational soul lower life and the hierarchy

The rational-soul scope is fundamental. Read these routes together when a passage compares soul, animal life, bodily qualities, angelic mind and God, or reports a disputed descent or migration.

Rational soul and irrational life; Inclination and independence; Soul as universal bond; Platonist disagreement and descent; Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Constitution, localized point and harmony; Separate forms and intellectual life; Dense, subtle and fifth body; Images, migration and the perfect agent; Severed animals and replacement souls; Substance, qualities and degrees; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency.

Life motion stability and time

Self-motion, vital activity, bodily movement, reflexive return and substantial stability are different comparisons. The motion articles preserve the objections and the steps by which Ficino connects them.

Motion and substantial stability; Natural striving, source and return; Circularity and spiritual spheres; Life and vivification; Time, memory and expectation; Animation, first light and regress; Contrary powers and directed movement; Primary self-motion and the regress of parts; Integrity of the whole; Vital motion, action and passion; Eight motions and the cold-water objection; Generation, corruption and self-preservation; Temporal discourse and psychic ascent; Exemplars of bodily motion in soul; Stable craftsman and the river reflection; Repose, motion, and contemplation; Outward flow and rational life’s return.

Indivisibility extension place and whole presence

A point, a small body and an indivisible power are not equivalent. These routes examine spatial distribution, contact, comparison and the relation between parts and the whole.

Indivisibility and contact; Number and spiritual amplitude; Point, dimension and substantial unity; Essential presence and containment; Unity, dispersion and the inward bond; Place, coincidence and painless penetration; Members, house and sinew; Comparison and common sense; Composition and inward unity; One comprehension and indivisible sensation; Point, line and the comparing power; Whole presence and vital intensity; Bodily points and the seat of understanding; Touch, traversal, and the rejection of bodily contact; The whole mind and the measure of equality; Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

Body nourishment growth and mixture

Natural production, nutritive direction and bodily constitution supply distinct tests. The physiological claims remain historical examples, while their causal distinctions are explained in their own terms.

Art and elemental transformation; Transmission of form and natural order; Nourishment and the life-giving form; Earth, wood and severed stones; Rennet, magnet and clock; Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree; Elements, conjunction and the inward orderer; Growth, amputation and soul-size; Food, lending and borrowing life; Temperament, flux and the stable ruler; Bodily constitution and temperament; Bodily spirit and mediation;

Nutrition, growth and the principal agent; Soul as the body’s craftsman; Body, instruments, and vital spirit.

Sensation images pain and judgement

The argument passes from receiving images and comparing senses to locating injury and explaining attentive activity. The different roles of body, bodily spirit, sensory power and soul remain separate.

Passivity and bodily affection; Sensory error and corrective reason; Animal acuity and bodily size; Memory, rigidity and fluidity; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Spiritual images and light; Injury and the uninjured judge; Pain, location and reporting; Sensation as attentive activity; Comparison and common sense; Four stages of cognition; Images, intentions, and conjecturing substance.

Intellect universals and the structure of knowledge

Follow the distinctions among an image, an intention, common nature, a divine Idea, an intelligible essence and an intellectual form. Logical division and material division are tested separately.

Intelligible principles and reasoning; Ideas, natural ascent and rest; Intellectual objects and the owl’s eye; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea; Immediate intellection and the return to particulars; Truth, mathematical figures, and immutable principles; Virtue as an indivisible quality; Sciences, virtues, and mutual containment; Intellectual forms and intelligible essences; Definition, genus, difference, and mindless parts; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Simplicity of human and numerical species; First concepts, unity, and the end of analysis; Universality, law, and material restriction; Mutual knowledge of minds and the celestial spheres; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding; Innate forms and the stimulus of images.

Learning memory reflection and moral formation

Knowledge can be acquired, retained, shared and reflected upon in different ways. The educational examples also distinguish habit, immediate apprehension and activity directed toward the good.

Teaching without loss; Sleep and dreams; Conversion, desire and compulsion; Habit, purification and intellectual experiment; Avicenna’s imagined adult; Plato’s cave and gradual education; Persistence, memory and recognition; Moral concord and the robber; Food, truth, and the hungry mind; Sudden insight, habituation, and the hare; Reflexive understanding and willing; Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

Harmony proportion and the agent that orders

Ficino rejects the identity of soul and harmony while retaining bodily concord, proportion and arrangement. These articles distinguish an ordered result from the power that makes and maintains it.

Temperament and harmony; Constitution, localized point and harmony; Harmony and the strings; Vital harmony and its producer; Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Moral concord and the robber; Discord and the soul’s persistence; Composition and inward unity; Spiritual equality, the line, and the tuned lyre.

Immortality infinity and the preservation of identity

Non-annihilation, the persistence of a rational nature, individual life and a species' succession must be distinguished. The mind's unlimited range is also distinguished from divine absolute infinity.

Generation, corruption and annihilation; Contraries, death and imperishability; Zoroaster and the mistress of life; Conditions and the fashioner's law; Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus; Contraries, privations, and knowledge of evil; Infinite operations and the limits of sensory kinds; Finite angels, infinite act, and infinite potency; Measuring infinity and thinking being and nonbeing; Insatiable desire and divine enlargement; Individual immortality and the scope of the conclusion.

Concrete images crafts and natural examples

These examples are explained for the relations they illuminate. Their metaphorical or hypothetical use is not converted into a literal identity between soul and a bodily object.

Comets and defining accounts; Fountains, drawing and infusion; Seal, wax and restoration; Ariston, sculptor and painter; Image, shadow and ranked truth; Garment, mud and misleading shadows; Bronze mirror and concentrated fire; Light, spirit and the unseen source; Spark, globe and luminous vehicles; Rennet, magnet and clock; Lucifer and indivisible meaning; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Harmony and the strings; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun; Mental hands, conception, and creative understanding.

Authorities alternatives and the conduct of proof

The source's reported classifications, assumptions, objections and reservations are part of its meaning. These routes help distinguish an endorsed conclusion from a position introduced for examination.

Cavalcanti and the five positions; Corporeal soul and elemental doxography; Three offices and the order of proof; Necessary predication and the fire objection; Conditions and the fashioner's law; Platonist disagreement and descent; Zoroaster and the mistress of life; Avicenna's imagined adult; Plato's cave and gradual education; Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

Authorities and cited works

These entries locate named authorities, reported schools, interlocutors and explicitly identified works discussed in the companion. They distinguish Ficino's attribution, his own endorsement, an illustrative name and a work-title citation. Grouped entries retain the members of the source's classifications. The index is a finding aid, not a new history of these figures or a verification of every ancient attribution.

Authorities and interlocutors

Ariston. The father of Plato serves as an example of a determinate human being generating another determinate human being in matter. He does not produce absolute

humanity or being itself; the example helps distinguish natural generation from creation. References: V.13.5. See Ariston, sculptor and painter.

Aristotle. Ficino places Aristotle largely, rather than without qualification, with the ancient theologians. Elsewhere the owl-eye comparison and arguments concerning cognitive activity and bodily restriction enter particular proofs. These uses do not by themselves establish complete agreement between Aristotle and Ficino. References: VI.1.6, VI.2.9, VII.12.1, VIII.10.2. See Divine production and the third essence; Intellectual objects and the owl's eye; Proportion, health, strength and beauty; Kind, generation, and operation's dependence on substance.

Aristoxenus and Dicaearchus. Ficino reports their account of life as a bodily temperament. Aristoxenus also figures in the classification of dependent soul-principles and in the later musical-harmony objection. The rejection concerns harmony as the sufficient producer or identity of soul. References: V.15.8, VI.1.5, VII.10.1. See Temperament and harmony; Constitution, localized point and harmony; Harmony and the strings.

Augustine. Augustine supports direct divine creation, the stable mind directing bodily movement, whole presence and active sensation in different passages. These local appeals have distinct argumentative functions and should not be collapsed into a single quotation. References: V.13.1, V.15.5, VII.5.2, VII.6.3. See Divine production and the third essence; Time, memory and expectation; Whole presence and vital intensity; Sensation as attentive activity.

Avicenna. Ficino recounts an imagined adult created without sensory experience and argues from self-affirmation. His further inference to incorporeality relies on the truth of an uncorrupted natural judgement. The account is explained as printed rather than replaced by another familiar version of the experiment. References: VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.2.14. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

Cavalcanti, Giovanni, and the Regnano gathering. Cavalcanti's speech at his house opens Book VI and requests proofs proper to the human soul. Cristoforo Landino, Bernardo Nuzzi and Giorgio Antonio Vespucci belong to the remembered gathering. The speech's classification is part of the literary conduct of the proof. References: VI.1.1. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

Contemporary philosophical circle. Bernardo Bembo, Antonio Cronico of Venice, Demetrius of Attica, Richard Angellerius of Anghiari, Oliviero Arduino of Florence, Naldo Naldi, Bartolomeo Fonzio, Giovanni Battista Boninsegni and Pier Leone of Spoleto appear in the contemporary discussion framing the classification. The source gives them different roles as host, disputants, Peripatetics, witnesses or interpreter of Platonic and Peripatetic teaching. These are Ficino's descriptions, not independent biographies. References: VI.1.6. See Cavalcanti and the five positions.

Dionysius the Areopagite and Origen. With Augustine, these Christian authorities support Ficino's preference for direct divine production of soul over the angelic production attributed to Plotinus and Proclus. Origen also appears in a separately reserved report about descent; the two contexts require separate treatment. References: V.13.1, V.14.9. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent.

Elemental-soul authorities. The opening classification reports fiery accounts under Democritus, Leucippus and Hipparchus; airy accounts under Anaximenes, Diogenes of Apollonia and Critias; watery under Hippias; earthy under Hesiod and Pronopides; fire-and-air under Boethus and Epicurus; and water-and-earth under Xenophantes. These

associations are the source’s doxography. Xenophantes is not silently identified with Xenophanes of Colophon. References: VI.1.2. See Corporeal soul and elemental doxography.

Empedocles and Timaeus of Locri. They appear with Origen and Plotinus in the reported descent account from which Ficino maintains a reservation. Their presence does not make every consequence of that account Ficino’s own settled teaching. References: V.14.9. See Platonist disagreement and descent.

Heraclitus. A Greek dry-light maxim is interpreted through Ficino’s accompanying Latin gloss. Another appeal, with the Orphic writers, occurs in the visible/invisible-light discussion. The companion does not replace the printed quotation with another historical form of the fragment. References: VI.2.26, VIII.13.1. See Spark, globe and luminous vehicles; Mirror, light, and the soul of the sun.

Hippocrates. Bodily proportions are contrasted with the character of cognitive excellence in the argument against identifying soul with bodily harmony. This is a use within Ficino’s historical physiology, not modern medical advice. References: VII.12.1. See Proportion, health, strength and beauty.

Localized-point authorities. Chrysippus, Archelaus and Heraclides of Pontus are assigned to the account of soul as a luminous qualitative point in heart or brain. The classificatory role is distinct from the later claim of a nonlocal, whole-present soul. References: VI.1.4. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

Nonlocal but materially dependent authorities. Xenophanes of Colophon, Asclepiades, Aristoxenus and Critolaus occur under a principle present throughout the body without spatial confinement, yet still dependent on material constitution or extracted from matter by an external producer. Whole presence alone therefore does not reach the fifth, divine account. References: VI.1.5. See Constitution, localized point and harmony; Divine production and the third essence.

Olympiodorus. Ficino cites Olympiodorus’s treatment of natural desire in connection with the Phaedo and Gorgias and with Pythagorean and Platonic materials. The argument turns on the possibility and proper object of a natural desire. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

Paul. Daily inward renewal enters the account of intellectual life and generation. The reference is explained in its immediate argument; no independently verified biblical verse number is supplied. References: VIII.15.2. See Intellectual generation and daily renewal.

Plato. Plato is both an authority and an illustrative individual in this volume. His name in examples of particular human beings must be distinguished from claims attributed to his works. The cave, the mixing-bowl account and the hierarchy of intelligible forms have different local uses. References: V.5.9, VI.2.14, VI.2.17, VII.1.1, VIII.1.1. See Plato’s cave and gradual education; Four causes and graded dependence; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Plotinus. The volume reports angelic production, lower-soul immortality and descent in passages where Ficino’s own endorsement varies. Other passages use Plotinus on vegetative power, active perception or a tentative analysis of being. Attribution and assent are not interchangeable. References: V.13.1, V.14.8, V.14.9, VI.10.1, VII.6.3, VIII.4.12. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent; Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree; Sensation as attentive activity; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction.

Porphyry. Porphyry is placed against the immortality of irrational life, alongside Proclus, in one reported dispute. His use with Plotinus concerning vegetative power's independence from bodily quantity does not by itself contradict that position: the properties being tested differ. References: V.14.8, VI.10.1. See Platonist disagreement and descent; Seminal power, fish eggs and the tree.

Proclus. Ficino reports Proclus in several settings, including angelic soul-production, the dispute over irrational immortality and a tentative analysis of being. VIII.15.2 explicitly leaves the stronger thesis of essential self-production to Proclus; VIII.15.3 retains formal self-causation rather than efficient self-creation. References: V.13.1, V.14.8, VIII.4.12, VIII.15.2, VIII.15.3. See Divine production and the third essence; Platonist disagreement and descent; Analysis, mangling, and fictive construction; Self-causation: formal cause and efficient cause; First Cause, principal causes and causal dependence.

Pythagoras and the ancient theologians. The sphere argument attributed to Pythagoras is mentioned while being passed over in Book V. Book VI places Zoroaster, Hermes, Orpheus, Aglaophemus, Pythagoras and Plato in the ancient theological line. These two contexts do different argumentative work. References: V.1.4, VI.1.6. See Circularity and spiritual spheres; Divine production and the third essence.

Socrates and named pupils or companions. Socrates and Plato frequently function as concrete individuals in arguments about reception, generation and universals. Xenophon, Alcibiades and Phaedrus in VII.1.1 are remembered persons; Phaedrus there is not a citation of the dialogue. Antisthenes and Xenophon in VIII.1.2 likewise help distinguish individuals from common nature. References: V.7.1, V.8.1, VII.1.1, VIII.1.2. See Reception and the receiver; Receiving images: wax, seals and mirrors; Common nature, participation, and the divine Idea.

Stoic constitution authorities. Zeno of Citium, Cleanthes, Antipater and Posidonius are said to appear to have held the warm-constitution account. Ficino's qualifying language is retained rather than converted into an independently certain historical attribution. References: VI.1.3. See Constitution, localized point and harmony.

Strato and the imagined Epicurean objection. The objection that exclusion of death might allow annihilation is introduced as what Strato or an Epicurean might say. It is an argumentative possibility in the source, not a historically authenticated quotation from Strato. References: V.14.7. See Contraries, death and imperishability; Generation, corruption and annihilation.

Xenocrates, Speusippus and Numenius. With Plotinus, they are reported on the side of immortality for irrational souls; Porphyry, Proclus and others are placed on the other side. Ficino's rational-soul scope prevents this report from being read as his undifferentiated assertion about every form of animal life. References: V.14.8. See Platonist disagreement and descent; Rational soul and irrational life.

Zoroaster. The Greek expression describing soul as immortal and mistress of life supports the local discussion of life and death through Ficino's own gloss. The attribution remains the supplied text's attribution. Zoroaster also appears in the ancient theological sequence. References: V.14.6, VI.1.6. See Zoroaster and the mistress of life; Divine production and the third essence.

Explicitly named works

Avicenna, Natural Philosophy, book VI. The source explicitly names this work in introducing the imagined adult without sensory experience. The subsequent reply and the

comparison with Plato develop Ficino's local presentation, rather than replacing it with another version of the experiment. References: VI.2.12, VI.2.13, VI.2.14. See Avicenna's imagined adult.

Aristotle, "Divine Philosophy," book II. The source's own title and book designation accompany the owl-eye analogy. Modern chapter or Bekker references have not been silently supplied. References: VI.2.9. See Intellectual objects and the owl's eye.

Plato, Gorgias and Phaedo. These titles occur in the Olympiodorus reference supporting the treatment of natural desire. The present index follows Ficino's mediation rather than claiming to verify a verbatim Platonic quotation. References: VIII.2.8. See Natural desire, possible good, and Olympiodorus.

Plato, Republic, book VII. The cave narrative and its subsequent mapping organize gradual intellectual education and the difficulty of return. Ficino's retelling and applications are the immediate object of the articles. References: VI.2.9, VI.2.14, VI.2.15, VI.2.16, VI.2.17. See Plato's cave and gradual education; Intellectual objects and the owl's eye.

Plato, Timaeus. The explicit mixing-bowl reference concerns souls and the causes on which they depend. Elsewhere "Timaeus the Pythagorean" names an argumentative authority and should not automatically be treated as an explicit title citation. References: V.5.9, V.4.1. See Four causes and graded dependence; Prime matter and enduring support.

Sources and editorial notes

Primary source

Marsilio Ficino, *Platonic Theology on the Immortality of Souls*, Volume II, Books V–VIII. Supplied Diotimos bilingual edition, comprising a Latin reading text and an independently worded English translation. The consulted PDF has 461 pages; the accompanying DOCX contains the same 297 paired comparison units. The source's edition statement appears on PDF page 2, reading instructions on page 5, substantive apparatus on pages 381–451, and comparison-unit locator register on pages 453–461.

All passage references in this companion use that edition's comparison units. No location from a modern edition has been silently substituted. Statements about variant readings, authorial corrections or historical-witness agreement are attributed to the supplied apparatus. The companion's lexical and philosophical explanations are based on the supplied text, with uncertainty retained where the source requires it.

Historical witnesses identified by the source edition

The supplied edition identifies the following witnesses and digital records. They describe its editorial foundation; listing them does not mean this companion has performed a second collation of their images.

- **M1482:** Florence 1482 printing. Digital record supplied by the edition: Bayerische Staatsbibliothek record
- **G1559:** Paris 1559 printing. Digital record supplied by the edition: Universidad Complutense de Madrid record

- **P1641:** Paris 1641 *Opera* printing, used by the source edition as a later control. Digital record supplied by the edition: Digitized volume

Attribution and textual caution

Named ancient, late-antique and Christian authors enter this lexicon first through Ficino's use of them. "Plato says," "the Platonists hold," or "Proclus maintains" identifies a claim in the supplied passage. Unless expressly stated otherwise, it is not the result of a separate textual investigation of the named author's complete works. The difference matters especially when Ficino reports a position, prefers another authority, or expressly declines responsibility for a stronger claim.

At **V.10.2–3**, the apparatus retains *mutabiliter* and *relatio perfectionis*. Mutable mediation and the soul's perfecting relation therefore remain visible in the explanations. At **V.13.11**, the supplied Latin has *voluptas*, reflected by "pleasure"; it is not silently replaced with *voluntas*. At **VII.5.4**, the retained negation states that more perfect souls do not live in each severed member, which lacks their varied bodily instruments. At **VII.12.1**, the active force of *componant* matters to the question how the individual powers could compose the soul, rather than merely be composed themselves.

At **VIII.13.1**, the edition explicitly adopts *visibilis* as an emendation against the reported witness reading *invisibilis*. The lexicon explains the adopted reading as this edition's text, not as unanimous manuscript or printed-witness testimony. Awkward wording retained at **VIII.4.10** and **VIII.16.4** is treated with the source's stated caution rather than silently rewritten into a supposedly settled Latin original.

At **V.4.10** (PDF **24–25**), the supplied English takes *hanc* in *Hanc format vis ea quae primum movet* to refer to the efficient power that forms matter; the apparatus explicitly adopts the same construal (PDF **385**). Both *materia* and *vis* are feminine, so morphology alone does not settle the antecedent. This companion records the edition's adopted interpretation; no typographical error or alternative Latin reading has been established.

At **VII.15.1**, *mortalium* means "of mortals": the phrase concerns the souls of mortal human beings, not an assertion that their souls are mortal. The supplied English "every mortal soul" should be read in that possessive sense.

At **VI.12.12** (PDF **212–213**), the stark phrase *non cognitivo, ignorat enim se ipsam*, "not cognitive, for it does not know itself," is retained. The context distinguishes constant essential life from intermittent cognitive acts. It does not authorize inserting "always" into the sentence or denying every possible act of self-reflection. The reported "life generating itself" belongs to VI.12.10's vital progression, while VI.12.14 expressly excludes finite self-generation. VIII.15.2's strong formulation *semper intelligendo atque volendo* remains visible alongside this distinction; it is not silently harmonized into a claim of uninterrupted conscious attention.

At **VI.13.8** (PDF **226–227**), "unity beyond number" interprets the retained *innumeralis*, reported in M1482 and G1559 against P1641's *innumerabilis*. The apparatus explains this through continuity beyond the sequence of counted material replacements. This is an interpretive gloss, not an unambiguous technical equivalent or an assertion that the body contains an actually infinite number of components.

The printed chapter-number error at **VIII.11** is corrected in the supplied edition from the eleventh-argument rubric and the surrounding sequence. The companion follows that numbering; no chapter is missing from its argument map.

Translation and terminology

The purpose of this companion is to make distinctions accessible. Variation among “act,” “activity,” “operation,” “form,” “species,” “reason,” “principle,” “power” and “potency” is assessed in its local context. It is not assumed to be inconsistency simply because one Latin word can have more than one English equivalent or more than one Latin construction can share an English word.

In particular, “first cause,” “first principle” and “principal cause” consistently reflect distinct Latin descriptions in the passages examined. “Primary cause” is not an exact phrase in the supplied Volume II. The extended First Cause article explains how that possible English label can be understood without proposing a correction to the translation.

Format and review statement

The Markdown is the textual master for the DOCX, PDF and EPUB. The PDF is rendered from the DOCX; the EPUB is a reflowable edition with embedded fonts. The release checks compare the canonical body and footnote text across formats, test internal links and article-directory page references, and inspect every rendered PDF page.

The EPUB receives structural, navigation, text-parity and font-coverage checks. No dedicated ebook-reading application or EPUBCheck is available in the production environment, so actual reading-app behaviour is not claimed to have been tested. Page breaks in the reflowable edition depend on the reader’s software and settings.