Plato Symposium Lexicon

A Philological and Philosophical Reading Companion

October 2026

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Introduction

Scope and purpose

This lexicon accompanies Plato's complete *Symposium*, 172a–223d, in the supplied Greek–English *Symposium Edition*, translated and annotated by Diotimos Editions in 2026. It follows the word-centred, philosophical reading format of the *Charmides* lexicon. Its purpose is to make the dialogue's vocabulary available for close reading: not only love and beauty, but the language of giving and receiving, testing and persuading, bodily repair, birth, memory, companionship, praise and embarrassment through which the argument develops.

The dialogue does not begin with a definition of love and then illustrate it. A chain of narrators reports a dinner whose participants make different speeches. Phaedrus makes love an incentive to shame and honour; Pausanias distinguishes kinds of love and the conditions under which a relationship can be admirable; Eryximachus extends the subject into medicine and the cosmos; Aristophanes gives desire a story of bodily division and reunion; Agathon praises the god's character and gifts. Socrates questions Agathon, then reports Diotima's teaching. Alcibiades arrives and praises Socrates instead of Love. The ending leaves an argument about comedy and tragedy only partly remembered. A word's meaning depends on its place within these changing occasions.

Accordingly, the articles distinguish what a speaker says, what an interlocutor grants, what an argument provisionally requires and what the narration shows. Diotima's instruction has an exceptional position: Socrates says that he is persuaded and tries to persuade others (212b). That endorsement matters, but does not turn every

earlier speech into her doctrine or make every detail of the closing drama a transparent confirmation of it.

This is a comprehensive reading lexicon with selected annotated attestations, not a complete morphological concordance. The whole supplied dialogue is the field of discovery. Articles and compact records collect the significant senses, constructions, contrasts and images found through that reading; they do not count every occurrence of an ordinary word or every inflected form. The indexes are routes into these explanations, not substitutes for them. An editorial English title can group a lexical family or name an argumentative problem without pretending to be a Greek technical expression.

How to use the lexicon

The substantial articles follow five functions. **The word** identifies a word, phrase or family and explains its relevant senses. **In the Symposium** follows what it does in the conversation. **Places to Read** supplies source-ordered, annotated Stephanus references. **In this edition** records checked English renderings and important textual qualifications. **See also** links related explanations and contrasts. The shorter explained-vocabulary records preserve useful details without forcing every item into an essay of the same length.

The separate Greek vocabulary register gives each retained lexical record a local definition, printed attestation and passage locator. A dictionary headword supplied for orientation is not necessarily the form printed in the dialogue. Inflected attestations retain the source's accentuation, including contextual grave accents where relevant; a family record is not counted as one independently attested dictionary lemma. Transliteration assists recognition. It is not a claim about a single historical pronunciation.

The English lookup, Greek headword and form lookup, thematic index, argument map and passage index provide complementary ways in. A link between two articles can mark a disagreement, revision or contrast. For example, the relation between the whole and the good is a question Diotima revises, not an identification endorsed by putting the terms beside each other.

Distinctions to keep in view

The lover is not the beloved. The one who desires and the object desired have different positions in the argument. At 204c Diotima diagnoses a confusion between them; Alcibiades later describes a reversal of social erotic roles. Neither move licenses treating the roles as interchangeable everywhere.

Lack includes a relation to time. At 200b–e Socrates considers someone who already has health, strength or wealth and wants to keep it. Desire for future possession can concern what is possessed now. The claim that desire involves lack cannot simply be paraphrased as a denial that one desires to preserve present goods.

Not beautiful does not entail ugly. Diotima rejects the forced alternative at 201e–202b. Her example of correct opinion also distinguishes successful judgement from knowledge that can give an account. The intermediate is not merely a rhetorical compromise between two complete theories.

The whole is not sufficient without the good. Diotima's response to the whole-and-half account includes the willingness to cut off one's own hands or feet if they are bad (205d–206a). The vocabulary of one's own, the whole and the good therefore needs separate attention.

Beauty is both sought and the setting of generation. The argument moves from the desire for beautiful things

to the good's being one's own always, and then to begetting and giving birth in beauty (204d–207a). An article that defines love only as admiration for beauty loses this development. Conversely, reducing all the uses of love to biological reproduction loses the explicitly psychic forms of pregnancy and the later ascent.

Replacement and unchanging being are not the same. Mortal bodies, dispositions and pieces of knowledge are described through loss and renewal (207d–208b). The beautiful itself is subsequently described as neither coming to be nor perishing (210e–211b). The dialogue places these modes of continuity in relation without making them synonymous.

Suddenness has a preparation. The sight at 210e follows a correctly ordered course. The wording does not make the preceding education irrelevant. At 212a the account includes both producing and nurturing true virtue, and its final statement about immortality remains conditional in form.

An image has a speaker and a task. Aristophanes' divided bodies, Diotima's pregnancy and sea, and Alcibiades' silenus figures do not belong to one undifferentiated allegory. Their concrete vocabulary deserves to be read before a general philosophical meaning is assigned to it.

The supplied edition and the evidence

The edition identifies its Greek as John Burnet's text in *Platonis Opera*, volume II, first published in 1901 and revised in 1910. Its editorial note describes the particular copy as an undated later impression printed by John Johnson and issued no earlier than January 1935. Those details are the supplied edition's bibliographical account; this lexicon has not independently collated that impression or its manuscript witnesses.

The supplied Markdown, Word, EPUB and PDF are four presentations of the same edition, not four independent textual witnesses. The continuous Greek, the English translation, Burnet's apparatus as reproduced, the translator's notes, and the modern introduction and glossary remain distinct layers. An apparatus variant is not silently treated as a word in the continuous text. The edition's own narrative of its preparation and review is not presented as work performed for this lexicon.

Stephanus references identify Plato's text across editions. The supplied edition additionally divides the dialogue into seventy-two units corresponding to Burnet's pages. Those units are retained in the passage directory for locating the Greek and facing English. The commentary and lexical explanations here are new; the translation choices discussed are those of the supplied edition. No claim is made to cover later critical editions, the entire history of interpretation or every possible lexical sense outside this dialogue.

Readers of the earlier *Charmides* lexicon will find useful points of comparison in temperance, self-knowledge, desire, beauty and the care of oneself. The present volume stands on its own. It does not replace or silently revise an earlier lexicon.

This volume contains 75 substantial articles, 112 compact explained-vocabulary records, and 545 contextual lexical records in the Greek register. These categories overlap in subject matter: register records support the articles and vocabulary explanations. They are not totals of distinct dictionary words or of occurrences in Plato.

Argument map

A story heard and rehearsed

172a–174a. Apollodorus distinguishes his present listener from Glaucon, reports Aristodemus as his source, and says that he checked some details with Socrates. Philosophical enthusiasm and the limits of testimony begin together.

Read alongside: Bare feet and cloaks; Beauty and ugliness; Care of oneself and neglect; Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Hearing and enchantment; Irony, play, and earnestness; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Speech and account; Wisdom and philosophy.

Invitation and delayed arrival

174a–176a. Socrates brings Aristodemus uninvited, pauses in a neighbouring porch, and eventually reclines beside Agathon. The joke about wisdom flowing through touch anticipates questions about how another person can make one better.

Read alongside: Attention and standing still; Bare feet and cloaks; Beauty and ugliness; Drinking and sobriety; Exchange and gold for bronze; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Laughter and frankness; Narrating and reporting; Outlandishness; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Wisdom and philosophy.

A rule for drinking and praise

176a–178a. The company rejects compulsory drinking, dismisses the pipe-girl and agrees on speeches praising Love. Socrates claims expertise in matters of love; the narrator warns that not everything has been remembered.

Read alongside: Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Gratification and favour; Hearing and enchantment; Knowledge; Love; Medicine and healing; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Order and disorder; Speech and account.

Phaedrus on honour and sacrifice

178a–180b. Love is praised as ancient and a source of admirable action. Shame before the beloved and the examples of Alcestis, Orpheus and Achilles support the speech's comparisons between lovers and beloveds.

Read alongside: Courage and composure; Dying for another and dying after; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Honour and ambition; Love; Lover and beloved; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Shame and being ashamed; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.

Pausanias on kinds and conditions

180c–185c. Two Aphrodites support two Loves. The moral character of an action depends on its manner and purpose; the interpretation of law and custom culminates in the special case of gratification for virtue.

Read alongside: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Beauty and ugliness; Encomium, praise and hymn; Endurance; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Gratification and favour; Law and custom; Love; Lover and beloved; Medicine and healing; Memory and rehearsal; Order and disorder; Shame and being ashamed; Testing, pursuit and flight; The beautiful itself; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service.

Eryximachus on ordering opposites

185c–188e. A hiccup changes the order of speakers. The doctor carries the distinction between loves into bodily processes, musical harmony, seasons and relations between gods and human beings.

Read alongside: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Daimon and mediation; Divination, piety and right; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Gratification and favour; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Justice, agreement and force; Love; Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Order and disorder; Seasons, blending and astronomy; Speech and account; Virtue and becoming better.

Aristophanes on division and reunion

189a–193e. After a bodily cure and a joke about order, Aristophanes imagines three original human kinds cut in two. Desire reaches beyond sexual satisfaction towards a wholeness that lovers cannot fully articulate; restoration remains a conditional hope.

Read alongside: Androgyne and the three kinds; Divination, piety and right; Encomium, praise and hymn; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Hephaestus and fusion; Justice, agreement and force; Laughter and frankness; Law and custom; Love; Lover and beloved; Medicine and healing; Order and disorder; Shame and being ashamed; Speech and account; Tally and matching halves; Testing, pursuit and flight; Wholeness and the half.

Agathon on the god and his gifts

193e–198a. Agathon proposes to describe Love himself before his benefits. Youth, tenderness and beauty lead to claims about justice, temperance, courage and wisdom.

The polished praise ends with acknowledged play and earnestness.

Read alongside: Birth and begetting; Care of oneself and neglect; Courage and composure; Desire and lack; Divination, piety and right; Encomium, praise and hymn; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Hephaestus and fusion; Irony, play, and earnestness; Justice, agreement and force; Law and custom; Love; Making and poetry; Music, harmony and rhythm; Order and disorder; Participation; Resource and Poverty; Shame and being ashamed; Temperance and self-command; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Virtue and becoming better; Wisdom and philosophy.

Socrates questions praise

198a–201c. Socrates contrasts truth with attributing impressive qualities regardless of their truth. Relational questions and the temporal qualifications of desire lead Agathon to concede that Love lacks the beauty and goodness he desires.

Read alongside: Beauty and ugliness; Desire and lack; Encomium, praise and hymn; Ignorance and sufficiency; Love; Love of something; Memory and rehearsal; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; Resource and Poverty; Shame and being ashamed; Speech and account; The good.

Diotima on the intermediate

201d–204c. Socrates reports being corrected by Diotima. Right opinion helps challenge an exhaustive opposition; Love is daimonic, not a god. The story of Resource and Poverty explains the unstable position of the lover of wisdom.

Read alongside: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Bare feet and cloaks; Beauty and ugliness; Between; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Divination, piety and right; Happiness; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Knowledge; Love; Love of something; Lover and beloved; Resource and Poverty; Right opinion; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Wisdom and philosophy.

From beauty to the good always

204c–206a. The questions move from possessing beautiful things to happiness through good things. A making/poetry analogy separates a wide activity from its narrower customary name. The whole and one's own are desirable only under the condition of goodness.

Read alongside: Desire and lack; End and purpose; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Happiness; Love; Love of something; Lover and beloved; Making and poetry; Naming whole and part; Present and future possession; Resource and Poverty; Speech and account; Tally and matching halves; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Testing, pursuit and flight; The good; Wholeness and the half.

The work of love

206b–207a. Diotima identifies love's activity as giving birth in beauty, in body and soul. Beauty is figured as attending and releasing birth; the desire for immortality is connected to the already agreed desire to possess the good always.

Read alongside: Beauty and ugliness; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Desire and lack; Diotima; Dying for another and dying after; End and purpose; Immortality; Love; Testing, pursuit and flight; The good.

Mortal renewal and offspring

207a–209e. Animal care leads to the replacement by which mortal nature continues. Body, dispositions, memory and knowledge enter the account. Honour, poems, laws and educational companionship extend generation beyond bodily children.

Read alongside: Ascent; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Bite, madness, and initiation; Body and soul; Companionship and shared presence; Desire and lack; Diotima; Dying for another and dying after; End and purpose; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Happiness; Honour and ambition; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Justice, agreement and force; Knowledge; Law and custom; Love; Making and poetry; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; Outlandishness; Participation; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; Resource and Poverty; Right opinion; Temperance and self-command; The good; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.

Initiation and the beautiful itself

209e–212c. Diotima conditionally describes a correctly guided course through bodies, souls, practices, laws and kinds of knowledge. A sudden sight follows this preparation. The beautiful itself is distinguished from its participants; genuine virtue and its nurture conclude the account. Socrates declares himself persuaded.

Read alongside: Ascent; Attention and standing still; Beauty and ugliness; Birth and begetting; Bite, madness, and initiation; Body and soul; Care of oneself and neglect; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Diotima; Encomium, praise and hymn; End and purpose; Happiness; Hearing and enchantment;

Honour and ambition; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Knowledge; Law and custom; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Love; Making and poetry; Naming whole and part; Participation; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; Seeing and contemplating; The beautiful itself; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Wholeness and the half; Wisdom and philosophy.

Alcibiades disrupts the order

212c–215a. A noisy arrival interrupts Aristophanes' attempted response. Ribbons and seating contribute to the encounter with Socrates; Alcibiades takes charge of drinking and agrees to praise Socrates under an announced condition of truthfulness.

Read alongside: Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Hearing and enchantment; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Memory and rehearsal; Naming whole and part; Outlandishness; True virtue and images; Wholeness and the half.

Sileni and the power of words

215a–216e. Alcibiades compares Socrates to opened figures and a musical satyr. The language of hearing, possession, shame and flight makes his conflicting responses visible, while an attractive interior is set against an unpromising exterior.

Read alongside: Bite, madness, and initiation; Care of oneself and neglect; Desire and lack; Encomium, praise and hymn; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Hearing and enchantment; Honour and ambition; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues;

Memory and rehearsal; Music, harmony and rhythm; Outlandishness; Shame and being ashamed; Speech and account; Temperance and self-command; Testing, pursuit and flight; True virtue and images; Voluntary slavery and service.

An attempted exchange

216e–219e. Alcibiades reports his efforts to exchange bodily beauty for wisdom. Socrates' gold-for-bronze comparison remains qualified by a challenge to look more carefully. The narrative ends with Alcibiades both humiliated and admiring.

Read alongside: Attention and standing still; Bare feet and cloaks; Bite, madness, and initiation; Care of oneself and neglect; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Daimon and mediation; Drinking and sobriety; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Gratification and favour; Hearing and enchantment; Honour and ambition; Initiation and fulfilment; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lover and beloved; Resource and Poverty; Right opinion; Seeing and contemplating; Shame and being ashamed; Temperance and self-command; Testing, pursuit and flight; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Wisdom and philosophy.

Endurance and opened speeches

219e–222b. Campaign episodes exhibit Socrates' endurance, enjoyment, attention and composure. The concluding image transfers the opening of silenus figures to his speeches and their apparently ordinary craft vocabulary. Alcibiades warns of a reversal of erotic roles.

Read alongside: Attention and standing still; Bare feet and cloaks; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Drinking and sobriety; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Insolence and the mock trial; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lover and beloved; Outlandishness; Resource and Poverty; Seeing and contemplating; Temperance and self-command; Testing, pursuit and flight; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Voluntary slavery and service.

Rivalry and the unfinished night

222c–223d. Socrates offers his own explanation of Alcibiades' purpose. Seating, a new crowd and sleep dissolve the order of praise. Aristodemus remembers only the conclusion of an argument connecting comedy and tragedy; Socrates returns to his ordinary day.

Read alongside: Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Endurance; Irony, play, and earnestness; Justice, agreement and force; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Order and disorder; Temperance and self-command.

Articles

Androgyne and the three kinds

Headwords and labels: ἀνδρόγυνος (androgynos); γένος (genos); ἑταιρίστρια (hetairistria); ἄρρην (arrēn); θῆλυς (thēlys)

The word. Androgynos is the combined male-and-female kind; genos supplies the classification; the rare hetairistria identifies women directed erotically toward women. A modern label should not be imposed as though it were the Greek noun's exact historical equivalent.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes distinguishes a male original, a female original and a mixed original, linked respectively to sun, earth and moon. Present attractions are explained by the origin of the cut parts: mixed-kind halves seek the other sex; halves of the original female turn toward women; halves of the original male pursue males. The speech therefore does not begin with universal androgyny. Nor does it reduce every current relationship to one male and one female seeking reunion.

The explanation is evaluative as well as imaginative. Aristophanes attributes exceptional courage to the male-derived youths and rejects the charge of shamelessness against them; the surrounding jokes complicate a flatly solemn reading. His final formulation nevertheless explicitly includes both men and women in the possibility of happiness. The myth organizes diverse attractions through a shared account of deprivation, while its local hierarchy and assumptions remain those of the represented speaker.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **189d–190b.** Three kinds, bodily form and cosmic parentage.

- **191d–192b.** The origin-story explains different attractions.
- **193b–d.** The speaker extends the promised happiness to men and women.

In this edition. The edition leaves “androgyne” and hetairistriai visible and explains the latter in a note. It also notes the abusive ordinary use of the first word, which Aristophanes explicitly mentions. The explanation remains specific to Aristophanes’ use of the words.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Tally and matching halves; Shame and being ashamed; Law and custom.

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Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common

Headwords and labels: Ἀφροδίτη (Aphroditē); Οὐρανία (Ourania); Πάνδημος (Pandēmos); Οὐράνιος (Ouranios)

The word. Pausanias makes two Aphrodites support two Loves. Heavenly and Common are divine titles that become evaluative classifications within his speech. Their meaning in that argument must not be mistaken for an exhaustive taxonomy of attraction.

In the Symposium. The older Aphrodite is motherless and descends from Heaven; the younger is daughter of Zeus and Dione. Pausanias infers a Love corresponding to each and then judges actions by how they are performed. Common Love is directed toward women no less than boys, toward bodies rather than souls, and toward the most unthinking partners available. Heavenly Love is confined in his account to males and to a purportedly durable educational attachment. The comparison “rather than” is important: the speech does not produce a simple body-only versus soul-only opposition.

The speech's distinction also cuts within male-directed love. Pausanias criticizes seeking immature boys whose later character is uncertain and says the worthy lover seeks an enduring common life. These claims belong to a historical and partisan defense of the relationship, not to an unqualified endorsement by Plato.

Eryximachus attaches his analogous distinction to two Muses, not to another pair of Aphrodites. Diotima later tells a different story: Love is conceived at Aphrodite's birth-feast and therefore becomes her follower, drawn to her beauty. That account does not simply repeat Pausanias' two divine genealogies.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **180c–181e.** The two titles, genealogies and differentiated objects of attraction.
- **184c–185c.** Educational purpose supplies Pausanias' final criterion.
- **187d–e.** Eryximachus transfers the distinction to Muses.
- **203b–c.** Diotima gives a different account of Love's relation to Aphrodite.

In this edition. The edition renders the titles "Heavenly" and "Common", preserving the connection with Heaven in the first. Its contextual note distinguishes the Hesiodic and Homeric genealogies. The quantifiers and comparisons at 181b rule out the false equation of Common Love with heterosexual desire alone.

See also. Gratification and favour; Law and custom; Urania and Polyhymnia; Love; Lover and beloved.

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Ascent

Headwords and labels: ἐπάνειμι (epaneimi); ἐπαναβασμός (epanabasmos); ἡγέομαι (hēgeomai); ἄγω (agō)

The word. Ascent is a convenient modern heading for going upward, being led, and using steps. The text offers a comparison with steps, not an architectural description of a literal ladder. Correctness of approach and guidance repeatedly qualify the movement.

In the Symposium. Diotima's fuller account begins with a young learner attracted to beautiful bodies and, under a good guide, one body in particular. Beautiful speeches are already generated there. The learner then recognizes bodily beauties as kindred, takes beauty in all bodies as one and the same, and relaxes the excessive attachment to one. The object of the devaluation at this point is the single-body fixation, not an explicit command to despise the whole person loved.

Next, beauty in souls is judged more honourable than beauty in the body. A person fine in soul with little bodily bloom can be loved and cared for, with speeches aimed at improving the young. This leads to the beauty in ways of life and laws, and then in kinds of knowledge. The learner is released from servile confinement to one body, person or pursuit. Turning towards the great sea of beauty, he generates many speeches and thoughts in abundant philosophy until a single knowledge becomes visible.

At 210e the apprehension is sudden, but follows ordered and correct education. It is not offered as a substitute for the earlier work. The summary at 211b–c describes steps from one to two bodies, all bodies, ways of life, studies, and finally the study of beauty itself. The abbreviated recap does not explicitly repeat every stage, including souls and laws, in the fuller description. Both versions belong in the account.

The final aim does not erase generation: true virtue is born and nurtured there. Socrates' assent to the teaching is explicit, his completed attainment of the vision is not. The lasting place of particular persons within the highest life remains a legitimate interpretive question; the lexicon can map the movement without pretending the text resolves it in one sentence.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **209e–210a.** The distinction of preliminary and final instruction, and conditional correct guidance.
- **210a–210b.** One body, kinship of bodily beauties, and relaxation of exclusive vehemence.
- **210b–210d.** Souls, practices, laws and knowledge broaden and elevate the field.
- **210d–211b.** Philosophical fertility and sudden apprehension of invariant beauty.
- **211b–211d.** The shorter stepwise recap and the life worth living.
- **212a–212b.** True virtue, nurture and Socrates' endorsement.

In this edition. The English keeps kinds of knowledge in the fuller account and studies in the recap, reflecting distinct Greek nouns. The printed steps form is supported by T and the papyrus; the apparatus offers a closely related spelling. Neither changes the fact that the comparison says as if.

See also. Initiation and fulfilment; Seeing and contemplating; The beautiful itself; The great sea of beauty.

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Attention and standing still

Headwords and labels: προσέχω (prosechō); ἵστημι (histēmi); ζητέω (zēteō)

The word. The idiom “apply the mind” means attend. Standing is ordinarily a bodily posture; in these episodes its duration makes an otherwise invisible activity of inquiry visible to companions and onlookers.

In the Symposium. On the road to Agathon’s, Socrates turns his attention somehow to himself and falls behind. The qualifying “somehow” belongs to the report: Aristodemus does not name the subject of thought. Socrates then stands in a neighbouring porch and refuses the slave’s summons. Aristodemus recognises this as a habit and asks the others not to disturb him. When Socrates arrives, Agathon jokingly assumes that he has found the wise thing he was seeking; the narrator has not independently said that he solved a particular problem.

Alcibiades’ campaign story supplies a longer parallel. Socrates starts thinking at dawn, stands looking into something, and continues seeking when it does not progress. The spectators watch him through evening and night, until he leaves after sunrise and prayer. The text specifies sustained inquiry and endurance, but not a vision, a trance, the object of his investigation, or its eventual solution.

The same attention idiom links these silent episodes with listening. Diotima demands concentrated attention at the threshold of her final account; Alcibiades requests it before disclosing his private encounters. Attention may be inwardly directed, given to a teacher, or demanded of an audience. The dialogue does not reduce it to social withdrawal.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174d–175d.** Inward attention, habitual standing, and Agathon's conjecture about wisdom.
- **210e.** Diotima explicitly requests the closest possible attention.
- **217b.** Alcibiades asks the guests to attend and Socrates to refute falsehood.
- **220c–d.** An unanswered question holds Socrates standing from dawn until the next sunrise.

In this edition. "Paying attention somehow to himself" preserves the uncertainty in the opening report. "He stood looking into it" and "stood seeking" preserve active verbs in the campaign account. Nothing in the supplied Greek identifies the activity as a medical or mystical condition.

See also. Endurance; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Hearing and enchantment; Outlandishness.

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Bare feet and cloaks

Headwords and labels: ἀνυπόδητος (anypodētos); βλαῦται (blautai); ἱμάτιον (himation); τρίβων (tribōn)

The word. Anypodētos means without footwear. Himation is an ordinary cloak; tribōn specifies a worn one. The concrete vocabulary makes poverty, ceremony, attempted intimacy, and bodily endurance legible without turning every garment into an allegorical object.

In the Symposium. Aristodemus' habitual bare feet initially distinguish the narrator who will accompany Socrates. Socrates himself appears unusually bathed and shod: he says he has made himself beautiful for the beautiful Agathon. A small deviation from habit introduces the dinner's play over beauty.

The barefoot Love of Diotima's birth-story brings a suggestive resemblance to this Socratic world, but the dialogue does not simply announce that Socrates and Love are the same being. Love's lack of shoes belongs to a larger portrait of poverty and resourceful pursuit. Socrates' barefoot walk on ice, by contrast, is Alcibiades' evidence for extraordinary endurance. Other soldiers protect their feet with felt and sheepskins; they interpret his ease as contempt for them, an interpretation the narrator reports rather than proves.

At 219b the two cloaks must remain distinct. Alcibiades wraps his own himation around Socrates, then lies under Socrates' worn tribōn and embraces him. The physical closeness sharpens the point of the following denial: nothing sexual, by Alcibiades' own account, results. The cloak therefore does not itself settle whether a shared bed or association includes sexual activity. In the winter campaign the same ordinary category of garment becomes a measure of what Socrates does not need to add.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **173b–174a.** Aristodemus is barefoot; Socrates' slippers are unusual and festive.
- **203d.** Love's barefoot poverty supplies a possible dramatic resemblance.
- **219b–d.** Alcibiades' cloak and Socrates' worn cloak frame an unsuccessful seduction.
- **220a–b.** Ordinary clothing and bare feet contrast with the soldiers' elaborate protection.

In this edition. The translation renders blautai "slippers," himation "cloak," and tribōn "worn cloak." These are three distinct lexical choices. The source notes compare Socrates' customary clothing elsewhere, but the present entry does not require those external passages to identify the garments here.

See also. Endurance; Love; Irony, play, and earnestness; Exchange and gold for bronze.

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Beauty and ugliness

Headwords and labels: καλός (kalos); κάλλος (kallos); αἰσχρός (aischros)

The word. The adjective spans visible beauty and admirable character or action. Its contrary likewise spans ugliness and shamefulness. The noun names beauty, while the neuter adjective can mean what is beautiful, a beautiful thing, or the beautiful considered as the inquiry's object.

In the Symposium. The dialogue exploits this range rather than choosing between an aesthetic and an ethical subject. Socrates prepares to go beautiful to beautiful Agathon; Pausanias asks when conduct is beautiful or shameful; Agathon presents a beautiful god in a beautiful speech. The questioning distinguishes the speech's attractiveness from the truth of its portrait. If Love desires beauty because he lacks it, his own beauty is no longer secured by the praise.

Diotima's correction is logical before it is metaphysical. Not beautiful is not automatically ugly, just as a person with right opinion need be neither knowledgeable nor ignorant. This intermediate possibility makes room for a desirous Love who is not the finished object he desires. The next development gives beauty a productive role: it is the fitting setting in which pregnancy can come to birth. At 206e, of beauty is corrected to of generation in beauty. The grammatical change is part of the argument.

On the ascent, beauty is recognized across bodies, souls, practices, laws and kinds of knowledge. The lover's evaluation changes as well: a slight bodily bloom can

suffice where the soul is fine, and bodily beauty comes to seem small in comparison. The final object excludes beauty that is qualified by respect, time, comparison, place or observer. A common word holds the stages together, but the movement does not make every beautiful object equivalent in value.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174a.** The opening play on Socrates' and Agathon's attractiveness.
- **180e–181a.** The beauty of an action depends on how it is done.
- **198b–201c.** Beautiful speech and the disavowal of beauty in Love are distinguished.
- **201e–202b.** Absence of beauty is not simply ugliness.
- **206b–206e.** Beauty makes productive birth possible.
- **210a–212a.** The ascent extends, ranks and ultimately transforms the object of beauty.

In this edition. This edition deliberately renders the adjective beautiful across bodily, ethical and intellectual uses. Readers should hear fine or noble where conduct requires it, without replacing the repeated word. The adverb is normally well, and is not a separate ethical predicate.

See also. The beautiful itself; Birth and begetting; Between; The good; Ascent.

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Beauty at birth

Headwords and labels: Καλλονή (Kallonē); Μοῖρα (Moira); Εἰλείθυια (Eileithyia); ἁρμόττω (harmottō); ὠδίς (ōdis)

The word. The personified name Beauty is distinct from the ordinary adjective and noun. Moira and Eileithyia name functions surrounding birth, while fittingness explains why beauty is a suitable setting for a divine process in a mortal creature.

In the Symposium. Diotima calls pregnancy and generation immortal in the mortal animal and therefore divine. What is ugly is unfitting for the divine; the beautiful is fitting. Beauty then receives the offices of the powers attending childbirth. These names do explanatory work: approaching beauty releases the pregnant subject into gladness and production, whereas ugliness brings contraction, distress and retention.

The small bodily verbs make the passage more than an abstract formula. The subject draws near, opens or melts in delight, coils up, turns away and shrinks back. Excitement about beauty is explained by release from pain. The object carried precedes the encounter, and the encounter enables its birth. Reading Beauty as the mother or as the newborn would scramble the account's roles.

This description applies to the broad claim about bodily and psychic pregnancy. It is not a clinical proposition that physical childbirth depends upon aesthetic attractiveness, nor a historical account of a particular ritual. The personification clarifies the philosophical analogy while the subsequent discussion supplies its intellectual and ethical applications.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206c–206e.** Divine generation, fittingness, personified assistance and the pregnant subject's reactions.
- **209b–209c.** The psychic counterpart finds a beautiful body and soul in whose company production occurs.

In this edition. The translation capitalizes Beauty here for the personification and keeps Moira and Eileithyia as names. At 206d it follows the printed everything divine; the apparatus also records every god. The local argument should be based on the printed wording.

See also. Birth and begetting; Beauty and ugliness; Approach and recoil.

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Between

Headwords and labels: μεταξύ (metaxy); μέσος (mesos)

The word. Between can locate something spatially, rank it between alternatives, or describe its mediating function. These uses are related but not identical. The dialogue does not name a single separate entity called the Intermediate.

In the Symposium. Diotima's first intervention denies that not beautiful entails ugly. Her analogy is right opinion: it is not knowledge because it cannot give an account, yet not ignorance because it reaches what is. This is a positive case showing why the binary choice is insufficient. Its lesson transfers to Love without making Love itself an opinion or identifying every intermediate with the same cognitive condition.

The next contrast concerns mortality and divinity. Denying that Love is a god does not make him an ordinary mortal. As a daimon he stands between god and mortal and actively carries messages, sacrifices and returns between them. The intermediate is here not just a lesser degree of divine perfection: it has a connective task. Love's parentage then explains the unstable combination of need and resource, dying and revival.

Finally, wisdom and ignorance are not treated as exhausting the possible attitudes towards learning. A

person already wise lacks no wisdom to seek; the unreflectively ignorant person imagines himself sufficient. The philosopher occupies the middle through wanting what he does not completely possess. This description does not establish that all non-knowers philosophize. The confident refusal to recognize a lack is precisely what distinguishes the ignorant extreme. Reading the three arguments together makes intermediate a tool for understanding pursuit, not a consolation prize for remaining indefinitely indecisive.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201e–202b.** A counterexample in cognition blocks the false beauty/ugliness dilemma.
- **202d–203a.** The daimonic intermediates between gods and mortals.
- **203e–204b.** Love and philosophy occupy the middle between wisdom and ignorance.

In this edition. The English varies between between and in the middle according to the Greek expressions. The apparatus at 202d11 has an alternative that assigns a reply to Socrates, but the printed text and translation assign it to Diotima.

See also. Right opinion; Daimon and mediation; Wisdom and philosophy; Ignorance and sufficiency.

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Birth and begetting

Headwords and labels: τίκτω (tiktō); τόκος (tokos); γεννάω (gennaō); γέννησις (gennēsis); κυέω (kyeō); κύημα (kyēma)

The word. The vocabulary distinguishes pregnancy, begetting, birth and the conceived offspring. Diotima applies these words across bodily and psychic life. The distinctions are worth retaining even where English

normally assigns giving birth and begetting to different parents.

In the Symposium. After defining love through lasting possession of good, Diotima asks what kind of action receives the usual name love. Her answer is birth in the beautiful, in body and soul alike. Human beings are already pregnant; beauty allows what is carried to be released. Thus the beloved does not simply inject wisdom into an empty recipient. A productive subject finds a fitting condition and companion for birth.

The scene of contraction and release explains the prepositional distinction. Love is not simply of the beautiful as Socrates supposes, but of generation and birth in the beautiful. Beauty is neither discarded nor simply the offspring. It is the enabling setting, with the divine fittingness symbolized by childbirth goddesses. Generation is sought because it provides mortal beings with the possibility of continuing beyond their present condition. Diotima calls it everlasting and immortal for a mortal, a qualification that the later replacement argument explains.

Psychic pregnancy produces intelligence and the rest of virtue. In company with a fine soul, a pregnant person generates speeches about excellence and education; the partners rear their offspring together. Poetry and legislation supply public examples of enduring children. The hierarchy is not a strict division between people who possess only bodies and people who possess only souls: some are pregnant in soul still more than in body.

Birth persists on the ascent. Beautiful speeches arise at the first bodily attachment, many speeches and thoughts arise before the great sea of beauty, and true virtue is born and nurtured at the summit. Contemplation is therefore not presented as a sterile alternative to production. At the same time, the work leaves interpretive questions about

the relation between beauty as condition and beauty as final object; the vocabulary should not flatten those changes into a single mechanism.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196e–197a.** Agathon had connected love with poetic and animal production.
- **206b–207a.** Pregnancy, fitting beauty, release, and the link to immortality.
- **208e–209e.** Bodily and psychic offspring, education, poems and laws.
- **210a–210d.** Productive speech continues through the ascent.
- **212a.** True virtue must be born and nurtured.

In this edition. The edition consistently distinguishes give birth, beget and be pregnant. At 209a3 Burnet prints the papyrus reading meaning to give birth, not the manuscripts' repeated pregnancy verb. At 209b1 the main text's unwed is a conjecture, while divine is the manuscript and papyrus reading; neither should silently replace the other.

See also. Beauty at birth; Body and soul; Immortality; True virtue and images.

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Bite, madness, and initiation

Headwords and labels: δάκνω (daknō); ἔχις (echis); μανία (mania); βακχεία (bakcheia); βέβηλος (bebēlos)

The word. The bite vocabulary gives philosophical speech the force of a wound. Mania and bakcheia recast the listeners as a community of affected, almost initiated people. Bebēlos supplies the contrasting outsider, who is not qualified to hear what follows.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades pauses before telling the most intimate part of his story. Wine may make him truthful, but he also needs an audience capable of understanding behaviour produced by philosophical pain. A person bitten by a viper, he says, can explain the suffering only to others who have experienced it. He himself has been bitten by something more painful, in the heart, soul, or whatever the proper name of that vulnerable place is. The hesitation about naming matters: the passage offers a vivid account of experience, not an anatomical identification.

Philosophical speeches grip a gifted young soul more fiercely than a viper and can make it do or say anything. This describes the intensity of Alcibiades' experience and his plea for sympathetic understanding; it does not endorse everything an overwhelmed listener might do. The very disclosure records serious misunderstanding of Socrates.

He addresses the assembled men as fellow participants in philosophical madness and Bacchic frenzy, then orders slaves and the profane to place gates on their ears. The imagery recalls Diotima's initiatory progression, but it serves a different immediate purpose: not a graded account of the beautiful, but permission to tell a compromising personal story. His claim that all the named guests share the condition is part of his rhetoric. It should not be converted into independent proof that each follows the same philosophical teaching.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **209e–210a.** Diotima's language of initiation supplies a significant earlier comparison.
- **215c–216a.** Musical possession and disturbance prepare the painful experience of hearing.
- **217e–218c.** The viper-bite analogy and exclusion of profane hearers introduce the private disclosure.

In this edition. The edition translates philosophos in the phrase as “wisdom-loving,” retaining its verbal force. Its note connects the command about ears with the language of Orphic exclusions; that contextual parallel is not a claim that Alcibiades is literally performing an initiation rite.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Initiation and fulfilment; Care of oneself and neglect; Drinking and sobriety.

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Body and soul

Headwords and labels: σῶμα (sōma); ψυχή (psychē)

The word. Body and soul organize differences within human life without making every contrast a claim about two independently demonstrated substances. The repeated in respect of specifies the dimension in which pregnancy, alteration or beauty is considered.

In the Symposium. All human beings are described as pregnant in body and soul. When Diotima differentiates those whose bodily pregnancy draws them towards women from those who carry psychic offspring, she immediately explains that some are pregnant in their souls still more than in their bodies. The comparison preserves overlapping capacities rather than defining two exclusive biological groups. Psychic children are intelligence and other virtue, embodied in teaching, poems, inventions and laws.

Both body and soul undergo change. Hair, flesh, bones and blood renew; so do dispositions, opinions, desires, pleasures, pains and fears. Even knowledge requires replacement through memory. This passage cannot be cited as a proof here that the individual soul is an immutable immortal entity. The wider argument concerns

how mortal beings participate in immortality through renewal and offspring.

The ascent ranks beauty of soul above beauty of body. This does not make care for an individual disappear at the first transition: Diotima explicitly says the lover loves, cares for and produces improving speeches for a person fine in soul even with little bodily bloom. Later the scope broadens beyond one body, person or practice. At the summit, the beautiful itself is not a face, hands or bodily constituent. The sequence must be followed without treating the initial bodily stage as already the final object or assuming the dialogue explicitly resolves every question about the continuing value of particular love.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206b–206e.** The paired dimensions of pregnancy and birth.
- **207d–208b.** Body, soul and knowledge share the mortal pattern of change.
- **208e–209c.** Bodily and psychic generation are distinguished comparatively.
- **210a–210d.** The ascent ranks psychic beauty and expands the field of concern.
- **211a–211e.** The final beautiful is not a bodily shape or mixture.

In this edition. The translation's both in body and in soul expresses the paired construction. At 209a still more than is indispensable: replacing it with only would create a distinction the printed text does not make.

See also. Birth and begetting; Renewal and identity; Ascent; The beautiful itself.

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Care of oneself and neglect

Headwords and labels: ἀμελέω (ameleō); ἐπιμελής (epimelēs); μέλει (melei); δραπετεύω (drapeteuō)

The word. Care and neglect concern the direction of attention and action. The impersonal "it matters" construction asks what someone treats as significant; the runaway-slave verb exposes a failure to live by an acknowledged judgement.

In the Symposium. Apollodorus makes Socrates' daily conduct his concern, but the frame lets another voice challenge his contempt for nearly everyone else. Philosophical devotion is therefore present alongside a question about how its advocate treats his companions. Agathon's culminating praise calls Love heedful of good and heedless of bad; its compact polarity is an idealising flourish, not an analysis of the difficult choices that follow.

Alcibiades provides that difficulty. Socrates forces him to agree that he still lacks much and neglects himself while conducting public affairs. The contrast is between governing others and failing to examine or improve the person who governs. Alcibiades cannot answer Socrates' demand, yet public honour draws him away from it. He therefore stops his ears and flees, calling himself a runaway. His shame records an outstanding commitment rather than an achieved conversion.

Socrates' alleged indifference to beauty, wealth, and prestige is different. Alcibiades depicts these attractions as unable to control him. To say that beauty "matters nothing" in that passage need not mean that Socrates cannot recognise beauty, engage in love, or care for a person. The very portrait makes his erotic association and his independence from the proposed payment coexist. Diotima's ascent similarly includes loving and caring for someone fine in soul even with little bodily bloom.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172c–173e.** Apollodorus' concern for Socrates and his companions' criticism of his manner.
- **197d.** Agathon's Love is heedful of good and heedless of bad.
- **210b–c.** Care for a fine soul continues when bodily bloom is slight.
- **216a–e.** Neglect of self, public ambition, flight, and Socratic independence are juxtaposed.

In this edition. The phrase at 216a explicitly sets "myself" against "the affairs of the Athenians." It is not a generic recommendation to withdraw permanently from politics. "Play the runaway slave" renders the force of drapeteuō, distinguishing it from the adjacent ordinary verb "flee."

See also. Temperance and self-command; Hearing and enchantment; Honour and ambition; Shame and being ashamed; Beauty and ugliness.

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Comedy and tragedy

Headwords and labels: κωμῳδία (kōmōidia); τραγῳδία (tragōidia); τραγῳδοποιός (tragōidopoios); κωμῳδοποιός (kōmōidopoios)

The word. The compound names of poets are literally names of makers. The important qualification at the close is "by craft": the report concerns what knowledgeable making entails, not merely which popular poets happen to compose both genres.

In the Symposium. Agathon's victory in tragedy provides the dinner's occasion, while Aristophanes brings comedy into its company. The two kinds of poet remain present after the other guests leave or fall asleep. Socrates converses with them as they drink from a common bowl,

making them agree that knowledge of making comedy and tragedy belongs to the same person, and that the tragic poet by craft is also a comic poet.

The report immediately limits what can be inferred. Aristodemus did not hear the start and was nodding off; he remembers the main point, not the remainder of the argument. Agathon and Aristophanes are likewise drowsy and not following closely. Their agreement is reported as compelled by Socrates, but the reader does not receive the premises by which the conclusion was reached. A complete theory of the unity of the genres cannot honestly be reconstructed from this sentence alone.

The dramatic arrangement is nevertheless forceful. A work filled with laughter, elevated praise, painful confession, and myth ends with the relation between the comic and tragic crafts. Socrates then "puts them to sleep" and leaves for an ordinary day. The phrase makes a playful ending to his intellectual persistence, without claiming that he deliberately employed a sleeping technique or gave the poets a sedative.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **173a.** Agathon's tragic victory establishes the occasion.
- **177e.** Socrates associates Aristophanes' occupation with Dionysus and Aphrodite.
- **222c–d.** Alcibiades' speech is called a satyr-and-silenus play.
- **223c–d.** The two poets hear the final claim, fall asleep, and are left behind by Socrates.

In this edition. Burnet prints an added "also" in the second formulation, supplied from Vindobonensis 21; the principal manuscripts and papyrus lack it. The edition translates the printed supplement. Its note points to a

comparison in the Republic, but that is not itself the missing argument of this dialogue.

See also. Making and poetry; Irony, play, and earnestness; Memory and rehearsal; Laughter and frankness.

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Companionship and shared presence

Headwords and labels: συνουσία (synousia); σύνειμι (syneimi); ἑταῖρος (hetairos); ὁμιλέω (homileō); ὁμιλία (homilia)

The word. Synousia names shared presence or association. The verb syneimi is correspondingly broad. Hetairos identifies a companion without by itself making that companionship erotic or philosophical.

In the Symposium. The dinner is first named a gathering before its speeches are narrated. The word gives the event a social form that can be filled differently: drinking to excess, enjoying one another's talk, instruction, rivalry, or the disorder of revellers. Eryximachus' proposal to be together through speeches makes a choice about the quality of companionship, not simply about entertainment.

Apollodorus calls his wealthy interlocutors companions even while attacking their pursuits, and Glaucon describes Socrates as Apollodorus' companion. Such terms therefore do not guarantee agreement. Alcibiades' association with Socrates is still more conflicted: he resents being refused but cannot endure losing the company of the man he admires. His solitary encounters and shared exercise in 217b–c do not themselves imply sex; the narrative carefully makes their failure to produce the expected erotic result the point.

At 203a Diotima says that gods do not mingle with human beings; their company and conversation are conducted through daimonic mediation, in waking and sleep. Association here bridges a distinction rather than abolishing it. At 212a being "with" the beautiful itself extends the vocabulary of company into contemplation. The earlier educational pair at 209c jointly rears offspring of the soul. These uses connect love with sustained presence and activity rather than mere possession. The ending returns to literal companionship when Aristodemus follows Socrates to the Lyceum.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173d.** Gathering, philosophical association, and ordinary social companions frame the story.
- **176e.** The company chooses association through speeches.
- **203a.** Diotima makes company and conversation between gods and mortals depend on daimonic mediation.
- **209c; 212a.** Shared nurture and contemplative presence widen the vocabulary of being together.
- **217b–219e.** Alcibiades seeks private company and cannot readily relinquish it.
- **221b; 223d.** A companion in battle and a habitual follower close the dramatic arc.

In this edition. The edition uses "gathering," "being with," and "companion" according to the construction. At 221b Burnet prints "companion" from Aelius Aristides' quotation; the manuscripts and papyrus have "the other." That variant does not alter the stated fact that Socrates and Laches retreat together.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Care of oneself and neglect; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Following and guidance.

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Courage and composure

Headwords and labels: ἀνδρεία (andreia); ἔμφρων (emphrōn); ἀμύνω (amynō); Λάχης (Lachēs)

The word. Andreia names courage, not merely physical power. Emphrōn adds the specifically cognitive feature of keeping one's wits. The narrative asks how steadfastness, perception, and defence combine when there is real danger.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus presents love as a force that keeps a fighter from abandoning his beloved or throwing away his arms. Agathon offers a different route: Love masters Ares, the outstandingly courageous god, because Ares loves Aphrodite; hence Love must be more courageous still. The superlative conclusion depends on treating erotic mastery as superiority in the mastered person's virtue. Socrates later continues to praise Love's courage, but after the account has radically changed what Love is.

Alcibiades' examples make courage visible without this verbal competition. At Potidaea Socrates refuses to leave the wounded Alcibiades and saves both him and his equipment. Alcibiades says Socrates deserved the prize, yet Socrates supported awarding it to Alcibiades. The episode separates courageous action from insistence on receiving public honour.

At Delium, courage appears in an orderly retreat rather than an advance. Socrates surveys friends and enemies calmly and makes his readiness to resist obvious. Alcibiades explains that such fighters are left alone while those who flee headlong are pursued. His own better view of Socrates is explicitly linked to being less afraid because he is mounted. The observer's condition matters to the

evidence. Aristophanes' comic image of swaggering and sidelong eyes is reused to describe an alert gait in battle: the same outward manner can be ridiculous in one setting and protective in another.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178d–179b.** Phaedrus connects erotic attachment with refusing dishonour and desertion.
- **196c–d.** Agathon's Love masters Ares and is therefore pronounced most courageous.
- **212b.** Socrates endorses praise of Love's power and courage after Diotima's teaching.
- **219d.** Courage is joined to temperance and endurance in Alcibiades' admiration.
- **220d–221c.** Rescue, relinquished honours, and composed retreat give the term concrete tests.

In this edition. "Having his wits about him" renders emphrōn, rather than supplying another occurrence of the noun "courage." "The prize for valour" names the military award, not the virtue itself. The historical dates and later testimony in the notes provide context, but the lexicon's claims about the conduct follow Alcibiades' speech.

See also. Endurance; Temperance and self-command; Honour and ambition; Shame and being ashamed; Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

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Daimon and mediation

Headwords and labels: δαίμων (daimōn); δαιμόνιος (daimonios); ἑρμηνεύω (hermēneuō); διαπορθμεύω (diaporthmeuō)

The word. Daimon is preserved as a transliterated term because demon imports misleading later associations.

Diotima gives the word a specific intermediate function. The related adjective can also describe a remarkable person without proving that person literally belongs to a separate divine species.

In the Symposium. The argument begins with a denial. The gods possess beautiful and good things and are happy, while Love lacks the things he desires. Love therefore is not a god on the agreed premises. Socrates' next proposed alternative, mortal, is also rejected. Diotima classifies him as a great daimon and explains the power of the daimonic generally. It interprets and ferries human petitions and sacrifices to gods, and divine orders and recompenses to humans.

This communication is reciprocal, although the kinds of thing carried differ. The daimonic fills the middle so that the whole is bound to itself. Divination, priestly work, rites, charms, prophecy and sorcery pass through it. The statement that a god does not mingle with a human being belongs to this account of mediated contact. It must not be silently rewritten as no relation at all. Nor is every daimon Love: Diotima says there are many and varied daimons, of whom he is one.

The designation of the religiously knowledgeable person as daimonic, contrasted with a menial craftsman, reveals the account's hierarchy of expertise. Later Alcibiades calls Socrates daimonic and marvellous. That language invites comparison with Love's exceptional nature, but does not identify Socrates with the whole daimonic class. The dialogue also does not narrate Socrates receiving his familiar personal sign; that topic should not be supplied merely because related vocabulary appears.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **188b–188d.** Eryximachus had already treated ritual and divination as divine-human relations.

- **202c–203a.** Love is denied godhood and placed in the daimonic class; the mediating power is explained.
- **203a–203b.** Many daimons exist, and Love's distinctive parentage is requested.
- **219b–219c.** Alcibiades uses the adjective of Socrates.
- **223a.** Socrates uses the adjective in addressing Alcibiades.

In this edition. The English uses daimon and daimonic consistently. The printed she said at 202d11 attributes the intermediate answer to Diotima; an apparatus variant would give the wording to Socrates. The distinction is a reported textual choice, not a fresh collation of witnesses.

See also. Between; Resource and Poverty; Immortality; Power and capacity.

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Desire and lack

Headwords and labels: ἐπιθυμέω (epithymeō); ἐπιθυμία (epithymia); ἐνδεής (endeēs); ἔνδεια (endeia)

The word. Desire is broader than sexual appetite and need not name a lower part of the soul. Lack takes its sense from its object and time. The argument asks not simply whether a person owns a thing now but what, exactly, that person wants.

In the Symposium. Agathon initially answers that the lover probably does not have what he desires. Socrates asks him to replace probability with necessity, and then tests the claim against apparent counterexamples. A healthy person can indeed want health, and a wealthy person wealth, but Socrates redescribes such wishes as wanting present possessions to remain in the future. The wanted future continuity is not yet available. The

conclusion concerns this specified object of desire; it is not an injunction that one must be wholly unhealthy before caring about health.

Socrates joins that conclusion to Agathon's admission that love concerns beautiful things, obtaining Love's lack of beauty, and then, because good things are beautiful, his lack of good things. Diotima prevents a further invalid leap: lack of beauty or goodness does not compel ugliness or badness. The possible intermediate must remain open.

The genealogy gives deficiency a durable dramatic form, but Diotima's account of ignorance adds a qualification of a different kind. Someone who does not think himself lacking does not desire what he does not think he needs. Objective deficiency alone therefore does not explain the philosopher's pursuit; an awareness of incompleteness is also relevant. Later the universal desire for good includes ambition, parenting, poetry and philosophy. These variations should not be reduced to one bodily craving.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195d.** Agathon himself uses lacking of Love's need for a Homer to describe his tenderness.
- **200a–201c.** Probability, necessity, the future-possession test, and the application to beauty and good.
- **201e–202b.** Diotima blocks the inference from not beautiful to ugly.
- **203c–204b.** Permanent lack and recognition of need characterize philosophical love.
- **205d–207a.** Desire extends to good, generation and immortality.
- **216a.** Alcibiades reports being made to admit his continuing deficiency.

In this edition. The supplied translation keeps lack for the adjective with a form of be, and be in need for the

distinct need-verb. That consistency allows Agathon's earlier use and Alcibiades' later admission to resonate without making them identical arguments.

See also. Present and future possession; Between; Ignorance and sufficiency; Love.

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Diotima

Headwords and labels: Διοτίμα (Diotima); ξένη (xenē); διδάσκω (didaskō)

The word. Diotima is a named speaker inside Socrates' reported speech, itself transmitted through the dialogue's narrators. Stranger marks her non-Athenian origin, not ignorance of Socrates. The teaching verbs give her an active intellectual role.

In the Symposium. Socrates introduces her as wise in matters of love and many other things, and credits her with a ten-year postponement of the plague after Athenian sacrifice. That is what he says about her; the dialogue does not supply independent verification. He then reproduces her instruction by starting from the concessions he and Agathon have reached. He portrays his younger self as making assertions like Agathon's and undergoing the same refutation. Her authority is thus enacted through questioning, distinctions and explanations, not only through the opening religious credential.

Her tone varies. She rebukes a false dilemma with a ritual-sounding Hush, laughs at the assertion that everyone calls Love a god, says the intermediate philosophers should be obvious even to a child, and answers with the assurance of the perfect sophists. These dramatic touches belong alongside the sustained reasoning; calling her a transparent mouthpiece would

remove the very pedagogical relationship the speech displays.

Before the final ascent she distinguishes the matters into which Socrates might perhaps be initiated from the perfect and contemplative rites that he may not be able to follow. She promises to omit no effort, while placing conditions on the learner. At the end Socrates says Diotima said these things and he is persuaded. This is a strong commitment to her account, but it leaves distinct her teaching, his assent, and the question whether he personally attained the culminating vision.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201d–202b.** Introduction, plague claim, reported refutation and intermediate example.
- **203a–204b.** Genealogy and the philosopher's position are taught.
- **206b–207c.** Socrates repeatedly seeks clarification and acknowledges needing teachers.
- **208b–208c.** The narrator's comparison with professional teachers.
- **209e–210a.** Her qualified invitation to initiation and ascent.
- **211d–212b.** Explicit attribution of the final teaching and Socrates' assent.

In this edition. The edition notes that independent attestation of the historical Diotima is lacking. This article therefore treats her securely as a character and reported teacher, without deciding whether Plato invented her. At 201d the printed adjective is Mantinean; prophetic appears as a variant, not the main text.

See also. Wisdom and philosophy; Initiation and fulfilment; Truth and persuasion.

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Divination, piety and right

Headwords and labels: μαντική (mantikē); εὐσέβεια (eusebeia); ἀσέβεια (asebeia); θέμις (themis)

The word. Divination, piety and themis concern the regulation and intelligibility of human dealings with gods. Their religious force should not be erased by treating them as interchangeable with civic law or generic good behavior.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus makes sacrifice and divination part of a partnership between gods and humans, governed by the right care of Love. Impiety arises when the disorderly rather than the orderly Love is honored, both toward parents, living or dead, and toward gods. Divination therefore watches and heals those who love and produces friendship through its knowledge.

Aristophanes places piety inside his myth's conditional hope. The gods can divide people further if they remain disorderly; reunion requires reconciliation. He does not say that complete restoration has already occurred for everyone who forms a couple. Agathon's modest proviso "if it is right" belongs to the decorum of praise before his extraordinary claim about Love's happiness.

Diotima later preserves the connecting work but changes its structure. Love is not simply one of the fully happy gods: the daimonic carries petitions and sacrifices upward and divine commands and returns downward. Divination is part of this mediation. Reading the later passage beside Eryximachus shows continuity in the question of communication without collapsing their different accounts.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **188b–d.** Divination guards, heals and creates friendship.

- **193a–d.** Piety conditions the hope of restored wholeness.
- **195a.** Agathon qualifies an exceptional divine superlative.
- **202d–203a.** Diotima explains mediation between human and divine.

In this edition. Two readings matter at 188c–d. Burnet prints “those who are in love”, not the alternative “loves”, as what is watched and healed. He also prints “piety” from Stobaeus where the principal manuscripts reported in the apparatus have “impiety”. The article follows the continuous supplied text, without claiming fresh witness collation.

See also. Order and disorder; Wholeness and the half; Daimon and mediation; Medicine and healing.

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Drinking and sobriety

Headwords and labels: πίνω (pinō); μέθη (methē); μεθύω (methyō); νήφω (nēphō)

The word. Drinking, drunkenness, and sobriety are distinct lexical and practical categories. The setting is a drinking party, but it initially regulates consumption so that conversation need not be subordinated to intoxication.

In the Symposium. After the previous night’s excess, Pausanias asks for an easy way of drinking and Eryximachus supports moderation from his medical experience. The resulting agreement is not abstinence: each may drink for pleasure, as much as he wants, without compulsion. Socrates is expressly excepted from the comparison of strong and weak drinkers because he can manage either course.

Alcibiades reverses the arrangement. He enters already drunk, demands that the company drink with him, elects himself ruler of the drinking, and substitutes a wine-cooler for a cup. Even he concedes that making Socrates drink cannot make him drunk. His own intoxication becomes a reason both for frank disclosure and for excusing disorderly recollection, but not for surrendering every claim to truth. Socrates later teasingly calls him sober because his speech seems calculated to separate Socrates and Agathon. The observation about a concealed purpose need not mean that Alcibiades is physiologically sober.

The second arrival of revellers abolishes order altogether and compels excessive drinking. Socrates remains awake and conversing after the others tire, then conducts his ordinary day. Alcibiades' praise presents this as freedom in both scarcity and abundance: Socrates can enjoy a feast without becoming its captive. It is not a general assurance that large quantities of alcohol are harmless.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **176a–e.** The party agrees to voluntary drinking for pleasure; Socrates can manage either course.
- **212d–214c.** Alcibiades imposes drinking and recognises his own disadvantage against sober speakers.
- **217e.** Wine is invoked as a proverbial aid to truth-telling.
- **220a.** Alcibiades connects Socrates' enjoyment with his resistance to intoxication.
- **222c–223d.** Calculated speech, uncontrolled drinking, and Socrates' continuing wakefulness conclude the contrast.

In this edition. The translation differentiates "drink," "drunk," and "sober." At 213e Burnet's punctuation makes Agathon an addressee, not the person ordered to fetch the

vessel. The claim that no one has seen Socrates drunk belongs to Alcibiades' encomium; the closing narrative supplies a particular illustration.

See also. Temperance and self-command; Endurance; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl; Laughter and frankness.

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Dying for another and dying after

Headwords and labels: ὑπεραποθνῄσκω (hyperapothnēiskō); ἐπαποθνῄσκω (epapothnēiskō); ἔνθεος (entheos)

The word. The difference between the two death-compounds matters to the argument. Alcestis dies in her husband's place, while Achilles chooses a death that follows the already dead Patroclus. Divine inspiration describes the lover's motive-power, not the beloved's rank.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus claims that love makes extraordinary courage possible and that lovers alone willingly die for another, expressly including women. Alcestis supplies the first example. Orpheus supplies the negative contrast: his attempt to enter Hades alive is treated as a refusal of the necessary daring. Achilles then receives greater honor because, in this speaker's account, he is the beloved who freely responds to his lover. Phaedrus corrects Aeschylus' assignment of the roles and makes Achilles' youth and beauty evidence for his own assignment.

The comparative is easily reversed. The lover is called more divine because inspired; precisely for that reason the gods find the beloved's responsive devotion more admirable and reward it more. This is Phaedrus' explanation of unequal rewards, not an uncomplicated claim that divine inspiration and merit are the same.

Diotima first broadens the pattern beyond heroic humans: even weak animals fight the strongest and face death to rear their offspring (207a–b), a phenomenon not adequately explained by deliberate human calculation. She then returns to Alcestis and Achilles while explaining the desire for immortal reputation. The same deaths now bear another explanatory emphasis. Reading the passages together shows the dialogue reinterpreting its own examples, rather than establishing a single unqualified lesson that death proves love or that self-sacrifice guarantees immortality.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178e–179b.** The imagined army and love-inspired courage.
- **179b–d.** Alcestis and Orpheus provide opposed examples.
- **179e–180b.** Achilles dies for and after Patroclus; beloved and lover receive different honors.
- **207a–c.** Animal defense and nurture extend the phenomenon beyond heroic deliberation.
- **208c–e.** Diotima reinterprets heroic sacrifice through immortal memory.

In this edition. The English carefully preserves “die for” and “die after”. At 180b “a lover is a more divine thing than a darling” explains why the beloved’s reciprocation is more admired; it does not identify Achilles as the lover.

See also. Alcestis; Orpheus and the phantom; Achilles and Patroclus; Honour and ambition; Courage and composure; Immortality.

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Encomium, praise and hymn

Headwords and labels: ἐγκώμιον (enkōmion); ἔπαινος (epainos); ὕμνος (hymnos); ἐγκωμιάζω (enkōmiazō); ἐπαινέω (epaineō); ὑμνέω (hymneō)

The word. An encomium is an organized act of praise, not merely any speech about its subject. Epainos has the wider range of praise and approval, while hymnos points particularly toward divine celebration. These overlap in the guests' undertaking without being interchangeable in every occurrence.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus proposes that each guest speak as beautifully as he can in praise of Love. The immediate comparison includes hymns, prose praises of Heracles, and the comic disproportion of a book praising salt. The proposed speeches will make good an alleged neglect of the god, but the standard of success has not yet been examined.

Pausanias first demands discrimination: which Love deserves praise? Agathon then distinguishes the recipient's own character from the benefits he confers. Socrates accepts this ordering of questions, but not Agathon's answers. After the applause he contrasts selecting beautiful truths with attaching the greatest possible attributes whether or not they are true. His apparent withdrawal at 199a is therefore from a way of praising, not from every commendation of Love. At 212b–c he again says he praises Love's power and courage and leaves the genre-name to Phaedrus.

Alcibiades transfers praise from Love to Socrates. He promises truth and permission to correct falsehood, yet also speaks as a disappointed admirer who wants revenge. The result is neither an impartial report nor mere false flattery: the dialogue makes the truth-claim, emotional investment and formal encomium coexist. The

unfinished plan to praise Agathon at 222e–223a finally returns the word to the seating-game of the party.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177a–e.** The proposal joins hymn, encomium and praise.
- **180c–181a.** Pausanias asks which Love is praiseworthy.
- **194e–195a.** Agathon separates character from gifts.
- **198d–199c.** Socrates challenges praise without truth but retains the order of inquiry.
- **212b–c.** He resumes praise and leaves its label open.
- **214e–215a.** Alcibiades promises truthful praise through likenesses.
- **222e–223a.** The proposed encomium of Agathon is interrupted.

In this edition. The edition distinguishes “encomium”, “praise” and “hymn”, rather than flattening them into one English expression. Its description of Agathon’s Gorgianic sound-patterning is editorial interpretation; Socrates himself explicitly names Gorgias at 198c. The claimed neglect of Love at 177a–c belongs to Phaedrus’ complaint, not an independently verified history of Greek poetry.

See also. Speech and account; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Irony, play, and earnestness; Truth and persuasion; Appearing.

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End and purpose

Headwords and labels: τέλος (telos); ἕνεκα (heneka); τελευτάω (teleutaō)

The word. End can mean a temporal finishing point, explanatory stopping point or purpose. The for-the-sake-of

construction identifies an aim. These related uses need not be folded into a technical causal system not stated in the dialogue.

In the Symposium. Diotima says happiness ends the answer because asking why someone wants to be happy no longer calls for a further good beyond it. The inquiry nevertheless continues: one must understand how this universal wish is pursued and what work is conventionally called love. An answer's explanatory end is therefore not the end of the dialogue's investigation.

Later the perfect rites are said to be that for whose sake the preliminary matters exist, if rightly pursued. The beautiful itself is then presented as the object for whose sake all earlier toils occurred. The ascent has an orientation, not merely a chronological series of preferences. Its final study concerns that beautiful alone.

The relationship among happiness, lasting good, generation, immortality and beauty is the substance of Diotima's account. Their successive appearances should not be forced into one undifferentiated goal-word, nor treated as unrelated topics whenever the vocabulary changes. The text offers an ordered development whose connections must be argued from the stated transitions.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **204e–205a.** Happiness supplies an explanatory stopping point.
- **206a–207a.** The account proceeds from the aim of lasting good to productive activity and immortality.
- **209e–210a.** Preliminary matters are oriented towards consummating rites.
- **210e–211d.** Earlier toils and successive steps are for the sake of the final beautiful.

In this edition. The English end preserves the repetition of the noun, while for the sake of translates the purpose construction. At 211c Burnet's printed infinitive is a conjectural correction listed in the apparatus; the lexicon follows the supplied continuous text.

See also. Happiness; Ascent; Initiation and fulfilment; The good.

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Endurance

Headwords and labels: καρτερία (karteria); καρτερέω (kartereō); καρτέρησις (karterēsis); καρτερός (karteros)

The word. The karter- family connects steadfastness, strength, and holding out. Its uses are not all praise: one may persist in a misguided project, or be unable to resist a beneficial challenge.

In the Symposium. Pausanias includes holding out under bad treatment among the tests that discriminate durable attachment from surrender to money or influence. Alcibiades reverses the emphasis: if he really listened, he could not hold out against Socrates' challenge to his way of life. He therefore avoids the encounter rather than refuting it. His own attempt to win Socrates then proceeds "by main force," but this resolution does not secure its object.

When he finally names Socrates' endurance, the contrast has been prepared by these failures. Socrates is not mastered by Alcibiades' bodily beauty; on campaign he outlasts the others when food is unavailable, walks barefoot across severe frost, and continues an inquiry all day and night. The endurance of privation and the endurance of investigation become neighbouring demonstrations rather than separate kinds of man.

The story is not a programme of suffering for its own sake. Alcibiades also says Socrates can enjoy feasts when they occur. What remains consistent is his ability to respond without losing command of himself. Nor should endurance simply be equated with courage or knowledge: the account names these together and gives related examples, but does not formally identify their definitions.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **184a–b.** Holding out belongs to Pausanias' social tests of attachment.
- **216a; 217c.** Alcibiades cannot withstand Socrates' speech and persists forcefully in his own project.
- **219d–220b.** Endurance is named, then illustrated by scarcity and winter.
- **220c–d.** A Homeric "strong man" introduces sustained inquiry.
- **223c–d.** Wakefulness and the ordinary next day complete the portrayal.

In this edition. The edition deliberately distinguishes "endurance," "holding out," "feats of endurance," and "strong." At 219d the continuous text has karteria; the apparatus records enkrateia in the papyrus. This is a meaningful variant, not permission to quote both as if Burnet had printed both.

See also. Attention and standing still; Temperance and self-command; Courage and composure; Bare feet and cloaks.

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Exchange and gold for bronze

Headwords and labels: ἀλλάσσω (allassō); πλεονεκτέω (pleonekteō); διαμείβομαι (diameibomai); χρύσεος (chryseos)

The word. The exchange verbs bring two valuations into relation. Pleonektein makes the asymmetry explicit: one party would secure more than an equal return. The point is not merely that wisdom is precious, but that the proposed method of obtaining it rests on an untested estimate of both parties.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades thinks that Socrates' serious attraction to his youth is a fortunate opportunity. By granting favours he expects to hear everything Socrates knows. He presents this as an ethical choice: becoming as good as possible comes first, and intelligent observers should approve his compliance with such a helper. Socrates does not simply accept the offered division of roles.

His reply begins with conditions. If Alcibiades' account is true and Socrates possesses a power that can make him better, then Alcibiades sees a beauty vastly beyond his own fine form. He would be acquiring the truth of beautiful things for an opinion or appearance of them, gold for bronze. The Homeric allusion illustrates unequal worth, not a monetary tariff for instruction. Socrates then tells him to examine more carefully whether he is overlooking Socrates' being nothing at all. The supposed treasure and its accessibility remain questions, not conceded facts.

The exchange thus recalls Agathon's earlier wish that wisdom could flow by bodily contact from the fuller person into the emptier. In both scenes close physical association is imagined as a convenient way to acquire a good. The failed night does not show that learning from another is impossible; it shows that Alcibiades' proposed transaction does not secure what he wants. Socrates offers instead future deliberation about what will be best for both.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175c–e.** Agathon's contact-and-flow image supplies an earlier model of easy acquisition.
- **216e–217a.** Alcibiades sees inner treasure and imagines bodily favour will purchase access.
- **218c–219b.** The proposal receives a conditional reply and the gold-for-bronze comparison.
- **219b–e.** Physical proximity fails to capture Socrates or make the bargain succeed.

In this edition. The source note identifies the quotation as the exchange of Glaucus' golden armour for Diomedes' bronze armour in the Iliad. The English retains "if" and the warning "lest you fail to notice that I am nothing." Omitting either would turn Socrates' testing reply into a straightforward assertion that he possesses transferable wisdom.

See also. Touch and transmitted wisdom; Irony, play, and earnestness; Beauty and ugliness; Gratification and favour; Temperance and self-command.

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Friendship, partnership and affinity

Headwords and labels: φιλία (philia); κοινωνία (koinōnia); οἰκειότης (oikeiotēs); ἀλλοτριότης (allotriotēs)

The word. The dialogue distinguishes erotic love from friendship without separating their activities absolutely. Koinōnia emphasizes what is shared; oikeiotēs emphasizes the experienced belonging of one person or thing with another. These words should not all be translated as a single emotion.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus says Alcestis' erotic love makes her exceed the husband's parents in friendship. Pausanias gives friendship civic and educational roles: it

can resist tyranny, and it can become lasting only when based on stable character rather than money or power. Eryximachus extends friendship to bodily opposites and to the relationship between gods and humans. This breadth is a deliberate expansion of interpersonal language, not proof that bodies and seasons literally form friendships in the same way as people.

Aristophanes brings friendship, affinity and love together in the shock of meeting one's own half. Agathon gives the banquet itself a similar explanation: Love empties people of estrangement and fills them with affinity. Diotima qualifies the authority of belonging by insisting that one's own is not desired merely because it is one's own; the good supplies the criterion. Her account of educational generation then presents a durable partnership in the rearing of shared spiritual offspring. The relationship is productive and cooperative, not simply the possession of an attractive individual.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179b–c.** Love intensifies Alcestis' friendship beyond biological kinship.
- **182b–c.** Friendships and partnerships oppose tyranny.
- **184a–b.** Money and power do not ground noble, lasting friendship.
- **186d–188d.** Friendship is extended to bodily opposites and divine-human relations.
- **192b–c.** Affinity accompanies the encounter with one's half.
- **197d.** Love makes a gathering by overcoming estrangement.
- **205e–206a.** The good qualifies the claims of one's own.

- **209c.** Shared generation and nurture produce a firmer partnership.

In this edition. The English differentiates “friendship”, “partnership” and “affinity”. At 179c “through her love” gives the cause of Alcestis’ surpassing affection; it should not be omitted or treated as another translation of philia. At 209c the comparison depends on the shared, supposedly more enduring offspring, not on a bare claim that all nonphysical relationships are superior.

See also. Honour and ambition; Gratification and favour; Wholeness and the half; The good; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture.

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Gratification and favour

Headwords and labels: χαρίζομαι (charizomai); ἀχαριστέω (acharisteō); χάρις (charis)

The word. The family concerns favor and gratification, with a specifically erotic application when a beloved responds to a lover. It would be misleading either to sexualize every occurrence or to neutralize the courtship argument into unspecified kindness.

In the Symposium. Pausanias’ question is not whether every favor is pleasant but when granting favors is beautiful rather than shameful. He supplies paired criteria: the recipient must be decent and the act performed well. His culminating defense joins the lover’s willingness to serve with the beloved’s desire for virtue. Money and political advantage fail this test, and failure to collect an expected payment does not redeem the motive. Conversely, a sincere educational aim remains beautiful even when the supposed educator proves bad.

Eryximachus broadens the field. Medicine must gratify healthy tendencies and refuse unhealthy ones; music

must sustain orderly people and cultivate order in others. His handling of Common Love is not a simple command to eliminate pleasure: its pleasurable effect may be admitted carefully without implanting licentiousness. The repeated verb exposes his analogy with Pausanias while also changing what its objects are.

Alcibiades later speaks almost as though enacting Pausanias' defense, offering Socrates gratification because he wants to become better. Socrates' response questions the assumed transaction. An educational justification does not by itself establish that wisdom is present, transferable, or obtainable by exchanging one kind of beauty for another.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177c.** An ordinary favor to Phaedrus.
- **182a–185b.** Conditions and motivations of erotic gratification.
- **186b–d.** Therapeutic gratification and refusal.
- **187d–188c.** Musical and religious extensions of the verb.
- **218c–219b.** Alcibiades offers gratification for improvement; Socrates questions the exchange.

In this edition. The edition deliberately keeps "gratify" across ordinary, erotic and medical uses. Its consistency makes the analogy visible but requires attention to the changing object. The return at 218c–d is especially pointed because Alcibiades explicitly subordinates the offer to becoming as good as possible.

See also. Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Law and custom.

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Happiness

Headwords and labels: εὐδαίμων (eudaimōn); εὐδαιμονέω (eudaimoneō); εὐδαιμονία (eudaimonia)

The word. The happy person has or enjoys good things. The local account is about how life goes for a person, not only an agreeable feeling. The related noun and verb carry the same aim into the discussion of universal desire and offspring.

In the Symposium. At 202c Diotima uses the agreed happiness and beauty of the gods to deny that deficient Love is a god. Possession matters: the gods are not merely longing for the things that would make them happy. When she later asks what the lover gains by possessing beautiful things, Socrates stalls. Substitution of good makes the answer available: happiness.

Diotima says the answer has reached an end because one need no longer ask for what further purpose the person wants to be happy. This is a stopping point in the explanatory chain of desire, not an empirical demonstration that every desired object really brings happiness. The subsequent distinction between the common aspiration and its different social names makes happiness an aim of all, including people who are not ordinarily called lovers.

The prospect is then tested by time and mortality. If goods are wanted always, temporary acquisition leaves something unfulfilled. Parents hope to procure immortality, memory and happiness through children, but the clause as they think marks their expectation as theirs. Philosophical ascent offers a more exacting picture of the life worth living, culminating in the production and nurture of true virtue. The later account should therefore be read as development of the happiness question, not

abandoned because its vocabulary shifts towards beauty and vision.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **202c–202d.** Gods' happiness contrasts with Love's lack.
- **204e–205b.** Happiness terminates the question of further ends and is shared as an aim by all.
- **205d.** The general desire for good and happiness is called love.
- **208e.** Parents' expected happiness is explicitly qualified.
- **211d–212a.** The worth-living life is described through vision and true virtue.

In this edition. The English happy does not preserve the word's historical daimon element, but the argument does not derive happiness from possessing a daimon. That tempting wordplay must not substitute for the explicit explanation through goods.

See also. The good; End and purpose; Immortality; True virtue and images.

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Hearing and enchantment

Headwords and labels: ἀκούω (akouō); κηλέω (kēleō); κατέχω (katechō); ψιλός (psilos)

The word. Akouein ranges from physically hearing a voice to listening to a report or discourse. Kēlein and katechesthai describe a more intense response: being charmed or held by what one hears. "Bare" names the absence of instrumental accompaniment, not absence of power or meaning.

In the Symposium. The entire dialogue is offered to hearers who depend on other hearers. Glaucon can listen

on the road; Apollodorus takes extraordinary pleasure in philosophical talk whether speaking or listening. At the dinner the dismissal of the pipe-girl privileges speeches, but Alcibiades' arrival brings musical sound back into the room. His subsequent comparison makes this opposition unstable: Socrates' speech can accomplish what instrumental music does.

Marsyas' tunes retain their force whether a good performer or a poor pipe-girl plays them. Alcibiades says Socratic words likewise work even when another, quite poor, speaker repeats them. Woman, man, and youth are all included among possible hearers. The comparison therefore locates the effect beyond the prestige or brilliance of the immediate performer. It also supplies a pertinent image for a dialogue transmitted through several narrators, though Alcibiades does not explicitly offer a theory of Plato's narrative.

The effect is not simple pleasure. Alcibiades' heart leaps, tears flow, and his own enslaved condition becomes intolerable to him. He could admire Pericles' oratory without this disturbance. Stopping his ears like someone escaping the Sirens, he refuses the hearing that would expose his failure to care for himself. At 218b he reverses the gesture and excludes the supposedly uninitiated by telling them to gate their ears. Listening is thus an ethical exposure as well as a sensory event.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172b–173c.** The report passes through hearers; philosophical hearing gives Apollodorus pleasure.
- **176e; 212c–e.** The pipe-girl is dismissed and musical sound later returns.
- **215b–216b.** Socratic speech charms across performers and kinds of hearer, provoking self-recognition and resistance.

- **218a–b.** The initiated may hear what the profane are told to exclude.

In this edition. “Bare words” translates a phrase in which “bare” modifies the speeches; it does not translate “prose” or assert that Socrates speaks without rhetorical effects. “Possessed” preserves the religious analogy but remains Alcibiades’ description of the experience.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Care of oneself and neglect; Bite, madness, and initiation; Marsyas and Olympus; Sirens.

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Hephaestus and fusion

Headwords and labels:Ἥφαιστος (Hēphaistos); συντήκω (syntēkō); συμφυσάω (symphysaō)

The word. Hephaestus supplies an artisan’s answer to an otherwise unspoken erotic wish. The verbs describe fusion and smithing: the second should not be silently assimilated to the earlier desire of the halves to grow together.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes asks the company to imagine Hephaestus addressing two lovers who cannot explain what they want beyond continued company. The smith proposes to unite them permanently, alive and in Hades, so they become one instead of two. Aristophanes says none would refuse. This is a hypothetical device for making desire articulate, not an event that occurs within the prehistoric story, and not the narrator’s report of an actual divine offer.

The craft-image anticipates the conclusion that love seeks the whole. It also makes vivid a tension within that desire: perfect union would remove the distinction between the partners who now love one another. The dialogue does not explicitly settle this tension. Agathon’s later list makes

Hephaestus himself a learner from Love, extending the erotic explanation from human union to the crafts of the gods.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **191a.** The halves initially want to grow together.
- **192c–193a.** Hephaestus' hypothetical offer clarifies the unspoken wish.
- **197a–b.** Crafts, including bronze-working, are taught by Love.

In this edition. The printed form at 192e is symphysēsai, which the edition renders "forge … together"; later hands offer the different verb "make grow together". The dictionary headword here is supplied for the printed inflection. The difference is small in appearance but material to the smith's image.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Tally and matching halves; Making and poetry.

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Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre

Headwords and labels: Ἡράκλειτος (Hērakleitos); τόξον (toxon); διαφέρω (diapherō)

The word. The name identifies an interlocutor quoted inside another speaker's exposition, not an independent text of Heraclitus reproduced in full. The bow and lyre supply the image, while the contrast between differing and agreeing does the argumentative work.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus thinks music supports his medical model. He says Heraclitus perhaps wants to say the same, but does not say it well. The quoted one is described as differing from itself yet agreeing with itself, like the harmony of a bow and lyre. Eryximachus rejects a harmony constituted by elements still at variance. He

reconstructs the thought as a sequence: previously differing high and low pitches are subsequently made to agree by the musical craft.

Both the charitable “perhaps” and the temporal reconstruction matter. The doctor is proposing an interpretation that brings another thinker under his own theory. A lexicon should not label this corrected account simply “Heraclitus’ doctrine”. Nor should it treat the bow-image as a detailed musical mechanism already analyzed in the dialogue: the speech moves quickly to pitches and rhythm.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **186d–e.** The preceding medical reconciliation of opposites.
- **187a–c.** The quotation, objection and temporal reconstruction.
- **187c–e.** Music’s ethical application introduces another distinction.

In this edition. The note identifies the conventional fragment reference and observes that another ancient quotation gives fuller and different wording. This entry relies on the wording in the supplied dialogue, not a fresh reconstruction of Heraclitus’ original book. “Harmony” and “agreement” must retain the speaker who defines their relation.

See also. Music, harmony and rhythm; Medicine and healing; Opposites and unlike objects.

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Honour and ambition

Headwords and labels: τιμή (timē); φιλοτιμία (philotimia); κλέος (kleos); τιμάω (timaō); φιλοτιμέομαι (philotimeomai)

The word. Timē is the honor paid; philotimia is the desire for it. Kleos names the renown that can remain after death. The three are linked but not identical: ambition seeks recognition, and a publicly honored person need not be genuinely good.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus' account initially gives ambition a constructive place. In the beloved's presence, the lover wants to perform beautiful actions and avoids disgrace. His imagined company of lovers competes in honor while fighting side by side. Divine honors then recognize Alcestis and Achilles, but not in equal measure: the gods admire a beloved's reciprocation more because it does not enjoy the lover's prior divine inspiration.

Diotima relocates heroic ambition within the desire for immortality. She names Alcestis and Achilles again, asking whether they would have died without expecting an immortal memory of their virtue. Her claim concerns a motivation she attributes to the heroes; it does not erase their acts of care or establish a general equation of goodness with fame. The discussion proceeds to poetic and legislative offspring, and ultimately to true virtue, so renown is not the dialogue's final criterion.

Alcibiades supplies the sharpest practical complication. He recognizes the claims Socrates makes upon him but is overcome, when away from Socrates, by the honor of the many. Socrates is said to treat the crowd's prized distinctions as worthless. Recognition can thus move someone toward noble action, preserve an achievement, or divert him from acknowledged self-improvement. Its source and object matter.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178c–179b.** Love-directed shame and ambition organize Phaedrus' moral psychology.

- **179d–180b.** Different divine honors for lover and beloved.
- **208c–209e.** Ambition is interpreted as desire for immortal memory and fame.
- **212b.** Socrates himself says Love should be honored.
- **216b–e.** Popular honor competes with Socratic self-examination.

In this edition. The edition keeps “honour” and “love of honour”, and renders kleos as “fame”. At 208c the assertion that risks are taken even more for fame than for children is a comparison, not a denial of parental devotion. At 180b the greater honor given to Achilles does not mean he is the more divinely possessed party.

See also. Shame and being ashamed; Virtue and becoming better; Alcestis; Achilles and Patroclus; Immortality.

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Ignorance and sufficiency

Headwords and labels: ἀμαθία (amathia); ἱκανός (hikanos); οἴομαι (oiomai)

The word. Ignorance here has an attitudinal dimension: not possessing wisdom is accompanied by a mistaken sense of having enough. Sufficient is what the person seems to himself to be, not the narrator’s judgement that he is sufficient.

In the Symposium. Diotima’s account differentiates ignorance from the philosopher’s incomplete understanding. The philosopher cannot already possess the wisdom sought, yet recognizes or experiences a lack that makes the search possible. The ignorant person described at 204a combines an actual deficiency with the belief that nothing important is missing. To say that no ignorant person can learn would make the subsequent

education impossible; the local contrast is with this closed, self-satisfied condition.

Socrates' reported performance as Diotima's pupil exhibits another response to not knowing. When he cannot explain animal reproductive behaviour, he admits that he needs teachers and asks for the cause. Agathon's admission that he knew nothing of his speech is more uncomfortable: he first says he cannot contradict Socrates, who redirects him to the truth rather than personal defeat. In both episodes acknowledged inadequacy makes continued inquiry possible. The text therefore gives more than a static sorting of people into three castes.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201b–201c.** Agathon's admission and Socrates' distinction between a person and the truth.
- **202a.** Right opinion is not classified as ignorance.
- **204a–204b.** Mistaken sufficiency explains the failure to desire wisdom.
- **207b–207c.** Socrates admits need of instruction and requests an explanation.

In this edition. The English sufficient preserves the evaluative force of the Greek adjective. Not wise, not knowing and ignorant should not be mechanically interchanged where the argument gives them different functions.

See also. Between; Wisdom and philosophy; Diotima; Desire and lack.

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Immortality

Headwords and labels: ἀθανασία (athanasia); ἀθάνατος (athanatos); θνητός (thnētos)

The word. Deathlessness can describe the divine, but Diotima also uses its vocabulary for the forms of continuation available to mortals. The same word need not imply the same mechanism each time. Comparative language about more immortal offspring makes the need for context especially clear.

In the Symposium. The inference begins conditionally: if love is for the good to be one's own always, immortality must be desired along with the good. Generation answers that demand so far as a mortal can attain it. The subsequent account does not describe a mortal organism remaining numerically and materially unchanged forever. Even within one lifetime the apparently same creature loses and replaces bodily and psychic contents. It is preserved by leaving another new thing like what departs. Diotima expressly contrasts this with the divine's being entirely the same always.

Parenting, animal self-sacrifice and concern for offspring are explained through this drive. Human ambition also seeks immortal fame and remembered virtue; Diotima revisits Alcestis and Achilles and adds Codrus. This reinterpretation is not identical to Phaedrus' original explanation through devotion to the beloved. Poetry, legislation and intellectual education generate children described as more beautiful and more immortal than bodily offspring, with a firmer partnership among their begetters.

The final speech returns to immortality after true virtue has been born and nurtured. Its phrasing is emphatic but qualified: if any other human being can become immortal, so can this person. It neither provides a mechanism of personal survival nor simply repeats the replacement account word for word. Readers may ask how the ending transforms the earlier aspiration; a lexicon should preserve that question rather than announcing a

completed proof of individual immortality or reducing every occurrence to mere fame.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **202d–203e.** Love is intermediate between mortal and immortal.
- **206e–207a.** The conditional inference from lasting good to immortality.
- **207a–208b.** Animals, renewal and the distinct divine way of persistence.
- **208c–209e.** Fame, memory, poetry and laws as human continuities.
- **212a.** True virtue, nurture, divine favour and the qualified closing immortality.

In this edition. At 208b the printed text says but the immortal in another way. The conjecture that would produce otherwise impossible is only an apparatus alternative. This article does not replace the actual text with that easier construction. At 208e as they think also qualifies parents' expected success.

See also. Always; Renewal and identity; Birth and begetting; True virtue and images.

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Initiation and fulfilment

Headwords and labels: μυέω (myeō); τέλεος (teleos); ἐποπτικός (epoptikos)

The word. The passage adopts the vocabulary of initiation and advanced beholding to distinguish levels of learning. The adjective complete also has ordinary uses, as in accomplished teachers. A shared word alone does not make every occurrence a ritual reference.

In the Symposium. Diotima tells Socrates that he might perhaps be initiated into the erotic matters already

described. The perfect rites and those of beholding, for whose sake the earlier matters exist when properly pursued, may exceed his capacity. She will nevertheless tell the account and spare no eagerness; he must attempt to follow if able. The modal and conditional expressions are substantive, not polite fillers. They keep instruction, ability to understand and achieved vision apart.

The supplied notes connect this diction with the mysteries and their higher grade of beholding. That contextual comparison explains the force of guided revelation, without making the philosophical speech a literal transcript of secret ritual. The higher teaching itself consists of a sequence of attractions, recognitions and intellectual enlargements ending in beauty itself.

Alcibiades later portrays the company as sharers in philosophical madness and commands the profane to close their ears. The convergence gives ritual colouring to philosophical experience in both speeches, but Alcibiades' comic secrecy and painful attachment are not simply the completion of Diotima's ascent. He has been profoundly affected by philosophical words while still resisting what they require of his life.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **208c.** The ordinary excellence of the perfect sophists anticipates but does not equal ritual completion.
- **209e–210a.** Conditional initiation and the advanced rites of beholding.
- **210e–212a.** The promised culminating apprehension and its ethical production.
- **218a–218b.** Alcibiades' philosophical frenzy and exclusion of the profane.

In this edition. The translation expands the substantivized adjectives into perfect rites and those of

the beholding. The Greek phrase should not be represented as containing an explicit noun for rites at this point. The article follows the edition's stated ritual comparison without making an independent historical claim about initiation procedures.

See also. Ascent; Seeing and contemplating; Diotima; End and purpose.

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Insolence and the mock trial

Headwords and labels: ὑβριστής (hybristēs); ὑβρίζω (hybrizō); ὑπερηφανία (hyperēphania); δικαστής (dikastēs)

The word. The insolence vocabulary concerns an affront that diminishes another's standing. It need not be translated as a single psychological trait called pride. The relevant question is what act the accuser regards as outrageous, and why.

In the Symposium. Agathon first calls Socrates insolent after an apparently flattering speech. Socrates' comparison of uncertain personal wisdom with the young poet's public brilliance carries a sting; Agathon proposes a later trial of their wisdom with Dionysus judging. Alcibiades later stages another trial before the drinking companions. His accusation is not that Socrates forced himself on him, but almost the reverse: Socrates refused the bodily beauty in which Alcibiades took exceptional pride.

The sequence of verbs at 219c joins prevailing, despising, laughing at, and treating with insolence. Alcibiades feels dishonoured precisely while he comes to admire Socrates' temperance, courage, intelligence, and endurance. Calling the audience jurors makes that mixed response comic without erasing its pain. By the end he expressly says he has blended blame with praise.

The term also belongs to the satyr likeness. Socrates' speech has the outward hide of an insolent satyr, yet an interior full of sense and ethical value. The reader should not automatically adopt the accusation as a settled moral diagnosis, nor strip it of force as harmless banter. It records how Socrates' refusal to confirm other people's self-valuations can be experienced as an affront. The opening joke about Homer's mistreatment of a proverb shows the same family at a lighter, verbal register.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174b–c.** Homer is jokingly accused of treating a proverb with insolence.
- **175d–e.** Agathon charges Socrates with insolence and proposes a judgement by Dionysus.
- **215b.** Alcibiades begins his accusation with a promise of witnesses.
- **219b–e.** The failed seduction becomes a mock trial of Socrates' haughtiness.
- **221e–222a.** The satyr-like speeches and mixture of blame with praise complete the charge.

In this edition. The English distinguishes "insolence" from "haughtiness," translating related but different Greek families. The passage is a narrated comic accusation, not an actual indictment establishing a legal offence. The source's "jury" identifies the guests' invented role within Alcibiades' performance.

See also. Irony, play, and earnestness; Temperance and self-command; Laughter and frankness; Dionysus; Honour and ambition; Shame and being ashamed.

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Irony, play, and earnestness

Headwords and labels: εἰρωνεύομαι (eirōneuomai); εἰρωνικῶς (eirōnikōs); παίζω (paizō); σπουδάζω (spoudazō); παιδιά (paidia)

The word. Eirōneuesthai here names an indirect, self-depreciating or dissembling presentation of oneself. It is not simply the modern act of saying the opposite of what one means. Playing and being in earnest form a connected but not identical contrast.

In the Symposium. The dialogue begins with a joke, and Socrates soon answers Agathon's wish to receive wisdom by contact with extravagant deference: his own wisdom is dreamlike, Agathon's brilliantly public. Agathon recognises an insult beneath the compliment. Such a scene prepares the later naming of Socratic irony without needing to label every polite expression deceptive.

Alcibiades says that erotic excitement and total ignorance constitute Socrates' silenus-like outer guise, while temperance and divine statues lie within. He also claims that Socrates passes his life ironically playing with human beings. These are Alcibiades' characterisations, framed by his conviction that he has penetrated a secret interior. They do not establish that every Socratic admission of ignorance is knowingly false.

The distinction between play and earnestness then turns against Alcibiades. Because he believes Socrates is seriously attracted to his youth, he imagines he can exchange bodily favour for all Socrates knows. Socrates' "very ironic" reply is carefully conditional: if he really possesses the power Alcibiades supposes, the proposed bargain exchanges much less for much more; Alcibiades should look again lest Socrates prove to be nothing. Alcibiades hears an opening where the reader can also hear a warning.

Agathon had explicitly mixed play with measured earnestness in his praise. Alcibiades' speech likewise mixes praise and complaint, and Socrates calls it a satyr-and-silenus play with a concealed practical purpose. Play does not remove philosophical stakes; it makes the relation between declared and intended meaning something the hearer must examine.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a; 175d–e.** A joking summons and Socrates' exaggerated deference establish playful indirection.
- **197e.** Agathon defines his speech as partly playful and partly earnest.
- **216d–217a.** Alcibiades contrasts Socrates' surface with his earnest interior, then misreads his interest.
- **218d–219b.** The conditional reply to the proposed exchange is explicitly called ironic.
- **222c–d.** Socrates treats Alcibiades' performance as a play with a hidden purpose.

In this edition. The source note glosses "being ironic" as saying less than one means or knows. The English "very ironically" at 218d translates an explicit adverb, whereas the earlier irony of 175d–e is inferred from the exchange and Agathon's response. The distinction between a printed designation and an interpretive description is worth keeping.

See also. Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Exchange and gold for bronze; Insolence and the mock trial; Knowledge.

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Justice, agreement and force

Headwords and labels: δικαιοσύνη (dikaiosynē); βία (bia); ἑκών (hekōn); ἀδικία (adikia)

The word. Justice is not given one complete definition in the dialogue. Its word-family extends from the ordinary "it is right" to the substantive virtue. Bia and hekōn organize Agathon's claim that Love's relations are voluntary rather than violent.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus connects the greatest beneficial power of Love with temperance and justice, not with undifferentiated appetite. Aristophanes calls the original human assault on the gods injustice and makes reconciliation the condition of healing. Both accounts frame justice through relations, but neither offers a tested analysis of every just action.

Agathon offers a sharper argument. Love neither does nor suffers wrong, he says, because he neither acts nor is acted upon by force; everyone serves him willingly. He then appeals to the laws' recognition of what a willing person agrees with another willing person. This moves quickly from lack of force to justice and personifies the passion as a perfectly virtuous god. The text reports his inference; it does not separately establish that every apparently voluntary agreement is just. Socrates' ensuing inquiry challenges the way qualities have been attributed to Love, although it does not refute each of these claims one by one.

Diotima places justice and temperance within the greatest and most beautiful intelligence concerned with ordering cities and households. Here the pair describes productive civic formation rather than merely a lack of overt violence. The final revel changes the party from voluntary drinking to compelled drinking, a small but pointed

reminder that the distinction between willing and forced action matters in practice as well as in praise.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **188d.** Love directed to good things with justice and temperance.
- **193a–b.** Injustice, punishment and reconciliation in Aristophanes' myth.
- **196b–d.** Agathon's argument from voluntary agreement.
- **209a.** Justice and temperance in civic and household ordering.
- **223b.** Compulsion replaces the opening agreement about drinking.

In this edition. The edition preserves the double willingness at 196c: "what one willingly agrees with one who is willing". Its quotation "the laws, kings of the city" is attributed in the note to a rhetorical parallel, not to a law code actually cited and checked here. Ordinary "just" or "right" elsewhere need not denote the entire virtue.

See also. Law and custom; Voluntary slavery and service; Temperance and self-command; Endurance; Order and disorder; Necessity.

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Knowledge

Headwords and labels: ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē); ἐπίσταμαι (epistamai); μάθημα (mathēma)

The word. The singular can mean knowledge generally or a definite knowledge of something. The plural can denote what a person knows or organized fields of study. A study is the learned subject or learning-content, not automatically the same word as knowledge.

In the Symposium. Socrates opens with a conspicuous claim to know matters of love, yet in recounting Diotima's instruction he presents himself repeatedly unable to answer. These are different dramatic moments: the account of his learning explains rather than simply cancels his present profession. Right opinion falls below knowledge because it cannot give an account, while reaching reality keeps it from being sheer ignorance.

Diotima later includes knowledge within mortality. Not only does a person gain some items and lose others; even a single piece of knowledge requires practice, which supplies fresh memory in place of what is departing. The argument concerns a human knower's preservation of knowledge, not the destruction of the truth of its object. It supports the wider claim that mortal continuity works through renewal.

On the ascent, kinds of knowledge are themselves beautiful and broaden the lover's attention beyond attachment to one person or practice. The movement culminates in a certain single knowledge and, in the recap, the study of the beautiful itself. A crucial distinction follows: at 211a the beautiful itself is neither an account nor a knowledge. The study and its object therefore cannot simply be identified. The lover comes to know what beautiful is, but the beauty known is not reduced to the mental state or discourse by which it is apprehended.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177d.** Socrates' restricted claim to knowledge.
- **202a.** Right opinion lacks the account belonging to knowledge.
- **207e–208b.** Individual knowledge is maintained through renewing memory.
- **210c–210e.** Many kinds of knowledge lead towards one knowledge of beauty.

- **211a–211d.** The beautiful is not itself a knowledge; the final study has it as its object.

In this edition. The edition uses pieces of knowledge at 207e–208a and kinds of knowledge at 210c for the same plural. Its studies at 211c follows a change in Greek noun, not a translator's desire for variation. The note on what beautiful is at 211c marks an interpretive reading of the accented verb.

See also. Right opinion; Wisdom and philosophy; Memory and practice; The beautiful itself.

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Laughter and frankness

Headwords and labels: γέλως (gelōs); γελοῖος (geloios); παρρησία (parrhēsia); καταγέλαστος (katagelastos)

The word. The vocabulary distinguishes the laughable thing, the act of laughing, and frank speech that exposes its speaker. Frankness describes openness; it does not guarantee freedom from interested motives or complete self-understanding.

In the Symposium. Aristodemus' arrival without the man who invited him becomes a small comedy of misplaced expectation. At 189b Aristophanes distinguishes laughable things, welcome to his comic Muse, from ridiculous things that invite derision. A comic speaker need not renounce intellectual responsibility in order to amuse. Alcibiades later worries that drunkenness will make the others laugh, and Socrates expects that his praise may make him more ridiculous. Alcibiades answers that his likeness aims at truth rather than laughter. The distinction leaves room for a truthful account that is funny; it denies that ridicule is its sufficient purpose.

Near the end, the same problem becomes a test of listening. Socrates' recurring examples of ordinary crafts

and animals make his speeches seem ridiculous at first. Alcibiades says an inexperienced and senseless hearer laughs at the exterior instead of looking inside. Laughter here signals a premature judgement. Yet the party's own laughter at Alcibiades' frankness is also intelligible: he has openly revealed the love and wounded pride still governing him.

Socrates then gives that openness a further reading. Alcibiades has, he says, hidden a wish to monopolise Socrates and Agathon inside his praise. Being candid about one's feelings is therefore compatible with arranging a speech to achieve a social end. The dialogue allows laughter to accompany recognition, vanity, misunderstanding, and genuine insight rather than assigning it one fixed philosophical value.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174e–175a.** A missed companion makes an arrival comic.
- **189b.** Aristophanes separates welcome comic effect from being made an object of derision.
- **212e–215a.** Drunkenness and likeness raise the question whether praise will become ridicule.
- **221e–222a.** Laughter at the exterior of Socratic speech can block its sense.
- **222c–223a.** The party laughs at frankness and a rivalry over the couch follows.

In this edition. "Frankness" is the edition's rendering of parrhēsia. The passage does not call Alcibiades' speech a formal exercise of political free speech. "Laughable" can denote an amusing scene as well as a dismissive judgement; each use requires its local target.

See also. Irony, play, and earnestness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Drinking and sobriety; Comedy and tragedy.

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Law and custom

Headwords and labels: νόμος (nomos); νομίζω (nomizō); νομοθετέω (nomotheteō)

The word. Nomos embraces both law and socially accepted custom. Nomizō describes what people hold or acknowledge, while the related law-making vocabulary can describe the establishment of a norm. Translating them all in legal language must not turn every practice mentioned into a written statute.

In the Symposium. Pausanias uses a geographical survey to defend a discriminating account of courtship. He contrasts uncomplicated permission in Elis and Boeotia, prohibition under tyrannical rulers, and the intricate situation at Athens and Sparta. His account of Athens then sets permission and resistance side by side: the lover receives extraordinary latitude, while fathers and companions guard the beloved. He makes these apparently inconsistent practices cooperate as a test of character. The personified law wants time to expose lasting commitment rather than acquisition by money or political pressure.

This is a speaker's persuasive reconstruction of civic norms. His claim that a law should forbid courting the young is explicitly a proposal; his attribution of motives to foreign rulers is also an argument, not a neutral inventory. The remark on the tyrannicides illustrates the danger of accepting every historical claim in a speech as Plato's own report.

Aristophanes gives nomos a different function: marriage and child-production can be imposed on men whose natural affinity draws them elsewhere. Agathon makes willing agreement a criterion of justice by appealing to laws as kings. Diotima finally treats laws as spiritual offspring and as instances of beauty to be understood

together with ways of life. The dialogue therefore moves among social regulation, constraint, educational creation and an object of philosophical discernment.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **181d–e.** Pausanias proposes a law and describes self-imposed restraint.
- **182a–183d.** Competing civic customs and apparent Athenian inconsistency.
- **183e–185b.** Law acts as tester and the two educational norms are joined.
- **192b.** Law constrains the marriage-choice of a group in Aristophanes' myth.
- **196b–c.** Agathon appeals to the laws in defining just agreement.
- **209d–210c.** Legislation is productive offspring and a field of beauty.

In this edition. The supplied translation uses "law" throughout and expressly notes at 181d that the term also covers accepted custom. At 184c Burnet prints the dual "these two laws" from later copies, rather than the singular transmitted by B, T and W. The dagger on "of philosophy" at 183a warns against constructing a precise legal or philosophical doctrine from that corrupt phrase.

See also. Testing, pursuit and flight; Voluntary slavery and service; Tyranny and friendship; Justice, agreement and force; Ascent.

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Likenesses, sileni, and statues

Headwords and labels: εἰκών (eikōn); σιληνός (silēnos); ἄγαλμα (agalma); ἀνοίγω (anoigō); σάτυρος (satyros); ἔξωθεν (exōthen); ἔνδοθεν (endothen)

The word. Eikōn is a likeness or image employed in comparison. Agalma is a statue, here divine or precious. Silenus figures open in two, enabling the contrast between an initially comic exterior and valuable contents.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades insists that his likenesses aim at truth. He first compares Socrates to the figures made by carvers of herms, represented with pipes and opening to reveal statues of gods. Physical resemblance matters, but the comparison soon becomes an account of mistaken judgement. Socrates' apparent infatuation and ignorance are an outer covering; within, Alcibiades says, lie temperance and statues so beautiful that he felt bound to obey. The claim to have seen these is Alcibiades' personal testimony, not an independently described supernatural event.

Marsyas adds a second dimension: Socrates exercises through unaccompanied speech the captivating power associated with the satyr's music. The comparison does not make an outwardly ugly body irrelevant, since the shock of an unexpected interior depends on the contrast. It instead warns against taking appearance as a sufficient measure of worth.

At 221d–222a the likeness opens again, now around the speeches themselves. Pack-asses, smiths, shoemakers, and tanners make an uninstructed hearer laugh; someone who gets inside discovers sense and statues of virtue, extending to what a person needs to examine to become beautiful and good. Alcibiades' claim that these alone have sense is an encomiastic superlative, not an editorial judgement on every other discourse.

These valued statues must not be confused with Diotima's "images of virtue" at 212a. She contrasts images with true virtue using a different word and argument. Alcibiades' statues, by contrast, name the precious interior of

discourse. Both are image-language, but they are not automatically identical grades in one technical ontology.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **212a.** Diotima's different contrast between images and true virtue is an essential comparison.
- **215a–c.** Sileni and Marsyas introduce two linked likenesses.
- **216c–217a.** Exterior, opening, interior temperance, and divine statues become an ethical portrait.
- **221c–222a.** The comparison is extended to the speeches and their apparently commonplace language.
- **222c–d.** Socrates answers by calling Alcibiades' own performance a satyr-and-silenus play.

In this edition. The edition keeps "likeness," "statue," and "image" distinct. Its notes identify the mythic sileni and Marsyas, but the construction of the opening figures is stated by Alcibiades himself. "Statues of virtue" is a figurative development of this object, not a claim that Socrates owns literal cult images within his body.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Irony, play, and earnestness; Outlandishness; Beauty and ugliness; Virtue and becoming better; Marsyas and Olympus; Commonplace crafts.

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Love

Headwords and labels: ἔρως (erōs); ἐράω (eraō); ἐρωτικός (erōtikos)

The word. The noun can name a passion, the figure praised as a god, or a comprehensive orientation towards what seems worth having. The verb concerns loving or desiring rather than a fixed social position. Matters of love

names a field of understanding and practice, not merely a series of affairs.

In the Symposium. The dialogue does not begin with a shared definition. Phaedrus makes Love ancient, Agathon makes him youngest, Pausanias distinguishes two Loves, Eryximachus extends love through bodies and the cosmos, and Aristophanes connects it with recovery of a lost whole. Socrates changes the question from the attributes that make Love praiseworthy to the object without which love could not be love at all. In his exchange with Agathon, the desire for beautiful things implies a lack of them and undermines the claim that Love himself is beautiful.

Diotima first distinguishes the loving subject from the lovely object, then gives Love an intermediate nature. In her genealogy he is neither a complacently complete god nor simple helplessness: his inherited need and inventiveness sustain his pursuit. Her subsequent enlargement is equally important. Everyone wants good things and happiness, but ordinary language reserves the name love for one conspicuous species of that pursuit. Money-making, athletics and philosophy can therefore fall within the wider account without their practitioners ordinarily being called lovers.

The formula at 206a is not the last word about love's activity. Lasting possession of good requires an account of mortal continuity; hence generation in the beautiful and desire for immortality. The later ascent makes the beautiful itself the aim of a disciplined education that culminates in true virtue. These are successive argumentative developments, not several interchangeable dictionary definitions. Socrates finally says that he is persuaded by Diotima and praises Love as a fellow-worker in the desired acquisition. He does not say that he has personally completed every stage she describes.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177d.** Socrates' initial claim to know matters of love.
- **178a–197e.** The competing encomia establish different objects, powers and genealogies.
- **199c–201c.** Love is tested as a relation to what is desired and lacking.
- **203b–204c.** The genealogy and the correction of confusion between the loving subject and the beloved object.
- **204d–206a.** Universal desire for happiness and the definition through lasting good.
- **206b–212b.** Productive activity, ascent, and Socrates' concluding commitment.

In this edition. The English keeps Love where Burnet capitalizes the Greek name and love for the lower-case passion. This is an editorial distinction, not proof that the dialogue has stopped moving between personification and psychological description. The translation consistently uses be in love for the verb and matters of love for the plural adjective.

See also. Love of something; Desire and lack; The good; Immortality; Ascent.

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Love of something

Headwords and labels: τις (tis); πατήρ (patēr); ἀδελφός (adelphos)

The word. Love of something is a modern descriptive heading for Socrates' examination of the genitive construction. A relational term calls for a correlate: a father is father of a child, a brother brother of a sibling, and love love of something.

In the Symposium. Socrates deliberately separates two ways of understanding of. He is not yet asking whose child the god Love is. He asks what a father or brother is as just that thing, and uses the answers to establish that Love must have an object. The examples make a structural point before the object is named. Agathon need not say at this stage that love is of beauty, goodness, a person, or a lost half.

This order matters. Establishing that love has an object does not itself prove that the lover lacks it; that is the next question at 200a. Nor does a genitive by itself establish a single kind of relation: descent, possession and an object of desire can all be expressed with it. Diotima's later account of Love's parents supplies precisely the genealogical story that Socrates brackets here. Her definition at 206a then gives love a complex object: not the good alone, but the good's being one's own always. The lexicon's heading therefore identifies a method of clarification, not an explicit ancient classification of every relative term.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **199c–200a.** The sequence father, mother, brother, Love establishes a correlate before its identity.
- **203a–203c.** The question about Love's parentage is now asked in its genealogical sense.
- **206a.** The genitive governs the fuller object of lasting possession of good.

In this edition. The English repeats of, preserving both the useful analogy and its possible ambiguity. The note at 199d marks the parent/object explanation as interpretation. Nothing here requires importing a complete theory of relatives from another dialogue.

See also. Love; Desire and lack; Present and future possession.

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Lover and beloved

Headwords and labels: ἐραστής (erastēs); ἐρώμενος (erōmenos); τὰ παιδικά (ta paidika); ἐρῶν (erōn)

The word. The erastēs is the lover, the erōmenos the beloved, and ta paidika the darling, often a single person despite its plural form. The active expression “the one in love” identifies a subject of desire. These are related but not identical ways of describing a relationship.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus makes the role distinction do argumentative work. His Achilles is the beloved and Patroclus the lover; he explicitly disputes Aeschylus’ reversal. The beloved’s response earns greater divine admiration even though the lover is more divine because god-filled. The two comparisons have different subjects and must both be preserved.

Pausanias builds an asymmetrical social account around these roles. The lover pursues and receives license for otherwise servile conduct; the beloved is expected to delay and discriminate. The educational exception is supposed to join the lover’s ability to improve with the beloved’s willingness to respond for virtue’s sake. This is the speaker’s defense of a historical practice, not a model whose every premise the dialogue ratifies. Aristophanes’ wider story includes different attractions and shared longing while still using conventional role-words.

Diotima makes a grammatical correction with larger consequences. Socrates imagined Love as what is loved rather than what loves. The lovely perfection belongs to the desirable object; the subject of desire is needy and resourceful. The neuter expressions at 204c need not refer only to one socially classified person.

Alcibiades' narrative then unsettles the courtship pattern. He offers himself and lays plans like a lover for a darling. At the end he says Socrates appears to be a lover but becomes the darling instead. This describes the effect of Socrates on his admirers, not a simple correction assigning him one permanent sexual role.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178c–180b.** The initial relation and the decisive lover/beloved comparison.
- **181c–185b.** Pausanias' differentiated roles, tests and educational exchange.
- **191d–193c.** Aristophanes' broader account of attractions and partners.
- **204c.** Diotima distinguishes love's subject from its object.
- **217c–218d.** Alcibiades pursues and offers an exchange.
- **222a–b.** His concluding warning reverses the apparent roles.

In this edition. The edition deliberately distinguishes "lover", "beloved", "darling" and "the one in love". Paidika should not be counted as several beloveds simply because its morphology is plural. Likewise the neuter participles at 204c are "what is loved" and "what is in love", not merely gendered social titles.

See also. Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Gratification and favour; Voluntary slavery and service; Dying for another and dying after; Love; Pederasty and education.

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Making and poetry

Headwords and labels: ποίησις (poiēsis); ποιητής (poiētēs); δημιουργός (dēmiourgos); αἰτία (aitia)

The word. Making and poetry are connected by one noun, and maker and poet by another. Diotima uses this ordinary specialization of a broad word to explain the similarly restricted everyday name love. Craftsman is a general productive role in the passage, not a reference to the creator of another Platonic work.

In the Symposium. The puzzle is that everyone desires good and happiness, yet only some are called lovers. Diotima answers by analogy. All bringing from not being into being is making, and the works done under the crafts are therefore makings. Their practitioners would all be makers under that broad description. Ordinary speech nevertheless calls only those concerned with music and metres poets, assigning the whole's name to a marked-off part.

The argument is linguistic and classificatory. It does not assert that craftsmen literally compose verse when they build or manufacture, and it does not require replacing every occurrence of poetry with production. It shows how an extension can be wider than the customary name suggests. Love likewise includes many pursuits even though the noun and social labels remain especially attached to one species.

Agathon had already moved from poetic making to the generation of animals when praising Love's wisdom. Diotima reuses the lexical connection for a different purpose, and later places poets and inventive craftsmen among begetters of intelligence and virtue. Homer's and Hesiod's offspring and the legislator's laws are not simply examples of the naming trick: they now exemplify enduring products of psychic pregnancy. These argumentative functions need to be distinguished even though the same family joins them.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196d–197a.** Agathon moves from poetry to the making of animals and craft invention.
- **205b–205d.** The broad-making/narrow-poetry analogy explains love's special everyday name.
- **209a–209e.** Poets, inventors and legislators generate enduring psychic offspring.

In this edition. The English making and poets deliberately expose a connection that English cannot preserve with one ordinary word in both noun positions. The edition's note explains this. At 205c the printed she said follows the papyrus rather than the manuscripts' already, a speaker marker rather than an extra temporal assertion.

See also. Naming whole and part; Birth and begetting; Love.

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Medicine and healing

Headwords and labels: ἰατρική (iatrikē); ἰατρός (iatros); ὑγιεινός (hygieinos); νοσώδης (nosōdēs); ἰάομαι (iaomai)

The word. The medical vocabulary includes a practitioner, an expertise, the healthful and diseased, and acts of healing. Eryximachus' claim is that his craft knows and manages bodily loves, not that medicine is merely another name for Love.

In the Symposium. The doctor's expertise is practical before it becomes cosmic. He advises against heavy drinking and prescribes successive measures for Aristophanes' hiccup. In his speech he then reasons from the distinction between healthy and sick bodily conditions to different desires and objects. The skilled practitioner must recognize which love is beneficial, change one into

another, implant a needed tendency and remove an inappropriate one. The governing subject of these interventions is the knowledgeable craftsman. Love is the wider field and divine power through which the craft is said to operate.

The culminating medical image makes hostile opposites friendly: hot and cold, bitter and sweet, dry and wet. Eryximachus extends the model into music, agriculture, seasons and worship. Aristophanes answers with another kind of medicine. His Love heals the deprivation created by the ancient cut, while Apollo repairs the bodies and Zeus later alters reproduction so the halves do not die of their embrace. Medical language thus supports contrasting explanatory stories. The hiccup's noisy cure also lets Aristophanes tease the idea that bodily order must always look quiet and well behaved.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **176c–e.** Medical advice establishes the voluntary, moderate drinking arrangement.
- **185c–e.** Practical remedies postpone Aristophanes' speech.
- **186a–187a.** The doctor defines and extends his expertise.
- **188b–d.** Divination is cast as watching and healing.
- **189a.** The sneeze comically tests the language of order.
- **189c–191d.** Aristophanes recasts Love as a healer of divided human nature.

In this edition. The edition distinguishes "healthy" from "wholesome" and "sick" from "unwholesome" according to the Greek adjectives. The definition at 186c is explicitly compressed, "to put it in a word". It is Eryximachus' medical interpretation, not a comprehensive account of historical Greek medicine.

See also. Surfeit and emptying; Music, harmony and rhythm; Order and disorder; Asclepius; Hiccup and sneeze; Wholeness and the half.

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Memory and practice

Headwords and labels: μνήμη (mnēmē); λήθη (lēthē); μελέτη (meletē); μελετάω (meletaō)

The word. Memory has both an inward cognitive use and a public commemorative one. Practice supplies fresh retention; fame and remembered virtue keep a person present to others. These functions are connected by continuation, but are not one psychological event.

In the Symposium. The account of practice is unusually precise. Even if we single out one body of knowledge, maintaining it does not mean its presence is inert. Forgetting removes it; practice supplies new memory in place of the departing memory and thereby keeps knowledge safe. Diotima uses this to explain how mortal persistence differs from divine sameness. The point is not that repetition makes an opinion true, or that practice manufactures the object known. It concerns the knower's retention.

Public memory appears in the very next development. Alcestis, Achilles and Codrus are said to have expected immortal remembrance of their virtue; parents seek memory through offspring; poets and legislators leave works that sustain their renown. The same vocabulary allows the continuity argument to move from recurring recollection to lasting cultural remembrance. The transition should be explained rather than hidden under a single gloss of memory.

The dialogue's rehearsed narration offers a further resonance: Apollodorus is not unrehearsed, and the

banquet reaches the reader through repeated accounts. That narrative preservation is a useful comparison, not Diotima's explicit proof that every retelling is accurate.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173c.** The opening account is rehearsed and checked through reported conversation.
- **207e–208b.** Practice and renewed memory preserve a single piece of knowledge.
- **208c–209d.** Immortal memory concerns persons, virtue and cultural offspring.

In this edition. The supplied translation's fresh memory and seems to be the same preserve the mechanism and its qualification. At 208d memory is remembrance of persons for their virtue, not the heroes' own indefinitely surviving faculty of recollection.

See also. Renewal and identity; Knowledge; Immortality.

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Memory and rehearsal

Headwords and labels: μιμνήσκομαι (mimnēiskomai); ἀναμιμνήσκομαι (anamimnēiskomai); μελέτη (meletē); ἀμελέτητος (ameletētos); μνήμη (mnēmē); λήθη (lēthē)

The word. The family of remembering includes retaining something, calling it back, and mentioning it again. Meletē is practice; its negative adjective makes the first sentence's "not unrehearsed" a modest but substantive claim about preparation.

In the Symposium. Apollodorus is ready because he recently repeated the story to Glaucon. Readiness does not amount to total recall: at 178a he separates what Aristodemus failed to remember from what he himself failed to retain. At 180c several earlier speeches are passed over because Aristodemus did not remember them

well. Alcibiades adds another limitation at 215a, explaining that recollection while drunk may not proceed in order. The final philosophical exchange survives only in summary because Aristodemus missed its start and was drowsy.

Remembering also belongs to argument. Socrates asks Agathon to hold on to the relational conclusion, then reminds him of his earlier claim that Love concerns beautiful things. A new inference depends on keeping an earlier commitment available.

Diotima supplies a wider account at 208a: knowledge does not simply remain identical in a mortal possessor; practice replaces a departing memory with a new one and so preserves the knowledge, making it seem the same. This is not presented as recovery of knowledge from before birth. Later memory becomes what heroic deeds, children, poems and laws secure beyond one life. At 209c remembered companionship in absence helps sustain the shared offspring of the soul. The dialogue's carefully rehearsed but incomplete narrative can be read alongside these themes, without claiming that Diotima explicitly explains its literary form.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173c.** A recent retelling explains Apollodorus' rehearsal.
- **178a; 180c.** Two narrators' limits and the omission of poorly remembered speeches are admitted.
- **200a–201a.** Socrates requires retention of an argument and recalls an earlier assertion.
- **208a–209d.** Practice renews memory; deeds and offspring sustain remembrance; an absent companion remains remembered.
- **215a.** Alcibiades qualifies the order, rather than the intended truthfulness, of his recollections.

- **223c–d.** Sleep and late awakening limit the final report.

In this edition. The English distinguishes “practising” and “practice” at 208a from “remembering.” The frame’s wording is “not unrehearsed,” not a claim to perfect memory. At 218c a related verb means “mention” an erotic proposal, which should not be mistaken for another technical account of memory.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Knowledge; Immortality; Companionship and shared presence.

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Music, harmony and rhythm

Headwords and labels: μουσική (mousikē); ἁρμονία (harmonia); συμφωνία (symphōnia); ῥυθμός (rhythmos); μελοποιία (melopoiia)

The word. Harmony, consonance, agreement and rhythm form a connected vocabulary but do not name the same relation without distinction. Mousikē here covers composition and educational application as well as what modern English calls music.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus treats music as a second craft that knows erotic relations. He objects to saying that a harmony consists of things that remain in disagreement. In his interpretation, high and low previously differ but subsequently agree through musical expertise; fast and slow similarly produce rhythm. His correction of Heraclitus is therefore temporal: prior difference is followed by achieved agreement. It should not be silently substituted for Heraclitus’ own doctrine.

The next distinction is just as important. In the constitution of harmony and rhythm the double Love is not present “yet”. Difficulty arises when these structures are applied to human beings through composition or

education. The practitioner must sustain orderly desire and help those not yet orderly become so. The common or Polyhymnian form is not simply forbidden: its pleasure is to be used cautiously, without implanting excess.

Alcibiades later makes Socrates a musical power without instruments. That image does not merely repeat Eryximachus' theory. It shows words disturbing the listener into shame and self-recognition, rather than simply providing harmonious pleasure. The musical comparison can therefore illuminate the challenge and discomfort of education as well as its ordering work.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **186e–187c.** Music is placed beside medicine; harmony and rhythm are explained.
- **187c–e.** The technical constitution is distinguished from ethical application.
- **197a–b.** Agathon makes the Muses pupils of Love.
- **215b–216a.** Socrates produces a musical effect through bare words.

In this edition. The word "yet" at 187c represents Badham's reading, printed by Burnet, rather than the differently accented form reported for the main manuscripts. Preserving it prevents the false claim that music as a whole has only one Love. The English "music" should also be read broadly enough to include song and poetic metre.

See also. Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Medicine and healing; Urania and Polyhymnia; Order and disorder; Hearing and enchantment.

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Naming whole and part

Headwords and labels: ὄνομα (onoma); εἶδος (eidos); μόριον (morion); ὀνομάζω (onomazō)

The word. Names, forms and parts belong to Diotima's explanation of usage. The form here is a kind of activity within a broader class. It should not be capitalized automatically as a metaphysical entity.

In the Symposium. The broad desire for good and happiness is common to all, while ordinary speakers say only some people are in love. Diotima does not solve this by denying the common desire. She explains the mismatch between classification and customary terminology: a whole's name has attached to one part, leaving the other pursuits to be named differently. Making and poetry provide the comparison.

This move makes it possible to interpret money-making, athletics and philosophy as routes towards the same general aim without insisting that everyday language already calls their practitioners erotic lovers. The argument therefore neither simply defines love by current usage nor dismisses usage as meaningless. It expands the account while explaining why the name is restricted.

At the close Socrates permits Phaedrus to call his speech an encomium or whatever he likes. That freedom of naming concerns the genre of the performance, not a withdrawal of the account's content. In both places the text asks readers not to mistake a label for the entire structure it labels.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **205a–205d.** Universal aim, selective everyday naming and the poetry analogy.
- **212b–212c.** Socrates commits to the teaching while relaxing the name of his speech.

In this edition. The translation's form at 205b and 205d is faithful to the noun's classificatory use. These occurrences are not evidence that Diotima has already introduced the final beautiful itself as a transcendent Form.

See also. Making and poetry; Love; Form and figure.

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Narrating and reporting

Headwords and labels: διηγέομαι (diēgeomai); ἀπαγγέλλω (apangellō); φημί (phēmi)

The word. Diēgeisthai is to tell a connected story; apangellein is to report words or events to someone else. Phēmi supplies the repeated "he said" by which Plato keeps reports nested within reports. These are working verbs of the dialogue's construction, not dispensable verbal padding.

In the Symposium. The opening distinguishes knowing a story from attending its events. Glaucon has heard a report through someone who heard Phoenix, but its chronology is confused. Apollodorus corrects him: the dinner took place while they were still boys, whereas his own association with Socrates is less than three years old. His source is Aristodemus, a participant who also supplied Phoenix. Apollodorus has additionally asked Socrates about some of the material, and Socrates agreed with that account. "Some" is the limit of this verification; the passage does not certify every speech word for word.

At 174a Apollodorus undertakes to reproduce what Aristodemus related. The narration consequently contains Aristodemus' recollections, the guests' speeches, Socrates' report of Diotima, and Alcibiades' remembered private conversation with Socrates. Repeated "he said" formulas sometimes make the English cumbersome, but preserve

whose knowledge or recollection warrants each statement.

The frame is neither an ordinary eyewitness transcript nor a declaration that the story is worthless. It offers a named chain of transmission, a limited check with Socrates, recent rehearsal, and explicit admissions of forgetting. Readers can distinguish the narrated occasion, the remembered accounts, and Plato's composition without treating the confidently voiced claim of any guest as an unqualified authorial verdict.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173b.** Glaucon's muddled report is corrected; Aristodemus is named and Socrates supplies limited confirmation.
- **173c–174a.** Apollodorus repeats a recently rehearsed account and undertakes to tell it from the beginning.
- **178a.** The narrator identifies remembered and selected speeches rather than claiming complete reproduction.
- **223c–d.** Aristodemus preserves the final argument's main point but not its reasoning.

In this edition. The supplied translation retains "he said," even when Apollodorus is reporting Aristodemus reporting a guest. Its note identifies Glaucon as the acquaintance on the road, not the unnamed companion listening in the present frame. These persons must not be conflated.

See also. Memory and rehearsal; Hearing and enchantment; Companionship and shared presence; Apollodorus and Aristodemus.

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Order and disorder

Headwords and labels: κόσμιος (kosmios); κόσμος (kosmos); ἀκοσμία (akosmia); κοσμέω (kosmeō)

The word. The kosmos family can describe order, propriety and adornment. Its occurrence does not automatically mean “the cosmos” as the universe. The range allows speakers to move between orderly action and an attractive arrangement.

In the Symposium. Pausanias says no action done orderly and lawfully could justly be blamed, an assertion within his defense of discriminating courtship. Eryximachus enlarges order into a governing principle of bodily, musical, seasonal and religious relations. Orderly loves must be encouraged, and those not yet orderly educated. Aristophanes’ sneeze punctures an easy identification of order with dignified appearance: a noisy disturbance can restore bodily functioning.

The myth then gives the term another role. Apollo turns each cut human toward the wound so that seeing it may make the person more orderly; respect toward the gods is required to avoid a further cut. Agathon returns to adornment, calling Love the kosmos of gods and humans. At the end a band of revellers destroys the agreed order of the feast and compels heavy drinking. The shared vocabulary invites comparison across these uses, but neither medical order nor polite appearance automatically establishes ethical goodness.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177c.** Praise adorns its divine recipient.
- **182a.** Orderly and lawful action in Pausanias’ defense.
- **187d–188d.** Order across education, seasons and piety.

- **189a.** The comic challenge of the sneeze.
- **190e–193b.** The wound and the threat of further division educate humans.
- **197e.** Love as adornment.
- **223b.** The drinking agreement gives way to disorder.

In this edition. The edition properly varies between "orderly", "order", and "adornment". Translating every kosmos-family occurrence by a single cosmic noun would obscure both the rhetoric and the comic ending.

See also. Seasons, blending and astronomy; Justice, agreement and force; Hiccup and sneeze; Insolence and the mock trial; Drinking and sobriety.

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Outlandishness

Headwords and labels: ἄτοπος (atopos); ἀτοπία (atopia)

The word. Atopos and atopia describe what does not fit the expected situation or familiar classification. "Outlandish" preserves the discomfort of an encounter with something not readily placed, without making the word a technical doctrine of transcendence.

In the Symposium. Agathon's first use concerns a practical oddity: his guest stands outside instead of entering dinner. Aristodemus answers not with a theory but with familiarity: Socrates often does this, and should be left alone. What is outlandish for one participant can be customary for another.

Alcibiades makes the word central to his praise. Socrates' combination of erotic appearance, indifference to inducement, formidable speech, bodily endurance, and calm in danger is difficult to recount neatly. More radically, no ancient or contemporary human being

furnishes an adequate comparison. Achilles may be matched with Brasidas and Pericles with Homeric counsellors, but Socrates and his speeches must be compared instead with sileni and satyrs. The chosen nonhuman likeness both expresses and partially answers the failure of ordinary comparison.

The family is not restricted to this portrait. Diotima calls the replacement of knowledge within an apparently continuous life still more outlandish than other bodily and psychic changes. That occurrence helps prevent a mechanical reading in which every use secretly means "Socratic." Strangeness can mark a surprising explanatory claim as well as an extraordinary person. The reader is invited to investigate what initially seems anomalous, not merely to admire oddness.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175a–b.** A guest's unusual behaviour is identified as a familiar Socratic habit.
- **207e–208a.** The changing life of knowledge is called still more outlandish.
- **215a.** Alcibiades warns that Socrates' strangeness is difficult to recount in sequence.
- **221c–d.** Human comparisons fail and sileni return as the alternative.

In this edition. The edition uses "outlandish" and "outlandishness" for the adjective and noun, including the comparative in Diotima's speech. These words need not imply moral disapproval: Agathon is puzzled, while Alcibiades is largely admiring and aggrieved at once.

See also. Attention and standing still; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Irony, play, and earnestness; Memory and rehearsal.

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Participation

Headwords and labels: μετέχω (metechō); πάσχω (paschō); πλέον (pleon)

The word. Participation is a useful English heading for sharing in something. The verb is not automatically a fully articulated technical relation at every occurrence. Its object and the account of how sharing occurs must be read locally.

In the Symposium. Agathon says Love has the greatest share in temperance. That ordinary predication attributes a virtue; it does not explain a separate entity through a metaphysical mechanism. At 208b Diotima gives a more explicit account of mortal participation in immortality: the mortal leaves a new thing like itself behind. She contrasts this with the immortal's different manner.

At 211b all other beautiful things share in the beautiful itself. The crucial explanatory qualification is negative: as the other things arise and perish, the beautiful does not become more or less or undergo anything. Sharing therefore does not mean cutting pieces out of a finite stock of beauty, adding the participants together to manufacture the beautiful, or physically affecting it by their changes.

The text says in some such way, then gives the condition of invariance. It does not supply an exhaustive mechanism of participation or resolve every question a later reader could put about the relation between one and many. The word's earlier uses help readers hear sharing, while the local qualifiers show what makes the summit distinctive. Likewise, participation in immortality and participation in beauty are not automatically the same relation merely because the same verb occurs.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196c.** Agathon attributes a great share of temperance to Love.
- **208a–208b.** Mortal participation in immortality is explained by replacement.
- **211a–211b.** Changing beauties share in what remains unaffected.

In this edition. The English sharing in preserves the ordinary verb rather than introducing technical participation everywhere. The phrase in some such way must not be dropped, nor the denial of more, less and affection compressed into the vague claim that beauty is eternal.

See also. The beautiful itself; Immortality; Renewal and identity; More and less.

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Present and future possession

Headwords and labels: ἔχω (echō); κτάομαι (ktaomai); πάρειμι (pareimi); ἔπειτα (epeita); κτῆσις (ktēsis)

The word. Having, acquiring and having present are not interchangeable in every construction. Present possession can be contrasted with the future continuance of the same possession. The future is an essential component of what is wanted.

In the Symposium. The healthy person's wish to remain healthy is the central test of the lack thesis. Socrates does not deny the ordinary statement that such a person desires health. He reconstructs its content: the person wants present health preserved into a time not yet at hand. An unqualified statement that love can never concern anything one has would erase the argument's own solution.

This temporal distinction prepares Diotima's addition of always to the possession of good. The question moves from whether a beautiful thing becomes the lover's to what that acquisition does for him. With good things, Socrates can answer happiness; Diotima then specifies that everyone wants the goods always. In mortal life, however, simple permanent retention is not available. Generation and renewal answer that limitation. What is kept safe does not remain materially or psychologically unaltered: the mortal leaves another new thing behind.

The vocabulary of possession can sound proprietary in English. Here its objects include health, wisdom, happiness and virtue, not only material property or a beloved person. The construction should not by itself decide the ethics of possessing another human being. Socrates' final description of the desired attainment as a possession at 212b reaches back to this argument, while naming Love its fellow-worker rather than a commodity to be stored.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **200b–200e.** Existing strength, health and wealth are redescribed as desires for future continuance.
- **204d–206a.** Acquisition, happiness, and the demand that good be one's own always.
- **207d–208b.** Mortal preservation operates through renewal, not strict unchanged retention.
- **212b.** Love assists human nature in the desired possession.

In this edition. The repeated English present preserves the connection between what is now possessed and what is available. The phrase in the time to come must not be omitted when summarizing the lack argument.

See also. Desire and lack; Happiness; Renewal and identity; Always.

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Renewal and identity

Headwords and labels: αὐτός (autos); νέος (neos); καταλείπω (kataleipō); σῴζω (sōzō)

The word. The contrast is between being called the same living being and continuously having the same constituents. New does not simply mean young in age: it marks what replaces what has departed. Preservation names continuity achieved through such change.

In the Symposium. Diotima does not wait until death to introduce replacement. The person called the same from childhood to old age never retains the same bodily materials throughout. Hair, flesh, bones and blood supply concrete cases. Psychic dispositions and experiences likewise come and go. Knowledge then sharpens the account: not only do different items replace each other, but even one apparently identical item of knowledge needs refreshing through memory.

The series supports the claim that everything mortal persists by leaving another new thing similar to itself. It is not a modern biological account of every cell's lifespan, nor does it enumerate numerical identity criteria. Called the same and seems to be the same are part of the wording, so the difference between ordinary attribution and underlying alteration must remain visible. At the same time, it would go too far to make the passage a blanket denial that any mortal is one enduring person: Diotima explains the way mortal preservation works.

The contrast with the divine is explicit. The divine is entirely the same always; the mortal partakes in immortality by a different device. This prepares the later description of beauty itself as neither growing nor diminishing when beautiful particulars arise and pass

away. Continuity through replacement and invariance without replacement are therefore distinct routes in the dialogue, not two translations of one claim.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **200d.** Desired future preservation first appears in the argument about lack.
- **207d–208b.** Bodily, psychic and cognitive replacement explain mortal continuity.
- **209c–209e.** Enduring cultural offspring extend the leaving-behind pattern.
- **210e–211b.** Beauty itself contrasts with changing participants.

In this edition. The English preserves called and seems in the relevant claims about sameness. These qualifications are philosophically significant and should not be smoothed into an unqualified assertion of either strict identity or total discontinuity.

See also. Memory and practice; Immortality; The beautiful itself; Participation.

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Resource and Poverty

Headwords and labels: Πόρος (Poros); Πενία (Penia); Μῆτις (Mētis); πόριμος (porimos); ἀπορία (aporia); εὐπορέω (euporeō); εὔπορος (euporos)

The word. Resource and Poverty are personified names whose common lexical families continue outside the myth. Lack of a way, devising means, and having an answer are not decorative echoes: they describe the pursuit the genealogy explains.

In the Symposium. When the gods celebrate Aphrodite's birth, Resource becomes drunk on nectar and falls asleep in Zeus' garden. Poverty, at the doors and wanting a

resource, lies beside him and conceives Love. Diotima's tale makes Love Aphrodite's follower both by the occasion of his conception and by his natural concern with beauty. It does not make Aphrodite his mother. Metis is his paternal grandmother within this account, not an alternative parent.

Love's maternal inheritance is conspicuous: he is poor, rough, squalid, barefoot and homeless, sleeping without bedding in doorways and roads. His paternal inheritance is pursuit, courage, intensity and inventiveness. He hunts the beautiful and good, weaves devices and loves wisdom throughout life. The combined portrait directly counters Agathon's tender, beautiful and secure god. Its resemblance to Socrates is a well-supported dramatic comparison, but Diotima does not say that every physical feature is a coded biographical statement.

The inheritance also prevents a simple equation of love with destitution. What Love acquires slips away, yet he revives through his father's nature: never completely at a loss and never rich. Socrates' earlier anxiety about being at a loss after Agathon and his later more resourceful answer about happiness bring the word family back into conversation. At 209b the pregnant soul finds resources in speeches when it meets a suitable person. Productive discourse thus exemplifies the search for a way through, rather than merely repeating the names of the parents.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **198a–198b.** Socrates' anticipated inability to find a speech uses the at-a-loss family.
- **203b–204b.** The genealogy and its consequences for Love's body, activity and philosophy.
- **204d–204e.** Changing the question enables a resourceful answer.
- **209b.** A suitable companion enables abundant speech about virtue.

- **219d–219e.** Alcibiades describes being unable to find a way of winning Socrates.

In this edition. The translation keeps Resource, Poverty and resourceful distinct from being at a loss while explaining their family connection in its note. Love's never at a loss at 203e must not be mistranslated never poor: the preceding narrative explicitly says he is always poor.

See also. Desire and lack; Wisdom and philosophy; Hunting and devices; Birth and begetting.

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Right opinion

Headwords and labels: ὀρθὴ δόξα (orthē doxa); δοξάζω (doxazō); λόγον δίδωμι (logon didōmi); τνγχάνω (tynchanō)

The word. Right opinion is not simply any opinion somebody confidently regards as right. Correctness concerns its reaching what is; its defect is that it cannot give an account. The phrase about giving an account must be taken as a whole.

In the Symposium. The distinction appears as an example in an argument about Love. Socrates assumes that whatever is not beautiful must be ugly. Diotima asks whether everything not wise is ignorant and supplies a third case. An opinion that is right but cannot explain itself is neither knowledge nor ignorance. It misses the account required of knowledge but does not miss reality. The example supports an intermediate between contraries without pretending that all intermediate states are identical.

The construction does not offer a full definition of knowledge. It tells us that a judgement without an account cannot be knowledge; it does not demonstrate that adding any explanation whatever would suffice, nor settle what a

satisfactory account must contain. Likewise, hits upon what is need not be translated into a modern technical theory of accidental true belief. The local point is success regarding the object despite inadequate explanatory command.

Later, opinions belong to the soul's changing contents, alongside desires, pleasures and fears. That claim about alteration should not be substituted for the earlier distinction by truth and account. Alcibiades' imagined exchange of opinion for truth at 218e is another local contrast, in Socrates' conditional response to his proposal. It does not retroactively turn right opinion at 202a into falsehood.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **202a–202b.** The definition of the intermediate and its application to Love.
- **207e.** Opinions are among the contents of mortal psychic life that arise and disappear.
- **218d–219a.** Socrates contrasts opinion and truth within a hypothetical exchange of beauties.

In this edition. The supplied English rightly says right opinion, not wrong opinion or mere illusion. Its knowing, knowledge and intelligence distinguish words that Diotima places on the cognitive side of the comparison. The explanatory gloss in this article does not import the Meno's fuller account, although the edition notes that parallel.

See also. Between; Knowledge; Truth and persuasion.

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Seasons, blending and astronomy

Headwords and labels: ὥρα (hōra); κρᾶσις (krasis); ἀστρονομία (astronomia); πλεονεξία (pleonexia)

The word. Hōra names a season in this passage; krasis its constituent blend; astronomia the expertise concerned with stellar movement and seasonal relations. The terminology is both cosmological and evaluative.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus' expansion from bodies and music reaches the year. When hot, cold, dry and wet encounter one another in orderly love and receive a temperate blend, they bring good seasons and health to humans, animals and plants. When the other Love gains dominance, destruction and disease follow. His explanation describes the same opposites as capable of beneficial or harmful relations; it does not assign one constituent permanently to the good side.

The vocabulary of greed, insolence and injustice personifies natural disruption. Astronomy is then named as knowledge of these relations concerning the stars and seasons. The passage is evidence for how this speaker extends an expert's model, not a modern account of weather or disease. Its scope also matters: plants and other animals are explicitly included, so the proposed order is not only a human ethical ideal projected onto an otherwise unmentioned world.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **186d–e.** Bodily opposites provide the earlier model.
- **187e–188b.** Yearly composition, good blend, disorder and astronomy.
- **188d.** The conclusion distinguishes Love's total power from its best exercise.

In this edition. The edition renders krasis "blend", sōphrōn "temperate", and pleonexia "greed". These preserve the passage's ethical coloring. Hōra elsewhere can denote youthful bloom, as at 219c, so the local seasonal meaning should not be generalized to every occurrence.

See also. Order and disorder; Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Temperance and self-command; Endurance.

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Seeing and contemplating

Headwords and labels: θεάομαι (theaomai); θεωρέω (theōreō); καθοράω (kathoraō); κατιδεῖν (katidein); ὁρατός (horatos)

The word. The dialogue uses several verbs rather than one technical term for intellectual intuition. Ordinary seeing, attentive beholding, contemplation and catching sight can shade into philosophical apprehension. Their objects and contexts determine that shift.

In the Symposium. The ascent is not only a sequence of things desired but a transformation of attention. The learner notices likeness across bodies, recognizes the honour of psychic beauty, beholds what is beautiful in practices and laws, and sees beauty in knowledge. Contemplating the great sea accompanies fertile thought, not the suspension of all speech. Catching sight of a single knowledge then prepares the sudden apprehension of beauty itself.

The apparent tension between knowledge and vision should not be solved by erasing either vocabulary. The summit is described both as coming to know what beautiful is and as seeing or beholding it. At the same time, beauty itself is not any knowledge or account. The subject's apprehension and its object remain distinct.

At 212a the beholder sees with what he must, and with that by which the beautiful is visible. The means or faculty is not explicitly named in those clauses. It is reasonable to understand the sight as more than bodily looking, given the exclusion of bodily forms, but supplying the Greek

noun mind as if printed would be false. Socrates' later conditional remark about the sight of thought at 219a offers a comparison, not a missing word to insert into Diotima's sentence. Ordinary uses, such as seeing Socrates on the battlefield, also prevent treating every member of this family as a technical mystical term.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **210b–210e.** Seeing develops through the successive beautiful objects and productive contemplation.
- **211a–211d.** The final object is distinguished from bodily appearance and knowledge itself.
- **211e–212a.** The means of seeing is specified relationally but not named.
- **218e–219a.** Socrates conditionally contrasts bodily beauty and the sight of thought.
- **220e.** Beholding also describes the memorable sight of Socrates in retreat.

In this edition. The edition's behold, contemplate, catch sight of and see preserve lexical distinctions. At 212a it follows the printed instrumental wording with what he must; the apparatus records alternatives. This entry keeps the reading and does not claim that the source explicitly names a particular organ or faculty.

See also. Ascent; Knowledge; The beautiful itself; Suddenly.

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Shame and being ashamed

Headwords and labels: αἰσχύνη (aischynē); αἰσχύνομαι (aischynomai); ἀναισχυντία (anaischyntia)

The word. Aischynē can name felt shame and the disgrace incurred; aischynomai describes being ashamed, often before a particular person. These should be

distinguished from the mere ugliness or shamefulness of the object and from an outside accusation of shamelessness.

In the Symposium. For Phaedrus, shame has an audience: lovers and beloved are especially unwilling to be seen acting badly by one another. His account therefore makes an erotic relationship a powerful support for socially valued conduct. Pausanias qualifies the standard. A youth deceived by a false promise of wealth remains disgraced because his own aim has been exposed; one deceived while honestly seeking virtue is not shamed by that failure. The decisive issue is not simply successful concealment or public success.

Aristophanes resists a particular shame-judgment, attributing the behavior of male-derived youths to courage and affinity rather than shamelessness. This is his partisan explanation within the myth, not a neutral definition of moral worth by sexual preference.

Before Agathon's speech Socrates asks whether shame applies only before the wise or also before the many, but Phaedrus interrupts before the issue is resolved. Alcibiades later presents the conflict personally: he cannot refute what Socrates asks of him, yet seeks the crowd's honor and is ashamed of his abandoned agreements. Shame here registers a divided life rather than guaranteeing that the ashamed person changes.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178d–179a.** Being seen by the beloved motivates avoidance of disgrace.
- **184e–185b.** Motive, not the mere success of an exchange, determines shame.
- **192a.** Aristophanes rejects an accusation of shamelessness.

- **194b–d.** Socrates raises the question of whose judgment matters.
- **198b.** Socrates playfully claims shame at competing with Agathon's style.
- **216a–c.** Alcibiades feels shame but repeatedly flees its demands.
- **218c–d.** He invokes the intelligent rather than the many to justify his offer.

In this edition. The translation differentiates "shame", "ashamed" and "shamelessness". It uses "shameful" for ethical aischros and "ugly" where the contrast is primarily with bodily or metaphysical beauty. The lexical family alone does not decide whether a particular shame-judgment is justified.

See also. Honour and ambition; Gratification and favour; Law and custom; Beauty and ugliness.

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Speech and account

Headwords and labels: λόγος (logos); μῦθος (mythos)

The word. Logos ranges from an individual contribution at dinner to an account that explains a subject and may have to answer objections. Mythos at 177a means the tale or saying that Eryximachus is borrowing. The text does not consistently assign stories to one term and rational arguments to the other.

In the Symposium. The speeches are inherited and reported before they are judged: Phaedrus fathers the evening's topic, and each guest contributes a logos. Pausanias and Eryximachus each claim to improve the account already offered. Aristophanes tells a fantastic story, yet calls it his logos, while Eryximachus jokingly requires him to give an account of what he says. Diotima likewise calls both the half-seeking story and her

alternative a logos. The noun therefore identifies a claim-bearing account without guaranteeing its truth or its manner of proof.

Socrates changes the relation between speech and conversation. Rather than merely following an impressive performance with another, he obtains Agathon's agreements through questions before presenting Diotima's teaching. Alcibiades later insists that Socrates' words can exert their distinctive effect even when repeated by an inferior speaker. This gives the transmission-frame a pointed counterpart: reported discourse may retain force, but its content and its hearer's response must still be assessed.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173c.** The speeches are requested, remembered and retold.
- **177a–d.** A borrowed tale and the father of the discourse.
- **185e–186a.** Eryximachus proposes to finish Pausanias' account.
- **189b–c.** Comic speech remains accountable.
- **199b–c.** Questions and agreements precede Socrates' speech.
- **205d–206a.** Two accounts of what love seeks are distinguished.
- **215c–e.** Bare words retain power through another speaker.

In this edition. The English alternates "speech" and "account" according to context, and "tale" for mythos at 177a. A reader should not infer a technical opposition between myth and reason merely from those English choices. "Father of the speech" at 177d refers to originating the proposal as well as to Phaedrus' first turn.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Agreement and premise; Refutation and examination; Narrating and reporting; Memory and rehearsal; Laughable and ridiculous.

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Tally and matching halves

Headwords and labels: σύμβολον (symbolon); λίσπαι (lispai)

The word. Symbolon here is a recognition-token whose matching portion is held elsewhere. It is not primarily the modern "symbol" as an arbitrary sign. The tally image makes divided identity and recognition palpable.

In the Symposium. After explaining the new bodily arrangement, Aristophanes calls each human a tally, cut two from one like a flatfish. The sought partner is described as one's own matching token. The image contributes more than the simple fraction "half": the parts can identify one another by fitting together. It supports the felt shock of friendship and affinity when one encounters the other part.

The later warning imagines another division, producing beings like profile reliefs and halved dice. These objects turn the same image from recognition toward vulnerability. The myth's surviving half may also seek a different partner after a death, so the token-image should not be expanded into a strict modern theory of exactly one possible partner. Diotima subsequently tests the value of any proposed whole by the good.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **191d.** Flatfish and the matching tally describe present humans.
- **192b–c.** Recognition is experienced as friendship, affinity and love.

- **193a.** Reliefs and halved dice illustrate the threat of another cut.
- **205d–e.** Diotima qualifies the value of the sought half and whole.

In this edition. The edition renders symbolon “tally” and lispai “halved dice”, explaining both in notes. The latter is a rare concrete term; the article follows the edition’s explanation rather than pretending to establish the object’s material history independently.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Androgyne and the three kinds; Cutting, repair and the navel.

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Temperance and self-command

Headwords and labels: σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē); κρατέω (krateō)

The word. Sōphrosynē does not mean merely drinking little. It can signify a well-ordered, self-controlled condition, while the associated language of mastering makes visible the question: who governs, and what is governed?

In the Symposium. Agathon reasons from the assertion that temperance consists in mastering pleasures and desires. Since no pleasure is stronger than Love, the others would be weaker and mastered by him; Love would therefore be exceptionally temperate. The reasoning exploits the god’s dominance over desire to give him a virtue usually understood as governing one’s own appetites. This is Agathon’s praise, not a neutral proof accepted without further examination by every speaker.

Diotima places temperance alongside justice in the greatest and most beautiful intelligence: the ordering of

cities and households. Here it is productive ethical and political order rather than simply victory over an appetite.

Alcibiades gives the term a dramatic test. The outwardly erotic, allegedly ignorant Socrates contains extraordinary temperance within; beautiful bodies, money, and public honours cannot purchase his compliance. After Alcibiades' attempted seduction fails, he admires Socrates' temperance and courage even while feeling dishonoured. The drinking narrative further complicates a merely ascetic definition: Socrates can enjoy what is available as well as endure its absence. His self-command is shown as independence from inducements, not inability to appreciate pleasure.

Alcibiades supplies an unstable witness to that independence. He can acknowledge Socrates' authority, but the honour of the crowd defeats his own intentions once he leaves. Socrates' composure and the admirer's divided conduct are therefore contrasting results, not a claim that association automatically transfers virtue.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196c–d.** Agathon derives Love's temperance from mastery over pleasures and desires.
- **209a.** Diotima joins temperance and justice within civic and household ordering.
- **216b–e.** Alcibiades' defeat by public honour contrasts with Socrates' interior temperance.
- **218c–219e.** The proposed exchange fails and admiration survives wounded pride.
- **220a–223d.** Enjoyment and resistance to intoxication furnish further dramatic evidence.

In this edition. The edition consistently uses "temperance" for sōphrosynē. At 219d Burnet prints "endurance"; the papyrus offers a different term, enkrateia, self-control. The papyrus variant is reported in

the apparatus, not silently substituted for the printed Greek or treated as an additional continuous-text occurrence.

See also. Courage and composure; Endurance; Drinking and sobriety; Virtue and becoming better; Justice, agreement and force; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Tenderness, softness and hardness

Headwords and labels: ἁπαλός (hapalos); μαλακός (malakos); σκληρός (sklēros); ὑγρός (hygros)

The word. Tender, soft, hard and supple belong to a tactile description of Love but are not synonyms. Agathon begins with tenderness, locates the god among soft souls and characters, and adds supple form. Diotima later reverses the central attribution.

In the Symposium. Agathon borrows Homer's tender-footed Ate as a model for inference: a being that treads on soft things must itself be tender. He improves the image by making Love dwell not on people's heads but in their souls and characters, choosing the soft rather than the hard. Suppleness then explains Love's unobtrusive entrances and departures, while bloom and fragrance provide signs of a beautiful complexion. These are an encomiast's analogies from surroundings and effects, not a demonstrated anatomy of the passion.

Diotima deliberately gives the opposite portrait. Love is far from tender and beautiful: he is hard, squalid, barefoot and homeless, continually living with lack. The later explanation distinguishes the lover from the lovable object. Agathon's tender perfection fits what is desired more readily than the desiring subject. The lexical reversal is therefore part of a shift in grammatical and

philosophical perspective, not merely a change in poetic taste.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195c–196b.** Tender feet, soft dwellings, supple form and floral appearance.
- **203c–d.** Hardness and exposure replace tenderness and comfort.
- **204c.** Diotima distinguishes the lover's condition from the beloved's attractiveness.

In this edition. The translation keeps "tender", "soft", "hard" and "supple" distinct. Apollodorus' nickname "the Soft" at 173d belongs to a separate dramatic use of the softness family and should not be read as the same character judgment. The source's qualification "not … in all souls" at 195e restricts Agathon's claim.

See also. Ate and tender feet; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Love; Resource and Poverty; Lover and beloved.

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Testing, pursuit and flight

Headwords and labels: βασανίζω (basanizō); διώκω (diōkō); φεύγω (pheugō); δίωξις (diōxis)

The word. Testing is a process of discrimination, and pursuit and flight give it dramatic form. These verbs do not supply a uniform moral code: one must ask what is pursued, what is avoided, and why.

In the Symposium. Pausanias explains delay in courtship by the work time can do. Quick capture is suspect because lasting character has not yet been tested. Money and coercive political advantage produce a different kind of capture, not the stable friendship he values. The law, imagined as a contest-organizer, assigns pursuit to one

role and flight to the other to make distinctions visible. His account is not a claim that all resistance is a hidden invitation: it is his reconstruction of the particular conventional system under discussion.

Aristophanes changes the sought object into the lost whole; Diotima then asks whether that object is good. Alcibiades reverses the moral value of flight again: he evades Socrates because he has acknowledged a demand he does not fulfill. Direction alone cannot determine whether the movement is well ordered. The vocabulary carries the reader from external courtship patterns into the problem of directing an entire life.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **183e–184b.** Time, resistance and the testing of character.
- **192e–193a.** Pursuit of the whole defines Aristophanes' love.
- **205d–206b.** Diotima changes the criterion and asks how the good is pursued.
- **216a–c.** Flight becomes avoidance of acknowledged self-care.
- **219e.** Socrates escapes Alcibiades' expected means of capture.

In this edition. "Test" renders the repeated basanizō, not a single decisive examination. "Catching", "being caught", "pursuing" and "fleeing" belong to Pausanias' metaphorical organization of the relationship; their attribution and context should remain explicit.

See also. Law and custom; Gratification and favour; Wholeness and the half; Shame and being ashamed.

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The beautiful itself

Headwords and labels: αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν (auto to kalon); αὐτὸ καθ' αὑτό (auto kath' hauto); μονοειδής (monoeidēs); γίγνομαι (gignomai)

The word. The neuter adjective can be substantivized as the beautiful. Itself intensifies the object as such, while itself by itself and single in form describe its independence and invariance. These expressions justify discussing a Form of Beauty as an interpretive heading, but the passage should be read through its own wording rather than a prefabricated catalogue of Forms.

In the Symposium. The final object is introduced as the thing for whose sake all earlier labours occurred. Diotima specifies it through a careful series of exclusions. It always is, neither comes to be nor perishes, and neither grows nor diminishes. It is not beautiful in one respect and ugly in another, beautiful now but not later, beautiful relative to one thing and ugly relative to another, or beautiful here but ugly there according to different observers. These are different qualifications of ordinary beauty; reducing them all to beauty is subjective loses the argument's precision.

Nor is the beautiful itself a face, hands, a bodily constituent, an account or a knowledge. It is not located in an animal, earth, heaven or some other thing. The positive description gives it independent, uniform being, while all the other beautiful things share in it. Their appearance and disappearance do not enlarge, diminish or otherwise affect it. This is more than an assertion that one especially attractive object never ages.

The exclusion of knowledge does not mean that beauty cannot be known. The ascent has just led to a single knowledge of it, and the recap ends in learning what beautiful is. Object and cognition are distinguished. The later language of purity, unmixedness and the divine

likewise describes what is seen, not merely the viewer's psychological calm.

Earlier Pausanias had said an action itself by itself is neither beautiful nor shameful. The same phrase there brackets a bare action from its manner of performance; it does not already assert an independent metaphysical entity. Context determines what itself by itself accomplishes. At the summit its force is specified by the sustained contrasts with dependent and changing particulars.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **180e–181a.** A bare action's beauty depends on how it is done.
- **183d.** Pausanias' ordinary use of itself by itself must be distinguished from the later description.
- **210e–211b.** Temporal, relational, bodily and dependent forms of beauty are excluded.
- **211b–211d.** Participation, the final study and the life worth living.
- **211e–212a.** Pure divine beauty leads to true virtue rather than images.

In this edition. The edition renders the phrase itself by itself consistently and the adjective single in form. It does not insert a capitalized noun Form into every occurrence. At 211c its what beautiful is follows the supplied accentuation and is identified in the note as an interpretation.

See also. Participation; Beauty and ugliness; Ascent; Knowledge; Pure and unmixed.

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The good

Headwords and labels: ἀγαθός (agathos); οἰκεῖος (oikeios); ἀλλότριος (allotrios)

The word. Good can describe a person, action, object or result. In Diotima's argument it supplies the evaluative condition under which possession, wholeness and lasting existence are wanted. The article's heading does not imply that every use names an independently described Form of Good.

In the Symposium. Socrates' question to Agathon establishes that good things are beautiful. The argument does not state that every beautiful thing is therefore good, and treating the premise as a reversible identity obscures its use. If Love lacks beauty, and goods are beautiful, he lacks goods too. Diotima then substitutes good for beautiful in the question about what the lover wants. Socrates can explain the outcome of possessing good things: the possessor will be happy.

The good also provides the explicit qualification to the search for one's half or whole. A person will consent to losing a hand or foot judged bad, so membership in one's original whole is not sufficient to make something desirable. Diotima does not simply ban the language of one's own. She permits calling the good akin and one's own and the bad alien, but then goodness, rather than prior ownership, determines the valuation.

The final formula has three parts: the good, its being the lover's, and its being so always. Immortality subsequently enters with the good, not as a self-sufficient aim for which any kind of endless existence would do. Diotima explains many pursuits by this structure, but the dialogue has not established that people correctly identify what is good in every case. Her as they think about bodily progenitors

preserves an explicit distance between a pursuit and its promised fulfilment.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201c.** The direction of the implication from good to beautiful.
- **204d–205a.** Substitution of good reveals happiness as the answer's end.
- **205d–206a.** Good qualifies the appeal to half, whole and one's own.
- **206e–207a.** Immortality is desired along with the good.
- **208e.** The expected immortality, memory and happiness of physical offspring are qualified by as they think.

In this edition. The translation keeps good distinct from beautiful, even when the argument connects them. Its akin for the ownness adjective at 205e must be read with and his own; the phrase is not evidence for an independently defended doctrine of natural affinity.

See also. Happiness; Love; Present and future possession; Immortality.

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Touch and transmitted wisdom

Headwords and labels: ἅπτομαι (haptomai); ῥέω (rheō); ἔριον (erion); κενός (kenos); ἐφάπτομαι (ephaptomai)

The word. Haptesthai can mean bodily touching, taking hold of an object of thought, or attacking. Rheō supplies a material process for the first of these settings: water flows through wool from a fuller cup to an emptier one.

In the Symposium. Agathon invites Socrates to recline beside him so that touch may communicate the wise thing supposedly discovered in the porch. Socrates answers that

it would be fine if wisdom behaved like water passing through wool between cups. The sentence is conditional, not an endorsed physical theory of education. He then reverses Agathon's estimate of the two men, saying that he himself would gain much brilliant wisdom from his host. Agathon calls him insolent.

The scene tests a tempting idea of learning: proximity to a possessor would be enough to fill a deficit. Alcibiades later proposes a comparable exchange, expecting bodily favour to secure everything Socrates knows. In both scenes an attraction to wisdom is real, but the proposed mode of acquisition is inadequate or unverified.

The later occurrences of touching should neither be ignored nor collapsed into this joke. At 209c Diotima's pregnant soul touches and associates with the beautiful companion, giving birth and nurturing something together. At 211b one nearly touches the goal; at 212a contact with what is true explains the production of true rather than merely imaged virtue. The family can thus mark fruitful encounter as well as a mistaken shortcut. At Delium its hostile sense, laying hands on a fighter, supplies a reminder that the verb itself has no single philosophical meaning.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175c–e.** Agathon's wish and Socrates' conditional cup-and-wool comparison.
- **209c.** Touch and company accompany generation and shared nurture.
- **211b–212a.** Reaching the goal and contact with truth develop nonliteral senses.
- **218d–219b.** The proposed exchange of beauties resumes the problem of acquiring an inner good.
- **221b.** The ordinary hostile sense appears in the account of retreat.

In this edition. At 175c the words “by touching you” are printed from T and W, while B omits them. The English preserves the optative and conditional construction of Socrates’ reply. The wool conducts water; it is not presented as producing wisdom or causing intellectual insight.

See also. Exchange and gold for bronze; Knowledge; Birth and begetting; Beauty and ugliness; Companionship and shared presence.

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True virtue and images

Headwords and labels: εἴδωλον (eidōlon); ἀληθής (alēthēs); τρέφω (trephō); θεοφιλής (theophilēs)

The word. An image can resemble what it does not itself fully instantiate. True here means genuine virtue, not merely an accurate sentence about virtue. Nurture matters because giving birth is not treated as the end of responsibility for the offspring.

In the Symposium. Diotima’s culminating claim joins contemplation to ethical production. The person who sees beauty with the appropriate means and keeps company with it will there alone be able to generate not images of virtue but true virtue, because the object touched is true rather than an image. This is the local reason for the contrast. The passage does not enumerate every earlier product that should now be assigned to the inferior category, so one should not casually label all poems, laws and educational friendships counterfeit.

The birth imagery has persisted from bodily generation through psychic offspring and the proliferating speeches of the ascent. Its final application prevents a reading of the highest life as passive visual consumption. Yet the genuine product is not guaranteed by a fleeting encounter

alone: Diotima adds nurtured it. Becoming loved by the gods belongs to the person who has both generated and reared true virtue. The sentence then offers its qualified culmination concerning immortality, if such a thing belongs to any human being.

Phaedrus' phantom of Orpheus' wife supplies a thematic comparison, but uses different Greek vocabulary; the two passages must not be presented as attestations of the same noun-family. It is also distinct from the divine statues inside the Silenus figures in Alcibiades' praise. Those statues can suggest an inner value concealed by an unpromising exterior; they should not be silently identified with the inferior images of virtue excluded at 212a.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179d.** Phaedrus' phantom of Orpheus' wife supplies a thematic comparison in different Greek vocabulary.
- **209a–209e.** Psychic products and their common rearing prepare the final birth.
- **210d.** Philosophical contemplation is already productive in speeches and thoughts.
- **211e–212a.** Contact with true beauty, true virtue, nurture, divine favour and qualified immortality.
- **215a–215b; 222a.** Alcibiades' divine statues form a distinct image and vocabulary.

In this edition. The English supplies virtue with the feminine true adjective in the first contrast and then translates the explicitly repeated noun in the following clause. This makes the ellipsis intelligible without changing its referent. The means of vision is not explicitly named as mind.

See also. Birth and begetting; The beautiful itself; Immortality; Seeing and contemplating.

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Virtue and becoming better

Headwords and labels: ἀρετή (aretē); βελτίων (beltiōn)

The word. Aretē names excellence, not one fixed activity throughout these speeches. “Becoming better” supplies its practical direction: an erotic relationship is defended by what it can contribute to a person’s formation. That aim must be distinguished from the claim that a given lover actually has or transmits virtue.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus emphasizes a transformation toward courage: love can make even a poor character resemble someone naturally excellent in danger. Pausanias makes education the condition under which the beloved’s compliance becomes beautiful. His account includes wisdom and other parts of virtue, and he distinguishes an educator’s real ability from the youth’s possibly mistaken belief in it. The beautiful deception of 185a–b does not make deception itself a virtue; it preserves the moral value of the deceived person’s sincere aim.

Agathon assigns justice, temperance, courage and wisdom to Love himself. Each is supported by a verbal argument or mythic example, and none should be presented as a definition independently accepted by Socrates. Diotima’s turn to souls gives virtue a productive setting: intelligence and the other virtues are conceived, expressed in educational speeches, and embodied in laws and ordered civic life. At the summit the contrast is between images of virtue and true virtue, because the lover is in contact with the true rather than an image. This exceeds merely acquiring the praise of an admired audience.

Alcibiades’ proposed exchange tests the educational promise dramatically. He puts becoming as good as

possible first and offers Socrates his beauty and resources. Socrates refuses to confirm that wisdom can be bought in that fashion and asks him to examine what he supposes Socrates possesses. The desire to become better is genuine in the report, but not self-executing.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179a–180b.** Phaedrus connects erotic courage and divine reward.
- **184b–185c.** Pausanias makes educational improvement the condition of noble gratification.
- **196b–197b.** Agathon distributes the principal excellences to Love.
- **208d–209e.** Immortal virtue, education and legislative offspring.
- **210b–c.** Beautiful souls call forth speeches that improve the young.
- **212a.** True virtue is contrasted with images.
- **218c–219b.** Alcibiades offers an exchange for improvement; Socrates asks for scrutiny.

In this edition. The edition consistently uses “virtue” for aretē. Its comparative language is consequential: wishing to become better is not the same as having become so. At 212a the English supplies “virtue” after “true” to make the Greek contrast with images of virtue intelligible; it is not introducing a second, unrelated object.

See also. Gratification and favour; Voluntary slavery and service; Justice, agreement and force; Temperance and self-command; Endurance; Courage and composure; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture.

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Voluntary slavery and service

Headwords and labels: δουλεία (douleia); ἐθελοδουλεία (ethelodouleia); θεραπεύω (therapeuō)

The word. The language is stronger than polite helpfulness: Pausanias deliberately calls the behavior slavery. Its voluntary character and educational purpose are supposed to remove a reproach that would otherwise attach to free people's servility.

In the Symposium. His argument begins from asymmetrical conventions. A lover can implore, sleep at doors and serve a darling in ways that would be condemned if used to gain money or office. For the beloved there remains one parallel exception: willing service for wisdom or another part of virtue. The two norms are to coincide, so that one supplies educational benefit and the other responds for the sake of becoming better.

The apparent reciprocity does not dissolve the role distinction, and it does not authorize every bargain called educational. Pausanias specifically excludes money and civic power as durable grounds of noble friendship. His case of the deceived youth separates the learner's character from the teacher's actual worth.

Diotima later calls narrow attachment to one beautiful person or practice a kind of small-minded servitude that the lover must outgrow. Alcibiades, meanwhile, portrays himself as a runaway from Socrates and eventually as enslaved to him despite the failed bargain. These later uses prevent Pausanias' formula from becoming the dialogue's final, unqualified description of philosophical education.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **183a–c.** Courtship receives an exception from the normal reproach of servility.
- **184b–185b.** The educational exception and the two norms of service.
- **210c–d.** Diotima opposes narrow servitude to an expanding view of beauty.
- **216b.** Alcibiades represents flight from Socrates as running away.
- **218c–219e.** His attempted bargain ends in perplexity and a sense of enslavement.

In this edition. The translation preserves “slavery”, “willing slavery” and “voluntary slavery”, rather than sanitizing the social metaphor. At 184d it also marks Burnet’s supplied infinitive in the construction about doing service. These remain the claims of Pausanias’ speech.

See also. Gratification and favour; Virtue and becoming better; Law and custom; Beauty and ugliness; Ascent.

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Wholeness and the half

Headwords and labels: ὅλος (holos); ἥμισυς (hēmisys); συμφύω (symphyō)

The word. The contrast between whole and half describes a damaged original nature and a desire to overcome division. In this story a “half” is a present human being, not simply an incomplete personality awaiting a romantic partner.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes first imagines three kinds of double-bodied humans. Their assault on the gods leads Zeus to cut each in two. The first response is disastrous: the halves embrace, refuse to act separately,

and die of hunger. Zeus' second intervention relocates their genitals so sexual satisfaction can permit a return to work and ordinary life. Thus neither cutting nor reunion alone explains the condition of present humans.

The lovers' deepest wish exceeds sexual intercourse. Hephaestus' hypothetical offer of permanent fusion gives words to what their souls can only intimate. Aristophanes names love the desire and pursuit of the whole. Yet the story is less rigid than a popular doctrine of one predestined soulmate: a survivor can seek another half at 191b. Complete return to the ancient nature remains a hope conditional on piety, while the best available present relation is its nearest approximation.

Diotima's correction is decisive. Neither half nor whole is loved unless it is good; people will even amputate their own hands and feet if these seem bad. The argument does not deny affection or the experience of belonging. It denies that restoration or ownership alone supplies love's sufficient criterion. Aristophanes attempts to respond when Socrates finishes, but the entrance of the revellers interrupts him. The reader receives the correction, not a completed debate between the two accounts.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **189d–190d.** Three original kinds and Zeus' decision to divide.
- **190e–191c.** Repair, starving embraces and the second intervention.
- **191d–192c.** Different attractions and the meeting of halves.
- **192d–193d.** Hephaestus, whole-seeking and the conditional hope of restoration.
- **205d–206a.** Goodness qualifies every claim of half, whole or one's own.

- **212c.** Aristophanes' attempted answer is interrupted.

In this edition. The edition's "whole", "half", "tally" and "section" preserve different aspects of the story. At 192e the formula crosses the boundary into 193a, so a range is useful. The cutting of bad limbs at 205e is Diotima's counterexample, not another episode in Aristophanes' prehistoric myth.

See also. Androgyne and the three kinds; Tally and matching halves; Hephaestus and fusion; The good; Divination, piety and right.

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Wisdom and philosophy

Headwords and labels: σοφία (sophia); φιλοσοφέω (philosopheō); φιλόσοφος (philosophos); φιλοσοφία (philosophia)

The word. The family keeps loving and wisdom audible together. Wisdom itself can refer to particular excellence or expertise, so each claim requires its speaker and context. Philosophy is not defined here as possession of the very wisdom it seeks.

In the Symposium. At the opening, Apollodorus associates a transformed life with philosophy, and Agathon hopes to gain Socrates' insight by sitting next to him. Socrates' fantasy of wisdom flowing like water through wool exposes the questionable picture of teaching as effortless transfer. Agathon subsequently ascribes comprehensive poetic and productive wisdom to Love. Diotima instead makes Love a desirer of intelligence and a lifelong philosopher.

Her reasoning has two sides. The wise do not seek to become wise, since they already are; the ignorant who think themselves sufficient do not recognize a need to

seek. The philosopher is between these extremes. This does not condemn all people who lack knowledge to incuriosity. It singles out self-satisfied ignorance as the opposing condition. Love's genealogy supplies an imaginative explanation: his father provides resource and his mother lack. The conjunction makes pursuit possible.

The premise that wisdom belongs among the most beautiful things connects the argument to Love's object; the text does not infer philosophy solely from an etymology. At 210d philosophy expands beyond one treasured body, person or way of life and becomes prolific in beautiful speeches and thoughts. Alcibiades later calls the participants partners in wisdom-loving madness. His emotional, bodily metaphor shows another aspect of philosophical involvement, but his inability to live as Socrates' words demand prevents treating enthusiastic attachment as completed wisdom.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **173a–173c.** Apollodorus' changed valuation of philosophy.
- **175c–175e.** The fantasy of transmitted wisdom.
- **196d–197b.** Agathon's ascription of productive wisdom to Love.
- **203d–204b.** The philosopher's intermediate status is argued.
- **210c–210e.** Philosophy generates thought through expanding apprehension of beauty.
- **218a–218b.** Alcibiades describes philosophical speech as a bite and shared frenzy.

In this edition. The translation uses love wisdom and lover of wisdom where the argument requires the compound's force, and philosophy for the noun. This entry does not use the daggered word in Pausanias' corrupt passage at 183a as independent proof of a philosophical doctrine.

See also. Ignorance and sufficiency; Knowledge; Resource and Poverty; Ascent.

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Explained vocabulary

These compact records retain words, constructions, persons and images whose local force can be explained more briefly. They are independently defined rather than being bare directions to another article.

Achilles and Patroclus

Headwords and labels: Ἀχιλλεύς (Achilleus); Πάτροκλος (Patroklos)

The word. The relationship's roles are part of Phaedrus' argument, not left implicit.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus rejects Aeschylus' presentation of Achilles as lover. He argues from Achilles' greater beauty, lack of beard and younger age that Achilles is the beloved. Forewarned that killing Hector will bring his own death, Achilles nevertheless avenges Patroclus and chooses to die after him. The gods reward this reciprocation more than Alcestis' sacrifice, although the inspired lover is described as more divine. Diotima later explains Achilles' choice through the prospect of an immortal memory of virtue.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179e–180b.** The roles, foreknowledge and greater divine reward.
- **208d.** The same death is used in Diotima's explanation of ambition.

In this edition. The edition's notes identify the Homeric and Aeschylean references. This is a local interpretation debated inside Phaedrus' speech, not a claim that the Homeric poems themselves explicitly present the exact relationship vocabulary used here.

See also. Dying for another and dying after; Lover and beloved; Honour and ambition.

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Acusilaus

Headwords and labels: Ἀκουσίλεως (Akousileōs)

The word. The name provides corroboration within Phaedrus' sequence of authorities.

In the Symposium. Acusilaus is made to concur with Hesiod that Earth and Love came after Chaos. This supports the claim that Love belongs among the oldest gods; it does not by itself establish the moral benefits Phaedrus next attributes to Love. Agathon later contests the chronological thesis itself.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178b–c.** The corroborating genealogy.
- **195b–c.** Agathon rejects Phaedrus' antiquity claim.

In this edition. Burnet relocates this sentence from its manuscript position after the Parmenides quotation and adopts a verb from Stobaeus, as the edition's note explains. This is a reported editorial arrangement, not a newly collated reading.

See also. Hesiod; Parmenides; Encomium, praise and hymn.

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Agreement and premise

Headwords and labels: ὁμολογέω (homologeō); ἀνομολογέομαι (anomologeomai)

The word. An acknowledged premise makes the next inference possible; it must retain its content and scope.

In the Symposium. The questioning repeatedly checks what Agathon accepts before applying it to Love. Socrates then begins Diotima's account from what he and Agathon have agreed. The later inference to immortality likewise cites agreed premises. These markers help readers distinguish an argument's commitments from unrelated opinions asserted elsewhere in the banquet.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **199b–201c.** Admissions are obtained, recalled and applied.
- **201d.** The report begins from the present exchange's agreements.
- **206e–207a.** The immortality claim follows from the established account of love.

See also. Probability and necessity; Truth and persuasion.

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Alcestis

Headwords and labels: Ἄλκηστις (Alkēstis)

The word. Alcestis is an exemplum, a named figure whose act is offered as evidence for a claim about love.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus contrasts her willing death for her husband with the refusal of his living parents. The gods send her soul back from Hades in admiration of her deed. Achilles receives still greater honor because his response, as beloved rather than inspired lover, is judged more admirable. Diotima later asks whether Alcestis would have died without expecting immortal memory of her virtue. The later interpretation adds a different explanatory motive rather than repeating the earlier praise unchanged.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179b–d.** Alcestis surpasses the parents and receives a rare divine reward.
- **180b.** Achilles' honor is explicitly greater.
- **208c–d.** Diotima relates the sacrifice to lasting fame.

In this edition. The edition names her husband Admetus in the note to 179b and in the dialogue at 208d. The local account should not be expanded with unmentioned details of other versions of her story.

See also. Dying for another and dying after; Honour and ambition; Achilles and Patroclus.

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Alcibiades

Headwords and labels: Ἀλκιβιάδης (Alkibiadēs)

The word. The name identifies both a witness to Socrates and the speaker whose own desires are made visible by his testimony.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades comes to crown Agathon, finds Socrates unexpectedly, and takes command of drinking. His praise includes truth-claims, likenesses, intimate confession, and memories of shared military service. He admires Socrates while feeling insulted by him, and acknowledges escaping the self-examination he cannot refute. His warning to Agathon is interpreted by Socrates as a manoeuvre of jealousy. Neither drunkenness alone invalidates everything he says nor his oath makes the encomium neutral.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **212d–215a.** Arrival, crowning, drinking, and agreement about truth prepare his speech.

- **215a–222b.** The praise discloses admiration, frustration, and military evidence.
- **222c–223a.** Socrates and Agathon expose its continuing erotic stakes.

In this edition. The edition's historical notes add later events from Alcibiades' career. The present entry does not import them as unspoken content of his speech or as a verdict that the dramatic report itself pronounces.

See also. Laughter and frankness; Jealousy and reconciliation; Care of oneself and neglect; Courage and composure.

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All and every

Headwords and labels: πᾶς (pas); σύμπας (sympas)

The word. Universal words do not always range over all reality. They concern all humans, gods, desires, or other beautiful things according to the clause.

In the Symposium. Diotima tests the claim that everyone agrees Love is a god by showing that Socrates' own admissions undermine it. At 205a the universal wish for lasting good is distinguished from the subset ordinarily called lovers. At 206c all humans have bodily and psychic pregnancy, a claim that must remain alongside the later comparison that some are more pregnant in soul. At 211b all other beautiful things share in the final beautiful; other excludes confusing the participated object with its participants.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **202b–202c.** An asserted universal agreement is challenged.
- **205a–205d.** Universal desire differs from restricted naming.

- **206c; 209a.** All and more prevent an exclusive two-class division.
- **211b.** Other specifies the class of participants.

See also. Naming whole and part; Body and soul; Participation.

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Always

Headwords and labels: ἀεί (aei)

The word. Always does not carry a single pre-established metaphysical meaning at every occurrence.

In the Symposium. Love is always poor, yet gains resources and loses them. Mortal nature always leaves something new behind and a person is always becoming new; these are continuing processes. By contrast, the beautiful itself always is and does not come to be or perish. In the definition of love, always names the lover's desired continuity of good, not an already achieved condition. The argument depends on the difference between desiring unbroken possession, renewing what passes away, and being invariant.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203c–203e.** Love's persistent lack and fluctuating resource.
- **206a.** The temporal component of the definition.
- **207d–208b.** Ongoing renewal contrasts with divine sameness.
- **210e–211b.** Beauty's permanence excludes generation and destruction.

See also. Present and future possession; Immortality; The beautiful itself.

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Apollodorus and Aristodemus

Headwords and labels: Ἀπολλόδωρος (Apollodōros); Ἀριστόδημος (Aristodēmos); μαλακός (malakos)

The word. These names identify different places in the chain of testimony. Apollodorus tells the story now; Aristodemus was present at the dinner.

In the Symposium. Apollodorus is devoted to Socrates and has rehearsed the account recently, but admits that he too has forgotten some of what he heard. His interlocutor challenges his belief that everyone except Socrates is wretched. Aristodemus is small, habitually barefoot, and described as exceptionally devoted to Socrates; he is not a disinterested recording device. His memory selects speeches and his sleep leaves the final argument incomplete. Their commitment makes the report possible while their limitations remain visible.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–174a.** The two narrators' roles, chronology, devotion, and personal manner are established.
- **178a; 180c; 223b–d.** Forgetting and sleep explain gaps in the transmitted account.

In this edition. Burnet prints "Soft" at 173d from B. Other witnesses have a correction to "mad," echoed by Apollodorus' response about madness. The supplied reading should not be silently replaced with the more familiar nickname.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Memory and rehearsal; Bare feet and cloaks.

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Appearing

Headwords and labels: φαίνω (phainō); φαντάζομαι (phantazomai)

The word. Appearance language may describe a misleading impression or the mode in which something presents itself. It is not always equivalent to falsehood.

In the Symposium. Socrates criticizes praise that seeks to make Love seem splendid to those who do not know. Diotima diagnoses his beautiful portrait as a confusion between the object loved and the subject loving. At the summit, the denial of a bodily appearance tells the learner what not to expect of beauty itself. The later use therefore does not say the final object is unreal; it limits its manner of presentation.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **198e–199a.** Rhetorical appearance is contrasted with truthful praise.
- **204c.** An apparent beauty follows a subject/object confusion.
- **211a–211b.** The final object is not presented in a bodily or dependent guise.

See also. Truth and persuasion; Love; The beautiful itself.

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Approach and recoil

Headwords and labels: προσπελάζω (prospelazō); διαχέω (diacheō); συσπειρᾶται (syspeiratai); ἀνείλλεται (aneilletai)

The word. The verbs trace physical-looking movements that make the generation analogy vivid.

In the Symposium. Beauty prompts a gracious, joyful opening and birth; ugliness prompts coiling, aversion and painful retention. The contrast explains why the pregnant

subject is so excited about beauty. These are the subject's reactions to the condition of birth, not actions performed by the conceived child. The subsequent psychic application makes their figurative force clear.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206d–206e.** The contrasting sequences explain productive release and blocked generation.

See also. Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting.

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Arcadians and being broken apart

Headwords and labels: Ἀρκάδες (Arkades); διοικίζω (dioikizō)

The word. The political verb makes bodily division resemble the dispersal of a community.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes compares humans separated by the god to Arcadians separated by the Spartans. The comparison gives the myth a civic scale: unity can be lost through punitive dispersal, and another division remains a threat. The edition connects it with Mantinea's historical breakup, an event later than the dramatic date of the dinner; that dating inference belongs to editorial historical interpretation.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **192e–193b.** Lost unity, political comparison and the warning of another cut.

In this edition. The note identifies the historical comparison and its apparent anachronism. This entry does not infer a precise composition date beyond what that note supports.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Law and custom; Divination, piety and right.

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Ares held by Love

Headwords and labels: Ἄρης (Arēs)

The word. The proof turns on holding and being held, with the god Love and the passion named by the same word.

In the Symposium. Agathon invokes Ares' love for Aphrodite: since Love holds the god most courageous among the others, the holder must be stronger and more courageous. The sequence is a rhetorical proof by mastery, not a demonstrated definition of courage. Its shift between the god and the passion is part of the verbal ingenuity.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196c–d.** The sequence from temperance through mastery to courage.

In this edition. The edition notes that the adapted line originally names Necessity as what Ares cannot resist, and that the Ares-Aphrodite story is the familiar Homeric one. The article follows the adaptation as spoken here.

See also. Courage and composure; Necessity; Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

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Arrows, capture, and Ajax

Headwords and labels: βέλος (belos); ἄτρωτος (atrōtos); ἁλίσκομαι (haliskomai); Αἴας (Aias)

The word. Weapons and capture translate an attempted seduction into an unsuccessful campaign. The metaphors identify Alcibiades' strategic imagination, not an actual bodily wound.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades believes his declaration has hit its target, then finds that bodily closeness and offered beauty do not secure Socrates. He already knows money is still less effective: Socrates is invulnerable to it at every point, beyond the comparison with Ajax's protection from iron. The account moves immediately to actual campaigning, where Socrates saves the genuinely wounded Alcibiades. Metaphorical aggression and real protective action therefore stand in pointed contrast.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **219b–e.** Imagined arrows, invulnerability, failed capture, and bewilderment describe Alcibiades' defeat.
- **220d–e.** Socrates saves Alcibiades when he is actually wounded in battle.

In this edition. Burnet prints plural "arrows" from B at 219b; other witnesses have the singular. The note explains Ajax's vulnerability at one point in a lost tragedy, but the present comparison's essential feature is Socrates' resistance to bribery.

See also. Exchange and gold for bronze; Temperance and self-command; Courage and composure.

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As they think

Headwords and labels: οἴομαι (oiomai); δοκέω (dokeō)

The word. The small reporting clauses preserve whose judgement is being described.

In the Symposium. Diotima's broad explanation of desire does not prove that every desired means achieves its intended good. As they think qualifies the expectation surrounding bodily offspring, while the amputation example depends on what people judge bad. Earlier self-

sufficient ignorance likewise turns on a mistaken judgement about oneself. A paraphrase that removes these markers can wrongly convert a psychology of pursuit into a guarantee of success.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **204a.** Mistaken self-sufficiency blocks desire for wisdom.
- **205e.** The amputation example is framed by judgement.
- **208e.** The reproductive expectation remains attributed to those who hold it.

See also. The good; Ignorance and sufficiency; Happiness.

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Asclepius

Headwords and labels: Ἀσκληπιός (Asklēpios)

The word. The name links a practical expertise with its claimed divine founder.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus says Asclepius established medicine by knowing how to create love and concord among opposites. He explicitly attributes this to what the poets say and adds that he is persuaded. The invocation honors his craft, as Agathon later honors poetry by making its god supremely skilled. It is a professional genealogy inside the speech, not independently demonstrated medical history.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **186d–187a.** Asclepius founds medicine by reconciling opposites.
- **196d–e.** Agathon imitates the doctor’s honoring of his own craft.

In this edition. The note identifies the conventional Asclepiad affiliation of doctors. The immediate referent of “these poets here” is interpreted by the edition as the poets at the table; that identification should remain an interpretation.

See also. Medicine and healing; Opposites and unlike objects.

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At least and argumentative focus

Headwords and labels: γε (ge); γοῦν (goun)

The word. These particles guide emphasis and the local force of an assertion. They do not always have one mechanical English equivalent.

In the Symposium. Pausanias’ closing phrase gives virtue focused prominence as the end that makes gratification beautiful. Aristophanes’ goun marks the practical result of satiation even where procreation is not the outcome of the embrace. The qualification matters because the myth subsequently distinguishes sexual satisfaction from the deeper desire for union. These small words are useful signs of how much the speaker claims at that moment.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **185b.** Focused insistence on virtue as the end.
- **191c.** The limited practical benefit of satiation.

In this edition. The edition preserves “at least” in both local contexts, though ge and goun are not identical particles. The elided form g’ in the printed phrase is retained as an attestation rather than silently expanded.

See also. For the sake of and because of; Surfeit and emptying; Gratification and favour.

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Ate and tender feet

Headwords and labels: Ἄτη (Atē)

The word. The divine name identifies the bearer of the tender-footed description, not another name for Love.

In the Symposium. Agathon cites Ate's movement over people's heads rather than the ground to support an inference from soft footing to tenderness. He then transfers and refines the reasoning: Love dwells among soft souls and characters. The analogy is deliberately ingenious, and its attribution to a god of destructive delusion complicates the bland sweetness of the encomium without requiring an imported theory of Ate.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195c–e.** Homer's example and Agathon's transfer of the inference.

In this edition. The edition's note identifies the Homeric context and glosses Ate as "Delusion". The article keeps the distinction between the quoted feet and Agathon's claim about the god's overall tenderness.

See also. Tenderness, softness and hardness; Hesiod; Encomium, praise and hymn.

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Attention and strengthening

Headwords and labels: προσέχω (prosechō); ῥώννυμι (rhōnnymi); αὐξάνω (auxanō)

The word. The learner's strengthened attention is distinct from the invariant object eventually apprehended.

In the Symposium. The sequence is pedagogical: sustained generation of speeches and thoughts strengthens and enlarges the learner, and Diotima calls

for the greatest possible attention before describing the final object. The later denial that beauty increases or diminishes therefore concerns the object, not a denial that the philosopher undergoes development.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **210d–210e.** Strengthening, growth and explicit attention prepare the final description.
- **211a–211b.** Increase is denied of beauty itself, not of the learner.

See also. Ascent; The beautiful itself.

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Cause and explanation

Headwords and labels: αἴτιον (aition); αἰτία (aitia)

The word. The cause-words ask why a disposition or action occurs. They do not impose one universal kind of causation.

In the Symposium. The genealogy explains Love's nature through inherited characteristics; the account of animal care explains its otherwise surprising sacrifices through mortal nature's pursuit of immortality. Socrates' request at 207c shows that the narrative of behaviour itself has not supplied the explanation. Descriptions of causation should keep these local mechanisms clear, rather than attaching technical formal, efficient or final labels that the passage does not itself distinguish.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **204b.** Parentage explains Love's character.
- **205b–205c.** Productive causation defines making broadly.
- **207a–208b.** Observed animal behaviour calls for an account of its cause.

See also. Making and poetry; Immortality; Resource and Poverty.

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Charmides and Euthydemus

Headwords and labels: Χαρμίδης (Charmidēs); Εὐθύδημος (Euthydēmos)

The word. The patronymics distinguish the persons more precisely than their names alone.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades claims that Socrates does not merely behave this way toward him, but deceives many by appearing as lover and becoming beloved instead. Charmides and Euthydemus are examples in that allegation. The claim illustrates the reversal of expected erotic roles; it supplies no detailed account of either man's encounter.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **222a–b.** The names expand Alcibiades' personal complaint into a warning to Agathon.

In this edition. The notes identify Charmides and cautiously suggest which Euthydemus is meant. The continuous dialogue does not identify this Euthydemus as the sophist of the dialogue bearing that title.

See also. Love; Companionship and shared presence; Alcibiades.

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Cicadas and birth into earth

Headwords and labels: τέττιξ (tettix)

The word. The insect comparison belongs to the myth's contrast between two arrangements of generation.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes says the original creatures begot and gave birth into the earth like cicadas. Zeus' later device makes generation occur in one another and makes sexual satisfaction possible, allowing the embracing halves to resume work. The comparison is part of a narrated prehistoric anatomy, not a scientific account of human reproduction.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **191b–d.** The second divine device changes generation and makes everyday life sustainable.

In this edition. The edition's "cicadas" translates the explicit insect name. The source does not elaborate its biology or explain the comparison further.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Surfeit and emptying; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture.

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Common nurture

Headwords and labels: συνεκτρέφω (synektrephō); κοινωνία (koinōnia); βέβαιος (bebaios)

The word. Generation is followed by cooperative education and care, not merely by possession of a product.

In the Symposium. The beautiful companion is not a wholly passive container: after the lover generates what he has long carried, they rear it together. Diotima grounds the strength of their partnership in their more beautiful and more immortal children. The claim is her comparative valuation of educational relationships, not a universal empirical proof that every intellectual friendship lasts longer than every family.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **209b–209d.** Encounter, educational speech, birth, memory and common nurture form a sustained relationship.
- **212a.** Nurture is again required after true virtue is born.

See also. Birth and begetting; True virtue and images.

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Commonplace crafts

Headwords and labels: ὄνος κανθήλιος (onos kanthēlios); χαλκεύς (chalkeus); σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos); βυρσοδέψης (byrsodepsēs)

The word. These concrete nouns name animals and working occupations, not coded philosophical entities with a fixed hidden equivalent.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades says Socrates seems always to speak about the same things through the same things. Pack-asses and familiar craftsmen form the rough exterior of speeches that repay being opened. The point is not that any mention of a shoemaker is profound; it is that social prestige and verbal grandeur are unreliable tests of an argument's sense. The sequence culminates in what must be examined to become beautiful and good.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **221d–222a.** Commonplace vocabulary is the satyr-like exterior of arguments with ethical scope.

In this edition. The translation differentiates smiths, shoemakers, and tanners. It does not turn them into three formal branches of a craft taxonomy in this passage.

See also. Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Knowledge; Making and poetry; Laughter and frankness.

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Corybantic response

Headwords and labels: κορυβαντιάω (korybantiaō)

The word. The printed form is a participle describing those who undergo the Corybantic condition, not the proper noun alone.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades compares the bodily effects of hearing Socrates with ritual excitement: his heart leaps and tears flow. The comparison's "more" intensifies the claim, while the following confession explains its ethical content. He recognises his own servile condition and his neglect of himself. The passage neither identifies philosophy with a particular cult nor supplies a general classification of inspired madness.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **215d–216a.** Bodily agitation and tears distinguish Socratic discourse from admired oratory.

In this edition. The edition's "the Corybants'" compresses the Greek participial construction into familiar English. Its note supplies ritual context; the claim of heightened response belongs to Alcibiades.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Bite, madness, and initiation.

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Cutting, repair and the navel

Headwords and labels: τομή (tomē); ὀμφαλός (omphalos); βαλλάντιον (ballantion); καλάπους (kalapous); μνημεῖον (mnēmeion)

The word. The myth's bodily repair combines surgical, tailoring and leather-working images. The navel is not only a scar but an intended reminder.

In the Symposium. Zeus divides; Apollo turns the face and neck toward the wound, gathers the skin like a purse, ties the central opening and smooths most wrinkles with a shoemaker-like implement. Some wrinkles remain around the belly and navel so the old suffering will not be forgotten. The different agents and tasks matter: Apollo does not devise the original punishment, and the later relocation of genitals belongs to Zeus' second remedy. Looking at the wound is supposed to induce orderliness, making anatomy part of the myth's moral education.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **190d–191b.** Division, repair and a visible memorial precede the new reproductive arrangement.

In this edition. The edition translates the concrete comparisons directly. "Memorial" should not be promoted into a technical doctrine of recollection; it is the lasting bodily reminder specified by the story.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Order and disorder; Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.

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Deception and intention

Headwords and labels: ἀπάτη (apatē); ἐξαπατάω (exapataō)

The word. The active deceiver and the deceived person must remain distinct. The unusual positive judgment concerns what the mistake reveals about the latter's purpose.

In the Symposium. Pausanias constructs parallel failures. Someone who gratifies a supposedly rich lover for money

remains shameful when no money arrives, because the mercenary intention was already displayed. Someone who gratifies a supposedly good lover to become better is not shamed when the lover proves bad, because the intention was virtue. The conclusion does not endorse the educator's deception or claim that being deceived actually improves the learner.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **184e–185b.** The two parallel cases and their different moral verdicts.

In this edition. The edition retains the startling "the deception is beautiful". The preceding reasoning is needed to prevent this phrase from becoming an unrestricted commendation of deception.

See also. Gratification and favour; Virtue and becoming better; Testing, pursuit and flight.

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Dionysus

Headwords and labels: Διόννσος (Dionysos)

The word. The name links the party's drinking with its dramatic occasion. These connections are active in the conversation before Alcibiades introduces satyrs and Bacchic language.

In the Symposium. Agathon answers Socrates' teasing deference by proposing that Dionysus judge their wisdom. Later the crown, drunken arrival, silenus and satyr comparisons, and the vocabulary of Bacchic frenzy give the evening a strongly Dionysiac texture. Yet the dialogue does not explicitly announce a formal verdict by the god. Treating Alcibiades as the exact fulfilment of the opening promise is a possible dramatic interpretation, not the content of the proper name itself.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175e; 177e.** The god is named as judge and as patron of the comic poet's occupation.
- **212e–218b.** Wreath, satyrs, and Bacchic frenzy develop related imagery.
- **223c–d.** The night closes with the relation between tragedy and comedy.

In this edition. The edition identifies Dionysus as god of dramatic festivals and wine. The lexical record distinguishes that supplied context from the stronger interpretive claim that a particular character literally speaks as the god.

See also. Wreaths and ribbons; Bite, madness, and initiation; Comedy and tragedy; Drinking and sobriety.

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Divine teachers and craft pupils

Headwords and labels: Ἀπόλλων (Apollōn); Ἀθηνᾶ (Athēna); Ζεύς (Zeus); Μοῦσα (Mousa)

The word. The familiar divine names occupy different explanatory roles as the speakers develop their accounts of Love.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes gives Zeus the problem of punishment and survival, and Apollo the practical repair of the divided bodies. Agathon reverses the hierarchy of expertise by making Apollo, the Muses, Hephaestus, Athena and Zeus pupils of Love in their characteristic crafts. This supports his claim that Love has the wisdom he imparts. The two speeches need not be forced into one literal divine chronology: their craft-images serve different explanations.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **190c–191c.** Zeus devises, Apollo repairs, and Zeus makes a second intervention.
- **197a–b.** The divine crafts are all attributed to instruction by Love.

In this edition. The edition marks the Zeus phrase at 197b as a quotation whose source is unknown. The body-repair passage uses the shortened accusative Apollō, distinct from the nominative Apollōn in the craft-list.

See also. Cutting, repair and the navel; Hephaestus and fusion; Medicine and healing; Making and poetry.

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Dreamlike wisdom

Headwords and labels: ὄναρ (onar)

The word. Onar here names a likeness rather than a dream actually narrated.

In the Symposium. Socrates calls his wisdom paltry or disputable, like a dream, against Agathon's brilliant and publicly witnessed achievement. The extravagant contrast belongs to the irony Agathon immediately recognises as insolence. It does not prove that Socrates has received a dream revelation in the porch or that all his thought is unreal.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175d–e.** Dreamlike personal wisdom is set against Agathon's theatrical brilliance.

In this edition. The edition's "being like a dream" attaches to Socrates' wisdom. Diotima's separate reference to divine-human communication during waking and sleep at 203a is not the same image or a narrated explanation of this comparison.

See also. Irony, play, and earnestness; Touch and transmitted wisdom.

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Earnestness and exertion

Headwords and labels: σπουδή (spoudē); σύντασις (syntasis)

The word. These nouns characterize intensity and commitment before the correct object and mode of activity have been fully explained.

In the Symposium. The definition of love through lasting good still leaves open what people actually do. Diotima asks in which action their earnestness and exertion would count as love, then answers with birth in beauty. Animal struggle for offspring subsequently displays that strenuous commitment. Intensity alone is not treated as the criterion of a correct ascent: it must be educated and redirected.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206b.** The activity behind desire's earnestness must be identified.
- **207a–208b.** Animal nurture and sacrifice show its extent.
- **210b.** Vehemence for one body is relaxed through learning.

In this edition. The supplied text prints the noun exertion at 206b; the apparatus records a different related noun in T and W. This entry does not silently substitute that variant.

See also. Birth and begetting; Ascent.

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Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants

Headwords and labels: Ἐφιάλτης (Ephialtēs);Ὦτος (Ōtos); γίγας (gigas)

The word. The passage uses two related but distinct mythic comparisons: an attempted ascent and a precedent for divine annihilation.

In the Symposium. The original humans' strength and pride lead them to attack the gods. Aristophanes aligns this with the Homeric story of Ephialtes and Otus. When the gods deliberate, destroying the humans like the Giants would also destroy the honors and sacrifices the gods receive. Zeus therefore devises division rather than annihilation. The comic dependence of the gods on worship helps explain the shape of the punishment.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **190b–d.** Attack, divine dilemma and the device of cutting.

In this edition. The edition identifies the Odyssey passage for the two named brothers. It does not equate them with all the Giants, and this entry keeps the comparisons distinct.

See also. Wholeness and the half; Cutting, repair and the navel; Divination, piety and right.

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Evidence and testimony

Headwords and labels: τεκμήριον (tekmērion); μαρτυρία (martyria)

The word. Evidence may be an absence, an example, an analogy or a cited poetic line. Calling it evidence is itself part of a speaker's presentation.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus moves from divine genealogy to exemplary actions; Aristophanes offers political behavior as confirmation of his account of male-derived youths; Agathon reasons from soft surroundings to tenderness. These are different evidential moves, and the lexicon should identify each rather than treating the shared noun as a certification of proof. The subsequent questioning of Agathon changes the standard by asking what follows from explicit agreements.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178b–c.** Genealogical evidence for antiquity.
- **179b–c.** An exemplary act as testimony.
- **192a.** A politically charged claim offered as evidence.
- **195b–e.** Signs support the god's youth and tenderness.
- **199c–201c.** Questions test the qualities previously attributed to Love.

In this edition. The edition's "piece of evidence" usefully avoids making every tekmērion a conclusive demonstration. Speaker attribution is especially important where a claim is a comic exaggeration or rhetorical analogy.

See also. Hesiod; Alcestis; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Agreement and premise; Refutation and examination.

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Flowers, bloom and fragrance

Headwords and labels: ἄνθος (anthos); εὐανθής (euanthēs); εὐώδης (euōdēs); εὐσχημοσύνη (euschēmosynē)

The word. The sensory terms combine bodily attractiveness with the language of flourishing and decay.

In the Symposium. Pausanias uses bodily bloom to expose an unstable attachment: when the flower fades, the merely bodily lover flies away. Agathon instead makes flowering and fragrant surroundings evidence of Love's beautiful complexion. Diotima later says a person with a worthy soul can suffice even with little bodily bloom, subordinating the image without erasing it. Thus the same attractive surface can signify transience, poetic perfection, or something outweighed by a soul's value. The slight bodily bloom allowed at 210b is not a claim that the person has no physical attractiveness at all.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **183e.** The fading body tests a lover's constancy.
- **196a–b.** Graceful form, flowers and fragrance support Agathon's praise.
- **210b–c.** A worthy soul is sufficient despite little bodily bloom.

In this edition. The English preserves "bloom" or "flower" according to the immediate construction. Agathon explicitly extends flowerlessness to body, soul or anything else; the metaphor is not limited to literal flowers.

See also. Tenderness, softness and hardness; Testing, pursuit and flight; Beauty and ugliness; Ascent; Body and soul.

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Following and guidance

Headwords and labels: ἕπομαι (hepomai)

The word. The verb of following can name bodily accompaniment, allegiance, or comprehension. The construction and situation decide which is meant.

In the Symposium. The command to follow brings Aristodemus to dinner; his following Socrates out the next

morning closes the frame. Between these physical uses Diotima asks Socrates to follow an account whose culmination may exceed him. At the close Agathon and Aristophanes agree while failing to follow attentively. Physical presence and spoken agreement are therefore not sufficient evidence of intellectual grasp.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174b; 197e.** Socrates invites a follower; Agathon calls Love a leader whom all should follow.
- **210a.** Diotima's invitation to follow is expressly conditional on ability.
- **223d.** Inattentive following of an argument contrasts with habitual physical following.

In this edition. "If you are able" at 210a should not be omitted. At the final physical following Burnet supplies a pronoun identifying Aristodemus; the surrounding narration, not the verb alone, distinguishes him from Socrates.

See also. Attention and standing still; Companionship and shared presence; Comedy and tragedy.

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For a mortal and so far as possible

Headwords and labels: ὡς (hōs); δυνατός (dynatos)

The word. These phrases make the limits of mortal fulfilment explicit.

In the Symposium. Generation is not said to turn the mortal creature straightforwardly into an unchanging god. It is deathless in the way available to mortal nature, which is then explained through replacement and offspring. Keeping the qualifiers prevents the immortality vocabulary from promising more than the intermediate

argument establishes. The different closing possibility at 212a must still be read on its own terms.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206e–207a.** The immortality of generation receives a mortal qualification.
- **207d–208b.** Capacity is limited, and replacement explains the possible achievement.

See also. Immortality; Renewal and identity.

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For the sake of and because of

Headwords and labels: ἕνεκα (heneka); διά (dia)

The word. The purpose for which something is done and the cause through which it happens must not be silently exchanged.

In the Symposium. Pausanias' paired cases at 185a–b keep the outward gratification comparable while changing its end. A failed attempt to gain money is still shameful; a failed attempt to obtain virtue can reveal a beautiful intention. Aristophanes' "because of our injustice" explains why the cut occurred, rather than stating an end people seek. The small expressions carry distinctions that a thematic paraphrase about love and goodness can easily lose.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **184e–185b.** Different purposes decide the evaluation of otherwise similar actions.
- **193a.** A causal explanation of the punishment.

In this edition. The edition's "for the sake of" should retain its named object. "Through", "because of", and "for the sake of" are not interchangeable stylistic alternatives; case and context decide the relation.

See also. Gratification and favour; Virtue and becoming better; Wholeness and the half.

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Form and figure

Headwords and labels: εἶδος (eidos); ἰδέα (idea)

The word. The familiar Greek nouns must not receive one technical sense everywhere.

In the Symposium. Agathon uses the vocabulary for Love's supple figure. Diotima uses one noun for species in the naming analogy and the other for the different character of the loving subject. At 210b beauty in form still occurs within the inference about all beautiful bodies. The culminating beautiful itself is characterized by independence and single-form being at 211b; that argument, rather than the bare appearance of a form-word, supplies the grounds for a metaphysical reading.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **196a.** Agathon's description of a supple figure.
- **204c.** Loving subject and beloved have different characters.
- **205b–205d.** A form is a species within the wider pursuit.
- **210b–211b.** Bodily form and the later single-form beautiful must be distinguished.

See also. Naming whole and part; The beautiful itself.

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Glaucon and Phoenix

Headwords and labels: Γλαύκων (Glaukōn); Φοῖνιξ (Phoinix)

The word. The names let the reader reconstruct two branches of a reported story, not two independent eyewitness accounts.

In the Symposium. Glaucon's previous information came from a person who heard Phoenix. He mistakes the gathering for a recent occasion, and Apollodorus corrects him. Both Phoenix's report and Apollodorus' derive from Aristodemus, though Apollodorus has also checked some matters with Socrates. Glaucon is not the unnamed companion addressed in the present frame, nor should he be identified solely from his name with every other Platonic Glaucon.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **172a–173b.** The earlier questioner and the report's common source are distinguished.

In this edition. The source note expressly leaves uncertain whether this Glaucon is Plato's brother. Charmides is later called son of Glaucon at 222b; the shared name is not proof that his father is the questioner here.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Charmides and Euthydemus.

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Godsend

Headwords and labels: ἕρμαιον (hermaion)

The word. Hermaion calls something a lucky find or godsend. The word names the speaker's favourable appraisal, not an independently certified divine gift.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus sees an advantage for weak drinkers in the others' inability to drink heavily. Alcibiades later imagines a more consequential piece of luck: he thinks bodily favour will secure everything

Socrates knows. The failure of that plan shows why recognising an apparent opportunity and understanding its real value are different.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **176c.** The doctor sees a practical advantage for the weaker drinkers.
- **217a–219d.** Alcibiades' imagined lucky exchange ends in frustrated expectation.

In this edition. The edition renders both occurrences "godsend," and explains the connection with Hermes in the first note. The second use does not introduce a new intervention by that god.

See also. Drinking and sobriety; Exchange and gold for bronze.

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Gorgias and the Gorgon

Headwords and labels: Γοργίας (Gorgias); ἀφωνία (aphōnia)

The word. The Greek actually names the head of Gorgias; the Gorgon belongs to the recognized Homeric allusion and pun.

In the Symposium. Socrates jokes that Agathon's brilliant ending may send a formidable speaker's head against him and petrify him into silence. The compliment is followed by his distinction between truthful praise and lavish attribution without regard to truth. The joke marks both Agathon's rhetorical achievement and Socrates' refusal to compete on identical terms. It is not a literal assertion that rhetorical beauty prevents inquiry: Socrates immediately begins a different kind of speaking.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **197d–198c.** Agathon's patterned ending and the petrifaction joke.
- **198d–199c.** The joke turns into criticism of the standard of praise.

In this edition. The note identifies Odysseus' fear of the Gorgon head and the pun on the rhetorician's name. It also distinguishes the "dread" or "formidable" force of the adjective in the allusion. "Gorgon" is an English lookup title, not claimed as a Greek word printed in this passage.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Speech and account; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Hades and the Isles of the Blessed

Headwords and labels: Ἅιδης (Haidēs); μακάρων νῆσοι (makarōn nēsoi)

The word. The locations differentiate mythic outcomes rather than form one systematic map of the afterlife.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus makes Alcestis' return, Orpheus' failure and Achilles' blessed destination evidence of divine judgments on devotion. Aristophanes later imagines Hephaestus making lovers one not only throughout life but in Hades after death. The wish for persistent union is clear, but the passage remains a hypothetical offer. These accounts should not be identified without argument with Diotima's later explanation of mortal continuity through generation.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179b–180b.** Contrasting destinations and rewards.
- **192d–e.** The imagined union continues after death.

In this edition. The English keeps the mythic place-names. The normalized phrase-headword for the islands is distinguished from the exact accusative phrase supplied as its attestation.

See also. Alcestis; Orpheus and the phantom; Achilles and Patroclus; Hephaestus and fusion; Immortality.

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Heroic and oratorical counterparts

Headwords and labels: Βρασίδας (Brasidas); Νέστωρ (Nestōr); Ἀντήνωρ (Antēnōr); Περικλῆς (Periklēs)

The word. The names provide comparative types: a fighter can resemble Achilles, an orator earlier counsellors. Their function is relational rather than biographical.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades does not deny that other men display courageous or impressive conduct. He distinguishes particular achievements from Socrates' combination of person and speech, for which no human counterpart can be found. The failure of this otherwise workable comparative method sends him back to sileni and satyrs. Pericles' earlier appearance sharpens the distinction between admired speaking and speech that unsettles the hearer's life.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **215e.** Pericles illustrates impressive oratory without the same ethical disturbance.
- **221c–d.** Familiar historical-heroic comparisons establish the contrast with Socrates.

In this edition. The source notes supply historical and Homeric identifications. The argument here requires only the text's pairings, not a claim that the figures are identical in all virtues or political aims.

See also. Outlandishness; Courage and composure; Hearing and enchantment; Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

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Hesiod

Headwords and labels: Ἡσίοδος (Hēsiodos)

The word. Hesiod's name serves three distinct argumentative functions: witness, disputed predecessor, and productive poet.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus cites Chaos, Earth and Love to support Love's great age. Agathon later attributes the violent ancient divine affairs to Necessity rather than Love, conditionally granting that the poets speak truly. Diotima is no longer asking whether a genealogy establishes Love's age: she treats Hesiod's surviving works as offspring that confer immortal fame. The named poet's authority is thus used, questioned and relocated.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178b–c.** The genealogical citation.
- **195b–c.** Agathon disputes the inference about Love's age.
- **209c–d.** Poetic works as enduring offspring.

In this edition. The note at 178b observes that Phaedrus' quotation omits intervening lines of the Theogony. The lexicon does not treat the shortened quotation as a complete transcription of Hesiod's passage.

See also. Acusilaus; Parmenides; Necessity; Making and poetry.

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Hiccup and sneeze

Headwords and labels: λύγξ (lynx); πταρμός (ptarmos); γαργαλισμός (gargalismos); πτάρνυμαι (ptarnymai)

The word. A small bodily disturbance changes the literary sequence and becomes a test of the doctor's explanatory language.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes cannot speak, so Eryximachus speaks first while prescribing breath-holding, gargling and finally a sneeze. The narrative does not state confidently that overeating caused the hiccup. Once cured, Aristophanes asks whether the orderly body desires such noises and ticklings. The joke takes up Eryximachus' own language of bodily desires and order without delivering a formal refutation of his entire medical cosmology.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **185c–e.** The interruption, exchanged turns and successive remedies.
- **189a–b.** The sneeze becomes a comic challenge to the doctor.

In this edition. The edition preserves the uncertain cause and the sequence of remedies. The practical sequence also governs the changed order of the speeches.

See also. Medicine and healing; Order and disorder; Laughable and ridiculous.

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Hunting and devices

Headwords and labels: θηρευτής (thēreutēs); μηχανή (mēchanē); ἐπίβουλος (epiboulos)

The word. Hunting, plotting and weaving devices describe purposeful ingenuity. Device can also name a structural means, without implying dishonest trickery.

In the Symposium. The genealogy makes Love both needy and inventive. His pursuit of beauty and good is strenuous and strategic, unlike the polished beloved Socrates had imagined. When the same device-noun returns in the mortality argument, it names the process of replacement. The later occurrence does not accuse mortal nature of deception; it identifies the route by which a limited creature continues.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203b–203e.** Poverty's plot and Love's inherited inventiveness.
- **208b.** Replacement is a device for mortal participation in immortality.

See also. Resource and Poverty; Renewal and identity.

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Hush and good omen

Headwords and labels: εὐφημέω (euphēmeō)

The word. The literal appeal to good-omened speech functions as Hush in the supplied translation.

In the Symposium. Diotima's response treats the leap from not beautiful to ugly as something Socrates should not casually utter about Love. She immediately follows the rebuke with an argument, so ritual colouring does not replace explanation. The recurrence in Socrates' exchange with Alcibiades shows the phrase's conversational range as well as its religious resonance.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201e–202a.** A rebuke introduces the correction of a false dilemma.
- **214d.** Socrates checks Alcibiades with the same formula.

In this edition. The edition's note explains the auspicious-speech sense and marks the blasphemy comparison as interpretation. The continuous text prints the interrogative formula; Hush is its contextual English rendering.

See also. Diotima; Between.

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If and if indeed

Headwords and labels: εἰ (ei); ἐάν (ean); εἴπερ (eiper)

The word. These particles organize dependencies. They are small words with large consequences for the scope of a philosophical conclusion.

In the Symposium. The dialogue's arguments repeatedly reason from agreed premises rather than asserting every claim without qualification. If love is for the good always, immortality is also desired; if guidance is right, the learner begins the prescribed course; if immortality belongs to any other human, it belongs to the producer and nurturer of true virtue. The strengthened particle can sound confident, but removing it changes what the sentence says. The related if-ever and if-anywhere constructions around the vision likewise preserve a conditional or emphatic comparison, not a report that Socrates has already undergone it.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201b–201c.** Conditional consequences of the admissions about love.

- **207a.** The immortality inference retains its premise.
- **210a.** Correct guidance is a condition.
- **211d–212a.** Seeing and immortality are expressed with important conditions.

See also. Immortality; Ascent.

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Intelligence

Headwords and labels: φρόνησις (phronēsis); διακόσμησις (diakosmēsis)

The word. Intelligence is not used here solely as a modern measure of mental ability. It concerns sound understanding and, in the account of psychic offspring, its excellent practical expression.

In the Symposium. Diotima uses intelligence on the cognitive side of the contrast with ignorance, then makes Love a desirer of it. When she asks what a soul appropriately conceives and produces, the answer is intelligence and the rest of virtue. The wording includes intelligence within the field of excellence rather than placing it outside ethics.

She singles out the ordering of cities and households as by far the greatest and most beautiful kind of intelligence, calling it temperance and justice. These are her explicit valuations. The passage does not supply a complete institutional programme, nor does it establish that every administrator or legislator has the stated virtue. The ensuing examples of poems, laws and education illustrate productive psychic life. Elsewhere the word can praise Socrates' understanding, so no one technical sense should erase the difference between knowledge, practical ordering and a person's perceived judgement.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **202a.** Intelligence marks the higher side of the right-opinion comparison.
- **203d.** Love desires intelligence.
- **209a.** Psychic offspring include intelligence, with civic and household order singled out.
- **219d.** Alcibiades admires Socrates' intelligence and endurance.

In this edition. The edition renders the noun intelligence. At 209a its the affairs of follows the printed conjectural article agreeing with the singular ordering; the apparatus records a different construction. The lexicon follows the continuous text and does not claim an independent restoration.

See also. Knowledge; Wisdom and philosophy; Birth and begetting.

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Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord

Headwords and labels: ἄκλητος (aklētos); αὐτόματος (automatos); καλέω (kaleō)

The word. Aklētos negates invitation; automatos marks coming without being summoned. Neither word by itself judges the guest's character.

In the Symposium. Socrates alters a proverb to justify Aristodemus' company, then invokes Homer's uninvited Menelaus. Aristodemus answers that he may be the inferior guest and insists that Socrates must defend his presence. At the house Agathon welcomes him and says he had already been seeking him to invite him. A possible social embarrassment is resolved by hospitality, while the joke opens questions about who is good, wise, or qualified to join.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174b–175a.** Proverb, Homeric comparison, protested invitation, and welcome are linked stages of the scene.

In this edition. Burnet prints a conjectural form of Agathon's name in the proverb where the manuscripts have "of the good." The pun concerns the host's name in either case; the translation makes the personal reference explicit.

See also. Companionship and shared presence; Following and guidance; Laughter and frankness.

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Jealousy and reconciliation

Headwords and labels: ζηλοτυπέω (zēlotypeō); φθονέω (phthoneō); διαλλάσσω (diallassō)

The word. The verbs describe contested access to people and praise. Reconciliation would restore relations without conceding the exclusive possession that the jealous speaker seeks.

In the Symposium. Socrates complains that Alcibiades prevents him from even looking at or speaking to another beautiful person. Alcibiades answers with a counterclaim: Socrates will not tolerate his praising anyone else. The ensuing encomium apparently confirms continued attachment but ends as a warning to Agathon. Socrates identifies its purpose as making himself love only Alcibiades and Agathon be loved only by Alcibiades. The couch becomes a physical map of that attempted control.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **213c–e.** Accusation, counteraccusation, and refused reconciliation prepare the praise.

- **222b–223a.** The warning to Agathon becomes a rivalry about who will sit beside and praise whom.

In this edition. The assertions of jealousy are spoken within a comic dispute, not independently certified descriptions of every past interaction. The initial narrative says ribbons prevented Alcibiades from seeing Socrates before he sat between the two men.

See also. Wreaths and ribbons; Companionship and shared presence; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Kindred beauties

Headwords and labels: ἀδελφός (adelphos); συγγενής (syngenēs)

The word. Kinship language gives the learner a way of recognizing related beauties beyond one beloved instance.

In the Symposium. The sibling comparison precedes the judgement that bodily beauty is one and the same across all bodies. The kindred predicate then helps the transition through practices and laws. These are steps in widening and reordering attention. They do not themselves state that the final beautiful is simply a collective family made from adding all attractive things together.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **210a–210b.** Bodily beauties are recognized as siblings.
- **210c.** The kinship of beauty in practices and laws widens the field.

See also. Ascent; The beautiful itself.

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Knowing and learning

Headwords and labels: γιγνώσκω (gignōskō); μανθάνω (manthanō); κατανοέω (katanoeō); νοῦς (nous)

The word. Learning, recognizing and knowing describe stages and activities, not one static possession of information.

In the Symposium. Socrates' admissions of not understanding generate requests for explanation. Recognition of needing teachers is itself a cognitive achievement, unlike the complacency attributed to ignorance. On the ascent the learner must actively grasp connections, not simply have successive objects displayed. The final knowledge is of what beautiful is. The noun mind is explicitly present in the earlier request for attention, but not in the instrumental phrase with what he must at 212a; these locations should not be merged.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206b–207c.** Lack of understanding leads to instruction and recognition of need.
- **210a–210e.** Grasping similarities and directing attention are part of education.
- **211c–212a.** Knowing the beautiful and the unnamed means of final seeing remain distinct constructions.

See also. Knowledge; Ignorance and sufficiency; Seeing and contemplating.

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Laughable and ridiculous

Headwords and labels: γελοῖος (geloios); καταγέλαστος (katagelastos)

The word. The distinction is between provoking appropriate laughter and becoming a deserving object of ridicule.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus warns that he will watch Aristophanes for something laughable. Aristophanes replies that being funny belongs to his Muse and would be a gain; what he fears is ridiculousness. He therefore asks for the right to use comedy without having the argument dismissed in advance. Socrates later uses the stronger term about his own agreement to praise Love under what he portrays as a mistaken standard. Comic self-description can introduce a serious criticism.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **189a–c.** The exchange establishes the conditions of Aristophanes' comic speech.
- **198c–199b.** Socrates uses ridicule in renegotiating the genre of praise.
- **215a.** Alcibiades says his likeness serves truth, not merely laughter.

In this edition. The edition uses "laughable" and "ridiculous" to preserve the contrast. Those renderings should not be collapsed into "comic", which would erase the difference in evaluation.

See also. Irony, play, and earnestness; Encomium, praise and hymn; Speech and account.

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Leader, pilot and companion

Headwords and labels: ἡγεμών (hēgemōn); κυβερνήτης (kybernētēs); ἐπιβάτης (epibatēs); σωτήρ (sōtēr)

The word. The titles evoke leadership and companionship through danger rather than one technical account of causation.

In the Symposium. Aristophanes makes Love leader and general toward recovery of one's own, conditional on reconciliation with the gods. Agathon accumulates a larger set of roles: pilot, marine, comrade and savior, following peace and festal gathering. The rapid accumulation is characteristic of his encomium. It should not be converted into the assertion that a pilot and a marine perform the same task or that each image independently proves Love's goodness.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **193a–d.** Love guides the hoped-for restoration.
- **197c–e.** Peace, festivity and the final cluster of protective roles.

In this edition. The edition preserves "pilot" and "marine" as distinct terms. At 197e it also keeps "in speech" among the circumstances of assistance, following the supplied text rather than replacing it with a conjectured battlefield word.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Wholeness and the half; Order and disorder.

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Letting be and not letting go

Headwords and labels: ἐάω (eaō); ἀνίημι (aniēmi)

The word. Letting someone be and refusing to let a question go are different but complementary actions in the portrayal of Socratic attention.

In the Symposium. Aristodemus prevents repeated summons from interrupting Socrates' customary standing. At Potidaea Socrates himself refuses to release a problem simply because it has not yielded. The first verb protects space for inquiry; the second shows the inquirer's

persistence. Neither passage says that delay by itself proves successful discovery.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175a–c.** Aristodemus asks the host not to disturb Socrates.
- **220c–d.** Socrates continues seeking through a long period without progress.

In this edition. The phrase “did not let go” translates a negated verb, not a positive statement that Socrates already knew the answer. It is stronger evidence for persistence than for accomplishment.

See also. Attention and standing still; Endurance.

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Lyceum

Headwords and labels: Λύκειον (Lykeion)

The word. The place-name returns the narrative from an exceptional night to a recognisable setting of daily activity.

In the Symposium. Socrates leaves after the poets fall asleep, with Aristodemus following as usual. He goes to the Lyceum, washes, and spends the day as at other times before resting at home in the evening. The detail completes the portrayal of endurance, but also refuses a grand concluding declaration: philosophical conversation gives way to an ordinary day.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **223d.** The last movement is from the banquet to the Lyceum and eventually home.

In this edition. The edition identifies the Lyceum as a gymnasium sacred to Apollo Lyceius. No claim about

Aristotle's later school is needed to explain this occurrence.

See also. Endurance; Companionship and shared presence; Sleep and dawn.

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Marsyas and Olympus

Headwords and labels: Μαρσύας (Marsyas);Ὄλυμπος (Olympos)

The word. The names identify the musical side of the satyr comparison. Olympus is the person named in that teaching relation, not Mount Olympus.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades expressly attributes the tunes played by Olympus to Marsyas because Marsyas taught him. This helps detach the music's power from one performer: whoever plays the tunes can produce the relevant possession. Socratic words are similarly said to affect hearers when repeated by someone else. The musical genealogy therefore does argumentative work rather than supplying only mythological ornament.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **215b–d.** Marsyas, Olympus, and later performers establish the analogy for words that retain their power when retold.
- **215e–216c.** Alcibiades calls Socrates his Marsyas as he describes the effects on his own soul.

In this edition. The source notes recount Marsyas' musical contest with Apollo, but Alcibiades does not narrate that contest here. The lexical focus is the teaching and transmission of compelling tunes.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Narrating and reporting.

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Meeting and encounter

Headwords and labels: ἐντυγχάνω (entynchanō)

The word. Entynchanō means come upon or meet, with no necessary implication that the meeting was planned or that it produces understanding.

In the Symposium. A chance-seeming meeting starts Aristodemus' participation in the dinner. The same everyday verb can describe finding an unexpected book, encountering an educable beautiful soul, and recognising the extraordinary person one has been with. Alcibiades' use after the failed seduction changes the encounter's significance: bodily proximity has disclosed a character he had not anticipated.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174a; 177b.** A person and an unexpected book are encountered.
- **209b; 219d.** An encounter may make educational or ethical possibility visible.

In this edition. The translation varies "met," "came across," and "met with" with the object. These are local renderings of a common verb, not separate technical kinds of revelation.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Companionship and shared presence; Outlandishness.

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More and less

Headwords and labels: μᾶλλον (mallon); τιμιώτερος (timiōteros); ἔλαττον (elatton)

The word. Comparatives preserve distinctions that a blunt either/or translation can destroy.

In the Symposium. Psychic pregnancy more than bodily pregnancy does not mean absence of bodily pregnancy. More honourable beauty of soul ranks objects without denying bodily beauty. More beautiful and more immortal children in the education passage likewise express a comparison of enduring products, not a literal percentage of deathlessness. Conversely the more/less pair at 211b is wholly negated: participation does not change the magnitude of the beautiful itself.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **209a–209c.** Comparative pregnancy and offspring.
- **210b–210c.** The ascent changes the ranking of beauty.
- **211b.** Both increase and diminution are excluded.

See also. Body and soul; Immortality; Participation.

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More, rather than and no less

Headwords and labels: μᾶλλον (mallon); οὐχ ἧττον (ouch hētton)

The word. These comparative expressions rank or equate; they do not automatically divide people into mutually exclusive classes.

In the Symposium. The two clauses describing Common Love are especially vulnerable to distortion. Women are loved no less than boys, and bodies more than souls. Neither clause means that Common Love is only heterosexual or only bodily. Elsewhere Phaedrus compares the gods' admiration for beloved and lover, while Diotima says some are pregnant more in soul than body. A summary should preserve the compared items

and the direction of the comparison, not convert “more” into “only”.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **180a–b.** Greater admiration for the beloved’s reciprocation.
- **181b.** The two comparisons characterize Common Love.
- **209a.** Greater pregnancy of soul does not exclude bodily pregnancy.

In this edition. The edition’s “no less than” and “rather than” are deliberately different. The phrase record includes the negative because hētton alone would mean “less”, the opposite of the phrase’s assertion.

See also. Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Lover and beloved; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture; Only and not every.

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Nature

Headwords and labels: φύσις (physis); πέφυκα (pephyka)

The word. Nature can describe inherited constitution, a creature’s characteristic striving or the character of the final object.

In the Symposium. Diotima explains Love’s disposition through parentage, mortal nature through generation and renewal, and beauty’s nature through the exclusions that follow its introduction. The word alone does not identify all three with one substance or imply that a mythic genealogy is a biological explanation. The scope-limiting so far as possible is essential when nature is said to seek immortality.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203c–204b.** Love's nature is explained through his two parents.
- **206c.** Human nature desires birth.
- **207c–208b.** Mortal nature's limited route to continuation.
- **210e–211b.** The beautiful's marvellous nature is specified.

See also. Resource and Poverty; Immortality; The beautiful itself.

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Necessity

Headwords and labels: Ἀνάγκη (Anankē); Κρόνος (Kronos); Ἰαπετός (Iapetos)

The word. This capitalized Necessity is a power within a poetic account, distinct in function from an argument's logical necessity.

In the Symposium. Agathon rejects the claim that Love is older than Cronus and Iapetus: the ancient castrations and bindings, he argues, could not have occurred if Love were ruling. They belong to Necessity, if the poets' accounts are true. His concluding return makes the birth of Love the source of good things for gods and humans. The temporal story serves his praise of a young and peaceful god; it is not a systematic reconciliation of every divine genealogy cited at dinner.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195b–c.** The old divine violence is reassigned to Necessity.
- **197b–c.** Love's birth and kingship explain a new order of benefits.

In this edition. The translation capitalizes the personification. The same ordinary Greek noun elsewhere can express a requirement or necessary inference; those uses need their own argumentative context.

See also. Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Hesiod; Parmenides; Justice, agreement and force; Probability and necessity.

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Nectar and garden

Headwords and labels: νέκταρ (nektar); κῆπος (kēpos); προσαιτέω (prosaiteō)

The word. These concrete details stage the contrast between divine abundance and Poverty's need.

In the Symposium. Resource's intoxication and sleep make Poverty's opportunity, while her place at the doors displays the want that motivates her plan. The text does not say that someone formally expelled or excluded her. Nectar rather than wine is explicit and matters in a dialogue whose human banquet is organized around wine; the myth should not be retold as though Resource had been drinking ordinary wine.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203b–203c.** Feast, intoxication, garden, begging and conception form the genealogy's scene.

See also. Resource and Poverty.

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Not and neither

Headwords and labels: οὔτε (oute); μή (mē)

The word. Negation and an opposed positive predicate are different. Not beautiful need not mean ugly; not knowledgeable need not mean ignorant.

In the Symposium. Diotima makes this distinction explicit and supplies right opinion as a counterexample to an exhaustive binary division. At the summit a long chain of negations removes becoming, destruction, variable beauty and dependence on another thing. Those exclusions jointly characterize the final object; no isolated negative should be treated as its complete positive definition.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201e–202b.** The false move from negation to a contrary is corrected.
- **210e–211b.** Coordinated denials establish invariance and independence.

See also. Between; The beautiful itself.

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Not yet and at hand

Headwords and labels: οὔπω (oupō); ἕτοιμος (hetoimos)

The word. Not yet distinguishes what is unavailable now from what could never be available. At hand concerns the relevant possession, not merely physical nearness.

In the Symposium. Socrates' healthy person desires the future continuation of health, which is not yet possessed. The negative temporal expression is what makes this an instance of lack despite present health. Elsewhere readiness can describe willingness to act or die; that ordinary use should not be substituted for availability in this argument.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **200c–200e.** Present qualities and their not-yet-secured future continuance are distinguished.

See also. Present and future possession; Desire and lack.

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Not yet and the stage of an argument

Headwords and labels: πω (pō)

The word. The particle makes the statement local to a stage in Eryximachus' exposition.

In the Symposium. Before turning to human application, the doctor says that distinguishing erotic relations in the construction of harmony and rhythm presents no difficulty and that double Love is not there yet. The difficult distinction returns when music is composed for people or used educationally. Dropping "yet" makes him seem to contradict his extension of two Loves to music as a whole.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **187c–e.** Technical constitution precedes the problem of ethical application.

In this edition. Burnet prints Badham's pō, "yet"; the reported main manuscripts have pōs, accented as "how". The entry follows the continuous printed reading and marks its editorial basis.

See also. Music, harmony and rhythm; Urania and Polyhymnia.

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Offshoot

Headwords and labels: ἀποβλάστημα (apoblastēma); ἔκγονος (ekgonos)

The word. Organic growth and descent supply related images for what outlasts its producer.

In the Symposium. The offshoot phrase explains animal care after the replacement account. The offspring of Homer and Hesiod extend the image to poems that provide immortal fame and remembrance. The text invites comparison between biological and cultural continuance without making a poem literally a biological child or proving that its author remains personally conscious through it.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **208b.** Care for one's offshoot follows the immortality explanation.
- **209c–209e.** Poetic and legislative offspring sustain their producers' remembrance.

See also. Birth and begetting; Immortality.

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Only and alone

Headwords and labels: μόνος (monos); μοναχοῦ (monachou)

The word. Restrictive expressions must be kept with the verb or phrase they qualify rather than generalized into a whole philosophy.

In the Symposium. Only in this way at 207d concerns the account of mortal nature's continuity through birth and replacement. It must not erase the printed contrast that the immortal is preserved in another way. There alone at 212a gives the final vision an exclusive productive

significance within Diotima's argument; it does not explicitly list all previous products as fraudulent or claim that no other human can behave virtuously in any ordinary sense.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **207d–208b.** The mortal route is restricted but distinguished from the immortal route.
- **212a.** The unique locus of generating true virtue is stated.

See also. Immortality; True virtue and images.

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Only and not every

Headwords and labels: οὐ πᾶς (ou pas); μόνος (monos); μοναχοῦ (monachou)

The word. Negation and exclusive terms determine the strength and scope of the speakers' claims.

In the Symposium. Pausanias' "not every Love is beautiful" leaves some Love praiseworthy; it does not deny beauty of all love. His later "there alone … nowhere else" is much more restrictive: it identifies the educational joining of the two norms as the sole acceptable situation for the beloved's gratification. Phaedrus' claim that only lovers willingly die for others is also strong and belongs to him. These formulations should be presented with their speakers and qualifying objects, not weakened into vague tendencies or amplified into Plato's settled conclusions.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179b.** The exclusivity claim about self-sacrifice.
- **181a.** The denial of universal praiseworthiness.
- **184c–e.** The tightly restricted educational exception.

In this edition. The phrase ou pas must be indexed with its negative intact. The edition preserves the emphatic “there and there alone” at 184e; the lexicon should not omit it while explaining Pausanias’ conclusion.

See also. Gratification and favour; Dying for another and dying after; More, rather than and no less.

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Opposites and unlike objects

Headwords and labels: ἀνόμοιος (anomoios); ἐναντίος (enantios); ψυχρός (psychros); πικρός (pikros); ξηρός (xēros); θερμός (thermos); γλυκύς (glykys); ὑγρός (hygros)

The word. Unlikeness of conditions and opposition between constituents belong to successive steps of the doctor’s argument, not to a single unexplained maxim that all opposites naturally attract.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus first distinguishes healthy and sick states and their different desires. He then gives the practitioner the task of making hostile opposites friends and lovers. The reconciliation is something expertise produces, not an automatic fact already present merely because the objects are opposite. The seasonal extension similarly makes the quality of their blend, rather than any one constituent by itself, determine the outcome.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **186b–e.** Different states, different desires and the doctor’s reconciliation.
- **188a–b.** Good or bad seasonal relations among opposed constituents.

In this edition. The dative in each printed pair marks the opposed relation: cold to hot, bitter to sweet, dry to wet.

“Unlike desires unlike things” must retain the preceding reference to unlike bodily conditions.

See also. Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Seasons, blending and astronomy.

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Orpheus and the phantom

Headwords and labels: Ὀρφεύς (Orpheus); φάσμα (phasma); κιθαρῳδός (kitharōidos)

The word. The phantom is not the recovered person. Phaedrus makes the substitution an explicit sign of failure.

In the Symposium. In this version Orpheus does not receive his wife and then lose her by looking back. The gods show only a phantom because, Phaedrus says, he contrived to enter Hades alive rather than daring to die as Alcestis did. His later death at women’s hands is represented as punishment. The dismissal of a lyre-singer as soft belongs to Phaedrus’ heroic valuation, not to the lexicon’s judgment on music.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179d–e.** The unsuccessful descent and the punishment.

In this edition. Burnet’s continuous text has phasma; the apparatus reports a longer alternative form in other witnesses. The supplied note explicitly contrasts the better-known later look-back narrative, which must not replace this account.

See also. Dying for another and dying after; Alcestis; Music, harmony and rhythm.

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Parmenides

Headwords and labels: Παρμενίδης (Parmenidēs)

The word. Only the use made of Parmenides in this dialogue is at issue.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus quotes a line saying that Love was devised first of all gods, adding it to the testimony for antiquity. The Greek quoted line supplies no expressed subject. Agathon later names Parmenides with Hesiod while assigning the old violent affairs to Necessity if their accounts are true. Neither occurrence expounds the poem's wider account of being or knowledge.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **178b–c.** The verse supports Phaedrus' antiquity claim.
- **195c.** Agathon conditionally reassigns the ancient events to Necessity.

In this edition. The English "she" in the quotation follows the interpretive source identified by the edition's note; it is not an explicit feminine noun or pronoun printed in this Greek line. The limits of the quotation should remain visible.

See also. Hesiod; Acusilaus; Necessity.

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Peace and calm

Headwords and labels: εἰρήνη (eirēnē); γαλήνη (galēnē)

The word. The juxtaposition makes social peace and natural calm parallel effects within Agathon's praise.

In the Symposium. The youthful god's kingship supposedly ends the old order of violence. Agathon's concluding verse then ranges from people to sea and

winds, preparing the longer list of Love's benefits. The parallel resembles the earlier expansion from ethical life into nature, but it is now a poetic celebration rather than Eryximachus' account of expert discrimination.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195b–c.** Peace distinguishes Love's rule from the old divine past.
- **197c–e.** Verse and clustered epithets celebrate the benefits.

In this edition. The edition distinguishes peace from maritime calm and follows the printed reading "sleep in sorrow" later in the verse. Its alternative textual history is not needed to change the meanings of these two nouns.

See also. Necessity; Encomium, praise and hymn; Seasons, blending and astronomy.

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Pederasty and education

Headwords and labels: παιδεραστία (paiderastia); παιδεραστής (paiderastēs); φιλεραστής (philerastēs); παιδεία (paideia); παίδευσις (paideusis)

The word. The words connect an age-structured historical practice with disputed claims about education. They should neither be sanitized into modern friendship nor treated as an unqualified prescription.

In the Symposium. Pausanias distinguishes indiscriminate pursuit from a commitment to a person whose developing judgment can support a lasting common life. He refers to the approach of beard-growth, not to a stated modern legal age. His final criterion requires the younger party's sincere aim of becoming better and the older party's educational ability, though the example of deception distinguishes sincere belief from

actual ability. Eryximachus uses paideia for musical formation, showing that education is not confined to the erotic institution. Diotima later describes shared speech and nurture as productive education, and Socrates' refusal of Alcibiades' bargain tests whether this benefit can be exchanged for bodily favors.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **181c–e.** Differentiation within the practice and concern about undeveloped judgment.
- **184c–185b.** The proposed educational condition.
- **187c–e.** Education through right use of music.
- **192a–b.** Aristophanes' paired role-words.
- **209b–c.** Educational speech and shared nurture.
- **218c–219b.** The proposed exchange is questioned.

In this edition. The edition explicitly defines "pederasty" historically at 181c. Its Greek words for education are distinct from paidia, play, and should receive separate lookup routes even where their derivation is related.

See also. Lover and beloved; Virtue and becoming better; Gratification and favour; Music, harmony and rhythm; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Pipe-girl and pipes

Headwords and labels: αὐλητρίς (aulētris); αὐλός (aulos); σύριγξ (syrinx)

The word. The aulos and syrinx are distinct instruments. The female performer is not simply a decorative absence: the dismissal of one performer and the later entrance of a pipe-player help define what kind of company the guests are choosing.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus allows the player to perform for herself or the women inside while the men associate through speeches. A pipe-player later brings the drunken Alcibiades into that verbal setting. His praise then argues that Socrates can accomplish without instruments what Marsyas does through them, even when a poor female performer plays the tunes. The contrast concerns medium and efficacy, not a claim that women cannot hear philosophy; Alcibiades explicitly includes women among its affected hearers.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **176e.** The performer is dismissed so the men can share speeches.
- **212c–e.** Instrumental sound and a supporting player accompany Alcibiades' arrival.
- **215b–d.** Instruments and performers furnish the analogy for Socratic speech.

In this edition. The translation uses "pipe," "panpipes," and "pipe-girl." These should not be collapsed into a generic flute if that obscures the printed distinction between aulos and syrinx.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Marsyas and Olympus; Drinking and sobriety.

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Play and earnestness

Headwords and labels: παιδιά (paidia); σπουδή (spoudē)

The word. The opposition describes an attitude or mode of performance, not an infallible test for the truth of what is said.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus complains that much earnest effort has been spent praising trivial subjects while Love is neglected. Pausanias uses the same

earnestness vocabulary for the investments of lovers, which may be misdirected. Agathon closes by acknowledging both play and measured earnestness in his offering. This self-description discourages treating every flourish as a solemn proposition, but does not make the speech irrelevant to the inquiry. Alcibiades later contrasts Socrates' habitual play with the extraordinary things he has seen when Socrates becomes serious.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177b–c.** The disproportion of serious effort and its subjects.
- **181d–e.** Lovers' effort can be spent on uncertain prospects.
- **197e.** Agathon's mixed dedication.
- **216e–217a.** Alcibiades distinguishes Socrates' outward play and serious interior.

In this edition. Paidia, "play", should not be confused with paideia, "education", despite their visible resemblance. The edition renders spoudē according to context with earnestness or serious concern, not automatically as philosophical rigor.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Laughable and ridiculous; Irony, play, and earnestness; Virtue and becoming better.

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Plotting and ambush

Headwords and labels: ἐλλοχάω (ellochaō); ἐπιβουλεύω (epibouleuō)

The word. Ambush and plotting make erotic interaction strategic. The vocabulary can expose a speaker's projection as much as another person's intention.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades first accuses Socrates of lying in wait for him, though the narrative has shown Socrates already at dinner. His own recalled seduction is then expressly planned: private meetings, exercise, dinner, and a contrived overnight stay. Penia's earlier plotting to obtain a child from Poros supplies a significant verbal parallel, but the stories differ in agency and result. The later speech itself is judged by Socrates to conceal a plan to control the company's attachments.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203b.** Penia plots to conceive by Poros.
- **213b–c.** Alcibiades redescribes unexpected discovery as ambush.
- **217c–218c.** His own planned approaches escalate.
- **222c–e.** Socrates identifies an ulterior purpose in the praise.

In this edition. The narrator's account of arrival and the characters' later accusations are not interchangeable evidence. No claim that Socrates arranged Alcibiades' unseen entrance or seating follows from the ambush metaphor.

See also. Jealousy and reconciliation; Irony, play, and earnestness; Exchange and gold for bronze.

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Porch and threshold

Headwords and labels: πρόθυρον (prothyron); θύρα (thyra)

The word. The porch is not Agathon's dining room and not necessarily his own porch: the slave specifies the neighbours'. Doors separate the ordered company from arrivals outside.

In the Symposium. Socrates' pause displaces a guest from the expected route into dinner. Later knocking introduces

Alcibiades, and an accidentally open door allows the final crowd to enter unchecked. These concrete thresholds control who can join, delay, or dissolve the company. They can support a reading about access to philosophical company without needing to become a fixed allegory.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174e–175d.** An open door welcomes Aristodemus while Socrates remains in the neighbouring porch.
- **212c–e; 223b.** Knocking and later unguarded entry change the drinking party.

In this edition. "Neighbours' porch" is a precise spatial detail. It should not be silently replaced by "Agathon's porch" merely because the dinner is his.

See also. Attention and standing still; Companionship and shared presence; Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.

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Potidaea and Delium

Headwords and labels: Ποτείδαια (Poteidaia); Δήλιον (Dēlion)

The word. The place-names distinguish two campaign settings and several episodes. They are not interchangeable locations for one feat.

In the Symposium. At Potidaea the men share meals; Socrates endures lack of food and winter frost, later stands thinking through a separate summer day and night, and saves the wounded Alcibiades. The story then changes to the retreat from Delium, where Alcibiades is mounted and Socrates is on foot with arms. Keeping the locations, seasons, and observer's circumstances distinct prevents the dramatic examples from collapsing into a generic legend of endurance.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **219e–220e.** The Potidaea account includes scarcity, winter cold, summer inquiry, and rescue.
- **220e–221c.** The retreat from Delium supplies a second setting and a different view of Socrates.

In this edition. The source's historical notes identify the campaigns, while the continuous speech provides the sequence and distinctions used here. The two printed forms of Potidaea differ in accentuation with their inflection and are retained as printed.

See also. Courage and composure; Endurance; Sun and prayer.

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Power and capacity

Headwords and labels: δύναμις (dynamis); δύναμαι (dynamai)

The word. Power means an ability with a specified operation, not an unexplained force detached from what it accomplishes.

In the Symposium. Socrates asks about the daimonic's power after learning its intermediate rank. Diotima answers through actions of mediation, so classification alone is not sufficient. Mortal nature's capacity receives a different limitation: continuation operates through generation and replacement. Socrates' own ability to tell the account and the learner's ability to follow are also qualified. The concluding praise of Love's power therefore follows a speech that has repeatedly specified what its help can do and under what conditions.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **201d.** The narrator qualifies his capacity to reproduce the teaching.

- **202e–203a.** Daimonic power is explained through mediation.
- **207d.** Mortal capacity is limited to the route described.
- **210a; 212b.** The learner's capacity and Love's helpful power are distinguished.

See also. Daimon and mediation; For a mortal and so far as possible; Use and fellow-worker.

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Probability and necessity

Headwords and labels: εἰκός (eikos); ἀνάγκη (anankē)

The word. Likely and necessary mark different strengths of claim, not alternative translations of one judgement.

In the Symposium. Agathon tentatively answers that the lover probably does not have what he desires. Socrates presses for necessity and tests apparent counterexamples through the distinction between present possession and future retention. The resulting necessity is asserted within the agreed argument. Its scope is not an unqualified empirical assertion that people can never want anything they presently possess. Earlier Necessity appears as a personified ruler of divine affairs; that mythic figure is not the grammatical subject of this argument.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **195c; 197b.** Agathon's contrasting mythic reign of Necessity.
- **200a–200e.** The argument moves from probability to necessity and considers the present-possession objection.

See also. Desire and lack; Present and future possession.

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Pure and unmixed

Headwords and labels: εἰλικρινής (eilikrinēs); καθαρός (katharos); ἄμεικτος (ameiktos); φλυαρία (phlyaria)

The word. The three adjectives intensify the final object's unmixed character; they are not names of three additional rungs.

In the Symposium. Diotima asks what life would be like if someone saw the divine beautiful itself without human flesh, colours and other mortal nonsense. The description continues the earlier exclusion of bodily form and dependence in another thing. It does not state a hygienic programme or demand literal withdrawal from every embodied human relationship. The contrast concerns the object of the highest vision and the kind of virtue it can generate.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **211a–211b.** Body and dependent location are excluded.
- **211e–212a.** Purity leads into the contrast of image-virtue and true virtue.

See also. The beautiful itself; True virtue and images.

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Question and answer

Headwords and labels: ἐρώτησις (erōtēsis); ἀπόκρισις (apokrisis)

The word. Questioning is not merely an interruption to a prepared speech; it sets the terms an adequate answer must meet.

In the Symposium. That the beautiful become his initially sounds sufficient, but Diotima asks what this acquisition does for the lover. Substitution of good enables Socrates to

say he becomes happy. The sequence reveals a missing explanatory step and then an endpoint. The personification of an answer that yearns also places the vocabulary of desire within the inquiry itself.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **204d–205a.** The answer's lack is exposed and repaired through a new question.

See also. Happiness; End and purpose.

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Refutation and examination

Headwords and labels: ἀνακρίνω (anakrinō); ἐλέγχω (elenchō)

The word. The verbs concern an argumentative encounter, not simply scolding or victory in a competition.

In the Symposium. Socrates' account makes him occupy the role Agathon has just occupied: asserting that Love is a great beautiful god, then admitting premises that undo the portrait. The conclusion is explicitly by his own account. Diotima subsequently corrects an overreaction to the refutation, since not beautiful does not entail ugly. Refutation opens a better distinction rather than automatically delivering the opposite of the rejected thesis.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **199c–201c.** Socrates questions Agathon from shared admissions.
- **201d–202b.** The reported examination of Socrates both parallels and extends that exchange.

See also. Between; Love of something; Diotima.

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Rightly and well

Headwords and labels: ὀρθῶς (orthōs); καλῶς (kalōs)

The word. Correctly and well overlap in English, but the Greek adverbs are not the same word.

In the Symposium. The edition reads Socrates' praise at 201c as a compliment to the manner of Agathon's speech despite the refutation of its content; that is a plausible interpretation of the irony, not an independently stated distinction in that brief reply. The repeated rightly in Diotima's ascent instead qualifies the route, leadership and recognition needed for its end. At 210e orderly sequence and correctness are both named; correct order is more than merely moving rapidly through a list of attractions. Neither adverb by itself establishes that a particular speaker or learner has satisfied the standard.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **199c; 201c.** Socrates' qualified admiration for Agathon's speech.
- **209e–211c.** Correct approach, guidance and ordered beholding are repeated conditions.

In this edition. The edition's note 107 interprets the adverb at 201c through the beauty of the speech despite the failure of its account. This entry preserves that reading as an interpretation. The repeated rightly in the ascent follows the distinct adverb in the Greek.

See also. Ascent; Beauty and ugliness.

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Roundness and cartwheels

Headwords and labels: στρογγύλος (strongylos); κυβιστάω (kybistaō)

The word. Roundness is first a specified bodily feature, then part of the explanatory genealogy.

In the Symposium. The original humans have four hands and four legs, two opposed faces and one head. They walk upright but can move rapidly by rolling on their eight limbs like tumblers. Their rounded forms and paths are explained through likeness to sun, earth and moon, the three kinds' parents. This fantastic bodily completeness supplies the physical starting point for the later language of division and restoration.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **189e–190b.** Anatomy, movement and cosmic parentage.

In this edition. The English "form" here describes a bodily configuration. It should not automatically be identified with the metaphysical status of the beautiful itself later in Diotima's speech.

See also. Androgyne and the three kinds; Wholeness and the half; Cutting, repair and the navel.

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Salt, contribution and shared praise

Headwords and labels: ἅλς (hals); ἔρανος (eranos)

The word. The commonplace object and the social contribution frame the grand undertaking in deliberately ordinary terms.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus has encountered a book praising salt's usefulness while, he claims, no poet has adequately praised Love. Eryximachus answers by contributing to and gratifying his friend through the proposed speeches. The language makes praise something the guests jointly furnish, even though their accounts soon compete and correct one another.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177b–d.** Salt's praise contrasts with neglect, and the proposal becomes a contribution.

In this edition. The edition renders eranos through the phrase "bring him my contribution". The whole expression, not the noun alone, supplies the action of bringing or paying in.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Gratification and favour.

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Seeking and pursuing

Headwords and labels: ζητέω (zēteō); διώκω (diōkō)

The word. Seeking identifies an absence or unfinished task; pursuing emphasizes movement or effort towards its object.

In the Symposium. The words connect the universal aim with the different activities through which it is approached. Diotima asks not only what people want but how they pursue it. Psychic pregnancy seeks an appropriate companion; mortal nature seeks what it can of permanence; the ascent refines the field being pursued. None of these statements guarantees success merely from the fact of seeking.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **206b.** The mode of pursuit must be specified.
- **207d.** Mortal striving has a limited possible fulfilment.
- **209b–210b.** The search for fitting beauty becomes an educated pursuit.

See also. Birth and begetting; Ascent; Immortality.

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Sight of the mind

Headwords and labels: ὄψις (opsis); ὀξύς (oxys)

The word. Vision supplies a comparison for understanding, but “the sight of the mind” is an explicit phrase only in this local exchange, not an automatic gloss on every verb of seeing.

In the Symposium. Socrates tells Alcibiades to inspect his supposed inner treasure more carefully. His remark that mental sight sharpens as the eyes lose their prime challenges the young man’s confidence in youthful appearance and current judgement. Alcibiades is still far from that stage. The sentence does not assert that old age by itself makes everyone wise, or identify the unnamed seeing-capacity in Diotima’s earlier culmination as a technical faculty solely by this later phrase.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **218d–219a.** The correction of a proposed exchange culminates in a contrast between bodily and mental sight.

In this edition. The edition has “sight of the mind” for a phrase using dianoia, not the noun nous. At 212a “with what he must” leaves the faculty unnamed; the two passages should be compared without silently rewriting either.

See also. Exchange and gold for bronze; Beauty and ugliness; Attention and standing still.

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Sirens

Headwords and labels: Σειρήν (Seirēn)

The word. The plural name belongs to the familiar danger of irresistible listening. Alcibiades makes the image a means of explaining his flight.

In the Symposium. He knows that if he gives Socrates his ears he will be unable to withstand the resulting self-recognition. He therefore stops them and escapes, lest he grow old sitting beside him. The danger is presented from the conflicted listener's perspective: the speech is also what exposes his need to change. The image should not be converted into Plato's assertion that Socrates corrupts hearers or that remaining beside him is literally fatal.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **216a–c.** Flight from a compelling voice is joined to shame and the pull of public honour.

In this edition. The source note recalls the Odyssey, in which Odysseus blocks his companions' ears while he himself listens bound to the mast. Alcibiades' self-description is a free comparison, not an exact reenactment of every detail.

See also. Hearing and enchantment; Care of oneself and neglect.

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Sleep and dawn

Headwords and labels: ὕπνος (hypnos); καθεύδω (katheudō); ἐγρήγορα (egrēgora); ἀλεκτρυών (alektryōn)

The word. Sleep and waking organise access to conversation. The final cocks and daylight mark elapsed time with ordinary sensory details.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades' private speech requires first checking that Socrates is awake. At the symposium's end Aristodemus' sleep creates a gap in the report; his drowsiness after waking prevents full recall of the final

argument. The two poets then fall asleep in turn while Socrates remains capable of his ordinary day. Bodily endurance and the limits of testimony coincide, without making the sleepy witnesses dishonest.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **218b–c.** The lamp is out and the slaves gone, but Socrates is awake.
- **223b–d.** Sleep interrupts the witness's access; dawn reveals the final conversation and its incomplete reception.

In this edition. "Having put them to sleep" at the close is a playful active expression in the narrative. No drug, spell, or deliberate sleep-inducing technique is described.

See also. Memory and rehearsal; Endurance; Comedy and tragedy.

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So to speak

Headwords and labels: ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν (hōs epos eipein)

The word. The whole expression is an idiom; its meaning is not obtained by assigning "so to speak" to a single constituent.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus uses it with a sweeping military claim, Eryximachus with his expansion of love across nature, and Aristophanes with inseparable companionship. It does not withdraw the basic point, but it signals that the speaker is not insisting on the most rigid possible literal reading of the universality or precision.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **179a.** A military superlative is qualified.
- **186a.** The scope of the natural extension is qualified.

- **192c.** Near-inseparability is described with the same idiom.
- **209d.** Diotima similarly qualifies the laws' saving of Greece.

In this edition. The English consistently makes the qualification visible. A paraphrase using "absolutely all" or "never for even one instant" without it would strengthen the source.

See also. Honour and ambition; Medicine and healing; Wholeness and the half.

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Socrates

Headwords and labels: Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

The word. The name's many occurrences belong to different speakers and levels of report. "Socrates says" and "Alcibiades says about Socrates" are not equivalent forms of evidence.

In the Symposium. His own contribution questions Agathon, reports Diotima, and ends with an endorsement of her account. Alcibiades then makes his character the object of praise: erotic and ironic outwardly, independent of bodily and financial inducements, steadfast in inquiry and danger. The dialogue does not explicitly certify that he has reached the culminating vision Diotima describes. Its final portrait instead shows him still conversing, then continuing an ordinary day.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **174a–177e.** Habits, arrival, and the claim to know matters of love establish the participant.
- **199c–212c.** Questioning, reported instruction, and personal endorsement structure his speech.

- **215a–223d.** He becomes a subject of praise, answers the praise, and outlasts the party.

In this edition. The name is not a substitute for the author's. Claims made by this dramatic Socrates, claims he reports from Diotima, and claims Alcibiades makes about him are distinguished throughout these entries.

See also. Attention and standing still; Irony, play, and earnestness; Temperance and self-command; Outlandishness; Narrating and reporting.

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Sophists and Prodicus

Headwords and labels: σοφιστής (sophistēs); Πρόδικος (Prodikos)

The word. The local uses must be read before imposing a uniform modern sense of "sophist" as a consciously deceptive arguer.

In the Symposium. Phaedrus contrasts the many subjects of prose praise, including Heracles, with Love's alleged neglect. Apollodorus later teases the taste for matched sounds in "Pausanias paused". Diotima's resourceful Love is a sophist as well as a hunter and sorcerer, while her own assured answer at 208c resembles that of accomplished sophists. These uses emphasize verbal or intellectual resource and performance in different ways. None by itself establishes that every claim made by the named teacher is false.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177b.** Prodicus and prose encomia.
- **185c.** The joke about saying matching things.
- **203d.** Love's resourceful repertoire.
- **208c.** Diotima's authoritative manner.

In this edition. The edition uses “sophist” and identifies Prodicus’ Heracles narrative in a contextual note. That wider story is not reproduced or made an independent entry’s subject here.

See also. Encomium, praise and hymn; Speech and account; Resource and Poverty; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish

Headwords and labels: ὄα (oa); ᾠόν (ōion); ψῆττα (psētta)

The word. The domestic and culinary objects give comic precision to the myth’s extraordinary surgery.

In the Symposium. Zeus’ division is compared first with cutting fruit for preserving and then with cutting eggs with hairs. When present humans are described as tallies, the flatfish provides another image of the divided body. These comparisons keep physical separateness visible underneath the later account of romantic longing. They are neither decorative synonyms for “half” nor demonstrations that human beings literally derive from these objects.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **190d–e.** The fruit and egg comparisons.
- **191d.** Flatfish introduces the tally-image.

In this edition. The sorb-apple reading is Ruhnken’s correction, printed by Burnet; the reported witnesses have forms meaning eggs. The edition thus prints two distinct comparisons where the alternatives would repeat the egg. This entry follows that printed text explicitly.

See also. Cutting, repair and the navel; Tally and matching halves.

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Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist

Headwords and labels: γόης (goēs); φαρμακεύς (pharmakeus); σοφιστής (sophistēs)

The word. The three labels combine intellectual resource with enchantment and ambiguity. They are not a definition of philosophy as fraud.

In the Symposium. Diotima places these powers beside Love's lifelong love of wisdom. The portrait resists a sanitized picture of a tender, securely perfect god: desire is needy, inventive and capable of captivating others. Her own later comparison with accomplished sophists concerns the assurance of her answer. It does not by itself prove that Socrates rejects the account, since he explicitly endorses it at the end. Nor should potion-worker here be converted into a claim that Love literally poisons a named victim.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **203d.** Love's mixed powers include philosophy and enchantment.
- **208c.** Socrates characterizes Diotima's manner of authoritative teaching.
- **212b.** His final assent rules out treating the comparison as a simple repudiation.

See also. Resource and Poverty; Wisdom and philosophy; Diotima.

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Suddenly

Headwords and labels: ἐξαίφνης (exaiphnēs)

The word. The adverb marks suddenness, not necessarily an unprepared event or a supernatural intervention.

In the Symposium. The sight promised in Diotima's ascent is sudden only after ordered guidance, learning, and previous toil. The same word subsequently marks disruptive entrances and Alcibiades' surprised recognition of Socrates. These repetitions invite comparison between contemplative culmination and dramatic interruption, but the word does not make all four events the same kind of revelation.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **210e.** Preparation precedes sudden vision.
- **212c; 213c; 223b.** Abrupt sound, unexpected presence, and a new crowd redirect the evening.

In this edition. The supplied edition calls attention to the recurrence. A lexical entry can record the echo without treating it as proof that Alcibiades is the beautiful itself or that an interruption fulfils Diotima's teaching.

See also. Attention and standing still; Beauty and ugliness; Outlandishness; Drinking and sobriety; Ascent; Seeing and contemplating.

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Sun and prayer

Headwords and labels: ἥλιος (hēlios); προσεύχομαι (proseuchomai)

The word. The prayer is a reported action following prolonged standing, not a transcription of its words or an explanation of the thought that preceded it.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades says Socrates stands until dawn and sunrise, then leaves after praying to the sun. The temporal sequence is clear; its theological or philosophical motive is not supplied. The episode occurs

in summer, when the observers bring their pallets into the cool, and is distinct from the preceding account of barefoot endurance in winter frost.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **220b–d.** Winter walking is followed by a separate summer episode ending in sunrise and prayer.

In this edition. The note supplies a comparison concerning prayer to the rising sun, but the continuous passage names neither the prayer's content nor the solution of Socrates' problem.

See also. Attention and standing still; Endurance; Sleep and dawn.

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Surfeit and emptying

Headwords and labels: πλησμονή (plēsmonē); κένωσις (kenōsis)

The word. The noun for fullness can mark a troublesome excess or a satiation that permits action to resume. Its value is contextual.

In the Symposium. Eryximachus defines medicine as knowledge of the body's erotic relations concerning surfeit and emptying. The definition needs the expertise that judges, introduces, removes and changes the relevant loves; fullness by itself is not the complete good. In Aristophanes' myth, satiation after Zeus' second intervention serves a practical purpose: lovers can stop clinging and attend to the rest of life. It still does not express the deeper wish Hephaestus subsequently reveals.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **185c.** The narrator gives an uncertain possible cause of the hiccup.

- **186c–d.** Fullness and emptying require skilled discrimination.
- **191c–192d.** Satiation supports survival but does not exhaust desire.

In this edition. The edition keeps “surfeit” across these uses. In the myth, English “satiation” may clarify the function, but it should not replace or conceal the printed translation’s lexical continuity.

See also. Medicine and healing; Hiccup and sneeze; Wholeness and the half.

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The great sea of beauty

Headwords and labels: πέλαγος (pelagos); ἄφθονος (aphthonos); διανόημα (dianoēma)

The word. The sea is a concrete image of expansiveness. Ungrudging describes the philosophical activity, not a material ocean containing beauty as a substance.

In the Symposium. The learner has moved beyond one body, person or practice and can see beauty in many kinds of knowledge. Turning to the great sea frees thought from a servile fixation and produces many speeches and thoughts. This is still a productive stage before the single knowledge and the final vision. The sea should therefore not simply be equated with the final beautiful itself, which receives its distinct characterization next.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **210c–210e.** Expansion, productive contemplation, strengthening and eventual single knowledge.

See also. Ascent; Wisdom and philosophy; Seeing and contemplating.

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The tongue and the mind

Headwords and labels: γλῶσσα (glōssa); φρήν (phrēn); Εὐριπίδης (Euripidēs)

The word. The paired body-word and mind-word mark a playful separation between what was verbally undertaken and what Socrates now accepts doing.

In the Symposium. Socrates adapts a tragic line to withdraw from the encomiastic method he has just criticized. He does not thereby refuse every speech: he immediately offers to tell the truth in his own fashion. The quotation therefore renegotiates the scope of his agreement. Eryximachus had likewise borrowed Euripides' "the tale is not mine" to acknowledge Phaedrus as his source. Tragic language is repeatedly remade for the present conversational situation.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **177a.** A borrowed opening credits Phaedrus.
- **198e–199b.** The tongue-and-mind joke qualifies the earlier agreement and opens a new mode of speech.

In this edition. The note identifies the later source as Hippolytus and explains the adaptation. Burnet letterspaces only words actually taken over; the lexicon does not present the whole new sentence as a verbatim Euripidean quotation.

See also. Speech and account; Encomium, praise and hymn; Irony, play, and earnestness.

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Truth and persuasion

Headwords and labels: ἀλήθεια (alētheia); πείθω (peithō)

The word. Truth names what the account aims to get right; persuasion names a person's resulting stance or the activity of bringing another to it.

In the Symposium. Socrates refuses praise that makes its subject seem splendid regardless of truth. When Agathon yields to him personally, he distinguishes refuting Socrates from contradicting truth. At the end he attributes the doctrine to Diotima, declares himself persuaded and undertakes to persuade others. The speech therefore offers both reasons and a reported commitment. Persuasion is not silently equated with proof, nor is the attribution to another speaker a denial of Socrates' endorsement.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **198d–199b.** Truth rather than competitive embellishment governs Socrates' proposed speech.
- **201c.** Personal concession is distinguished from truth.
- **212b–212c.** Socrates attributes, assents to and promotes the account.

See also. Diotima; Right opinion; Love.

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Tyranny and friendship

Headwords and labels: τυραννίς (tyrannis); Ἀριστογείτων (Aristogeitōn); Ἁρμόδιος (Harmodios)

The word. The lexical connection is between erotic or friendly solidarity and forms of political rule.

In the Symposium. Pausanias says rulers have an interest in preventing strong friendships, partnerships and elevated aspirations among the ruled. He invokes Aristogiton and Harmodius as an Athenian confirmation, then contrasts greed among rulers with cowardice among

subjects. His claim that the lovers' act ended the tyranny is historically compressed. The supplied note distinguishes their killing of Hipparchus from the later end of Hippias' rule. The lexicon should therefore report the political argument without certifying its summary as precise history.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **182b–d.** The survey of customs and the tyrannicide example.

In this edition. The contextual note explicitly supplies the historical qualification. Pausanias' geographical and motivational generalizations remain his claims, not a modern description of whole peoples.

See also. Law and custom; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Honour and ambition.

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Unwed

Headwords and labels: ἤθεος (ēitheos)

The word. This word is an unusually consequential textual choice, not a secure basis for a whole theory of celibacy.

In the Symposium. The printed text describes someone pregnant in soul from youth, unwed, and reaching the age when he desires to give birth. The edition reports divine as the reading of the manuscripts and papyrus, while adopting unwed by conjecture. The entry records what this edition actually prints without claiming that the conjecture is independently confirmed. The surrounding account of psychic generation does not impose a universal ban on marriage.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **209a–209b.** The description introduces the person seeking beauty for psychic birth.

In this edition. The word unwed translates the conjecture printed in the main text. The alternative divine belongs to the apparatus and the edition's note; no new witness collation is claimed.

See also. Birth and begetting; Body and soul.

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Urania and Polyhymnia

Headwords and labels: Οὐρανία (Ourania); Πολυμνία (Polymnia)

The word. The doctor borrows the dual pattern of Pausanias' Loves but changes the associated divine figures to Muses.

In the Symposium. The heavenly musical Love preserves orderly desire and can improve those not yet orderly. The Common Love associated with Polyhymnia is to be applied cautiously so that its pleasure is enjoyed without generating excess. This is regulated use, not absolute rejection. The contrast belongs to the application of music to people, after the preceding discussion of harmony and rhythm as such.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **187c–e.** From musical structures to the two Loves in their human use.

In this edition. The Greek prints Polymnia, while the English uses the familiar "Polyhymnia". The distinction from Pausanias' Aphrodites must be preserved even though "Heavenly" is repeated.

See also. Music, harmony and rhythm; Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Gratification and favour.

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Use and fellow-worker

Headwords and labels: χρεία (chreia); συνεργός (synergos)

The word. The practical question concerns what Love enables human beings to achieve. Fellow-worker makes human nature and Love collaborators in that pursuit.

In the Symposium. After the genealogy, Socrates asks about Love's use, and the ensuing account explains good, happiness, generation and ascent. His conclusion answers that question by praising Love as a helper towards the possession described. The comparative is qualified: one would not easily find a better helper. It is not a literal assertion that Love alone accomplishes everything while the learner contributes no labour, practice or care.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **204c–204d.** Socrates asks about the service of the described Love.
- **212b.** His final endorsement presents Love as a fellow-worker.

See also. Love; Ascent; Present and future possession.

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Well and rightly

Headwords and labels: καλῶς (kalōs); ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

The word. The adverbs qualify an act's manner or direction. They help distinguish the fact of doing something from doing it well.

In the Symposium. Pausanias refuses to assign beauty or shame to drinking, singing or conversation considered merely as actions. Their value depends on how they are performed. Eryximachus similarly distinguishes making a musical structure from correctly applying it in education. Diotima's later insistence on correct guidance and ordered pursuit continues this attention to method, though it does not simply repeat Pausanias' ethical rule.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **180e–181a.** The manner of performance supplies the evaluation.
- **183d.** Pausanias repeats the rule for gratification.
- **187c–e.** Correct use makes music educational.
- **210a–e.** Correct leading and ordered looking qualify the ascent.

In this edition. The edition normally renders the adjective kalos "beautiful" but its adverb "well". At 183d Burnet's printed "well" follows a reading different from the principal manuscripts' "beautiful"; the distinction should not be erased in lexical analysis.

See also. Law and custom; Gratification and favour; Music, harmony and rhythm; Beauty and ugliness; Ascent.

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Wine-cooler and drinking bowl

Headwords and labels: ψυκτήρ (psyktēr); κοτύλη (kotylē); φιάλη (phialē)

The word. The cooler and the final drinking bowl are not the same named object. The measure describes the cooler's capacity, not a prescribed serving for ordinary drinking.

In the Symposium. Alcibiades' substitution magnifies his attempted command over the party: he fills the cooler,

drinks it, and orders an equivalent pour for Socrates while acknowledging that the trick cannot defeat him. The later large bowl accompanies the last philosophical conversation. The continuing rightward circulation preserves one small piece of symposium order after the formal programme has collapsed.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **213e–214a.** A cooling vessel becomes the instrument of Alcibiades' drinking challenge.
- **223c–d.** A large bowl passes among the three remaining speakers.

In this edition. The note estimates eight kotylai at about two litres. That is the edition's approximate conversion, and the Greek says the cooler holds more than eight. The form phialē should not be replaced by psyktēr in the closing scene.

See also. Drinking and sobriety; Comedy and tragedy.

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Wish and willingness

Headwords and labels: βούλομαι (boulomai); βούλησις (boulēsis); ἐθέλω (ethelō)

The word. The verbs concern wanting and willingness in their local constructions; no separate technical taxonomy of rational and irrational desire is supplied here.

In the Symposium. Socrates uses wanting alongside desiring to test whether current possession satisfies a wish. Diotima calls the universal orientation towards good a wish as well as love. The amputation example then shows willingness to lose what is one's own when goodness fails. These uses connect evaluative choice with desire without establishing that every willing act is well judged.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **200b–200e.** Wanting present qualities to endure.
- **205a.** The common wish for good always.
- **205e.** Willing loss of one's own members qualifies the wholeness account.

See also. The good; Desire and lack.

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Witnesses and oaths

Headwords and labels: μάρτυς (martys); ὄμνυμι (omnymi); μά (ma)

The word. Witnesses and oaths are ways a speaker presses a claim upon hearers. They offer an evidential posture, not automatic independent verification.

In the Symposium. Socrates' appeal to more than thirty thousand Greek witnesses is part of his ironic estimate of Agathon's public success. Alcibiades repeatedly appeals to Socrates' ability to contradict him, offers witnesses, and eventually swears to the uneventful outcome of the shared night. These devices make the testimony emphatic while leaving its narrative status intact: the reader is hearing Alcibiades' report inside another remembered report.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **175e.** The public audience is used in Socrates' teasing praise.
- **214e–215d.** Alcibiades permits interruption and invokes witnesses and oath.
- **219c–d; 220e.** He insists on the truth of sexual refusal and military rescue.

In this edition. The repeated formula "you will not say that I lie" is a challenge to Socrates within the story. It

should not be silently upgraded into a statement that every detail has been independently corroborated.

See also. Narrating and reporting; Insolence and the mock trial; Laughter and frankness.

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Work and action

Headwords and labels: ἔργον (ergon); πρᾶξις (praxis)

The word. Work is not necessarily a separately manufactured object. It can be the characteristic activity through which a desire is carried out.

In the Symposium. Socrates approves Agathon's order of treating Love himself before his effects, even while correcting the description. Diotima later asks for the concrete action by which desire for lasting good operates. Her answer is giving birth in beauty. The question is therefore not answered simply by repeating that love desires goodness; the activity that realizes the pursuit must be explained.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **199c; 201d–201e.** Nature and work are distinguished as stages of exposition.
- **206a–206c.** The account moves from desire's object to its characteristic activity.

See also. Love; Birth and begetting; End and purpose.

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Wreaths and ribbons

Headwords and labels: στέφανος (stephanos); ταινία (tainia); κιττός (kittos); ἴον (ion)

The word. Wreath and ribbons are separate parts of Alcibiades' decoration. He brings the ribbons to crown Agathon and later uses some to crown Socrates.

In the Symposium. Crowning transfers the language of victory from Agathon's recent tragic success to Socrates' claimed constant victories in speech. The ribbons also do practical narrative work: they block Alcibiades' sight, so that he sits between Socrates and Agathon without seeing Socrates. Agathon later treats that placement as evidence of a deliberate attempt to separate them. The earlier visual obstruction prevents the later inference from being treated as an uncontested fact.

Places to Read. Selected annotated passages.

- **212e–213b.** The wreath, crowning intention, and obstructed sight explain Alcibiades' arrival.
- **213e.** Socrates is crowned as an enduring victor in speech.
- **222d–e.** Agathon gives a later, interested interpretation of the seating.

In this edition. The edition notes ivy's Dionysiac association. The causal detail about sight is in the continuous narrative, and is more secure than any symbolic interpretation of the flowers.

See also. Dionysus; Jealousy and reconciliation; Drinking and sobriety.

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Greek vocabulary register

Dictionary headwords and family or phrase labels are distinguished from the printed attestations listed below them. Each contextual record supplies its own local explanation. Related records can retain the same headword when different arguments need different senses.

ἀγαθός

agathos — Good, beneficial or excellent; here especially the object desired as one's own and the ground of happiness.

- **201c** — **τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλά**. Good things are beautiful: the premise used to infer Love's deficiency.
- **206a** — **τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ**. The desired good is the object that survives Diotima's correction of the half-and-whole account.

Read: The good.

ἄγαλμα

agalma — A statue or precious divine image; figuratively the admirable ethical contents revealed within Socrates and his speeches.

- **215b** — **ἀγάλματα**. Statues of gods lie inside the opening carvings.
- **216e** — **ἀγάλματα**. Alcibiades says he has once seen the statues within Socrates.
- **222a** — **ἀγάλματ' ἀρετῆς**. The opened speeches contain statues of virtue.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

ἄγω

agō — To lead, including movement into a new field of attention.

- **210c** — **ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν**. The guide must lead the learner from practices to kinds of knowledge.

Read: Ascent.

ἀδελφός

adelphos — Brother or sibling; metaphorically the close relation among bodily beauties.

- **210a–210b** — **ἀδελφόν**. Beauty on one body is brother to beauty on another.

Read: Kindred beauties.

ἀδελφός

adelphos — Brother; a second familial example isolates the form of a relation.

- **199e** — **ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς**. A brother's correlate can be brother or sister.

Read: Love of something.

ἀδικία

adikia — Injustice or wrongdoing; Aristophanes makes it the reason humans were divided.

- **193a** — **ἀδικίαν**. The primal transgression is redescribed as injustice.

Read: Justice, agreement and force.

ἀεί

aei — Always, continuously or indefinitely according to its predicate and temporal context.

- **206a** — **τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί**. Always qualifies the good's being one's own.
- **211a** — **ἀεὶ ὄν**. The beautiful itself always is.

Read: Always.

ἀθανασία

athanasia — Immortality or deathlessness, sought with the good and reached by mortals through a qualified form of continuance.

- **207a** — **ἀθανασίας**. Desire for immortality follows from the agreed demand for good always.
- **208b** — **θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει**. The mortal participates in immortality through replacement.

Read: Immortality.

ἀθάνατος

athanatos — Immortal; its application changes between divine being, lasting offspring, fame and the closing possibility.

- **208b** — **ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ**. The immortal participates or is preserved in another way; this is the printed clause.
- **209c** — **ἀθανατωτέρων**. The comparative more immortal is applied to psychic children.
- **212a** — **εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ**. The final promise is qualified: if to any other human being.

Read: Immortality.

Ἀθηνᾶ

Athēna — Athena, included as a learner of weaving from Love.

- **197b** — **Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας**. Her craft is woven into Agathon's list of divine pupils.

Read: Divine teachers and craft pupils.

Αἴας

Aias — Ajax, the heroic standard of bodily invulnerability in the comparison.

- **219e** — **Αἴας**. The hero's resistance to iron is surpassed by Socrates' resistance to money.

Read: Arrows, capture, and Ajax.

Ἅιδης

Haidēs — Hades, the realm from which Alcestis is restored, from which Orpheus is sent away unsuccessful, and in which the imagined fused lovers would remain one.

- **179c** — **ἐξ Ἅιδου**. The gods send Alcestis' soul back.
- **192e** — **ἐν Ἅιδου**. The hypothetical fusion extends into the state after death.

Read: Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.

αἰσχρός

aischros — Ugly or shameful; its negative evaluation varies with what is being assessed.

- **202b** — **ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι**. Diotima forbids forcing what is not beautiful into the contrary category ugly.

Read: Beauty and ugliness.

αἰσχύνη

aischynē — Shame or disgrace, either the aversive response to a shameful act or the shame brought upon a person by it.

- **178d** — **αἰσχύνην**. Phaedrus' shame at shameful actions.
- **184e** — **αἰσχύνην φέρει**. Wrongly motivated gratification brings shame whether successful or not.

Read: Shame and being ashamed.

αἰσχύνομαι

aischynomai — To feel shame before someone or about an acknowledged action; the relevant audience and standard vary.

- **178e** — **αἰσχύνεται**. The beloved feels shame before his lovers.
- **216b** — **αἰσχύνομαι**. Alcibiades says he is ashamed before Socrates alone.

Read: Shame and being ashamed.

αἰτία

aitia — Cause or explanation; its character differs between genealogy and reasoned account.

- **204b** — **αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ**. Love's birth is offered as the cause of his intermediate philosophical nature.
- **207c** — **τὴν αἰτίαν**. Socrates asks Diotima to explain the reproductive phenomenon.

Read: Cause and explanation.

αἰτία

aitia — Cause or explanatory source; the broad formulation concerns bringing something into being.

- **205b** — **αἰτία πᾶσά**. The universal phrase defines production broadly.

Read: Making and poetry.

αἴτιον

aition — What is responsible for something, an explanatory factor requested by a question.

- **207a** — **αἴτιον εἶναι**. Diotima asks what causes animals' reproductive desire.

Read: Cause and explanation.

ἄκλητος

aklētos — Uninvited; a social status disputed and playfully renegotiated on the way to dinner.

- **174b** — **ἄκλητος**. Socrates asks whether Aristodemus will accompany him uninvited.

Read: Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.

ἀκοσμία

akosmia — Disorder, here in excessive relations among seasonal constituents.

- **188b** — **ἀκοσμίας**. One source of destructive seasonal effects in Eryximachus' model.

Read: Order and disorder.

Ἀκουσίλεως

Akousileōs — Acusilaus, a prose genealogist invoked as agreeing with Hesiod about Earth and Love after Chaos; this is the printed nominative form.

- **178b** — **Ἀκουσίλεως**. Phaedrus' additional witness for Love's antiquity.

Read: Acusilaus.

ἀκούω

akouō — To hear or listen; here also to receive another person's account or submit oneself to its force.

- **173b** — **ἀκούειν**. Walking gives Glaucon an occasion for talking and listening.
- **215d** — **ἀκούῃ**. Socrates' own speech or another person's repetition affects the hearer.

Read: Hearing and enchantment.

ἀλεκτρυών

alektryōn — A cock, whose crowing marks the approach of day.

- **223c** — **ἀλεκτρυόνων**. The cocks are already crowing when Aristodemus wakes.

Read: Sleep and dawn.

ἀλήθεια

alētheia — Truth, distinct from the personal authority of the speaker asserting it.

- **201c** — **τῇ ἀληθείᾳ**. Socrates redirects Agathon's inability to contradict him towards the truth.

Read: Truth and persuasion.

ἀληθής

alēthēs — True or genuine; here qualifying virtue rather than merely a statement.

- **212a** — **ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ**. True virtue must be generated and nurtured.

Read: True virtue and images.

ἁλίσκομαι

haliskomai — To be caught or captured; erotic and political inducements are described as instruments of capture.

- **219e** — **ἁλώσεσθαι**. Alcibiades wrongly expected Socrates to be captured by his beauty.

Read: Arrows, capture, and Ajax.

Ἄλκηστις

Alkēstis — Alcestis, who dies for her husband and is restored by the gods in Phaedrus' version; Diotima later reinterprets her choice.

- **179b** — **Ἄλκηστις**. Named as testimony that women too die for love.
- **208d** — **Ἄλκηστιν**. Her death returns in the argument about immortal memory.

Read: Alcestis.

Ἀλκιβιάδης

Alkibiadēs — The late-arriving guest who redirects praise from Love to Socrates and exposes his own conflicted attachment.

- **212d** — **Ἀλκιβιάδου**. His drunken voice is heard before he enters.

- **222c** — **Ἀλκιβιάδη**. Socrates addresses him after the encomium.

Read: Alcibiades.

ἀλλάσσω

allassō — To exchange one thing for another; the proposed equivalence of values is precisely what Socrates questions.

- **218e** — **ἀλλάξασθαι**. Socrates describes Alcibiades' proposal as exchanging beauty for beauty.

Read: Exchange and gold for bronze.

ἀλλότριος

allotrios — Alien or belonging to another; contrasted with what is good and one's own.

- **205e** — **τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον**. The bad is termed alien in the conditional recasting of ownness.

Read: The good.

ἀλλοτριότης

allotriotēs — Alienness or estrangement, the opposite of affinity in Agathon's rhetoric.

- **197d** — **ἀλλοτριότητος**. Love empties the company of alienness.

Read: Friendship, partnership and affinity.

ἅλς

hals — Salt, an everyday useful substance whose elaborate praise makes Phaedrus' complaint comically pointed.

- **177b** — **ἅλες**. Salt receives a marvelous praise for its benefit.

Read: Salt, contribution and shared praise.

ἀμαθία

amathia — Ignorance; especially the unrecognized deficiency that prevents pursuit of wisdom.

- **203e** — **σοφίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀμαθίας**. Love stands between wisdom and ignorance.
- **204a** — **αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία**. Diotima identifies the troubling feature of ignorance as mistaken sufficiency.

Read: Ignorance and sufficiency.

ἄμεικτος

ameiktos — Unmixed.

- **211e** — **ἄμεικτον**. The beautiful is not blended with flesh, colours and mortal distractions.

Read: Pure and unmixed.

ἀμελέτητος

ameletētos — Unpractised or unrehearsed; its negation describes Apollodorus' readiness.

- **172a** — **οὐκ ἀμελέτητος**. Apollodorus begins by saying he is not unrehearsed.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

ἀμελέω

ameleō — To neglect or fail to attend to; Alcibiades applies it to his own unexamined condition.

- **216a** — **ἐμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ**. Alcibiades admits neglect of himself while managing Athenian affairs.

Read: Care of oneself and neglect.

ἀμύνω

amynō — To ward off an attack or defend oneself or another.

- **221b** — **ἀμυνεῖται**. Socrates visibly promises stout defence if attacked.

Read: Courage and composure.

Ἀνάγκη

Anankē — Personified Necessity, to which Agathon attributes the violent divine past in contrast to Love's peaceful kingship.

- **195c** — **Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι**. The explicit reassignment of the ancient events.
- **197b** — **τῆς Ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν**. The kingship that precedes Love in Agathon's account.

Read: Necessity.

ἀνάγκη

anankē — Necessity or a necessary conclusion; distinct here from the personified Necessity of earlier speeches.

- **200a** — **ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη**. Socrates explicitly replaces a probability test with a necessity test.

Read: Probability and necessity.

ἀναισχυντία

anaischyntia — Shamelessness, an accusation that Aristophanes contests when explaining male-directed attraction.

- **192a** — **ἀναισχυντίας**. Aristophanes denies that the youths act from shamelessness.

Read: Shame and being ashamed.

ἀνακρίνω

anakrinō — To examine by questioning.

- **201e** — **ἀνακρίνουσα**. Socrates describes Diotima questioning him.

Read: Refutation and examination.

ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι

anamimnēiskomai — To recall again; here ordinary recollection, not an asserted doctrine of prenatal recollection.

- **215a** — **ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος**. Alcibiades warns that his recollections may come out of sequence.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

ἀνδρεία

andreia — Courage, conventionally associated with manliness but attributed to Love and to Socrates in different kinds of argument.

- **196c** — **ἀνδρείαν**. Agathon turns from temperance to courage.
- **212b** — **ἀνδρείαν**. Socrates praises Love’s power and courage after reporting Diotima.

- **219d** — **ἀνδρείαν**. Alcibiades admires Socrates' courage after the unsuccessful night together.

Read: Courage and composure.

ἀνδρόγυνος

androgynos — Man-woman, the name of one original combined male-and-female kind in Aristophanes' myth; not the name of every original human.

- **189e** — **ἀνδρόγυνον**. One vanished kind survives as a name used in reproach.

Read: Androgyne and the three kinds.

ἀνείλλεται

aneilletai — Printed middle form: shrinks back or draws itself in, accompanying aversion to ugliness.

- **206d** — **ἀνείλλεται**. Recoil accompanies turning away and failure to beget.

Read: Approach and recoil.

ἄνθος

anthos — A flower or bloom, figuratively the fleeting bloom of a body and, in Agathon, the flourishing quality of Love's dwelling.

- **183e** — **τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει**. Pausanias' bodily bloom fades.
- **196a** — **κατ' ἄνθη**. Agathon's Love lives among flowers.
- **210b** — **σμικρὸν ἄνθος**. A person fine in soul may have only slight bodily bloom.

Read: Flowers, bloom and fragrance.

ἀνίημι

aniēmi — To release, relax, or let go; its negation makes persistence explicit.

- **220c** — **οὐκ ἀνίει**. Socrates does not give up when his inquiry fails to advance.

Read: Letting be and not letting go.

ἀνοίγω

anoigō — To open; here the move from visible guise to an interior of ethical significance.

- **216d** — **ἀνοιχθεὶς**. The opened Socrates is said to contain temperance.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

ἀνόμοιος

anomoios — Unlike: differing bodily conditions desire differing objects in Eryximachus' initial formulation.

- **186b** — **τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων**. The unlike condition is paired with unlike objects of desire.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

ἀνομολογέομαι

anomologeomai — To come to or review agreement; here the relevant admissions are gathered again.

- **200e** — **ἀνομολογησώμεθα**. Socrates proposes to agree again on the claims just established.

Read: Agreement and premise.

Ἀντήνωρ

Antēnōr — Another Homeric counsellor paired with Pericles in the comparison.

- **221c** — **Ἀντήνορα**. He joins Nestor as a recognisable oratorical counterpart.

Read: Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

ἀνυπόδητος

anypodētos — Barefoot, a bodily detail shared by Aristodemus, Socrates, and Diotima's portrait of Love.

- **173b** — **ἀνυπόδητος**. Aristodemus is described as always barefoot.
- **203d** — **ἀνυπόδητος**. Love is barefoot within the account of his poverty.
- **220b** — **ἀνυπόδητος**. Socrates crosses ice barefoot.

Read: Bare feet and cloaks.

ἀπαγγέλλω

apangellō — To report or bring back another person's words; the relationship to the speaker is part of the claim to authority.

- **172b** — **ἀπαγγέλλειν**. Glaucon calls Apollodorus especially entitled to report his companion's speeches.

Read: Narrating and reporting.

ἁπαλός

hapalos — Tender or delicate, the quality Agathon infers from Love's manner of dwelling; Diotima later expressly denies it of the needy lover.

- **195c** — **ἁπαλός**. Agathon adds tenderness to youth.

- **195e** — **ἁπαλώτατον**. His superlative conclusion from contact with the softest places.
- **203c** — **ἁπαλός τε καὶ καλός**. The negated description: Love is far from tender and beautiful.

Read: Tenderness, softness and hardness.

ἀπάτη

apatē — Deception: in Pausanias' exceptional case the deceived person's mistake may reveal a beautiful intention without making the deceiver good.

- **185b** — **καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη**. The deception is called beautiful because the youth sought virtue.

Read: Deception and intention.

ἀποβλάστημα

apoblastēma — A growth or offshoot from oneself, the object of reproductive care.

- **208b** — **τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλάστημα**. Everything by nature honours its own offshoot for the sake of immortality.

Read: Offshoot.

ἀπόκρισις

apokrisis — An answer, assessed for whether it satisfies the explanatory demand.

- **204d** — **ἡ ἀπόκρισις**. The answer is playfully said to yearn for a question.
- **205a** — **ἡ ἀπόκρισις**. With happiness, the answer reaches an end.

Read: Question and answer.

Ἀπολλόδωρος

Apollodōros — The present narrator, who repeats Aristodemus' account but did not attend the dinner.

- **172a** — **Ἀπολλόδωρος**. Glaucon hails him on the road from Phaleron.

Read: Apollodorus and Aristodemus.

Ἀπόλλων

Apollōn — Apollo, the body-repairer in Aristophanes' myth and discoverer of crafts under Love's guidance in Agathon's praise.

- **190e** — **τὸν Ἀπόλλω**. Zeus commands Apollo to turn and heal the cut bodies.
- **197a** — **Ἀπόλλων**. Archery, medicine and divination are discovered under love's leadership.

Read: Divine teachers and craft pupils.

ἀπορία

aporia — Want of resource or a way forward.

- **203b** — **τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπορίαν**. Poverty's deficiency motivates her plot.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

ἅπτομαι

haptomai — To touch, come into contact with, or lay hold of; its force varies with bodily, educational, contemplative, and hostile contexts.

- **175c** — **ἁπτόμενός σου**. Agathon hopes to enjoy Socrates' wise discovery by touching him.
- **175d** — **ἁπτώμεθα**. Socrates imagines contact between people as a condition of wisdom's flow.

- **209c** — **ἁπτόμενος**. Diotima describes contact with the beautiful companion in spiritual generation.
- **221b** — **ἅπτονται**. Enemies do not even lay a hand on composed fighters.

Read: Touch and transmitted wisdom.

ἀρετή

aretē — Excellence or virtue, ranging from inspired courage to intellectual and civic formation, and finally to the true virtue produced in contact with the true.

- **179a** — **πρὸς ἀρετήν**. Love makes a person god-filled toward virtue in Phaedrus' battlefield argument.
- **185b** — **ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα**. Pausanias makes virtue the qualifying aim of gratification.
- **212a** — **ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ**. Diotima's culmination distinguishes true virtue from images.

Read: Virtue and becoming better.

Ἄρης

Arēs — Ares, the war god, used by Agathon as the apparently strongest test of Love's courage.

- **196d** — **οὐδ' Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται**. The adapted verse says not even Ares withstands Love.
- **196d** — **Ἔρως Ἄρη**. Love holds Ares, rather than Ares holding Love.

Read: Ares held by Love.

Ἀριστογείτων

Aristogeitōn — Aristogiton, the lover named in Pausanias' political example.

- **182c** — **Ἀριστογείτονος**. His love is paired with Harmodius' friendship.

Read: Tyranny and friendship.

Ἀριστόδημος

Aristodēmos — The guest whose recollections supply the main narrative.

- **178a** — **Ἀριστόδημος**. His incomplete memory is explicitly acknowledged.

Read: Apollodorus and Aristodemus.

Ἀρκάδες

Arkades — Arcadians, the people used in Aristophanes' simile for the gods' breaking apart of human unity.

- **193a** — **Ἀρκάδες**. The comparison with Spartan action.

Read: Arcadians and being broken apart.

Ἁρμόδιος

Harmodios — Harmodius, named as the friend whose firm attachment contributes to overthrow in Pausanias' compressed account.

- **182c** — **Ἁρμοδίου**. The friendship becomes politically consequential.

Read: Tyranny and friendship.

ἁρμονία

harmonia — A fitting-together or harmony; Eryximachus explains it as consonance resulting from an agreement of formerly differing pitches.

- **187b** — **ἁρμονία συμφωνία ἐστίν**. His proposed explanation of harmony.

Read: Music, harmony and rhythm.

ἁρμόττω

harmottō — To fit or be in harmony; the participle characterizes beauty's suitability to the divine.

- **206d** — **τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁρμόττον**. Beauty is fitting, in contrast to ugliness.

Read: Beauty at birth.

ἄρρην

arrēn — Male; the neuter form names one of the original kinds and also one component of the mixed kind.

- **189d** — **ἄρρεν**. One of the two kinds present now, distinguished from the original mixed third.

Read: Androgyne and the three kinds.

ἀσέβεια

asebeia — Impiety; Eryximachus attributes it to honoring the wrong Love in relations with parents and gods.

- **188c** — **ἀσέβεια**. The neglected orderly Love explains impiety in his account.

Read: Divination, piety and right.

Ἀσκληπιός

Asklēpios — Asclepius, invoked by the doctor as the ancestral founder who knew how to implant love and concord among bodily opposites.

- **186e** — **ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός**. Eryximachus' professional and divine ancestry.

Read: Asclepius.

ἀστρονομία

astronomia — Astronomy, named here as knowledge concerning stellar movements and the seasons in their erotic relations.

- **188b** — **ἀστρονομία**. Eryximachus names the relevant expertise.

Read: Seasons, blending and astronomy.

Ἄτη

Atē — Ate, Delusion, invoked from Homer as a goddess with tender feet for Agathon's analogy about Love.

- **195d** — **Ἄτην**. Agathon introduces the Homeric example.

Read: Ate and tender feet.

ἀτοπία

atopia — Outlandishness or strangeness, especially Socrates' resistance to ordinary personal comparisons.

- **215a** — **ἀτοπίαν**. Alcibiades says it is hard to enumerate Socrates' outlandishness in order.
- **221d** — **ἀτοπίαν**. Both Socrates and his speeches resist likeness to another human being.

Read: Outlandishness.

ἄτοπος

atopos — Outlandish, strange, or resistant to familiar expectations; not exclusively an epithet for Socrates.

- **175a** — **Ἄτοπόν**. Agathon reacts to the report of Socrates standing in the neighbours' porch.

- **207e** — **ἀτοπώτερον**. Diotima calls the continual alteration of knowledge still more outlandish.

Read: Outlandishness.

ἄτρωτος

atrōtos — Unwounded or invulnerable; here resistant to money as an inducement.

- **219e** — **ἄτρωτος**. Socrates is more invulnerable to money than Ajax to iron.

Read: Arrows, capture, and Ajax.

αὐλητρίς

aulētris — A female pipe-player, present as a performer and later assisting Alcibiades.

- **176e** — **αὐλητρίδα**. Eryximachus proposes dismissing the player from the men's gathering.
- **212d** — **αὐλητρίδα**. A player supports Alcibiades as he enters.

Read: Pipe-girl and pipes.

αὐλός

aulos — A pipe, the instrument represented on the opening silenus figures and associated with Marsyas.

- **215b** — **αὐλοὺς**. The carved figures hold pipes or panpipes.

Read: Pipe-girl and pipes.

αὐξάνω

auxanō — To increase or grow.

- **210d** — **αὐξηθεὶς**. Growth of the learner precedes the single knowledge; growth is later denied of beauty itself.

Read: Attention and strengthening.

αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό

auto kath’ hauto — Itself by itself; a phrase record for independence, whose force depends on context.

- **211b** — **αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ μεθ’ αὑτοῦ**. The beautiful is itself by itself with itself, rather than in another thing.

Read: The beautiful itself.

αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν

auto to kalon — The beautiful itself, distinguished from its changing, relative or embodied instances.

- **211d** — **αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν**. The object whose contemplation makes life worth living.

Read: The beautiful itself.

αὐτόματος

automatos — Of one’s own accord, without an external summons; not here a technical theory of spontaneous generation.

- **174b–c** — **αὐτόματοι**. The altered proverb says good men go to feasts of their own accord.

Read: Invited, uninvited, and of one’s own accord.

αὐτός

autos — With the article, the same; the dictionary headword also has other pronominal functions, which must not be imposed on these identity constructions.

- **207d** — **ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται**. The person is called the same despite continual replacement.
- **208a** — **τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι**. Being always the same is distinguished from mortal preservation.

Read: Renewal and identity.

ἄφθονος

aphthonos — Ungrudging or abundant, not withholding productive activity.

- **210d** — **ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ**. Philosophical fertility accompanies contemplation of the great sea.

Read: The great sea of beauty.

Ἀφροδίτη

Aphroditē — Aphrodite, whose two genealogies and titles provide Pausanias with a framework for distinguishing Loves.

- **180d** — **Ἀφροδίτη**. Pausanias says there is no Aphrodite without Love.
- **203c** — **τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος**. Diotima makes Love Aphrodite's follower for a different genealogical reason.

Read: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

ἀφωνία

aphōnia — Speechlessness, the figurative petrifaction feared by Socrates after Agathon's display.

- **198c** — **τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ**. The effect that would turn Socrates to stone.

Read: Gorgias and the Gorgon.

ἀχαριστέω

acharisteō — To refuse gratification; the negative counterpart distinguishes therapeutic refusal from indiscriminate indulgence.

- **186c** — **ἀχαριστεῖν**. The practitioner must refuse the diseased or unwholesome.

Read: Gratification and favour.

Ἀχιλλεύς

Achilleus — Achilles, assigned the beloved's role by Phaedrus and honored for knowingly choosing death after Patroclus.

- **179e** — **Ἀχιλλέα**. Thetis' son is contrasted with Orpheus.
- **208d** — **Ἀχιλλέα**. Diotima reuses the sacrifice.

Read: Achilles and Patroclus.

βακχεία

bakcheia — Bacchic frenzy or inspired revelry, coupled with philosophical madness.

- **218b** — **βακχείας**. Alcibiades describes a shared condition that warrants sympathetic hearing.

Read: Bite, madness, and initiation.

βαλλάντιον

ballantion — A purse or bag, whose drawn-together mouth supplies the model for gathering skin.

- **190e** — **τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια**. The drawstring-purse comparison.

Read: Cutting, repair and the navel.

βασανίζω

basanizō — To test or assay; Pausanias represents time and custom as testing which kind of lover and beloved one confronts.

- **184a** — **βασανίζειν**. The law seeks to test lovers well.
- **184a** — **βασανίζων**. The law is pictured as organizer and examiner of a contest.

Read: Testing, pursuit and flight.

βέβαιος

bebaios — Firm or secure.

- **209c** — **φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν**. The friendship is said to be firmer because of the kind of children shared.

Read: Common nurture.

βέβηλος

bebēlos — Profane or uninitiated, excluded from hearing the disclosure in Alcibiades' mock-sacred address.

- **218b** — **βέβηλός**. Anyone profane, along with household slaves, is told to gate the ears.

Read: Bite, madness, and initiation.

βέλος

belos — A missile or arrow; Alcibiades imagines his persuasive declaration as a shot that has wounded Socrates.

- **219b** — **βέλη**. His spoken proposal is compared to arrows he has released.

Read: Arrows, capture, and Ajax.

βελτίων

beltiōn — Better: the comparative marks a desired improvement, not an already guaranteed result of association.

- **185b** — **βελτίων γενέσθαι**. The youth's intention is to become better.
- **210c** — **βελτίους τοὺς νέους**. Speeches are sought that will make the young better.

Read: Virtue and becoming better.

βία

bia — Force or violence, denied as Love's way of acting and suffering in Agathon's argument.

- **196b** — **βίᾳ**. Agathon denies that Love suffers by force.
- **196b** — **βία**. He says force does not touch Love.

Read: Justice, agreement and force.

βλαῦται

blautai — Slippers, here exceptional festive footwear rather than Socrates' usual appearance.

- **174a** — **βλαύτας**. Socrates wears slippers after bathing for Agathon's dinner.

Read: Bare feet and cloaks.

βούλησις

boulēsis — Wish or wanting; the common desire for lasting good.

- **205a** — **Ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν**. Diotima asks whether this wish is shared by all humans.

Read: Wish and willingness.

βούλομαι

boulomai — To want or wish; the object may be a quality, its future retention or a goal.

- **200d** — **βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα**. Present goods are wanted as remaining present later.

Read: Wish and willingness.

Βρασίδας

Brasidas — A named example of a man who can be compared with Achilles.

- **221c** — **Βρασίδαν**. Alcibiades contrasts an available heroic comparison with Socrates' singularity.

Read: Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

βυρσοδέψης

byrsodepsēs — A tanner, a worker preparing hides.

- **221e** — **βυρσοδέψας**. Tanners complete the local list of lowly examples.

Read: Commonplace crafts.

γαλήνη

galēnē — Calm of the sea, a natural counterpart to human peace in Agathon's verse.

- **197c** — **γαλήνην**. The sea's calm stands beside peace among people.

Read: Peace and calm.

γαργαλισμός

gargalismos — A tickling or irritation, invoked with noise to challenge a solemn picture of bodily order.

- **189a** — **γαργαλισμῶν**. Part of Aristophanes' teasing question about what the orderly body desires.

Read: Hiccup and sneeze.

γε

ge — An enclitic focusing particle; it can emphasize or limit the item on which the speaker presently insists.

- **185b** — **ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα**. The focus falls on virtue as the relevant purpose.

Read: At least and argumentative focus.

γελοῖος

geloios — Laughable or funny, a potentially successful effect for a comic poet rather than necessarily a fault.

- **189b** — **γελοῖα**. Aristophanes welcomes the possibility of saying funny things.

Read: Laughable and ridiculous.

γελοῖος

geloios — Laughable or amusing; appearance of absurdity may invite or obstruct understanding.

- **174e** — **γελοῖον**. Aristodemus calls his unaccompanied arrival laughable.
- **221e** — **γελοῖοι**. Socrates' speeches initially appear laughable.

Read: Laughter and frankness.

γέλως

gelōs — Laughter, whose target and cause range from a comic incident to a person's revealing confession.

- **222c** — **γέλωτα**. The company laughs at Alcibiades' frankness and continued love for Socrates.

Read: Laughter and frankness.

γεννάω

gennaō — To beget or generate, paired with giving birth rather than restricted to a modern paternal role.

- **206d** — **τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ**. The pregnant subject gives birth and begets when approaching beauty.

Read: Birth and begetting.

γέννησις

gennēsis — Begetting or generation, sought for mortal participation in lasting existence.

- **206e** — **Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ**. Diotima corrects the account of love's object.

Read: Birth and begetting.

γένος

genos — Kind, race or stock: the classification varies between the three original kinds and humankind as a whole.

- **189d** — **τρία ἦν τὰ γένη**. The myth begins from three original kinds.
- **193c** — **τὸ γένος**. Humankind collectively is the subject of the hoped-for happiness.

Read: Androgyne and the three kinds.

γίγας

gigas — A Giant; the destruction of Giants by thunderbolts supplies a possible but rejected solution to the human revolt.

- **190c** — **τοὺς γίγαντας**. Zeus cannot simply destroy humanity as the Giants were destroyed, because human worship would disappear.

Read: Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.

γίγνομαι

gignomai — To come to be; expressly denied of the final beautiful.

- **211a** — **οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον**. Neither becoming nor perishing marks its contrast with changing beautiful things.

Read: The beautiful itself.

γιγνώσκω

gignōskō — To recognize, learn or know; the aorist can mark coming to an understanding.

- **207c** — **γνοὺς**. Socrates has recognized that he needs teachers.
- **211c** — **γνῷ**. At the end the learner knows what beautiful is.

Read: Knowing and learning.

Γλαύκων

Glaukōn — The acquaintance who asks Apollodorus for the story during an earlier walk.

- **172c** — **Γλαύκων**. Apollodorus addresses the questioner by name.

Read: Glaucon and Phoenix.

γλυκύς

glykys — Sweet, the counterpart of bitter.

- **186d** — **γλυκεῖ**. Dative counterpart to bitter.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

γλῶσσα

glōssa — The tongue, made the agent of a promise that Socrates jokingly refuses to assign to his mind.

- **199a** — **ἡ γλῶσσα**. The verbal promise is contrasted with inward commitment.

Read: The tongue and the mind.

γόης

goēs — Sorcerer or enchanter; a potentially unsettling image of Love's persuasive power.

- **203d** — **δεινὸς γόης**. Love is described as a formidable sorcerer.

Read: Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.

Γοργίας

Gorgias — Gorgias, the rhetorician whose name Socrates turns into a pun on the petrifying Gorgon.

- **198c** — **Γοργίου κεφαλὴν**. The head sent in Agathon's speech against Socrates' speech.

Read: Gorgias and the Gorgon.

γοῦν

goun — At any rate or at least, marking a point offered as sufficient or secure within the present reasoning.

- **191c** — **πλησμονὴ γοῦν**. At least satiation is produced in the male-male case of the myth.

Read: At least and argumentative focus.

δαιμόνιος

daimonios — Daimonic; belonging to the intermediate order or, in address and description, extraordinary.

- **202d** — **πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον**. The entire daimonic kind lies between god and mortal.
- **203a** — **δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ**. The person wise in divine-human mediation is called daimonic.

Read: Daimon and mediation.

δαίμων

daimōn — A divine intermediary; in Diotima's account, neither a god nor an ordinary mortal.

- **202d** — **Δαίμων μέγας**. The answer to what Love is after divine and mortal alternatives have been rejected.

Read: Daimon and mediation.

δάκνω

daknō — To bite; the passive forms make philosophical speech an injury experienced in the heart or soul.

- **218a** — **δεδηγμένος**. Alcibiades depicts himself as already bitten.
- **218a** — **δηχθεὶς**. The speeches of philosophy are the agent of the figurative bite.

Read: Bite, madness, and initiation.

Δήλιον

Dēlion — The place from which the Athenian army retreats in Alcibiades' second military example.

- **220e** — **Δηλίου**. The army retreats in flight while Socrates and Laches remain composed.

Read: Potidaea and Delium.

δημιουργός

dēmiourgos — A craftsman or producer of a work; not here a uniquely named cosmic creator.

- **209a** — **τῶν δημιουργῶν**. Inventive craftsmen join poets as begetters of psychic offspring.

Read: Making and poetry.

διά

dia — Through or because of with the genitive or accusative construction supplying the local relation; in the example here the accusative gives a cause.

- **193a** — **διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν**. Aristophanes explains the division as caused by human injustice.

Read: For the sake of and because of.

διακόσμησις

diakosmēsis — Ordering or arranging affairs; the practical expression of intelligence singled out by Diotima.

- **209a** — **ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις**. Ordering cities' and households' affairs is ranked as the greatest and most beautiful kind of intelligence.

Read: Intelligence.

διαλλάσσω

diallassō — To reconcile parties in conflict.

- **213d** — **διάλλαξον**. Socrates asks Agathon to reconcile him and Alcibiades.

Read: Jealousy and reconciliation.

διαμείβομαι

diameibomai — To exchange reciprocally, here sharpened by the Homeric contrast of gold and bronze.

- **219a** — **διαμείβεσθαι**. Socrates interprets the proposed bargain as an unequal exchange.

Read: Exchange and gold for bronze.

διανόημα

dianoēma — A thought or product of thinking.

- **210d** — **διανοήματα**. Thoughts are generated alongside beautiful and magnificent speeches.

Read: The great sea of beauty.

διαπορθμεύω

diaporthmeuō — To ferry across; a transport image for divine-human mediation.

- **202e** — **διαπορθμεῦον**. Paired with interpreting, not restricted to transport of souls after death.

Read: Daimon and mediation.

διαφέρω

diapherō — To differ or be at variance; Eryximachus treats continuing difference as incompatible with achieved harmony.

- **187a** — **διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρεσθαι**. The reported claim: what differs from itself accords with itself.

Read: Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.

διαχέω

diacheō — To spread or melt; in the middle, to open or relax with gladness.

- **206d** — **διαχεῖται**. Glad release precedes giving birth.

Read: Approach and recoil.

διδάσκω

didaskō — To teach; Diotima's questioning and explanation are reported as the origin of Socrates' understanding.

- **201d** — **ἐδίδαξεν**. Socrates says she taught him matters of love.

Read: Diotima.

διηγέομαι

diēgeomai — To relate an event or speech in an ordered account; in the frame it marks a report dependent on previous tellers.

- **172b** — **διηγεῖτο**. Glaucon describes an earlier, unsatisfactory report.
- **174a** — **διηγήσασθαι**. Apollodorus promises to try to tell it as Aristodemus told it.

Read: Narrating and reporting.

δικαιοσύνη

dikaiosynē — Justice: an excellence invoked in orderly divine-human relations, attributed to Love by Agathon, and later named in civic and household ordering.

- **188d** — **δικαιοσύνης**. Eryximachus qualifies the good exercise of Love.
- **196c** — **δικαιοσύνῃ**. Agathon proceeds from Love's justice to temperance.
- **209a** — **δικαιοσύνη**. Diotima names justice with temperance in the ordering of cities and households.

Read: Justice, agreement and force.

δικαστής

dikastēs — A judge or juror; the dinner audience temporarily becomes a court.

- **219c** — **δικασταί**. Alcibiades addresses the guests as judges of the alleged affront.

Read: Insolence and the mock trial.

διοικίζω

dioikizō — To disperse or break up a settlement into separate habitations; transferred to humanity's division.

- **193a** — **διῳκίσθημεν**. Humans are said to have been broken up because of injustice.

Read: Arcadians and being broken apart.

Διόνυσος

Dionysos — The god invoked in connection with drama, drinking, and the proposed judgement of poetic and Socratic wisdom.

- **175e** — **τῷ Διονύσῳ**. Agathon names Dionysus as judge of the dispute about wisdom.
- **177e** — **Διόννσον**. Socrates associates Aristophanes' whole occupation with Dionysus and Aphrodite.

Read: Dionysus.

Διοτίμα

Diotima — The Mantinean woman from whom Socrates reports learning matters of love.

- **201d** — **Διοτίμας**. Socrates identifies the source of the account he will reproduce.
- **208b** — **ὦ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα**. Socrates addresses her as most wise while asking whether her account is true.

Read: Diotima.

διώκω

diōkō — To pursue, with directed effort rather than passive attraction.

- **206b** — **διωκόντων**. Diotima asks in which mode of pursuit the activity receives the name love.
- **210b** — **διώκειν**. The learner pursues the beautiful in form.

Read: Seeking and pursuing.

διώκω

diōkō — To pursue, seek or chase; erotic pursuit becomes an image for directed striving.

- **184a** — **διώκειν**. The law encourages the lover to pursue.

Read: Testing, pursuit and flight.

δίωξις

diōxis — Pursuit, the action-noun paired with desire in Aristophanes' description of love for the whole.

- **192e–193a** — **διώξει**. Aristophanes includes pursuit in his formula of love for the whole.

Read: Testing, pursuit and flight.

δοκέω

dokeō — To seem or be thought; local judgement is not automatically established knowledge.

- **205e** — **ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ**. People consent to amputation if their own members seem bad to them.

Read: As they think.

δοξάζω

doxazō — To hold an opinion; with the correctness modifier, to judge correctly or hold right opinions.

- **202a** — **Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν**. The activity is considered together with inability to give an account.

Read: Right opinion.

δουλεία

douleia — Slavery or servile submission. Courtship transfers the vocabulary of actual subjection into a controversial model of voluntary service.

- **183a** — **δουλείας δουλεύειν**. The lover performs services represented as beneath even a slave.
- **184c** — **δουλεία ἑκούσιος**. Pausanias' exceptional voluntary slavery for virtue.

Read: Voluntary slavery and service.

δραπετεύω

drapeteuō — To run away, especially as a slave; Alcibiades uses the image for escape from Socrates' acknowledged authority.

- **216b** — **δραπετεύω**. Flight replaces the argument he cannot produce against Socrates.

Read: Care of oneself and neglect.

δύναμαι

dynamai — To be able; the capacity may be qualified by circumstance, limitation or a condition.

- **201d** — **ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι**. Socrates will reproduce Diotima's account as best he can.
- **207d** — **δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον**. Mortal nature can achieve its continuation only in the described way.

Read: Power and capacity.

δύναμις

dynamis — Power or capacity to do something; its content is supplied by the activity described.

- **202e** — **δύναμιν ἔχον**. The requested power is explained as interpreting and ferrying communications.
- **212b** — **τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν**. Socrates praises Love's power and courage.

Read: Power and capacity.

δυνατός

dynatos — Possible or within a capacity.

- **207d** — **κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν**. Mortal nature seeks immortality only so far as it can.

Read: For a mortal and so far as possible.

ἐάν

ean — If or whenever with the subjunctive; local context determines a specific condition or general case.

- **210a** — **ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται**. The learner's initial route depends on the guide's leading correctly.

Read: If and if indeed.

ἐάω

eaō — To allow or let be; it can protect another person's activity rather than signify indifference.

- **175b** — **ἐᾶτε**. Aristodemus repeatedly asks that Socrates be left alone.

Read: Letting be and not letting go.

ἐγκωμιάζω

enkōmiazō — To make an encomium or speak formal praise; Socrates distinguishes genuinely doing this from merely appearing to.

- **198e** — **ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει**. Socrates contrasts seeming to praise with genuinely praising.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ἐγκώμιον

enkōmion — An encomium: a formally offered speech or song of praise. Its truthful performance, not simply its pleasing effect, becomes disputed.

- **177b** — **ἐγκώμιον**. Phaedrus' complaint, reported by Eryximachus, that Love has received no encomium.
- **212c** — **ὡς ἐγκώμιον**. Socrates lets Phaedrus decide whether this name fits his speech.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ἐγρήγορα

egrēgora — To be awake, a perfect form used to describe a continuing waking state.

- **223c** — **ἐγρηγορέναι**. Only Socrates and the two poets are still awake when Aristodemus wakes.

Read: Sleep and dawn.

ἐθελοδουλεία

ethelodouleia — Willing slavery: Pausanias' name for freely serving someone from whom improvement is expected.

- **184c** — **ἐθελοδουλεία**. Not shameful or flattery when its aim is virtue.

Read: Voluntary slavery and service.

ἐθέλω

ethelō — To be willing, including consent to losing what is judged harmful.

- **205e** — **ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι**. People are willing to have their own hands or feet cut off when judged bad.

Read: Wish and willingness.

εἰ

ei — If; introduces a condition that must remain attached to the conclusion.

- **201b** — **εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει**. Love's beauty is challenged on the stated conditions.

Read: If and if indeed.

εἶδος

eidos — Visible form, characteristic appearance, or a kind within a class, according to context.

- **210b** — **τὸ ἐπ' εἴδει καλόν**. The phrase concerns beauty in form within the discussion of bodily beauties.

Read: Form and figure.

εἶδος

eidos — Form or species within a larger class, without requiring a separately existing Form.

- **205b** — **τι εἶδος**. An unspecified form of love is singled out for the common name.
- **205d** — **ἕν τι εἶδος**. Those pursuing one special form receive the customary erotic labels.

Read: Naming whole and part.

εἴδωλον

eidōlon — An image or semblance; at the culmination, an image of virtue is contrasted with the genuine thing.

- **212a** — **οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς**. The successful beholder gives birth not to images of virtue.
- **212a** — **οὐκ εἰδώλου**. The reason given is that the beholder touches no image.

Read: True virtue and images.

εἰκός

eikos — Likely or probable, offered before Socrates asks whether the conclusion is necessary.

- **200a** — **ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε**. Agathon initially qualifies his answer that the lover does not have the desired object.

Read: Probability and necessity.

εἰκών

eikōn — A likeness used to make a person intelligible; Alcibiades expressly directs it toward truth rather than mere ridicule.

- **215a** — **δι’ εἰκόνων**. Alcibiades announces praise through likenesses.
- **215a** — **ἡ εἰκὼν**. The likeness is to serve truth, not the laughable.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

Εἰλείθυια

Eileithyia — The goddess of childbirth, whose assisting office clarifies Beauty's generative role.

- **206d** — **Εἰλείθυια**. Beauty is Eileithyia at the birth, not the child being born.

Read: Beauty at birth.

εἰλικρινής

eilikrinēs — Pure or unadulterated, describing the final beautiful as seen in itself.

- **211e** — **εἰλικρινές**. The beautiful itself is seen pure.

Read: Pure and unmixed.

εἴπερ

eiper — If indeed or if as granted; can emphasize a premise without turning every resulting claim unconditional.

- **207a** — **εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν**. The inference to immortality depends on the agreed formula of love.
- **212a** — **εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων**. The conditional qualification remains in the final immortality claim.

Read: If and if indeed.

εἰρήνη

eirēnē — Peace, the relation Agathon says follows Love's rule in place of ancient divine violence.

- **195c** — **φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη**. Friendship and peace contrast with castrations, bindings and force.

- **197c** — **εἰρήνην**. Peace among humans begins the metrical celebration.

Read: Peace and calm.

εἰρωνεύομαι

eirōneuomai — To use an understated or dissembling manner; Alcibiades applies it to the disparity between Socrates' surface and what he believes lies within.

- **216e** — **εἰρωνευόμενος**. Alcibiades describes Socrates' lifelong manner toward human beings.

Read: Irony, play, and earnestness.

εἰρωνικῶς

eirōnikōs — Ironically or with characteristic self-depreciating reserve.

- **218d** — **εἰρωνικῶς**. Alcibiades introduces Socrates' answer to the proposed erotic bargain.

Read: Irony, play, and earnestness.

ἔκγονος

ekgonos — Born from or descended from; in the neuter plural, offspring.

- **209d** — **ἔκγονα**. The lasting works of poets are called offspring left behind.

Read: Offshoot.

ἑκών

hekōn — Willing or voluntary; in the agreement argument both parties must be willing.

- **196c** — **ἑκὼν ἑκόντι**. One willing person agrees with another willing person.

Read: Justice, agreement and force.

ἔλαττον

elatton — Less; at the summit, part of a denial of quantitative change.

- **211b** — **μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον**. The beautiful itself is not increased or diminished by changing participants.

Read: More and less.

ἐλέγχω

elenchō — To test or refute by exposing a consequence inconsistent with what was asserted.

- **201e** — **ἤλεγχε**. Diotima refuted Socrates by arguments like those he has used against Agathon.

Read: Refutation and examination.

ἐλλοχάω

ellochaō — To lie in ambush; Alcibiades accuses Socrates of appearing where least expected.

- **213b** — **ἐλλοχῶν**. His startled discovery of Socrates becomes an accusation of ambush.

Read: Plotting and ambush.

ἔμφρων

emphrōn — Having one's wits about one; practical composure under danger.

- **221a–b** — **ἔμφρων εἶναι**. Alcibiades says Socrates surpassed Laches in composed awareness during retreat.

Read: Courage and composure.

ἐναντίος

enantios — Opposite; the superlative identifies constituents most hostile to one another that medicine must reconcile.

- **186d** — **τὰ ἐναντιώτατα**. The most opposed constituents are the most hostile.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

ἐνδεής

endeēs — Lacking a specified object or quality; a dictionary headword for the inflected forms.

- **200b** — **ἐνδεὲς**. The qualification is repeated under negation: no desire if there is no lack.
- **201b** — **Ἐνδεὴς**. Love is concluded to lack beauty.

Read: Desire and lack.

ἔνδεια

endeia — Lack or deficiency.

- **203d** — **ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος**. Love is always a housemate of lack in the genealogy.

Read: Desire and lack.

ἔνδοθεν

endothen — Within or from the inside, the location of what an opening reveals.

- **215b** — **ἔνδοθεν**. The carvings show statues inside.
- **216d** — **ἔνδοθεν**. The opened Socrates reveals temperance within.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

ἕνεκα

heneka — For the sake of; marks an aim rather than simply a prior cause.

- **210e** — **οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν**. The final beautiful is that for whose sake the earlier toils occurred.
- **211c** — **ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ**. The ascent begins with particular beauties for the sake of that beautiful.

Read: End and purpose.

ἕνεκα

heneka — For the sake of, marking a purpose or motivating end; the value of the same outward act can turn on this complement.

- **185a** — **πλούτου ἕνεκα**. Wealth supplies the contrasting discreditable motive.
- **185b** — **ἀρετῆς γ’ ἕνεκα**. Virtue is the explicit end that qualifies gratification.

Read: For the sake of and because of.

ἔνθεος

entheos — God-filled or divinely inspired; in Phaedrus’ account the lover’s courage has Love as its inspiring source.

- **179a** — **ἔνθεον**. Love could inspire even a bad man toward virtue.
- **180b** — **ἔνθεος**. The lover is more divine because god-filled.

Read: Dying for another and dying after.

ἐντυγχάνω

entynchanō — To meet or come upon; encounter can concern a person, a book, or a soul recognised as beautiful.

- **174a** — **ἐντυχεῖν**. Aristodemus reports that Socrates met him.
- **177b** — **ἐνέτυχον**. Phaedrus, as quoted by Eryximachus, encountered a book praising salt.
- **209b** — **ἐντύχῃ**. Diotima envisages encountering a beautiful and well-endowed soul.
- **219d** — **ἐντυχεῖν**. Alcibiades says he had never expected to encounter such a person.

Read: Meeting and encounter.

ἐξαίφνης

exaiphnēs — Suddenly, marking an abrupt change in experience or narrative without itself identifying its cause.

- **210e** — **ἐξαίφνης**. The properly prepared lover will suddenly see the beautiful.
- **210e** — **ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί**. The sudden seeing follows the described education and ordered contemplation.
- **212c** — **ἐξαίφνης**. Knocking interrupts the response to Socrates' speech.
- **212c** — **καὶ ἐξαίφνης**. The revellers' knocking suddenly interrupts the response to Socrates' account.
- **213c** — **ἐξαίφνης**. Alcibiades says Socrates habitually appears unexpectedly.
- **223b** — **ἐξαίφνης**. A second crowd of revellers arrives abruptly.

Read: Suddenly.

ἐξαπατάω

exapataō — To deceive thoroughly; the passive marks the person whose expectation proves false.

- **185a** — **ἐξαπατηθείη**. The apparent rich lover is discovered to be poor.
- **185a–b** — **ἐξαπατηθείη**. The apparent good educator is discovered to lack virtue.

Read: Deception and intention.

ἔξωθεν

exōthen — On the outside, describing the visible or audible guise that can mislead initial judgement.

- **216d** — **ἔξωθεν**. The silenus-like guise is worn externally.
- **221e** — **ἔξωθεν**. The speeches wrap themselves externally in ordinary words and expressions.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

ἐπαινέω

epaineō — To praise or commend; the verb includes Alcibiades' attempt to praise Socrates through truthful likenesses.

- **215a** — **ἐπαινεῖν**. Alcibiades undertakes to praise Socrates through likenesses.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ἔπαινος

epainos — Praise or commendation, a broader family than the formal encomium; the noun and verb also describe personal approval.

- **177d** — **ἔπαινον**. The agreed subject and purpose of each speech.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ἐπαναβασμός

epanabasmos — A step or ascent-step; the headword is supplied from the printed dative plural.

- **211c** — **ἐπαναβασμοῖς**. The lover proceeds as if using steps.

Read: Ascent.

ἐπάνειμι

epaneimi — To go up or return upward; the movement is educational and evaluative in Diotima's recap.

- **211c** — **ἐπανιέναι**. The learner is to go upward always from these beauties for the sake of that beauty.

Read: Ascent.

ἐπαποθνῄσκω

epapothnēiskō — To die after or upon another's death; Phaedrus distinguishes Achilles' choice from merely substituting for the other.

- **180a** — **ἐπαποθανεῖν**. Achilles dies after Patroclus has already died.
- **208d** — **ἐπαποθανεῖν**. Diotima recalls the same heroic sequence.

Read: Dying for another and dying after.

ἔπειτα

epeita — Afterwards; with time, future continuation rather than repetition of present possession.

- **200d** — **εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον**. The temporal qualification resolves the apparent counterexample.

Read: Present and future possession.

ἐπιβάτης

epibatēs — A marine or passenger aboard, here part of a cluster of protective companions rather than identical with the pilot.

- **197e** — **ἐπιβάτης**. A second maritime role in Agathon's list.

Read: Leader, pilot and companion.

ἐπιβουλεύω

epibouleuō — To plot against or lay plans to obtain something from another.

- **217c** — **ἐπιβουλεύων**. Alcibiades invites Socrates to dinner like a lover plotting for a darling.

Read: Plotting and ambush.

ἐπίβουλος

epiboulos — Plotting against or laying plans for an object.

- **203d** — **ἐπίβουλός**. Love lays plans for beautiful and good things after his father's nature.

Read: Hunting and devices.

ἐπιθυμέω

epithymeō — To desire; the object is examined as something lacking rather than merely absent from view.

- **200a** — **τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν**. Infinitival formulation of the proposed necessity: what desires desires what it lacks.

Read: Desire and lack.

ἐπιθυμία

epithymia — Desire or appetite, not restricted here to bodily appetite.

- **200e** — **ἡ ἐπιθυμία**. Desire is coordinated with love at the conclusion of the temporal argument.
- **205d** — **πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία**. All desire for good things falls within the enlarged account of love.

Read: Desire and lack.

ἐπιμελής

epimelēs — Heedful or concerned; what receives the concern determines its ethical force.

- **172c** — **ἐπιμελὲς**. Apollodorus has made daily knowledge of Socrates' acts and words his concern.
- **197d** — **ἐπιμελὴς**. Agathon's Love is heedful of good things.

Read: Care of oneself and neglect.

ἐπίσταμαι

epistamai — To know or understand; not merely to have heard a proposition.

- **177d** — **ἐπίστασθαι**. Socrates' claim is restricted to matters of love.
- **202a** — **ἐπίστασθαί**. Knowing is denied to opinion without an account.

Read: Knowledge.

ἐπιστήμη

epistēmē — Knowledge, a particular body of knowledge, or a field of understanding according to number and context.

- **202a** — **ἐπιστήμη**. A thing without an account cannot be knowledge.
- **207e** — **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι**. Pieces of knowledge are included in mortal change.
- **210d** — **τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν**. A certain single knowledge becomes visible after expansion through many beauties.

Read: Knowledge.

ἕπομαι

hepomai — To follow, physically or intellectually; following a person does not guarantee following the argument.

- **174b** — **Ἕπου**. Socrates tells Aristodemus to follow him to dinner.
- **210a** — **ἕπεσθαι**. Diotima tells Socrates to try to follow if he can.
- **223d** — **ἑπομένους**. The drowsy poets are not following closely.
- **223d** — **ἕπεσθαι**. Aristodemus follows Socrates after the party.

Read: Following and guidance.

ἐποπτικός

epoptikos — Pertaining to beholding in the language of initiation.

- **210a** — **ἐποπτικά**. Substantivized plural coordinated with perfect rites; the noun beholding is an English rendering of the ritual implication.

Read: Initiation and fulfilment.

ἔρανος

eranos — A contribution to a shared undertaking or collection; Eryximachus casts his proposal as a contribution to Phaedrus.

- **177c** — **ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν**. The phrase makes the speeches a cooperative contribution.

Read: Salt, contribution and shared praise.

ἐραστής

erastēs — A lover, commonly the pursuing party in the socially recognized courtship relation; the role is not simply interchangeable with every grammatical subject who loves.

- **178c** — **ἐραστὴς χρηστὸς**. Phaedrus' decent lover for a youth.
- **180b** — **ἐραστὴς παιδικῶν**. The lover is more divine than the darling in Phaedrus' explanation.
- **222b** — **ἐραστὴς**. The role that Socrates only appears to occupy, according to Alcibiades.

Read: Lover and beloved.

ἐράω

eraō — To be in love with or passionately desire; normally constructed with a genitive object.

- **204d** — **ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν**. The one in love loves beautiful things; the next question asks what outcome is desired.

Read: Love.

ἔργον

ergon — A work or characteristic activity; the inquiry distinguishes Love's nature from what Love does.

- **201e** — **τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ**. Socrates retains Agathon's sequence: who Love is, then his works.
- **206b** — **τὸ ἔργον**. The activity singled out is birth in beauty.

Read: Work and action.

ἔριον

erion — Wool, the material conducting water between cups in the comparison.

- **175d** — **τοῦ ἐρίου**. The strand through which water passes, not the source of the water.

Read: Touch and transmitted wisdom.

ἕρμαιον

hermaion — A fortunate find or lucky opportunity, conventionally associated with Hermes; its apparent benefit can be misjudged.

- **176c** — **Ἕρμαιον**. Eryximachus welcomes strong drinkers' temporary exhaustion.

- **217a** — **ἕρμαιον**. Alcibiades regards Socrates' supposed attraction as a lucky opportunity.

Read: Godsend.

ἑρμηνεύω

hermēneuō — To interpret or convey meaning between parties.

- **202e** — **Ἑρμηνεῦον**. The daimonic interprets communications in both directions.

Read: Daimon and mediation.

ἐρώμενος

erōmenos — The beloved, a substantivized passive participle: the person who is loved. The verbal formation keeps the object-position visible.

- **180b** — **ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ**. The beloved cherishes the lover, a response Phaedrus judges especially admirable.
- **204c** — **τὸ ἐρώμενον**. Diotima's neuter expression means what is loved, contrasting with the desiring subject.

Read: Lover and beloved.

ἐρῶν

erōn — The one in love, an active participial expression identifying the desiring subject without always assigning the social title of lover.

- **204c** — **τὸ ἐρῶν**. The neuter expression for what is in love, which Diotima contrasts with the beloved.

Read: Lover and beloved.

ἔρως

erōs — Love as desire, its personified divine figure, and the wider pursuit of lasting good; the speaker and argument determine the scope.

- **199e** — **Ἔρως**. Socrates asks whether Love is of something.
- **206a** — **ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί**. Diotima's compressed formula includes the good, its being one's own, and always.

Read: Love.

ἐρώτησις

erōtēsis — A question that can expose a gap in an apparently finished answer.

- **204d** — **ἐρώτησιν**. The first answer still calls for another question about what possession brings.

Read: Question and answer.

ἐρωτικός

erōtikos — Concerned with love; in the neuter plural, matters or practices of love.

- **177d** — **τὰ ἐρωτικά**. Socrates says these are the only things he knows.
- **212b** — **τὰ ἐρωτικὰ**. Socrates says he honours and practises matters of love.

Read: Love.

ἑταιρίστρια

hetairistria — A woman whose erotic partners are women, in the local explanation of halves from the original female kind.

- **191e** — **ἑταιρίστριαι**. The plural identifies a group traced to the original female.

Read: Androgyne and the three kinds.

ἑταῖρος

hetairos — A companion or associate, ranging from a social acquaintance to someone sharing danger.

- **172b** — **ἑταίρου**. Socrates is the companion whose speeches Apollodorus is to report.
- **221b** — **ἑταῖρος**. Laches is Socrates' companion in retreat, in Burnet's printed reading.

Read: Companionship and shared presence.

ἕτοιμος

hetoimos — Ready or available; here at hand as an object of possession.

- **200e** — **τοῦ μὴ ἑτοίμου**. The desired object is unavailable in the specified respect.

Read: Not yet and at hand.

εὐανθής

euanthēs — In flower or flourishing, a favorable condition for Love's resting-place in Agathon's portrait.

- **196b** — **εὐανθής**. One quality of the place where Love alights.

Read: Flowers, bloom and fragrance.

εὐδαιμονέω

eudaimoneō — To be happy; the goal shared by the desires grouped under love.

- **205d** — **τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν**. Being happy is included with desire for good things.

Read: Happiness.

εὐδαιμονία

eudaimonia — Happiness as an expected enduring benefit.

- **208e** — **εὐδαιμονίαν**. Physical progenitors expect happiness through children, as they think.

Read: Happiness.

εὐδαίμων

eudaimōn — Happy or flourishing through possession of goods, rather than merely pleased at a moment.

- **204e** — **εὐδαίμων ἔσται**. Socrates answers what happens to someone whose good things become his.
- **205a** — **οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες**. Diotima explains happiness through possession of good things.

Read: Happiness.

Εὐθύδημος

Euthydēmos — Another named example in Alcibiades' allegation of reversed lover-beloved roles.

- **222b** — **Εὐθύδημον**. Identified as son of Diocles.

Read: Charmides and Euthydemus.

εὐπορέω

euporeō — To have resources or find an answer readily.

- **203e** — **εὐπορήσῃ**. Love flourishes when he gains resource.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

εὔπορος

euporos — Well resourced; its comparative adverb describes finding an answer more readily.

- **204e** — **εὐπορώτερον**. Socrates can answer with more resource when good replaces beautiful.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

Εὐριπίδης

Euripidēs — Euripides, named at the opening borrowed line and identified by the edition as the source of the later tongue-and-mind adaptation.

- **177a** — **τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην**. Eryximachus explicitly identifies his earlier borrowed opening.

Read: The tongue and the mind.

εὐσέβεια

eusebeia — Piety or appropriate regard toward divine powers, made a condition of hoped-for restoration by Aristophanes.

- **188d** — **εὐσέβειαν**. Positive piety in the printed reading.
- **193d** — **εὐσέβειαν**. Aristophanes conditions Love's promised restoration upon human piety.

Read: Divination, piety and right.

εὐσχημοσύνη

euschēmosynē — Gracefulness of shape or bearing, used as evidence for a proportionate, supple figure.

- **196a** — **ἡ εὐσχημοσύνη**. Agathon's visible sign of Love's pleasing form.

Read: Flowers, bloom and fragrance.

εὐφημέω

euphēmeō — To speak auspiciously or refrain from ill-omened speech; here a sharp request to stop an inappropriate remark.

- **201e** — **Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις**. Diotima responds to Socrates' suggestion that Love is ugly and bad.
- **214d** — **Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις**. Socrates later uses the same formula to check Alcibiades.

Read: Hush and good omen.

εὐώδης

euōdēs — Fragrant; paired with flowering in the same sensory image.

- **196b** — **εὐώδης**. Fragrance marks the attractive dwelling.

Read: Flowers, bloom and fragrance.

ἐφάπτομαι

ephaptomai — To come into contact with or lay hold of; at the culmination, contact with truth explains true ethical generation.

- **212a** — **ἐφαπτομένῳ**. The participle is repeated: not touching an image, but touching what is true.

Read: Touch and transmitted wisdom.

Ἐφιάλτης

Ephialtēs — Ephialtes, named with Otus as a poetic parallel for the original humans' attempted assault on heaven.

- **190b** — **Ἐφιάλτου τε καὶ Ὦτου**. The paired allusion to Homer.

Read: Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.

ἔχις

echis — A viper; the creature supplies a comparison for pain understood by fellow sufferers.

- **217e** — **τοῦ ἔχεως**. The person bitten by a viper tells only others who have been bitten.

Read: Bite, madness, and initiation.

ἔχω

echō — To have or possess; the object and temporal qualification determine whether desire has been satisfied.

- **200c** — **ἔχουσιν**. The people already have these qualities at present, whether they want them or not.

Read: Present and future possession.

Ζεύς

Zeus — Zeus, a deliberating governor in Aristophanes' myth, and himself instructed in governing by Love in Agathon's praise.

- **190c** — **ὁ Ζεὺς**. He seeks a device that preserves worship while weakening humanity.
- **197b** — **Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν**. Agathon makes even divine government a skill learned through Love.

Read: Divine teachers and craft pupils.

ζηλοτυπέω

zēlotypeō — To be jealous of a rival or of another person's attention.

- **213d** — **ζηλοτυπῶν**. Socrates accuses Alcibiades of jealous interference.

Read: Jealousy and reconciliation.

ζητέω

zēteō — To seek or investigate; it describes activity continued despite initial lack of progress.

- **220c** — **εἱστήκει ζητῶν**. Standing and seeking continue when the problem does not move forward.

Read: Attention and standing still.

ζητέω

zēteō — To seek or look for an object, answer or condition of fulfilment.

- **207d** — **ζητεῖ**. Mortal nature seeks lasting existence.
- **209b** — **ζητεῖ**. The pregnant soul seeks beauty in which to beget.

Read: Seeking and pursuing.

ἡγεμών

hēgemōn — A leader or guide, used for Love in restoration and in the festal or cosmic procession of praise.

- **193b** — **ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός**. Aristophanes gives Love guiding and commanding roles.

- **197e** — **ἡγεμὼν**. Agathon closes by making Love the finest leader.

Read: Leader, pilot and companion.

ἡγέομαι

hēgeomai — To lead or guide; elsewhere to consider or believe, so the construction decides.

- **210a** — **ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος**. The initial guided course is conditional on correct leadership.

Read: Ascent.

ᾖθεος

ēitheos — Unwed or unmarried; the supplied text uses this of a soul-pregnant person reaching productive maturity.

- **209b** — **ᾖθεος**. Burnet prints Parmentier's conjecture in the description of psychic pregnancy.

Read: Unwed.

ἥλιος

hēlios — The sun, whose rising ends the all-night episode of inquiry.

- **220d** — **ἥλιος**. Socrates remains standing until the sun rises.

Read: Sun and prayer.

ἥμισυς

hēmisys — Half; substantivized for a divided person and the counterpart sought, not a fractional arithmetic thesis.

- **191a** — **τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ αὑτοῦ**. Each cut creature yearns for its own half.

- **205e** — **οὔτε ἡμίσεός**. Diotima's account refuses to make half-seeking sufficient by itself.

Read: Wholeness and the half.

Ἡράκλειτος

Hērakleitos — Heraclitus, quoted and then corrected by Eryximachus, who distinguishes what he might mean from his actual wording.

- **187a** — **Ἡράκλειτος**. The doctor attributes a statement about unity in difference to him.

Read: Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.

Ἡσίοδος

Hēsiodos — Hesiod as poetic witness for Love's antiquity, later reconsidered by Agathon and exemplifying immortal poetic offspring for Diotima.

- **178b** — **Ἡσίοδος**. Phaedrus quotes the beginning of the divine genealogy.
- **195c** — **Ἡσίοδος**. Agathon qualifies the old stories with "if they spoke truth".
- **209d** — **Ἡσίοδον**. Diotima names him beside Homer as a parent of enduring works.

Read: Hesiod.

Ἥφαιστος

Hēphaistos — The divine smith, introduced hypothetically to articulate lovers' wish for complete joining; later a pupil of Love in Agathon's craft-list.

- **192d** — **ὁ Ἥφαιστος**. He stands over the imagined lovers carrying his tools.
- **197b** — **Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας**. Hephaestus' bronze-working is taught by Love in Agathon's praise.

Read: Hephaestus and fusion.

θεάομαι

theaomai — To behold or view attentively, from ordinary sight to philosophical apprehension.

- **210c** — **θεάσασθαι**. The lover beholds beauty in practices and laws.
- **211d** — **θεωμένῳ**. The life worth living is described as beholding beauty itself.

Read: Seeing and contemplating.

θέμις

themis — What is divinely right or sanctioned, rather than simply a statute enacted by a city.

- **188d** — **θέμιν**. Paired with piety as the object of divinatory understanding.
- **195a** — **θέμις**. Agathon qualifies his praise: if it is right to say Love is happiest.

Read: Divination, piety and right.

θεοφιλής

theophilēs — Loved by the gods; a consequence attributed to the producer and nurturer of true virtue.

- **212a** — **θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι**. Becoming god-loved follows the twofold condition.

Read: True virtue and images.

θεραπεύω

therapeuō — To attend or serve; in this argument it is personal attendance believed to lead to betterment, not itself a technical term for medical cure.

- **184c** — **θεραπεύειν**. Willing attendance upon an expected educator.

Read: Voluntary slavery and service.

θερμός

thermos — Hot, the counterpart of cold in the body and seasons.

- **186d** — **θερμῷ**. Dative counterpart to cold.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

θεωρέω

theōreō — To contemplate or observe; active attention, not mere visual contact.

- **210d** — **θεωρῶν**. Contemplation of the great sea accompanies the generation of speeches and thoughts.

Read: Seeing and contemplating.

θῆλυς

thēlys — Female; the neuter form names the other kind, whose original double-bodied members yield female-directed halves.

- **189d** — **θῆλυ**. The female is distinguished from male and from the vanished mixed kind.

Read: Androgyne and the three kinds.

θηρευτής

thēreutēs — Hunter, an image of Love's active pursuit.

- **203d** — **θηρευτὴς δεινός**. Love is a formidable hunter, not a passive beautiful object.

Read: Hunting and devices.

θνητός

thnētos — Mortal, subject to death and change.

- **206e** — **ὡς θνητῷ**. Generation is immortal for a mortal; the qualification restricts the sense.

Read: Immortality.

θύρα

thyra — A door; openings and arrivals repeatedly govern the party's changes.

- **174e** — **θύραν**. Aristodemus finds Agathon's door open.
- **223b** — **θύρας**. The second band of revellers finds the doors open and enters.

Read: Porch and threshold.

ἰάομαι

iaomai — To heal or cure, applied to bodily repair and to the restoration promised by love.

- **191d** — **ἰάσασθαι**. Love tries to heal human nature after its division.

Read: Medicine and healing.

Ἰαπετός

Iapetos — Iapetus, paired with Cronus as an emblem of the older divine generation.

- **195b** — **Ἰαπετοῦ**. The second member of Agathon's chronological comparison.

Read: Necessity.

ἰατρική

iatrikē — Medicine as an expertise that discriminates bodily erotic tendencies and changes their relations to fullness and emptying.

- **186c** — **ἰατρική**. Eryximachus' definition begins from the medical craft.

Read: Medicine and healing.

ἰατρός

iatros — A doctor or healer: literally Eryximachus, and metaphorically Love in Aristophanes' account.

- **189d** — **ἰατρὸς**. Aristophanes calls Love a doctor of the human condition.

Read: Medicine and healing.

ἰδέα

idea — Figure or character; not invariably an independently existing Form.

- **204c** — **ἄλλην ἰδέαν**. What loves has a different figure from the lovely beloved.

Read: Form and figure.

ἱκανός

hikanos — Sufficient or adequate; in this argument, a self-assessment rather than proved competence.

- **204a** — **δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν**. Someone not beautiful, good or intelligent seems sufficient to himself.

Read: Ignorance and sufficiency.

ἱμάτιον

himation — A cloak or outer garment; its wearer and role must be identified in each scene.

- **219b** — **ἱμάτιον**. Alcibiades puts his own cloak around Socrates.
- **220b** — **ἱμάτιον**. Socrates wears his accustomed cloak in severe cold.

Read: Bare feet and cloaks.

ἴον

ion — A violet, here part of the wreath rather than a metaphorical bloom.

- **212e** — **ἴων**. The genitive plural specifies violets.

Read: Wreaths and ribbons.

ἵστημι

histēmi — To stand or set standing; here sustained bodily stillness accompanies thinking.

- **175a** — **ἔστηκεν**. A slave reports Socrates standing in the neighbours' porch.
- **220c** — **εἱστήκει σκοπῶν**. Socrates stands investigating a thought that has not yet advanced.

Read: Attention and standing still.

καθαρός

katharos — Clean or pure.

- **211e** — **καθαρόν**. The adjective reinforces the contrast with mortal admixture.

Read: Pure and unmixed.

καθεύδω

katheudō — To sleep; whether someone is asleep determines what can be said, heard, or remembered.

- **218c** — **καθεύδεις**. Alcibiades asks whether Socrates is asleep before making his proposal.

Read: Sleep and dawn.

καθοράω

kathoraō — To catch sight of or discern.

- **211b** — **καθορᾶν**. Beginning to catch sight of the beautiful nearly reaches the end.

Read: Seeing and contemplating.

καλάπους

kalapous — A shoemaker's last, around which leather is smoothed; the tool-image explains Apollo's shaping.

- **191a** — **τὸν καλάποδα**. The last used in the comparison with leather-working.

Read: Cutting, repair and the navel.

καλέω

kaleō — To call or invite; Aristodemus distinguishes the host's invitation from Socrates' invitation.

- **174d** — **κεκλημένος**. Aristodemus will say he has been invited by Socrates.

Read: Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.

Καλλονή

Kallonē — Beauty personified as the enabling power at birth.

- **206d** — **ἡ Καλλονή**. Beauty is named as Moira and Eileithyia for generation.

Read: Beauty at birth.

κάλλος

kallos — Beauty, the noun corresponding to beautiful.

- **201a** — **κάλλους**. Love is agreed to be love of beauty.
- **210b** — **τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος**. Beauty in souls is ranked above bodily beauty.
- **210c** — **ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος**. Beauty belongs also to kinds of knowledge.

Read: Beauty and ugliness.

καλός

kalos — Beautiful, fine or admirable in body, conduct, practice, speech or understanding.

- **201c** — **τἀγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ**. Socrates asks whether good things are also beautiful; he does not reverse the implication.

Read: Beauty and ugliness.

καλῶς

kalōs — Well or finely; the adverb of beautiful can commend speech or action without certifying its account.

- **201c** — **καλῶς γε εἶπες**. Socrates still tells Agathon he spoke well after refuting the portrait.

Read: Rightly and well.

καλῶς

kalōs — Well, finely or beautifully; the adverb evaluates how an act is performed, not merely the appearance of its object.

- **181a** — **καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον**. Well-performed action becomes beautiful.

Read: Well and rightly.

καρτερέω

kartereō — To hold out or persist; the value depends on what one withstands.

- **184a–b** — **καρτερήσῃ**. Pausanias tests whether a beloved holds out under mistreatment.
- **216a** — **καρτερήσαιμι**. Alcibiades says he could not hold out against listening to Socrates.
- **220a** — **καρτερεῖν**. Socrates surpasses others in holding out without food.

Read: Endurance.

καρτέρησις

karterēsis — An act or feat of endurance, here resistance to severe winter conditions.

- **220a** — **καρτερήσεις**. Alcibiades turns to Socrates' feats of endurance against winter.

Read: Endurance.

καρτερία

karteria — Endurance: the capacity to hold steady under difficulty or pressure.

- **219d** — **καρτερίαν**. Alcibiades pairs endurance with intelligence in his admiration.

Read: Endurance.

καρτερός

karteros — Strong or stout; context may make the strength forceful persistence or heroic endurance.

- **217c** — **κατὰ τὸ καρτερὸν**. Alcibiades resolves to attack his seduction problem by main force.
- **220c** — **καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ**. A Homeric phrase introduces the story of Socrates standing in thought.

Read: Endurance.

καταγέλαστος

katagelastos — Ridiculous, deserving to be laughed at; the failure Aristophanes says he fears.

- **189b** — **καταγέλαστα**. The object of the comic poet's stated fear.
- **198c** — **καταγέλαστος**. Socrates calls his former assumption about encomium ridiculous.

Read: Laughable and ridiculous.

καταγέλαστος

katagelastos — Ridiculous or deserving derisive laughter, contrasted by Aristophanes with welcome comic amusement.

- **189b** — **καταγέλαστα**. Aristophanes fears ridiculous rather than merely laughable things.

Read: Laughter and frankness.

καταλείπω

kataleipō — To leave behind, including offspring and replacement contents.

- **207d** — **καταλείπει**. Mortal nature continues by leaving something new behind.

Read: Renewal and identity.

κατανοέω

katanoeō — To grasp or consider with attention.

- **210a** — **κατανοῆσαι**. The learner must recognize kinship between beauty on different bodies.

Read: Knowing and learning.

κατέχω

katechō — To hold fast or possess; in the passive it describes the hearer's overwhelming response.

- **215d** — **κατεχόμεθα**. Alcibiades says the hearers are struck and possessed.

Read: Hearing and enchantment.

κατιδεῖν

katidein — To catch sight of; infinitival citation form from the seeing family.

- **210d** — **κατίδῃ**. The strengthened learner catches sight of a certain single knowledge.
- **210e** — **κατόψεταί**. The learner will suddenly catch sight of marvellous beauty.

Read: Seeing and contemplating.

κενός

kenos — Empty; the comparative describes a receiver in the imagined transfer.

- **175d** — **κενώτερον**. The emptier person, analogised with the emptier cup.

Read: Touch and transmitted wisdom.

κένωσις

kenōsis — Emptying or evacuation, paired with fullness as an object of medical discrimination.

- **186c** — **κένωσιν**. The second bodily process in the doctor's definition.

Read: Surfeit and emptying.

κηλέω

kēleō — To charm or enchant, used of the power of Marsyas' music over listeners.

- **215b–c** — **ἐκήλει**. Marsyas charmed people through instruments by the power of his mouth.

Read: Hearing and enchantment.

κῆπος

kēpos — Garden, the place where Resource sleeps and Poverty conceives Love.

- **203b** — **τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κῆπον**. The garden belongs to Zeus in Diotima's story.

Read: Nectar and garden.

κιθαρῳδός

kitharōidos — A singer to the lyre, invoked by Phaedrus as an explanation of Orpheus' supposed softness.

- **179d** — **κιθαρῳδός**. The profession colors the speaker's adverse judgment.

Read: Orpheus and the phantom.

κιττός

kittos — Ivy, a material of the festive wreath.

- **212e** — **κιττοῦ**. Ivy is joined with violets in the description.

Read: Wreaths and ribbons.

κλέος

kleos — Fame that is spoken or heard of, here the lasting renown sought by heroic sacrifice and preserved in cultural offspring.

- **208c** — **κλέος**. Immortal fame is the object of ambitious striving.
- **209d** — **ἀθάνατον κλέος**. Poems leave enduring fame to their makers.

Read: Honour and ambition.

κοινωνία

koinōnia — Partnership or sharing, here founded on common psychic offspring.

- **209c** — **πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν**. Diotima calls their partnership much greater than that concerning bodily children.

Read: Common nurture.

κοινωνία

koinōnia — A partnership, sharing or association, whose content must be supplied by context: civic solidarity, divine-human relations, or shared offspring.

- **182c** — **κοινωνίας**. Strong partnerships threaten tyrannical rulers in Pausanias' argument.
- **188c** — **κοινωνία**. The relation between gods and human beings in Eryximachus' account.
- **209c** — **μείζω κοινωνίαν**. The partnership of co-educators is compared with that of human children.

Read: Friendship, partnership and affinity.

κορυβαντιάω

korybantiaō — To be seized by Corybantic frenzy or perform its ecstatic response; Alcibiades uses a comparison, not a formal diagnosis.

- **215e** — **κορυβαντιώντων**. His heart leaps even more than the hearts of those in Corybantic frenzy.

Read: Corybantic response.

κοσμέω

kosmeō — To arrange or adorn; honoring the god through speeches is itself represented as adornment.

- **177c** — **κοσμῆσαι τὸν θεόν**. Eryximachus proposes to adorn Love by the gathering's praise.

Read: Order and disorder.

κόσμιος

kosmios — Orderly, well-regulated or decorous; the adjective links social conduct, bodily state, cosmic relation and piety without making them identical.

- **187d** — **κοσμίοις**. The people whose desires musical education should sustain.
- **189a** — **τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος**. Aristophanes jokes about the bodily order cured by a sneeze.

Read: Order and disorder.

κόσμος

kosmos — Order or adornment; at the rhetorical climax Love is the adornment of gods and humans, while at the end the party loses order.

- **197e** — **κόσμος**. Love as adornment in Agathon's praise.
- **223b** — **ἐν κόσμῳ**. The negative context: drinking no longer has any order.

Read: Order and disorder.

κοτύλη

kotylē — A measure of capacity; the vessel's unusually large volume is explicit.

- **214a** — **κοτύλας**. The cooler holds more than eight measures.

Read: Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.

κρᾶσις

krasis — A blend or mixture, qualified as temperate when seasonal constituents cooperate well.

- **188a** — **κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα**. The healthy mixture accompanies harmony.

Read: Seasons, blending and astronomy.

κρατέω

krateō — To master, prevail over, or be stronger than; the relation between agent and what is mastered must be preserved.

- **196c** — **τὸ κρατεῖν**. The infinitive names mastery of pleasures and desires.
- **196c** — **κρατῶν**. Agathon infers Love's temperance from his mastery of pleasures and desires.

Read: Temperance and self-command.

Κρόνος

Kronos — Cronus, a figure of the ancient divine generation used to contest Love's alleged antiquity.

- **195b** — **Κρόνου**. Agathon denies that Love is older than Cronus.

Read: Necessity.

κτάομαι

ktaomai — To acquire; perfect forms can denote possessing what has been acquired.

- **200d** — **κεκτῆσθαι**. The imagined healthy or wealthy person wants to possess the goods in the time to come.

Read: Present and future possession.

κτῆσις

ktēsis — Possession or acquisition; a noun related to the acquire/possess verb.

- **205a** — **Κτήσει**. Possession of good things explains happiness.

Read: Present and future possession.

κυβερνήτης

kybernētēs — A pilot or steersman, one of Agathon's images for Love's assistance through life's difficulties.

- **197e** — **κυβερνήτης**. Love guides in toil, fear, yearning and speech.

Read: Leader, pilot and companion.

κυβιστάω

kybistaō — To tumble or turn cartwheels; a familiar bodily action explains the mythic humans' rapid movement.

- **190a** — **κυβιστῶντες**. The comparison uses actual tumblers to make the strange body imaginable.

Read: Roundness and cartwheels.

κυέω

kyeō — To be pregnant or carry a conception, bodily or psychically.

- **206c** — **κυοῦσιν**. All human beings are described as pregnant in body and soul.

Read: Birth and begetting.

κύημα

kyēma — What has been conceived and is being carried.

- **206d** — **τὸ κύημα**. The conception is painfully retained when the pregnant subject recoils from ugliness.

Read: Birth and begetting.

κωμῳδία

kōmōidia — Comedy, named at the close as a poetic practice that Socrates connects with tragedy through knowledge.

- **223d** — **κωμῳδίαν**. Socrates makes the two poets agree that the same man knows how to make comedy and tragedy.

Read: Comedy and tragedy.

κωμῳδοποιός

kōmōidopoios — A maker of comedy, linked to the knowledgeable tragic maker in the closing claim.

- **223d** — **κωμῳδοποιὸν**. The second predicate in the conclusion reported by Aristodemus.

Read: Comedy and tragedy.

Λάχης

Lachēs — Socrates' companion in the retreat from Delium, named as a standard of comparison for composure.

- **221a** — **Λάχης**. He retreats alongside Socrates.
- **221a** — **Λάχητος**. Alcibiades says Socrates surpassed Laches in keeping his wits.

Read: Courage and composure.

λήθη

lēthē — Forgetting, described as the departure of knowledge.

- **208a** — **λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος**. Diotima explicitly explains forgetting through loss of knowledge.

Read: Memory and practice.

λήθη

lēthē — Forgetting, defined locally as the departure of knowledge that practice counters.

- **208a** — **λήθη**. Diotima explains why repeated practice is necessary.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

λίσπαι

lispai — Halved dice, the concrete comparison for a further division that would leave humans thinner still; the plural is retained as a source-form headword.

- **193a** — **λίσπαι**. A threatened further cut yields bodies like halved dice.

Read: Tally and matching halves.

λόγον δίδωμι

logon didōmi — To give an account: a phrase record, not one dictionary headword.

- **202a** — **ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι**. Right opinion is specified as lacking the capacity to render an account.

Read: Right opinion.

λόγος

logos — A speech, account, formulation or reasoned explanation. Its exact force depends on whether a speaker performs, reports, proposes, or tests it.

- **177d** — **πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου**. Phaedrus is father of the proposed discourse.
- **189b** — **δώσων λόγον**. Aristophanes is told to speak as one who must give an account.
- **205e** — **ὁ δ’ ἐμὸς λόγος**. Diotima distinguishes her account from the story of the halves.
- **215c** — **ψιλοῖς λόγοις**. Alcibiades credits Socrates’ bare words with a musical power.

Read: Speech and account.

λύγξ

lynx — A hiccup, the bodily interruption that changes the order of speeches.

- **185c** — **λύγγα**. The cause is left uncertain: surfeit or something else.
- **185d** — **ἡ λύγξ**. The doctor’s proposed remedies address it.

Read: Hiccup and sneeze.

Λύκειον

Lykeion — The gymnasium to which Socrates goes after leaving the party.

- **223d** — **Λύκειον**. Socrates washes there and continues the day in his usual way.

Read: Lyceum.

μά

ma — An oath particle introducing the deity or deities invoked; it does not itself mean that the assertion is true.

- **219c** — **μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς**. Alcibiades swears by gods and goddesses that the night produced no sexual result.

Read: Witnesses and oaths.

μάθημα

mathēma — Something learned, a study or learned subject; distinct from the noun knowledge.

- **211c** — **τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα**. Beautiful studies form a stage in the recap of ascent.
- **211c** — **αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα**. The final study is of that beautiful itself.

Read: Knowledge.

μακάρων νῆσοι

makarōn nēsoi — Isles of the Blessed, the specially honored destination assigned to Achilles in Phaedrus' account; a normalized phrase-headword.

- **179e** — **εἰς μακάρων νήσους**. Achilles is sent to the blessed islands.

Read: Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.

μαλακός

malakos — Soft, the nickname printed for Apollodorus, in tension with his severe speech.

- **173d** — **μαλακὸς**. The companion questions why Apollodorus bears this name.

Read: Apollodorus and Aristodemus.

μαλακός

malakos — Soft, applied to the characters and souls in which Agathon's Love dwells.

- **195e** — **μαλακωτάτοις**. The softest things are Love's favored dwelling.
- **195e** — **μαλακόν**. A soft character admits Love.

Read: Tenderness, softness and hardness.

μᾶλλον

mallon — More or rather; its comparison identifies a difference of degree or preference, not always exclusion.

- **209a** — **ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν**. Some people are pregnant in soul still more than in body.

Read: More and less.

μᾶλλον

mallon — More or rather, a comparative marker that can rank motives or objects without excluding the less-preferred alternative.

- **181b** — **τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν**. Common lovers prefer bodies to souls; this is not a body-only assertion.

Read: More, rather than and no less.

μανθάνω

manthanō — To learn or understand what is being said.

- **206b** — **οὐ μανθάνω**. Socrates does not yet understand the formula birth in beauty.
- **206b** — **μαθησόμενος**. He has come to Diotima in order to learn these matters.

Read: Knowing and learning.

μανία

mania — Madness; here part of Alcibiades' description of a shared philosophical experience.

- **218b** — **τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας**. The guests are addressed as partners in wisdom-loving madness.

Read: Bite, madness, and initiation.

μαντική

mantikē — Divination as an expertise concerning relations between gods and human beings; later placed within daimonic mediation.

- **188c–d** — **ἡ μαντικὴ**. Eryximachus calls it a craftsman of divine-human friendship.
- **202e** — **ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα**. Diotima places all divination through the daimonic.

Read: Divination, piety and right.

Μαρσύας

Marsyas — The satyr whose captivating pipe-music provides a likeness for Socrates' speech.

- **215b** — **Μαρσύᾳ**. Alcibiades compares Socrates to the satyr.
- **215c** — **Μαρσύου**. The tunes played by Olympus are attributed to Marsyas as his teacher.

Read: Marsyas and Olympus.

μαρτυρία

martyria — Testimony or witness, here supplied by a named exemplary deed.

- **179b** — **ἱκανὴν μαρτυρίαν**. Alcestis' conduct testifies for the claim about loving self-sacrifice.

Read: Evidence and testimony.

μάρτυς

martys — A witness called to support a claim or to establish the public visibility of an achievement.

- **175e** — **μάρτυσι**. The theatrical audience serves as witness to Agathon's brilliant wisdom in Socrates' teasing praise.
- **215b** — **μάρτυρας**. Alcibiades threatens to bring witnesses to Socrates' insolence.

Read: Witnesses and oaths.

μέθη

methē — Drunkenness, not the act of drinking in itself.

- **176d** — **ἡ μέθη**. Eryximachus calls drunkenness harsh for human beings.

Read: Drinking and sobriety.

μεθύω

methyō — To be drunk; the narrator and speakers contrast this state with Socrates' unusual resistance.

- **212d** — **μεθύοντος**. Alcibiades is audibly very drunk on arrival.
- **220a** — **Σωκράτη μεθύοντα**. Object of Alcibiades' claim that no human being has ever seen him drunk.

Read: Drinking and sobriety.

μέλει

melei — It matters or is a concern; the construction identifies what does or does not command someone's attention.

- **216d** — **μέλει**. Alcibiades says another person's beauty matters nothing to Socrates in the relevant sense.

Read: Care of oneself and neglect.

μελετάω

meletaō — To practise or rehearse.

- **208a** — **μελετᾶν**. The activity exists because knowledge departs.

Read: Memory and practice.

μελέτη

meletē — Practice or rehearsal that maintains knowledge by renewing memory.

- **208a** — **μελέτη**. Practice preserves knowledge so that it seems the same.

Read: Memory and practice.

μελέτη

meletē — Practice or rehearsal that renews something in memory.

- **208a** — **μελέτη**. Diotima says practice puts a fresh memory in place of the one departing.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

μελοποιία

melopoiia — Song-making, distinguished from the proper educational use of songs already made.

- **187d** — **μελοποιίαν**. The productive side of applying music to people.

Read: Music, harmony and rhythm.

μέσος

mesos — Middle; an ordinary spatial expression made to articulate mediation.

- **202e** — **ἐν μέσῳ**. The daimonic fills the interval between gods and humans.

Read: Between.

μεταξύ

metaxy — Between: an intermediate position that blocks exhaustive division into two opposed descriptions.

- **202a** — **μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας**. Right opinion lies between intelligence and ignorance.
- **202d** — **μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου**. Diotima places Love between mortal and immortal.
- **204b** — **μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς**. A lover of wisdom is between wise and ignorant.

Read: Between.

μετέχω

metechō — To share or have a part in; its objects range from virtues to immortality and beauty itself.

- **208b** — **θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει**. The mortal shares in immortality by a specified device of replacement.

- **211b** — **τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα**. All other beautiful things share in the beautiful itself.

Read: Participation.

μή

mē — Not in the constructions appropriate to conditions, general descriptions and dependent clauses.

- **202b** — **ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν**. What is not beautiful must not be forced to be ugly.

Read: Not and neither.

Μῆτις

Mētis — Metis, the mother of Resource; the edition explains the name as Cunning Intelligence.

- **203b** — **τῆς Μήτιδος**. The genealogy gives Resource a mother but does not narrate her own myth.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

μηχανή

mēchanē — Device, contrivance or means of achieving something.

- **203d** — **πλέκων μηχανάς**. Love continually weaves devices.
- **208b** — **ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ**. Replacement is the device by which mortals share in immortality.

Read: Hunting and devices.

μιμνῄσκομαι

mimnēiskomai — To remember or recall; what is retained and what is lost delimit both a narrative and an inquiry.

- **178a** — **ἐμέμνητο**. Aristodemus did not completely remember everything.
- **200a** — **μεμνημένος**. Socrates tells Agathon to remember what Love is of.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

μνημεῖον

mnēmeion — A memorial or reminder, here deliberately embodied in the repaired surface.

- **191a** — **μνημεῖον**. The retained wrinkles remind humans of their old suffering.

Read: Cutting, repair and the navel.

μνήμη

mnēmē — Memory, either refreshed cognitive retention or the lasting remembrance of a person's virtue.

- **208a** — **μνήμην**. Fresh memory replaces what is departing.
- **208d** — **ἀθάνατον μνήμην**. Remembered virtue motivates heroic sacrifice in Diotima's account.

Read: Memory and practice.

μνήμη

mnēmē — Memory, both the renewed retention of knowledge and the lasting remembrance sought through offspring or works.

- **208a** — **μνήμην**. Fresh memory preserves a piece of knowledge.

- **208d** — **ἀθάνατον μνήμην**. The remembered virtue of exemplary figures motivates sacrifice in Diotima's account.

Read: Memory and rehearsal.

Μοῖρα

Moira — Moira or Fate/Portion, assigned a function at birth in Diotima's personification.

- **206d** — **Μοῖρα**. The name is predicated of Beauty alongside Eileithyia.

Read: Beauty at birth.

μοναχοῦ

monachou — In this one place or there alone.

- **212a** — **ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ**. Only there can the described beholder generate true rather than image-virtue.

Read: Only and alone.

μοναχοῦ

monachou — Only there or in that one case, emphasizing a restrictive condition.

- **184e** — **μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα**. Pausanias says gratification is beautiful in that joined educational arrangement alone.

Read: Only and not every.

μονοειδής

monoeidēs — Single in form; not changing character across perspectives or participants.

- **211b** — **μονοειδὲς**. The beautiful itself is characterized as single in form and always being.
- **211e** — **μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν**. The final invitation repeats its single-form character.

Read: The beautiful itself.

μόνος

monos — Only or alone; restricts an alternative or location within its grammatical scope.

- **207d** — **ταύτῃ μόνον**. Mortal nature achieves continuance only in this way, through generation.

Read: Only and alone.

μόνος

monos — Only or alone, whose restricted subject or condition must be identified from the sentence.

- **179b** — **μόνοι**. Phaedrus restricts willingness to die for another to lovers.
- **184c** — **μία μόνη**. Pausanias restricts the beloved's non-reproachable voluntary slavery to one kind.

Read: Only and not every.

μόριον

morion — A part marked off within a wider productive field.

- **205c** — **ἓν μόριον**. Music and metres form the part commonly called poetry.

Read: Naming whole and part.

Μοῦσα

Mousa — A Muse; the collective Muses learn their musical expertise from Love in Agathon's list.

- **197b** — **Μοῦσαι**. The Muses appear alongside the named craft-gods.

Read: Divine teachers and craft pupils.

μουσική

mousikē — The musical or Muse-governed art, here comprising the construction and use of harmony, rhythm, songs and metres.

- **187c** — **μουσικὴ**. Eryximachus parallels the musical craft with medicine.

Read: Music, harmony and rhythm.

μυέω

myeō — To initiate into mysteries; the passive form marks Socrates as a possible recipient of preliminary instruction.

- **209e–210a** — **μυηθείης**. Diotima says perhaps even Socrates might be initiated into these matters.

Read: Initiation and fulfilment.

μῦθος

mythos — A tale or narrated saying; at its first occurrence the word introduces a borrowed remark, not a universal contrast between myth and rational argument.

- **177a** — **οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος**. Eryximachus adapts a Euripidean line to acknowledge Phaedrus as his source.

Read: Speech and account.

νέκταρ

nektar — Nectar, the drink that intoxicates Resource at the divine feast.

- **203b** — **τοῦ νέκταρος**. Resource is drunk on nectar, explicitly before wine exists.

Read: Nectar and garden.

νέος

neos — New or young; here the replacement left behind by the departing old.

- **207d** — **ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ**. Another new thing takes the old thing's place.

Read: Renewal and identity.

Νέστωρ

Nestōr — A Homeric counsellor used as a counterpart for Pericles.

- **221c** — **Νέστορα**. The comparison belongs to familiar excellence in speech.

Read: Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

νήφω

nēphō — To be sober; Socrates also uses it pointedly of Alcibiades' apparently calculated speech.

- **222c** — **Νήφειν**. Socrates says Alcibiades seems sober because his speech has a cleverly concealed purpose.

Read: Drinking and sobriety.

νομίζω

nomizō — To hold, acknowledge or regard something as customary; not every occurrence amounts to formal legislation.

- **182b** — **αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται**. An established local shame-judgment.

Read: Law and custom.

νομοθετέω

nomotheteō — To establish by law or lay down a normative arrangement; Pausanias uses it in comparing civic regulations and customs.

- **182d** — **νενομοθέτηται**. The law-making verb presents the Athenian arrangement as better established.

Read: Law and custom.

νόμος

nomos — A law, accepted custom, or norm represented as governing conduct. The word does not itself distinguish statute from unwritten expectation.

- **181d** — **νόμον εἶναι**. Pausanias proposes a prohibition rather than reporting one already in force.
- **183e–184a** — **ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος**. The local norm is personified as testing lovers.
- **192b** — **ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου**. Aristophanes says law compels marriage and procreation.
- **210c** — **τοῖς νόμοις**. Laws become objects of discerned beauty.

Read: Law and custom.

νοσώδης

nosōdēs — Diseased or unwholesome, the condition whose gratification must be refused.

- **186c** — **νοσώδεσιν**. The contrast with good and wholesome bodily constituents.

Read: Medicine and healing.

νοῦς

nous — Mind or attentive understanding in the exhortation to follow the account.

- **210e** — **τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν**. Diotima asks Socrates to attend as closely as possible.

Read: Knowing and learning.

ξένη

xenē — Female stranger or woman from elsewhere; emphasizes her position in Socrates' report.

- **211d** — **ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη**. The Mantinean stranger is explicitly reidentified near the conclusion.

Read: Diotima.

ξηρός

xēros — Dry, paired with wet; the same pair later enters the account of seasons.

- **186d** — **ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ**. Dry in relation to wet.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

ὄα

oa — Sorb-apples, preserved fruits that supply one comparison for Zeus' cutting; the printed plural is used as the headword.

- **190d–e** — **τὰ ὄα**. The fruits are cut before preservation.

Read: Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.

οἰκεῖος

oikeios — One's own or akin, a relation Diotima subjects to a standard of goodness.

- **205e** — **τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον**. Calling the good one's own is allowed as a reformulation, not a proof that everything already one's own is good.

Read: The good.

οἰκειότης

oikeiotēs — Affinity or a sense of belonging together, not necessarily genealogical kinship or ownership.

- **192c** — **οἰκειότητι**. The meeting of one's own half produces affinity with friendship and love.
- **197d** — **οἰκειότητος**. Agathon says Love fills people with affinity.

Read: Friendship, partnership and affinity.

οἴομαι

oiomai — To think or suppose; a reporting qualification can separate an agent's expectation from the narrator's endorsement.

- **208e** — **ὡς οἴονται**. Parents expect immortality, memory and happiness through offspring, as they think.

Read: As they think.

οἴομαι

oiomai — To think or suppose; the belief about one's lack affects one's desire.

- **204a** — **ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι**. The person who does not think he lacks will not desire what he does not think he needs.

Read: Ignorance and sufficiency.

ὅλος

holos — Whole or entire: the original condition sought in Aristophanes' story, but not an adequate object of love unless good in Diotima's correction.

- **192e** — **ἦμεν ὅλοι**. Aristophanes says humans were originally whole.
- **192e–193a** — **τοῦ ὅλου**. The whole is the object of desire and pursuit in his formula.
- **205e** — **οὔτε ὅλου**. Diotima denies that love is of a whole without the further qualification of goodness.

Read: Wholeness and the half.

Ὄλυμπος

Olympos — The musician named as a pupil whose tunes derive from Marsyas.

- **215c** — **Ὄλυμπος**. Alcibiades explains the relation between performer and teacher.

Read: Marsyas and Olympus.

ὁμιλέω

homileō — To associate or keep company, including the shared presence through which educational offspring are generated.

- **209c** — **ὁμιλῶν**. The soul-pregnant person keeps company with the beautiful companion.

Read: Companionship and shared presence.

ὁμιλία

homilia — Company or intercourse between parties; Diotima makes divine-human communication mediated rather than direct mingling.

- **203a** — **ἡ ὁμιλία**. All company of gods with humans proceeds through the daimonic.

Read: Companionship and shared presence.

ὄμνυμι

omnymi — To swear an oath, invoked as a guarantee of sincerity in a difficult account.

- **215d** — **ὀμόσας**. Alcibiades says he would describe his experience on oath.

Read: Witnesses and oaths.

ὁμολογέω

homologeō — To agree or acknowledge; an agreement can furnish a premise without becoming infallible knowledge.

- **201b** — **ὡμολόγηται**. The shared lack premise is recalled.
- **207a** — **ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων**. The immortality inference is explicitly from what has been agreed.

Read: Agreement and premise.

ὀμφαλός

omphalos — The navel, figured as the gathered opening of repaired skin and left as a memorial of the former wound.

- **190e** — **τὸν ὀμφαλὸν**. The tied mouth of the repaired belly.
- **191a** — **τὸν ὀμφαλόν**. The navel and nearby wrinkles preserve the memorial.

Read: Cutting, repair and the navel.

ὄναρ

onar — A dream; in the opening comparison, a figure for wisdom that is uncertain or disputable.

- **175e** — **ὥσπερ ὄναρ**. Socrates compares his own wisdom to a dream.

Read: Dreamlike wisdom.

ὄνομα

onoma — Name or conventional designation; its ordinary extension may be narrower than the broader account.

- **205d** — **τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα**. One form of love receives the name of the whole.

Read: Naming whole and part.

ὀνομάζω

onomazō — To name or give a designation.

- **205b** — **ὀνομάζομεν**. Ordinary speakers impose the whole-name on a part.

Read: Naming whole and part.

ὄνος κανθήλιος

onos kanthēlios — A pack-ass, one of the ordinary examples that make Socratic speech seem comic on first hearing.

- **221e** — **ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους**. The animal belongs to Alcibiades' list of humble conversational materials.

Read: Commonplace crafts.

ὀξύς

oxys — Sharp or keen; the neuter used adverbially qualifies seeing rather than naming a physical eye.

- **219a** — **ὀξὺ βλέπειν**. The phrase describes the acuity of mental vision.

Read: Sight of the mind.

ὁρατός

horatos — Visible or accessible to seeing; the relevant means of seeing is left unnamed at the climax.

- **212a** — **ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν**. The beholder sees with that by which the beautiful is visible.

Read: Seeing and contemplating.

ὀρθὴ δόξα

orthē doxa — Right opinion: a judgement that reaches what is without being able to supply an account.

- **202a** — **ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα**. Diotima's positive intermediate between intelligence and ignorance.

Read: Right opinion.

ὀρθῶς

orthōs — Rightly or correctly, according to the requirements of the practice or inquiry.

- **210e** — **ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς**. Beautiful things must be beheld in sequence and rightly.

Read: Rightly and well.

ὀρθῶς

orthōs — Rightly or correctly, a procedural or normative qualification that can accompany “well” without being identical to it.

- **181a** — **καὶ ὀρθῶς**. Right performance joins good manner in Pausanias’ criterion.
- **187d** — **χρώμενον ὀρθῶς**. The correct use of composed music is education.

Read: Well and rightly.

Ὀρφεύς

Orpheus — Orpheus, the singer whom Phaedrus treats as an insufficiently courageous lover.

- **179d** — **Ὀρφέα**. The gods send him away from Hades without the woman herself.

Read: Orpheus and the phantom.

οὐ πᾶς

ou pas — Not every or not all: a denial of universality, not necessarily a universal denial.

- **181a** — **οὐ πᾶς ἐστι καλὸς**. Not every Love is beautiful.

Read: Only and not every.

οὔπω

oupō — Not yet, preserving a temporal qualification rather than a permanent impossibility.

- **200d** — **ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον**. Future preservation of present goods is not yet at hand.

Read: Not yet and at hand.

Οὐρανία

Ourania — Heavenly, the title of the older, motherless Aphrodite; the masculine derivative names the corresponding Love.

- **180d** — **Οὐρανίαν**. The daughter of Heaven receives the title Heavenly.

Read: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

Οὐρανία

Ourania — Urania or Heavenly, the Muse to whom Eryximachus assigns the beautiful, heavenly Love.

- **187d–e** — **Οὐρανίας μούσης**. A Muse, not the Heavenly Aphrodite of Pausanias' speech.

Read: Urania and Polyhymnia.

Οὐράνιος

Ouranios — Heavenly, the masculine adjective used for the Love associated with Heavenly Aphrodite.

- **180e** — **Οὐράνιον**. The corresponding masculine title for Love.

Read: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

οὔτε

oute — Neither or nor; coordinates denials without supplying a positive contrary.

- **201e** — **οὔτε καλὸς**. Love is reported as neither beautiful nor good by Socrates' earlier account.

Read: Not and neither.

οὐχ ἧττον

ouch hētton — No less, a comparative phrase expressing at least parity rather than exclusive preference.

- **181b** — **οὐχ ἧττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων**. Common lovers love women no less than boys.

Read: More, rather than and no less.

ὄψις

opsis — Sight or vision; Socrates distinguishes the mind's sharpening vision from bodily eyesight.

- **219a** — **τῆς διανοίας ὄψις**. Mental sight begins to see keenly as bodily sight leaves its prime.

Read: Sight of the mind.

παιδεία

paideia — Education or cultivation, explicitly distinguished by Eryximachus from producing songs: it is the proper use of existing songs and metres.

- **187d** — **παιδεία**. The educational use of musical material.

Read: Pederasty and education.

παιδεραστής

paiderastēs — A male lover of youths, one role within Aristophanes' account of males derived from the original male kind.

- **192b** — **παιδεραστής**. The adult role is paired with loving lovers.

Read: Pederasty and education.

παιδεραστία

paiderastia — The historical courtship practice involving an older male lover and a younger male beloved, differentiated and defended by Pausanias under restrictive educational conditions.

- **181c** — **τῇ παιδεραστίᾳ**. Pausanias distinguishes different motivations even within the practice.

Read: Pederasty and education.

παίδευσις

paideusis — Education as the learner's sought acquisition and development in Pausanias' proposed reciprocal arrangement.

- **184e** — **παίδευσιν**. The younger party needs to acquire what contributes to education and wisdom.

Read: Pederasty and education.

παιδιά

paidia — Playfulness, explicitly distinguished from but mixed with measured earnestness.

- **197e** — **παιδιᾶς**. Agathon says his speech shares in play and measured earnestness.

Read: Irony, play, and earnestness.

παιδιά

paidia — Play or playfulness, which may coexist with a measured serious purpose.

- **197e** — **παιδιᾶς**. Agathon says his speech shares partly in play.

Read: Play and earnestness.

παίζω

paizō — To play or joke; the verb can describe social teasing or a sustained manner of interaction.

- **172a** — **παίζων**. Glaucon jokes in hailing Apollodorus.
- **216e** — **παίζων**. Socrates is said to play with people throughout his life.

Read: Irony, play, and earnestness.

Πάνδημος

Pandēmos — Of all the people or Common; in Pausanias' evaluative distinction the title describes a less discriminating Love.

- **180e** — **Πάνδημον**. Title of the younger Aphrodite and her cooperating Love.
- **181a–b** — **πάνδημός**. The common lover's indiscriminate manner is stressed.

Read: Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

πάρειμι

pareimi — To be present or available; not merely spatial proximity in the desire argument.

- **200d** — **τὰ νῦν παρόντα**. Things present now are desired as present also in the future.

Read: Present and future possession.

Παρμενίδης

Parmenidēs — Parmenides as a cited poet of Love's divine origin, not as an exposition of an entire philosophical system.

- **178b** — **Παρμενίδης**. Phaedrus introduces the verse about devising Love first.
- **195c** — **Παρμενίδης**. Agathon returns to the old divine stories.

Read: Parmenides.

παρρησία

parrhēsia — Frankness or speaking openly, here the quality noticed in Alcibiades' intimate disclosure.

- **222c** — **παρρησίᾳ**. The narrator names the openness of the speech as the occasion of laughter.

Read: Laughter and frankness.

πᾶς

pas — All or every; its domain must be supplied by the noun and speaker.

- **206c** — **πάντες ἄνθρωποι**. All human beings are said to be pregnant in body and soul.
- **211b** — **τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ**. All the other beautiful things participate in the final beautiful.

Read: All and every.

πάσχω

paschō — To undergo or suffer an affection; change in participants does not cause an affection in beauty itself.

- **211b** — **μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν**. The final beautiful suffers nothing through participants' generation and destruction.

Read: Participation.

πατήρ

patēr — Father, used as a relational predicate rather than a genealogy of Love.

- **199d** — **ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος**. The question concerns what being a father implies.

Read: Love of something.

Πάτροκλος

Patroklos — Patroclus, assigned the lover's role in Phaedrus' interpretation.

- **179e** — **τῷ ἐραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ**. The explicit assignment of the role.
- **208d** — **Πατρόκλῳ**. The person after whom Achilles dies.

Read: Achilles and Patroclus.

πείθω

peithō — To persuade; in the perfect middle/passive, to be convinced or persuaded.

- **212b** — **πέπεισμαι**. Socrates states his own resulting conviction.
- **212b** — **πείθειν**. He tries to persuade others of Love's value as helper.

Read: Truth and persuasion.

πέλαγος

pelagos — Open sea, an image for the expanded field of beauty available to philosophical thought.

- **210d** — **τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος**. The learner turns towards beauty's great sea rather than serving a single attachment.

Read: The great sea of beauty.

Πενία

Penia — Poverty, Love's mother, who seeks a child because of her own want of resource.

- **203b** — **ἡ Πενία**. She comes to the doors to beg.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

Περικλῆς

Periklēs — The orator whom Alcibiades has heard and can match with earlier speakers.

- **215e** — **Περικλέους**. His speeches impressed Alcibiades without Socrates' disturbing effect.
- **221c** — **Περικλῆς**. Pericles admits heroic counterparts where Socrates allegedly does not.

Read: Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

πέφυκα

pephyka — To be constituted or be by nature; a perfect-form dictionary citation for the printed form.

- **203e** — **πέφυκεν**. Love is by nature neither immortal nor mortal in the simple opposed senses.

Read: Nature.

πικρός

pikros — Bitter, paired with sweet in the same list.

- **186d** — **πικρὸν γλυκεῖ**. Bitter in relation to sweet.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

πίνω

pinō — To drink; the dialogue distinguishes willingness, quantity, pleasure, and compulsion.

- **176e** — **πίνειν**. The agreed rule permits each guest to drink as much as he wants.

Read: Drinking and sobriety.

πλέον

pleon — More; paired with less to deny quantitative alteration of the final object.

- **211b** — **μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον**. Beauty itself becomes neither more nor less when other beauties change.

Read: Participation.

πλεονεκτέω

pleonekteō — To obtain more or get the better of another in a transaction.

- **218e** — **πλεονεκτεῖν**. If Socrates has the supposed power, Alcibiades would gain disproportionately.

Read: Exchange and gold for bronze.

πλεονεξία

pleonexia — Overreaching or greed: a social-moral description extended here to excessive relations among natural constituents.

- **188b** — **πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας**. Excess and disorder explain frost, hail and blight in the speech.

Read: Seasons, blending and astronomy.

πλησμονή

plēsmonē — Fullness, repletion or surfeit: a bodily condition, possible cause of hiccup, and later sexual satiation.

- **185c** — **πλησμονῆς**. One possible explanation of Aristophanes' hiccup.
- **186c** — **πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν**. The paired field of medicine in Eryximachus' definition.
- **191c** — **πλησμονὴ**. Satiation permits the halves to pause and return to work.

Read: Surfeit and emptying.

ποίησις

poiēsis — Making or production in the broad sense, and poetry as the specially named part of that activity.

- **205b** — **ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ**. Diotima calls making something manifold.
- **205b–205c** — **πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις**. Every cause bringing anything from not being into being counts as making.

Read: Making and poetry.

ποιητής

poiētēs — Maker or poet; ordinary usage restricts the shared name to a part of the larger class.

- **205c** — **οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί**. All the craftsmen are makers under the broad definition.

Read: Making and poetry.

Πολυμνία

Polymnia — Polyhymnia, assigned the Common Love whose pleasure requires careful management.

- **187e** — **Πολυμνίας**. Her Love may be used without implanting licentiousness.

Read: Urania and Polyhymnia.

πόριμος

porimos — Resourceful, able to devise ways of gaining the desired object.

- **203d** — **πόριμος**. Love's paternal inheritance is coordinated with his desire for intelligence.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

Πόρος

Poros — Resource, Love's father in Diotima's genealogy; his name evokes means and a way through.

- **203b** — **Πόρος**. Son of Metis, present at Aphrodite's birth-feast.

Read: Resource and Poverty.

Ποτείδαια

Poteidaia — The campaign setting shared by Socrates and Alcibiades, where endurance and rescue are recalled.

- **219e** — **Ποτείδαιαν**. Their shared campaign follows the unsuccessful seduction in Alcibiades' narrative.
- **221a** — **Ποτειδαίᾳ**. Alcibiades compares his observation of Socrates there with his better view at Delium.

Read: Potidaea and Delium.

πρᾶξις

praxis — Action or practical activity, specified as the mode in which the universal desire is pursued.

- **206b** — **ἐν τίνι πράξει**. Diotima asks in what action earnest pursuit is called love.

Read: Work and action.

Πρόδικος

Prodikos — Prodicus, named as an accomplished composer of prose praise.

- **177b** — **Πρόδικος**. The particular example in Phaedrus' complaint.

Read: Sophists and Prodicus.

πρόθυρον

prothyron — A porch or space before a door, here the neighbours' place where Socrates stops.

- **175a** — **προθύρῳ**. Socrates is reported standing in the neighbours' porch.

- **175d** — **προθύροις**. Agathon imagines that a wise discovery arrived there.

Read: Porch and threshold.

προσαιτέω

prosaiteō — To beg or ask for alms.

- **203b** — **προσαιτήσουσα**. Poverty arrives intending to beg at the feast.

Read: Nectar and garden.

προσεύχομαι

proseuchomai — To pray; Socrates' departure follows a prayer directed to the sun.

- **220d** — **προσευξάμενος**. The aorist participle places the prayer before his departure.

Read: Sun and prayer.

προσέχω

prosechō — To direct or apply; with the mind as object, to pay attention.

- **174d** — **προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν**. Socrates directs attention to himself while falling behind.
- **210e** — **τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν**. Diotima asks Socrates to attend as closely as possible.
- **217b** — **προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν**. Alcibiades asks the hearers to pay attention to his account.

Read: Attention and standing still.

προσέχω

prosechō — To direct or hold attention, with mind as its object in the exhortation.

- **210e** — **τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν**. Diotima explicitly asks Socrates to pay close attention.

Read: Attention and strengthening.

προσπελάζω

prospelazō — To draw near or approach.

- **206d** — **προσπελάζῃ**. The pregnant subject approaches what is beautiful.

Read: Approach and recoil.

πταρμός

ptarmos — A sneeze, the noisy remedy that finally stops the hiccup.

- **189a** — **τὸν πταρμὸν**. Aristophanes reports the successful intervention.

Read: Hiccup and sneeze.

πτάρνυμαι

ptarnymai — To sneeze; the imperative gives the doctor's final proposed remedy.

- **185e** — **πτάρε**. The command follows breath-holding and gargling.

Read: Hiccup and sneeze.

πω

pō — Yet, an enclitic temporal particle whose negative setting marks a stage not so far reached, rather than a permanent absence.

- **187c** — **οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν**. The double Love is not present yet in the bare constitution of harmony and rhythm.

Read: Not yet and the stage of an argument.

ῥέω

rheō — To flow; the literal movement of water provides a deliberately conditional model of learning.

- **175d** — **ῥεῖν**. Socrates imagines wisdom flowing from fuller to emptier people.

Read: Touch and transmitted wisdom.

ῥυθμός

rhythmos — Rhythm, which the speaker derives from the reconciliation of fast and slow.

- **187b** — **ὁ ῥυθμὸς**. Rhythm is introduced as a parallel to harmony.

Read: Music, harmony and rhythm.

ῥώννυμι

rhōnnymi — To strengthen or make vigorous.

- **210d** — **ῥωσθεὶς**. The learner is strengthened through the expansive philosophical stage.

Read: Attention and strengthening.

σάτυρος

satyros — A satyr, the nonhuman figure through which Socrates' appearance, insolence, and power of speech are compared.

- **215b** — **σατύρῳ**. Socrates is likened to Marsyas.
- **221e** — **σατύρου**. The exterior language of the speeches is a satyr's hide.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

Σειρήν

Seirēn — A Siren, whose compelling song supplies a comparison for the voice Alcibiades both wants and resists.

- **216a** — **τῶν Σειρήνων**. Alcibiades stops his ears as if escaping from the Sirens.

Read: Sirens.

σιληνός

silēnos — A silenus, especially an opening figure whose unpromising exterior conceals divine statues.

- **215a** — **σιληνοῖς**. Carved sileni provide the first comparison for Socrates.
- **221d** — **σιληνοῖς**. The comparison returns for Socrates' speeches.

Read: Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

σκληρός

sklēros — Hard, initially what Love avoids, later a quality of Love himself in Diotima's account.

- **195e** — **σκληρὸν ἦθος**. Agathon's Love leaves a hard character.
- **203c** — **σκληρὸς**. Diotima describes Love as hard and needy.

Read: Tenderness, softness and hardness.

σκυτοτόμος

skytotomos — A shoemaker or leather-cutter.

- **221e** — **σκυτοτόμους**. Shoemakers are part of the apparently repetitive exterior of the speeches.

Read: Commonplace crafts.

σοφία

sophia — Wisdom or expertise; the completed possession contrasted with its pursuit.

- **175d** — **ἡ σοφία**. Socrates imagines, conditionally, wisdom flowing by bodily contact.
- **204b** — **τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία**. Wisdom is among the most beautiful things, not simply declared the sole most beautiful thing.

Read: Wisdom and philosophy.

σοφιστής

sophistēs — A professional wise speaker or teacher; its uses here range from prose encomiast to Diotima's rhetorical manner and Love's resourceful persona.

- **177b** — **σοφιστάς**. Phaedrus' comparison with writers of prose praise.
- **203d** — **σοφιστής**. Diotima includes the term in Love's resourceful character.
- **208c** — **οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί**. Socrates compares Diotima's emphatic assurance with accomplished professional teachers.

Read: Sophists and Prodicus.

σοφιστής

sophistēs — Sophist or expert performer/teacher; its force varies with context.

- **203d** — **σοφιστής**. Love is a sophist in the genealogy.
- **208c** — **οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί**. Diotima's authoritative reply is compared with that of accomplished sophists.

Read: Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.

σπουδάζω

spoudazō — To be in earnest, take seriously, or make something a serious concern.

- **216e** — **σπουδάσαντος**. Alcibiades contrasts Socrates' earnest opening with his playful exterior.
- **217a** — **ἐσπουδακέναι**. Alcibiades supposes Socrates to be seriously interested in his youthful beauty.

Read: Irony, play, and earnestness.

σπουδή

spoudē — Serious attention or earnest effort, rather than merely play.

- **206b** — **ἡ σπουδὴ**. The earnestness of pursuit must be specified to identify love's work.
- **208b** — **αὕτη ἡ σπουδὴ**. Reproductive care's earnestness is explained by immortality.

Read: Earnestness and exertion.

σπουδή

spoudē — Earnestness, serious effort or committed concern; it does not mean truth or correctness merely by itself.

- **177c** — **πολλὴν σπουδὴν**. Effort lavished on trivial subjects intensifies Phaedrus' complaint.
- **197e** — **σπουδῆς μετρίας**. Agathon claims measured earnestness alongside play.

Read: Play and earnestness.

στέφανος

stephanos — A wreath or crown; Alcibiades' head is festally decorated on arrival.

- **212e** — **στεφάνῳ**. The wreath is thick with ivy and violets.

Read: Wreaths and ribbons.

στρογγύλος

strongylos — Round, describing the original humans' entire bodily shape in Aristophanes' story.

- **189e** — **στρογγύλον**. The whole form is circular, with back and sides all round.

Read: Roundness and cartwheels.

συγγενής

syngenēs — Kindred or of common kin.

- **210c** — **συγγενές**. Beauty in ways of life and laws is recognized as kindred with itself.

Read: Kindred beauties.

σύμβολον

symbolon — A matching token or tally, one part retained to identify its counterpart; Aristophanes uses it for the divided human.

- **191d** — **ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον**. Each present person is a tally of a human being.
- **191d** — **τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος σύμβολον**. Each seeks the matching tally of his or her own.

Read: Tally and matching halves.

σύμπας

sympas — All together; an emphatic totality that can be challenged by a counterexample.

- **202b** — **Συμπάντων**. Socrates insists that everyone calls Love a god before Diotima names the exceptions.

Read: All and every.

συμφυσάω

symphysaō — To blow together, as at bellows, hence weld or forge together in this context. It differs from growing together.

- **192e** — **συμφυσῆσαι**. Burnet's printed verb for the smith's second operation.

Read: Hephaestus and fusion.

συμφύω

symphyō — To grow together; used of the bodily joining desired after the cut, before the proposed smith's welding.

- **191a** — **συμφῦναι**. The embracing halves desire to grow together.

Read: Wholeness and the half.

συμφωνία

symphōnia — Consonance or sounding together, treated as a kind of agreement.

- **187b** — **συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία τις**. The next link in Eryximachus' reasoning.

Read: Music, harmony and rhythm.

σύνειμι

syneimi — To be with someone or something; the object and setting determine the kind of association.

- **176e** — **συνεῖναι**. Eryximachus proposes being with one another through speeches.
- **212a** — **συνόντος**. Diotima describes the contemplator as being with the beautiful itself.

Read: Companionship and shared presence.

συνεκτρέφω

synektrephō — To rear together, an active joint care for what has been generated.

- **209c** — **συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ**. The pregnant lover and the companion rear the offspring in common.

Read: Common nurture.

συνεργός

synergos — Fellow-worker or helper in attaining something, not sole producer.

- **212b** — **συνεργὸν ἀμείνω**. Socrates says one would not readily find a better helper than Love.

Read: Use and fellow-worker.

συνουσία

synousia — Being together, association, or a gathering; not inherently a word for sexual intercourse.

- **172a** — **συνουσίαν**. Glaucon asks about the gathering at Agathon's.
- **219d** — **συνουσίας**. Alcibiades cannot bear deprivation of Socrates' company.

Read: Companionship and shared presence.

σύντασις

syntasis — Exertion or intense effort; the printed noun in Diotima's question about love's activity.

- **206b** — **ἡ σύντασις**. Coordinated with earnestness when asking what pursuit is called love.

Read: Earnestness and exertion.

συντήκω

syntēkō — To melt or fuse together; the smith offers to make two into one.

- **192d** — **συντῆξαι**. First verb in the offer of union.

Read: Hephaestus and fusion.

σύριγξ

syrinx — A panpipe, distinguished from the aulos in the description of the figures.

- **215b** — **σύριγγας**. The alternative instrument held by the carven sileni.

Read: Pipe-girl and pipes.

συσπειρᾶται

syspeiratai — Printed middle form: coils or draws itself together in a reaction of distress.

- **206d** — **συσπειρᾶται**. The pregnant subject contracts in distress before ugliness.

Read: Approach and recoil.

σῴζω

sōzō — To preserve or keep safe, without necessarily preserving every constituent unchanged.

- **208a** — **πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται**. All the mortal is preserved by the described kind of renewal.

Read: Renewal and identity.

Σωκράτης

Sōkratēs — The central participant, first a remembered companion and interlocutor, then the subject of Alcibiades' praise.

- **213b** — **Σωκράτης**. Alcibiades recognises the person he did not expect to find beside Agathon.
- **223c** — **Σωκράτη**. Socrates remains awake with the two poets.

Read: Socrates.

σῶμα

sōma — Body, the living and changing embodied condition and an initial object of erotic education.

- **206b** — **κατὰ τὸ σῶμα**. Birth in beauty occurs in respect of body as well as soul.
- **211c** — **τὰ καλὰ σώματα**. Beautiful bodies are recalled as the ascent's initial rungs.

Read: Body and soul.

σωτήρ

sōtēr — A savior or preserver, completing the list of assistance.

- **197e** — **σωτὴρ**. Love is praised as the best savior.

Read: Leader, pilot and companion.

σωφροσύνη

sōphrosynē — Temperance, sound ordering, or self-command; its scope shifts from mastery of appetites to civic ordering and Socratic character.

- **196c** — **σωφροσύνη**. Agathon invokes an agreed definition as mastery of pleasures and desires.
- **209a** — **σωφροσύνη**. Diotima pairs temperance with justice in ordering cities and households.
- **216d** — **σωφροσύνης**. Alcibiades says the opened Socrates is filled with temperance.

Read: Temperance and self-command.

τὰ παιδικά

ta paidika — The darling or beloved youth: a neuter plural expression that can designate a single person.

- **179a** — **τὰ παιδικὰ**. A single darling must not be abandoned in danger.
- **222b** — **παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντ' ἐραστοῦ**. Alcibiades says Socrates becomes darling instead of lover.

Read: Lover and beloved.

ταινία

tainia — A ribbon or fillet used in crowning.

- **212e** — **ταινίας**. Alcibiades brings many ribbons on his head.
- **213a** — **ταινίας**. The ribbons held before his eyes obstruct his view of Socrates.

Read: Wreaths and ribbons.

τεκμήριον

tekmērion — A piece of evidence or sign put forward to support a conclusion; the noun does not guarantee the inference's success.

- **178b** — **τεκμήριον**. Lack of named parents supports Phaedrus' claim of Love's antiquity.
- **192a** — **μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον**. Aristophanes offers an emphatic claim about public life as evidence.
- **195d** — **καλῷ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι τεκμηρίῳ**. Agathon praises Homer's inference from tender feet.

Read: Evidence and testimony.

τέλεος

teleos — Complete or perfect; in the ritual phrase, the consummating rites.

- **208c** — **οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί**. The same adjective previously characterizes accomplished professional teachers.
- **210a** — **τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά**. The advanced teaching is distinguished from what precedes.

Read: Initiation and fulfilment.

τελευτάω

teleutaō — To finish or arrive at an end.

- **211c** — **τελευτῆσαι**. The printed infinitive describes arrival at the final study.

Read: End and purpose.

τέλος

telos — An end, completion or point at which a process or question reaches fulfilment.

- **205a** — **τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις**. The happiness answer seems to terminate further questioning about purpose.
- **210e** — **πρὸς τέλος**. The learner approaches the end of matters of love.

Read: End and purpose.

τέττιξ

tettix — A cicada, used to characterize the original humans' manner of generating into the earth rather than into one another.

- **191c** — **οἱ τέττιγες**. The comparison precedes Zeus' relocation of the genitals.

Read: Cicadas and birth into earth.

τίκτω

tiktō — To give birth; used of bodily and psychic production.

- **206c** — **τίκτειν**. Human nature desires to give birth when the appropriate age comes.
- **212a** — **τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς**. The highest vision enables birth of true virtue rather than images.

Read: Birth and begetting.

τιμάω

timaō — To honor or value; the object and the reason for honoring must be distinguished from the mere possession of social honor.

- **179d** — **τιμῶσιν**. The gods honor erotic earnestness and virtue.

Read: Honour and ambition.

τιμή

timē — Honour, esteem or a publicly recognized distinction; its value depends on what and whom it honors.

- **178c** — **τιμαὶ**. Ordinary honors cannot implant right motivation as effectively as love, according to Phaedrus.
- **216b** — **τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν**. Alcibiades is defeated by the honor bestowed by the many.

Read: Honour and ambition.

τιμιώτερος

timiōteros — More to be honoured; a comparative ranking of beauties.

- **210b** — **τιμιώτερον**. Beauty in souls is valued above beauty in body.

Read: More and less.

τις

tis — An indefinite someone or something; in the genitive, the unspecified correlate of a relation.

- **199e** — **ἔστι τινὸς ἀδελφὸς**. Brother is brother of someone; the indefinite genitive supplies the relation's correlate.
- **199e** — **οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός**. Socrates asks whether Love is of nothing or of something.

Read: Love of something.

τόκος

tokos — Birth or giving birth, the activity specified as love's work.

- **206b** — **τόκος ἐν καλῷ**. The phrase states love's activity as birth in what is beautiful.

Read: Birth and begetting.

τομή

tomē — A cut or cutting surface, made into an object of sight so that the divided human may become more orderly.

- **190e** — **πρὸς τὴν τομήν**. Apollo turns the face toward the cut.

Read: Cutting, repair and the navel.

τόξον

toxon — A bow, paired with the lyre in the quoted analogy of harmony.

- **187a** — **τόξου τε καὶ λύρας**. The joined objects in the Heraclitean comparison.

Read: Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.

τραγῳδία

tragōidia — Tragedy, both the occasion of Agathon's victory and the craft discussed at the close.

- **173a** — **τραγῳδίᾳ**. Agathon's first tragic victory dates the dinner.
- **223d** — **τραγῳδίαν**. Tragedy is paired with comedy in the final reported conclusion.

Read: Comedy and tragedy.

τραγῳδοποιός

tragōidopoios — A maker of tragedy; the final claim specifically qualifies the maker as working by craft.

- **223d** — **τραγῳδοποιὸν**. The person who is a tragic poet by craft is said also to be a comic poet.

Read: Comedy and tragedy.

τρέφω

trephō — To nourish or rear; ethical production requires sustained nurture.

- **212a** — **θρεψαμένῳ**. The condition joins nurture to having given birth.

Read: True virtue and images.

τρίβων

tribōn — A worn cloak, specifically Socrates' garment in the overnight encounter.

- **219b** — **τρίβωνα**. Alcibiades lies under Socrates' worn cloak.

Read: Bare feet and cloaks.

τυγχάνω

tynchanō — Here, to hit upon or reach, with a genitive object; not automatically a judgement about accidental truth.

- **202a** — **τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον**. The opinion reaches what is, which prevents classifying it as ignorance.

Read: Right opinion.

τυραννίς

tyrannis — Tyranny, which Pausanias presents as threatened by strong friendships, elevated aspirations and shared pursuits.

- **182b** — **τὰς τυραννίδας**. The proposed reason for hostile customs under foreign rule.

Read: Tyranny and friendship.

ὑβρίζω

hybrizō — To treat outrageously or with insolence; Alcibiades applies the verb to his rejected sexual overture.

- **219c** — **ὕβρισεν**. Alcibiades says Socrates insulted his youth by refusing it.
- **222a** — **ὕβρισεν**. He closes by acknowledging that complaint has been mixed into praise.

Read: Insolence and the mock trial.

ὑβριστής

hybristēs — An insolent or outrageous person; Agathon and Alcibiades use the accusation against Socrates in different scenes.

- **175e** — **Ὑβριστὴς**. Agathon answers Socrates' extravagant comparison of their wisdom.
- **215b** — **ὑβριστὴς**. Alcibiades offers witnesses to Socrates' insolence.

Read: Insolence and the mock trial.

ὑγιεινός

hygieinos — Wholesome or healthful, opposed to the unwholesome; not identical in grammatical role to the already healthy condition.

- **186c** — **ὑγιεινοῖς**. What the practitioner should gratify within the body.

Read: Medicine and healing.

ὑγρός

hygros — Wet or moist in the physical pair opposed to dry; distinct from Agathon's figurative suppleness.

- **186d** — **ὑγρῷ**. Dative counterpart to dry.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

ὑγρός

hygros — Fluid or supple; in Agathon's portrait it describes the pliancy of form, not literal bodily wetness.

- **196a** — **ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος**. Suppleness explains Love's capacity to wrap round and pass through souls.

Read: Tenderness, softness and hardness.

ὑμνέω

hymneō — To hymn or celebrate in song-like praise, particularly a divine benefactor.

- **193d** — **ὑμνοῖμεν**. Aristophanes says Love would be rightly hymned as the cause of reunion.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ὕμνος

hymnos — A hymn, especially praise addressed to a divine recipient; the hymn vocabulary keeps a religious dimension in the gathering.

- **177a** — **ὕμνους**. Other gods have received hymns and paeans.

Read: Encomium, praise and hymn.

ὑπεραποθνῄσκω

hyperapothnēiskō — To die on behalf of another; the compound marks the beneficiary or cause for which the life is given.

- **179b** — **ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν**. Phaedrus says lovers alone are willing to die for another.
- **180a** — **ὑπεραποθανεῖν**. Achilles' act is first described as dying for Patroclus.
- **207b** — **ὑπεραποθνῄσκειν**. Diotima broadens the phenomenon to animals willing to die for offspring.

Read: Dying for another and dying after.

ὑπερηφανία

hyperēphania — Haughtiness, the elevated disdain charged in Alcibiades' mock courtroom.

- **219c** — **ὑπερηφανίας**. The drinking companions are made judges of Socrates' haughtiness.

Read: Insolence and the mock trial.

ὕπνος

hypnos — Sleep, an ordinary bodily need that also limits the narrator's access to speech.

- **223b** — **ὕπνον**. Sleep overtakes Aristodemus after the second crowd's arrival.

Read: Sleep and dawn.

φαίνω

phainō — To appear or seem in middle/passive use; appearing as something does not itself establish that one is it.

- **199a** — **φαίνηται**. Competitive praise aims to make Love appear most beautiful and best.
- **204c** — **ἐφαίνετο**. Confusion with the beloved made Love appear all-beautiful to Socrates.

Read: Appearing.

φαντάζομαι

phantazomai — To appear to someone in a certain guise.

- **211a** — **φαντασθήσεται**. The final beautiful will not appear as a bodily face or hands.

Read: Appearing.

φαρμακεύς

pharmakeus — A worker with potions, rendered poisoner here.

- **203d** — **φαρμακεὺς**. The label belongs to Love's mixed, resourceful character.

Read: Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.

φάσμα

phasma — A phantom or apparition, distinguished from the actual wife Orpheus came to recover.

- **179d** — **φάσμα**. What the gods show instead of granting the woman.

Read: Orpheus and the phantom.

φεύγω

pheugō — To flee or avoid, either a protective response to a bad lover or a refusal to confront a demanding good.

- **184a** — **φεύγειν**. The beloved is encouraged to flee so the pursuit can test character.

- **216b** — **φεύγω**. Alcibiades flees the person before whom he feels shame.

Read: Testing, pursuit and flight.

φημί

phēmi — To say; repeated reporting formulas keep different levels of narration visible.

- **174a** — **ἔφη**. Apollodorus introduces what Aristodemus said about meeting Socrates.

Read: Narrating and reporting.

φθονέω

phthoneō — To begrudge or envy another's access to something valued.

- **213d** — **φθονῶν**. Socrates couples jealousy with begrudging conduct.
- **223a** — **φθονήσῃς**. Socrates asks Alcibiades not to begrudge Agathon his praise.

Read: Jealousy and reconciliation.

φιάλη

phialē — A bowl used for drinking in the closing scene.

- **223c** — **φιάλης**. The three remaining speakers drink from a large bowl, going to the right.

Read: Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.

φιλεραστής

philerastēs — One who loves lovers, paired with the preceding role in Aristophanes' explanation of kindred attraction.

- **192b** — **φιλεραστὴς**. The compound names affection directed toward lovers.

Read: Pederasty and education.

φιλία

philia — Friendship or affectionate attachment, which may be produced or strengthened through erotic love without being simply identical to it.

- **179c** — **τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα**. Alcestis surpasses her husband's parents in affection through her love.
- **209c** — **φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν**. Shared spiritual offspring support a firmer friendship.

Read: Friendship, partnership and affinity.

φιλοσοφέω

philosopheō — To love wisdom; activity prompted by a lack not mistaken for sufficiency.

- **203d** — **φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου**. Love philosophizes throughout life.
- **204a** — **θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ**. No god seeks wisdom, because a god already is wise.

Read: Wisdom and philosophy.

φιλοσοφία

philosophia — Philosophy, the pursuit of wisdom in speech and thought.

- **210d** — **ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ**. An abundant, ungrudging philosophical activity generates many speeches and thoughts.

Read: Wisdom and philosophy.

φιλόσοφος

philosophos — A lover of wisdom, located between the wise and the ignorant.

- **204b** — **Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι**. Love must be a philosopher because wisdom is beautiful and Love concerns beauty.

Read: Wisdom and philosophy.

φιλοτιμέομαι

philotimeomai — To compete in honor or seek distinction; Phaedrus pictures mutual rivalry in fine conduct.

- **178e** — **φιλοτιμούμενοι**. The imagined lovers' company vies in honor with one another.

Read: Honour and ambition.

φιλοτιμία

philotimia — Love of honor or ambition for distinction: potentially an incentive to fine action, but also a desire for durable reputation.

- **178d** — **φιλοτιμίαν**. Phaedrus places love of honor beside shame.
- **208c** — **φιλοτιμίαν**. Diotima explains human ambition through the wish for immortal fame.

Read: Honour and ambition.

φλυαρία

phlyaria — Nonsense or empty chatter; here a disparaging figure for mortal accretions.

- **211e** — **φλυαρίας θνητῆς**. Diotima names the mortal admixture from which the final object is distinguished.

Read: Pure and unmixed.

Φοῖνιξ

Phoinix — An earlier recipient of Aristodemus' report, from whom another teller had heard it.

- **172b** — **Φοίνικος**. Glaucon names Phoenix son of Philippus in his chain of hearsay.
- **173b** — **Φοίνικι**. Apollodorus identifies Aristodemus as Phoenix's source as well as his own.

Read: Glaucon and Phoenix.

φρήν

phrēn — Mind or understanding, the faculty denied the promise in Socrates' adapted quotation.

- **199a** — **ἡ δὲ φρὴν**. The mind is the contrasted subject.

Read: The tongue and the mind.

φρόνησις

phronēsis — Intelligence or understanding; its contexts range from the contrast with ignorance to practical ordering.

- **202a** — **μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας**. Right opinion stands between intelligence and ignorance.
- **203d** — **φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς**. Love desires intelligence rather than already possessing it completely.
- **209a** — **φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν**. The psychic offspring are intelligence and the rest of virtue.

Read: Intelligence.

φύσις

physis — Constitution, disposition or nature; the noun takes its content from the thing described.

- **207c–207d** — **ἡ θνητὴ φύσις**. Mortal nature seeks continuing existence so far as possible.
- **210e** — **θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν**. The object suddenly seen is marvellous in its nature.

Read: Nature.

χαλκεύς

chalkeus — A smith or metalworker.

- **221e** — **χαλκέας**. Smiths appear among Socrates' recurrent examples.

Read: Commonplace crafts.

χαρίζομαι

charizomai — To do a favor, please or oblige someone; in the courtship setting, to grant a lover sexual favors. The context, not the verb alone, determines the specificity.

- **177c** — **χαρίσασθαι**. Eryximachus wants to oblige Phaedrus by proposing the speeches.
- **182b** — **χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς**. Pausanias discusses the beloved's granting of favors to lovers.
- **186c** — **χαρίζεσθαι**. Eryximachus transfers the verb to healthy bodily constituents.
- **218d** — **χαριζόμενος**. Alcibiades presents his proposed compliance as justified by education.

Read: Gratification and favour.

χάρις

charis — Favor, grace or attractiveness attending an action; its favorable appearance need not settle its ethical quality.

- **183b** — **χάρις ἔπεστι**. The lover's otherwise servile conduct receives a favorable social coloring.

Read: Gratification and favour.

Χαρμίδης

Charmidēs — A named young man whom Alcibiades says Socrates has treated as he treated Alcibiades.

- **222b** — **Χαρμίδην**. Identified as son of Glaucon.

Read: Charmides and Euthydemus.

χρεία

chreia — Use or service provided to human beings; the practical question after Love's nature is described.

- **204c** — **τίνα χρείαν ἔχει**. Socrates asks what use a Love of this sort has for humans.

Read: Use and fellow-worker.

χρύσεος

chryseos — Golden; in the quotation the neuter plural stands for golden things, originally armour.

- **219a** — **χρύσεα χαλκείων**. Gold in exchange for bronze: the offered bodily attraction is not equivalent to the supposed inner good.

Read: Exchange and gold for bronze.

ψῆττα

psētta — A flatfish, used for the present half-human's divided shape.

- **191d** — **αἱ ψῆτται**. Each person is cut like a flatfish, two from one.

Read: Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.

ψιλός

psilos — Bare or unaccompanied; here speech without musical instruments.

- **215c** — **ψιλοῖς λόγοις**. Socrates produces the comparable effect with bare words.

Read: Hearing and enchantment.

ψυκτήρ

psyktēr — A wine-cooling vessel, pressed into service by Alcibiades as an exceptionally large drinking cup.

- **213e** — **ψυκτῆρα**. Alcibiades orders the cooler after asking for a large cup.

Read: Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.

ψυχή

psychē — Soul, the locus of character, desires, opinions, knowledge and productive understanding.

- **206b** — **κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν**. Psychic generation is paired with bodily generation.
- **209a** — **ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς**. Some are pregnant in their souls more than in their bodies.

Read: Body and soul.

ψυχρός

psychros — Cold, paired with hot as one example of opposed bodily constituents.

- **186d** — **ψυχρὸν θερμῷ**. Cold in relation to hot.

Read: Opposites and unlike objects.

ὠδίς

ōdis — A birth-pang, used to explain the pregnant subject's excitement at beauty.

- **206e** — **μεγάλης ὠδῖνος**. Beauty releases the person carrying a conception from great labour-pain.

Read: Beauty at birth.

ᾠόν

ōion — An egg; cutting eggs with hairs supplies the second comparison.

- **190e** — **τὰ ᾠὰ**. A familiar delicate division illustrates the god's cut.

Read: Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.

ὥρα

hōra — A season or appointed portion of time; in Eryximachus' cosmic example the seasons of the year, not an hour of clock time.

- **188a** — **τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ**. The composition of the yearly seasons is full of both Loves.

Read: Seasons, blending and astronomy.

ὡς

hōs — As or in the capacity of; the local phrase limits the application of immortal.

- **206e** — **ὡς θνητῷ**. Generation is everlasting and immortal for a mortal.

Read: For a mortal and so far as possible.

ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν

hōs epos eipein — So to speak, an idiom qualifying the exactness or literal sweep of a statement.

- **179a** — **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**. Qualifies the claim that the lovers' army could defeat all humans.
- **186a** — **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**. Qualifies the cosmic extension to all things that are.
- **192c** — **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν**. Qualifies the lovers' unwillingness to be separated at all.

Read: So to speak.

Ὦτος

Ōtos — Otus, the companion of Ephialtes in the cited attempt to reach the gods.

- **190b** — **Ὦτου**. Second name in the pair.

Read: Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.

English lookup

English article headings and transliterations provide finding routes. A heading may be editorial; it is not necessarily a translation of one Greek word.

- **acharisteō** — Gratification and favour.
- **Achilles and Patroclus** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **Achilleus** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **Acusilaus** — Acusilaus.
- **adelphos** — Kindred beauties; Love of something.
- **adikia** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **aei** — Always.
- **agalma** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **agathos** — The good.
- **Agreement and examination** — Agreement and premise; Refutation and examination.
- **Agreement and premise** — Agreement and premise.
- **agō** — Ascent.
- **Aias** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **aischros** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **aischynomai** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **aischynē** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **aitia** — Cause and explanation; Making and poetry.
- **aition** — Cause and explanation.
- **aklētos** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **akosmia** — Order and disorder.
- **Akousileōs** — Acusilaus.
- **akouō** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **Alcestis** — Alcestis.

- **Alcibiades** — Alcibiades.
- **alektryōn** — Sleep and dawn.
- **Alkibiadēs** — Alcibiades.
- **Alkēstis** — Alcestis.
- **All and every** — All and every.
- **allassō** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **allotrios** — The good.
- **allotriotēs** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **Always** — Always.
- **alētheia** — Truth and persuasion.
- **alēthēs** — True virtue and images.
- **amathia** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ameiktos** — Pure and unmixed.
- **ameletētos** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **ameleō** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **amynō** — Courage and composure.
- **anaischyntia** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **anakrinō** — Refutation and examination.
- **anamimnēiskomai** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **Anankē** — Necessity.
- **anankē** — Probability and necessity.
- **andreia** — Courage and composure.
- **Androgyne and the three kinds** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **androgynos** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **aneilletai** — Approach and recoil.
- **aniēmi** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **anoigō** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **anomoios** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **anomologeomai** — Agreement and premise.
- **anthos** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **Antēnōr** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

- **anypodētos** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **apangellō** — Narrating and reporting.
- **apatē** — Deception and intention.
- **Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **Aphroditē** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **aphthonos** — The great sea of beauty.
- **aphōnia** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **apoblastēma** — Offshoot.
- **apokrisis** — Question and answer.
- **Apollodorus and Aristodemus** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **Apollodōros** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **Apollōn** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **aporia** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Appearing** — Appearing.
- **Approach and recoil** — Approach and recoil.
- **Arcadians and being broken apart** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **Ares held by Love** — Ares held by Love.
- **aretē** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **Aristodēmos** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **Aristogeitōn** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Arkades** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **Arrows, capture, and Ajax** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **arrēn** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **Arēs** — Ares held by Love.
- **As they think** — As they think.
- **Ascent** — Ascent.
- **Asclepius** — Asclepius.
- **asebeia** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Asklēpios** — Asclepius.

- **astronomia** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **At least and argumentative focus** — At least and argumentative focus.
- **Ate and tender feet** — Ate and tender feet.
- **athanasia** — Immortality.
- **athanatos** — Immortality.
- **Athēna** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **atopia** — Outlandishness.
- **atopos** — Outlandishness.
- **atrōtos** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **Attention and standing still** — Attention and standing still.
- **Attention and strengthening** — Attention and strengthening.
- **Atē** — Ate and tender feet.
- **aulos** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **aulētris** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **auto kath' hauto** — The beautiful itself.
- **auto to kalon** — The beautiful itself.
- **automatos** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **autos** — Renewal and identity.
- **auxanō** — Attention and strengthening.
- **bakcheia** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **ballantion** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **Bare feet and cloaks** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **basanizō** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **Beautiful and ugly** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **Beauty** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **Beauty and the ascent** — Ascent; Beauty and ugliness.
- **Beauty and ugliness** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **Beauty at birth** — Beauty at birth.

- **bebaios** — Common nurture.
- **bebēlos** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **belos** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **beltiōn** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **Between** — Between.
- **bia** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **Birth and begetting** — Birth and begetting.
- **Birth and generation** — Birth and begetting.
- **Birth and spiritual offspring** — Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture.
- **Bite, madness, and initiation** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **blautai** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **Bloom** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **Body and soul** — Body and soul.
- **boulomai** — Wish and willingness.
- **boulēsis** — Wish and willingness.
- **Brasidas** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **byrsodepsēs** — Commonplace crafts.
- **Care of oneself and neglect** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **Cause and explanation** — Cause and explanation.
- **chalkeus** — Commonplace crafts.
- **charis** — Gratification and favour.
- **charizomai** — Gratification and favour.
- **Charmides and Euthydemus** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **Charmidēs** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **chreia** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **chryseos** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **Cicadas and birth into earth** — Cicadas and birth into earth.
- **Comedy and tragedy** — Comedy and tragedy.

- **Common nurture** — Common nurture.
- **Commonplace crafts** — Commonplace crafts.
- **Companionship and shared presence** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **Corybantic response** — Corybantic response.
- **Courage** — Courage and composure.
- **Courage and composure** — Courage and composure.
- **Craft and knowledge** — Knowledge; Making and poetry.
- **Cutting, repair and the navel** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **Daimon and mediation** — Daimon and mediation.
- **daimonios** — Daimon and mediation.
- **daimōn** — Daimon and mediation.
- **daknō** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **Deception and intention** — Deception and intention.
- **Desire and lack** — Desire and lack.
- **dia** — For the sake of and because of.
- **diacheō** — Approach and recoil.
- **diakosmēsis** — Intelligence.
- **diallassō** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **diameibomai** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **dianoēma** — The great sea of beauty.
- **diapherō** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **diaporthmeuō** — Daimon and mediation.
- **didaskō** — Diotima.
- **dikaiosynē** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **dikastēs** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **dioikizō** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **Dionysos** — Dionysus.
- **Dionysus** — Dionysus.

- **Diotima** — Diotima.
- **Divination, piety and right** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Divine teachers and craft pupils** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **diēgeomai** — Narrating and reporting.
- **diōkō** — Seeking and pursuing; Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **diōxis** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **dokeō** — As they think.
- **douleia** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **doxazō** — Right opinion.
- **drapeteuō** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **Dreamlike wisdom** — Dreamlike wisdom.
- **Drinking and sobriety** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **Dying for another and dying after** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **dynamai** — Power and capacity.
- **dynamis** — Power and capacity.
- **dynatos** — For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **Dēlion** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **dēmiourgos** — Making and poetry.
- **ean** — If and if indeed.
- **Earnestness and exertion** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **eaō** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **echis** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **echō** — Present and future possession.
- **egrēgora** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ei** — If and if indeed.
- **eidos** — Form and figure; Naming whole and part.
- **eidōlon** — True virtue and images.
- **eikos** — Probability and necessity.

- **eikōn** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Eileithyia** — Beauty at birth.
- **eilikrinēs** — Pure and unmixed.
- **eiper** — If and if indeed.
- **eirēnē** — Peace and calm.
- **eirōneuomai** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **eirōnikōs** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **ekgonos** — Offshoot.
- **elatton** — More and less.
- **elenchō** — Refutation and examination.
- **ellochaō** — Plotting and ambush.
- **emphrōn** — Courage and composure.
- **enantios** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **Encomium, praise and hymn** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **End and purpose** — End and purpose.
- **endeia** — Desire and lack.
- **endeēs** — Desire and lack.
- **endothen** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Endurance** — Endurance.
- **enkōmiazō** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **enkōmion** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **entheos** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **entynchanō** — Meeting and encounter.
- **epaineō** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **epainos** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **epanabasmos** — Ascent.
- **epaneimi** — Ascent.
- **epapothnēiskō** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **epeita** — Present and future possession.
- **ephaptomai** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.

- **Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **Ephialtēs** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **epibatēs** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **epibouleuō** — Plotting and ambush.
- **epiboulos** — Hunting and devices.
- **epimelēs** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **epistamai** — Knowledge.
- **epistēmē** — Knowledge.
- **epithymeō** — Desire and lack.
- **epithymia** — Desire and lack.
- **epoptikos** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **eranos** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **erastēs** — Lover and beloved.
- **eraō** — Love.
- **ergon** — Work and action.
- **erion** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **erōmenos** — Lover and beloved.
- **erōn** — Lover and beloved.
- **erōs** — Love.
- **erōtikos** — Love.
- **erōtēsis** — Question and answer.
- **ethelodouleia** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **ethelō** — Wish and willingness.
- **euanthēs** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **eudaimoneō** — Happiness.
- **eudaimonia** — Happiness.
- **eudaimōn** — Happiness.
- **euphēmeō** — Hush and good omen.
- **euporeō** — Resource and Poverty.
- **euporos** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Euripidēs** — The tongue and the mind.

- **euschēmosynē** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **eusebeia** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Euthydēmos** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **euōdēs** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **Evidence and testimony** — Evidence and testimony.
- **exaiphnēs** — Suddenly.
- **exapataō** — Deception and intention.
- **Exchange and gold for bronze** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **exōthen** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Flowers, bloom and fragrance** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **Following and guidance** — Following and guidance.
- **For a mortal and so far as possible** — For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **For the sake of and because of** — For the sake of and because of.
- **Form and figure** — Form and figure.
- **Friendship, partnership and affinity** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **galēnē** — Peace and calm.
- **gargalismos** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **ge** — At least and argumentative focus.
- **geloios** — Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness.
- **gelōs** — Laughter and frankness.
- **gennaō** — Birth and begetting.
- **gennēsis** — Birth and begetting.
- **genos** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **gigas** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **gignomai** — The beautiful itself.

- **gignōskō** — Knowing and learning.
- **Glaucon and Phoenix** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **Glaukōn** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **glykys** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **glōssa** — The tongue and the mind.
- **Godsend** — Godsend.
- **Gorgias** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **Gorgias and the Gorgon** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **goun** — At least and argumentative focus.
- **goēs** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **Gratification** — Gratification and favour.
- **Gratification and favour** — Gratification and favour.
- **Hades and the Isles of the Blessed** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **Haidēs** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **haliskomai** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **hals** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **hapalos** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **Happiness** — Happiness.
- **haptomai** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **Harmodios** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **harmonia** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **harmottō** — Beauty at birth.
- **Hearing and enchantment** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **hekōn** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **heneka** — End and purpose; For the sake of and because of.
- **Hephaestus and fusion** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **hepomai** — Following and guidance.

- **Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **hermaion** — Godsend.
- **hermēneuō** — Daimon and mediation.
- **Heroic and oratorical counterparts** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **Hesiod** — Hesiod.
- **hetairistria** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **hetairos** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **hetoimos** — Not yet and at hand.
- **Hiccup and sneeze** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **hikanos** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **himation** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **histēmi** — Attention and standing still.
- **holos** — Wholeness and the half.
- **homileō** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **homilia** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **homologeō** — Agreement and premise.
- **Honour and ambition** — Honour and ambition.
- **Honour and shame** — Honour and ambition; Shame and being ashamed.
- **horatos** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **Hunting and devices** — Hunting and devices.
- **Hush and good omen** — Hush and good omen.
- **hybristēs** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **hybrizō** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **hygieinos** — Medicine and healing.
- **hygros** — Opposites and unlike objects; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **hymneō** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **hymnos** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **hyperapothnēiskō** — Dying for another and dying after.

- **hyperēphania** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **hypnos** — Sleep and dawn.
- **hēgemōn** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **hēgeomai** — Ascent.
- **hēlios** — Sun and prayer.
- **hēmisys** — Wholeness and the half.
- **Hēphaistos** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **Hērakleitos** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **Hēsiodos** — Hesiod.
- **hōra** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **hōs** — For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **hōs epos eipein** — So to speak.
- **iaomai** — Medicine and healing.
- **Iapetos** — Necessity.
- **iatrikē** — Medicine and healing.
- **iatros** — Medicine and healing.
- **idea** — Form and figure.
- **If and if indeed** — If and if indeed.
- **Ignorance and sufficiency** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **Immortality** — Immortality.
- **Initiation and fulfilment** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **Insolence and the mock trial** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **Intelligence** — Intelligence.
- **Interpreting and ferrying** — Daimon and mediation.
- **Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **ion** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **Irony** — Irony, play, and earnestness.

- **Irony, play, and earnestness** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **Jealousy and reconciliation** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **Justice** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **Justice, agreement and force** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **kalapous** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **kaleō** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **Kallonē** — Beauty at birth.
- **kallos** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **kalos** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **kalōs** — Rightly and well; Well and rightly.
- **kartereō** — Endurance.
- **karteria** — Endurance.
- **karteros** — Endurance.
- **karterēsis** — Endurance.
- **katagelastos** — Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness.
- **kataleipō** — Renewal and identity.
- **katanoeō** — Knowing and learning.
- **katechō** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **katharos** — Pure and unmixed.
- **katheudō** — Sleep and dawn.
- **kathoraō** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **katidein** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **kenos** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **kenōsis** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **Kindred beauties** — Kindred beauties.
- **kitharōidos** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **kittos** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **kleos** — Honour and ambition.

- **Knowing and learning** — Knowing and learning.
- **Knowledge** — Knowledge.
- **koinōnia** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **korybantiaō** — Corybantic response.
- **kosmeō** — Order and disorder.
- **kosmios** — Order and disorder.
- **kosmos** — Order and disorder.
- **kotylē** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **krasis** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **krateō** — Temperance and self-command.
- **Kronos** — Necessity.
- **ktaomai** — Present and future possession.
- **ktēsis** — Present and future possession.
- **kybernētēs** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **kybistaō** — Roundness and cartwheels.
- **kyeō** — Birth and begetting.
- **kyēma** — Birth and begetting.
- **kēleō** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **kēpos** — Nectar and garden.
- **kōmōidia** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **kōmōidopoios** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **Lachēs** — Courage and composure.
- **Laughable and ridiculous** — Laughable and ridiculous.
- **Laughter and frankness** — Laughter and frankness.
- **Law and custom** — Law and custom.
- **Leader, pilot and companion** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **Letting be and not letting go** — Letting be and not letting go.

- **Likenesses, sileni, and statues** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **lispai** — Tally and matching halves.
- **logon didōmi** — Right opinion.
- **logos** — Speech and account.
- **Love** — Love.
- **Love of something** — Love of something.
- **Lover and beloved** — Lover and beloved.
- **Lyceum** — Lyceum.
- **Lykeion** — Lyceum.
- **lynx** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **lēthē** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **ma** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **makarōn nēsoi** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **Making and poetry** — Making and poetry.
- **malakos** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **mallon** — More, rather than and no less; More and less.
- **mania** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **manthanō** — Knowing and learning.
- **mantikē** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Marsyas** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **Marsyas and musical enchantment** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **Marsyas and Olympus** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **martyria** — Evidence and testimony.
- **martys** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **mathēma** — Knowledge.
- **Medicine and healing** — Medicine and healing.

- **Meeting and encounter** — Meeting and encounter.
- **melei** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **meletaō** — Memory and practice.
- **meletē** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **melopoiia** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **Memory and practice** — Memory and practice.
- **Memory and rehearsal** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **Memory and report** — Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting.
- **mesos** — Between.
- **metaxy** — Between.
- **metechō** — Participation.
- **methyō** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **methē** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **mimnēiskomai** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **mnēmeion** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **mnēmē** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **Moira** — Beauty at birth.
- **monachou** — Only and alone; Only and not every.
- **monoeidēs** — The beautiful itself.
- **monos** — Only and alone; Only and not every.
- **More and less** — More and less.
- **More, rather than and no less** — More, rather than and no less.
- **morion** — Naming whole and part.
- **Mousa** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **mousikē** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **Music, harmony and rhythm** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **myeō** — Initiation and fulfilment.

- **Mysteries and initiation** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **mythos** — Speech and account.
- **mē** — Not and neither.
- **mēchanē** — Hunting and devices.
- **Mētis** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Naming whole and part** — Naming whole and part.
- **Narrating and reporting** — Narrating and reporting.
- **Nature** — Nature.
- **Necessity** — Necessity.
- **Necessity and probability** — Probability and necessity.
- **Nectar and garden** — Nectar and garden.
- **nektar** — Nectar and garden.
- **neos** — Renewal and identity.
- **Nestōr** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **nomizō** — Law and custom.
- **nomos** — Law and custom.
- **nomotheteō** — Law and custom.
- **nosōdēs** — Medicine and healing.
- **Not and neither** — Not and neither.
- **Not yet and at hand** — Not yet and at hand.
- **Not yet and the stage of an argument** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **nous** — Knowing and learning.
- **nēphō** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **oa** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **Offshoot** — Offshoot.
- **oikeios** — The good.
- **oikeiotēs** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **oiomai** — As they think; Ignorance and sufficiency.

- **Olympos** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **omnymi** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **omphalos** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **onar** — Dreamlike wisdom.
- **One's own and the good** — The good.
- **Only and alone** — Only and alone.
- **Only and not every** — Only and not every.
- **onoma** — Naming whole and part.
- **onomazō** — Naming whole and part.
- **onos kanthēlios** — Commonplace crafts.
- **Opposites and unlike objects** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **opsis** — Sight of the mind.
- **Order and disorder** — Order and disorder.
- **Orpheus** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **Orpheus and the phantom** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **orthē doxa** — Right opinion.
- **orthōs** — Rightly and well; Well and rightly.
- **ou pas** — Only and not every.
- **ouch hētton** — More, rather than and no less.
- **oupō** — Not yet and at hand.
- **Ourania** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Ouranios** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **oute** — Not and neither.
- **Outlandishness** — Outlandishness.
- **oxys** — Sight of the mind.
- **paideia** — Pederasty and education.
- **paiderastia** — Pederasty and education.
- **paiderastēs** — Pederasty and education.
- **paideusis** — Pederasty and education.

- **paidia** — Irony, play, and earnestness; Play and earnestness.
- **paizō** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **Pandēmos** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **pareimi** — Present and future possession.
- **Parmenides** — Parmenides.
- **Parmenidēs** — Parmenides.
- **parrhēsia** — Laughter and frankness.
- **Participation** — Participation.
- **pas** — All and every.
- **paschō** — Participation.
- **Patroklos** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **patēr** — Love of something.
- **Peace and calm** — Peace and calm.
- **Pederasty and education** — Pederasty and education.
- **peithō** — Truth and persuasion.
- **pelagos** — The great sea of beauty.
- **Penia** — Resource and Poverty.
- **pephyka** — Nature.
- **Periklēs** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **phainō** — Appearing.
- **phantazomai** — Appearing.
- **pharmakeus** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **phasma** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **pheugō** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **phialē** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **philerastēs** — Pederasty and education.
- **philia** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **philosopheō** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **philosophia** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **philosophos** — Wisdom and philosophy.

- **philotimeomai** — Honour and ambition.
- **philotimia** — Honour and ambition.
- **phlyaria** — Pure and unmixed.
- **Phoinix** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **phronēsis** — Intelligence.
- **phrēn** — The tongue and the mind.
- **phthoneō** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **physis** — Nature.
- **phēmi** — Narrating and reporting.
- **pikros** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **pinō** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **Pipe-girl and pipes** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **Play and earnestness** — Irony, play, and earnestness; Play and earnestness.
- **pleon** — Participation.
- **pleonekteō** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **pleonexia** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **Plotting and ambush** — Plotting and ambush.
- **plēsmonē** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **Poetry and making** — Making and poetry.
- **poiēsis** — Making and poetry.
- **poiētēs** — Making and poetry.
- **Polymnia** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Porch and threshold** — Porch and threshold.
- **porimos** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Poros** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Poteidaia** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **Potidaea and Delium** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **Poverty and resource** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Power and capacity** — Power and capacity.
- **praxis** — Work and action.

- **Present and future possession** — Present and future possession.
- **Probability and necessity** — Probability and necessity.
- **Prodikos** — Sophists and Prodicus.
- **prosaiteō** — Nectar and garden.
- **prosechō** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening.
- **proseuchomai** — Sun and prayer.
- **prospelazō** — Approach and recoil.
- **prothyron** — Porch and threshold.
- **psilos** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **psychros** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **psychē** — Body and soul.
- **psyktēr** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **psētta** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **ptarmos** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **ptarnymai** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **Pure and unmixed** — Pure and unmixed.
- **pō** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **Question and answer** — Question and answer.
- **Refutation and examination** — Refutation and examination.
- **Renewal and identity** — Renewal and identity.
- **Resource and Poverty** — Resource and Poverty.
- **rheō** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **rhythmos** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **rhōnnymi** — Attention and strengthening.
- **Right opinion** — Right opinion.
- **Rightly and well** — Rightly and well.
- **Roundness and cartwheels** — Roundness and cartwheels.

- **Salt, contribution and shared praise** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **satyros** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Seasons, blending and astronomy** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **Seeing and contemplating** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **Seeking and pursuing** — Seeking and pursuing.
- **Seirēn** — Sirens.
- **Shame and being ashamed** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **Sight of the mind** — Sight of the mind.
- **silēnos** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Sirens** — Sirens.
- **sklēros** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **skytotomos** — Commonplace crafts.
- **Sleep and dawn** — Sleep and dawn.
- **So to speak** — So to speak.
- **Socrates** — Socrates.
- **sophia** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **Sophists and Prodicus** — Sophists and Prodicus.
- **sophistēs** — Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **Speech and account** — Speech and account.
- **spoudazō** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **spoudē** — Earnestness and exertion; Play and earnestness.
- **stephanos** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **strongylos** — Roundness and cartwheels.

- **Suddenly** — Suddenly.
- **Sun and prayer** — Sun and prayer.
- **Surfeit and emptying** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **symbolon** — Tally and matching halves.
- **sympas** — All and every.
- **symphysaō** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **symphyō** — Wholeness and the half.
- **symphōnia** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **syneimi** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **synektrephō** — Common nurture.
- **synergos** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **syngenēs** — Kindred beauties.
- **synousia** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **syntasis** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **syntēkō** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **syrinx** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **syspeiratai** — Approach and recoil.
- **Sōkratēs** — Socrates.
- **sōma** — Body and soul.
- **sōphrosynē** — Temperance and self-command.
- **sōtēr** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **sōzō** — Renewal and identity.
- **ta paidika** — Lover and beloved.
- **tainia** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **Tally and matching halves** — Tally and matching halves.
- **tekmērion** — Evidence and testimony.
- **teleos** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **teleutaō** — End and purpose.
- **telos** — End and purpose.
- **Temperance and endurance** — Endurance; Temperance and self-command.

- **Temperance and self-command** — Temperance and self-command.
- **Tenderness, softness and hardness** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **Testing, pursuit and flight** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **tettix** — Cicadas and birth into earth.
- **The beautiful itself** — The beautiful itself.
- **The good** — The good.
- **The great sea of beauty** — The great sea of beauty.
- **The tongue and the mind** — The tongue and the mind.
- **theaomai** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **themis** — Divination, piety and right.
- **theophilēs** — True virtue and images.
- **therapeuō** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **thermos** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **theōreō** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **thnētos** — Immortality.
- **thyra** — Porch and threshold.
- **thēlys** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **thēreutēs** — Hunting and devices.
- **tiktō** — Birth and begetting.
- **timaō** — Honour and ambition.
- **timiōteros** — More and less.
- **timē** — Honour and ambition.
- **tis** — Love of something.
- **tokos** — Birth and begetting.
- **tomē** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **Touch and transmitted wisdom** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **toxon** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.

- **tragōidia** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **tragōidopoios** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **trephō** — True virtue and images.
- **tribōn** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **True virtue and images** — True virtue and images.
- **Truth and appearance** — Appearing; Truth and persuasion.
- **Truth and persuasion** — Truth and persuasion.
- **tynchanō** — Right opinion.
- **tyrannis** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Tyranny and friendship** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Unwed** — Unwed.
- **Urania and Polyhymnia** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Use and fellow-worker** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **Virtue** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **Virtue and becoming better** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **Voluntary slavery and service** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **Ways of life and laws** — Ascent; Law and custom.
- **Well and rightly** — Well and rightly.
- **Wholeness and the half** — Wholeness and the half.
- **Wine-cooler and drinking bowl** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **Wisdom and philosophy** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **Wish and willingness** — Wish and willingness.
- **Witnesses and oaths** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **Work and action** — Work and action.

- **Wreaths and ribbons** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **xenē** — Diotima.
- **xēros** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **Zeus** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **zēlotypeō** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **zēteō** — Attention and standing still; Seeking and pursuing.
- **ēitheos** — Unwed.
- **ōdis** — Beauty at birth.
- **ōion** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **Ōtos** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.

Greek lookup

Headwords, printed forms and Greek expressions displayed in the explanations are indexed here. Register links carry definitions and attestations; article links lead to the contextual discussion of a displayed phrase. Individual words within registered phrases also have lookup routes; the linked phrase supplies their local construction and sense.

- **ἀγαγεῖν** — Ascent.
- **ἀγαθὰ** — The good.
- **ἀγαθὸν** — Always; Love; The good.
- **ἀγαθός** — The good.
- **ἀγαθοῦ** — If and if indeed; The good.
- **ἀγαθῶν** — Desire and lack.
- **ἄγαλμα** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀγάλματ** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀγάλματα** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀγάλματ’ ἀρετῆς** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀγαπᾷ** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἄγω** — Ascent.
- **ἀδελφῆς** — Love of something.
- **ἀδελφόν** — Kindred beauties.
- **ἀδελφός** — Kindred beauties; Love of something.
- **ἀδελφὸς** — Love of something.
- **ἀδελφοῦ** — Love of something.
- **ἀδελφοῦ ἢ ἀδελφῆς** — Love of something.
- **ἀδικία** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **ἀδικίαν** — Justice, agreement and force; For the sake of and because of.
- **ἀεί** — Always; Love.
- **ἀεὶ** — Always; If and if indeed; Desire and lack; Renewal and identity.

- **ἀεὶ ἐνδείᾳ σύνοικος** — Desire and lack.
- **ἀεὶ ὄν** — Always.
- **ἀθανασία** — Immortality.
- **ἀθανασίας** — Immortality; Participation.
- **ἀθάνατον** — Honour and ambition; Immortality; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἀθάνατον δὲ ἄλλῃ** — Immortality.
- **ἀθάνατον κλέος** — Honour and ambition.
- **ἀθάνατον μνήμην** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἀθάνατος** — Immortality.
- **ἀθανάτου** — Between.
- **ἀθανάτῳ** — Immortality.
- **ἀθανατωτέρων** — Immortality.
- **Ἀθηνᾶ** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **Ἀθηνᾶ ἱστουργίας** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **αἱ** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish; Knowledge.
- **αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι** — Knowledge.
- **αἱ ψῆτται** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **Αἴας** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **Ἅιδης** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **Ἅιδου** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **αἰσχρὸν** — Beauty and ugliness; Law and custom.
- **αἰσχρὸν νενόμισται** — Law and custom.
- **αἰσχρός** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **αἰσχύνεται** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **αἰσχύνη** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **αἰσχύνην** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **αἰσχύνην φέρει** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **αἰσχύνομαι** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **αἰτία** — Cause and explanation; Making and poetry.

- **αἰτία δὲ αὐτῷ** — Cause and explanation.
- **αἰτία πᾶσά** — Making and poetry.
- **αἰτίαν** — Cause and explanation.
- **αἴτιον** — Cause and explanation.
- **αἴτιον εἶναι** — Cause and explanation.
- **ἄκλητος** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **ἀκόλουθος** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **ἀκοσμία** — Order and disorder.
- **ἀκοσμίας** — Order and disorder; Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **ἀκούειν** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **ἀκούῃ** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **Ἀκουσίλεως** — Acusilaus.
- **ἀκούω** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **ἀλεκτρυόνων** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ἀλεκτρυών** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ἅλες** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **ἀλήθεια** — Truth and persuasion.
- **ἀληθείᾳ** — Truth and persuasion.
- **ἀληθῆ** — True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἀληθής** — True virtue and images.
- **ἀλίσκομαι** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **Ἄλκηστιν** — Alcestis.
- **Ἄλκηστις** — Alcestis.
- **Ἀλκιβιάδη** — Alcibiades.
- **Ἀλκιβιάδης** — Alcibiades.
- **Ἀλκιβιάδου** — Alcibiades.
- **ἄλλα** — All and every; Participation.
- **ἀλλάξασθαι** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **ἀλλάσσω** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **ἄλλῃ** — Immortality.

- **ἄλλην** — Form and figure; Intelligence.
- **ἄλλην ἰδέαν** — Form and figure.
- **ἀλλότριον** — The good.
- **ἀλλότριος** — The good.
- **ἀλλοτριότης** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **ἀλλοτριότητος** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **ἄλλῳ** — If and if indeed; Immortality.
- **ἅλς** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **ἁλώσεσθαι** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **ἀμαθία** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ἀμαθίας** — Between; Ignorance and sufficiency; Intelligence.
- **ἀμαθοῦς** — Between.
- **ἄμεικτον** — Pure and unmixed.
- **ἄμεικτος** — Pure and unmixed.
- **ἀμείνω** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **ἀμελέτητος** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἀμελέω** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἀμελῶ** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἀμυνεῖται** — Courage and composure.
- **ἀμύνω** — Courage and composure.
- **ἂν** — Power and capacity.
- **Ἀνάγκη** — Necessity.
- **ἀνάγκη** — Probability and necessity.
- **Ἀνάγκῃ** — Necessity.
- **Ἀνάγκῃ καὶ οὐκ Ἔρωτι** — Necessity.
- **Ἀνάγκης** — Necessity.
- **ἀναισχυντία** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **ἀναισχυντίας** — Shame and being ashamed.
- **ἀνακρίνουσα** — Refutation and examination.
- **ἀνακρίνω** — Refutation and examination.

- **ἀναμιμνῄσκομαι** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἀναμιμνῃσκόμενος** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἀνδρεία** — Courage and composure.
- **ἀνδρείαν** — Courage and composure; Power and capacity.
- **ἀνδρόγυνον** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἀνδρόγυνος** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἀνείλλεται** — Approach and recoil.
- **ἄνευ** — Right opinion.
- **ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι** — Right opinion.
- **ἀνήρ** — Daimon and mediation.
- **ἀνὴρ** — Endurance.
- **ἄνθει** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **ἄνθη** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **ἀνθίσταται** — Ares held by Love.
- **ἄνθος** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **ἄνθρωποι** — All and every.
- **ἀνθρώπου** — Tally and matching halves.
- **ἀνθρώπου σύμβολον** — Tally and matching halves.
- **ἀνθρώπων** — If and if indeed; Immortality.
- **ἀνίει** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **ἀνίημι** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **ἀνοίγω** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀνοιχθεὶς** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἀνόμοιον** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ἀνόμοιος** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ἀνομοίων** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ἀνομολογέομαι** — Agreement and premise.
- **ἀνομολογησώμεθα** — Agreement and premise.
- **ἀντ** — Lover and beloved.
- **Ἀντήνορα** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.

- **Ἀντήνωρ** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **ἀντὶ** — Probability and necessity; Renewal and identity.
- **ἀντὶ τοῦ εἰκότος εἰ ἀνάγκη** — Probability and necessity.
- **ἀνυπόδητος** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **ἀπαγγέλλειν** — Narrating and reporting.
- **ἀπαγγέλλω** — Narrating and reporting.
- **ἀπαλός** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ἀπαλός τε καὶ καλός** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ἀπαλώτατον** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ἀπάτη** — Deception and intention.
- **ἀποβλάστημα** — Offshoot.
- **ἀπόκρισις** — End and purpose; Question and answer.
- **Ἀπολλόδωρος** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **ἀπολλύμενον** — The beautiful itself.
- **Ἀπόλλω** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **Ἀπόλλων** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **ἀπορία** — Resource and Poverty.
- **ἀπορίαν** — Resource and Poverty.
- **ἀποτέμνεσθαι** — Wish and willingness.
- **ἅπτομαι** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἁπτόμενός** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἁπτόμενος** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἁπτόμενός σου** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἅπτονται** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἁπτώμεθα** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἀρετή** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἀρετήν** — Intelligence; Virtue and becoming better.

- **ἀρετὴν** — True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἀρετὴν ἀληθῆ** — True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἀρετῆς** — At least and argumentative focus; Birth and begetting; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; For the sake of and because of; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἀρετῆς γ' ἕνεκα** — At least and argumentative focus; For the sake of and because of; Virtue and becoming better.
- **Ἄρη** — Ares held by Love.
- **Ἄρης** — Ares held by Love.
- **Ἀριστογείτονος** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Ἀριστογείτων** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Ἀριστόδημος** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **Ἀρκάδες** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **Ἁρμόδιος** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **Ἁρμοδίου** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **ἁρμονία** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ἁρμονία συμφωνία ἐστίν** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ἁρμόττον** — Beauty at birth.
- **ἁρμόττω** — Beauty at birth.
- **ἄρρεν** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἄρρην** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἀσέβεια** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Ἀσκληπιός** — Asclepius.
- **ἀστρονομία** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **Ἄτη** — Ate and tender feet.
- **Ἄτην** — Ate and tender feet.
- **ἀτοπία** — Outlandishness.
- **ἀτοπίαν** — Outlandishness.

- **Ἄτοπόν** — Outlandishness.
- **ἄτοπος** — Outlandishness.
- **ἀτοπώτερον** — Outlandishness.
- **ἄτρωτος** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **αὖ** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **αὐλητρίδα** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **αὐλητρίς** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **αὐλός** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **αὐλοὺς** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **αὐξάνω** — Attention and strengthening.
- **αὐξηθεὶς** — Attention and strengthening.
- **αὖτη** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **αὖτη ἡ σπουδὴ** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **αὐτῆς** — Resource and Poverty.
- **αὐτὸ** — The beautiful itself; The beautiful itself; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Ignorance and sufficiency; Renewal and identity.
- **αὐτό** — The beautiful itself.
- **αὐτὸ** — The beautiful itself.
- **αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτό ἐστι χαλεπὸν ἀμαθία** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό** — The beautiful itself.
- **αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτὸ μεθ’ αὐτοῦ** — The beautiful itself.
- **αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν** — The beautiful itself.
- **αὐτοῖς** — As they think.
- **αὐτόματοι** — Invited, uninvited, and of one’s own accord.
- **αὐτόματος** — Invited, uninvited, and of one’s own accord.
- **αὐτὸς** — Lover and beloved; Renewal and identity.
- **αὐτός** — Renewal and identity.
- **αὐτοῦ** — Knowledge; Work and action.

- **αὐτοῦ** — The beautiful itself; Offshoot; Tally and matching halves; Wholeness and the half.
- **αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ καλοῦ μάθημα** — Knowledge.
- **αὐτῷ** — Always; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Ignorance and sufficiency; Love.
- **αὐτῷ** — Cause and explanation; Only and alone.
- **ἄφθονος** — The great sea of beauty.
- **ἀφθόνῳ** — The great sea of beauty; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **Ἀφροδίτη** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **Ἀφροδίτης** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **ἀφωνία** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **ἀφωνίᾳ** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **ἀχαριστεῖν** — Gratification and favour.
- **ἀχαριστέω** — Gratification and favour.
- **Ἀχιλλέα** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **Ἀχιλλεύς** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **βακχεία** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **βακχείας** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **βαλλάντια** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **βαλλάντιον** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **βασανίζειν** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **βασανίζω** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **βασανίζων** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **βασιλείαν** — Necessity.
- **βέβαιος** — Common nurture.
- **βεβαιοτέραν** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **βέβηλος** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **βέβηλός** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **βέλη** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **βέλος** — Arrows, capture, and Ajax.
- **βελτίους** — Virtue and becoming better.

- **βελτίους τοὺς νέους** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **βελτίων** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **βελτίων γενέσθαι** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **βία** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **βίᾳ** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **βίου** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **βλαῦται** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **βλαύτας** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **βλέπειν** — Sight of the mind.
- **βούλησιν** — Wish and willingness.
- **βούλησις** — Wish and willingness.
- **βούλομαι** — Wish and willingness.
- **βούλομαι τὰ νῦν παρόντα** — Wish and willingness.
- **Βρασίδαν** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **Βρασίδας** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **βυρσοδέψας** — Commonplace crafts.
- **βυρσοδέψης** — Commonplace crafts.
- **γ** — At least and argumentative focus; For the sake of and because of; Virtue and becoming better.
- **γαλήνη** — Peace and calm.
- **γαλήνην** — Peace and calm.
- **γὰρ** — Commonplace crafts; Ignorance and sufficiency; Memory and practice; Speech and account; Well and rightly.
- **γαργαλισμός** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **γαργαλισμῶν** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **γε** — At least and argumentative focus; Probability and necessity; Rightly and well.
- **γελοῖα** — Laughable and ridiculous.
- **γελοῖοι** — Laughter and frankness.
- **γελοῖον** — Laughter and frankness.

- **γελοῖος** — Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness.
- **γέλως** — Laughter and frankness.
- **γέλωτα** — Laughter and frankness.
- **γενέσθαι** — True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better.
- **γένη** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **γεννᾷ** — Birth and begetting.
- **γεννάω** — Birth and begetting.
- **γεννήσεως** — Birth and begetting.
- **γέννησις** — Birth and begetting.
- **γένος** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **γίγαντας** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **γίγας** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **γίγνομαι** — The beautiful itself.
- **γιγνόμενον** — The beautiful itself.
- **γιγνώσκω** — Knowing and learning.
- **Γλαύκων** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **γλυκεῖ** — Opposites and unlike objects; Opposites and unlike objects.
- **γλυκύς** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **γλῶσσα** — The tongue and the mind.
- **γνοὺς** — Knowing and learning.
- **γνῷ** — Knowing and learning.
- **γόης** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **Γοργίας** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **Γοργίου** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **Γοργίου κεφαλὴν** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **γοῦν** — At least and argumentative focus.
- **γυναικῶν** — More, rather than and no less.
- **δ** — Speech and account.
- **δαιμόνιον** — Daimon and mediation.
- **δαιμόνιος** — Daimon and mediation.

- **δαιμόνιος ἀνήρ** — Daimon and mediation.
- **δαίμων** — Daimon and mediation.
- **Δαίμων** — Daimon and mediation.
- **Δαίμων μέγας** — Daimon and mediation.
- **δάκνω** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **δὲ** — All and every; Beauty at birth; Cause and explanation; Evidence and testimony; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Music, harmony and rhythm; Opposites and unlike objects; Participation; Power and capacity; The good; The good; The tongue and the mind.
- **δεδηγμένος** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **δεινός** — Hunting and devices.
- **δεινὸς** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **δεινὸς γόης** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **δὴ** — End and purpose; Wish and willingness.
- **Δήλιον** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **Δηλίου** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **δημιουργοὶ** — Making and poetry.
- **δημιουργός** — Making and poetry.
- **δημιουργῶν** — Making and poetry.
- **δηχθεὶς** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **δι** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **διά** — For the sake of and because of.
- **διὰ** — Friendship, partnership and affinity; For the sake of and because of; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **διὰ τὴν ἀδικίαν** — For the sake of and because of.
- **διακόσμησις** — Intelligence.
- **διάλλαξον** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **διαλλάσσω** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **διαμείβεσθαι** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **διαμείβομαι** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **διανόημα** — The great sea of beauty.

- **διανοήματα** — The great sea of beauty.
- **διανοίας** — Sight of the mind.
- **διαπορθμεῦον** — Daimon and mediation.
- **διαπορθμεύω** — Daimon and mediation.
- **διαφερόμενον** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **διαφερόμενον αὐτὸ αὑτῷ συμφέρεσθαι** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **διαφέρω** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **διαχεῖται** — Approach and recoil.
- **διαχέω** — Approach and recoil.
- **διδάσκω** — Diotima.
- **δίδωμι** — Right opinion.
- **διηγεῖτο** — Narrating and reporting.
- **διηγέομαι** — Narrating and reporting.
- **διηγήσασθαι** — Narrating and reporting.
- **δικαιοσύνη** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **δικαιοσύνῃ** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **δικαιοσύνης** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **δικασταί** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **δικαστής** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **διοικίζω** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **Διόνυσον** — Dionysus.
- **Διόνυσος** — Dionysus.
- **Διονύσῳ** — Dionysus.
- **Διὸς** — Nectar and garden.
- **Διοτίμα** — Diotima.
- **Διοτίμας** — Diotima.
- **διπλοῦς** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **διῳκίσθημεν** — Arcadians and being broken apart.
- **διώκειν** — Seeking and pursuing; Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **διωκόντων** — Seeking and pursuing.

- **διώκω** — Seeking and pursuing; Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **διώξει** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **δίωξις** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **δι’ εἰκόνων** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **δοκεῖ** — End and purpose; Evidence and testimony.
- **δοκεῖν** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **δοκεῖν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἱκανόν** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **δοκέω** — As they think.
- **δοκῇ** — As they think.
- **δόξα** — Right opinion.
- **δοξάζειν** — Right opinion.
- **δοξάζω** — Right opinion.
- **δόξει** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **δουλεία** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **δουλεία ἑκούσιος** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **δουλείας** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **δουλείας δουλεύειν** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **δουλεύειν** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **δοῦναι** — Right opinion.
- **δραπετεύω** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **δύναμαι** — Power and capacity.
- **δύναμιν** — Power and capacity.
- **δύναμιν ἔχον** — Power and capacity.
- **δύναμις** — Power and capacity.
- **δύναται** — Power and capacity.
- **δύναται δὲ ταύτῃ μόνον** — Power and capacity.
- **δυνατὸν** — For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **δυνατός** — For a mortal and so far as possible.

- **δύνωμαι** — Power and capacity.
- **δώσων** — Speech and account.
- **δώσων λόγον** — Speech and account.
- **ἐὰν** — As they think; Ascent; If and if indeed.
- **ἐάν** — If and if indeed.
- **ἐὰν αὐτοῖς δοκῇ** — As they think.
- **ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται** — If and if indeed.
- **ἐὰν ὀρθῶς ἡγῆται ὁ ἡγούμενος** — Ascent.
- **ἐᾶτε** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **ἑαυτῷ** — If and if indeed.
- **ἐάω** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **ἐγκωμιάζειν** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐγκωμιάζειν δόξει** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐγκωμιάζω** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐγκώμιον** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐγρήγορα** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ἐγρηγορέναι** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ἐδίδαξεν** — Diotima.
- **ἐθελοδουλεία** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **ἐθέλουσιν** — Wish and willingness.
- **ἐθέλουσιν ἀποτέμνεσθαι** — Wish and willingness.
- **ἐθέλω** — Wish and willingness.
- **εἰ** — If and if indeed; Probability and necessity.
- **εἰ ταῦτα οὕτως ἔχει** — If and if indeed.
- **εἴδει** — Form and figure.
- **εἶδος** — Form and figure; Naming whole and part; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **εἴδωλα** — Birth and begetting; True virtue and images.
- **εἴδωλον** — True virtue and images.
- **εἰδώλου** — True virtue and images.
- **εἰκόνων** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.

- **εἰκός** — Probability and necessity.
- **εἰκότος** — Probability and necessity.
- **εἰκών** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **εἰκὼν** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Εἰλείθυια** — Beauty at birth.
- **εἰλικρινές** — Pure and unmixed.
- **εἰλικρινής** — Pure and unmixed.
- **εἶναι** — Always; Beauty and ugliness; Between; Cause and explanation; If and if indeed; Courage and composure; Ignorance and sufficiency; Ignorance and sufficiency; Law and custom; Love; Renewal and identity; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **εἰπεῖν** — So to speak.
- **εἴπερ** — If and if indeed.
- **εἴπέρ** — If and if indeed; Immortality.
- **εἴπερ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἑαυτῷ εἶναι ἀεὶ ἔρως ἐστίν** — If and if indeed.
- **εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων** — If and if indeed.
- **εἴπέρ τῳ ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτῳ καὶ ἐκείνῳ** — Immortality.
- **εἶπες** — Rightly and well.
- **εἰρήνη** — Peace and calm.
- **εἰρήνην** — Peace and calm.
- **εἰρωνεύομαι** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **εἰρωνευόμενος** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **εἰρωνικῶς** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **εἰς** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed; Present and future possession.
- **εἰς μακάρων νήσους** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον** — Present and future possession.

- **εἰσενεγκεῖν** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **εἰστήκει** — Attention and standing still; Attention and standing still.
- **εἰστήκει ζητῶν** — Attention and standing still.
- **εἰστήκει σκοπῶν** — Attention and standing still.
- **ἐκ** — Agreement and premise.
- **ἐκ τῶν ὡμολογημένων** — Agreement and premise.
- **ἕκαστος** — Tally and matching halves.
- **ἔκγονα** — Offshoot.
- **ἔκγονος** — Offshoot.
- **ἐκείνου** — End and purpose; Knowledge; Participation.
- **ἐκείνου ἕνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ** — End and purpose.
- **ἐκείνῳ** — Immortality.
- **ἐκήλει** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **ἑκόντι** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **ἑκούσιος** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **ἑκών** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **ἑκὼν** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **ἑκὼν ἑκόντι** — Justice, agreement and force.
- **ἔλαττον** — More and less; Participation.
- **ἐλέγχω** — Refutation and examination.
- **ἐλλοχάω** — Plotting and ambush.
- **ἐλλοχῶν** — Plotting and ambush.
- **ἐμαυτοῦ** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἐμαυτοῦ μὲν ἀμελῶ** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἐμέμνητο** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **ἐμὸς** — Speech and account; Speech and account.
- **ἔμφρων** — Courage and composure.
- **ἔμφρων εἶναι** — Courage and composure.
- **ἐν** — Beauty and ugliness; Between; Birth and begetting; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; The

great sea of beauty; Hades and the Isles of the Blessed; More and less; Order and disorder; Wisdom and philosophy; Work and action.

- **ἕν** — Naming whole and part.
- **ἓν** — Naming whole and part.
- **ἐν Ἅιδου** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **ἐν κόσμῳ** — Order and disorder.
- **ἐν μέσῳ** — Between.
- **ἓν μόριον** — Naming whole and part.
- **ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς** — Body and soul.
- **ἕν τι εἶδος** — Naming whole and part.
- **ἐν τίνι πράξει** — Work and action.
- **ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ** — The great sea of beauty; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **ἐναντίος** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ἐναντιώτατα** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ἐνδεές** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐνδεὲς** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐνδεής** — Desire and lack.
- **Ἐνδεὴς** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐνδεὴς** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ἔνδεια** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐνδείᾳ** — Desire and lack.
- **ἔνδοθεν** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἕνεκα** — At least and argumentative focus; End and purpose; For the sake of and because of; Virtue and becoming better.
- **ἕνεκεν** — End and purpose.
- **ἐνέτυχον** — Meeting and encounter.
- **ἔνθεον** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ἔνθεος** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ἐνιαυτοῦ** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **ἐνταῦθά** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.

- **ἐνταῦθα** — Only and alone; Only and not every.
- **ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ μοναχοῦ** — Only and alone.
- **ἐντυγχάνω** — Meeting and encounter.
- **ἐντυχεῖν** — Meeting and encounter.
- **ἐντύχῃ** — Meeting and encounter.
- **ἐξ** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **ἐξ Ἅιδου** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **ἐξαίφνης** — Suddenly.
- **ἐξαίφνης κατόψεταί** — Suddenly.
- **ἐξαπατάω** — Deception and intention.
- **ἐξαπατηθείη** — Deception and intention.
- **ἔξοδος** — Memory and practice.
- **ἔξωθεν** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἐπ** — Form and figure.
- **ἐπαινεῖν** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐπαινέω** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἔπαινον** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἔπαινος** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ἐπαναβασμοῖς** — Ascent.
- **ἐπαναβασμός** — Ascent.
- **ἐπάνειμι** — Ascent.
- **ἐπανιέναι** — Ascent.
- **ἐπαποθανεῖν** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ἐπαποθνήσκω** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ἔπειτα** — Present and future possession.
- **ἕπεσθαι** — Following and guidance.
- **ἔπεστι** — Gratification and favour.
- **ἐπὶ** — Ascent.
- **ἐπὶ τὰς ἐπιστήμας ἀγαγεῖν** — Ascent.
- **ἐπιβάτης** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **ἐπιβουλεύω** — Plotting and ambush.

- **ἐπιβουλεύων** — Plotting and ambush.
- **ἐπίβουλος** — Hunting and devices.
- **ἐπίβουλός** — Hunting and devices.
- **ἐπιθυμεῖν** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐπιθυμέω** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐπιθυμητὴς** — Intelligence.
- **ἐπιθυμία** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐπιθυμοῦν** — Desire and lack.
- **ἐπιμελὲς** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἐπιμελής** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἐπιμελὴς** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **ἐπίσταμαι** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπίστασθαι** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπίστασθαί** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπιστῆμαι** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπιστήμας** — Ascent.
- **ἐπιστήμη** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπιστήμην** — Knowledge.
- **ἐπιστήμης** — Memory and practice.
- **ἐπιστημῶν** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **ἐπιστημῶν κάλλος** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **ἕπομαι** — Following and guidance.
- **ἑπομένους** — Following and guidance.
- **ἐποπτικά** — Initiation and fulfilment; Initiation and fulfilment.
- **ἐποπτικός** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **ἔπος** — So to speak.
- **Ἕπου** — Following and guidance.
- **ἐρᾷ** — Love.
- **ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐρῶν τῶν καλῶν** — Love.
- **ἔρανον** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.

- **ἔρανον εἰσενεγκεῖν** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **ἔρανος** — Salt, contribution and shared praise.
- **ἐρασταῖς** — Gratification and favour.
- **ἐραστῇ** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **ἐραστὴν** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐραστής** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐραστὴς** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐραστὴς παιδικῶν** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐραστὴς χρηστὸς** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐραστοῦ** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐράω** — Love.
- **ἔργα** — Work and action.
- **ἔργον** — Work and action.
- **ἔριον** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἐρίου** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἕρμαιον** — Godsend.
- **Ἕρμαιον** — Godsend.
- **Ἑρμηνεῦον** — Daimon and mediation.
- **ἑρμηνεύω** — Daimon and mediation.
- **ἐρώμενον** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐρώμενος** — Lover and beloved.
- **ἐρῶν** — Love; Lover and beloved.
- **Ἔρως** — Ares held by Love; Love.
- **ἔρως** — If and if indeed; Love; Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **Ἔρως Ἄρη** — Ares held by Love.
- **ἔρωτα** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **Ἔρωτα** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **Ἔρωτα φιλόσοφον εἶναι** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **ἐρώτησιν** — Question and answer.
- **ἐρώτησις** — Question and answer.

- **Ἔρωτι** — Necessity.
- **ἐρωτικά** — Love.
- **ἐρωτικὰ** — Love.
- **ἐρωτικός** — Love.
- **ἐσπουδακέναι** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **ἔσται** — Happiness.
- **ἔστηκεν** — Attention and standing still.
- **ἐστι** — Ignorance and sufficiency; Love of something; Making and poetry; Only and not every.
- **ἔστι** — Love of something.
- **ἐστί** — Making and poetry.
- **ἔστι τινὸς ἀδελφὸς** — Love of something.
- **ἐστιν** — Beauty and ugliness; Desire and lack; Not and neither.
- **ἐστίν** — If and if indeed; Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ἔστιν** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **ἑταιρίστρια** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἑταιρίστριαι** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **ἑταῖρος** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ἑταίρου** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ἕτερον** — Renewal and identity.
- **ἕτερον νέον ἀντὶ τοῦ παλαιοῦ** — Renewal and identity.
- **ἔτι** — More and less.
- **ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν** — More and less.
- **ἕτοιμον** — Not yet and at hand.
- **ἕτοιμος** — Not yet and at hand.
- **ἑτοίμου** — Not yet and at hand.
- **εὐανθής** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **εὐδαιμονεῖν** — Happiness.
- **εὐδαίμονες** — Happiness.

- **εὐδαιμονέω** — Happiness.
- **εὐδαιμονία** — Happiness.
- **εὐδαιμονίαν** — Happiness.
- **εὐδαίμων** — Happiness.
- **εὐδαίμων ἔσται** — Happiness.
- **Εὐθύδημον** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **Εὐθύδημος** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **εὐπορέω** — Resource and Poverty.
- **εὐπορήσῃ** — Resource and Poverty.
- **εὔπορος** — Resource and Poverty.
- **εὐπορώτερον** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Εὐριπίδης** — The tongue and the mind.
- **Εὐριπίδου** — The tongue and the mind.
- **εὐσέβεια** — Divination, piety and right.
- **εὐσέβειαν** — Divination, piety and right.
- **εὐσχημοσύνη** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **εὐφημέω** — Hush and good omen.
- **εὐφημήσεις** — Hush and good omen.
- **εὐώδης** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **ἐφαίνετο** — Appearing.
- **ἐφάπτομαι** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἐφαπτομένῳ** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ἐφεξῆς** — Rightly and well.
- **ἐφεξῆς τε καὶ ὀρθῶς** — Rightly and well.
- **ἔφη** — Narrating and reporting.
- **Ἐφιάλτης** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **Ἐφιάλτου** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **Ἐφιάλτου τε καὶ Ὤτου** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **ἕχει** — If and if indeed; Use and fellow-worker.
- **ἕχειν** — End and purpose; Right opinion.
- **ἕχεως** — Bite, madness, and initiation.

- **ἔχις** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **ἔχον** — Power and capacity.
- **ἔχουσιν** — Present and future possession.
- **ἔχω** — Present and future possession.
- **Ζεύς** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **Ζεὺς** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **Ζεὺς κυβερνᾶν** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **ζηλοτυπέω** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **ζηλοτυπῶν** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **ζητεῖ** — Seeking and pursuing.
- **ζητέω** — Attention and standing still; Seeking and pursuing.
- **ζητῶν** — Attention and standing still.
- **ἡ** — Beauty at birth; Companionship and shared presence; Deception and intention; Desire and lack; Diotima; Divination, piety and right; Drinking and sobriety; Earnestness and exertion; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Hiccup and sneeze; Intelligence; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Nature; Question and answer; Resource and Poverty; Right opinion; The tongue and the mind; The tongue and the mind; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **ἢ** — More, rather than and no less; More, rather than and no less; Love of something; Love of something; More and less.
- **ἡ ἀπόκρισις** — Question and answer.
- **ἡ γλῶσσα** — The tongue and the mind.
- **ἡ δὲ φρὴν** — The tongue and the mind.
- **ἡ εἰκὼν** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **ἡ ἐπιθυμία** — Desire and lack.
- **ἡ εὐσχημοσύνη** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **ἡ θνητὴ φύσις** — Nature.
- **ἡ Καλλονή** — Beauty at birth.

- **ἡ λύγξ** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **ἡ μαντικὴ** — Divination, piety and right.
- **ἡ μαντικὴ πᾶσα** — Divination, piety and right.
- **ἡ Μαντινικὴ ξένη** — Diotima.
- **ἡ μέθη** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **ἡ ὁμιλία** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα** — Right opinion.
- **ἡ Πενία** — Resource and Poverty.
- **ἡ περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεών τε καὶ οἰκήσεων διακόσμησις** — Intelligence.
- **ἡ σοφία** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **ἡ σπουδὴ** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **ἡ σύντασις** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **ἡγεμών** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **ἡγεμὼν** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **ἡγεμὼν καὶ στρατηγός** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **ἡγέομαι** — Ascent.
- **ἡγῆται** — Ascent; If and if indeed.
- **ἡγούμενος** — Ascent.
- **ἦθος** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ᾔθεος** — Unwed.
- **ἤλεγχε** — Refutation and examination.
- **ἅλιος** — Sun and prayer.
- **ἦμεν** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ἦμεν ὅλοι** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ἡμέτερος** — Asclepius; Law and custom.
- **ἡμίσεός** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ἅμισυ** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ἅμισυς** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ἦν** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **Ἡράκλειτος** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.

- **Ἠσίοδον** — Hesiod.
- **Ἠσίοδος** — Hesiod.
- **ἧττον** — More, rather than and no less.
- **Ἥφαιστος** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **Ἥφαιστος χαλκείας** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **θαυμαστὸν** — Nature.
- **θαυμαστὸν τὴν φύσιν καλόν** — Nature.
- **θεάομαι** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **θεάς** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **θεάσασθαι** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **θέμιν** — Divination, piety and right.
- **θέμις** — Divination, piety and right.
- **θεόν** — Order and disorder.
- **θεούς** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **θεοφιλεῖ** — True virtue and images.
- **θεοφιλεῖ γενέσθαι** — True virtue and images.
- **θεοφιλής** — True virtue and images.
- **θεραπεύειν** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **θεραπεύω** — Voluntary slavery and service.
- **θερμός** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **θερμῷ** — Opposites and unlike objects; Opposites and unlike objects.
- **θεωμένῳ** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **θεῶν** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **θεῶν οὐδεὶς φιλοσοφεῖ** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **θεωρέω** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **θεωρῶν** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **θῆλυ** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **θῆλυς** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **θηρευτής** — Hunting and devices.
- **θηρευτὴς** — Hunting and devices.

- **θηρευτὴς δεινός** — Hunting and devices.
- **θνητὴ** — Nature.
- **θνητῆς** — Pure and unmixed.
- **θνητὸν** — Immortality; Participation; Renewal and identity.
- **θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει** — Immortality; Participation.
- **θνητός** — Immortality.
- **θνητοῦ** — Between.
- **θνητῷ** — For a mortal and so far as possible; Immortality.
- **θρεψαμένῳ** — True virtue and images.
- **θύρα** — Porch and threshold.
- **θύραν** — Porch and threshold.
- **θύρας** — Porch and threshold.
- **ἰάομαι** — Medicine and healing.
- **Ἰαπετός** — Necessity.
- **Ἰαπετοῦ** — Necessity.
- **ἰάσασθαι** — Medicine and healing.
- **ἰατρική** — Medicine and healing.
- **ἰατρός** — Medicine and healing.
- **ἰατρὸς** — Medicine and healing.
- **ἰδέα** — Form and figure.
- **ἰδέαν** — Form and figure.
- **ἱκανὴν** — Evidence and testimony.
- **ἱκανὴν μαρτυρίαν** — Evidence and testimony.
- **ἱκανόν** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ἱκανός** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ἱμάτιον** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **ἴον** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **ἵστημι** — Attention and standing still.
- **ἱστουργίας** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **ἴων** — Wreaths and ribbons.

- **καθ** — The beautiful itself.
- **καθαρόν** — Pure and unmixed.
- **καθαρός** — Pure and unmixed.
- **καθεύδεις** — Sleep and dawn.
- **καθεύδω** — Sleep and dawn.
- **καθίσταται** — Lover and beloved.
- **καθορᾶν** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **καθοράω** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **καὶ** — Beauty and ugliness; Between; Birth and begetting; Birth and begetting; Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Intelligence; Intelligence; Leader, pilot and companion; Necessity; Peace and calm; Power and capacity; Rightly and well; Seasons, blending and astronomy; Suddenly; Surfeit and emptying; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Well and rightly.
- **καὶ ἐξαίφνης** — Suddenly.
- **καὶ ὀρθῶς** — Well and rightly.
- **κακὸν** — The good.
- **καλὰ** — All and every; Beauty and ugliness; Body and soul; Knowledge; Participation.
- **καλά** — The good.
- **καλάποδα** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **καλάπους** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **καλεῖται** — Renewal and identity.
- **καλέω** — Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.
- **καλὴ** — Deception and intention.
- **καλὴ ἡ ἀπάτη** — Deception and intention.
- **καλλίστων** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **Καλλονή** — Beauty at birth.
- **κάλλος** — Beauty and ugliness.

- **κάλλους** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **καλόν** — The beautiful itself; Beauty and ugliness; Form and figure; Nature; Not and neither; Seeing and contemplating.
- **καλὸν** — Beauty at birth.
- **καλός** — Beauty and ugliness; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **καλὸς** — Not and neither; Only and not every.
- **καλοῦ** — End and purpose; Knowledge.
- **καλῷ** — Birth and begetting; Birth and begetting; Evidence and testimony.
- **καλῷ οὖν δοκεῖ μοι τεκμηρίῳ** — Evidence and testimony.
- **καλῶν** — Love.
- **καλῶς** — Rightly and well; Well and rightly.
- **καλῶς γε εἶπες** — Rightly and well.
- **καλῶς μὲν γὰρ πραττόμενον** — Well and rightly.
- **κανθήλιος** — Commonplace crafts.
- **κανθηλίους** — Commonplace crafts.
- **καρτερεῖν** — Endurance.
- **καρτερέω** — Endurance.
- **καρτερήσαιμι** — Endurance.
- **καρτερήσεις** — Endurance.
- **καρτερήσῃ** — Endurance.
- **καρτέρησις** — Endurance.
- **καρτερία** — Endurance.
- **καρτερίαν** — Endurance.
- **καρτερὸν** — Endurance.
- **καρτερός** — Endurance.
- **καρτερὸς** — Endurance.
- **καρτερὸς ἀνὴρ** — Endurance.
- **κατ** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.

- **κατὰ** — Body and soul; Body and soul; Endurance; For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν** — Body and soul.
- **κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν** — For a mortal and so far as possible.
- **κατὰ τὸ καρτερὸν** — Endurance.
- **κατὰ τὸ σῶμα** — Body and soul.
- **καταγέλαστα** — Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness.
- **καταγέλαστος** — Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness.
- **καταλείπει** — Renewal and identity.
- **καταλείπω** — Renewal and identity.
- **κατανοέω** — Knowing and learning.
- **κατανοῆσαι** — Knowing and learning.
- **κατεχόμεθα** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **κατέχω** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **κατιδεῖν** — The beautiful itself; Seeing and contemplating.
- **κατίδῃ** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **κατόψεταί** — Seeing and contemplating; Suddenly.
- **κατ’ ἄνθη** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **κεκλημένος** — Invited, uninvited, and of one’s own accord.
- **κεκτῆσθαι** — Present and future possession.
- **κενός** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **κένωσιν** — Surfeit and emptying; Surfeit and emptying.
- **κένωσις** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **κενώτερον** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **κεφαλὴν** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **κηλέω** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **κῆπον** — Nectar and garden.

- **κῆπος** — Nectar and garden.
- **κιθαρῳδός** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **κιττός** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **κιττοῦ** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **κλέος** — Honour and ambition.
- **κοινῇ** — Common nurture.
- **κοινωνία** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **κοινωνίαν** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **κοινωνίας** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **κορυβαντιάω** — Corybantic response.
- **κορυβαντιώντων** — Corybantic response.
- **κοσμέω** — Order and disorder.
- **κοσμῆσαι** — Order and disorder.
- **κοσμῆσαι τὸν θεόν** — Order and disorder.
- **κοσμίοις** — Order and disorder.
- **κόσμιον** — Order and disorder.
- **κόσμιος** — Order and disorder.
- **κόσμος** — Order and disorder.
- **κόσμῳ** — Order and disorder.
- **κοτύλας** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **κοτύλη** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **κρᾶσιν** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **κρᾶσις** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **κρατεῖν** — Temperance and self-command.
- **κρατέω** — Temperance and self-command.
- **κρατῶν** — Temperance and self-command.
- **Κρόνος** — Necessity.
- **Κρόνου** — Necessity.
- **κτάομαι** — Present and future possession.

- **Κτήσει** — Present and future possession.
- **κτῆσις** — Present and future possession.
- **κυβερνᾶν** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **κυβερνήτης** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **κυβιστάω** — Roundness and cartwheels.
- **κυβιστῶντες** — Roundness and cartwheels.
- **κυέω** — Birth and begetting.
- **κύημα** — Birth and begetting.
- **κυοῦσιν** — Birth and begetting.
- **κωμῳδία** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **κωμῳδίαν** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **κωμῳδοποιὸν** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **κωμῳδοποιός** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **λάβῃ** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **Λάχης** — Courage and composure.
- **Λάχητος** — Courage and composure.
- **λήθη** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **λήθη γὰρ ἐπιστήμης ἔξοδος** — Memory and practice.
- **λίσπαι** — Tally and matching halves.
- **λόγοις** — Hearing and enchantment; Speech and account.
- **λόγον** — Right opinion; Speech and account.
- **λόγον δίδωμι** — Right opinion.
- **λόγος** — Speech and account.
- **λόγου** — Speech and account.
- **λύγγα** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **λύγξ** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **Λύκειον** — Lyceum.
- **λύρας** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **μά** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **μὰ** — Witnesses and oaths.

- **μὰ θεούς, μὰ θεάς** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **μάθημα** — Knowledge.
- **μαθήματα** — Knowledge.
- **μαθησόμενος** — Knowing and learning.
- **μακάρων** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **μακάρων νῆσοι** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **μαλακόν** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **μαλακός** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **μαλακὸς** — Apollodorus and Aristodemus.
- **μαλακωτάτοις** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **μᾶλλον** — More, rather than and no less; Lover and beloved; More and less.
- **μανθάνω** — Knowing and learning.
- **μανία** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **μανίας** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **μαντική** — Divination, piety and right.
- **μαντικὴ** — Divination, piety and right.
- **Μαντινικὴ** — Diotima.
- **Μαρσύᾳ** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **Μαρσύας** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **Μαρσύου** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **μάρτυρας** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **μαρτυρία** — Evidence and testimony.
- **μαρτυρίαν** — Evidence and testimony.
- **μάρτυς** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **μάρτυσι** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **μέγα** — Evidence and testimony.
- **μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον** — Evidence and testimony.
- **μεγάλης** — Beauty at birth.
- **μεγάλης ὠδῖνος** — Beauty at birth.

- **μέγας** — Daimon and mediation.
- **μεθ** — The beautiful itself.
- **μέθη** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **μεθύοντα** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **μεθύοντος** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **μεθύω** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **μείζω** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **μείζω κοινωνίαν** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **Μελανίππην** — The tongue and the mind.
- **μέλει** — Care of oneself and neglect.
- **μελετᾶν** — Memory and practice.
- **μελετάω** — Memory and practice.
- **μελέτη** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **μελοποιία** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **μελοποιίαν** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **μεμνημένος** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **μὲν** — Care of oneself and neglect; The good; Well and rightly.
- **μέσος** — Between.
- **μέσῳ** — Between.
- **μεταξύ** — Between.
- **μεταξὺ** — Between; Intelligence.
- **μεταξὺ εἶναι σοφοῦ καὶ ἀμαθοῦς** — Between.
- **μεταξὺ θνητοῦ καὶ ἀθανάτου** — Between.
- **μεταξὺ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας** — Between; Intelligence.
- **μετέχει** — Immortality; Participation.
- **μετέχοντα** — Participation.
- **μετέχω** — Participation.
- **μετρίας** — Play and earnestness.

- **μὴ** — Beauty and ugliness; Ignorance and sufficiency; Not and neither; Not yet and at hand.
- **μή** — Not and neither.
- **μηδὲ** — Participation.
- **μηδὲ πάσχειν μηδέν** — Participation.
- **μηδέν** — Participation.
- **μήτε** — More and less; Participation.
- **μήτε τι πλέον μήτε ἔλαττον** — More and less; Participation.
- **Μήτιδος** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Μῆτις** — Resource and Poverty.
- **μηχανάς** — Hunting and devices.
- **μηχανή** — Hunting and devices.
- **μηχανῇ** — Hunting and devices.
- **μία** — Only and not every.
- **μία μόνη** — Only and not every.
- **μίαν** — Knowledge.
- **μιμνῄσκομαι** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **μνημεῖον** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **μνήμη** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **μνήμην** — Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal.
- **μοι** — Evidence and testimony.
- **Μοῖρα** — Beauty at birth.
- **μοναχοῦ** — Only and alone; Only and not every.
- **μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα** — Only and not every.
- **μόνη** — Only and not every.
- **μονοειδὲς** — The beautiful itself.
- **μονοειδὲς κατιδεῖν** — The beautiful itself.
- **μονοειδής** — The beautiful itself.
- **μόνοι** — Only and not every.
- **μόνον** — Only and alone; Power and capacity.

- **μόνος** — Only and alone; Only and not every.
- **μόριον** — Naming whole and part.
- **Μοῦσα** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **Μοῦσαι** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **μούσης** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **μουσική** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **μουσικὴ** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **μυέω** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **μυηθείης** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **μῦθος** — Speech and account.
- **νέκταρ** — Nectar and garden.
- **νέκταρος** — Nectar and garden.
- **νενόμισται** — Law and custom.
- **νενομοθέτηται** — Law and custom.
- **νέον** — Renewal and identity.
- **νέος** — Renewal and identity.
- **νέους** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **Νέστορα** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **Νέστωρ** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **νῆσοι** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **νήσους** — Hades and the Isles of the Blessed.
- **Νήφειν** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **νήφω** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **νομίζω** — Law and custom.
- **νομοθετέω** — Law and custom.
- **νόμοις** — Law and custom.
- **νόμον** — Law and custom.
- **νόμον εἶναι** — Law and custom.
- **νόμος** — Law and custom.
- **νόμου** — Law and custom.
- **νοσώδεσιν** — Medicine and healing.
- **νοσώδης** — Medicine and healing.

- **νοῦν** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening; Knowing and learning.
- **νοῦς** — Knowing and learning.
- **νῦν** — Present and future possession; Wish and willingness.
- **ξένη** — Diotima.
- **ξηρὸν** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ξηρός** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ὁ** — Ascent; Asclepius; Divine teachers and craft pupils; Hephaestus and fusion; Ignorance and sufficiency; Law and custom; Love; Love; Love of something; Lover and beloved; Music, harmony and rhythm; Not yet and the stage of an argument; Renewal and identity; Speech and account; Speech and account.
- **ὃ** — Beauty and ugliness; Not and neither; Not yet and at hand.
- **ὁ αὐτὸς καλεῖται** — Renewal and identity.
- **ὁ δ’ ἐμὸς λόγος** — Speech and account.
- **ὁ ἐρώμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπᾷ** — Lover and beloved.
- **ὁ ἔρως τοῦ τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί** — Love.
- **ὁ Ζεὺς** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **ὁ ἡμέτερος νόμος** — Law and custom.
- **ὁ ἡμέτερος πρόγονος Ἀσκληπιός** — Asclepius.
- **ὁ Ἥφαιστος** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν** — Not and neither.
- **ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν αἰσχρὸν εἶναι** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **ὁ μὴ οἰόμενος ἐνδεὴς εἶναι** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **ὃ οὔπω ἕτοιμον** — Not yet and at hand.
- **ὁ πατήρ ἐστι πατήρ τινος** — Love of something.

- **ὁ ῥυθμὸς** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ὅα** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **οἱ** — Cicadas and birth into earth; Happiness; Initiation and fulfilment; Making and poetry; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **οἱ εὐδαίμονες εὐδαίμονες** — Happiness.
- **οἱ τέλεοι σοφισταί** — Initiation and fulfilment; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **οἱ τέττιγες** — Cicadas and birth into earth.
- **οἱ τούτων δημιουργοὶ πάντες ποιηταί** — Making and poetry.
- **οἰκεῖον** — The good.
- **οἰκεῖος** — The good.
- **οἰκειότης** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **οἰκειότητι** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **οἰκειότητος** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **οἰκήσεων** — Intelligence.
- **οἴομαι** — As they think; Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **οἰόμενος** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **οἴονται** — As they think.
- **ὅλοι** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ὅλος** — Wholeness and the half.
- **ὅλου** — Naming whole and part; Wholeness and the half.
- **Ὄλυμπος** — Marsyas and Olympus.
- **ὁμιλέω** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ὁμιλία** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ὁμιλῶν** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **ὄμνυμι** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **ὁμολογέω** — Agreement and premise.

- **ὁμολογία** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ὀμόσας** — Witnesses and oaths.
- **ὀμφαλὸν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **ὀμφαλόν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **ὀμφαλός** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **ὂν** — Always.
- **ὄναρ** — Dreamlike wisdom.
- **ὄνομα** — Naming whole and part.
- **ὀνομάζομεν** — Naming whole and part.
- **ὀνομάζω** — Naming whole and part.
- **ὄνος** — Commonplace crafts.
- **ὄνος κανθήλιος** — Commonplace crafts.
- **ὄνους** — Commonplace crafts.
- **ὄνους γὰρ κανθηλίους** — Commonplace crafts.
- **ὄντος** — Right opinion.
- **ὀξὺ** — Sight of the mind.
- **ὀξὺ βλέπειν** — Sight of the mind.
- **ὀξύς** — Sight of the mind.
- **ὅπως** — Power and capacity.
- **ὅπως ἂν δύνωμαι** — Power and capacity.
- **ὁρατὸν** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **ὁρατός** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **ὀρθὰ** — Right opinion.
- **ὀρθὴ** — Right opinion.
- **ὀρθὴ δόξα** — Right opinion.
- **ὀρθῶς** — Ascent; If and if indeed; Rightly and well; Well and rightly.
- **Ὀρφέα** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **Ὀρφεύς** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **ὁρῶντι** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **ὁρῶντι ᾧ ὁρατὸν τὸ καλόν** — Seeing and contemplating.

- **οὐ** — Beauty and ugliness; Knowing and learning; Only and not every; Speech and account.
- **οὗ** — Desire and lack; End and purpose.
- **οὐ γὰρ ἐμὸς ὁ μῦθος** — Speech and account.
- **οὗ δὴ ἕνεκεν** — End and purpose.
- **οὐ μανθάνω** — Knowing and learning.
- **οὐ πᾶς** — Only and not every.
- **οὐ πᾶς ἐστι καλὸς** — Only and not every.
- **οὐδ** — Ares held by Love.
- **οὐδὲ** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **οὐδὲ ὁ διπλοῦς ἔρως ἐνταῦθά πω ἔστιν** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **οὐδεὶς** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **οὐδενὸς** — Love of something.
- **οὐδενὸς ἢ τινός** — Love of something.
- **οὐδ’ Ἄρης ἀνθίσταται** — Ares held by Love.
- **οὐκ** — Birth and begetting; Letting be and not letting go; Memory and rehearsal; Necessity; True virtue and images.
- **Οὐκ** — Hush and good omen.
- **οὐκ ἀμελέτητος** — Memory and rehearsal.
- **οὐκ ἀνίει** — Letting be and not letting go.
- **οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς** — True virtue and images.
- **οὐκ εἰδώλου** — True virtue and images.
- **Οὐκ εὐφημήσεις** — Hush and good omen.
- **οὖν** — Evidence and testimony.
- **οὔπω** — Not yet and at hand.
- **Οὐρανία** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Οὐρανίαν** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **Οὐρανίας** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Οὐρανίας μούσης** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Οὐράνιον** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.

- **Οὐράνιος** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **οὔτε** — The beautiful itself; Not and neither; Wholeness and the half; Wholeness and the half.
- **οὔτε γιγνόμενον οὔτε ἀπολλύμενον** — The beautiful itself.
- **οὔτε ἡμίσεός** — Wholeness and the half.
- **οὔτε καλὸς** — Not and neither.
- **οὔτε ὅλου** — Wholeness and the half.
- **οὕτως** — If and if indeed.
- **οὐχ** — More, rather than and no less.
- **οὐχ ἧττον** — More, rather than and no less.
- **οὐχ ἧττον γυναικῶν ἢ παίδων** — More, rather than and no less.
- **ὄψις** — Sight of the mind.
- **παιδεία** — Pederasty and education.
- **παιδεραστής** — Pederasty and education.
- **παιδεραστία** — Pederasty and education.
- **παιδεραστίᾳ** — Pederasty and education.
- **παίδευσιν** — Pederasty and education.
- **παίδευσις** — Pederasty and education.
- **παιδιά** — Irony, play, and earnestness; Play and earnestness.
- **παιδιᾶς** — Irony, play, and earnestness; Play and earnestness.
- **παιδικά** — Lover and beloved.
- **παιδικὰ** — Lover and beloved.
- **παιδικὰ μᾶλλον αὐτὸς καθίσταται ἀντ’ ἐραστοῦ** — Lover and beloved.
- **παιδικῶν** — Lover and beloved.
- **παίδων** — More, rather than and no less.
- **παίζω** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **παίζων** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **παλαιοῦ** — Renewal and identity.

- **πᾶν** — Daimon and mediation; Renewal and identity.
- **πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον** — Daimon and mediation.
- **πᾶν τὸ θνητὸν σῴζεται** — Renewal and identity.
- **Πάνδημον** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **Πάνδημος** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **πάνδημός** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **πάντα** — All and every; Participation.
- **πάντες** — All and every; Making and poetry.
- **πάντες ἄνθρωποι** — All and every.
- **παντὸς** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **πάρειμι** — Present and future possession.
- **Παρμενίδης** — Parmenides.
- **παρόντα** — Present and future possession; Wish and willingness.
- **παρρησία** — Laughter and frankness.
- **παρρησίᾳ** — Laughter and frankness.
- **πᾶς** — All and every; Only and not every.
- **πᾶσα** — Desire and lack; Divination, piety and right.
- **πᾶσά** — Making and poetry; Making and poetry.
- **πᾶσά ἐστι ποίησις** — Making and poetry.
- **πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία** — Desire and lack.
- **πάσχειν** — Participation.
- **πάσχω** — Participation.
- **πατήρ** — Love of something.
- **πατὴρ** — Speech and account.
- **πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου** — Speech and account.
- **Πάτροκλος** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **Πατρόκλῳ** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **πείθειν** — Truth and persuasion.
- **πείθω** — Truth and persuasion.
- **πέλαγος** — The great sea of beauty.

- **Πενία** — Resource and Poverty.
- **πέπεισμαι** — Truth and persuasion.
- **περὶ** — Intelligence.
- **Περικλέους** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **Περικλῆς** — Heroic and oratorical counterparts.
- **πέφυκα** — Nature.
- **πέφυκεν** — Nature.
- **πικρὸν** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **πικρὸν γλυκεῖ** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **πικρός** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **πίνειν** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **πίνω** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **πλέκων** — Hunting and devices.
- **πλέκων μηχανάς** — Hunting and devices.
- **πλέον** — More and less; Participation.
- **πλεονεκτεῖν** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **πλεονεκτέω** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **πλεονεξία** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **πλεονεξίας** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **πλεονεξίας καὶ ἀκοσμίας** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **πλησμονὴ** — At least and argumentative focus; Surfeit and emptying.
- **πλησμονή** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **πλησμονὴ γοῦν** — At least and argumentative focus.
- **πλησμονὴν** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **πλησμονὴν καὶ κένωσιν** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **πλησμονῆς** — Surfeit and emptying.
- **πλούτου** — For the sake of and because of.
- **πλούτου ἕνεκα** — For the sake of and because of.
- **ποίησις** — Making and poetry.
- **ποίησίς** — Making and poetry.

- **ποίησίς ἐστί τι πολύ** — Making and poetry.
- **ποιηταί** — Making and poetry.
- **ποιητής** — Making and poetry.
- **πόλεών** — Intelligence.
- **πολλὴν** — Play and earnestness.
- **πολλὴν σπουδὴν** — Play and earnestness.
- **πολλῶν** — Honour and ambition.
- **πολὺ** — Common nurture; The great sea of beauty.
- **πολύ** — Making and poetry.
- **πολὺ μείζω κοινωνίαν** — Common nurture.
- **Πολυμνία** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **Πολυμνίας** — Urania and Polyhymnia.
- **πόριμος** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Πόρος** — Resource and Poverty.
- **Ποτείδαια** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **Ποτειδαίᾳ** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **Ποτείδαιαν** — Potidaea and Delium.
- **πράξει** — Work and action.
- **πρᾶξις** — Work and action.
- **πραττόμενον** — Well and rightly.
- **πρόγονος** — Asclepius.
- **Πρόδικος** — Sophists and Prodicus.
- **προθύροις** — Porch and threshold.
- **πρόθυρον** — Porch and threshold.
- **προθύρῳ** — Porch and threshold.
- **πρὸς** — Cutting, repair and the navel; End and purpose; Virtue and becoming better.
- **πρὸς ἀρετήν** — Virtue and becoming better.
- **πρὸς τέλος** — End and purpose.
- **πρὸς τὴν τομήν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **προσαιτέω** — Nectar and garden.
- **προσαιτήσουσα** — Nectar and garden.

- **προσευξάμενος** — Sun and prayer.
- **προσεύχομαι** — Sun and prayer.
- **προσέχειν** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening; Knowing and learning.
- **προσέχετε** — Attention and standing still.
- **προσέχετε τὸν νοῦν** — Attention and standing still.
- **προσέχοντα** — Attention and standing still.
- **προσέχοντα τὸν νοῦν** — Attention and standing still.
- **προσέχω** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening.
- **προσπελάζῃ** — Approach and recoil.
- **προσπελάζω** — Approach and recoil.
- **πτάρε** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **πταρμὸν** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **πταρμός** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **πτάρνυμαι** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **πω** — Not yet and the stage of an argument.
- **ῥεῖν** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ῥέω** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **ῥυθμός** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ῥυθμὸς** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **ῥώννυμι** — Attention and strengthening.
- **ῥωσθεὶς** — Attention and strengthening.
- **σάτυρος** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **σατύρου** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **σατύρῳ** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **Σειρήν** — Sirens.
- **Σειρήνων** — Sirens.
- **σιληνοῖς** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **σιληνός** — Likenesses, sileni, and statues.
- **σκληρὸν** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.

- **σκληρὸν ἦθος** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **σκληρός** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **σκληρὸς** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **σκοπῶν** — Attention and standing still.
- **σκυτοτόμος** — Commonplace crafts.
- **σκυτοτόμους** — Commonplace crafts.
- **σμικρὸν** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **σμικρὸν ἄνθος** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **σου** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **σοφία** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **σοφίας** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **σοφίας τε αὖ καὶ ἀμαθίας** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **σοφισταί** — Initiation and fulfilment; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **σοφιστάς** — Sophists and Prodicus.
- **σοφιστής** — Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **σοφοῦ** — Between.
- **σοφωτάτη** — Diotima.
- **σπουδάζω** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **σπουδάσαντος** — Irony, play, and earnestness.
- **σπουδή** — Earnestness and exertion; Play and earnestness.
- **σπουδὴ** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **σπουδὴν** — Play and earnestness.
- **σπουδῆς** — Play and earnestness.
- **σπουδῆς μετρίας** — Play and earnestness.
- **στέφανος** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **στεφάνῳ** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **στρατηγός** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **στρογγύλον** — Roundness and cartwheels.

- **στρογγύλος** — Roundness and cartwheels.
- **συγγενές** — Kindred beauties.
- **συγγενής** — Kindred beauties.
- **σύμβολον** — Tally and matching halves.
- **Συμπάντων** — All and every.
- **σύμπας** — All and every.
- **συμφέρεσθαι** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **συμφῦναι** — Wholeness and the half.
- **συμφυσάω** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **συμφυσῆσαι** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **συμφύω** — Wholeness and the half.
- **συμφωνία** — Music, harmony and rhythm; Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **συμφωνία δὲ ὁμολογία τις** — Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **σύνειμι** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **συνεῖναι** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **συνεκτρέφει** — Common nurture.
- **συνεκτρέφει κοινῇ** — Common nurture.
- **συνεκτρέφω** — Common nurture.
- **συνεργὸν** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **συνεργὸν ἀμείνω** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **συνεργός** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **σύνοικος** — Desire and lack.
- **συνόντος** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **συνουσία** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **συνουσίαν** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **συνουσίας** — Companionship and shared presence.
- **σύντασις** — Earnestness and exertion.
- **συντήκω** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **συντῆξαι** — Hephaestus and fusion.

- **σύριγγας** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **σύριγξ** — Pipe-girl and pipes.
- **σύσπαστα** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **συσπειρᾶται** — Approach and recoil.
- **σῴζεται** — Renewal and identity.
- **σῴζω** — Renewal and identity.
- **Σωκράτη** — Drinking and sobriety; Socrates.
- **Σωκράτη μεθύοντα** — Drinking and sobriety.
- **Σωκράτης** — Socrates.
- **σῶμα** — Body and soul.
- **σώμασιν** — More and less.
- **σώματα** — Body and soul.
- **σώματος** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Order and disorder.
- **σωμάτων** — More, rather than and no less.
- **σωτήρ** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **σωτὴρ** — Leader, pilot and companion.
- **σώφρονα** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **σωφροσύνη** — Temperance and self-command.
- **σωφροσύνης** — Temperance and self-command.
- **τὰ** — All and every; Androgyne and the three kinds; Body and soul; Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish; Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish; Cutting, repair and the navel; Initiation and fulfilment; Intelligence; Knowledge; Love; Lover and beloved; Opposites and unlike objects; Participation; Present and future possession; The good; Wish and willingness; Work and action.
- **τὰ δὲ ἀγαθὰ καλά** — The good.
- **τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ** — All and every.
- **τὰ δὲ ἄλλα πάντα καλὰ ἐκείνου μετέχοντα** — Participation.

- **τὰ δὲ τέλεα καὶ ἐποπτικά** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **τὰ ἐναντιώτατα** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **τὰ ἔργα αὐτοῦ** — Work and action.
- **τὰ ἐρωτικά** — Love.
- **τὰ ἐρωτικὰ** — Love.
- **τὰ καλὰ μαθήματα** — Knowledge.
- **τὰ καλὰ σώματα** — Body and soul.
- **τὰ νῦν παρόντα** — Present and future possession.
- **τὰ ὅα** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **τὰ παιδικά** — Lover and beloved.
- **τὰ παιδικὰ** — Lover and beloved.
- **τὰ σύσπαστα βαλλάντια** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τὰ ᾠὰ** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **τἀγαθὰ** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **τἀγαθὰ οὐ καὶ καλὰ** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **ταινία** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **ταινίας** — Wreaths and ribbons.
- **ταῖς** — Beauty and ugliness; Body and soul.
- **τὰς** — Ascent; Tyranny and friendship.
- **τὰς τυραννίδας** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **ταῦτα** — If and if indeed.
- **ταύτῃ** — Hunting and devices; Only and alone; Power and capacity.
- **ταύτῃ μόνον** — Only and alone.
- **ταύτῃ τῇ μηχανῇ** — Hunting and devices.
- **Ταύτην** — Wish and willingness.
- **Ταύτην δὴ τὴν βούλησιν** — Wish and willingness.
- **τε** — Birth and begetting; Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Ignorance and sufficiency; Intelligence; Intelligence; Rightly and well; Tenderness, softness and hardness.

- **τεκμήριον** — Evidence and testimony.
- **τεκμηρίῳ** — Evidence and testimony.
- **τέλεα** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **τέλεοι** — Initiation and fulfilment; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **τέλεος** — Initiation and fulfilment.
- **τελευτάω** — End and purpose.
- **τελευτῆσαι** — End and purpose.
- **τέλος** — End and purpose.
- **τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις** — End and purpose.
- **τέττιγες** — Cicadas and birth into earth.
- **τέττιξ** — Cicadas and birth into earth.
- **τῇ** — Friendship, partnership and affinity; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Hunting and devices; Pederasty and education; Truth and persuasion.
- **τῇ ἀληθείᾳ** — Truth and persuasion.
- **τῇ ἀφωνίᾳ** — Gorgias and the Gorgon.
- **τῇ παιδεραστίᾳ** — Pederasty and education.
- **τῇ φιλίᾳ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **τὴν** — Body and soul; Cause and explanation; Cutting, repair and the navel; Intelligence; Nature; Power and capacity; For the sake of and because of; Resource and Poverty; The tongue and the mind; Wish and willingness.
- **τὴν αἰτίαν** — Cause and explanation.
- **τὴν αὐτῆς ἀπορίαν** — Resource and Poverty.
- **τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἀνδρείαν** — Power and capacity.
- **τὴν Εὐριπίδου Μελανίππην** — The tongue and the mind.
- **τῆς** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Bite, madness, and initiation; Honour and ambition; Necessity; Resource and Poverty; Sight of the mind.

- **Τῆς** — Birth and begetting.
- **τῆς Ἀνάγκης βασιλείαν** — Necessity.
- **τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀκόλουθος** — Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common.
- **Τῆς γεννήσεως καὶ τοῦ τόκου ἐν τῷ καλῷ** — Birth and begetting.
- **τῆς διανοίας ὄψις** — Sight of the mind.
- **τῆς Μήτιδος** — Resource and Poverty.
- **τῆς τιμῆς τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν** — Honour and ambition.
- **τῆς φιλοσόφου μανίας** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **τι** — Making and poetry; More and less; Naming whole and part; Participation.
- **τι εἶδος** — Naming whole and part.
- **τίκτει** — Birth and begetting.
- **τίκτει τε καὶ γεννᾷ** — Birth and begetting.
- **τίκτειν** — Birth and begetting.
- **τίκτειν οὐκ εἴδωλα ἀρετῆς** — Birth and begetting.
- **τίκτω** — Birth and begetting.
- **τιμαὶ** — Honour and ambition.
- **τιμάω** — Honour and ambition.
- **τιμή** — Honour and ambition.
- **τιμῆς** — Honour and ambition.
- **τιμιώτερον** — More and less.
- **τιμιώτερος** — More and less.
- **τιμῶσιν** — Honour and ambition.
- **τινὰ** — Knowledge.
- **τίνα** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **τινὰ ἐπιστήμην μίαν** — Knowledge.
- **τίνα χρείαν ἔχει** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **τίνι** — Work and action.
- **τινὸς** — Love of something.

- **τινός** — Love of something.
- **τινος** — Love of something.
- **τις** — Love of something; Music, harmony and rhythm.
- **τὸ** — Always; Androgyne and the three kinds; The beautiful itself; Beauty at birth; Beauty and ugliness; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Daimon and mediation; Desire and lack; Endurance; For a mortal and so far as possible; Form and figure; The great sea of beauty; Love; Lover and beloved; Lover and beloved; Naming whole and part; Offshoot; Opposites and unlike objects; Order and disorder; Probability and necessity; Renewal and identity; Renewal and identity; Seeing and contemplating; Tally and matching halves; Temperance and self-command; Tenderness, softness and hardness; The good; The good; Wholeness and the half; Work and action.
- **Τὸ** — Right opinion.
- **τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτῷ εἶναι ἀεί** — Always.
- **τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ εἶναι** — Renewal and identity.
- **τὸ αὐτοῦ ἀποβλάστημα** — Offshoot.
- **τὸ αὐτοῦ ἕκαστος σύμβολον** — Tally and matching halves.
- **τὸ γένος** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **τὸ δὲ κακὸν ἀλλότριον** — The good.
- **τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἁρμόττον** — Beauty at birth.
- **τὸ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κάλλος** — Beauty and ugliness.
- **τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν ἐπιθυμεῖν οὗ ἐνδεές ἐστιν** — Desire and lack.
- **τὸ ἐπ’ εἴδει καλόν** — Form and figure.
- **τὸ ἔργον** — Work and action.

- **τὸ ἐρώμενον** — Lover and beloved.
- **τὸ ἐρῶν** — Lover and beloved.
- **τὸ ἥμισυ τὸ αὐτοῦ** — Wholeness and the half.
- **τὸ κόσμιον τοῦ σώματος** — Order and disorder.
- **τὸ κρατεῖν** — Temperance and self-command.
- **τὸ κύημα** — Birth and begetting.
- **τὸ μὲν ἀγαθὸν οἰκεῖον** — The good.
- **Τὸ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν** — Right opinion.
- **τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος** — The great sea of beauty.
- **τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ὄνομα** — Naming whole and part.
- **τοῖς** — Law and custom; More and less.
- **τοῖς νόμοις** — Law and custom.
- **τόκος** — Birth and begetting.
- **τόκος ἐν καλῷ** — Birth and begetting.
- **τόκου** — Birth and begetting.
- **τομή** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τομήν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τὸν** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening; Cutting, repair and the navel; Cutting, repair and the navel; Divine teachers and craft pupils; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Hiccup and sneeze; Knowing and learning; Lover and beloved; Nectar and garden; Order and disorder; Present and future possession.
- **τὸν Ἀπόλλω** — Divine teachers and craft pupils.
- **τὸν καλάποδα** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τὸν νοῦν προσέχειν** — Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening; Knowing and learning.
- **τὸν ὀμφαλὸν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τὸν ὀμφαλόν** — Cutting, repair and the navel.
- **τὸν πταρμὸν** — Hiccup and sneeze.
- **τὸν τοῦ Διὸς κῆπον** — Nectar and garden.

- **τόξον** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **τόξου** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **τόξου τε καὶ λύρας** — Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre.
- **τοῦ** — Birth and begetting; Bite, madness, and initiation; If and if indeed; End and purpose; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Happiness; Knowledge; Law and custom; Love; Naming whole and part; Nectar and garden; Nectar and garden; Not yet and at hand; Order and disorder; Probability and necessity; Renewal and identity; Right opinion; Right opinion; Seasons, blending and astronomy; Speech and account; The good; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Wholeness and the half; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ** — The good.
- **τοῦ ἐρίου** — Touch and transmitted wisdom.
- **τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν** — Happiness.
- **τοῦ ἔχεως** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **τοῦ μὴ ἑτοίμου** — Not yet and at hand.
- **τοῦ νέκταρος** — Nectar and garden.
- **τοῦ ὅλου** — Wholeness and the half.
- **τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον** — Right opinion.
- **τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει** — Flowers, bloom and fragrance.
- **τοὺς** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Virtue and becoming better.
- **τοὺς γίγαντας** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **τοῦτό** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **τούτων** — Making and poetry.
- **τραγῳδία** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **τραγῳδίᾳ** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **τραγῳδίαν** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **τραγῳδοποιὸν** — Comedy and tragedy.

- **τραγῳδοποιός** — Comedy and tragedy.
- **τρέφω** — True virtue and images.
- **τρία** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **τρία ἦν τὰ γένη** — Androgyne and the three kinds.
- **τρίβων** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **τρίβωνα** — Bare feet and cloaks.
- **τυγχάνον** — Right opinion.
- **τυγχάνω** — Right opinion.
- **τυραννίδας** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **τυραννίς** — Tyranny and friendship.
- **τῷ** — Achilles and Patroclus; Birth and begetting; Dionysus.
- **τῳ** — If and if indeed; Immortality.
- **τῷ Διονύσῳ** — Dionysus.
- **τῷ ἐραστῇ Πατρόκλῳ** — Achilles and Patroclus.
- **τῶν** — Agreement and premise; More, rather than and no less; Desire and lack; Honour and ambition; Intelligence; Love; Making and poetry; Seasons, blending and astronomy; Sirens; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **τῶν δημιουργῶν** — Making and poetry.
- **τῶν καλλίστων ἡ σοφία** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **τῶν Σειρήνων** — Sirens.
- **τῶν σωμάτων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ψυχῶν** — More, rather than and no less.
- **τῶν ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **ὑβρίζω** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **ὕβρισεν** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **ὑβριστής** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **Ὑβριστὴς** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **ὑβριστὴς** — Insolence and the mock trial.

- **ὑγιεινοῖς** — Medicine and healing.
- **ὑγιεινός** — Medicine and healing.
- **ὑγρός** — Opposites and unlike objects; Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ὑγρὸς** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ὑγρὸς τὸ εἶδος** — Tenderness, softness and hardness.
- **ὑγρῷ** — Opposites and unlike objects; Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ὑμνέω** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ὑμνοῖμεν** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ὕμνος** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ὕμνους** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ὑπεραποθανεῖν** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ὑπεραποθνήσκειν** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ὑπεραποθνήσκω** — Dying for another and dying after.
- **ὑπερηφανία** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **ὑπερηφανίας** — Insolence and the mock trial.
- **ὕπνον** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ὕπνος** — Sleep and dawn.
- **ὑπὸ** — Honour and ambition; Law and custom.
- **ὑπὸ τοῦ νόμου** — Law and custom.
- **φαίνηται** — Appearing.
- **φαίνω** — Appearing.
- **φαντάζομαι** — Appearing.
- **φανταsθήσεται** — Appearing.
- **φαρμακεύς** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **φαρμακεὺς** — Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.
- **φάσμα** — Orpheus and the phantom.
- **φέρει** — Shame and being ashamed.

- **φεύγειν** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **φεύγω** — Testing, pursuit and flight.
- **φημί** — Narrating and reporting.
- **φθονέω** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **φθονήσῃς** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **φθονῶν** — Jealousy and reconciliation.
- **φιάλη** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **φιάλης** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **φιλεραστής** — Pederasty and education.
- **φιλεραστὴς** — Pederasty and education.
- **φιλία** — Friendship, partnership and affinity; Peace and calm.
- **φιλία καὶ εἰρήνη** — Peace and calm.
- **φιλίᾳ** — Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **φιλίαν** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **φιλίαν βεβαιοτέραν** — Common nurture; Friendship, partnership and affinity.
- **φιλοσοφεῖ** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοσοφέω** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοσοφία** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοσοφίᾳ** — The great sea of beauty; Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλόσοφον** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλόσοφος** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοσόφου** — Bite, madness, and initiation.
- **φιλοσοφῶν** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοσοφῶν διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου** — Wisdom and philosophy.
- **φιλοτιμέομαι** — Honour and ambition.
- **φιλοτιμία** — Honour and ambition.
- **φιλοτιμίαν** — Honour and ambition.
- **φιλοτιμούμενοι** — Honour and ambition.

- **φλυαρία** — Pure and unmixed.
- **φλυαρίας** — Pure and unmixed.
- **φλυαρίας θνητῆς** — Pure and unmixed.
- **Φοίνικι** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **Φοίνικος** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **Φοῖνιξ** — Glaucon and Phoenix.
- **φρήν** — The tongue and the mind.
- **φρὴν** — The tongue and the mind.
- **φρονήσεως** — Between; Intelligence.
- **φρονήσεως ἐπιθυμητὴς** — Intelligence.
- **φρόνησίν** — Intelligence.
- **φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν** — Intelligence.
- **φρόνησις** — Intelligence.
- **φύσιν** — Nature.
- **φύσις** — Nature.
- **χαλεπὸν** — Ignorance and sufficiency.
- **χαλκέας** — Commonplace crafts.
- **χαλκείας** — Hephaestus and fusion.
- **χαλκείων** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **χαλκεύς** — Commonplace crafts.
- **χαρίζεσθαι** — Gratification and favour.
- **χαρίζεσθαι ἐρασταῖς** — Gratification and favour.
- **χαρίζομαι** — Gratification and favour.
- **χαριζόμενος** — Gratification and favour.
- **χάρις** — Gratification and favour.
- **χάρις ἔπεστι** — Gratification and favour.
- **χαρίσασθαι** — Gratification and favour.
- **Χαρμίδην** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **Χαρμίδης** — Charmides and Euthydemus.
- **χρεία** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **χρείαν** — Use and fellow-worker.
- **χρηστὸς** — Lover and beloved.

- **χρόνον** — Present and future possession.
- **χρύσεα** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **χρύσεα χαλκείων** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **χρύσεος** — Exchange and gold for bronze.
- **χρώμενον** — Well and rightly.
- **χρώμενον ὀρθῶς** — Well and rightly.
- **ψῆττα** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **ψῆτται** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **ψιλοῖς** — Hearing and enchantment; Speech and account.
- **ψιλοῖς λόγοις** — Hearing and enchantment; Speech and account.
- **ψιλός** — Hearing and enchantment.
- **ψυκτήρ** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **ψυκτῆρα** — Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.
- **ψυχαῖς** — Beauty and ugliness; Body and soul.
- **ψυχή** — Body and soul.
- **ψυχήν** — Body and soul.
- **ψυχρὸν** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ψυχρὸν θερμῷ** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ψυχρός** — Opposites and unlike objects.
- **ψυχῶν** — More, rather than and no less.
- **ᾧ̃** — Diotima.
- **ᾧ̃ σοφωτάτη Διοτίμα** — Diotima.
- **ὠδῖνος** — Beauty at birth.
- **ὠδίς** — Beauty at birth.
- **ᾧ̣** — Seeing and contemplating.
- **ᾠὰ** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **ᾠόν** — Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish.
- **ὡμολογημένων** — Agreement and premise.
- **ὡμολόγηται** — Agreement and premise.
- **ὥρα** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.

- **ὡρῶν** — Seasons, blending and astronomy.
- **ὡς** — As they think; Encomium, praise and hymn; For a mortal and so far as possible; Immortality; Probability and necessity; So to speak.
- **ὡς ἐγκώμιον** — Encomium, praise and hymn.
- **ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν** — So to speak.
- **ὡς θνητῷ** — For a mortal and so far as possible; Immortality.
- **ὡς οἴονται** — As they think.
- **ὡς τὸ εἰκός γε** — Probability and necessity.
- **ὥσπερ** — Dreamlike wisdom.
- **ὥσπερ ὄναρ** — Dreamlike wisdom.
- **Ὦτος** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.
- **Ὦτου** — Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants.

Thematic index

Themes overlap. The links include disagreements and changes of use rather than asserting that all associated words mean the same thing.

Age

Sight of the mind.

Appearance

Wreaths and ribbons.

Argument and language

Agreement and premise; All and every; Always; Appearing; As they think; Beauty and ugliness; Between; Cause and explanation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; For a mortal and so far as possible; Form and figure; Hush and good omen; If and if indeed; Love; Love of something; Making and poetry; More and less; Naming whole and part; Nature; Not and neither; Not yet and at hand; Only and alone; Power and capacity; Probability and necessity; Question and answer; Refutation and examination; Right opinion; Rightly and well; Seeking and pursuing; Truth and persuasion; Use and fellow-worker; Wish and willingness; Work and action.

Argument and qualification

At least and argumentative focus; Deception and intention; Evidence and testimony; For the sake of and because of; More, rather than and no less; Not yet and the stage of an argument; Only and not every; So to speak; The tongue and the mind; Well and rightly.

Arts and production

Making and poetry.

Attention

Attention and standing still.

Beauty

Ascent; Beauty and ugliness; Beauty at birth; Exchange and gold for bronze; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Initiation and fulfilment; Kindred beauties; Knowledge; Participation; Pure and unmixed; Seeing and contemplating; Tenderness, softness and hardness; The beautiful itself; The great sea of beauty; True virtue and images.

Being and participation

Participation; Pure and unmixed; The beautiful itself.

Body

Bare feet and cloaks; Corybantic response; Endurance.

Body and soul

Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Renewal and identity.

Chance

Godsend.

Companionship

Companionship and shared presence; Jealousy and reconciliation; Pipe-girl and pipes.

Comparison

Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Outlandishness.

Compulsion

Drinking and sobriety.

Courage

Courage and composure.

Craft

Comedy and tragedy; Commonplace crafts.

Craft and nature

Asclepius; Cutting, repair and the navel; Divination, piety and right; Divine teachers and craft pupils; Gratification and favour; Hephaestus and fusion; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Hiccup and sneeze; Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Not yet and the stage of an argument; Opposites and unlike objects; Order and disorder; Seasons, blending and astronomy; Surfeit and emptying; Urania and Polyhymnia.

Divine and mortal

Between; Daimon and mediation; Hush and good omen; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Power and capacity; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist.

Drama

Dionysus.

Drinking

Drinking and sobriety; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.

Education

Ascent; Attention and strengthening; Body and soul; Care of oneself and neglect; Common nurture; Companionship and shared presence; Diotima; End and purpose; Exchange and gold for bronze; Hearing and enchantment; Ignorance and sufficiency; Initiation and fulfilment; Intelligence; Kindred beauties; Knowing and learning; Knowledge; Seeing and contemplating; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Wisdom and philosophy.

Encounter

Meeting and encounter.

Endurance

Endurance.

Erotic roles

Achilles and Patroclus; Androgyne and the three kinds; Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Charmides and Euthydemus; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Gratification and favour; Lover and beloved; More, rather than and no less; Pederasty and education; Tally and matching halves; Testing, pursuit and flight; Voluntary slavery and service; Wholeness and the half.

Ethics

Beauty and ugliness; Happiness; Intelligence; The good; True virtue and images.

Ethics and education

Alcestis; Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Ares held by Love; Deception and intention; Dying for another and dying after; For the sake of and because of; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Gratification and favour; Honour and ambition; Justice, agreement and force; Law and custom; Lover and beloved; Medicine and healing; Music, harmony and rhythm; Only and not every; Order and disorder; Orpheus and the phantom; Pederasty and education; Play and earnestness; Shame and being ashamed; Testing, pursuit and flight; Tyranny and friendship; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Well and rightly.

Evidence

Witnesses and oaths.

Exchange

Exchange and gold for bronze.

Feeling and motivation

Shame and being ashamed; Surfeit and emptying; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Testing, pursuit and flight.

Generation

Approach and recoil; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture; Immortality; Making and poetry; Offshoot; True virtue and images; Unwed.

Gods

Dionysus.

Gods and worship

Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Asclepius; Divination, piety and right; Divine teachers and craft pupils; Encomium, praise and hymn; Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Necessity; Urania and Polyhymnia.

Good and happiness

Wholeness and the half.

Guidance

Following and guidance.

Hearing

Corybantic response; Hearing and enchantment.

Hospitality

Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord.

Images

Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Bite, madness, and initiation; Dreamlike wisdom; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Sirens; Touch and transmitted wisdom.

Images and myth

Achilles and Patroclus; Acusilaus; Alcestis; Androgyne and the three kinds; Arcadians and being broken apart; Ares held by Love; Ate and tender feet; Cicadas and birth into earth; Cutting, repair and the navel; Dying for another and dying after; Ephialtes, Otus and the Giants; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Hades and the Isles of the Blessed; Hephaestus and fusion; Hesiod;

Leader, pilot and companion; Necessity; Orpheus and the phantom; Parmenides; Peace and calm; Roundness and cartwheels; Sorb-apples, eggs and flatfish; Tally and matching halves; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Wholeness and the half.

Images and objects

Approach and recoil; Hunting and devices; Nectar and garden; Offshoot; The great sea of beauty.

Immortality and generation

Cicadas and birth into earth; Dying for another and dying after; Hades and the Isles of the Blessed; Honour and ambition.

Initiation

Bite, madness, and initiation.

Inquiry

Attention and standing still; Endurance; Letting be and not letting go.

Insolence

Insolence and the mock trial.

Irony

Exchange and gold for bronze; Irony, play, and earnestness.

Jealousy

Jealousy and reconciliation.

Knowledge

Appearing; Attention and strengthening; Between; Dreamlike wisdom; Ignorance and sufficiency; Intelligence; Knowing and learning; Knowledge; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Resource and Poverty; Right opinion; Seeing and contemplating; Sight of the mind; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist; Wisdom and philosophy.

Knowledge and inquiry

Evidence and testimony; Lover and beloved; Sophists and Prodicus; Speech and account; Virtue and becoming better.

Laughter

Laughter and frankness.

Love

Jealousy and reconciliation.

Love and desire

Ascent; Birth and begetting; Daimon and mediation; Desire and lack; End and purpose; Happiness; Hunting and devices; Love; Love of something; Present and future possession; Resource and Poverty; The good; Wisdom and philosophy.

Madness

Bite, madness, and initiation.

Material life

Salt, contribution and shared praise.

Memory

Memory and rehearsal.

Mortality

Memory and rehearsal.

Music

Hearing and enchantment; Marsyas and Olympus; Pipe-girl and pipes.

Mythic figures

Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Marsyas and Olympus; Sirens.

Narrative

Alcibiades; Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Glaucon and Phoenix; Laughter and frankness; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Plotting and ambush; Sleep and dawn; Suddenly; Wreaths and ribbons.

Objects

Bare feet and cloaks; Commonplace crafts; Pipe-girl and pipes; Porch and threshold; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl; Wreaths and ribbons.

Order and proportion

Opposites and unlike objects; Order and disorder; Peace and calm; Seasons, blending and astronomy.

Persons

Alcibiades; Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Charmides and Euthydemus; Glaucon and Phoenix; Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Socrates.

Persons and figures

Beauty at birth; Diotima; Nectar and garden; Resource and Poverty.

Philosophy

Bite, madness, and initiation.

Place

Lyceum; Porch and threshold; Potidaea and Delium.

Plots

Plotting and ambush.

Poetry

Comedy and tragedy.

Politics

Care of oneself and neglect.

Poverty

Bare feet and cloaks.

Ritual

Corybantic response; Dionysus; Sun and prayer.

Self-care

Care of oneself and neglect.

Self-command

Temperance and self-command.

Sleep

Sleep and dawn.

Small words

Following and guidance; Godsend; Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord; Letting be and not letting go; Meeting and encounter; Plotting and ambush; Suddenly; Witnesses and oaths.

Society and politics

Arcadians and being broken apart; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Honour and ambition; Justice, agreement and force; Law and custom; Tyranny and friendship; Voluntary slavery and service.

Socratic character

Attention and standing still; Bare feet and cloaks; Care of oneself and neglect; Courage and composure; Drinking

and sobriety; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lyceum; Outlandishness; Socrates; Temperance and self-command.

Speech

Commonplace crafts; Hearing and enchantment; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Narrating and reporting; Witnesses and oaths.

Speech and interpretation

Acusilaus; Ate and tender feet; Encomium, praise and hymn; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Heraclitus, the bow and the lyre; Hesiod; Hiccup and sneeze; Laughable and ridiculous; Leader, pilot and companion; Music, harmony and rhythm; Parmenides; Play and earnestness; Salt, contribution and shared praise; Sophists and Prodicus; Speech and account; The tongue and the mind.

Text and translation

Unwed.

Time

Sleep and dawn; Suddenly; Sun and prayer.

Time and immortality

For a mortal and so far as possible; Immortality; Memory and practice; Not yet and at hand; Participation; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; The beautiful itself.

Touch

Touch and transmitted wisdom.

Virtue

Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Temperance and self-command.

Vision

Sight of the mind.

War

Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Courage and composure; Potidaea and Delium.

Wonder

Outlandishness.

Passage index

This directory follows the supplied edition's seventy-two Greek and English units, corresponding to Burnet's pages. Each entry leads to explanations citing at least one section in that unit. These are selected lexical attestations and discussions, not an occurrence concordance. Stephanus references locate Plato's text; Burnet page numbers identify the supplied edition's source divisions.

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Burnet page 1.

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guidance; Insolence and the mock trial; Invited, uninvited, and of one's own accord; Meeting and encounter; Narrating and reporting; Socrates.

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Burnet page 4.

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198d–199c

Burnet page 37.

Agreement and premise; Appearing; Beauty and ugliness; Encomium, praise and hymn; Evidence and testimony; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Laughable and ridiculous; Love; Love of something; Refutation and examination; Rightly and well; Socrates; Speech and account; The tongue and the mind; Truth and persuasion; Work and action.

199c–200b

Burnet page 38.

Agreement and premise; Beauty and ugliness; Desire and lack; Encomium, praise and hymn; Evidence and testimony; Gorgias and the Gorgon; Love; Love of something; Memory and rehearsal; Present and future possession; Probability and necessity; Refutation and examination; Rightly and well; Socrates; Speech and account; Wish and willingness; Work and action.

200b–200e

Burnet page 39.

Agreement and premise; Beauty and ugliness; Desire and lack; Evidence and testimony; Love; Memory and rehearsal; Not yet and at hand; Present and future possession; Probability and necessity; Refutation and

examination; Renewal and identity; Socrates; Wish and willingness.

200e–201c

Burnet page 40.

Agreement and premise; Beauty and ugliness; Desire and lack; Evidence and testimony; If and if indeed; Ignorance and sufficiency; Love; Memory and rehearsal; Not yet and at hand; Present and future possession; Probability and necessity; Refutation and examination; Rightly and well; Socrates; The good; Truth and persuasion; Wish and willingness.

201c–202a

Burnet page 41.

Agreement and premise; Beauty and ugliness; Between; Desire and lack; Diotima; Evidence and testimony; Hush and good omen; If and if indeed; Ignorance and sufficiency; Intelligence; Knowledge; Love; Not and neither; Power and capacity; Refutation and examination; Right opinion; Rightly and well; Socrates; The good; Truth and persuasion; Work and action.

202a–202d

Burnet page 42.

All and every; Beauty and ugliness; Between; Daimon and mediation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Divination, piety and right; Happiness; Hush and good omen; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Intelligence; Knowledge; Not and neither; Refutation and examination; Right opinion; Socrates.

202d–203a

Burnet page 43.

Between; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Diotima; Divination, piety and right; Happiness; Immortality; Love of something; Power and capacity; Socrates.

203a–203e

Burnet page 44.

Always; Aphrodite, Heavenly and Common; Bare feet and cloaks; Between; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Divination, piety and right; Hunting and devices; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Intelligence; Love; Love of something; Nature; Nectar and garden; Plotting and ambush; Power and capacity; Resource and Poverty; Socrates; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist; Tenderness, softness and hardness; Wisdom and philosophy.

203e–204d

Burnet page 45.

Always; Appearing; As they think; Between; Cause and explanation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Form and figure; Hunting and devices; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Love; Lover and beloved; Nature; Present and future possession; Question and answer; Resource and Poverty; Socrates; Tenderness, softness and hardness; The good; Use and fellow-worker; Wisdom and philosophy.

204d–205b

Burnet page 46.

All and every; Cause and explanation; End and purpose; Form and figure; Happiness; Love; Making and poetry; Naming whole and part; Present and future possession; Question and answer; Resource and Poverty; Socrates; The good; Use and fellow-worker; Wish and willingness.

205b–205e

Burnet page 47.

All and every; As they think; Cause and explanation; Desire and lack; Form and figure; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Happiness; Love; Making and poetry; Naming whole and part; Present and future possession; Socrates; Speech and account; Tally and matching halves; Testing, pursuit and flight; The good; Wholeness and the half; Wish and willingness.

205e–206c

Burnet page 48.

All and every; Always; As they think; Beauty and ugliness; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Desire and lack; Diotima; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Knowing and learning; Love; Love of something; Nature; Present and future possession; Seeking and pursuing; Socrates; Speech and account; Tally and matching halves; Testing, pursuit and flight; The good; Wholeness and the half; Wish and willingness; Work and action.

206c–207a

Burnet page 49.

Agreement and premise; All and every; Approach and recoil; Beauty and ugliness; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Cause and explanation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Dying for another and dying after; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; For a mortal and so far as possible; If and if indeed; Immortality; Knowing and learning; Love; Nature; Socrates; The good; Work and action.

207a–207e

Burnet page 50.

Agreement and premise; Always; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Cause and explanation; Desire and lack; Diotima; Dying for another and dying after; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; For a mortal and so far as possible; If and if indeed; Ignorance and sufficiency; Immortality; Knowing and learning; Knowledge; Love; Memory and practice; Nature; Only and alone; Outlandishness; Power and capacity; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; Right opinion; Seeking and pursuing; Socrates; The good.

207e–208d

Burnet page 51.

Achilles and Patroclus; Alcestis; Always; Body and soul; Cause and explanation; Diotima; Dying for another and dying after; Earnestness and exertion; For a mortal and so far as possible; Honour and ambition; Hunting and devices; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Knowledge; Love; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; Nature; Offshoot; Only and alone;

Outlandishness; Participation; Present and future possession; Renewal and identity; Right opinion; Socrates; Sophists and Prodicus; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist; Virtue and becoming better.

208d–209c

Burnet page 52.

Achilles and Patroclus; Alcestis; All and every; As they think; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture; Companionship and shared presence; Dying for another and dying after; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Happiness; Hesiod; Honour and ambition; Immortality; Intelligence; Justice, agreement and force; Love; Making and poetry; Meeting and encounter; Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; More and less; More, rather than and no less; Offshoot; Pederasty and education; Renewal and identity; Resource and Poverty; Seeking and pursuing; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; The good; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Unwed; Virtue and becoming better.

209c–210b

Burnet page 53.

Ascent; Beauty and ugliness; Beauty at birth; Birth and begetting; Bite, madness, and initiation; Body and soul; Care of oneself and neglect; Common nurture; Companionship and shared presence; Diotima; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Following and guidance; Form and figure; Friendship, partnership and affinity; Hesiod; Honour and ambition; If and if indeed; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Kindred beauties; Knowing and learning; Law and custom; Love; Making and poetry;

Memory and practice; Memory and rehearsal; More and less; Offshoot; Pederasty and education; Power and capacity; Renewal and identity; Rightly and well; Seeing and contemplating; Seeking and pursuing; So to speak; Socrates; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better; Well and rightly.

210b–211a

Burnet page 54.

Always; Appearing; Ascent; Attention and standing still; Attention and strengthening; Beauty and ugliness; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Care of oneself and neglect; Earnestness and exertion; End and purpose; Flowers, bloom and fragrance; Form and figure; Initiation and fulfilment; Kindred beauties; Knowing and learning; Knowledge; Law and custom; Love; More and less; Nature; Not and neither; Participation; Pure and unmixed; Renewal and identity; Rightly and well; Seeing and contemplating; Seeking and pursuing; Socrates; Suddenly; The beautiful itself; The great sea of beauty; True virtue and images; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Well and rightly; Wisdom and philosophy.

211a–211e

Burnet page 55.

All and every; Always; Appearing; Ascent; Attention and strengthening; Beauty and ugliness; Body and soul; Diotima; End and purpose; Form and figure; Happiness; If and if indeed; Initiation and fulfilment; Knowing and learning; Knowledge; Love; More and less; Nature; Not and neither; Participation; Pure and unmixed; Renewal and identity; Rightly and well; Seeing and contemplating;

Socrates; The beautiful itself; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images.

211e–212d

Burnet page 56.

Alcibiades; Ascent; Beauty and ugliness; Birth and begetting; Body and soul; Common nurture; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Diotima; Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Happiness; Hearing and enchantment; Honour and ambition; If and if indeed; Immortality; Initiation and fulfilment; Knowing and learning; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Love; Naming whole and part; Only and alone; Pipe-girl and pipes; Porch and threshold; Power and capacity; Present and future possession; Pure and unmixed; Seeing and contemplating; Socrates; Sorcerer, poisoner and sophist; Suddenly; The beautiful itself; Touch and transmitted wisdom; True virtue and images; Truth and persuasion; Use and fellow-worker; Virtue and becoming better; Wholeness and the half.

212d–213b

Burnet page 57.

Alcibiades; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Hearing and enchantment; Laughter and frankness; Pipe-girl and pipes; Plotting and ambush; Porch and threshold; Socrates; Wreaths and ribbons.

213b–213e

Burnet page 58.

Alcibiades; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Jealousy and reconciliation; Laughter and frankness; Plotting and

ambush; Socrates; Suddenly; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl; Wreaths and ribbons.

213e–214d

Burnet page 59.

Alcibiades; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Hush and good omen; Jealousy and reconciliation; Laughter and frankness; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl; Wreaths and ribbons.

214d–215b

Burnet page 60.

Alcibiades; Dionysus; Encomium, praise and hymn; Hearing and enchantment; Hush and good omen; Insolence and the mock trial; Laughable and ridiculous; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Marsyas and Olympus; Memory and rehearsal; Music, harmony and rhythm; Outlandishness; Pipe-girl and pipes; Socrates; True virtue and images; Witnesses and oaths.

215b–216a

Burnet page 61.

Alcibiades; Bite, madness, and initiation; Care of oneself and neglect; Corybantic response; Desire and lack; Dionysus; Endurance; Hearing and enchantment; Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Insolence and the mock trial; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Marsyas and Olympus; Music, harmony and rhythm; Pipe-girl and pipes; Shame and being ashamed; Sirens; Socrates; Speech and account; Testing, pursuit and flight; True virtue and images; Witnesses and oaths.

216a–216e

Burnet page 62.

Alcibiades; Bite, madness, and initiation; Care of oneself and neglect; Corybantic response; Desire and lack; Dionysus; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Hearing and enchantment; Honour and ambition; Irony, play, and earnestness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Marsyas and Olympus; Music, harmony and rhythm; Play and earnestness; Shame and being ashamed; Sirens; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Testing, pursuit and flight; Voluntary slavery and service.

216e–217d

Burnet page 63.

Alcibiades; Attention and standing still; Care of oneself and neglect; Companionship and shared presence; Dionysus; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Godsend; Honour and ambition; Irony, play, and earnestness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lover and beloved; Play and earnestness; Plotting and ambush; Socrates; Temperance and self-command.

217d–218c

Burnet page 64.

Alcibiades; Bite, madness, and initiation; Companionship and shared presence; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Exchange and gold for bronze; Godsend; Gratification and favour; Hearing and enchantment; Initiation and fulfilment; Lover and beloved; Pederasty and education; Plotting and ambush; Shame and being ashamed; Sleep and dawn; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Wisdom and philosophy.

218c–219b

Burnet page 65.

Alcibiades; Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Bare feet and cloaks; Bite, madness, and initiation; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Exchange and gold for bronze; Godsend; Gratification and favour; Insolence and the mock trial; Irony, play, and earnestness; Lover and beloved; Pederasty and education; Plotting and ambush; Right opinion; Seeing and contemplating; Shame and being ashamed; Sight of the mind; Sleep and dawn; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service.

219b–219e

Burnet page 66.

Alcibiades; Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Bare feet and cloaks; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Daimon and mediation; Endurance; Exchange and gold for bronze; Godsend; Gratification and favour; Insolence and the mock trial; Intelligence; Irony, play, and earnestness; Meeting and encounter; Pederasty and education; Potidaea and Delium; Resource and Poverty; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Testing, pursuit and flight; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Virtue and becoming better; Voluntary slavery and service; Witnesses and oaths.

220a–220d

Burnet page 67.

Alcibiades; Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Attention and standing still; Bare feet and cloaks; Courage and composure; Drinking and sobriety; Endurance; Letting be

and not letting go; Potidaea and Delium; Socrates; Sun and prayer; Temperance and self-command.

220d–221c

Burnet page 68.

Alcibiades; Arrows, capture, and Ajax; Attention and standing still; Companionship and shared presence; Courage and composure; Endurance; Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Letting be and not letting go; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Outlandishness; Potidaea and Delium; Seeing and contemplating; Socrates; Sun and prayer; Temperance and self-command; Touch and transmitted wisdom; Witnesses and oaths.

221c–222b

Burnet page 69.

Alcibiades; Charmides and Euthydemus; Commonplace crafts; Courage and composure; Heroic and oratorical counterparts; Insolence and the mock trial; Jealousy and reconciliation; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lover and beloved; Outlandishness; Potidaea and Delium; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; True virtue and images.

222b–222e

Burnet page 70.

Alcibiades; Charmides and Euthydemus; Comedy and tragedy; Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Irony, play, and earnestness; Jealousy and reconciliation; Laughter and frankness; Likenesses, sileni, and statues; Lover and beloved; Plotting and ambush; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Wreaths and ribbons.

222e–223d

Burnet page 71.

Alcibiades; Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Daimon and mediation; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Encomium, praise and hymn; Endurance; Following and guidance; Jealousy and reconciliation; Justice, agreement and force; Laughter and frankness; Lyceum; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Order and disorder; Plotting and ambush; Porch and threshold; Sleep and dawn; Socrates; Suddenly; Temperance and self-command; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl; Wreaths and ribbons.

223d

Burnet page 72.

Apollodorus and Aristodemus; Comedy and tragedy; Companionship and shared presence; Dionysus; Drinking and sobriety; Endurance; Following and guidance; Lyceum; Memory and rehearsal; Narrating and reporting; Sleep and dawn; Socrates; Temperance and self-command; Wine-cooler and drinking bowl.