Stobaeus Lexicon

A Reader's Companion
to Volume Two

166 entries with Greek and English
Passage references and explanatory notes

Diotimos Editions

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About these entries

This separate Stobaeus Lexicon accompanies the completed Greek-English Volume Two. Its 166 articles explain significant Greek words and related ideas in their local settings. It supplements the 610-article Volume One Lexicon and keeps that earlier companion's page references distinct.

Articles are grouped by subject and arranged alphabetically within each group. The English index also gives one alphabetical route through the whole book. The Greek index includes dictionary headwords and the inflected forms actually quoted in the articles; an attested form is marked as such.

An At a Glance section offers a short account of the word, its use, a translation choice and a passage to read. Meaning explains the lexical range. Use in the book follows the argument and the speaking voice. Places to read gives an annotated selection. Translation in this edition explains the English wording. Attested Greek forms records direct witnesses, and See also connects related articles.

The 434 annotated references are selected reading routes, not an exhaustive concordance. The 260 Greek witness quotations identify actual forms in the reviewed text. Their headings retain those inflections rather than pretending that every dictionary form occurs unchanged. An English quotation comes from the completed Volume Two translation.

Text voices and references

Stobaeus collects different speakers and schools. A Stoic definition, a Peripatetic exposition, a Platonic exchange and a dramatic fragment must be read in their own settings. Shared vocabulary does not make their claims identical or turn every quotation into the compiler's own teaching.

The Greek base is Curt Wachsmuth, Ioannis Stobaei Anthologii libri duo priores, volumen II (Berlin: Weidmann, 1884). The articles use the reviewed Greek-English corpus and its retained source-image checks. This companion is not a new complete collation of the printed scan. Missing chapter bodies remain missing; their surviving headings do not establish terminology in running text.

II.7.8.1 means Book II, chapter 7, excerpt 8, modern comparison subdivision 1. Final subdivisions divide long excerpts for bilingual layout; they do not create new ancient excerpts. English edition p. refers to the

English page of the completed 1,029-page bilingual Volume Two PDF. Wachsmuth references give the original printed pages instead.

References labeled Volume One Lexicon point to that separate 564-page PDF. Unqualified Lexicon PDF page numbers in this companion's indexes refer to the present book. Greek headwords normally use dictionary forms; lexical families are explained without assuming that their nouns, verbs and adjectives are interchangeable.

Supplied and rejected wording, uncertain attributions and differences between familiar parallels and the local anthology text retain their qualifications. The articles do not infer a whole philosophical system from a single occurrence, and they do not invent word frequencies or later reception where those have not been established.

Divine things and interpretation

Divine inspiration

Divine inspiration · Volume Two

ἔνθεος; ἐνθουσιάζω · entheos; enthousiazō — divinely inspired; possessed by a god; be inspired[1]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective and verb describe inspiration or possession attributed to a divine source. They make a stronger claim than ordinary excitement or enthusiasm.

In Stobaeus. The Ion compares inspired people to a suspended chain, explaining poetic production through dependence on the Muse rather than through an independently mastered art.

In this edition. Preserve the speaker's attribution and the source's marked supplement. Do not treat every irrational condition as divine knowledge or every poetic statement as a doctrine.

A place to read. II.5.3.2 Read the chain image and the parallel between epic and lyric poets, keeping the supplied comparison with Corybantic dancing visibly distinct in the text.

Meaning

Entheos describes someone divinely inspired or possessed; enthousiazō is a related verb. The terms mark an attributed divine source of speech rather than ordinary enthusiasm or a speaker's confident self-presentation.

Use in the book

In the Ion excerpts, the Muse makes people inspired and a further chain depends on them, like iron rings that receive their attracting power from a lodestone. Epic and lyric poets are said to produce their finest works through inspiration and possession rather than acquired art. The conclusion describes the god as speaking through poets whose understanding is absent. The Phaedrus selection likewise contrasts arriving at poetry with and without the Muses' madness. These images explain an argument about the source of

[1] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 35–37. The positive evidence here consists of the adjective and verb family. It should not be cited as an exact occurrence of the different abstract noun enthousiasmos.

poetic performance; they do not make every irrational state an instance of divine knowledge.

The chain image distributes dependence across several people: inspiration reaches others through those already inspired. The comparison with lyric composition adds rhythm and melody, but these do not make the poet an independent possessor of explanatory knowledge. The speaker instead describes a state in which the poet produces what he cannot account for through ordinary understanding. The honey and milk imagery belongs to that account of possession. The argument concerns the source and limits of poetic achievement, not a classification of every kind of mental disturbance.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.5.3.2. The Muse initiates a chain of inspired speakers. (English edition p. 109.)

II.5.3.4. The god is represented as speaking through the poets. (English edition p. 111.)

II.5.2. Poetic accomplishment is contrasted with reliance on skill alone. (English edition p. 107.)

Translation in this edition

Divinely inspired or possessed preserves the stronger ancient claim. Enthusiastic would usually weaken it to an ordinary feeling.

Attested Greek forms

ἐνθέους

Attested. II.5.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 36; English edition p. 109.

ἡ Μοῦσα ἐνθέους μὲν ποιεῖ αὐτή

ἐνθουσιαζόντων

Attested. II.5.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 36; English edition p. 109.

ἄλλος ἐνθουσιαζόντων ὁρμαθὸς ἐξαρτᾶται

See also

Madness (Volume One Lexicon, p. 257); Making and poetry; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43); Music.

God

God · Volume Two

θεός; θεῖος · theos; theios — god; a god; the gods; divine[2]

At a Glance

The word. The noun names a god or gods; the adjective means divine. Singular and plural occurrences belong to distinct voices whose claims require their own settings.

In Stobaeus. The selected passages connect divinity with reverence, limits of expression and beneficent action, without forming one continuous theological argument or an agreed doctrine.

In this edition. Preserve local number and qualifications. English capitalization alone does not establish one historical theology, and an adjective may require divine rather than God.

A place to read. II.1.5a Read the command to acknowledge and revere together with its discouragement of inquiry, retaining the fragment's speaker and its limited surviving argument.

Meaning

Theos names a god; theios means divine or pertaining to a god. Singular and plural forms occur within distinct voices whose claims should be read in their own settings.

Use in the book

A saying under Philemon's name commands reverence while discouraging investigation. The Hermetic address to Tat instead distinguishes difficult mental conception from impossible bodily expression and sensory apprehension. Hierocles gives divine goodness an ethical role: gods cause good and useful things so far as depends on them, while humans can refuse their benefactions and choose evils. These claims concern different questions, from worship and inquiry to responsibility. Their shared vocabulary does not make them parts of one continuous theological argument.

The short verse gives two positive imperatives before its prohibition. Reverence is urged, while inquiry is discouraged on the ground that it yields

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[2] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 4, 9, 181. The anthology's attributions and differing voices remain essential. English capitalization alone does not identify one historical theology or settle the relation among the passages.

nothing beyond itself. This is a particular judgment about inquiry's benefit, not a reason to assign the same prohibition to every excerpt in the chapter. Other speakers distinguish difficult conception from impossible bodily expression, or consider how humans receive divine benefits. The anthology preserves these different approaches beside one another; the shared noun does not erase these differences in purpose and emphasis.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.5a. Reverence is commanded without investigation. (English edition p. 11.)

II.1.26. Mental conception is distinguished from bodily expression. (English edition p. 25.)

II.9.7.1. Divine benefaction is distinguished from human refusal and vice. (English edition p. 671.)

Translation in this edition

Preserve the local singular or plural and the force of qualifications such as so far as depends on them. Divine is often needed for the adjective.

Attested Greek forms

Θεὸν

Attested. II.1.5a; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 4; English edition p. 11.

Θεὸν νόμιζε καὶ σέβου, ζήτει δὲ μή

θείου

Attested. II.1.26; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 9; English edition p. 25.

ὅσον τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου

See also

Piety (Volume One Lexicon, p. 317); Intellection; Good; Demiurge and craftsman.

Intellection

Intellection · Volume Two

νόησις; νοέω · noēsis; noeō — intellection; thought; conceiving; mental grasp[3]

At a Glance

The word. Intellection is thinking or intellectual apprehension; the related verb means conceiving. The passages distinguish its limited reach from bodily speech and sensory communication.

In Stobaeus. Plutarch permits a dim philosophical contact with divinity, while the Hermetic address distinguishes difficult conception of God from impossible bodily expression and apprehension.

In this edition. Thought, conceive or intellection should follow the construction. Preserve exceptions and limits rather than reducing different passages to one claim of absolute unknowability.

A place to read. II.1.13 Read the limitation imposed by bodies and passions together with its exception for thought through philosophy, whose dim-dream image preserves a qualified contact.

Meaning

Noēsis names thinking or intellectual apprehension; noeō is the related verb. The excerpts qualify what such apprehension can reach and distinguish it from what bodily speech can communicate.

Use in the book

Plutarch allows embodied souls only a limited contact with the divine: touching something like a dim dream in thought through philosophy. The exception matters, since the passage does not deny every kind of contact. The Hermetic address to Tat makes a different contrast. Conceiving God is difficult, expressing him impossible; the conclusion repeats that the speaker conceives what cannot be uttered. Mental grasp and sensory or bodily signification therefore cannot simply be identified. These two witnesses explore limitations in different ways and should not be flattened into one identical formula about unknowability.

The exception governs the strength of the negative claim. Souls enclosed in bodies and passions are denied participation, but the sentence immediately

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[3] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 5, 9. The decisive negative in the Hermetic comparison of mortal and divine is supplied in the edition; the lexical witnesses noēsei and noēsai are not supplied.

allows a dim contact through philosophical thought. Removing that exception would turn a qualified limit into an absolute barrier. The dream comparison also qualifies what is allowed: it does not describe full possession or clear sensory inspection. This makes the passage useful beside the Hermetic distinction between conception and expression, while leaving intact the different terms and purposes of the two speakers.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.13. Thought through philosophy permits a limited, dreamlike divine contact. (English edition p. 17.)

II.1.26. Conceiving is distinguished from bodily expression and sensory apprehension. (English edition p. 25.)

Translation in this edition

Thought is suitable for the noun in Plutarch; conceive makes the Hermetic contrast clear. Intellection provides a cross-volume headword without requiring the same English term in every sentence.

Attested Greek forms

νοήσει

Attested. II.1.13; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 5; English edition p. 17.

θιγεῖν νοήσει διὰ φιλοσοφίας

νοῆσαι

Attested. II.1.26; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 9; English edition p. 25.

Θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπόν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον.

See also

Incorporeal (Volume One Lexicon, p. 216); Thought; God; Interpretation (Volume One Lexicon, p. 230).

Likely account

Likely account · Volume Two

εἰκώς; εἰκὼς μῦθος · eikōs; eikōs muthos — likely; plausible; likely account or story[4]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective marks an account as likely or plausible. In the Timaeus selection it qualifies explanations of gods and the universe offered and judged by human beings.

In Stobaeus. Timaeus allows limits to exactness and consistency, yet asks for accounts no less likely than alternatives, joining explanatory adequacy with awareness of human limitation.

In this edition. Likely account preserves the explanatory force; likely story preserves the final noun. Myth should not imply mere falsehood or remove the stated qualification and comparison.

A place to read. II.1.19 Read the inability to give completely exact accounts together with the comparison to other accounts and the reminder that speaker and judges share human nature.

Meaning

Eikōs qualifies something as likely or plausible. In the Timaeus selection it marks the standing of accounts offered by human speakers about gods and the universe's coming into being.

Use in the book

Timaeus asks Socrates not to be surprised if such accounts cannot be made wholly consistent and exact in every respect. Accounts no less likely than others should be accepted with attention to the shared human nature of speaker and judges. The final expression is a likely muthos, a story or account. The qualification neither pretends to complete certainty nor licenses arbitrary invention: comparative adequacy still matters. The reader must retain both the proposed explanation and the limit placed on its precision.

The passage does not ask the audience to suspend judgment indiscriminately. It first acknowledges the difficulty of complete consistency and exactness, then introduces a comparative standard: the proposed

[4] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 7. The excerpt prints inflected eikotas and eikota rather than the headword's nominative eikōs. It follows the anthology's wording, not a replacement assembled from a fuller Timaeus text.

accounts should be no less likely than others. Human nature limits both the person explaining and those assessing the explanation. Their shared condition makes qualified acceptance appropriate without converting plausibility into certainty. The closing restriction on seeking beyond the likely story belongs to this subject and argument; it should not erase the passage's own concern for relative adequacy.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.19. The account's likely status is related to the human nature of speaker and judges. (English edition p. 19.)

Translation in this edition

Likely account keeps the explanatory force of the passage; likely story preserves its final noun. Myth is possible if it does not imply a merely false tale or erase the stated qualification.

Attested Greek forms

εἰκότα

Attested. II.1.19; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 7; English edition p. 19.

τὸν εἰκότα μῦθον ἀποδεχομένους

See also

Myth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 284); Reason and account; Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Judgment (Volume One Lexicon, p. 234).

Piety and holiness

Piety and holiness · Volume Two

εὐσέβεια; ὁσιότης · eusebeia; hosiotēs — piety; holiness; religious propriety[5]

At a Glance

The word. Piety and holiness concern duties toward divine beings and the departed, with different scopes and contrasting failures; their shared religious setting does not make them interchangeable names for devotion.

[5] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 62, 147. The two nouns are not treated as synonyms.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic definitions distinguish attention to gods and divine spirits from observing what is just toward gods and the departed, and leave one extreme of holiness explicitly unnamed.

In this edition. Retain the contrast between the Stoic knowledge definition and the Peripatetic states, and do not supply a conventional opposite for holiness where the local account names none.

A place to read. II.7.25.10 Compare the objects of the two definitions as well as their extremes: divine spirits occur in piety's description, while the departed enter the account of what holiness observes.

Meaning

Eusebeia and hosiotēs are related but distinct religious virtues. Attendance to gods, obligations toward the dead and proper observance need not receive one undifferentiated English label.

Use in the book

The Stoic list defines piety as knowledge of service to gods. The Peripatetic account makes piety a state attending to gods and divine spirits between godlessness and superstition. Holiness observes what is just toward gods and the departed, between unholiness and an unnamed extreme. That last name remains unnamed rather than being filled from a familiar parallel. These differences preserve religious duties as well as the contrast between knowledge definitions and mean-states; shared vocabulary does not prove identical theories.

The two definitions differ in both object and action. Piety attends to gods and divine spirits; holiness observes what is just toward gods and the departed. Their extremes are not presented symmetrically: godlessness and superstition are both named for piety, but holiness has an unnamed state opposite unholiness. This prevents a neat reconstructed chart from taking priority over the surviving account. The earlier Stoic definition as knowledge of divine service adds another context, without establishing that the two expositions mean precisely the same thing by a shared term.

"Holiness is a state of observing what is just toward the gods and the departed" (II.7.25.10).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.6. Piety is knowledge of divine service. (English edition p. 193.)

II.7.25.10. Distinct Peripatetic definitions. (English edition p. 521.)

Translation in this edition

"Holiness" explains religious propriety, not necessarily withdrawal from ordinary life.

Attested Greek forms

εὐσέβειαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 62; English edition p. 193.

εὐσέβειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας· χρηστότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐποιητικήν·

ὁσιότητα

Attested. II.7.25.10; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 147; English edition p. 521.

θεραπευτικήν, μεταξὺ οὖσαν ἀθεότητος καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας· ὁσιότητα δὲ ἕξιν δικαίων τῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς καὶ κατοιχομένους τηρητικήν,

See also

Piety (Volume One Lexicon, p. 317); Sacred (Volume One Lexicon, p. 373); Justice; Divine spirit (Volume One Lexicon, p. 129).

Riddle and allusion

Riddle and allusion · Volume Two

αἴνιγμα; ὑπόνοια · ainigma; huponoia — riddle; allusion; underlying or implied meaning[6]

At a Glance

The word. Riddle and hidden meaning name indirect modes of signifying. In Porphyry's discussion their presence makes interpretation demanding, but does not release the interpreter from the poet's words.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry credits Cronius's ability while criticizing the tendency to fit other material to proposed readings when Homer's actual wording resists the interpretation being imposed.

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[6] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 14–15. The closing syntax is difficult and includes a supplied span. Both headword witnesses occur earlier in the unbracketed running text, so the lexical selection does not depend on the reconstruction.

In this edition. Preserve both recognition of indirect meaning and criticism of interpretive overreach. An allusive text does not license importing any desired doctrine or replacing difficult local wording.

A place to read. II.1.32 Read the praise of Cronius together with the following reservation, where the direction of fitting opinions to words becomes the decisive question for interpretation.

Meaning

Ainigma is a riddle or indirect signification. Huponoia denotes a sense understood beneath or beyond the immediate wording. Their related interpretive roles do not make them the same grammatical word.

Use in the book

Porphyry says the ancients signified matters about gods and divine beings through riddles, and that Homer concealed them especially by employing such material in the presentation of other things. He then criticizes Cronius's handling of underlying meanings. The interpreter may be accomplished, yet still fit other material to his own proposed accounts and draw the poet toward his opinions. The passage consequently permits indirect meaning while insisting on accountability to what the poet says. It offers neither permission to invent any hidden doctrine nor a blanket refusal of allusion.

The paragraph does not simply reject an interpreter because he seeks hidden meanings. It begins by explaining why Homer's theological views are difficult to grasp and recognizes Cronius as particularly capable among those who try. The criticism concerns how the proposed explanation relates to the evidence. When the poet's words cannot be fitted to it, other material is introduced instead. The final contrast makes direction crucial: the interpretation should be brought into line with the poet, rather than bringing the poet into line with the interpreter's prior ideas.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.32. Indirect signification is acknowledged while an interpreter's imposing procedure is criticized. (English edition p. 39.)

Translation in this edition

Riddle preserves ainigma; underlying meaning or implied sense clarifies huponoia. Allegory may be explanatory but should not erase the passage's criticism of a particular interpretive method.

Attested Greek forms

αἰνιγμῶν

Attested. II.1.32; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 14-15; English edition p. 39.

δι᾽ αἰνιγμῶν ἐσήμαναν

ὑπονοίας

Attested. II.1.32; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 14-15; English edition p. 39.

τὰ δι᾽ ὑπονοίας παρ᾽ αὐτῷ λεγόμενα

See also

Hypothesis; Interpretation (Volume One Lexicon, p. 230); Making and poetry; Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440).

Argument language and inquiry

Ambiguity and equivocation

Ambiguity and equivocation · Volume Two

ἀμφιβολία; ὁμωνυμία · amphibolia; homōnumia — ambiguity; equivocation; sameness of name[7]

At a Glance

The word. Ambiguity leaves more than one possible sense; sameness of name concerns shared naming. Both can require inquiry without implying deliberate verbal deception.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus uses the interpretation of oracles to defend dialectical investigation, connecting clarified meanings with knowledge and with a beneficial practical decision.

In this edition. Render the pair without assuming a complete technical taxonomy. Sameness of name can be clearer than equivocation where intentional trickery is not asserted.

A place to read. II.2.5.2 Read the oracle examples together: the wooden wall concerns interpretation, while the arrow, lyre and ship illustrate the need for knowledgeable use.

Meaning

Amphibolia concerns uncertainty or double possibility in expression; homōnumia concerns sharing a name. In the letter on dialectic they name difficulties to be distinguished through inquiry rather than reasons to abandon reasoning.

Use in the book

Iamblichus argues that the Delphic god's manner of signifying awakens dialectical investigation. He then says ambiguity and homonymy were judged and every double meaning investigated. The account of the wooden wall illustrates interpretation's practical consequences within his argument. These terms belong to the process of distinguishing possible senses, while the broader passage presents such investigation as a source of knowledge. It does

[7] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 18–19. The beneficial historical example is part of Iamblichus's praise of dialectic. The word pair alone does not establish a general rule that every oracle has exactly two meanings.

not identify every shared name with a deliberate trick, or every uncertain expression with meaningless speech.

The oracle passage moves from how a sign is given to what its hearer must do. A sign does not supply a ready interpretation merely by being uttered. The hearers' investigation sorts alternatives and is said to kindle knowledge. Iamblichus then turns to instruments whose usefulness depends on informed use. Within this defense, interpreting an utterance and employing an instrument both require an active contribution from the recipient. The historical example remains an example in his argument; it does not establish that every difficult oracle has a uniquely recoverable meaning.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.5.2. The interpretation of oracular signs requires judging ambiguity and shared names. (English edition p. 51.)

Translation in this edition

Ambiguity and equivocation preserve the pair without claiming an exhaustive technical classification of all ambiguous sentences. Same name can explain homōnumia when equivocation would suggest intentional deception.

Attested Greek forms

ἀμφιβολία

Attested. II.2.5.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 18-19; English edition p. 51.

ἀμφιβολία τε καὶ ὁμωνυμία ἐκρίθησαν

ὁμωνυμία

Attested. II.2.5.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 18-19; English edition p. 51.

ἀμφιβολία τε καὶ ὁμωνυμία ἐκρίθησαν

See also

Name; Sign (Volume One Lexicon, p. 392); Interpretation (Volume One Lexicon, p. 230); Dialectic.

Apprehension

Apprehension · Volume Two

κατάληψις · katalēpsis — apprehension; cognitive grasp[8]

At a Glance

The word. Apprehension is a cognitive grasp whose strength and stability matter in Stoic definitions; it should not be confused with the ordinary English sense of anxiety or foreboding.

In Stobaeus. Knowledge's first definition adds security against argument to apprehension, while later formulations distinguish a system of apprehensions and a receptive state; the qualifiers perform real classificatory work.

In this edition. Use apprehension as cognitive grasp and preserve its qualifying adjectives; neither mere verbal confidence nor every acceptance of an impression supplies the security required by these definitions.

A place to read. II.7.5l.2 Compare the initial secure apprehension with the system of such apprehensions that follows; the shift from item to organized collection prevents an unqualified equation of every grasp with knowledge.

Meaning

Katalēpsis is apprehension or grasp. In the Stoic ethical account, its stability and relation to assent distinguish knowledge from weak or premature belief.

Use in the book

Knowledge is first defined as a secure apprehension that argument cannot overturn. Conviction is called a strong apprehension that confirms what is believed. By contrast, precipitate assent runs ahead before apprehension, and opinion can mean assent to what is not apprehensible. The differences are not simply degrees of verbal confidence: they concern the cognitive status and steadiness attributed to the agent's acceptance. The chapter links these claims to its ideal wise person rather than to an ordinary psychological survey of everyone's beliefs.

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[8] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 73–74, 112. The definitions of apprehension and knowledge are related but should not be rendered by one undifferentiated English word.

Apprehension appears first as the material of a definition rather than as a separately explained faculty. Knowledge requires a secure grasp unalterable by argument, and the next formulation organizes such grasps into a system. The word such carries the initial qualification forward. It is therefore insufficient to isolate the noun and conclude that any accepted impression constitutes knowledge. The later examples of conviction and precipitate assent likewise depend on strength, timing or stability. This paragraph provides the reader a starting distinction, while the related entries show how the account employs it in different judgments.

"a system of such apprehensions" (II.7.5l.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5l.2. Secure, unalterable apprehension figures in the knowledge definition. (English edition p. 231.)

II.7.11m.18. Conviction is strong apprehension. (English edition p. 367.)

II.7.11m.17. Assent before apprehension is criticized. (English edition p. 367.)

Translation in this edition

"Apprehension" means cognitive grasp here, not anxiety or foreboding.

Attested Greek forms

κατάληψιν

Attested. II.7.5l.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 73-74; English edition p. 231.

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπιστήμην σύστημα

See also

Knowledge; Assent; Conviction; Belief and opinion.

Art of letters

Art of letters · Volume Two

γραμματική; γραμματικὴ τέχνη · grammatikē; grammatikē technē — art of letters; grammatical art[9]

At a Glance

The word. The art of letters is a unified expertise concerning differentiated vocal elements. It exceeds alphabet recitation and is not confined to correcting syntax.

In Stobaeus. The Philebus selection follows recognition of classes and individual sounds, then explains why their mutual dependence makes the discipline one connected art.

In this edition. Art of letters preserves the account's breadth. Grammatical art is possible, provided it does not reduce the subject to modern school grammar.

A place to read. II.4.15.1 Read the successive distinctions among vowels, intermediate sounds and mutes, ending with numbered elements rather than an undifferentiated range of vocal sound.

Meaning

Grammatikē is the art concerned with letters. In this excerpt it is a unified expertise, not merely the ability to recite an alphabet or a modern school exercise in correcting usage.

Use in the book

The Philebus passage describes the recognition of distinct classes within unlimited vocal sound. Vowels, intermediate sounds and mutes are distinguished until individual elements and their number become clear. The sequel explains why the discipline is one: no single element can be learned on its own without the others, and their bond makes them one in a certain way. The art is therefore connected with an articulated whole whose constituents become intelligible through their relations. This explains its unity without denying the differences that the preceding classification established.

The narrated discovery proceeds through several levels of discrimination. Recognizing that vocal sound is unlimited is only the beginning; the

[9] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 30. The passage attributes the discovery in a qualified story about a god or divine man called Theuth. The lexical article does not turn that story into a documented historical account of alphabetic invention.

investigator next identifies classes, then individual members and their number. The source keeps the story's attribution qualified between a god and a divine man. Its explanatory interest lies in the resulting organization of a field of knowledge. The sequel connects the elements through a bond that prevents learning one independently of the others. Unity therefore emerges through understanding relations among differences, not by erasing those differences.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.15.1. Vocal sound is distinguished into classes and individual elements. (English edition p. 87.)

II.4.15.2. The interdependence of elements grounds one art of letters. (English edition p. 87.)

Translation in this edition

Art of letters retains the breadth of the local account. Grammatical art is possible if it does not narrow the subject to syntax alone.

Attested Greek forms

γραμματικὴν

Attested. II.4.15.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 30; English edition p. 87.

μίαν ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς ὡς οὖσαν γραμματικὴν τέχνην

See also

Letter and written character; Vowels and mutes; Element (Volume One Lexicon, p. 142); Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43).

Belief and opinion

Belief and opinion · Volume Two

δόξα; ὑπόληψις · doxa; hupolēpsis — opinion; belief; supposition; reputation[10]

At a Glance

The word. Belief and opinion overlap in ordinary use, but the Stoic definition singles out weak belief or assent to what is not apprehensible; doxa can mean reputation elsewhere.

In Stobaeus. The claim that the wise person has no opinions follows a distinction between secure belief and two deficient forms; it is not a denial that he accepts anything.

In this edition. Translate with the local sense, preserving the distinction between weak opinion and secure belief; an English recurrence elsewhere does not establish that every Greek opinion is false.

A place to read. II.7.11m.17 Read the opening affirmation of secure believing before the denial of opinion and the twofold definition; the order blocks an interpretation of wisdom as having no beliefs at all.

Meaning

Doxa and hupolēpsis overlap in the vocabulary of belief. The chapter's Stoic definitions give opinion a specially weak or deficient sense; elsewhere doxa can mean reputation rather than belief.

Use in the book

The wise person is denied opinions because opinion is classified either as assent to what is not apprehensible or as weak belief. Passions too are called opinions, understood as weak suppositions with a force capable of moving the soul. Those claims do not imply that every Greek use of doxa is false: Platonic excerpts elsewhere distinguish true opinion from knowledge, and the early ethical division uses doxa for reputation among life's topics. The translation therefore follows the local sense instead of treating an English recurrence as evidence of one theory.

The opening sentence is positive: the wise person believes securely and firmly. The subsequent denial of opinion therefore restricts a defined kind of acceptance rather than removing belief altogether. Two forms are

[10] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 43–44, 88–89, 112. The lexical family is broader than the technical restriction of opinion to weak assent.

distinguished, an inappropriate object of assent and weakness in belief. The final comment about rushing ahead before apprehension adds a temporal relation to cognitive failure. Some connectives are supplied and remain marked. A reader should follow this carefully qualified argument rather than replace it with a broad claim that all people who hold any view must lack wisdom.

"He believes nothing weakly, but rather securely and firmly" (II.7.11m.17).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11m.17. Two technical senses of opinion are set out. (English edition p. 367.)

II.7.10.3. Opinion in the passion account is weak supposition. (English edition p. 283.)

II.7.2.9. Doxa in the list of ethical topics means reputation. (English edition p. 131.)

Translation in this edition

Use "opinion," "belief," "supposition" or "reputation" with attention to the construction.

Attested Greek forms

δόξας

Attested. II.7.11m.17; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 112; English edition p. 367.

καὶ μηδὲ δοξάζειν τὸν σοφόν. Διττὰς γὰρ εἶναι δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας

ὑπόληψιν

Attested. II.7.11m.17; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 112; English edition p. 367.

δόξας, τὴν μὲν ἀκαταλήπτῳ συγκατάθεσιν, τὴν δὲ ὑπόληψιν ἀσθενῆ· ταύτας ⟨δ'⟩ ἀλλοτρίας εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως·

See also

Knowledge; Assent; Passion; Honor (Volume One Lexicon, p. 197).

Collection

Collection · Volume Two

συναγωγή · sunagōgē — collection; gathering together[11]

At a Glance

The word. Collection brings dispersed instances under a single form so that a subject can be defined clearly. It complements division rather than replacing discrimination among kinds.

In Stobaeus. Socrates credits the procedure with clarity and internal agreement even while leaving open whether the preceding account of Love was well or badly stated.

In this edition. Collection or gathering together follows the intellectual procedure. Avoid equating it with synthesis, compilation or the mere accumulation of examples without an organizing form.

A place to read. II.2.3.1 Read the account of Love as an example of defining a subject clearly while retaining the speaker's qualification about whether the account itself was good.

Meaning

Sunagōgē means a bringing together. In the Phaedrus excerpt its plural names the procedure that gathers scattered instances under one form, complementing division into kinds.

Use in the book

Socrates first describes seeing dispersed things together so that a speaker can make the subject clear by defining it. The example is Love: the account acquires clarity and agreement with itself even though the speaker leaves open whether it was well or badly stated. Later Socrates calls himself a lover of collections and divisions, linking them with the ability to speak and think. Collection is consequently more than compiling examples. It makes their unity available for a coherent account, while requiring the complementary discrimination of relevant differences.

The passage begins by reflecting on procedures that happened to appear in a discussion. Turning their power into an art would make their use more deliberate. Collection serves a teaching purpose: defining the subject clarifies

[11] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 16–17. The passage preserves qualifications about both the quality of the account and the name dialectician. It does not make every proposed collection correct merely because it unifies its material.

what the speaker wishes to explain. The qualification about Love separates intelligibility from correctness. A discourse can possess a stable subject and agree with itself while still requiring evaluation. This is why collection supplies a useful starting structure for inquiry without making the resulting definition immune to criticism.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.3.1. Scattered material is brought under one form to clarify a definition. (English edition p. 43.)

II.2.3.3. Socrates names collections together with divisions. (English edition p. 47.)

Translation in this edition

Collection is appropriate where the logical procedure is meant. Gathering together can make the initial image clearer. Do not substitute synthesis, which has a different Greek headword in this companion.

Attested Greek forms

συναγωγῶν

Attested. II.2.3.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 17; English edition p. 47.

τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν

See also

Division; Limit and definition; Form (Volume One Lexicon, p. 166); Dialectic.

Combination of words

Combination of words · Volume Two

συμπλοκή; συμπλέκειν; πλέγμα · sumplokē; sumplekein; plegma — combination; interweaving; verbal weave[12]

At a Glance

The word. The family uses interweaving to explain how names and verbs form a statement. An ordered string of one class alone does not yet accomplish that work.

In Stobaeus. The Sophist distinguishes mere naming from an utterance that says something about action, inaction or being through a suitable combination of verbal elements.

In this edition. Combination explains the relation plainly; interweaving preserves its image. Mere sequence is insufficient, and not every arbitrary joining of words becomes a statement.

A place to read. II.4.17.3 Read the movement from a list of animal names to a smallest statement, where mixing a name with a verb makes an assertion possible.

Meaning

Sumplokē is an interweaving or combination; sumplekein is to interweave, and plegma the resulting weave. The Sophist excerpt makes this image explain how speech achieves more than separate naming.

Use in the book

Names alone and verbs alone fail to produce a statement, even in orderly succession. When names and verbs fit together, their combination says something concerning what is or occurs. “A human being learns” supplies the minimal example. The sequel explains that this weave makes something clear about present, developing, past or future matters. Its unity is meaningful, not just acoustic continuity. The discussion returns at the end to the distinction between signs that fit and those that do not, so combination must be appropriate rather than an arbitrary joining of any words whatsoever.

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[12] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 32. The lexical family is grouped transparently here. Its linguistic use differs from a physical composition of bodies, even where English combination could describe either.

The example is deliberately minimal. A list such as lion, deer and horse names possible agents but does not yet make clear what any agent does or is. Mixing names with verbs changes the utterance's function, rather than simply increasing its length. The edition's example, "a human being learns" (II.4.17.3), supplies an agent and an activity in a single statement. The response accepts this as first and smallest. The passage thus analyzes what a statement accomplishes before evaluating the truth of any particular claim.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.17.3. A suitable combination produces a smallest statement. (English edition p. 95.)

II.4.17.4. The verbal weave accomplishes something beyond naming. (English edition p. 97.)

Translation in this edition

Combination is clear in analysis; interweaving preserves the governing metaphor. Do not reduce the expression to a sequence, since mere sequence is precisely what the examples show insufficient.

Attested Greek forms

συμπλοκὴ

Attested. II.4.17.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 32; English edition p. 95.

λόγος ἐγένετο εὐθὺς ἡ τοιαύτη συμπλοκὴ

πλέγματι

Attested. II.4.17.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 32; English edition p. 97.

τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐπεφθεγξάμεθα λόγον

See also

Name; Verb; Reason and account; Synthesis (Volume One Lexicon, p. 424).

Contrary

Contrary · Volume Two

ἐναντίον; ἀντίον · enantion; antion — opposite; contrary; opposed[13]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective family marks opposition. In the Doric argument attributed to Archytas, its force depends on the statements concerning the same relevant subject or matter.

In Stobaeus. The speaker rejects opposed accounts that are both unerring, using white and black as an example before distinguishing assessments directed at different aspects.

In this edition. Retain the general opposition expressed locally. Do not impose a complete later taxonomy of contradiction and contrariety or normalize the passage's Doric forms.

A place to read. II.2.4.1 Read the examples of white against white and white against black as steps in the speaker's rejection of two opposed accounts that are both trustworthy.

Meaning

The adjective family marks opposition. The Doric passage under Archytas's name uses forms of antion in reasoning about when two accounts genuinely oppose one another.

Use in the book

The speaker rejects the claim that two opposed accounts about everything can both be unerring. White does not oppose white; white opposes black, and the unerring is set against the false. The sequel insists that opposition concerns the same matter. Praising a person's soul while blaming the body does not address one identical subject, and different assessments of the Athenians can concern different aspects. The examples require attention to what is asserted and what it concerns before treating two utterances as incompatible. Mere verbal difference is not yet the opposition being tested.

The first example tests whether repetition of the same predicate can count as opposition. White does not oppose white; white and black provide the contrast. The speaker then applies this pattern to truth and falsehood. The

[13] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 17–18. The source attributes the work to Archytas and prints Doric forms. The entry reports that attribution without using the linguistic form alone to establish the work's authenticity.

following unit narrows the comparison to a common matter, so that praising a soul and blaming a body cannot automatically be treated as inconsistent statements. The argument asks the reader to identify both what is said and what it concerns. Verbal difference alone does not settle the issue of genuine opposition.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.4.1. Opposed predicates and truth-values are distinguished from identical ones. (English edition p. 47.)

II.2.4.2. Genuine opposition is restricted to the same matter. (English edition p. 49.)

Translation in this edition

Opposed or contrary retains the local generality. Do not impose a complete later technical distinction between contradiction and contrariety on the excerpt's wording.

Attested Greek forms

ἀντία

Attested. II.2.4.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 17-18; English edition p. 47.

τὸ καλὸν καὶ ⟨τὸ⟩ αἰσχρὸν ἀντία

Attested. II.2.4.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 18; English edition p. 49.

τὰ γὰρ ἀντία περὶ τωὐτῶ πράγματος ἀντικέαται ἀλλάλοις

See also

Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Falsehood; Reason and account; Division.

Conviction

Conviction · Volume Two

πίστις · pistis — conviction; firm assurance[14]

At a Glance

The word. Conviction is a strong apprehension confirming what is believed within this Stoic account; ordinary confidence or religious faith does not exhaust that technical evaluative description.

In Stobaeus. The paragraph connects conviction with moral excellence and knowledge resistant to argument, then denies these restricted achievements to the base person rather than denying all ordinary belief.

In this edition. Use conviction to retain the defined cognitive force without introducing a specifically religious faith; the ideal wise person's condition is narrower than everyday confidence in an assertion.

A place to read. II.7.11m.18 Follow the argument from false belief through conviction to the final claim about the base person; these linked definitions explain the restriction placed on knows and has conviction.

Meaning

Pistis is conviction or firm assurance in this Stoic passage. Its technical definition emphasizes strong apprehension rather than trust without reasons.

Use in the book

The account calls conviction a thing of moral excellence and defines it as a strong apprehension confirming what is believed. It pairs this with knowledge's resistance to being overturned by argument and concludes that the base person neither knows nor has conviction in these restricted senses. This is a claim about the ideal cognitive disposition, not a denial that ordinary people confidently believe things. Elsewhere pistis can name trust, evidence or assurance more broadly; the present article keeps the local technical use in view.

The paragraph joins several negative and positive cognitive descriptions. Unawareness and lack of conviction are each connected with false belief; conviction is then described positively as strong apprehension. Knowledge's resistance to argument provides a parallel ground for the final contrast with

[14] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 112. The claim about base agents follows the account's technical vocabulary, not ordinary usage of having a belief.

the base person. The report's conclusion is consequently tied to its definitions and ideal of moral excellence. It should not be turned into a claim that an ordinary person cannot firmly believe anything. The local relation among truth, stability and character gives the technical term its force.

"a strong apprehension that confirms what is believed" (II.7.11m.18).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11m.18. Conviction is defined through strong apprehension. (English edition p. 367.)

Translation in this edition

"Conviction" helps avoid importing a specifically religious meaning of "faith" into this definition.

Attested Greek forms

πίστιν

Attested. II.7.11m.18; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 112; English edition p. 367.

τὴν γὰρ ἀπιστίαν εἶναι ψεύδους ὑπόληψιν· τὴν δὲ πίστιν ἀστεῖον ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι γὰρ κατάληψιν ἰσχυράν, βεβαιοῦσαν τὸ

See also

Apprehension; Knowledge; Belief and opinion; Wise and base.

Demiurge and craftsman

Demiurge and craftsman · Volume Two

δημιουργός · dēmiourgos — maker; craftsman; producer[15]

At a Glance

The word. Demiourgos names a maker or productive practitioner. In the Gorgias excerpt its product is persuasion, so the word has no necessary cosmological force.

[15] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 25. The entry supplements the cosmological uses in the Volume One companion. Its specific witness concerns rhetoric, and supplies no independent doctrine about a universal creator or a hierarchy of divine makers.

In Stobaeus. Socrates asks whether producing persuasion in hearers' souls exhausts rhetoric's activity and chief purpose; Gorgias accepts that proposed account as an adequate definition.

In this edition. Maker or producer fits the grammatical predicate here. Rendering every occurrence as the Demiurge would introduce a theological office absent from this exchange.

A place to read. II.3.2 Read Socrates's qualified restatement and Gorgias's acceptance together, noting that the product named is persuasion and that no cosmic maker is under discussion.

Meaning

Dēmiourgos names a maker or productive practitioner. Volume Two supplies a particularly useful reminder that the word need not designate the creator of the cosmos.

Use in the book

In the Gorgias excerpt, rhetoric is called a maker of persuasion. Socrates asks whether its whole activity and chief purpose terminate in producing persuasion in its hearers' souls, and Gorgias accepts the definition. The noun explains what an art produces, rather than naming a cosmic maker. The passage thus clarifies how the same maker-language that carries cosmic significance elsewhere can operate in an analysis of a human skill.

The productive image helps specify an art by asking what its activity brings about. Socrates's restatement remains tentative: he asks whether he has understood Gorgias, then invites him to identify any further power rhetoric might possess. Gorgias's reply accepts the definition rather than adding a second product. The local use of maker therefore belongs to an inquiry into rhetoric's scope. It illustrates why a familiar philosophical noun must be translated through its construction and object, rather than automatically carrying the cosmological meaning it has in other passages.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.3.2. Rhetoric is called the maker of persuasion in hearers' souls. (English edition p. 73.)

Translation in this edition

Maker suits this grammatical predicate; producer makes its explanatory function clear. Translating every occurrence as the Demiurge would introduce a theological office absent from this passage.

Attested Greek forms

δημιουργός

Attested. II.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 25; English edition p. 73.

πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική

See also

Rhetoric; Persuasion; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43); Creator and poet (Volume One Lexicon, p. 103).

Dialectic

Dialectic · Volume Two

διαλεκτική; διαλεκτικός · dialektikē; dialektikos — dialectic; dialectical; dialectician[16]

At a Glance

The word. Dialectic is a disciplined practice of reasoned discussion or inquiry. The anthology preserves conflicting judgments of its value, so one excerpt cannot define every occurrence.

In Stobaeus. The Republic selection describes an ascent beyond hypotheses, with other studies helping to turn the soul; later passages both defend and criticize dialectical activity.

In this edition. Retain dialectic as the general term while distinguishing it from contentiousness and ordinary conversation. Preserve the different speakers' evaluations rather than reconciling them artificially.

A place to read. II.2.1 Read the upward movement toward a first principle together with the qualification that the assisting studies are less clear than knowledge and stronger than opinion.

Meaning

Dialektikē names a disciplined practice of reasoned discussion. Dialektikos can describe the practice or someone capable of it. The anthology preserves competing evaluations rather than supplying one definition that settles every occurrence.

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[16] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 15–16, 19, 22. The chapter title is supplied, but these running-text witnesses independently attest the term. The article therefore does not depend on that editorial heading.

Use in the book

The Republic excerpt presents dialectic as moving beyond hypotheses toward a principle, aided by other studies. Iamblichus treats its beginnings as a natural human capacity strengthened through practice and its developed form as indispensable to philosophy. The contrasting sequence then questions its usefulness: correct measures may measure worthless material, and sophisticated arguments may resemble fragile webs. These criticisms target the value and use of argument, not simply its grammatical complexity.

The ascent image assigns different roles to dialectic and its assisting studies. The studies help turn the soul, but the speaker immediately qualifies their habitual description as sciences. A different cognitive name is needed for what stands between opinion and knowledge. Dialectic's advance beyond hypotheses is thus presented alongside a distinction in the status of its helpers. The image is not an assertion that every discussion produces knowledge. In the anthology's contrasting sequence, the value of a procedure also depends on its objects, arguments and use.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.1. Dialectical inquiry advances beyond hypotheses toward a secure principle. (English edition p. 41.)

II.2.6.1. An innate conversational capacity requires cultivation. (English edition p. 53.)

II.2.12. Zeno compares dialectical arts to measures used on worthless material. (English edition p. 61.)

Translation in this edition

Retain dialectic as the general term, but distinguish it from contentiousness and from every ordinary exchange of remarks. A favorable claim in one excerpt does not cancel the contrary excerpts.

Attested Greek forms

διαλεκτικὴ

Attested. II.2.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 15-16; English edition p. 41.

ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταύτῃ πορεύεται

διαλεκτικῶν

Attested. II.2.12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 22; English edition p. 61.

τὰς τῶν διαλεκτικῶν τέχνας

See also

Hypothesis; Reason and account; Intellectual midwifery; Verbal subtlety.

Division

Division · Volume Two

διαίρεσις; διατέμνειν · diairesis; diatemnein — division; dividing into kinds; cutting apart[17]

At a Glance

The word. Division distinguishes kinds within an organized subject. The cutting image requires attention to natural joints, rather than arbitrary breakage or equal physical portions.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus example traces two speeches through different divisions of madness and Love, showing how a shared name can cover contrasting forms and evaluations.

In this edition. Divide according to forms or kinds preserves the procedure. Keep the cook's image and the distinction between common naming and the different divisions discovered.

A place to read. II.2.3.2 Read how the two speeches start with a common form, then divide toward contrasting kinds of Love that share a name without sharing their evaluation.

Meaning

Diairesis names division. The accompanying verb diatemnein means cutting through or distinguishing parts. Here a familiar physical image explains a method of articulated thinking.

Use in the book

The Phaedrus excerpt asks for the ability to divide according to kinds and natural joints, rather than break parts like a bad cook. Its two speeches distinguish forms of erotic madness, one criticized and another praised. Collection supplies a unity; division articulates its relevant kinds without treating all instances alike. Socrates later pairs divisions with collections as aids to speaking and thinking. The example therefore concerns discerning

[17] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 16–17. The divisions in the excerpt distinguish opposed accounts of love. The anthology does not thereby require every other use of division to reproduce this particular classification.

structure within the subject, not cutting a passage into arbitrary equal portions or separating every word from every other.

The bodily comparison explains why a single name need not identify a single undifferentiated condition. Left and right parts can share names while belonging to distinct sides. The two speeches similarly follow different branches of a common starting form. One discovers a form of Love it reproaches; the other presents a divine form as beneficial. The divisions therefore affect the argument's judgment as well as its arrangement. The procedure would fail if it simply broke the subject at convenient places without respecting the differences the account claims to find.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.3.2. Natural joints and the bad cook illustrate fitting and unfitting division. (English edition p. 45.)

II.2.3.3. Divisions and collections are paired as intellectual procedures. (English edition p. 47.)

Translation in this edition

Use division for the procedure and divide into kinds where the object needs clarification. The lexical connection with cutting should remain visible in the cook comparison.

Attested Greek forms

διαιρέσεων

Attested. II.2.3.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 17; English edition p. 47.

τῶν διαιρέσεων καὶ συναγωγῶν

διατέμνειν

Attested. II.2.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 16-17; English edition p. 45.

κατ' εἴδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν, κατ' ἄρθρα

See also

Collection; Form (Volume One Lexicon, p. 166); Genus and kind (Volume One Lexicon, p. 174); Limit and definition.

Eloquence and verbal skill

Eloquence and verbal skill · Volume Two

εὐγλωσσία; δεινὸς λέγειν · euglōssia; deinos legein — eloquence; fluency; formidable skill in speaking[18]

At a Glance

The word. Eloquence is fluency or power in speaking; related expressions describe formidable verbal ability. Such success does not by itself establish wisdom, justice or good conduct.

In Stobaeus. Dramatic speakers contrast verbal victory with deeds, or accuse clever speakers of concealing injustice. Their claims retain their particular argumentative and dramatic settings.

In this edition. Eloquence fits the noun; clever or gifted in speaking can preserve the ambivalence of related phrases. Do not automatically turn verbal skill into moral wisdom.

A place to read. II.15.12 Read the concession that a successful speaker is clever together with the explicit preference for deeds, rather than treating either half as the whole judgment.

Meaning

Euglōssia is fluency or eloquence. Deinos legein describes someone formidable or highly capable in speaking. Such ability is distinguished from the goodness of the agent and the worth of the deeds being discussed.

Use in the book

The Antiope fragment concedes that a victorious eloquent speaker is clever, then ranks actual deeds above words. In the Hippolytus fragment under the contrasting dialectical sequence, accomplished speakers can use well-shaped utterance to conceal what is true. Medea's speech adds a more pointed accusation: an unjust person's verbal skill may cloak injustice and encourage wrongdoing. These voices challenge the inference from speaking impressively to being wise or good. They do not make every effective use of speech an instance of deception.

The fragment's concession is important to its contrast. It does not deny that verbal victory displays an ability; the speaker grants cleverness before

[18] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 21, 187–188. The tragic passages belong to dramatic speakers. Medea's judgment is directed against Jason in its play context, not presented here as an uncomplicated authorial definition of wisdom.

ranking deeds more highly. The qualification prevents an easy equation between winning an exchange and possessing what matters most. Since the surviving lines do not supply the complete dramatic situation, their comparison should remain the judgment of a speaker in a fragment. It neither makes all eloquence deceptive nor establishes that every successful deed is good regardless of its purpose.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.15.12. Verbal victory is distinguished from the superiority of deeds. (English edition p. 695.)

II.2.8. Powerful speakers can disguise the truth through well-shaped speech. (English edition p. 59.)

II.15.22. Medea attacks clever speech that clothes injustice. (English edition p. 703.)

Translation in this edition

Eloquence is useful for the noun. Clever or gifted in speech can preserve the ambivalence of the related descriptions without automatically awarding genuine wisdom.

Attested Greek forms

εὐγλωσσίᾳ

Attested. II.15.12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 187; English edition p. 695.

Ὅς δ' εὐγλωσσίᾳ νικᾷ

δεινοὶ λέγειν

Attested. II.2.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 21; English edition p. 59.

ἵν' ἦσαν μηδὲν οἱ δεινοὶ λέγειν.

See also

Rhetoric; Persuasion; Seeming and being; Wisdom.

Falsehood

Falsehood · Volume Two

ψεῦδος; ψεύδεσθαι · pseudos; pseudesthai — falsehood; saying something false; lying[19]

At a Glance

The word. Falsehood as content differs from the act the report defines as lying; saying something false does not by itself establish every condition of that technical account.

In Stobaeus. The passage contrasts mistaken deceptive assertion with using falsehood without assent, illustrating the latter through military and other practical arrangements rather than supplying an unrestricted moral permission.

In this edition. Keep false statement, lying and false belief distinct, and preserve the source's uncomfortable qualifications instead of rewriting it as either a universal ban or a general license to deceive.

A place to read. II.7.11m.15 Read the stated conditions of lying before the examples of falsehood employed without assent; the conditional cognitive distinction gives the opening claim its particular, restricted sense.

Meaning

Pseudos is a falsehood; the verb pseudesthai can mean lying. The Stoic exposition explicitly distinguishes using a false statement from the defective belief and deceptive act it calls lying.

Use in the book

The wise person is said never to lie, yet sometimes to employ falsehood without assenting to it, for example in military arrangements or foreseeing an advantage. The account defines lying through saying a falsehood while mistaken and with a view to deceiving one's neighbors. It separately denies false belief to the wise person. The lexical article preserves this uncomfortable but explicit distinction rather than rewriting the passage into either an absolute ban on every false utterance or an unqualified permission to deceive.

The definition joins a false utterance with the speaker's being mistaken and having a deceptive purpose. The following exception concerns

[19] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 111. The report's definition is not silently replaced with a modern definition of lying.

employment without assent, which changes one of those cognitive conditions. Its military example and reference to arrangements of life illustrate the report's distinction; they do not provide a comprehensive rule for every possible deceptive situation. The supplied against in the military phrase remains marked. Readers should therefore distinguish the passage's technical use of lying from ordinary modern usage before deciding what follows from its claim about the wise person.

"without assenting to it" (II.7.11m.15).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11m.15. False statement, lying and use without assent are distinguished. (English edition p. 365.)

II.7.11m.16. The wise person is denied false belief. (English edition p. 365.)

Translation in this edition

"Falsehood" suits the statement or content; "lie" must follow the particular definition or context.

Attested Greek forms

ψεῦδος

Attested. II.7.11m.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 111; English edition p. 365.

ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὑπάρχειν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ διεψευσμένως τὸ ψεῦδος λέγειν

ψεύδεσθαι

Attested. II.7.11m.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 111; English edition p. 365.

Λέγεσθαι δὲ μὴ ψεύδεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ἀλλ' ἐν πᾶσιν ἀληθεύειν· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ λέγειν τι ψεῦδος

See also

Assent; Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Belief and opinion; Error and wrongdoing.

Gardens of Adonis

Gardens of Adonis · Volume Two

Ἀδωνιακοὶ κῆποι · Adōniakoi kēpoi — gardens of Adonis; short-lived plantings[20]

At a Glance

The word. The named gardens supply an image for attractive but quickly fading writing. In this witness their fleeting charm matters more than details of cultivation or ritual.

In Stobaeus. The anecdote attributes to Plato a comparison of much writing by certain people with plants whose charm lasts only a day before they wither.

In this edition. Retain the named image and its restrictions: most of what some people write. Do not reconstruct a ritual timetable or condemn all writing without exception.

A place to read. II.6.1 Read the limited object of the comparison and its movement from momentary charm to withering, rather than treating the saying as a rejection of every written work.

Meaning

The phrase names the gardens invoked in a comparison of writing. In this witness their defining feature is the fleeting charm followed by easy withering, not a detailed account of their cultivation.

Use in the book

Plato is reported to have compared most of what some people write to these gardens. Their attractiveness lasts only a day in the saying, after which they quickly fade. The qualification matters: the report targets much of certain writers' production rather than condemning all writing without exception. Its place after discussions of speech, letters and poetic inspiration makes durability of intellectual benefit a relevant question. The earlier praise of writing as a physician for the soul provides a contrasting assessment within the anthology, without forcing the two excerpts into one speaker's doctrine.

The saying's brevity makes its qualifications easy to lose. The criticism applies to most of what certain people write, not to everything written by

[20] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 29, 37. This is an anecdotal report about Plato, not a direct quotation assigned here to a dialogue. The article adds no botanical timetable or reconstructed ritual procedure beyond the comparison.

everyone. Its measure is also temporal: initial attraction does not endure. The comparison can direct attention to whether writing retains its benefit after its first charm passes, but it does not explain the causes of that failure. No details about the gardens' cultivation or religious setting are needed to preserve the contrast printed here.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.6.1. The reported comparison criticizes writing whose charm quickly fades. (English edition p. 113.)

II.4.10. A contrasting fragment values writing as a physician for the soul. (English edition p. 83.)

Translation in this edition

Retain the named gardens and explain their fleeting quality. Replacing them with a modern disposable object would lose the image used by the source.

Attested Greek forms

Ἀδωνιακοῖς κήποις

Attested. II.6.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 37; English edition p. 113.

τοῖς Ἀδωνιακοῖς κήποις εἴκασεν

See also

Letter and written character; Memory (Volume One Lexicon, p. 267); Useful (Volume One Lexicon, p. 449); Philosophy.

Hypothesis

Hypothesis · Volume Two

ὑπόθεσις · hupothesis — hypothesis; provisional starting point; proposed interpretation[21]

At a Glance

The word. A hypothesis is something laid down as a basis. Its work differs between a provisional starting point in reasoning and a proposed interpretation of a literary passage.

In Stobaeus. The Republic selection moves beyond hypotheses toward a principle; Porphyry criticizes fitting other material to interpretations when the poet's own words cannot be made to fit.

In this edition. Use hypothesis for the logical setting and proposed interpretation where that is clearer. Neither occurrence by itself denotes a modern experimental procedure or testing protocol.

A place to read. II.2.1 Read the removal of hypotheses as part of an advance toward a principle, alongside the distinct role and qualified cognitive standing of the assisting studies.

Meaning

Hupothesis is something laid down as a basis. Its force depends on the activity in which that basis is used: a starting assumption in inquiry is not the same thing as an interpretation imposed on a poem.

Use in the book

In the Republic excerpt, dialectic does away with hypotheses while proceeding toward the principle itself. The contrast makes the hypotheses provisional rather than self-certifying foundations. Porphyry uses the same word family when criticizing Cronius: other material is fitted to proposed interpretations because Homer's own words cannot be fitted to them. His concern is the direction of interpretive control. An explanatory proposal must answer to its evidence rather than determine in advance what the evidence is allowed to say.

The hypotheses are not rejected simply because they are false. Their provisional status is defined by the advance toward a principle that can

[21] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 14–16. Porphyry allows underlying meanings in Homer while criticizing an interpreter's procedure. The criticism should not be expanded into rejection of every interpretive hypothesis.

establish the inquiry securely. The accompanying arts help in this movement, but their ordinary designation as sciences is itself qualified. The paragraph therefore distinguishes levels of grounding and clarity within the ascent. Porphyry's separate literary use raises a different issue: whether the proposed interpretation answers to the text or makes other material accommodate it. The common word does not erase that difference in task.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.1. Dialectic moves beyond hypotheses toward a principle. (English edition p. 41.)

II.1.32. Cronius is criticized for accommodating evidence to proposed interpretations. (English edition p. 39.)

Translation in this edition

Hypothesis suits the logical setting; proposed interpretation clarifies the literary setting. Neither occurrence requires a modern experimental hypothesis with a specified testing protocol.

Attested Greek forms

ὑποθέσεις

Attested. II.2.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 15-16; English edition p. 41.

τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα ἐπ᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀρχήν

ὑποθέσεσι

Attested. II.1.32; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 14-15; English edition p. 39.

ταῖς τεθείσαις ὑποθέσεσι

See also

Dialectic; Principle (Volume One Lexicon, p. 331); Riddle and allusion; Reason and account.

Induction

Induction · Volume Two

ἐπαγωγή · epagōgē — induction; leading toward a general point[22]

At a Glance

The word. Induction leads through particular examples toward a common point. In this excerpt it identifies an argumentative procedure rather than a modern statistical rule or experimental method.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus cites an arrow, lyre and ship to show that usefulness depends on knowledgeable employment, making the instruments' different forms serve one explanatory comparison.

In this edition. Induction is a useful conventional rendering if the reader follows the examples actually given. Do not add formal steps or an exhaustive theory absent from the excerpt.

A place to read. II.2.5.2 Read the list of different instruments and its extension to anything else, noting that the shared point concerns knowledgeable use rather than their physical construction.

Meaning

Epagōgē is a leading or bringing on. In the dialectical setting it names an argumentative procedure in which particular examples make a common point apparent.

Use in the book

Iamblichus says that the god at Branchidae displays induction conspicuously. The quoted examples are an arrow, a lyre, a ship, and anything else: none would become useful without knowledgeable use. The sequence links different instruments through their dependence on competent employment. Its common point is not a physical property shared by all three objects, but the condition under which they benefit human life. The account occurs within a defense of dialectical inquiry, whose value is being demonstrated through its work rather than through a bare assertion of prestige.

The arrow, lyre and ship are not grouped because they resemble one another in shape or material. Their connection is a condition of benefit: each

[22] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 18–19. The passage's attribution of the example to a god is part of Iamblichus's presentation. The lexical explanation concerns the reasoning displayed, without independently authenticating an oracle.

needs knowledgeable use. Extending the claim to anything else makes the intended general point explicit. In Iamblichus's defense of dialectic, the example also turns attention from possessing an instrument to employing it well. The comparison is argumentative because it directs several cases toward one relation. It does not supply a rule for inferring numerical probabilities from a sample.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.5.2. Several instruments illustrate the need for knowledgeable use. (English edition p. 51.)

Translation in this edition

Induction is a useful conventional rendering, provided the reader follows the examples actually given. The excerpt does not state a modern statistical rule or enumerate the formal steps of a general inductive logic.

Attested Greek forms

ἐπαγωγὴν

Attested. II.2.5.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 18-19; English edition p. 51.

περιφανῆ τὴν ἐπαγωγὴν παραδηλῶν

See also

Use; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43); Dialectic; Reason and account.

Intellectual midwifery

Intellectual midwifery · Volume Two

μαιεία · maieia — midwifery; bringing thoughts to birth[23]

At a Glance

The word. The childbirth metaphor describes bringing thoughts to light and examining them. A thought's emergence does not establish its truth or oblige another person to accept it.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus places midwifery after recollection and connects its authority with dialectic, which tests opposed opinions and distinguishes true intellectual offspring from false ones.

In this edition. Intellectual midwifery makes the metaphor's application clear. The attested word is the noun in its genitive form, not an occurrence of a different adjectival headword.

A place to read. II.2.7 Read the sequence of recollection, midwifery and testing exercises, attending to the shared need for dialectic in properly giving and receiving an account.

Meaning

Maieia is midwifery. Iamblichus transfers childbirth language to philosophical discussion, treating emerging thoughts as offspring that require examination after they have been brought into the light.

Use in the book

The letter to Sopater puts exercises undertaken for midwifery after those directed toward recollection. Their task includes distinguishing true offspring from false. The subsequent explanation connects their authority with dialectic and describes purifications of thought through refutations: opposed opinions are placed alongside one another and brought into collision. The metaphor therefore gives two responsibilities to inquiry, eliciting a thought and testing it. A thought's emergence is not already a certificate of truth, nor does helping another person articulate an opinion require accepting it without criticism.

The letter distinguishes the work of eliciting a thought from the work of assessing it. Bringing intellectual offspring into the light is followed by

[23] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 20–21. This article describes the exercise as Iamblichus presents it in the excerpt. It does not add an account of an original dialogue beyond the source's own reference to Socratic questioning.

separating the true from the false. The explanation then identifies purifications through refutation, where the interlocutors' opposed opinions are compared and brought into conflict. Midwifery therefore includes critical responsibility rather than merely helping someone say what he already believes. The wider list of exercises places it among several practices with different immediate purposes, all dependent on an ability to handle accounts.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.7. Thoughts are brought to light and their truth or falsehood distinguished. (English edition p. 57.)

Translation in this edition

Midwifery retains the concrete metaphor; intellectual midwifery identifies its application. The Greek witness is the genitive maieias, not the different adjective commonly translated maieutic.

Attested Greek forms

μαιείας

Attested. II.2.7; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 20-21; English edition p. 57.

αἱ μαιείας ἕνεκα προσαγόμεναι καὶ τὰ γεννηθέντα εἰς φῶς προάγουσαι

See also

Recollection; Dialectic; Test and refutation; Purification.

Knowledge

Knowledge · Volume Two

ἐπιστήμη · epistēmē — knowledge; systematic expertise[24]

At a Glance

The word. Knowledge receives several technical Stoic definitions, including secure apprehension, systematic organization and a stable receptive state; other excerpts dispute or qualify its relation to ethical virtue.

[24] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 73–74, 117–118, 162. School-specific definitions are reported, not treated as a dictionary rule for every use in the volume.

In Stobaeus. The repeated in another sense distinguishes definitions at different explanatory levels, from an apprehension to a system and finally a state described through tension and power.

In this edition. Retain the local requirements of stability and organization, and do not merge the Stoic list with the Peripatetic denial that ethical virtue is itself knowledge in that account.

A place to read. II.7.5l.2 Read all four formulations rather than stopping at the first; their examples explain how the same term can refer to a grasp, a discipline, virtues or a receptive condition.

Meaning

Epistēmē is knowledge, but Chapter 7 supplies several Stoic technical senses rather than only the ordinary contrast between knowing and not knowing.

Use in the book

The Stoic definitions include secure apprehension unalterable by argument, a system of such apprehensions, an internally secure system of technical forms of knowledge, and a receptive state defined through tension and power. The virtues are analyzed as kinds of knowledge. The Peripatetic account expressly denies that ethical virtue itself is knowledge while defining wisdom as knowledge of first causes. Plato's Meno excerpt gives a further comparison: true opinions become stable knowledge when bound by reasoning about the cause. These accounts should illuminate one another without being combined into a single definition accepted by all.

The first formulation concerns the security of an apprehension against argument. The next moves to a system and uses logic as an example; a further system has certainty from itself, as the virtues do. The last formulation instead speaks of a receptive state. Repeated signals of another sense distinguish these explanatory levels. Tension and power belong to the wording of that final definition, but this excerpt does not develop their mechanism. The reader should preserve the list's plurality without inventing a single additional doctrine to make every definition interchangeable.

"In another sense" (II.7.5l.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5l.2. Four technical senses of knowledge are distinguished. (English edition p. 231.)

II.7.13.4. Peripatetic ethical virtue is not identified with knowledge. (English edition p. 389.)

II.8.34. True opinion is tied into stable knowledge. (English edition p. 589.)

Translation in this edition

"Knowledge" should retain the local requirements of stability, systematic unity or explanatory binding.

Attested Greek forms

ἐπιστήμην

Attested. II.7.5l.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 73-74; English edition p. 231.

Εἶναι δὲ τὴν ἐπιστήμην κατάληψιν ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἀμετάπτωτον ὑπὸ λόγου· ἑτέρως δὲ ἐπιστήμην

See also

Apprehension; Assent; Belief and opinion; Understanding and practical wisdom.

Letter and written character

Letter and written character · Volume Two

γράμμα · gramma — letter; written character; writing; written record[25]

At a Glance

The word. The noun can name an individual letter or, especially in the plural, writing and written records. The selected passages make both analytical and practical uses important.

In Stobaeus. Writing is praised as a remedy for forgetfulness and a record across absence or death; the Philebus selection instead examines letters through classes and relations.

In this edition. Choose letter, writing or written record through context. Do not make every plural occurrence an alphabetic inventory or assume that every written record is correspondence.

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[25] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 28–30. The inventors' claims in the dramatic fragments belong to their speakers. They are not independent historical proofs of who first devised writing.

A place to read. II.4.8 Read the dramatic speaker's sequence of uses for writing: communication across absence, records for children and a tablet's role in settling disputes about what was said.

Meaning

Gramma can name an individual letter or, especially in the plural, writing and written records. The anthology makes both the analytical and the practical senses important.

Use in the book

The Palamedes fragment calls letters remedies against forgetfulness: writing communicates across absence, records property for children and helps settle disputes. Another dramatic fragment calls writing a physician for the soul. The Philebus selection examines letters differently, distinguishing classes and explaining how their mutual connection supports a single art. Written signs thus appear both as durable resources in human life and as parts of an intelligible system. These uses should not be collapsed into a literal inventory of alphabetic marks whenever the plural grammata occurs.

The dramatic speaker connects invention with several kinds of separation. A person at sea can learn what happens at home; a dying owner can state the extent of property for children; a recipient can know what was recorded. The final tablet also supplies a stable object when claims become disputed. Writing's benefit thus concerns the persistence and accessibility of information, not only the shape of individual signs. The first-person invention claim belongs to the surviving dramatic speech and is not independent historical evidence about the origin of letters.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.8. Writing preserves information across distance, death and dispute. (English edition p. 81.)

II.4.10. Writing is represented as a physician for the soul. (English edition p. 83.)

II.4.15.1. Letters are distinguished into classes and individual elements. (English edition p. 87.)

Translation in this edition

Letter suits an individual character; writing suits the practical power of records. Letters in English may otherwise suggest correspondence even where no exchange of personal messages is meant.

Attested Greek forms

γράμματ’

Attested. II.4.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 28; English edition p. 81.

ἐξηῦρον ἀνθρώποισι γράμματ’ εἰδέναι

γραμμάτων

Attested. II.4.15.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 30; English edition p. 87.

τρίτον δὲ εἶδος γραμμάτων διεστήσατο

See also

Art of letters; Memory (Volume One Lexicon, p. 267); Speech and utterance (Volume One Lexicon, p. 405); Philosophical therapy.

Limit and definition

Limit and definition · Volume Two

ὁρίζω; ὁρίζεσθαι · horizō; horizesthai — define; determine a subject; mark a boundary[26]

At a Glance

The word. The attested verb concerns defining or determining a subject. A definition can give clarity and agreement about an account’s scope without thereby establishing its truth.

In Stobaeus. The Phaedrus connects definition with collection under one form; the Gorgias tests a proposed account of rhetoric through its product and chief purpose.

In this edition. Define fits the local verb. The relation to limit is lexical context, not evidence that the noun horos occurs in the cited passages.

A place to read. II.2.3.1 Read the definition of Love as a way to clarify a teaching subject, retaining the explicit reservation about whether the account was well or badly stated.

[26] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 16, 25. The present witnesses are verbs, not occurrences of the noun horos indexed in Volume One. The family connection is made explicit rather than treating grammatical forms as identical tokens.

Meaning

The verb horizō and its middle forms concern setting limits or defining. The logical examples make clear what is being discussed without assuming that any intelligible definition is thereby true.

Use in the book

In the Phaedrus excerpt, bringing scattered material into one form enables the speaker to define the subject and make it clear. Love supplies the example. The text expressly allows that its account may have been well or badly stated, while crediting definition with clarity and consistency. In the Gorgias excerpt, Gorgias says that Socrates has adequately defined rhetoric as producing persuasion. These cases connect definition with articulating a subject and securing agreement about an account's scope, while leaving further questions about adequacy and value open.

Definition performs a preliminary service by making clear what the discussion is about. Gathering dispersed material into one form allows a speaker to identify the subject rather than move ambiguously among several things. The example deliberately separates this achievement from the account's correctness. Clarity and internal agreement are credited even though evaluation remains open. In the Gorgias exchange, acceptance of a proposed definition likewise fixes the immediate topic for further inquiry. Neither instance makes agreement on wording a substitute for examining the account's value or adequacy.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.3.1. Defining makes a subject clear even while the account's correctness remains qualified. (English edition p. 43.)

II.3.2. The proposed account of rhetoric is accepted as an adequate definition. (English edition p. 73.)

Translation in this edition

Define is the appropriate local rendering. Determine or mark a boundary can recall the wider family represented by the Volume One headword.

Attested Greek forms

ὁριζόμενος

Attested. II.2.3.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 16; English edition p. 43.

ἵνα ἕκαστον ὁριζόμενος δῆλον ποιῇ

ὁρίσασθαι

Attested. II.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 25; English edition p. 73.

δοκεῖς ἱκανῶς ὁρίσασθαι.

See also

Collection; Division; Rhetoric; Reason and account.

Making and poetry

Making and poetry · Volume Two

ποίησις; ποιέω · poiēsis; poieō — making; poetic composition; poetry; compose[27]

At a Glance

The word. The noun names making or production and, in these literary settings, poetic composition. The related verb describes composing without by itself identifying a cosmic creative act.

In Stobaeus. Platonic excerpts contrast poetic accomplishment through inspiration with reliance on art alone, and consider how portraying different characters produces conflicting utterances without settled knowledge.

In this edition. Poetry or composition fits the literary object; making retains wider possibilities where needed. Preserve the speaker's distinction between inspiration, art and understanding rather than merging them.

A place to read. II.5.2 Read the image of arriving at poetry's gates and the paired incompleteness of poet and composition when reliance on art excludes the Muses' madness.

Meaning

Poiēsis is making or production and, in the poetic setting, poetry or composition. Poieō is the corresponding verb. These literary contexts should not automatically be translated as cosmic creation.

Use in the book

The Phaedrus selection describes both the aspiring poet and his poetry as incomplete when he reaches the poetic gates without the Muses' madness,

[27] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 35–36. The chapter title is supplied, but poiēsis and its related verb are attested in the surviving body. The quotations are particular Platonic arguments rather than a single systematic handbook of poetics.

relying on acquired art alone. The Ion excerpts develop the distinction through the inspired poet's restricted power and the image of a god speaking through human servants. In the Laws excerpt, a poet portraying differently disposed people is compelled to say conflicting things, without knowing which is true. The act of composition therefore requires attention to speaker, subject and the kind of authority being claimed.

The saying makes the aspiring poet's expectation part of the problem. He arrives convinced that art will be sufficient, yet both he and his poetry remain incomplete. The judgment therefore concerns a claim about adequacy, not a denial that art or training exists. The adjoining Ion selections develop another side of the contrast by portraying a poet who produces beautiful work under possession without an independently explanatory mastery. The anthology's sequence asks how poetic achievement is authorized, while keeping the particular speakers and comparisons of each excerpt distinct.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.5.2. Poetic composition is discussed together with its maker's inspiration. (English edition p. 107.)

II.5.3.3. The verb concerns composing poetry in the inspired state. (English edition p. 111.)

II.5.1. Portraying opposed characters explains contradictions in poetic speech. (English edition p. 107.)

Translation in this edition

Poetry and compose fit the literary setting; making preserves the broader family when a contrast requires it. Do not identify the poet with the divine creator merely from the shared verb.

Attested Greek forms

ποίησις

Attested. II.5.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 35; English edition p. 107.

ἀτελὴς αὐτός τε καὶ ἡ ποίησις.

See also

Creator and poet (Volume One Lexicon, p. 103); Divine inspiration; Resemblance and imitation; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43).

Name

Name · Volume Two

ὄνομα · onoma — name; noun; naming expression[28]

At a Glance

The word. A name is one class of vocal indication considered alongside verbs. The discussion asks how such elements fit together to make something clear rather than merely occur in sequence.

In Stobaeus. The Sophist approaches statements through selective combination: some elements fit and others do not, just as the earlier discussion considered forms and letters.

In this edition. Name follows the local class without imposing a complete modern grammar. Keep its contrast with verbs and the requirement that a sequence signify something.

A place to read. II.4.17.1 Read the question about all, none or some names fitting together before the distinction between names and verbs, which prepares the later smallest-statement example.

Meaning

Onoma means a name. In the Sophist excerpt it becomes one member of a linguistic contrast, alongside rhēma, the verb or expression indicating an action.

Use in the book

The discussion asks which vocal signs fit together meaningfully. A name is identified as the vocal sign applied to those who perform actions; examples include lion, deer and horse. Merely placing such names in sequence does not yet make a statement. They must be combined appropriately with verbs, as in the example a human being learns. Naming thus differs from saying something: a list can identify its separate items without making the assertion accomplished by a meaningful combination. This is the local explanatory role of onoma, not a definition covering every ordinary personal name elsewhere in the anthology.

The opening alternatives rule out treating combination as either entirely unrestricted or entirely impossible. The interlocutor accepts selective fitting,

[28] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 31–32. The examples belong to the dialogue's investigation of meaningful combination. The article does not impose a complete later grammatical system on this short excerpt.

but the speaker must still clarify what the agreement means. A meaningful sequence differs from one that signifies nothing. Introducing names and verbs then provides the two classes through which the inquiry can proceed. This staging matters: the passage is building an explanation of statementhood, not offering an isolated list of vocabulary categories. The later example of an agent learning supplies the work that names alone cannot accomplish.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.17.1. Names are distinguished from verbs among vocal signs. (English edition p. 91.)

II.4.17.2. A name indicates those performing an action. (English edition p. 93.)

II.4.17.3. A sequence of names alone does not make a statement. (English edition p. 95.)

Translation in this edition

Name preserves the Greek's breadth; noun can explain its grammatical role where the name/verb contrast is explicit. Neither rendering should erase the distinction between naming and stating.

Attested Greek forms

ὀνόματα

Attested. II.4.17.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 31; English edition p. 91.

Τὸ μὲν ὀνόματα, τὸ δὲ ῥήματα κληθέν.

See also

Verb; Combination of words; Reason and account; Sign (Volume One Lexicon, p. 392).

Pattern and model

Pattern and model · Volume Two

παράδειγμα · paradeigma — example; explanatory model; pattern[29]

At a Glance

The word. The word can name an example that assists explanation or a pattern used for comparison. Its specific function must be read from the local argument.

In Stobaeus. The Statesman fragment stresses the difficulty of explaining greater matters without examples, comparing unstable apparent understanding with knowing in a dream and ignorance when awake.

In this edition. Use example where the point is explanatory assistance. Do not assign every occurrence a separate metaphysical status merely because the same Greek noun can mean model.

A place to read. II.1.14 Read the need for examples together with the dream-and-waking comparison, keeping the speaker's tentative description of the weakness of apparently familiar understanding.

Meaning

Paradeigma is something presented alongside another thing as an example or model. In the Statesman excerpt it is an aid to explanation, rather than necessarily a separate archetype from which a physical object is made.

Use in the book

The speaker says it is difficult to make one of the greater matters adequately clear without examples. The dream-and-waking comparison then exposes an unstable grasp: each person seems to know particulars as in a dream, only to be ignorant again as though awake. The local point is the need to make what is known explainable and secure. The example is therefore part of inquiry and communication, not proof that the dream itself delivers reliable knowledge. This educational function gives the Volume Two witness a different emphasis from cosmological model-language elsewhere.

The short fragment presents examples as a response to a difficulty in understanding, not as decoration added after an explanation is complete. The dream comparison describes an unstable relation to what one seems to know:

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[29] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 6. The excerpt supplies a qualified statement about difficulty, not a rule that every explanation always requires a picture. The entry preserves that limit and does not turn the dream image into a separate epistemology.

apparent familiarity can disappear when the matter must be considered more clearly. An example can help bring the greater subject into view. The surviving lines do not, however, specify a particular example or demonstrate how its adequacy is tested. They support the explanatory need without supplying a complete theory of models.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.14. Examples are needed to explain greater matters adequately. (English edition p. 17.)

Translation in this edition

Example is clearest for the immediate explanatory use. Model can preserve the comparison's structural function, provided it does not import a maker-and-copy theory absent from this sentence.

Attested Greek forms

παραδείγμασι

Attested. II.1.14; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 6; English edition p. 17.

μὴ παραδείγμασι χρώμενον ἱκανῶς ἐνδείξασθαί τι τῶν μειζόνων

See also

Reason and account; Knowledge; Image and likeness (Volume One Lexicon, p. 205); Dream (Volume One Lexicon, p. 133).

Persuasion

Persuasion · Volume Two

πειθώ; πείθειν · peithō; peithein — persuasion; persuading; convincing[30]

At a Glance

The word. Persuasion is the effect sought by rhetoric in its hearers. Naming that effect does not itself settle whether the hearers gain knowledge, truth or morally beneficial guidance.

[30] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 25, 29. The definition in the Gorgias passage is part of a dialogue between Socrates and Gorgias. Its provisional acceptance here should not be treated as the dialogue's entire final verdict.

In Stobaeus. The Gorgias exchange defines rhetoric through making persuasion in the soul, asking whether any further power belongs to the art beyond producing that response.

In this edition. Preserve persuasion as the stated product without silently strengthening it to proof, teaching or truth. The definition's acceptance does not settle every later question about rhetoric.

A place to read. II.3.2 Read the reference to hearers' souls with Socrates's question about any further power, then Gorgias's reply that the proposed definition is adequate.

Meaning

Peithō names persuasion; the related verb concerns bringing someone to accept or follow what is said. The occurrence of the word does not determine whether the resulting belief is true or the persuasion beneficial.

Use in the book

The Gorgias excerpt identifies rhetoric as a maker of persuasion in the souls of those who hear. The exchange asks what the art produces, without making its effect equivalent to knowledge. In the saying attributed to Democritus, speech becomes a powerful means of persuasion. The political and ethical comparisons nearby supply a further test: powerful speech needs appropriate use, and impressive words may be contradicted by conduct. Persuasion consequently names an effect whose value must be assessed, rather than an automatic guarantee of truth or moral excellence.

The hearers' souls name the location of rhetoric's effect, while the question about further power tests whether that effect exhausts the art's stated scope. These are different elements of the definition: producing a response identifies what happens, and the question asks whether anything more should be added. Gorgias accepts the account. Nothing in that acceptance yet explains whether the hearer's resulting conviction is true or well grounded. The passage can therefore identify persuasion's role precisely without using the word itself to answer those further evaluative questions.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.3.2. Hearers' souls are the site of rhetoric's persuasive effect. (English edition p. 73.)

II.4.12. Speech is characterized as a powerful means of persuasion. (English edition p. 85.)

Translation in this edition

Persuasion suits the noun; convincing may suit the verb when acceptance is emphasized. Do not replace the term with proof, which would import a stronger claim than these witnesses make.

Attested Greek forms

πειθοῦς

Attested. II.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 25; English edition p. 73.

πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική

πειθὼ

Attested. II.4.12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 29; English edition p. 85.

Ἰσχυρὸν ἐς πειθὼ λόγος γίνεται.

See also

Rhetoric; Demonstration (Volume One Lexicon, p. 114); Reason and account; Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440).

Philosophical therapy

Philosophical therapy · Volume Two

θεραπεύω; ἰάομαι · therapeuō; iaomai — treat; heal; cure[31]

At a Glance

The word. The healing verbs describe a test of philosophical benefit through an analogy with medicine. The point concerns removing affliction or evil, rather than ornamental verbal performance.

In Stobaeus. The saying calls discourse empty when it heals no human affliction, comparing philosophy's benefit with medicine's ability to drive diseases from the body.

In this edition. Keep the comparison's ethical object and its conditional force. It does not provide a medical treatment, a diagnosis or evidence that every philosophical statement succeeds in healing.

[31] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 22–23. The printed attribution Pythagoras is retained even though the edition records a related parallel elsewhere. The article does not silently reassign the saying or identify an historical treatment practice.

A place to read. II.2.13 Read the two conditional comparisons together, noting that the discourse's value is assessed by what it removes rather than by its impressive verbal form.

Meaning

Therapeuō can mean attending to or treating; iaomai concerns healing. The medical comparisons in these excerpts make improvement in the soul or in conduct a test of philosophical discourse.

Use in the book

The saying headed Pythagoras calls a philosopher's account empty if it heals no human affliction. Bodily medicine provides the analogy, but the final object of philosophy is explicitly the evil of the soul. A saying attributed to Antisthenes applies the curative image to contradiction: answering a contentious person in kind resembles trying to cure madness by becoming mad oneself. Teaching, rather than repetition of the opposing behavior, is the proposed response. The practical direction of both sayings differs from treating discussion as successful merely when it defeats another speaker.

The medical comparison measures a practice through its work. Medicine without the removal of disease lacks its stated benefit; philosophy is tested in the same way with respect to evil in the soul. The saying therefore joins criticism of empty discourse to an expectation of practical change. It does not describe the steps of that change or name one universal remedy. Its force is a demand that philosophical speech answer to a human need, not simply that any discourse using therapeutic language counts as beneficial.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.13. A medical comparison tests philosophy by its treatment of the soul's evil. (English edition p. 63.)

II.2.15. Teaching is contrasted with reproducing contentious behavior. (English edition p. 63.)

Translation in this edition

Heal or treat follows the medical image; cure suits the Antisthenes comparison. Do not turn every pathos in the surrounding anthology into a modern diagnostic category.

Attested Greek forms

θεραπεύεται

Attested. II.2.13; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 22; English edition p. 63.

ὑφ᾽ οὗ μηδὲν ἀνθρώπου πάθος θεραπεύεται

ἰᾶται

Attested. II.2.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 23; English edition p. 63.

οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενός τις ἰᾶται.

See also

Affection (Volume One Lexicon, p. 29); Medicine (Volume One Lexicon, p. 266); Reason and account; Verbal subtlety.

Precipitate assent

Precipitate assent · Volume Two

προπιπτεῖν; προπετής · propiptein; propetēs — rush ahead; precipitate; rash in assent[32]

At a Glance

The word. Precipitate assent is acceptance that runs ahead of apprehension; the problem concerns premature cognitive commitment rather than a general condemnation of speed in action or inquiry.

In Stobaeus. The account first affirms secure believing and distinguishes two forms of opinion, then treats rushing before apprehension as alien to the complete virtuous person's disposition.

In this edition. Preserve the restriction to deficient assent, and do not turn it into a prohibition on asking questions, revising a conclusion or acting promptly when understanding is adequate.

A place to read. II.7.11m.17 Read the positive opening about firm belief before the criticism of rushing ahead; the relation between acceptance and apprehension explains what makes the assent precipitate.

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[32] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 112–113. Quickness of mind is separately praised among virtues; cognitive rashness is not the same thing.

Meaning

The propiptein family describes rushing ahead before apprehension. In this context precipitancy concerns the order and security of assent, not merely speaking quickly.

Use in the book

The Stoic exposition distinguishes secure belief from opinion and weak acceptance. It then condemns rushing ahead before apprehension and assenting in a precipitate manner as alien to the complete virtuous person. The problem is premature acceptance without the cognitive grasp required by the account. Related discussions deny conjecture and changes of mind to the wise person when these depend on prior false assent. The lexicon preserves these restricted descriptions instead of presenting them as a universal ban on inquiry, revision or practical speed.

The criticism follows a distinction between two kinds of opinion, not a general praise of slowness. A person can accept something that is not apprehensible or believe weakly; both are excluded from the ideal disposition. The final phrase adds the problem of accepting before apprehension, making the order of cognitive commitment important. This should not be paraphrased as saying that the wise person never reaches a conclusion quickly. The passage's concern is the relation between grasp and assent, while its supplied connective remains marked rather than made invisible in a smooth summary.

"rushing ahead before apprehension" (II.7.11m.17).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11m.17. Rushing before apprehension is opposed to firm belief. (English edition p. 367.)

II.7.11m.21. Conjecture and changing one's mind are analyzed through deficient assent. (English edition p. 371.)

Translation in this edition

"Precipitate assent" names the contextual family; the direct witness is the verb and adjective, not a claim that the noun προπέτεια is printed there.

Attested Greek forms

προπιπτεῖν

Attested. II.7.11m.17; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 112; English edition p. 367.

ἀλλοτρίας εἶναι τῆς τοῦ σοφοῦ διαθέσεως· δι' ὃ καὶ τὸ προπιπτεῖν πρὸ καταλήψεως ⟨καὶ⟩ συγκατατίθεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προπετῆ φαῦλον

See also

Assent; Apprehension; Knowledge; Belief and opinion.

Proposition and predicate

Proposition and predicate · Volume Two

ἀξίωμα; κατηγόρημα · axiōma; katēgorēma — proposition; predicate; what is asserted[33]

At a Glance

The word. Proposition and predicate identify different objects of assent and impulse within the ethical account; grammatical relations matter here without requiring an imported complete theory of statements.

In Stobaeus. The report places practical movement beside assent and says predicates are somehow contained in propositions; that qualification limits the precision claimed for their relation in this passage.

In this edition. Keep the terms distinct and retain the cautious relation between them; do not introduce external examples or reconstruct a full logical system from this short transition.

A place to read. II.7.9b Read the different objects after the opening classification of impulses as assents; their grammatical distinction is connected with the practical element that moves an agent toward action.

Meaning

Axiōma and katēgorēma have distinct logical roles in this ethical analysis. The former is what assent addresses; the latter describes what an impulse is toward, as contained within a proposition.

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[33] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 86, 88. Axiōma here should not be translated "axiom" merely because that is a familiar modern cognate.

Use in the book

The exposition says that practical impulses include the element moving to action. It then distinguishes assent to propositions from impulse toward predicates, and elsewhere calls thinking wisely a benefit expressed as a predicate. This makes the difference between having a good and doing something with it more than a stylistic contrast between nouns and verbs. The lexicon follows the local wording without reconstructing a full external theory of propositions or importing examples not given in this passage.

The word somehow limits the explanation's precision. Predicates toward which impulse moves are described as contained in propositions accepted by assent, but the containment relation is not developed further here. The preceding statement that practical impulses contain what moves to action supplies the ethical point. The paragraph then turns directly to passions as a species of impulse. A reader can use the grammatical contrast to follow that argument without assuming that this transition provides an exhaustive account of every proposition, predicate or form of predication.

"predicates somehow contained in the propositions" (II.7.9b).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9b. The two grammatical objects of assent and impulse. (English edition p. 279.)

II.7.8a.1. Thinking wisely and exercising temperance are benefits expressed as predicates. (English edition p. 273.)

Translation in this edition

Use "proposition" and "predicate," with the action-related relation explained in context.

Attested Greek forms

ἀξιώμασί

Attested. II.7.9b; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 279.

συγκαταθέσεις, ἐπ' ἄλλο δὲ ὁρμάς· καὶ συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιώμασί τισιν, ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα, τὰ περιεχόμενά πως ἐν τοῖς

κατηγορήματα

Attested. II.7.9b; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 279.

συγκαταθέσεις μὲν ἀξιώμασί τισιν, ὁρμὰς δὲ ἐπὶ κατηγορήματα, τὰ περιεχόμενά πως ἐν τοῖς ἀξιώμασιν, οἷς συγκατατίθεσθαι.

See also

Assent; Impulse; To be chosen; Correct action.

Reason and account

Reason and account · Volume Two

λόγος · logos — reason; account; argument; speech; statement[34]

At a Glance

The word. Logos can name a meaningful utterance, an explanatory account, reasoned teaching or human reason. Its object and argumentative role determine which English rendering is appropriate.

In Stobaeus. The anthology distinguishes an account from true opinion alone, joins teaching with guided action, and uses shared reason to support Musonius's argument for women's philosophy.

In this edition. Translate locally rather than forcing one English word everywhere. The personified Reason in Eusebius belongs to that narrative, not an identification supplied by the lexical noun alone.

A place to read. II.31.126.1 Read the same reason shared by women and men as both communication and reflection about moral particulars, then follow its place in the argument for philosophy.

Meaning

Logos has several related uses. It can name reasoning, an explanatory account, spoken discourse, or a meaningful statement. Context must decide; no single English equivalent works everywhere.

Use in the book

The Theaetetus distinguishes true opinion from knowledge accompanied by an account. The Sophist uses logos for a meaningful combination of names and verbs. In Lucius's report of Musonius, rational teaching guides practice: habit is more effective in conduct, but teaching comes first in order. Another Musonian excerpt calls reason a divine gift shared by women and men.

The shared human logos has two functions in Musonius's premise. It is used between people, and it is also the capacity by which each considers

[34] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 31–32, 180, 194, 244. The personification belongs to this excerpt's narrative; no Christian identification is supplied.

whether a particular matter is good or bad, noble or shameful. The argument therefore moves beyond the ability to deliver a speech. The educational conclusion depends on a common rational and moral task. Elsewhere, the account added to true opinion supplies a different explanatory relation. Attending to the work performed in each argument prevents one English recurrence from manufacturing a single technical definition across the anthology.

A personified guide. The narrative attributed to Eusebius makes Reason Hermes's herald and counselor, addressing souls before descent. Its advice joins rational counsel with a mythic account of moral consequences: a distinct use, different from the grammatical statement or a name for every god.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.16. An account distinguishes knowledge from true opinion alone. (English edition p. 89.)

II.4.17.4. A meaningful verbal weave is called a statement. (English edition p. 97.)

II.15.46.5. Reasoned teaching guides action and habituation. (English edition p. 723.)

II.31.126.1. Women and men share reason. (English edition p. 949.)

II.9.6.7. Personified Reason addresses souls as Hermes's counselor. (English edition p. 667.)

Translation in this edition

Translate locally and retain the difference between articulate explanation and mere verbal performance. Musonius's praise of practice does not identify logos with empty chatter.

Attested Greek forms

λόγος

Attested. II.15.46.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 194; English edition p. 723.

Συνεργεῖ μὲν γὰρ καὶ τῇ πράξει ὁ λόγος διδάσκων ὅπως πρακτέον

Attested. II.9.6.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 180; English edition p. 667.

προφήτης τε καὶ σύμβουλος λόγος

λόγον

Attested. II.4.17.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 32; English edition p. 97.

τῷ πλέγματι τούτῳ τὸ ὄνομα ἐπεφθεγξάμεθα λόγον

See also

Knowledge; Combination of words; Practice and exercise; Rhetoric.

Recollection

Recollection · Volume Two

ἀνάμνησις; ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι · anamnēsis; anamimnēiskesthai — recollection; remembering again[35]

At a Glance

The word. Recollection is remembering again, but its philosophical and ethical uses differ. A shared word family does not establish the same theory of knowledge wherever memory is involved.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus places recollective exercises first and links them with skillful questioning; the Democritean saying instead connects clear remembrance after injustice with fear and self-reproach.

In this edition. Keep the noun and related verb transparent as a family. Do not turn ordinary moral recollection into a claim that every remembered item was known before learning.

A place to read. II.2.7 Read recollection's position among exercises together with the subsequent practices of midwifery and testing, all discussed through the need for dialectical competence.

Meaning

Anamnēsis names recollection. The related verb concerns remembering or bringing something back to mind. The shared word family does not make every act of recollection a statement of one theory of knowledge.

Use in the book

Iamblichus places philosophical exercises directed toward recollection first in his sequence. Skillful questioning brings them to light, with Socrates'

[35] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 20–21, 177–178. The verb in II.9.3 is cited as a related form, not as a second occurrence of the noun. Its unstated object should not be supplied as a particular crime.

demonstration to Meno as the stated example. He distinguishes these exercises from intellectual midwifery and other tests, while making all depend on dialectic. In the Democritean saying about conduct, remembering has another role: the unjust person becomes afraid and reproaches himself when he recollects clearly. That occurrence concerns moral awareness in the saying, without naming a specific remembered offense or explaining how knowledge existed before questioning.

The letter organizes philosophical exercises by their immediate task. Recollective exercises are brought to light through good questioning; midwifery then distinguishes what has emerged as true or false. Later exercises test, train or examine received teachings. Their different purposes are retained even as dialectic supplies a shared requirement. The reference to Socrates and Meno identifies an example within the letter, but this short selection does not reproduce the complete earlier argument. It supports the connection between recollection and questioning without supplying every premise of a theory about previous knowledge.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.7. Skillful questioning brings exercises of recollection to light. (English edition p. 57.)

II.9.3. Clear recollection accompanies fear and self-reproach after unjust conduct. (English edition p. 657.)

Translation in this edition

Recollection distinguishes the noun from a bare possession of memory. Ordinary remembering is preferable where the moral saying uses the verb without a developed philosophical explanation.

Attested Greek forms

ἀνάμνησιν

Attested. II.2.7; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 20-21; English edition p. 57.

αἱ πρὸς ἀνάμνησιν ἀναγόμεναι

ἀναμνησθῇ

Attested. II.9.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 177-178; English edition p. 657.

ὅταν τ' εὖ ἀναμνησθῇ

See also

Memory (Volume One Lexicon, p. 267); Intellectual midwifery; Dialectic; Cheerfulness.

Resemblance and imitation

Resemblance and imitation · Volume Two

μίμησις · mimēsis — imitation; representation; portrayal[36]

At a Glance

The word. Imitation can concern the portrayal of people and their dispositions. In the Laws excerpt it helps explain how a poet can utter opposing claims without knowing which is true.

In Stobaeus. The poet's imitative art gives voice to differently disposed people, so contradictions among the resulting speeches need not constitute one consistent personal doctrine of the poet.

In this edition. Keep the act of portrayal distinct from assent to what is portrayed. Do not reconcile every dramatic utterance into an authorial teaching merely because one work contains it.

A place to read. II.5.1 Read the connection between opposed characters, opposed utterances and the poet's lack of settled knowledge, rather than attributing every represented speech directly to the author.

Meaning

Mimēsis names imitation or representation. In the Laws passage its object is the portrayal of people whose different dispositions lead them to speak in opposing ways.

Use in the book

The poet's art is called imitation, and the lawgiver is asked to consider what follows from this. A poet who makes characters differently disposed is often compelled to contradict himself and cannot simply certify one of their speeches as true. The statement does not require that every utterance in a poem be false. It distinguishes represented voices from an unqualified

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[36] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 35, 188. This noun witness is grouped with the broader resemblance-and-imitation family in the Volume One companion. The present context concerns dramatic representation, not a claim that every cosmic likeness functions like a poetic character.

assertion by the maker. That distinction is especially useful in an anthology where speeches by tragic and comic characters appear as short maxims outside their larger dramatic setting.

The passage connects contradiction with the demands of representation. Portraying people whose dispositions differ requires the poet to produce speeches that conflict. The speaker then distinguishes this production from knowing which claims are true. The spring image adds an account of uninhibited flow under inspiration, but the imitative explanation identifies a more specific source of plurality: different characters require different voices. This is useful when reading the anthology's dramatic fragments, whose isolated speeches should not automatically be converted into a poet's unrestricted personal position.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.5.1. The portrayal of contrary dispositions explains contrary poetic utterances. (English edition p. 107.)

II.15.22. A tragic character's judgment illustrates the need to identify a dramatic voice. (English edition p. 703.)

Translation in this edition

Portrayal can make the dramatic application clear; imitation retains the conventional philosophical term. Mere copying would be too narrow if it suggested only reproducing outward appearance.

Attested Greek forms

μιμήσεως

Attested. II.5.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 35; English edition p. 107.

καὶ τῆς τέχνης οὔσης μιμήσεως

See also

Making and poetry; Character (Volume One Lexicon, p. 72); Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Image and likeness (Volume One Lexicon, p. 205).

Rhetoric

Rhetoric · Volume Two

ῥητορική; ῥήτωρ · rhētorikē; rhētōr — rhetoric; oratory; orator[37]

At a Glance

The word. Rhetoric is treated here as an art whose stated product is persuasion. The exchange asks what its activity and chief purpose are, rather than merely listing impressive speech techniques.

In Stobaeus. Socrates offers Gorgias a qualified definition through rhetoric's effect on hearers, and Gorgias accepts it as adequate without identifying any further power in this excerpt.

In this edition. Retain the definition's tentativeness and immediate scope. The accepted account does not itself establish that rhetoric always produces truth, knowledge, justice or beneficial conduct.

A place to read. II.3.2 Read Socrates's inquiry into what sort of art rhetoric is and Gorgias's reply together, noting the difference between defining a product and proving its value.

Meaning

Rhētorikē names rhetorical art, while rhētōr is a speaker or orator. The anthology distinguishes an account of its power from judgments about the character and purposes of those who employ it.

Use in the book

In the Gorgias excerpt, Socrates asks whether rhetoric has any power beyond producing persuasion in its hearers; Gorgias accepts the proposed definition. The preceding excerpt imagines a city full of specialized abilities but lacking knowledge of their best use, including speakers who produce political bluster. The comic fragments and the anecdote that follow add hostile portraits of orators. These juxtaposed voices do not amount to one uninterrupted proof that every persuasive speaker is corrupt. They make skill, its effect on hearers, and its moral direction separate questions.

The question is framed as a check on understanding: Socrates restates what he takes Gorgias to mean and leaves room for correction. He identifies both the activity's product and its chief purpose, then asks whether anything

[37] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 25. The chapter title is supplied, but the main text independently attests rhētorikē. The poet called Plato in II.3.3a must not be confused with the philosophical dialogue's author.

further should be claimed. Gorgias's acceptance closes that local definition. The exchange provides a stable object for discussion without yet establishing the product's quality or the practitioner's moral character. This explains why other excerpts can criticize verbal success without simply denying the existence of rhetorical ability.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.3.2. Rhetoric is provisionally defined through its production of persuasion. (English edition p. 73.)

II.3.1. Political speaking without knowledge of what is best is criticized. (English edition p. 71.)

Translation in this edition

Render the art as rhetoric and its practitioner as orator where public speaking is meant. Rhetorical need not always mean insincere: criticism must come from the particular context.

Attested Greek forms

ῥητορική

Attested. II.3.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 25; English edition p. 73.

πειθοῦς δημιουργός ἐστιν ἡ ῥητορική

See also

Persuasion; Demiurge and craftsman; Eloquence and verbal skill; Use.

Self-knowledge

Self-knowledge · Volume Two

ἑαυτοῦ γνῶσις; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν · heautou gnōsis; gignōskein heauton — self-knowledge; knowing oneself[38]

At a Glance

The word. Self-knowledge is examined through a person's relations and role, not merely through private introspection. The examples connect understanding oneself with membership in an ordered community.

In Stobaeus. The Delphic injunction is tested through chorus, ship and army examples, then through the question whether a human being exists for himself alone or for community.

In this edition. Preserve the relational argument and the supplied replies. Do not make the fragment prove that knowing oneself includes complete knowledge of nature or a comprehensive cosmic theory.

A place to read. II.1.31.2 Read the movement from a dancer's harmony with others to the question of human community, noting where the dialogue stops further investigation rather than completing it.

Meaning

The expressions concern knowing oneself, but their object need not be an isolated private self. The excerpts give the demand different intellectual and social settings.

Use in the book

In the Epictetan exchange, a chorus dancer knows himself through attention to fellow dancers and his agreement with them; a sailor or soldier suggests corresponding relations. The questions then ask whether human beings are constituted for community. The exchange ends without satisfying every further demand for an account of nature. Iamblichus, by contrast, invokes reason's knowledge of itself while defending the study of reasoning. Reflexive attention here becomes an argument for dialectic, not a withdrawal from all other inquiry. Both contexts resist reducing self-knowledge to an inventory of personal feelings.

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[38] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 13–14, 20. The supplied answer for community in II.1.31.2 remains editorial. The entry's positive lexical witness is the unsupplied injunction and the independent reflexive phrase in Iamblichus.

The interlocutor first rejects the suggestion that the Delphic injunction is superfluous. Its force is then tested through roles whose performance depends on others: a dancer must attend to fellow dancers and their harmony. The sailor and soldier examples extend that relation before the question turns to human community. The discussion thus asks what the self is situated within. Its closing refusal of further inquiry remains part of the excerpt, so the passage should not be expanded into a completed explanation of all the natural order it invokes.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.1.31.2. The Delphic injunction is tested through communal roles. (English edition p. 37.)

II.2.6.3. Reason's knowledge of itself supports the defense of dialectic. (English edition p. 55.)

Translation in this edition

Know yourself suits the injunction; self-knowledge the reflexive intellectual activity. Keep clear whether the referent is the human agent or reason considering its own operations.

Attested Greek forms

γνῶθι σαυτόν

Attested. II.1.31.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 13-14; English edition p. 37.

τὸ γνῶθι σαυτόν

ἑαυτοῦ γνῶσιν

Attested. II.2.6.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 20; English edition p. 55.

τὴν ἑαυτοῦ γνῶσιν τοῦ λόγου

See also

Knowledge; Community and communion (Volume One Lexicon, p. 85); Dialectic; Reason and account.

Syllable

Syllable · Volume Two

συλλαβή · sullabē — syllable; combination of letters[39]

At a Glance

The word. The syllable figures as an articulated unit contrasted with its elements. The passage uses that contrast to connect expressibility, true opinion and the possibility of giving an account.

In Stobaeus. The reported account makes elements perceptible but without an account, while syllables can be known and expressed; adding an account distinguishes knowledge from true opinion alone.

In this edition. Keep the claim within the philosophical argument being reported. The excerpt does not by itself establish a universally accepted linguistic theory about every element and syllable.

A place to read. II.4.16 Read the contrast between elements and syllables together with the account added to true opinion, where being right about something is distinguished from knowing it.

Meaning

Sullabē names a syllable in the linguistic comparison. The same Greek noun has another use represented by the musical-fourth article in the Volume One companion; context must decide the meaning.

Use in the book

The Theaetetus excerpt contrasts elements with syllables while presenting an account of knowledge and explanation. The elements are described as perceptible but without an account and unknowable; syllables, by contrast, can be known, expressed and held in true opinion. The comparison does work within a philosophical proposal about what an account contributes. It should not be detached as a practical instruction that alphabetic letters are unteachable, or read as a claim about musical intervals. The reader needs both the linguistic image and the epistemological question it is being made to serve.

The elements-and-syllables comparison helps articulate a difference between perception, true opinion and knowledge. The paragraph allows a

[39] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 31. The excerpt presents a position discussed within the Theaetetus. This local report is not by itself evidence that every claim in the proposal is the dialogue's final conclusion.

soul to be right about an object while lacking the ability to give and receive an account of it. Syllables appear on the expressible side of that contrast, unlike the elements as described in the reported theory. The point is not simply that a syllable contains more sounds. Its role concerns whether an articulated object can support the explanatory relation that the passage makes necessary for knowledge.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.16. The contrast between elements and syllables supports a proposed account of knowledge. (English edition p. 89.)

Translation in this edition

Syllable is the appropriate rendering here. Do not use the musical sense merely because the same headword can designate a consonant interval elsewhere.

Attested Greek forms

συλλαβὰς

Attested. II.4.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 31; English edition p. 89.

τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνωστάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς

See also

Letter and written character; Combination of words; Reason and account; Musical fourth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 282).

Test and refutation

Test and refutation · Volume Two

ἔλεγχος; ἐλέγχω · elenchos; elenchō — examination; refutation; test; examine[40]

At a Glance

The word. Refutation examines an apparent claim to knowledge by comparing the person's opinions. The dialogue specifies conditions under which those opinions genuinely contradict one another.

[40] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 162–163, 253–254. The entry does not import the later classification of the sophist beyond this excerpt's ending. Its final concern is the unexamined person's capacity for genuine happiness.

In Stobaeus. The Sophist joins careful comparison with a change in self-assessment: seeing the conflict makes people angry with themselves, gentler toward others and less rigid about their own wisdom.

In this edition. Use test, examination or refutation through context. Preserve the same-time and same-respect conditions instead of reducing the procedure to verbal defeat or an exchange of insults.

A place to read. II.31.129.6 Read how the opinions are gathered and set beside one another, then how the stated contradiction changes the person's relation to himself and to other people.

Meaning

Elenchos can be a test or examination that exposes error. In the Sophist it is the educational treatment that dislodges a person's inflated belief in his own understanding. The force is not simply insult, contradiction for its own sake, or victory over an opponent.

Use in the book

Questioners bring a person's wandering opinions together and show their incompatibility at the same time, about the same things, in the same relations and respects. The resulting shame turns anger toward oneself and makes one gentler toward others. The next comparison describes removal of obstructing opinions before lessons can benefit the soul, as a body must be cleared before nourishment helps it. This is why refutation is called a major purification. The passage's conditions for contradiction and its intended change in the learner are as important as the exposure of a false claim.

The comparison is more exact than showing that two utterances sound different. The opinions must conflict at the same time, about the same things, in the same relations and respects. Those conditions protect the inference that the speaker's own position is unstable. The described result is also more than embarrassment before an opponent: anger turns inward and conduct toward others becomes gentler. The next paragraph explains this as clearing an obstacle to learning. The argument therefore joins a logical task to an educational change, while keeping each step explicit.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.129.6. Opinions are placed together and tested under explicit conditions of contradiction. (English edition p. 989.)

II.31.129.7. Refutation removes the conceit obstructing learning and is called purification. (English edition p. 991.)

II.8.36. Testing an account of the good is contrasted with mere opinion. (English edition p. 591.)

Translation in this edition

"Refutation" fits the educational procedure; "examination" emphasizes its questioning. Neither should be substituted mechanically for every occurrence of a test.

Attested Greek forms

ἔλεγχον

Attested. II.31.129.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 254; English edition p. 991.

καὶ τὸν ἔλεγχον λεκτέον ὡς ἄρα μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι

ἐλέγχων

Attested. II.31.129.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 254; English edition p. 991.

πρὶν ἂν ἐλέγχων τις τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον εἰς αἰσχύνην καταστήσας

See also

Purification; Lack of learning; Ignorance; Teacher and pupil; Reason and account.

Test and touchstone

Test and touchstone · Volume Two

βάσανος · basanos — test; touchstone; means of testing[41]

At a Glance

The word. The word names a test by which a claim is tried. In this fragment the proposed test concerns whether action follows speech rather than whether speech is merely impressive.

In Stobaeus. The surviving passage contrasts adorning oneself with words and surpassing words by deeds, qualifying its appeal to conduct as a test of truth.

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[41] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 192–193. The beginning is damaged, and the same-work attribution is questioned in the edition's notes. Neither the missing opening nor a more definite identification of the author is reconstructed in this article.

In this edition. Keep the incomplete opening and the qualification if indeed. The image does not establish that every successful action proves every claim made by its performer.

A place to read. II.15.45 Read the damaged opening and the condition attached to the test, where action following speech is proposed as evidence rather than presented as an unrestricted rule.

Meaning

Basanos denotes a means of testing. In the passage concerning Demosthenes it evokes a touchstone for judging whether words are answered by deeds.

Use in the book

The surviving excerpt contrasts verbal adornment with actions that exceed words, then proposes, with an explicit if indeed, that action following speech should count as a test of truth. The surrounding chapter repeatedly asks the reader to judge talk through conduct rather than assume that competent speech proves good character. This test therefore concerns the relation between a speaker's claims and what is done. It is not a rule that every successful action proves every proposition said by its agent, nor a replacement for the distinctions among argument, evidence and persuasion elsewhere.

The fragment asks the reader to compare two kinds of display. Verbal adornment presents a person through speech; deeds can exceed that presentation. The conditional phrase attached to the test remains important, since the text does not state a complete criterion covering every proposition. Its concern is the relation between what a person says and what he does. The missing opening prevents a full reconstruction of the original setting, but the surviving contrast is sufficient to explain the testing image.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.15.45. Conduct accompanying speech is proposed as a test of truth. (English edition p. 719.)

Translation in this edition

Test is the clearest local rendering; touchstone preserves the image behind the noun. Keep the conditional wording of the source rather than presenting its proposal as an unrestricted editorial maxim.

Attested Greek forms

βάσανον

Attested. II.15.45; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 192-193; English edition p. 719.

εἴγε δὴ βάσανον τῆς ἀληθείας εἶναι χρὴ νομίζειν

See also

Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Deed and work (Volume One Lexicon, p. 109); Reason and account; Test and refutation.

Thought

Thought · Volume Two

διάνοια · dianoia — thought; discursive thought; intellectual activity[42]

At a Glance

The word. Thought can name thinking generally or a more specific cognitive standing. The Republic excerpt proposes discursive thought for studies whose clarity differs from both opinion and knowledge.

In Stobaeus. The assisting arts help dialectic turn the soul, but their habitual description as sciences is corrected by locating their activity between stronger and weaker cognitive states.

In this edition. Retain the local distinction where thought is used technically. Do not make every occurrence of the same noun an identical position in one agreed hierarchy of cognition.

A place to read. II.2.1 Read the reclassification of the assisting arts after the ascent image, noting that usefulness in turning the soul does not make them identical with the highest knowledge.

Meaning

Dianoia can mean thought broadly. In the Republic excerpt it is the name of a particular cognitive condition, distinguished from opinion and knowledge rather than used as an interchangeable synonym for either.

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[42] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 15–16, 20–21. The excerpt's terminology belongs to the argument it preserves. It does not require every occurrence of dianoia elsewhere to name the same fixed intermediate grade.

Use in the book

The disciplines assisting dialectic have often been called sciences through habit, but the speaker says they need another name. Their condition is described as more effective than opinion and less clear than knowledge; the proposed name is dianoia. The anthology's wording therefore asks the reader to preserve both a distinction among cognitive conditions and the role these studies play in turning the soul. Elsewhere Iamblichus speaks of purifications of thought through refutations, showing a broader application of the same noun to the activity that is examined and corrected.

The paragraph's correction of ordinary naming is part of its argument. The arts have been called sciences from habit, yet the speaker now says that this name is insufficiently precise. Their standing is stronger than opinion but less clear than knowledge. They still do important work as helpers in turning the soul. The proposed cognitive distinction therefore does not dismiss them as useless. It explains how a study can contribute to a further inquiry while its own mode of understanding remains differentiated from the goal toward which it assists.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.1. Discursive thought is positioned between opinion and knowledge. (English edition p. 41.)

II.2.7. Refutations are described as purifications of thought. (English edition p. 57.)

Translation in this edition

Discursive thought identifies the technical use; thought is enough where no intermediate rank is being assigned. The local more effective follows the anthology's energesterou, not a substituted clearer from another text.

Attested Greek forms

Διάνοιαν

Attested. II.2.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 15-16; English edition p. 41.

Διάνοιαν δὲ αὐτὴν ἔν γε τῷ πρόσθεν που ὡρισάμεθα.

διανοίας

Attested. II.2.7; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 20-21; English edition p. 57.

καθάρσεις τῆς διανοίας

See also

Knowledge; Belief and opinion; Dialectic; Purification.

Verb

Verb · Volume Two

ῥῆμα · rhēma — verb; expression indicating an action[43]

At a Glance

The word. The verb is identified as a vocal indication applied to actions. The passage contrasts it with names and tests what their combination contributes to a statement.

In Stobaeus. The Sophist shows that an uninterrupted list of action words still fails to make a statement, preparing the later example where a name and verb fit together.

In this edition. Verb follows the source's local category without imposing an exhaustive modern grammar. Preserve its distinction from the agent's name and from a complete meaningful statement.

A place to read. II.4.17.2 Read the clarification after the interlocutor's misunderstanding, where a list of verbs illustrates why verbal sequence alone does not yet supply an assertion.

Meaning

Rhēma can mean an utterance or saying more broadly. In the Sophist selection it specifically denotes the member of a statement that indicates action, contrasted with the name of the agent.

Use in the book

The interlocutors define the action-indication as rhēma, then test whether verbs alone make a statement. Walks, runs and sleeps, even when all said in succession, do not. A sequence of names fails in the corresponding way. Combining the two types appropriately produces the smallest statement exemplified by a human being learns. The contrast makes the verb's role relational: it contributes to saying something about a subject, rather than carrying a complete assertion simply by being an action-word.

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[43] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 31–32. This contextual article distinguishes the grammatical use from the broader rhēma family already indexed as Speech and utterance. It does not treat the two English renderings as two unrelated Greek words.

The interlocutor's failure to understand prompts a more concrete example. Naming several actions in succession does not yet tell the hearer what performs them. The problem is not a lack of verbal quantity: adding all the other action words would still fail in the same way. The subsequent combination with a name supplies a different relation among the elements. This makes the verb's role intelligible through the work of a statement, rather than treating the category as an isolated grammatical label whose significance is already obvious.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.17.2. The term is applied to an indication concerning actions. (English edition p. 93.)

II.4.17.3. The example combines a name and a verb in a minimal statement. (English edition p. 95.)

Translation in this edition

Verb is needed in this explicit grammatical contrast. Utterance remains useful elsewhere, but would obscure why a sequence of rhēmata here still falls short of a logos.

Attested Greek forms

ῥῆμά

Attested. II.4.17.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 31-32; English edition p. 93.

Τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ὂν δήλωμα, ῥῆμά που λεγόμενον.

See also

Name; Combination of words; Speech and utterance (Volume One Lexicon, p. 405); Reason and account.

Verbal subtlety

Verbal subtlety · Volume Two

λεπτολογία · leptologia — subtle discourse; minute distinctions; excessive subtlety[44]

At a Glance

The word. The noun concerns fine or excessive refinement in philosophical discourse. The comparison evaluates the degree and use of subtlety rather than identifying all precision with a vice.

In Stobaeus. The hellebore image contrasts a coarser preparation that purges with fine particles that choke, warning that a practice can reverse its effect when pursued in another manner.

In this edition. Excessive subtlety preserves the unfavorable force of this saying. The medical image belongs to its argument and should not be offered as a treatment instruction or general pharmacological rule.

A place to read. II.2.23 Read both sides of the hellebore comparison, where the manner of preparation changes the effect and supplies the structure of the warning about philosophical refinement.

Meaning

Leptologia associates speech or reasoning with fineness. In Ariston's comparison, the point is not that every fine distinction is useless, but that refinement can undermine the benefit it was supposed to provide.

Use in the book

The example contrasts hellebore taken more coarsely, which purges, with the substance ground into very fine particles, which chokes. Philosophical subtlety is then compared with the latter process. The surrounding criticism of dialectic similarly distinguishes elaborate workmanship from worthwhile use. The comparison asks what inquiry achieves for its user, rather than setting the number of distinctions that an argument may contain. It does not by itself refute the earlier claims that dialectic can clarify meanings or test beliefs.

The image does not contrast two wholly unrelated substances. The same named material is described under different preparation, with opposed

[44] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 24. The hellebore comparison is an ancient rhetorical image. The entry explains the image's role and gives no recommendation about preparation, dosage or medicinal use.

effects. That structure makes the warning sharper than a simple rejection of philosophy or of careful distinctions. A pursuit that can help may also obstruct when its refinement becomes excessive. The fragment does not specify a numerical point at which that change occurs. Its contribution is a comparison that asks the reader to consider what argumentative subtlety does in practice, not merely how fine it appears.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.2.23. The fineness of a preparation illustrates destructive overrefinement in philosophical discourse. (English edition p. 67.)

II.2.22. Technical sophistication is compared with a web of no practical use. (English edition p. 67.)

Translation in this edition

Excessive subtlety brings out the unfavorable judgment in this particular saying. Subtle discourse is a more neutral lexical description; the context supplies the criticism.

Attested Greek forms

λεπτολογία

Attested. II.2.23; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 24; English edition p. 67.

οὕτω καὶ ἡ κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν λεπτολογία.

See also

Dialectic; Philosophical therapy; Useful (Volume One Lexicon, p. 449); Reason and account.

Vowels and mutes

Vowels and mutes · Volume Two

φωνῆεν; ἄφωνον · phōnēen; aphōnon — vowel; mute; voiceless letter[45]

At a Glance

The word. The paired labels mark classes within vocal sound and letters. The Philebus sequence also retains an intermediate class before dividing each down to individual numbered elements.

In Stobaeus. The Theuth story moves from an unlimited field of sound to distinct groups and members, using differentiation and number as steps toward an organized art of letters.

In this edition. Retain the source's threefold distinction and qualified attribution. Do not substitute a complete modern phonetic classification or treat the supplied word same as independent lexical evidence.

A place to read. II.4.15.1 Read the vowels, intermediate sounds and mutes in their printed sequence, then the division to individual elements, rather than reducing the passage to a simple twofold opposition.

Meaning

Phōnēen is the substantivized term for a vowel; aphōnon is something without voice, here a mute letter. The excerpt's plural forms belong to a classification of vocal and written elements.

Use in the book

In the Philebus selection, the discoverer first recognizes that vowels are several rather than one. Other sounds form an intermediate class, and what are now called mutes form a third. The procedure continues down to individual elements until their number is grasped. The point is the discrimination of an articulated field within apparently unlimited sound. The next unit joins the classes again through the single art of letters. Division and systematic connection therefore belong together; the passage does not merely prefer written marks to audible speech.

The investigation begins with plurality inside what appears unlimited. Recognizing several vowels does not finish the work, because further sounds require their own class and number. Mutes form a third group, and the

[45] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 30. The headwords are singular dictionary forms; the positive running-text witnesses are plural. Only the word "same" in this account is supplied, not the vowel or mute vocabulary.

procedure then divides the groups down to individual members. The resulting name element applies to each and to all. This progression explains why the paired headwords should be read with the intermediate group still present. The story's organization of the field matters more here than an attempt to make its classes coincide exactly with modern terminology.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.4.15.1. Vowels, intermediate sounds and mutes are distinguished. (English edition p. 87.)

II.4.15.2. Their mutual connection supports a unified expertise. (English edition p. 87.)

Translation in this edition

Vowels and mutes preserve the contrast used by the excerpt. The description of intermediate sounds should not be silently replaced with an exhaustive list of present-day phonetic categories.

Attested Greek forms

φωνήεντα

Attested. II.4.15.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 30; English edition p. 87.

πρῶτος τὰ φωνήεντα ἐν τῷ ἀπείρῳ κατενόησεν

ἄφωνα

Attested. II.4.15.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 30; English edition p. 87.

τὰ νῦν λεγόμενα ἄφωνα ἡμῖν

See also

Voice (Volume One Lexicon, p. 454); Element (Volume One Lexicon, p. 142); Art of letters; Division.

Aging and dying well

Aging and dying well · Volume Two

εὐγηρεῖν; εὐθανατεῖν · eugērein; euthanatein — age well; die well[46]

At a Glance

The word. Aging and dying well are defined through virtue and the quality of a life stage or death, not simply through comfort, longevity or external honor; the account separately qualifies when departure is appropriate.

In Stobaeus. The report extends its concern with virtuous use of circumstances from being blessed in children to old age and death, while denying that virtue alone automatically requires either remaining alive or departing.

In this edition. Keep the ethical quality and appropriate-action criteria explicit, and do not infer a particular method of death or an unconditional instruction to remain or leave from these general classifications.

A place to read. II.7.11q Read the definitions of aging and dying well after the qualification about being blessed in children, then compare the separate passage measuring life and death by appropriate action.

Meaning

These verbs name passing through old age and ending life well. Their explanation connects the quality of those events with virtue.

Use in the book

The Stoic report says only the virtuous person ages and dies well, defining each through a life stage or death of a certain quality in accordance with virtue. Dying well is not simply an easy, painless or externally honored death. The neighboring account of appropriate departure from life separates virtue and vice from an automatic requirement to remain or leave. These are the report's ethical classifications of how a life is used. They do not describe a particular death procedure or identify every departure as appropriate.

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[46] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 110, 114. No manner of death absent from the source is supplied.

The paragraph first qualifies being blessed in children: their excellence alone is not sufficient without the agent's use of the relationship. Aging and dying well are then likewise defined through a certain quality in accordance with virtue. This places the emphasis on how circumstances enter a life, not merely on their external description. The separate account of departure says that virtue does not keep someone alive and vice does not drive someone out. Appropriate action supplies the measure, preventing a simple inference from moral status to a universal decision about remaining or departing.

"Only the virtuous person ages well and dies well." (II.7.11q).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11q. Both verbs are defined through virtue. (English edition p. 375.)

II.7.11m.12. Remaining and departing are measured by appropriate action. (English edition p. 361.)

Translation in this edition

"Die well" preserves the ethical verb without importing modern institutional meanings.

Attested Greek forms

εὐγηρεῖν

Attested. II.7.11q; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 114; English edition p. 375.

Εὐγηρεῖν τε μόνον καὶ εὐθανατεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον· εὐγηρεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ γήρως διεξάγειν κατ' ἀρετήν, εὐθανατεῖν

εὐθανατεῖν

Attested. II.7.11q; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 114; English edition p. 375.

χρήσασθαι αὐτοῖς ὡς τοιούτοις. Εὐγηρεῖν τε μόνον καὶ εὐθανατεῖν τὸν σπουδαῖον· εὐγηρεῖν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ μετὰ ποιοῦ γήρως διεξάγειν

See also

Death (Volume One Lexicon, p. 107); Age and maturity (Volume One Lexicon, p. 30); Appropriate action; Virtue and excellence.

Anger

Anger · Volume Two
ὀργή · orgē — anger[47]

At a Glance

The word. Anger is defined as craving to punish an apparent wrongdoer in the Stoic taxonomy; the Peripatetic treatment instead evaluates whether anger is expressed under fitting conditions and limits.

In Stobaeus. The named species distinguish stages, duration and timing: beginning, swelling, storage, waiting for revenge and immediate eruption have different descriptions rather than forming a list of interchangeable synonyms.

In this edition. Preserve thought to have caused an injury and retain the source's species distinctions; an agent's apparent grievance is not the lexicon's endorsement that the other person really wronged him.

A place to read. II.7.10c.1 Read the initial craving definition before the temporal images that distinguish wrath, rage, rancor, grudge and bitterness; their sequence supplies more than alternative English words for anger.

Meaning

Orgē is anger. The Stoic analysis makes it a craving to punish an apparent wrongdoer, while the Peripatetic account allows anger regulated by gentleness.

Use in the book

The Stoic definition includes someone thought to have caused an injury contrary to what is fitting. Its species distinguish anger beginning, swelling, stored up, waiting for revenge or bursting out immediately. These named movements are not interchangeable synonyms. The Peripatetic example instead criticizes both anger at everything and complete lack of responsiveness, praising anger when, how and with whom one should be angry. The lexical article preserves the difference between defining anger as a passion and evaluating its fitting expression.

The definition includes a judgment about the supposed offender and an intention toward punishment. The subsequent species alter how anger

[47] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 91, 139. The apparent injury belongs to the angry person's evaluation; the definition does not establish that the other party really wronged him.

develops or persists. Rancor can be laid aside or stored, while a grudge waits for opportunity; bitterness erupts immediately. These contrasting descriptions show why choosing one generic English synonym for every item would lose the taxonomy. They also prevent the list from being read as a scale of intensity alone. Duration and timing matter, while the opening qualification about the thought injury continues to limit the asserted basis of the response.

"someone thought to have done an injury contrary to what is fitting" (II.7.10c.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10c.1. Anger and several species receive distinct definitions. (English edition p. 289.)

II.7.20.8. Gentleness regulates anger between two blameworthy states. (English edition p. 481.)

Translation in this edition

"Anger" is the main noun; "wrath," "rage," "rancor" and "grudge" help retain the source's subdivisions.

Attested Greek forms

Ὀργὴ

Attested. II.7.10c.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 91; English edition p. 289.

Ὀργὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἐπιθυμία τιμωρήσασθαι τὸν δοκοῦντα ἠδικηκέναι

See also

Passion; Gentleness; Desire; Punishment (Volume One Lexicon, p. 339).

Austerity

Austerity · Volume Two

αὐστηρός · austēros — austere; resistant to flattery[48]

At a Glance

The word. Austerity here describes the virtuous person's refusal to offer or receive favor-seeking speech, not a general program of severe living or a rejection of every agreeable interaction with others.

In Stobaeus. The definition concerns both speaking to someone else and admitting another's flattering discourse, with insofar as delimiting the precise respect in which the virtuous person is called austere.

In this edition. Keep the qualifying insofar as and the purpose of currying favor, and do not add prescriptions about food, clothing, bodily hardship or solitude that this brief passage does not supply.

A place to read. II.7.11s.2 Read the qualification and both directions of speech carefully; the definition specifies a relation to flattering discourse rather than describing the whole temperament or lifestyle of the virtuous person.

Meaning

Austēros describes moral austerity here, not an austere taste or merely a severe manner. Its definition is narrower than many ordinary English uses.

Use in the book

The virtuous person is called austere insofar as he neither offers nor accepts speech intended to curry favor. "Insofar as" limits the description: the passage identifies a relation to flattering discourse rather than condemning all agreeable conversation. It does not specify diet, dress, bodily hardship or withdrawal from common life. This ethical use differs materially from the same adjective's sensory use, so the older taste-entry alone would not explain it. The lexicon does not add an ascetic program that the quoted definition never gives.

The explanation is deliberately limited. A virtuous person neither offers such speech to anyone nor admits it from another person. The relevant feature is its purpose of currying favor, not simply whether it sounds

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[48] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 114. The adjective itself is the lemma; no unattested abstract noun is assumed.

pleasant. The two directions distinguish avoiding flattery oneself from refusing to receive it. Nothing further is said here about material deprivation or withdrawal from common life. This brief definition is therefore best read as a specific ethical use of austere, with the qualifying phrase preventing a broader character portrait from being silently added.

"insofar as he neither offers anyone nor admits speech intended to curry favor." (II.7.11s.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11s.2. Refusing favor-seeking speech defines this austerity. (English edition p. 377.)

Translation in this edition

Explain the local definition rather than inferring practices.

Attested Greek forms

Αὐστηρόν

Attested. II.7.11s.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 114; English edition p. 377.

Αὐστηρόν τε λέγεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον καθ' ὅσον οὔτε προσφέρει τινὶ οὔτε

See also

Austere taste (Volume One Lexicon, p. 49); Wise and base; Truthfulness and dissembling; Grace and favor.

Cheerfulness

Cheerfulness · Volume Two

εὔθυμος · euthumos — cheerful in mind; in a settled good frame of mind[49]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective describes a cheerful or settled frame of mind. Its relation to the noun euthymia does not make this witness an occurrence of that noun.

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[49] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 177–178. The same-author heading is supplied in the edition, carrying forward Democritus's name. Euthumos itself occurs in the running text, so the lexical evidence does not rest on the supplied attribution.

In Stobaeus. The Democritean saying connects cheerfulness with just and lawful activity, contrasting joyful waking and dreaming with fear and self-reproach after neglected obligations.

In this edition. Cheerful mind preserves the adjective's force. Avoid replacing it automatically with happiness, pleasure or a technical definition of the ultimate end of life.

A place to read. II.9.3 Read both halves of the saying: the cheerful agent's lawful deeds and the unjust agent's clear recollection supply the contrast that defines its ethical setting.

Meaning

Euthumos is an adjective describing a cheerful or settled frame of mind. Its lexical relation to the noun euthumia does not make an adjective witness an occurrence of that noun.

Use in the book

The saying transmitted under Democritus connects this condition with turning toward just and lawful deeds. The person rejoices both waking and dreaming, is vigorous and free from care. The contrary description concerns someone who neglects justice and what ought to be done: clear recollection then brings fear and self-reproach. Cheerfulness is consequently situated within an account of conduct and awareness, not identified with an isolated pleasant sensation or the absence of all demands. The contrast gives it ethical significance without supplying a formal definition of the ultimate end of life.

The saying does not describe a feeling in isolation from what someone does. It first places the cheerful person in a movement toward just and lawful deeds, then describes joy extending into both waking and dreaming. The contrary figure neglects justice and fails to perform what is required. Recollection is decisive: remembering clearly produces fear and self-reproach. The contrast ties mental condition to conduct and awareness without claiming that a pleasant mood by itself proves justice, or that every anxious person is guilty of wrongdoing.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.9.3. A cheerful agent's lawful activity is contrasted with recollection and self-reproach after injustice. (English edition p. 657.)

Translation in this edition

Cheerful mind brings out the adjectival force. Do not silently replace it with happiness or treat it as interchangeable with every use of eudaimonia.

Attested Greek forms

εὔθυμος

Attested. II.9.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 177-178; English edition p. 657.

Ὁ μὲν εὔθυμος ἐς ἔργα ἐπιφερόμενος δίκαια καὶ νόμιμα

See also

Happiness and flourishing; Recollection; Justice; Pleasure.

Choiceworthy

Choiceworthy · Volume Two

αἱρετός · hairetos — choiceworthy; worthy of choice[50]

At a Glance

The word. Choiceworthy describes what warrants reasonable choice; it differs from the prescribed activity to be chosen and from valuable things selected within the class of indifferents.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic analysis explains several evaluative descriptions through different relations to choice or virtue, and not every clause of that explanation survives without editorial supplementation.

In this edition. Keep choiceworthy separate from to be chosen and to be taken, and retain the visible uncertainty where the account's explanation is incomplete or supplied.

A place to read. II.7.5i Read the reasons for calling a good choiceworthy, pleasing, approvable and praiseworthy separately; the supplied missing clause limits how completely their definitions can be reconstructed.

[50] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 72, 75, 78, 118. The adjective does not by itself mean that the agent has already performed an act of choosing.

Meaning

Hairetos marks what warrants choice. The Stoic exposition distinguishes this adjective from what is to be taken and from what is to be chosen; the English similarities must not collapse their different functions.

Use in the book

A good is choiceworthy insofar as it moves reasonable choice. What is to be taken is associated with reasonable selection among valuable things. The account further distinguishes the good that one may have from the benefit expressed in acting or thinking wisely. In the Peripatetic exposition bodily goods can be choiceworthy for their own sake, a classification that does not follow the strict Stoic division of good and indifferent. The term therefore records both a technical contrast within one account and an expressed difference between accounts.

A sequence of related descriptions is organized by repeated insofar as clauses. Choiceworthiness concerns moving reasonable choice; pleasing concerns entering choice without misgiving; praise is connected with judging something to proceed from virtue. These are related evaluations, but their explanatory roles are not identical. The damaged and supplied wording in the middle prevents a secure complete reconstruction of the parallel series. The entry therefore helps the reader follow the surviving relations without making the attractive English list appear more textually complete or philosophically uniform than it is.

"A good is choiceworthy insofar as it moves reasonable choice" (II.7.5i).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5i. Choiceworthiness is explained through reasonable choice. (English edition p. 227.)

II.7.5o. Choiceworthy differs from what is to be taken. (English edition p. 237.)

II.7.6f.1. Choiceworthy differs from what is to be chosen. (English edition p. 249.)

II.7.13.6. Natural bodily goods are choiceworthy for themselves in the Peripatetic exposition. (English edition p. 391.)

Translation in this edition

Use "choiceworthy," retaining contrasts with the other verbal adjectives.

Attested Greek forms

αἱρετὸν

Attested. II.7.5i; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 72; English edition p. 227.

Καὶ πᾶν μὲν ἀγαθὸν αἱρετὸν εἶναι· ἀρεστὸν γὰρ καὶ δοκιμαστὸν καὶ ἐπαινετὸν ὑπάρχειν· πᾶν

See also

Good; Selection; To be chosen; Choice.

Courage

Courage · Volume Two

ἀνδρεία · andreia — courage[51]

At a Glance

The word. Courage is knowledge of terrible things in the Stoic definition, while the Peripatetic account regulates confidence and fear; praise of courage does not settle its constitution.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic formulation includes terrible, not terrible and neither, making discrimination across three classes central rather than defining courage by mere boldness or the absence of fear.

In this edition. Retain courage apart from bodily strength, confidence and rashness, and preserve the local school's definition instead of assuming every account praises universal fearlessness as its ideal.

A place to read. II.7.5b1.1 Compare courage's objects with the neighboring virtue definitions, especially their third neutral class; the shared knowledge pattern should not make the distinct concerns of each virtue disappear.

Meaning

Andreia is courage. The chapter contrasts its definition as knowledge in the Stoic account with its regulation of fear and confidence in the Peripatetic account.

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[51] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59, 61–62, 138. The gendered root does not justify replacing the technical moral concept with a claim about all men.

Use in the book

The Stoic formulation is knowledge of what is terrible, not terrible and neither; subordinate virtues include endurance, confidence, greatness of soul, stoutheartedness and love of effort. The Peripatetic examples deny that complete absence of fear is courage: fearing nothing, even a thunderbolt, is madness, while fearing every shadow is cowardice. A later definition makes courage blameless in confidence and fears at the mean. Both accounts can praise courage while disagreeing on its constitution and the ethical status of fear.

The courage definition occurs within a deliberate sequence of knowledge formulations. Its objects are terrible things, things not terrible and things neither, paralleling the threefold discriminations assigned to other virtues. The neutral class prevents courage from being summarized as a two-option reaction of fear or confidence. Nothing in this brief formulation identifies physical strength or an impressive outward manner as sufficient. The later shadow and thunderbolt examples explain another account's rejection of both extremes; they should be compared with this definition without being silently substituted for it.

"things terrible, things not terrible, and things neither" (II.7.5b1.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b1.1. Courage is defined as knowledge. (English edition p. 185.)

II.7.5b2.5. The subordinate virtues of courage. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.20.4. Two extremes of fear are rejected. (English edition p. 475.)

Translation in this edition

"Courage" should remain distinct from mere confidence, rashness and bodily strength.

Attested Greek forms

ἀνδρείαν

Attested. II.7.5b1.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 59; English edition p. 185.

δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην δεινῶν καὶ οὐ δεινῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων·

See also

Fear; Cowardice (Volume One Lexicon, p. 102); Endurance; Greatness of soul.

Desire

Desire · Volume Two

ἐπιθυμία · epithumia — craving; desire; appetite[52]

At a Glance

The word. Desire can mean the craving classified as a Stoic passion or the wider appetitive field regulated by virtue elsewhere; the Greek noun alone does not decide its status.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic sequence distinguishes anticipatory craving and fear from pleasure and distress following attainment, escape or frustration; their objects remain apparent goods or evils in the definition.

In this edition. Use craving for the restrictive passion and desire in wider accounts; preserve apparent and the stated conditions rather than treating every appetite as already vicious.

A place to read. II.7.10.2 Read the temporal relationship among the four primary genera and the paired conditions of attainment or escape; this is a connected evaluative sequence, not four isolated labels.

Meaning

Epithymia is rendered craving in the Stoic classification of passions, but desire in broader accounts of appetite. The difference reflects the local definition rather than two unrelated Greek words.

Use in the book

The Stoic account makes craving one of four primary passions, directed toward an apparent good and preceding pleasure when its object is attained. It is therefore not identical with every impulse or with reasonable wish. The Peripatetic account instead describes the temperate person as desiring appropriate objects at the appropriate time and amount; absence of all desire is a deficiency, illustrated by a stone. The lexicon keeps the restricted

[52] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 88, 141. The lemma is the noun, not a claim that every related adjective has the same technical force.

pathological sense distinct from this broader field of desire regulated by virtue.

The classification distinguishes primary genera from further passions referred to them. Craving has a forward-directed position alongside fear, while pleasure and distress depend on what occurs in relation to their objects. Attaining a craved object and escaping a feared one can both lead to pleasure; frustration and encountering the feared object lead to distress. This structure places desire in a connected evaluative account. The word apparent also matters: the definition is not an independent endorsement that every desired thing really is good.

"craving is directed toward an apparent good" (II.7.10.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10.2. Craving is a primary passion toward an apparent good. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.20.14. Due desire is distinguished from excess and total absence. (English edition p. 487.)

Translation in this edition

Read "craving" and "desire" with the local classification; do not assume every epithymia is already vicious.

Attested Greek forms

ἐπιθυμίαν

Attested. II.7.10.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 281.

ἔχειν. Πρῶτα δ' εἶναι τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι,

See also

Desiderative impulse; Will and wish; Passion; Self-control and temperance.

Dispreferred things

Dispreferred things · Volume Two

ἀποπροηγμένα · apoproēgmena — dispreferred things[53]

At a Glance

The word. Dispreferred things have substantial disvalue within the indifferent class, distinguishing a practical disadvantage from moral evil; some indifferents belong to neither preferred nor dispreferred class.

In Stobaeus. Degree and class govern the definition, so dispreferred does not give an unconditional command to avoid an object in every circumstance or at any cost.

In this edition. Retain dispreferred and its pairing with preferred indifferents; translating it as evil would confuse the evaluative levels that the report deliberately keeps apart.

A place to read. II.7.7b.1 Read preferred, dispreferred and neither together, paying attention to the amount and source of value; the neutral group prevents the two opposed classes from exhausting indifferents.

Meaning

Apoproēgmena are indifferents that possess substantial disvalue within their own evaluative class. They are opposed to preferred things without becoming moral evils in the Stoic classification.

Use in the book

The definition is paired with preferred things and followed by a third class, neither preferred nor dispreferred. Examples therefore have to be interpreted within the school's distinction between virtue or vice and natural advantages or disadvantages. The practical point is that one can reasonably reject a dispreferred thing while denying that it damages happiness in the way vice does. The account also allows differences of degree in value or disvalue; "dispreferred" is not a universal command to avoid an object regardless of circumstances.

The neutral class prevents every difference between objects from automatically becoming a preference or dispreference. Both opposed classes require a considerable amount of value or disvalue, which may belong to the

[53] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 80–81. Do not confuse disvalue in this scheme with an account's moral condemnation of injustice or cowardice.

thing itself or to what it produces. This is more structured than a division into attractive and unattractive circumstances. The marked supplement in the final definition restores part of a parallel; it should not make the English appear wholly transmitted. Practical ranking operates within the class already called indifferent.

"Dispreferred things are those which similarly have much disvalue." (II.7.7b.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7b.1. The definition specifies substantial disvalue. (English edition p. 255.)

II.7.7b.3. The account lists dispreferred examples. (English edition p. 257.)

Translation in this edition

The deliberately technical "dispreferred" keeps the connection with preferred indifferents visible.

Attested Greek forms

ἀποπροηγμένα

Attested. II.7.7b.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 80; English edition p. 255.

αὐτά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά· καὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα, τὰ δ' ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δ' οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα. Προηγμένα μέν, ὅσα ἀδιάφορα ὄντα πολλὴν

See also

Preferred things; Indifferent things; Rejection; Evil.

Distress

Distress · Volume Two

λύπη · lupē — distress; pain; grief[54]

At a Glance

The word. Distress is a primary Stoic passion, while pain also belongs to the Peripatetic field of ethical training; the same English word can therefore conceal different argumentative settings.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic sequence connects distress with frustrated craving or encountering a feared object, contrasting it with pleasure without classifying every bodily hardship as the same mental event.

In this edition. Retain distress for the defined mental passion and check the Greek and context when pain appears; distinct source terms and classifications should not become one modern category.

A place to read. II.7.10.2 Follow the two routes into distress and compare the two routes into pleasure; the repeated conditions make the role of prior craving or fear visible.

Meaning

Lypē can be rendered distress or pain. In the Stoic classification it is a primary passion; in the Peripatetic discussion it belongs to the field in which ethical virtue is developed and exercised.

Use in the book

The Stoic sequence connects distress with failing to obtain what was craved or encountering what was feared, contrasting it with pleasure. Its definition includes the opinion that an evil is present and that contraction is appropriate. The Peripatetic account does not simply repeat this condemnation: pleasure and pain accompany passions, and ethical virtue concerns their proper ordering. The same English "pain" can also translate bodily hardship elsewhere, so the Greek term and the local category should be checked before drawing a philosophical conclusion.

Distress is not merely placed after craving in a list. It receives two stated conditions: failing to attain what was craved and encountering what was feared. These mirror the conditions for pleasure, attainment and escape. The

[54] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 88, 90, 138. The general noun should not be reduced to grief over bereavement.

pattern explains why a discussion of distress can refer back to another passion and its evaluative object. It does not establish that every painful bodily occurrence has this structure. Later treatment of pleasures and pains therefore needs its own setting, especially where it describes the field in which ethical training forms character.

"distress when we fail to attain what we craved or encounter what we feared" (II.7.10.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10.2. Distress follows frustrated craving or encountered fear. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.10b.3. The passion is analyzed through an opinion of present evil. (English edition p. 287.)

II.7.20.6. Pleasure and pain define the field of ethical virtue. (English edition p. 477.)

Translation in this edition

"Distress" helps distinguish the Stoic mental passion from bodily *πόνος* without making every occurrence purely emotional.

Attested Greek forms

λύπην

Attested. II.7.10.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 281.

τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς

See also

Pain (Volume One Lexicon, p. 304); Passion; Pleasure; Fear.

End

End · Volume Two

τέλος · telos — end; final aim[55]

At a Glance

The word. The ethical end is what orders the other pursuits of life without itself being pursued for a further purpose; ordinary endings need not have that force.

In Stobaeus. Several definitions test whether a good belongs within the final activity or merely supplies a condition needed for living well in the account.

In this edition. Keep end and target distinct, and preserve the reported criticism of Critolaus rather than treating every definition in the chapter as equally accepted.

A place to read. II.7.3b.1 Read the repeated Stoic formulations beside the objection to composing the end from all three classes of goods; their explanatory direction matters.

Meaning

Telos can name a limit or completion, but ethical accounts ask what is pursued for its own sake and organizes the other pursuits of life. Its ordinary senses are not all technical definitions of happiness.

Use in the book

The Stoic definition makes the end that for whose sake everything is appropriately done, without its being done for something further. The epitome criticizes a definition associated with Critolaus that composes the end from every class of goods: bodily and external goods need not be parts of the end even when they are conditions of living well. Later formulations distinguish the end from a target and from the initial attraction of a nonrational creature. These disagreements belong to the reports and should remain visible.

The three Stoic definitions restate one asymmetry: other appropriate activities point toward the end, but the end does not point beyond itself. The change in wording from purposes to reference makes this an organizing

[55] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 46, 76. The chapter reports several accounts rather than giving one definition accepted by every school.

relation, not merely the final event in a sequence. The criticism of Critolaus then asks a different question: which goods actually constitute the end? It excludes bodily and external goods from that composition while retaining activities of the soul's virtue. A reader should therefore distinguish a definition's organizing function from the disputed inventory of what fulfills it.

"everything is appropriately done" (II.7.3b.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.3b.1. The Stoic final aim and the criticism of the Critolaean formulation. (English edition p. 139.)

II.7.6b. Three senses distinguish final good, target and attainment. (English edition p. 243.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "end" distinct from "target"; do not make every occurrence mean a final event in time.

Attested Greek forms

τέλος

Attested. II.7.3b.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 46; English edition p. 139.

Λέγεται δ' ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν Στωϊκῶν ὁρικῶς "τέλος ἐστὶν οὗ ἕνεκα πάντα πράττεται καθηκόντως, αὐτὸ δὲ πράττεται

See also

Target; Preliminary end; Happiness and flourishing; Good.

Endurance

Endurance · Volume Two

καρτερία; ὑπομονή; ἐμμενετός · karteria; hupomonē; emmenetos — endurance; remaining steadfast; holding to[56]

At a Glance

The word. Endurance combines distinct local expressions for abiding by correct judgment, bearing what should be borne and holding to what merits persistence; it does not authorize stubborn attachment to every decision.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic virtue list places endurance beside confidence, greatness of soul, stoutheartedness and love of effort, differentiating their functions even when ordinary English might describe them all as fortitude.

In this edition. Preserve the distinction between endurance nouns and the attested adjective for what is worthy of being held to; do not insert an unattested noun into the Greek headword family.

A place to read. II.7.5b2.5 Read endurance's definition with the neighboring forms of courage, then compare the account of things to be borne and held to rather than treating persistence alone as sufficient virtue.

Meaning

These related terms concern persistence but their grammatical and ethical roles are not identical. Karteria is knowledge abiding by correct judgments; other forms concern enduring or adhering to something.

Use in the book

The Stoic subordinate-virtue list places endurance under courage. A separate analysis distinguishes goods worthy of being endured or held to from benefits to be endured or held to, extending the contrast between choiceworthy and to be chosen. The Peripatetic exposition treats endurance of terrible things as part of stoutheartedness. The lexicon does not turn every instance into passive suffering: the object may be loyalty to a judgment, resistance to toil or perseverance in fitting action.

The decisive condition is that the judgment being maintained has been made correctly. Endurance therefore does not praise staying with an error merely because changing course is difficult. Its neighbors distinguish further

[56] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61–62, 78, 147. Karteria and hypomonē are persistence nouns; the related adjective emmenetos means worthy of being held to. They are not presented as exact synonyms.

functions: confidence concerns what will be encountered, stoutheartedness the soul's unconquerability, and love of effort carrying out a task despite toil. These definitions explain why several expressions associated with bearing or persisting are needed. The separate passage on things worthy of being held to shifts attention from the enduring agent to the objects appropriate for such persistence.

"Endurance is knowledge that abides by what has been correctly judged." (II.7.5b2.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.5. Endurance abides by correct judgments. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.6f.2. Worthy-of and to-be forms are distinguished. (English edition p. 249.)

II.7.25.15. Stoutheartedness is unconquerable in endurance. (English edition p. 527.)

Translation in this edition

Choose "endurance," "adherence" or "holding to" according to the form and object.

Attested Greek forms

καρτερίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.5; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 61-62; English edition p. 191.

καρτερίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐμμενετικὴν τοῖς ὀρθῶς κριθεῖσι· θαρραλεότητα δὲ

ὑπομοναῖς

Attested. II.7.25.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 147; English edition p. 527.

εὐψυχίαν δὲ ἕξιν ἀήττητον ἐν δεινῶν ὑπομοναῖς, μεταξὺ ἀψυχίας καὶ ἀρειμανιότητος· φιλοπονίαν δὲ ἕξιν ἀνένδοτον

ἐμμενετὰ

Attested. II.7.6f.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 78; English edition p. 249.

τὰ μὲν ἀγαθὰ πάντα ἐστὶν ὑπομενετὰ καὶ ἐμμενετὰ

See also

Courage; Stoutheartedness and love of effort; Choiceworthy; To be chosen.

Envy

Envy · Volume Two

φθόνος · phthonos — envy[57]

At a Glance

The word. Envy is distress at another's goods in this taxonomy, not necessarily distress at undeserved success; rivalry, jealousy and indignation require their separate objects and local evaluative distinctions.

In Stobaeus. The neighboring definitions differentiate deprivation, admiration, imitation and another person's shared attainment, showing why a single English label cannot replace the report's several related patterns of response.

In this edition. Use envy where phthonos is printed rather than automatically substituting jealousy, and do not improve the stated feeling into justified indignation by adding undeserved to the other person's goods.

A place to read. II.7.10c.5 Read envy's brief definition beside the longer distinctions of rivalry and jealousy; the additional senses are explicitly named and should not be attributed indiscriminately to every term in the paragraph.

Meaning

Phthonos is envy, defined in the Stoic list as distress at the goods of others. It is distinguished from rivalry, jealousy and indignation.

Use in the book

The definition does not require that the other person's good fortune is undeserved. That distinction matters when the Peripatetic account calls indignation a mean between enviousness and malicious joy and lists indignation among admirable feelings. A distress directed simply at another's goods cannot be silently improved into a justified protest at unfairness. The adjacent discussion also recognizes more than one sense of zēlos, rivalry or emulation. The source's named distinctions allow related feelings to differ in their object and moral assessment.

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[57] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 92, 146. A neighbor's goods may be regarded as good by the agent without the report granting them the strict moral status of goods.

Envy receives the shortest definition in the sequence, while rivalry is developed through several uses. One concerns another attaining what one lacks; others concern admiration and imitation. Jealousy then has a separate relation to another's also attaining a desired object, with also supplied in the edition. The contrast makes it especially important not to attach that added condition to envy itself. Nor does envy's definition mention whether the other person deserves the goods. The later comparison with indignation introduces another ethical distinction that must not be inserted retroactively into this wording.

"Envy is distress at the goods of others" (II.7.10c.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10c.5. Envy is distress at another's goods. (English edition p. 293.)

II.7.25.6. Enviousness is an extreme contrasted with indignation. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

Use "envy," not "jealousy," where φθόνος is printed.

Attested Greek forms

Φθόνος

Attested. II.7.10c.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 92; English edition p. 293.

Φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς· ζῆλος δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ ἕτερον

See also

Rivalry and jealousy; Indignation; Malicious joy; Distress.

Ethical mean

Ethical mean · Volume Two

μεσότης · mesotēs — mean; intermediate ethical state[58]

At a Glance

The word. The ethical mean is relative to us and constrained by knowledge and reason; it differs from a numerical midpoint, arbitrary compromise or everything described as intermediate elsewhere.

In Stobaeus. The passage explains action along a continuum before distinguishing relations among magnitudes from relations to us, then identifies the latter mean with what knowledge and reason prescribe.

In this edition. Keep mean and intermediate ethical state distinct from merely middle things; the text supplies a rational standard rather than permission for each individual to choose an unexplained personal balance.

A place to read. II.7.20.9 Follow the continuum comparison through the two relational senses before reading the conclusion about the mean relative to us; its explanatory direction prevents a purely quantitative interpretation.

Meaning

Mesotēs is a mean or intermediate relation. The ethical Peripatetic discussion makes it a standard of fitting quality relative to us, rather than a numerical average or indiscriminate compromise.

Use in the book

The account compares excess and deficiency in exercise with the corruption of virtue. It then distinguishes the mean relative to us, determined by knowledge and reason, from the quantitative midpoint. Virtue is a choice-involving state at this mean, determined as the practically wise person would determine it. Examples concern anger, fear, desire, giving and self-assessment. Not every intermediate thing is a virtuous mean: the intermediate life between virtue and vice and the Stoic indifferents use different classifications. The shared English “middle” should not conceal this difference.

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[58] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 139–140. A rationally fitting mean is not simply whatever the individual prefers.

The comparison begins with magnitudes, but the conclusion does not simply transfer a measured midpoint to ethical conduct. The paragraph distinguishes excess, deficiency and mean in relation to one another from those in relation to us. It then singles out the latter as best because of what knowledge and reason prescribe. The because clause gives the evaluative constraint; relative to us is not a claim that any privately preferred amount is correct. The next discussion of quality develops a distinction already prepared by this separation of relations.

"what knowledge and reason prescribe" (II.7.20.9).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.20.9. The mean relative to us is constrained by knowledge and reason. (English edition p. 481.)

II.7.20.10. Quality is distinguished from quantity. (English edition p. 483.)

II.7.20.12. Virtue is defined through the mean. (English edition p. 485.)

Translation in this edition

"Mean" names the ethical relation; the broader word's other uses should not be imported into these examples.

Attested Greek forms

μεσότητι

Attested. II.7.20.12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 140; English edition p. 485.

Διὸ ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν·

See also

Excess and deficiency; Understanding and practical wisdom; Virtue and excellence; Indifferent things.

Evil

Evil · Volume Two

κακόν · kakon — evil; a bad thing; evils[59]

At a Glance

The word. Evil may denote what is bad generally or a strict moral classification; the presence of suffering does not by itself settle which sense the passage uses.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic list makes vice central to evil and places opposing bodily or external conditions together among indifferents; later accounts give those conditions different ethical roles.

In this edition. Read evil with the speaker's stated classification, and preserve apparent where a passion concerns an agent's judgment rather than an established fact about its object.

A place to read. II.7.5a Compare the vice list with the following indifferent pairs; the classification gives disease and health the same broad status without equating their practical desirability.

Meaning

Kakon ranges from what is bad to a technically classified evil. Its force must be read with the account's division of goods, evils and intermediate things.

Use in the book

In Zeno's classification, folly, intemperance, injustice and cowardice are evils because they are vices or participate in vice. Disease, poverty and death are not therefore evils in that strict scheme, even when they are naturally dispreferred. Peripatetic passages give bodily injury and external adversity a different status and can distinguish nobility under suffering from happiness. The lexicon preserves those disagreements. Descriptions such as apparent evil in the account of fear concern the agent's evaluative judgment, not the lexicon's endorsement that the object really is evil.

The parallel lists explain why the word evil cannot simply be identified with whatever someone fears. Folly, intemperance, injustice and cowardice are grouped through their relation to vice; life, reputation, pleasure, wealth

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[59] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 57–58, 88, 132. An account's naming of something as an evil is not automatically shared by neighboring excerpts.

and health are instead paired with their opposites under another heading. The report thus separates ethical classification from the ordinary emotional response to an event. Its open-ended ending, things like these, also warns against reading the illustrations as a complete catalogue. This passage supplies a school-specific criterion, which the later Peripatetic discussion must be allowed to question or qualify.

"everything that is vice or partakes of vice" (II.7.5a).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5a. The Stoic definition links evils with vice. (English edition p. 179.)

II.7.10.2. Fear is directed toward an apparent evil. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.18.7. The Peripatetic account distinguishes noble endurance from happiness amid evils. (English edition p. 447.)

Translation in this edition

"Evil" can be technical; "bad" may express an ordinary evaluative use. Neither should silently become "unpleasant."

Attested Greek forms

κακά

Attested. II.7.5a; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 57-58; English edition p. 179.

οὐσίας μετέχει· τῶν δ' ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην,

See also

Good; Vice and wickedness; Dispreferred things; Fear.

Excess and deficiency

Excess and deficiency · Volume Two

ὑπερβολή; ἔλλειψις; ἔνδεια · huperbolē; elleipsis; endeia — excess; deficiency; falling short[60]

At a Glance

The word. Excess and deficiency describe opposite failures of due measure; ethical examples use bodily analogies without reducing virtue to physical balance or praising the absence of all feeling.

In Stobaeus. Visible cases of exercise, food and drink are offered as assurance about less visible ethical conditions, introducing an explanatory analogy rather than a medical regimen or quantitative moral formula.

In this edition. Preserve both directions of failure and the later qualitative standard; reducing feeling indefinitely is not the same as responding as reason and the practically wise agent would determine.

A place to read. II.7.20.3 Read the stated purpose of using evidence of the senses before the examples; it explains why strength and health appear in a discussion about the destruction of virtues.

Meaning

These nouns describe going beyond or falling short of due measure. The ethical exposition relates them to the destruction of virtue and to the states opposed to its mean.

Use in the book

Too much and too little exercise destroy strength; excess and deficiency in food or drink impair health. The account uses these visible examples to explain the ethical pattern, not to identify virtue with a bodily balance. Courage, gentleness and temperance require appropriate responses rather than simply less feeling. Deficiency can be as blameworthy as excess: never feeling anger or desire is not automatically praised. The quantitative illustration is later qualified by the mean's ethical quality, determined through reason and the practically wise agent.

The text explains its own use of bodily examples: visible things are meant to give assurance concerning what is not visible. Too much exercise and too

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[60] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 137–140. Endeia and elleipsis are related in this account but remain distinct printed words.

little both destroy strength, while due measure preserves it; drink and food supply a parallel. These are analogies supporting an ethical pattern, not a prescription for a particular amount of exercise or diet. The supplied concerning remains marked. Later examples must therefore determine what the relevant excess or deficiency is in conduct, rather than letting a simple arithmetic midpoint answer the moral question.

"wishing to provide assurance drawn from visible things" (II.7.20.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.20.3. Exercise and diet illustrate both directions of failure. (English edition p. 475.)

II.7.20.5. Excess and deficiency undermine virtues. (English edition p. 477.)

II.7.20.10. The mean is a qualitative standard. (English edition p. 483.)

Translation in this edition

Keep the pairs and their varying nouns rather than replacing every deficiency with a generic "vice."

Attested Greek forms

ἐνδείας

Attested. II.7.20.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 137-138; English edition p. 475.

Ταύτας δή φασιν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ

ὑπερβολῆς

Attested. II.7.20.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 137-138; English edition p. 475.

Ταύτας δή φασιν ὑπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρεσθαι. Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἔνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων

ἐλλείψεις

Attested. II.7.20.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 138; English edition p. 477.

ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν οὔσας κατὰ ταύτας ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἐλλείψεις φθείρειν αὐτάς, τὰς δὲ μετριότητας αὔξειν.

See also

Ethical mean; Measure (Volume One Lexicon, p. 266); Self-control and temperance; Gentleness.

Fear

Fear · Volume Two

φόβος · phobos — fear[61]

At a Glance

The word. Fear is a primary Stoic passion directed toward an apparent evil, while the Peripatetic account of courage evaluates appropriate responsiveness rather than demanding universal fearlessness.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic sequence places fear before the later responses of pleasure or distress, so escape and encounter connect its anticipated object with subsequent emotional movement.

In this edition. Preserve apparent and the local account's qualifications; making fear always irrational everywhere would import one school's definition into a different treatment of courage and feeling.

A place to read. II.7.10.2 Read fear's forward-directed place alongside the later consequences of escaping or encountering what was feared; the definition's object remains apparent evil rather than an endorsed judgment.

Meaning

Phobos is fear. Its moral status differs between the Stoic analysis of passion and the Peripatetic account of courage as appropriate responsiveness between extremes.

Use in the book

The Stoic account directs fear toward an apparent evil and analyzes it as an avoidance that is disobedient to reason. The Peripatetic examples reject both fearing everything, even a shadow, and fearing nothing, even a thunderbolt. Courage therefore does not mean the mere removal of every fear in that exposition. Its later definitions concern confidence and fears at the mean. The lexicon preserves this difference instead of combining the school-specific descriptions into a single definition of fear.

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[61] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 88, 90, 138. The avoidance term in the passion definition should not automatically be identified with ἀφορμή.

The word apparent prevents a reader from taking the object feared as an evil already established by the report. Fear occupies an anticipatory position: what happens afterward is explained through the relation between expectation and event. Escape can produce pleasure, while encountering the object leads to distress. This makes the fourfold classification a connected account rather than a simple inventory. The later courage examples address a different question, the fitting extent of confidence and fear, and cannot be evaluated merely by substituting this earlier passion definition into their sentences.

"fear toward an apparent evil" (II.7.10.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10.2. Fear is one of four primary Stoic passions. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.10b.2. Its definition links it with avoidance of an apparent evil. (English edition p. 287.)

II.7.20.4. Courage is neither total fearlessness nor fear of everything. (English edition p. 475.)

Translation in this edition

"Fear" remains distinct from cowardice, which names a vicious condition rather than every fearful experience.

Attested Greek forms

φόβον

Attested. II.7.10.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 281.

δ' εἶναι τῷ γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν

See also

Cowardice (Volume One Lexicon, p. 102); Courage; Passion; Aversion.

Generosity

Generosity · Volume Two

ἐλευθεριότης · eleutheriotēs — generosity; liberality[62]

At a Glance

The word. Generosity is a mean between prodigality and illiberality, distinguished from giving haphazardly or refusing all gifts; a damaged definition limits how fully its positive account can be recovered in this volume.

In Stobaeus. The local passages connect generosity with an appropriately directed use of resources and with contentment, while preserving the missing text instead of inventing the end of a familiar virtue definition.

In this edition. Keep the supplied generous and the marked gap in their passage; do not complete the lost account from a parallel or infer a fixed monetary average from the word mean.

A place to read. II.7.20.17 Read the rejection of both haphazard giving and giving nothing, then compare the explicit mean and the later association with self-sufficiency, keeping the missing continuation visible.

Meaning

Eleutheriotēs is generosity or liberality, distinguished from careless giving and unwillingness to give. Its relation to freedom does not mean free of charge.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic classification places generosity between prodigality and illiberality. Its example rejects giving haphazardly and refusing to give, but a gap follows, so the missing positive description is not reconstructed. Self-sufficiency also joins contentment with circumstances to generosity, preventing contentment from meaning refusal to share. The ethical context concerns fitting use of resources, not an assumption that the greatest expenditure is always best. The source's exact contrasts are more informative than a general endorsement of giving.

The short account rules out two easy substitutes for generosity: indiscriminate distribution and complete refusal to give. It then breaks off,

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[62] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 141, 146–147. Do not supply the lost mean-description silently from a parallel text.

with the adjective itself supplied. The later definition names prodigality and illiberality as the extremes, but that does not recover every word missing from the earlier passage. A further account associates generosity with self-sufficiency and contentment with what comes one's way. Together these passages identify a discriminating relation to resources; they do not supply a numerical spending rule or a complete reconstruction of the damaged definition.

"neither the person who gives things away haphazardly nor the person who gives nothing away" (II.7.20.17).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.25.5. Generosity is a mean between extremes. (English edition p. 517.)

II.7.20.17. The example has a following gap. (English edition p. 489.)

II.7.25.14. Self-sufficiency is joined with generosity. (English edition p. 525.)

Translation in this edition

"Generosity" is the usual rendering; "liberality" retains traditional terminology.

Attested Greek forms

ἐλευθεριότητα

Attested. II.7.25.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 517.

πραότητα δὲ ἕξιν μέσην ὀργιλότητος καὶ ἀναλγησίας· ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ μεσότητα ἀσωτίας καὶ ἀνελευθερίας· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ μεσότητα

See also

Wealth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 461); Use; Self-sufficiency; Magnificence.

Gentleness

Gentleness · Volume Two

πραότης; πραότης · praotēs — gentleness[63]

At a Glance

The word. Gentleness governs becoming angry when, how and with whom one should, occupying a praiseworthy position between indiscriminate anger and a complete failure to become angry in the Peripatetic account.

In Stobaeus. The account evaluates the state through its activities involving passions, so its praise of gentleness does not prescribe eliminating anger regardless of the situation or person toward whom it is directed.

In this edition. Preserve the conditions of proper anger and the passage's qualified description of the irascible person; do not replace the mean with a blanket instruction never to experience anger.

A place to read. II.7.20.8 Read the two hypothetical extremes and the three conditions governing anger; the concluding sentence explains how a state can be praised through activities that involve a passion.

Meaning

Praotēs is gentleness, whose definition permits fitting anger. The absence of every angry response is not necessarily its virtue in the Peripatetic account.

Use in the book

The example contrasts the irascible person angry at everything with the slack or callous person never angry at anything. Gentleness is the state through which anger occurs when, how and with whom it should. Its later definition calls it intermediate between irascibility and callousness. Forms both with and without iota subscript are printed; this variation does not change the named virtue. This is a context in which regulating a passion differs from defining passion as excessive disobedient impulse.

The argument starts from two imagined patterns: anger at everything in every way, and anger at nothing at all. Both are blameworthy. Gentleness is then identified through the circumstances of anger—when, how and with whom—not through an arithmetic quantity of feeling. The conclusion

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[63] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 139, 146. The two spellings reflect the local edition, not two concepts.

generalizes the example: virtues are states through which activities involving passions become praiseworthy. This gives the discussion its force. Feeling anger does not by itself establish failure in this account; the state and the way the feeling enters action must be assessed.

"the praiseworthy state is gentleness" (II.7.20.8).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.20.8. Fitting conditions of anger define gentleness. (English edition p. 481.)

II.7.25.5. The state is named with a spelling variation. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

"Gentleness" should not be paraphrased as never becoming angry.

Attested Greek forms

πραότητα

Attested. II.7.20.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 139; English edition p. 481.

εἶναι ψεκτάς, ἐπαινουμένην δὲ ἕξιν ὑπάρχειν τὴν πραότητα, καθ' ἣν ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ᾧ δεῖ ὀργιζόμεθα. Διόπερ ἕξεις

πραότητα

Attested. II.7.25.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 517.

πραότητα δὲ ἕξιν μέσην ὀργιλότητος καὶ ἀναλγησίας· ἐλευθεριότητα δὲ μεσότητα

See also

Anger; Ethical mean; Passion; Self-control and temperance.

Good

Good · Volume Two

ἀγαθόν · agathon — good; a good thing; goods[64]

At a Glance

The word. Good can name a strict moral class or a broader kind of advantage; the local division of goods, evils and indifferents determines its scope.

In Stobaeus. Zeno's classification groups virtues and participation in virtue together, while bodily conditions and external circumstances appear in opposed pairs among indifferents rather than goods.

In this edition. Preserve the distinctions between good, valuable, preferred and choiceworthy; using good for every favorable condition would erase the structure that the Stoic passage establishes.

A place to read. II.7.5a Begin with Zeno's three classes and follow the paired examples of life and death, reputation and disrepute, and health and disease within the indifferent class.

Meaning

To agathon is the good; the plural agatha names goods. Classification depends on the account being reported, so the presence of this familiar word does not settle what counts as good.

Use in the book

Zeno's division includes virtue and participation in virtue among goods, vice among evils, and health, wealth, life and their opposites among indifferents. Preferred indifferents can have selective value without becoming goods. The Peripatetic exposition instead includes goods of soul, body and external life, while distinguishing their rank, use and contribution to happiness. Its claim that some bodily goods are choiceworthy for themselves does not make them constituents of the final activity. Several classifications overlap without being reduced to one list.

The classification opens with a statement about existing things and then divides them ethically. Its lists are deliberately parallel: practical wisdom corresponds to folly, temperance to intemperance, justice to injustice and

[64] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 57–58, 75, 136. The lexical article records reported positions rather than defining the good independently of them.

courage to cowardice. The phrase extending each list to whatever partakes in virtue or vice prevents the examples from being an exhaustive inventory. By contrast, both members of such familiar oppositions as life and death fall within indifferents. Consequently, the everyday habit of calling one side good and the other bad cannot be carried over without examining the class in which the report places them.

"some are goods, some evils, and some indifferents" (II.7.5a).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5a. Zeno distinguishes goods, evils and indifferents. (English edition p. 179.)

II.7.5o. The good differs from what merely has value. (English edition p. 237.)

II.7.19.8. The Peripatetic list includes psychic, bodily and external goods. (English edition p. 467.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "good," "valuable," "preferred" and "choiceworthy" distinct wherever the report distinguishes them.

Attested Greek forms

ἀγαθά

Attested. II.7.5a; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 57-58; English edition p. 179.

Ζήνων, ὅσα οὐσίας μετέχει· τῶν δ' ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἀγαθά, τὰ δὲ κακά, τὰ δὲ ἀδιάφορα. Ἀγαθὰ μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα· φρόνησιν,

See also

Evil; Preferred things; Indifferent things; Value and disvalue.

Good deliberation and resourcefulness

Good deliberation and resourcefulness · Volume Two

εὐβουλία; εὐλογιστία; ἀγχίνοια; εὐμηχανία · euboulia; eulogistia; anchinoia; eumēchania — good deliberation; sound calculation; quickness of mind; resourcefulness[65]

At a Glance

The word. These related forms of practical intelligence concern choosing advantageous action, weighing events, finding the appropriate action quickly and discovering a way through difficulty, each with its own stated function.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic account presents these abilities as kinds of knowledge under practical wisdom, rather than treating speed, calculation or ingenuity as automatically good independently of their objects and direction.

In this edition. Distinguish quick recognition of appropriate action from precipitate assent, and mark the supplied neighboring definition without making that editorial restoration the only support for an otherwise attested headword.

A place to read. II.7.5b2.3 Follow the sequence from what and how to do through weighing, finding and overcoming difficulty; the definitions make several contributions to action rather than merely praising cleverness in general.

Meaning

These named cognitive virtues fall under practical wisdom. They distinguish advantageous deliberation, weighing and summing, immediate discovery of the appropriate, and finding a way through difficulties.

Use in the book

Good deliberation knows what to do and how to act advantageously. Sound calculation weighs against one another and sums up what is happening and being accomplished. Quickness of mind finds the appropriate action at once; resourcefulness discovers a way through a difficult situation. These are not undifferentiated cleverness. Their classification as forms of knowledge belongs to the Stoic account. Other neighboring definitions are partly supplied, and their transmission should remain distinguished from these surviving clauses.

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[65] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 60–61. Each lemma has its own transmitted witness; this is a conceptual grouping, not a claimed lexical family.

The opening definition asks both what to do and how to do it, connecting deliberation with advantageous action. Sound calculation then weighs and sums up events, while quickness of mind finds the appropriate action at once. Resourcefulness addresses a further problem: finding a way through difficulty. The account thus distributes practical intelligence across several tasks. Speed alone is not its measure, and the quickness praised here should not be confused with the separately criticized hastiness of assent. A supplied passage between these definitions is visible in the translation and should retain its editorial status.

"Resourcefulness is knowledge that finds a way through difficulties." (II.7.5b2.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.3. Four definitions distinguish complementary functions. (English edition p. 189.)

II.7.5b2.2. The group is subordinated to practical wisdom. (English edition p. 189.)

Translation in this edition

The descriptive phrases preserve differences that "intelligence" would obscure.

Attested Greek forms

Εὐβουλίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 60-61; English edition p. 189.

Εὐβουλίαν μὲν οὖν εἶναι λέγουσιν ἐπιστήμην τοῦ ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες

εὐλογιστίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 60-61; English edition p. 189.

ποῖα καὶ πῶς πράττοντες πράξομεν συμφερόντως· εὐλογιστίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀνταιρετικὴν καὶ συγκεφαλαιωτικὴν τῶν γινομένων

ἀγχίνοιαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 60-61; English edition p. 189.

συγκεφαλαιωτικὴν τῶν γινομένων καὶ ἀποτελουμένων· ἀγχίνοιαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὑρετικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα· νουνέχειαν

εὐμηχανίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 60-61; English edition p. 189.

ἐπιστήμην⟩ ἐπιτευκτικὴν τοῦ ἐν ἑκάστῳ σκοποῦ· εὐμηχανίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὑρετικὴν διεξόδου πραγμάτων·

See also

Understanding and practical wisdom; Knowledge;
Appropriate action; Target.

Greatness of soul

Greatness of soul · Volume Two

μεγαλοψυχία · megalopsuchia — greatness of soul; magnanimity[66]

At a Glance

The word. Greatness of soul is defined as knowledge in the Stoic virtue list and as a mean concerning worth in the Peripatetic account; these descriptions should remain connected without being merged.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic definition places the agent above events common to virtuous and base people, while the later account distinguishes taking what is due from claiming everything or deserving nothing.

In this edition. Do not turn greatness of soul into immunity from bodily events or universal entitlement; preserve the knowledge definition and the later qualification according to worth in their respective contexts.

A place to read. II.7.5b2.5 Read the events shared by virtuous and base people as part of the definition's scope, then compare the later discussion of what one properly claims according to worth.

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[66] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61–62, 141–142, 146. This virtue differs from magnificence, which concerns fitting splendor.

Meaning

Megalopsychia is greatness of soul, not simply pride or large ambitions. Its definition changes with the account's wider theory of virtue.

Use in the book

The Stoic subordinate-virtue list calls it knowledge raising one above things naturally occurring among virtuous and base people alike. This connects it with the distinction between virtue and external circumstances. The Peripatetic account places it between vanity and smallness of soul. Its example concerns assessing one's worth correctly, neither claiming every great thing nor thinking oneself worthy of nothing. Both oppose indiscriminate estimates of externals, but the knowledge definition should not silently be rewritten as the mean definition.

The phrase about events common to virtuous and base people limits the kind of superiority claimed. Such events do not themselves distinguish a person's ethical quality. The definition places greatness of soul within knowledge rather than describing exemption from illness, loss or other occurrences. In the later Peripatetic account, the relevant contrast instead concerns how people assess what they deserve: claiming every great thing and claiming nothing are both rejected. The article therefore requires two contexts, one about relation to events and another about an appropriately measured claim to worth.

"Greatness of soul is knowledge that raises one above the things that naturally occur among both the virtuous and the base." (II.7.5b2.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.5. The Stoic definition concerns superiority to common circumstances. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.20.18. The example regulates estimates of worth. (English edition p. 491.)

II.7.25.5. Vanity and smallness of soul are the extremes. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

"Greatness of soul" keeps the compound visible; "magnanimity" is conventional.

Attested Greek forms

μεγαλοψυχίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.5; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 61-62; English edition p. 191.

ἣν οἴδαμεν ὅτι οὐδενὶ δεινῷ μὴ περιπεσούμεν· μεγαλοψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ὑπεράνω ποιοῦσαν τῶν πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε

See also

Courage; Value and disvalue; Ethical mean; Self-sufficiency.

Happiness and flourishing

Happiness and flourishing · Volume Two

εὐδαιμονία · eudaimonia — happiness; flourishing; a good life[67]

At a Glance

The word. Happiness concerns the fulfillment of a life, and the chapter's broad starting descriptions must be distinguished from its competing explanations of where that fulfillment lies.

In Stobaeus. The introductory survey accepts several expressions for living well before dividing accounts by soul, body and their combination; verbal agreement leaves substantive disagreement unresolved.

In this edition. Use happiness as the edition's usual equivalent, but let flourishing explain the scope of a life rather than imply consensus among the surveyed schools.

A place to read. II.7.3d Read the movement from simple descriptions of happiness to the soul and body division; the examples show why a further analysis is necessary.

Meaning

Eudaimonia names the fulfillment of a life, not merely a pleasant feeling. The chapter explains it through competing accounts of the end and through the activities or conditions a good life requires.

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[67] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 48, 77, 145. Do not infer that every mention of pleasure defines happiness as pleasure.

Use in the book

The initial survey treats happiness as synonymous with the end while distinguishing ends located in soul, body or both. In the Stoic account, living in agreement and the activity of virtue govern the analysis; the account distinguishes happiness from being happy as the target from its attainment. The Peripatetic exposition gives bodily and external goods a different role. Virtue is sufficient for a noble life but not by itself for a happy one amid adverse natural conditions. This expressed disagreement prevents the same English word from supplying an artificial consensus.

The passage begins by gathering descriptions such as best, greatest and most excellent before announcing a further division. Blessedness and living blessedly are said to reach the same topic, but this linguistic convergence does not settle the theory. Examples then distribute proposed ends between soul, body and both: virtue, pleasure, and living nobly and pleasantly. The alternative pairs rational and nonrational, intellectual and feeling-based are presented as converging classifications. This is a map of possible accounts, not yet a proof that one of those proposed ends is correct.

"We must therefore make a further division." (II.7.3d).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.3d. Happiness is introduced through rival accounts of the end. (English edition p. 147.)

II.7.6e.2. Happiness is distinguished from its attainment. (English edition p. 247.)

II.7.24.9. Virtue suffices for nobility but not for happiness in the Peripatetic account. (English edition p. 511.)

Translation in this edition

"Happiness" is the edition's usual term; "flourishing" explains its concern with the whole life.

Attested Greek forms

εὐδαιμονία

Attested. II.7.3d; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 48; English edition p. 147.

Τὴν δ' εὐδαιμονίαν συνωνυμεῖν τῷ τέλει λέγουσιν. Εὐδαιμονία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἄριστον

See also

End; Good; Virtue and excellence; Self-sufficiency.

Indifferent things

Indifferent things · Volume Two

ἀδιάφορα; τὰ μέσα · adiaphora; ta mesa — indifferents; intermediate things[68]

At a Glance

The word. Indifferent can deny moral goodness or evil, or deny any practical stimulus toward action; the two senses must be distinguished before the examples are interpreted.

In Stobaeus. The report separates ethical classification from complete practical indifference, allowing selective differences in the first sense while trivial alternatives illustrate the stronger second sense.

In this edition. Translate according to the stated sense rather than treating indifferent as unimportant in every respect; Hierocles' intermediate things also retain their separate explanatory setting.

A place to read. II.7.7.2 Read both definitions before the finger and small-object examples; the supplied hair example is marked and is not the only illustration supporting the account.

Meaning

Adiaphora are things that make no difference in a specified respect. The Stoic text explicitly distinguishes two senses, so "indifferent" cannot simply mean unimportant in every possible way.

Use in the book

In the first sense they are neither goods nor evils and neither choiceworthy nor avoidable in the strict moral classification. In the second they stimulate neither impulse nor aversion and are altogether indifferent. Health and wealth can be indifferent in the first sense while still having selective value. Trivial alternatives illustrate the second. The account thus permits rational discrimination among things that do not constitute happiness. The Peripatetic classification of goods should not be silently forced into this Stoic division.

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[68] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 57–58, 79, 181–182. Indifference here does not commend emotional apathy or careless conduct.

The second definition is illustrated by changing a finger's direction or picking up a small thing in one's way. Such examples concern alternatives that fail to move impulse or aversion, rather than an instruction to ignore everything outside virtue. The distinction of senses governs the examples. Notice also the marked hair-count supplement: the other examples already supply the practical contrast, so the explanation need not depend solely on restored wording. The following paragraph qualifies how the school applies the first sense.

"what stimulates neither impulse nor aversion" (II.7.7.2).

Hierocles. Hierocles distinguishes good things from intermediate things, including some that accord with nature and others that are contrary to nature or difficult to use. His account then considers vice and matter as causes of adverse conditions. "Intermediate" is a classificatory relation here, not the virtuous ethical mean.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7.2. Two senses distinguish moral indifference from complete practical indifference. (English edition p. 251.)

II.7.7.3. Selective value and rejection remain possible. (English edition p. 253.)

II.7.5a. Life, wealth and health appear in the initial indifferent list. (English edition p. 179.)

II.9.7.3. Intermediate things are distinguished from goods. (English edition p. 675.)

II.9.7.4. Naturally adverse intermediate things include illness, death, poverty and reputation. (English edition p. 675.)

Translation in this edition

Use the plural noun "indifferents" where the classification itself is in view.

Attested Greek forms

Ἀδιάφορα

Attested. II.7.7.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 79; English edition p. 251.

Ἀδιάφορα δ' εἶναι λέγουσι τὰ μεταξὺ τῶν ἀγαθῶν καὶ τῶν κακῶν, διχῶς τὸ

τῶν μέσων

Attested. II.9.7.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 181-182; English edition p. 675.

σι, χαριζόμενος δὲ σὺν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς καὶ τῶν μέσων, ὅσα κατὰ φύσιν ἡμῖν ἐστι [τὰ] ποιητικά τε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν. Ἓν δὲ καὶ μόνον αἴτιον τῶν

See also

Preferred things; Dispreferred things; Good; Selection.

Indignation

Indignation · Volume Two

νέμεσις · nemesis — indignation[69]

At a Glance

The word. Indignation is counted among admirable passions in the Peripatetic account and later placed between enviousness and malicious joy, preserving a different assessment from the neighboring base responses to others' fortunes.

In Stobaeus. The classification distinguishes admirable, base and intermediate passions and impulses; indignation's positive place cannot be inferred merely from the presence of distress or from a generic disapproval of emotion.

In this edition. Keep indignation distinct from envy, and preserve the supplied transition in the later mean-definition rather than presenting the entire sequence as equally secure transmitted wording.

A place to read. II.7.21.1 Read indignation within the complete threefold classification, comparing its admirable companions with the named base and intermediate feelings before turning to its later definition as a mean.

Meaning

Nemesis here is indignation, not the name of a goddess or a general law of retribution. It is distinguished from envy and malicious joy.

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[69] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 142, 146. The lemma is transmitted in the list despite its supplied introduction in the later definition.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic list counts indignation among admirable passions. A later definition places it between enviousness and malicious joy, with part of the transition supplied. The edition's accompanying note relates its object to undeserved good fortune. Translating it merely as envy would erase the different objects and moral assessment. The mean also does not require mixing a little envy with malicious pleasure: the chapter makes the ethical standard a quality determined by reason, not an arithmetic blend.

The classification does not divide all feelings into a simple opposition between virtue and vice. It allows admirable, base and intermediate passions and impulses. Indignation appears with friendship, gratitude, modesty, confidence and pity, whereas envy and malicious joy are explicitly base. Anger, pleasure and desire belong to a third group. This structure helps explain why a favorable assessment of indignation cannot simply be transferred to every strongly felt response to another person's circumstances. The later mean-definition provides a further contrast, while its supplied transition must remain visible.

"Admirable are friendship, gratitude, indignation, modesty, confidence, and pity." (II.7.21.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.21.1. Indignation is an admirable passion. (English edition p. 495.)

II.7.25.6. Its mean contrasts with envy and malicious joy. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

"Indignation" retains the feeling without importing an independent theory of righteous anger.

Attested Greek forms

νέμεσιν

Attested. II.7.21.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 142; English edition p. 495.

φαῦλα, τὰ δὲ μέσα. Ἀστεῖα μὲν φιλίαν, χάριν, νέμεσιν, αἰδῶ, θάρσος, ἔλεον· φαῦλα δὲ φθόνον, ἐπιχαιρεκακίαν, ὕβριν·

See also

Envy; Malicious joy; Passion; Ethical mean.

Justice

Justice · Volume Two

δικαιοσύνη · dikaiosunē — justice[70]

At a Glance

The word. Justice concerns assigning each their due worth in the Stoic definition; its distributional relation should not be reduced either to equal quantities or conformity with every enacted rule.

In Stobaeus. Within the knowledge-based virtue series, justice is specified through allocation, while later Peripatetic arguments examine proportional equality and related states under a different explanatory framework and criterion.

In this edition. Retain justice and explain the stated standard of allocation where supplied; the shared vocabulary does not justify importing one account's knowledge definition into every political or distributive example.

A place to read. II.7.5b1.1 Read justice beside the other virtue definitions: its distinctive allocation formula sits within a shared knowledge pattern, showing why both common structure and particular concern matter.

Meaning

Dikaiosynē is justice, repeatedly explained through assigning what accords with worth. It concerns a criterion of allocation and conduct rather than simply conformity to every enacted rule.

Use in the book

The Stoic definition makes justice knowledge assigning each their due worth and places piety, kindness, good fellowship and fair dealing under it. The Peripatetic example locates the just agent between allotting himself too much and too little, then distinguishes proportionate equality from numerical equality. Its subordinate virtues are states with means rather than

[70] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59, 62, 141. Some definitions or transitions are editorially supplied elsewhere; the present headword has direct surviving witnesses.

definitions as knowledge. The political account similarly evaluates constitutions through common rather than private advantage. These relations illuminate justice without removing their distinct contexts.

Unlike the neighboring definitions that explicitly enumerate three classes of objects, the justice clause uses the activity of assigning each their due worth. This gives the word a relational and distributive focus within the shared knowledge vocabulary. The paragraph does not identify the measure with equal numerical shares or with whatever current law commands. Those questions receive fuller treatment in the related passages. Here the useful reading discipline is to preserve the actual criterion supplied, rather than replace worth with a familiar but different distributive slogan.

"assigns each their due worth" (II.7.5b1.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b1.1. Justice assigns each their due worth. (English edition p. 185.)

II.7.5b2.6. Subordinate forms of justice are defined. (English edition p. 193.)

II.7.20.16. Proportionate equality differs from numerical sameness. (English edition p. 489.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "justice," explaining the allocation criterion where the text supplies it.

Attested Greek forms

δικαιοσύνην

Attested. II.7.5b1.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 59; English edition p. 185.

ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἀπονεμητικὴν τῆς ἀξίας ἑκάστῳ· ἀνδρείαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην

See also

Value and disvalue; Equality (Volume One Lexicon, p. 147); Law; Kindness and fair dealing.

Living in agreement

Living in agreement · Volume Two

ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν; κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν · homologoumenōs zēn; kata phusin zēn — live in agreement; live according to nature[71]

At a Glance

The word. Living in agreement names a sequence of related Stoic formulations of the end, with nature, experience, selection and appropriate action developed differently by the named teachers rather than given as one unchanged slogan.

In Stobaeus. The report explicitly describes Cleanthes as adding with nature to Zeno's formula, then records further explanations that make rational consistency and the handling of natural circumstances central to the account.

In this edition. Preserve the named differences between formulations, and do not make successful acquisition of every preferred circumstance a condition of the end when the account distinguishes rational selection from attaining its objects.

A place to read. II.7.6a.1 Read Zeno's formula, its explanation and Cleanthes' addition in sequence, then continue through the later named formulations rather than treating the first two as competing English translations of identical Greek.

Meaning

These phrases articulate Stoic accounts of the end. Agreement is explained through a harmonious rational principle, not merely approval by other people.

Use in the book

Zeno's formula is living in agreement; Cleanthes adds with nature. Chrysippus explains this through experience of natural events, Diogenes through reasoning well in selection and rejection, and Antipater through sustained selection or doing what lies in one's power toward preferred things. The exposition later equates natural life with living well and virtuously. These related formulations are not word-for-word identical, and none guarantees attainment of every preferred external circumstance. Their

[71] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 75–76, 78. Both are directly attested phrases, not imported system labels.

different emphases should remain visible rather than being replaced with one familiar slogan.

The report explains agreement through a single harmonious rational principle and contrasts it with the unhappiness of living in conflict. It then identifies an addition to the wording: Cleanthes makes nature explicit because Zeno's predicate was taken to be incomplete. This is a reported development in formulation, not merely a translator's choice between short and long versions. The following teachers further specify experience, selection, rejection and appropriate action. Their shared concern with a coherent life does not remove those distinct emphases or promise control over every external result.

"living according to a single, harmonious rational principle" (II.7.6a.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.6a.1. Zeno and Cleanthes give distinct formulations. (English edition p. 239.)

II.7.6a.2. Further formulations emphasize experience and selection. (English edition p. 241.)

II.7.6a.3. Antipater stresses selection and effort. (English edition p. 241.)

II.7.6e.3. Natural and virtuous life are equated. (English edition p. 247.)

Translation in this edition

Retain the formulation and its attribution.

Attested Greek forms

ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν

Attested. II.7.6a.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 75-76; English edition p. 239.

Τὸ δὲ τέλος ὁ μὲν Ζήνων οὕτως ἀπέδωκε· 'τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν'· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶ καθ' ἕνα λόγον καὶ σύμφωνον ζῆν, ὡς τῶν μαχομένως

κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν

Attested. II.7.6e.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 78; English edition p. 247.

Δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τούτων, ὅτι ἰσοδυναμεῖ 'τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν' καὶ 'τὸ καλῶς ζῆν' καὶ 'τὸ εὖ ζῆν' καὶ πάλιν 'τὸ καλὸν κἀγαθὸν'

See also

End; Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285); Selection; Happiness and flourishing.

Magnificence

Magnificence · Volume Two

μεγαλοπρέπεια · megaloprepeia — magnificence; fitting splendor[72]

At a Glance

The word. Magnificence concerns fitting displays of splendor according to occasion, distinguished from pettiness and ostentation; the account does not praise grandeur wherever it can be achieved or expenditure for its own sake.

In Stobaeus. The explanation rejects both displaying splendor always and never doing so, locating the virtue in responding to the right moment rather than in the largest or smallest visible effect.

In this edition. Keep the occasion and right moment in the positive description, and distinguish the transmitted explanation from the supplied formulation of magnificence as a mean in the later list.

A place to read. II.7.20.18 Read the contrast between always, nowhere and fitting each occasion, alongside greatness of soul's different concern with worth; the two virtues require related but distinct discriminations.

Meaning

Megaloprepeia is magnificence: the fitting use of splendor or grandeur, distinct from generosity and greatness of soul.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic example rejects displaying splendor always, even where uncalled for, and never displaying it anywhere. The appropriate state fits each occasion according to the right time. Its classification places magnificence between ostentation and pettiness, although part of the later formal definition is supplied. The earlier example and virtue list provide surviving witnesses for the headword. Circumstance and fittingness are decisive rather

[72] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 140–142, 146. The transmitted example does not make the later supplemented clause fully preserved text.

than expensive display in itself; the lexicon does not invent a detailed expenditure rule absent from these clauses.

The paragraph explains greatness of soul and magnificence together, but gives them different measures. Greatness of soul concerns taking what is due according to worth. Magnificence concerns fitting a display to its occasion. Someone who displays splendor even where it is inappropriate fails just as someone who never does so fails. The positive description therefore depends on the right moment. Read beside the list of magnificence, pettiness and ostentation, this account prevents the virtue from being identified simply with lavishness, wealth or an impressive visible result.

"but the person who fits each occasion as the right moment requires." (II.7.20.18).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.20.13. The virtue and its opposing states are named. (English edition p. 485.)

II.7.20.18. The example concerns fitting splendor and occasion. (English edition p. 491.)

II.7.25.6. The formal definition contains a supplement. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

Retain the qualification through occasion.

Attested Greek forms

μεγαλοπρέπεια

Attested. II.7.20.13; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 140-141; English edition p. 485.

ἀνελευθερία· μεγαλοψυχία, μικροψυχία, χαυνότης· μεγαλοπρέπεια, μικροπρέπεια, σαλακωνία.

See also

Generosity; Greatness of soul; Opportune time (Volume One Lexicon, p. 302); Ethical mean.

Malicious joy

Malicious joy · Volume Two

ἐπιχαιρεκακία · epichairekakia — malicious joy; pleasure at another's misfortune[73]

At a Glance

The word. Malicious joy is pleasure at another person's evils, distinguished from other pleasures by its object and treated as morally objectionable rather than as an ordinary pleasure needing moderation.

In Stobaeus. The local list separates pleasure at others' evils, pleasure at unexpected events and pleasure through deceptive sight, showing that related feelings receive different definitions rather than one shared description.

In this edition. Use malicious joy for this compound, and distinguish its negative assessment from discussions of pleasure in general or the mean assigned to another response to other people's fortunes.

A place to read. II.7.10c.3 Read all three pleasure definitions, attending to their objects and occasions; then compare the later account of indignation without turning malicious joy itself into a praiseworthy mean.

Meaning

Epichairekakia is pleasure at another person's evils or misfortunes. It combines pleasure with its object rather than naming an undifferentiated happy feeling.

Use in the book

The Stoic list classifies it under pleasure, alongside other specifically defined forms of that passion. The Peripatetic account includes it among base feelings and later makes it one extreme opposed to indignation, with enviousness at the other extreme. These appearances connect the article with the taxonomy of passions and with the ethical mean. They do not imply that all pleasure in the chapter is malicious, or that indignation means simply taking the middle amount of this feeling.

The three definitions identify different sources or structures of pleasure. Another person's evils distinguish malicious joy; unexpected events distinguish delight; deceptive sight distinguishes enchantment. The passage

[73] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 91, 142, 146. The object of the pleasure is essential to the definition.

does not make every pleasure malicious, nor does it offer an acceptable amount of malicious joy. That distinction matters when the later account describes indignation between enviousness and malicious joy. The mean there is another named response, not a moderate version of rejoicing at another's suffering. The short definition supplies the object that keeps these discussions connected without making them identical.

"Malicious joy is pleasure at the evils of others" (II.7.10c.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10c.3. The direct definition is pleasure at others' evils. (English edition p. 291.)

II.7.21.1. It is listed among base passions. (English edition p. 495.)

II.7.25.6. It forms an extreme opposed to indignation. (English edition p. 517.)

Translation in this edition

The explanatory phrase may be clearer than an imported foreign-language label.

Attested Greek forms

Ἐπιχαιρεκακία

Attested. II.7.10c.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 91; English edition p. 291.

Ἐπιχαιρεκακία δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοτρίοις κακοῖς· ἀσμενισμὸς δὲ ἡδονὴ ἐπὶ ἀπροσδοκήτοις.

See also

Pleasure; Envy; Indignation; Passion.

Moral goodness

Moral goodness · Volume Two

καλοκἀγαθία · kalokagathia — moral goodness; nobility and goodness[74]

At a Glance

The word. The expression names moral nobility and goodness. Musonius uses it for the excellence toward which human nature supplies an orientation, rather than for an already completed achievement.

In Stobaeus. People claim to be good, sensible, just or temperate even without naming a teacher or practice; the argument distinguishes that natural orientation from their actual condition.

In this edition. Moral goodness makes the ethical force clear. Do not infer a historical social class, bodily attractiveness or proof of virtue from the expression alone.

A place to read. II.9.8.4 Read the repeated favorable self-descriptions together with the absence of named teaching or practice, then follow the argument's distinction between a beginning and completed virtue.

Meaning

Kalokagathia joins the language of being noble and good. In Musonius's argument the expression concerns the moral excellence toward which human nature supplies a beginning.

Use in the book

The source first observes that people claim to be good, sensible, just or temperate even when unable to identify a teacher of their moral goodness. It then calls the soul's natural orientation a predisposition toward kalokagathia and a seed of virtue. The sequence makes a distinction essential to the argument: having a natural orientation toward goodness does not prove that every claimant already has it. Deception and shame explain why the claims cannot simply be accepted at face value. The expression therefore names the goal of a moral capacity rather than a merely flattering social description.

Musonius proceeds through several questions people answer favorably about themselves. Each answer chooses the morally approved description, even where the respondent cannot explain his training. The pattern is

[74] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 183–184. The positive witness is an abstract noun in the argument, not a supplied heading. The passage does not define membership in an historical social class or praise bodily attractiveness.

evidence for a natural share or orientation, but it does not make the respondents' claims reliable assessments of their achievement. The surrounding argument will also account for deception and shame. Reading this paragraph as a description of completed goodness would therefore collapse the very distinction the sequence develops between a natural beginning and its successful cultivation.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.9.8.4. Claims of goodness need not be supported by an identified teacher or course of practice. (English edition p. 681.)

II.9.8.5. A predisposition toward moral goodness is distinguished from actually being good. (English edition p. 683.)

Translation in this edition

Moral goodness is clear in this context. The fuller nobility and goodness can recall the compound's ethical components without turning noble into an assertion about ancestry.

Attested Greek forms

καλοκἀγαθίαν

Attested. II.9.8.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 184; English edition p. 683.

πρὸς καλοκἀγαθίαν καὶ σπέρμα ἀρετῆς

See also

Natural predisposition; Virtue and excellence; Nobility of birth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 290); Practice and exercise.

Orderliness and propriety

Orderliness and propriety · Volume Two

εὐταξία; κοσμιότης; εὐκοσμία · eutaxia; kosmiotēs; eukosmia — orderliness; propriety; decorum[75]

At a Glance

The word. Orderliness concerns the timing and sequence of actions, while propriety concerns fitting and unfitting movements; the ethical account extends beyond neatness or outward appearance to an ordered way of acting.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic definitions distinguish when to act, what follows what and how movement fits, placing these forms of discrimination alongside modesty and adherence to right reason rather than reducing them to manners.

In this edition. Retain the supplied knowledge in propriety's definition and distinguish the related Greek expressions; the report's account of action order should not be silently narrowed to tidy physical surroundings.

A place to read. II.7.5b2.4 Read the definition's three parts—timing, succession and ordering—before moving to fitting movements; compare the neighboring definitions without treating all four as the same social restraint.

Meaning

These terms regulate ordering and fitting conduct. They differ from taxis, order in general, and from mere concern for an attractive appearance.

Use in the book

The Stoic account makes orderliness knowledge of when to act and what should follow what, while propriety concerns fitting and unfitting movements. In the Peripatetic definitions propriety observes fitting movements and postures, and orderliness aims at the noble in arrangement; both are placed between extremes. The ethical standard concerns the character and sequence of action, not a bare preference for tidiness. Related words may share an English rendering while retaining separate printed Greek forms.

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[75] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61, 147. The grouping does not normalize three different terms into one Greek word.

Orderliness is explained through action rather than possession or appearance. Its first question is when to act, followed by what should come after what. Propriety then concerns movements judged fitting or unfitting; knowledge in that definition is supplied. Modesty and self-control follow with further distinctions concerning justified reproach and right reason. The sequence shows how related virtues can govern different features of conduct. It does not license an inference that a well-arranged room, a conventional gesture or a socially approved appearance is by itself the ethical knowledge described here.

"Orderliness is knowledge of when to act, what should follow what, and, in general, the ordering of actions." (II.7.5b2.4).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.4. Action order and fitting movements are distinguished. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.25.13. Two virtues are separately defined as states. (English edition p. 525.)

Translation in this edition

Use "orderliness" for ordered relations and "propriety" for fitting bearing where distinguished.

Attested Greek forms

εὐταξίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 61; English edition p. 191.

εὐταξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ πότε πρακτέον, καὶ τί μετὰ τί, καὶ καθόλου

κοσμιότητα

Attested. II.7.5b2.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 61; English edition p. 191.

μετὰ τί, καὶ καθόλου τῆς τάξεως τῶν πράξεων· κοσμιότητα δὲ ⟨ἐπιστήμην⟩ πρεπουσῶν καὶ ἀπρεπῶν κινήσεων· αἰδημοσύνην δὲ

εὐκοσμίαν

Attested. II.7.25.13; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 147; English edition p. 525.

εὐκοσμίαν δὲ ἕξιν περί τε κινήσεις καὶ σχέσεις τηρητικὴν τοῦ πρέποντος,

See also

Order (Volume One Lexicon, p. 303); Self-control and temperance; The noble; Ethical mean.

Passion

Passion · Volume Two

πάθος · pathos — passion; feeling; what is undergone[76]

At a Glance

The word. Passion has a restrictive Stoic definition as excessive, reason-disobedient impulse; another exposition classifies feelings, capacities and states without giving every feeling this same ethical status.

In Stobaeus. The definition locates passions in the ruling part of the soul and equates passion with agitation, while marked restorations show that parts of its formula are supplied.

In this edition. Preserve the local school's definition rather than making every passion mean vice; the same Greek vocabulary enters a different framework within the later Peripatetic exposition.

A place to read. II.7.10.1 Read the excessive-impulse formula with its ruling-part parenthesis and agitation equivalence, noticing which connective words and explanatory adjective are editorially supplied rather than independently transmitted.

Meaning

Pathos has different functions in the chapter's ethical accounts. The Stoic definition makes passion an excessive impulse disobedient to reason; the Peripatetic account uses it more broadly for feelings whose expression can be good or bad.

Use in the book

The Stoic four primary passions are craving, fear, distress and pleasure, analyzed through judgments of apparent good or evil. This does not make every movement of the soul a passion in that restrictive sense. In the Peripatetic exposition, passions are distinguished from capacities to feel and settled states governing their expression. Anger, fear, longing, emulation and

[76] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 88, 139, 142. The general Greek word may also mean an experience undergone; the ethical category is determined by its local account.

pity are listed; some feelings are admirable, others base, others intermediate. The translation must therefore preserve the school-specific definitions instead of imposing the first definition on all later instances.

The ruling-part parenthesis connects passions with the preceding analysis of rational movement and assent. The account does not place passion in an unrelated bodily compartment while leaving the mind untouched. Its two formulations emphasize excess and disobedience, then movement contrary to nature. The closing equivalence with agitation is partly restored and retains that qualification. Later Peripatetic distinctions among feelings, capacities and states introduce another framework; they should be read afresh instead of receiving this particular definition automatically whenever a feeling is mentioned.

"All passions belong to the ruling part of the soul." (II.7.10.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10.1. The Stoic definition is excessive and disobedient impulse. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.20.7. The Peripatetic division distinguishes passions, capacities and states. (English edition p. 479.)

II.7.21.1. Feelings receive a threefold ethical classification. (English edition p. 495.)

Translation in this edition

"Passion" signals the technical category; "feeling" explains its broader Peripatetic use.

Attested Greek forms

Πάθος

Attested. II.7.10.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 281.

Πάθος δ' εἶναί φασιν ὁρμὴν πλεονάζουσαν καὶ ἀπειθῆ τῷ αἱροῦντι λόγῳ

See also

Affection (Volume One Lexicon, p. 29); Impulse; Settled state; Desire.

Pity

Pity · Volume Two

ἔλεος · eleos — pity[77]

At a Glance

The word. Pity is defined here as distress at apparently undeserved suffering; its classification differs between the Stoic taxonomy and the Peripatetic assessment of admirable passions elsewhere in Chapter 7.

In Stobaeus. The definition makes perceived desert part of the feeling's object, distinguishing pity from several neighboring forms of distress organized around death, weight, speechlessness, reflection or bodily penetration.

In this edition. Preserve seems in the definition, and do not treat the later favorable assessment of pity as if it silently revised the Stoic account's classification of distress.

A place to read. II.7.10c.6 Read pity beside mourning and the other named forms of distress, then compare the later Peripatetic assessment before assigning the whole chapter one view of compassionate feeling.

Meaning

Eleos is pity. Its different place in the chapter's classifications is a clear warning against assuming that every school evaluates the same feeling identically.

Use in the book

The Stoic list defines pity as distress at someone who seems to suffer undeservedly, placing it among the forms of distress. The Peripatetic exposition includes pity among admirable passions alongside friendship, gratitude, indignation, modesty and confidence. Both definitions or classifications remain visible; the lexical article does not resolve the disagreement by changing the Greek word or by treating the latter list as merely mistaken. The qualification "seems" in the Stoic definition concerns the perceiver's assessment of another's suffering.

Pity opens a list whose distinctions are more precise than a general category of sadness. Mourning concerns an untimely death; other names

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[77] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 92, 142. The word does not by itself establish that the suffering really is undeserved.

describe distress that weighs down, silences or penetrates the sufferer. Pity's own object includes a judgment about another person's suffering: it appears undeserved. The definition does not establish independently that this judgment is correct. Its place within the taxonomy also should not erase the later Peripatetic evaluation of some passions as admirable. Reading both settings preserves a disagreement in ethical assessment without changing the first definition.

"Pity is distress at someone who seems to suffer undeservedly" (II.7.10c.6).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10c.6. Pity is a species of distress at apparently undeserved suffering. (English edition p. 293.)

II.7.21.1. Pity is classed among admirable passions. (English edition p. 495.)

Translation in this edition

"Pity" is kept throughout, with the account's ethical assessment explained locally.

Attested Greek forms

ἔλεον

Attested. II.7.10c.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 92; English edition p. 293.

ἔλεον δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ δοκοῦντι ἀναξίως κακοπαθεῖν· πένθος δὲ λύπην

See also

Distress; Passion; Indignation; Envy.

Pleasure

Pleasure · Volume Two

ἡδονή · hēdonē — pleasure[78]

At a Glance

The word. Pleasure can name a Stoic passion, a bodily condition or a proposed end; its status follows the classification and argument, not the Greek noun alone.

In Stobaeus. In the passion sequence, pleasure follows either attaining what was craved or escaping what was feared, giving it a relation to prior evaluation as well as occurrence.

In this edition. Keep the local sense and school visible instead of reconciling different classifications by silently changing pleasure into another term whenever the argument becomes uncomfortable or unfamiliar.

A place to read. II.7.10.2 Compare pleasure's two conditions with the two conditions for distress; the paired structure explains why pleasure here cannot be read independently of prior craving or fear.

Meaning

Hēdonē is pleasure, but the chapter records different theories of its ethical status. A report that classifies pleasure as passion is not a universal definition imposed on the anthology.

Use in the book

In the Stoic passion account, pleasure follows attainment of a craved object or escape from a feared one and involves an evaluative uplifting. The initial list of Stoic indifferents also names pleasure and pain, requiring attention to the context and classification. The Peripatetic exposition makes pleasures and pains central to ethical virtue and distinguishes a life devoted to enjoyment from the proper use of pleasure. The earlier survey also records pleasure as a proposed end. These uses must be distinguished rather than reconciled by silently changing the word.

The four genera are not introduced as unrelated sensations. Craving and fear come first, and the subsequent pleasure depends on attainment or escape. That second route matters: the pleasurable response need not follow

[78] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 57–58, 88, 138. An account's criticism of a life of enjoyment does not itself condemn every pleasure.

acquiring a new positive object; it can follow avoiding something feared. Conversely, distress follows frustration or encounter. This structure situates pleasure within a pattern of evaluation and expectation. It should not be transferred unexamined to the separate list in which pleasure and pain are indifferents, or to accounts asking whether pleasure is the end of life.

"pleasure when we attain what we craved or escape what we feared" (II.7.10.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10.2. Pleasure in the sequence of the four primary passions. (English edition p. 281.)

II.7.5a. Pleasure also appears in the initial indifferent list. (English edition p. 179.)

II.7.20.6. Virtue concerns pleasures and pains. (English edition p. 477.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "pleasure," with the account's particular qualification or definition.

Attested Greek forms

ἡδονήν

Attested. II.7.10.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 281.

γένει ταῦτα τὰ τέσσαρα, ἐπιθυμίαν, φόβον, λύπην, ἡδονήν. Ἐπιθυμίαν μὲν οὖν καὶ φόβον προηγεῖσθαι, τὴν μὲν πρὸς τὸ φαινόμενον

See also

Distress; Passion; End; Happiness and flourishing.

Preferred things

Preferred things · Volume Two

προηγμένα · proēgmena — preferred things; things accorded precedence[79]

At a Glance

The word. Preferred things are indifferents with substantial value in their own class; preference marks a practical ranking below moral goodness rather than making an object virtuous.

In Stobaeus. The definition distinguishes degrees and sources of value before dividing indifferents into preferred, dispreferred and neither; the qualification about their class remains essential throughout.

In this edition. Retain preferred rather than substituting good, and keep the classification distinct from mere popularity or an agent's unexplained personal liking for an object.

A place to read. II.7.7b.1 Read the opening contrasts in amount and source of value before the threefold classification; the neutral third group prevents preferred and dispreferred from exhausting all indifferents.

Meaning

Proēgmena are the preferred indifferents: things with substantial value within the class of things that are neither moral goods nor evils. "Preferred" does not mean virtuous.

Use in the book

The exposition explicitly qualifies their value as value reckoned among indifferents. Bodily health, favorable capacities and certain external circumstances can therefore be preferred without constituting happiness. The account distinguishes having value in itself from being valuable through what something produces. A royal comparison explains the designation by ranking those after the king: the highest good is not itself simply another preferred item. Rational selection attends to the difference while keeping virtue in a distinct category.

The paragraph introduces two distinctions before giving its three classes. Value can be greater or less, and it can belong to a thing in itself or through what the thing produces. The definition of preferred then selects a high

[79] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 80–81, 85. Some indifferents are neither preferred nor dispreferred; the classification is not simply binary.

degree of value within the indifferent class. This qualification prevents the ranking from placing its members alongside virtue as goods. The final class also matters: an indifferent need not carry enough value or disvalue to be preferred or dispreferred. A marked supplement restores part of that last parallel without changing the structure of the surviving classification.

"as value is reckoned among indifferent things" (II.7.7b.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7b.1. Preferred things are defined through substantial value among indifferents. (English edition p. 255.)

II.7.7b.2. Examples are distributed across soul, body and external circumstances. (English edition p. 257.)

II.7.7g.2. The king comparison explains precedence without confusing it with the highest rank. (English edition p. 269.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "preferred" rather than translating it as "good" or merely "popular."

Attested Greek forms

προηγμένα

Attested. II.7.7b.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 80; English edition p. 255.

τὰ μὲν καθ' αὑτά, τὰ δὲ ποιητικά· καὶ τὰ μὲν προηγμένα, τὰ δ' ἀποπροηγμένα, τὰ δ' οὐδετέρως ἔχοντα. Προηγμένα μέν,

See also

Indifferent things; Dispreferred things; Value and disvalue; Selection.

Rivalry and jealousy

Rivalry and jealousy · Volume Two

ζῆλος; ζηλοτυπία · zēlos; zēlotupia — rivalry; emulation; jealousy[80]

At a Glance

The word. Rivalry and jealousy name related comparative feelings, but zēlos also means admiration or imitation; the Greek word does not identify one uniform moral condition throughout the report.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic definitions distinguish lacking another person's attainment from resenting another's also attaining something desired, while explicitly acknowledging further uses of rivalry outside that first definition.

In this edition. Keep the several senses of zēlos visible, and retain the supplied also in jealousy's definition rather than presenting that editorial addition as independently transmitted running text.

A place to read. II.7.10c.5 Read the complete sequence from envy through rivalry to jealousy, noticing how another sense introduces admiration and imitation rather than merely another example of the first distress.

Meaning

Zēlos has several senses in the chapter, while zēlotypia receives a distinct definition. The English words rivalry, emulation and jealousy must follow those local distinctions.

Use in the book

One form of zēlos is distress when another obtains what one craves and one does not. The text also uses the word for admiration felt by someone in want and imitation of a person considered superior. Jealousy, in contrast, is distress that another also obtains what one desired. The supplied "also" in that definition sharpens the difference and must remain identified as supplied. The Peripatetic list can include zēlos among feelings without immediately condemning it as vice, so its moral status cannot be inferred from one translation alone.

The contrast depends on what happens to the two people. In the first definition of rivalry, someone else obtains what the person craving it does not

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[80] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 92, 139. The jealousy definition contains an editorially supplied *καί*; the nouns themselves have direct running-text witnesses.

obtain. Jealousy instead concerns another person's also obtaining the desired object; the small word also is supplied. Between these definitions, the report names admiration by someone in want and imitation of a superior as additional uses of rivalry. Those uses prevent a reader from assigning distress, vice or resentment to every occurrence of the same noun without checking its immediate sense.

The report also uses rivalry for "the admiration felt by someone in want" (II.7.10c.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10c.5. Three senses of zēlos and the contrast with jealousy. (English edition p. 293.)

II.7.20.7. Emulation appears in the broader list of passions. (English edition p. 479.)

Translation in this edition

Use "rivalry" or "emulation" according to sense; reserve "jealousy" for the separate term here.

Attested Greek forms

ζῆλος

Attested. II.7.10c.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 92; English edition p. 293.

Φθόνος δὲ λύπη ἐπ' ἀλλοτρίοις ἀγαθοῖς· ζῆλος δὲ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπιθυμεῖ, αὐτὸν

ζηλοτυπίαν

Attested. II.7.10c.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 92; English edition p. 293.

ἐνδεοῦς καὶ ἔτι ἄλλως μίμησιν ὡς ἂν κρείττονος· ζηλοτυπίαν δὲ λύπην ἐπὶ τῷ ⟨καὶ⟩ ἕτερον ἐπιτυγχάνειν ὧν αὐτὸς ἐπεθύμει·

See also

Envy; Passion; Resemblance and imitation; Desire.

Seeming and being

Seeming and being · Volume Two

δοκεῖν; εἶναι · dokein; einai — to seem; to be reputed; to be[81]

At a Glance

The word. The infinitives contrast appearing good or just with actually possessing that quality. The passage tests reputation through the difference between seeming competent and performing well.

In Stobaeus. Teles uses acting and kithara playing to challenge the preference for mere appearance, then applies the distinction to being good and living well.

In this edition. Preserve the dialogue's questions and supplied answers. The argument compares appearance with the reality relevant to a task, not every possible use of reputation or presentation.

A place to read. II.15.47.1 Read the professional examples before the ethical conclusion, keeping the supplied dialogue spans visible and noting that the final claim remains expressed as what would appear better.

Meaning

Dokein can concern seeming or being regarded as something. In Teles's argument it is opposed to actually being good or competent, not used as a technical definition of an optical appearance.

Use in the book

The dialogue begins with a preference for seeming just and tests it against acting and playing an instrument. Good performance depends on being capable, not merely on a reputation. The discussion then turns to ordinary goods and courage. When the interlocutor prefers the honor earned by apparent courage, the reply exposes the duties and dangers the reputation may bring: front-rank service, single combat and harsher treatment in captivity. Being praised is thus separated from possessing what would make the assigned task bearable.

The opening preference for seeming just is tested by a sequence of performances. Actors act well and kithara players play well because they possess the relevant ability, not because an audience merely attributes it to

[81] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 194–196. The heading identifies Theodorus's epitome of Teles. The opening preference for appearance is the challenged position, not the conclusion endorsed by the whole excerpt.

them. Repeating the answer makes the proposed dependence explicit before the discussion turns to living well. The ethical conclusion draws its force from that comparison. It does not deny that appearances can affect treatment by others, a possibility the later examples explore; it asks what supplies the capacity on which good performance depends.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.15.47.1. Real competence is used to test the preference for seeming good. (English edition p. 725.)

II.15.47.2. The interlocutor introduces public honor as a reason to prefer appearance. (English edition p. 727.)

II.15.47.3. The costs of a false reputation for courage are made explicit. (English edition p. 729.)

Translation in this edition

Seem and be reputed both fit, depending on whether the contrast emphasizes appearance or other people's judgment. Preserve the opposition with being rather than translating both sides as belief.

Attested Greek forms

δοκεῖν

Attested. II.15.47.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 194-195; English edition p. 725.

τὸ δοκεῖν δίκαιον εἶναι τοῦ εἶναι

See also

Belief and opinion; Honor (Volume One Lexicon, p. 197); Courage; Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440).

Self-control

Self-control · Volume Two

ἐγκράτεια; ἀκρασία · enkrateia; akrasia — self-control; lack of control[82]

At a Glance

The word. Self-control can describe reason's mastery over resistant passion, while virtue is described as harmony; the Stoic subordinate-virtue definition employs the same family in another theoretical setting.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic passage distinguishes reason's victory, the nonrational part's victory and concord, making obedience and agreement different from a merely successful struggle against desire or feeling.

In this edition. Keep resistant self-control distinct from temperance where the text distinguishes victory from harmony; shared English praise does not erase the different structures of action being described.

A place to read. II.7.15.2 Read agreement and rebellion before the three outcomes of their relation; the final clause says not only that reason leads but that the other part follows obediently.

Meaning

Enkrateia is self-control, with mastery audible in the word family. Akrasia is its opposite, lack of control. The Peripatetic explanation distinguishes this conflict model from fully harmonious virtue.

Use in the book

Reason's victory over opposing passion is called self-control; the nonrational part's victory is lack of control. Virtue is instead the agreement of both, reason leading and the other following obediently. In the Stoic subordinate-virtue list, self-control is knowledge that does not transgress what appears in accordance with right reason. The two contexts therefore require qualification: the shared word does not make the Stoic knowledge definition identical to the Peripatetic description of resistance.

The opening as it were qualifies the description of reason and passion as two principles. Their opposition is connected with pleasures and pains, after which the text distinguishes which side wins. But victory does not exhaust the alternatives. Concord receives a separate name, virtue, and is explained

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[82] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61, 128. The title identifies the distinct lexical family, not an additional ancient virtue beyond the source's classifications.

through reason leading rightly and the other part following. The point is therefore not the removal of every feeling. It is the difference between overcoming resistance and an ordered relation without that rebellion. The entry preserves this relational account instead of treating all forms of control as one achievement.

"the other follows obediently" (II.7.15.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.15.2. Reason's victory and the contrary victory are distinguished from harmony. (English edition p. 429.)

II.7.5b2.4. Self-control is a subordinate virtue defined as knowledge. (English edition p. 191.)

Translation in this edition

Keep this term distinct from σωφροσύνη even when both receive "self-control" in ordinary English.

Attested Greek forms

ἐγκράτειαν

Attested. II.7.15.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 128; English edition p. 429.

οὖν τοῦ λόγου νίκην ἀπὸ τοῦ κράτους παρωνύμως ἐγκράτειαν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου διὰ τὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀπειθὲς

ἀκρασίαν

Attested. II.7.15.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 128; English edition p. 429.

ἔχειν, τὴν δὲ τοῦ ἀλόγου διὰ τὸ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἀπειθὲς ἀκρασίαν· τὴν δ' ἀμφοῖν ἁρμονίαν καὶ συμφωνίαν ἀρετήν, τοῦ μὲν ἄγοντος

See also

Self-control and temperance; Passion; Knowledge; Virtue and excellence.

Self-control and temperance

Self-control and temperance · Volume Two

σωφροσύνη · sōphrosunē — temperance; self-control; well-ordered desire[83]

At a Glance

The word. Temperance is defined as knowledge in the Stoic account and as orderly desire in the Peripatetic exposition; ordinary self-control can hide a separate technical term for resistance.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic definition locates temperance among knowledge-based virtues by its objects of choice and avoidance; the same paragraph differentiates justice, courage and practical wisdom through other objects.

In this edition. Retain temperance where the local classification needs it, explaining why resistant self-control and harmony of desire are distinguished rather than merging both into a single English moral label.

A place to read. II.7.5b1.1 Read the temperance definition within the series rather than as an isolated slogan; the repeated threefold distinctions show how the account organizes the virtues through different objects of knowledge.

Meaning

Sōphrosynē concerns the proper ordering of desire and choice. The edition renders it temperance in the Stoic account and self-control in parts of the Peripatetic exposition; its distinction from enkrateia remains explicit.

Use in the book

The Stoic definition makes temperance knowledge of what is choiceworthy, avoidable or neither, and assigns it steadiness of impulses. The Peripatetic account locates virtue in the harmony of reason and passion rather than reason's contested victory. It calls the temperate person one who desires the right objects at the right time and amount, avoiding both excess and stone-like absence of desire. This is why ordinary English "self-control" can conceal a technical distinction: enkrateia may involve resistance to a contrary desire, while virtue involves its orderly agreement.

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[83] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59, 128, 141. The Volume One combined title is retained; the separate Self-control article addresses enkrateia.

The definition includes not only what is choiceworthy and avoidable but also what is neither. That third class matters because knowledge must distinguish neutral cases rather than merely divide everything into two opposed lists. The neighboring virtues follow a comparable structure with different objects: actions, due worth and terrible things. This particular paragraph therefore presents temperance through discrimination rather than through a description of a struggle with appetite. The later Peripatetic contrast between victory and harmony asks another question, which the shared English phrase self-control must not conceal.

"what is choiceworthy, what is to be avoided, and what is neither" (II.7.5b1.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b1.1. Temperance is a form of knowledge in the Stoic account. (English edition p. 185.)

II.7.15.2. Harmony differs from reason's victory over resistant passion. (English edition p. 429.)

II.7.20.14. Due desire lies between excess and total absence. (English edition p. 487.)

Translation in this edition

Preserve the edition's local renderings and its explanatory contrast with ἐγκράτεια.

Attested Greek forms

σωφροσύνην

Attested. II.7.5b1.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 59; English edition p. 185.

λοιπῶν δὲ ἀρετῶν οὕτως ἀκούειν παραγγέλλουσι)· σωφροσύνην δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αἱρετῶν καὶ φευκτῶν καὶ οὐδετέρων· δικαιοσύνην

See also

Self-control; Desire; Virtue and excellence; Ethical mean.

Self-sufficiency

Self-sufficiency · Volume Two

αὐτάρκεια; αὐτάρκης · autarkeia; autarkēs — self-sufficiency; sufficiency[84]

At a Glance

The word. Self-sufficiency concerns contentment, sufficiency for a specified end or communal provision, depending on context; it does not by itself declare that the virtuous person has no need of other people.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic account distinguishes the happy life from the noble life by their required conditions, making virtue sufficient for the latter while denying its sufficiency for happiness in that discussion.

In this edition. Always retain what a person, virtue or community is sufficient for; do not convert sufficiency for a noble life into an unqualified claim about happiness or isolation from others.

A place to read. II.7.24.9 Read the two kinds of life and their conditions before the sentence about virtue's sufficiency; former and latter refer to different ends and cannot be interchanged without reversing the claim.

Meaning

This family concerns having what suffices. Its individual, ethical and civic applications should not become a universal ideal of isolation.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic subordinate virtue is contentment with what comes one's way together with generosity, between poverty and extravagance. Elsewhere virtue suffices for a noble life but not for happiness, because the latter also requires natural conditions. A city is a community sufficient for a self-sufficient life. These uses concern contentment, sufficiency for an end and communal provision respectively. None says by itself that the good person has no need of other people; the object or end of sufficiency must remain explicit.

The passage makes sufficiency depend on the end under discussion. A noble life can exist amid conditions contrary to nature, whereas happiness requires conditions in accordance with nature throughout. The following sentence assigns virtue's sufficiency to the former possibility of nobility, not

[84] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 145, 147, 150. The unusual extreme poverty is not silently replaced with illiberality.

to happiness. The separate state called self-sufficiency combines contentment with generosity, and the city's definition concerns provision for a self-sufficient life. These uses therefore require their complements. None independently establishes that needing resources, circumstances or other people contradicts every sense of sufficiency in the volume.

"Virtue is not sufficient for the former, but is sufficient for the latter." (II.7.24.9).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.25.14. Contentment is joined with generosity. (English edition p. 525.)

II.7.24.9. Virtue suffices for nobility, not happiness. (English edition p. 511.)

II.7.26.9. Communal sufficiency for life. (English edition p. 537.)

Translation in this edition

Preserve what a condition is said to suffice for.

Attested Greek forms

αὐτάρκειαν

Attested. II.7.25.14; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 147; English edition p. 525.

αὐτάρκειαν δὲ ἕξιν ἀρκουμένην τοῖς τυχοῦσι μετὰ ἐλευθεριότητος, μεταξὺ

αὐτάρκης

Attested. II.7.24.9; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 145; English edition p. 511.

δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς παρὰ φύσιν· καὶ πρὸς ὃν μὲν οὐκ αὐτάρκης ἡ ἀρετή, πρὸς ὃν δὲ αὐτάρκης.

See also

Happiness and flourishing; Generosity; City; Need and utility (Volume One Lexicon, p. 289).

Stoutheartedness and love of effort

Stoutheartedness and love of effort · Volume Two

εὐψυχία; φιλοπονία · eupsuchia; philoponia — stoutheartedness; love of effort[85]

At a Glance

The word. Stoutheartedness concerns the soul's unconquerability, while love of effort concerns accomplishing the task despite toil; the two share a virtue context without being interchangeable names for hardship or aggression.

In Stobaeus. The definitions connect strength to knowledge and task performance, alongside endurance and confidence; the later account also distinguishes love of effort from both softness and pointless expenditure of effort.

In this edition. Keep the task at hand in love of effort's definition, and avoid translating the pair as a general admiration for suffering, fighting or strenuous activity regardless of its purpose.

A place to read. II.7.5b2.5 Read the two definitions after endurance and greatness of soul, asking what each adds: the soul's resistance to defeat differs from completing the particular action without being stopped by toil.

Meaning

Eupsychia and philoponia are distinct virtues associated with courage: an unconquerable spirit and active willingness to carry through effort. These favorable terms do not praise toil without regard to its end.

Use in the book

The Stoic definitions concern a soul rendering itself unconquerable and knowledge accomplishing the task without being hindered by toil. The Peripatetic definitions place stoutheartedness between faintheartedness and warlike frenzy, and love of effort between softness and futile toil. Its latter definition includes accomplishing the noble. These details prevent endurance from becoming mere obstinacy or a preference for the maximum amount of labor. Both the active task and its appropriate aim matter.

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[85] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61–62, 147. The paired article does not identify the two virtues with each other.

The two definitions identify different achievements. An unconquerable soul describes stoutheartedness, while love of effort is directed toward the work presently to be done. Neither definition says that effort is valuable simply because it is painful. Their placement beside endurance and confidence further differentiates maintaining a correct judgment, anticipating nothing terrible, resisting defeat and completing a task. The later distinction between love of effort, softness and futile toil makes this practical orientation especially important. An excessive or pointless exertion cannot become virtuous merely by receiving the same English name as purposeful perseverance.

"Love of effort is knowledge that carries out the task at hand and is not hindered by toil." (II.7.5b2.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.5. Both are subordinate virtues defined as knowledge. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.25.15. Their means oppose frenzy, softness and futile toil. (English edition p. 527.)

Translation in this edition

Retain the two labels rather than merging them with courage or strength.

Attested Greek forms

εὐψυχίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.5; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 61-62; English edition p. 191.

πεφυκότων ἐν σπουδαίοις τε γίνεσθαι καὶ φαύλοις· εὐψυχίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ψυχῆς παρεχομένης ἑαυτὴν ἀήττητον· φιλοπονίαν δὲ

φιλοπονίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.5; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 61-62; English edition p. 191.

ἐπιστήμην ψυχῆς παρεχομένης ἑαυτὴν ἀήττητον· φιλοπονίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἐξεργαστικὴν τοῦ προκειμένου, οὐ κωλυομένην διὰ

See also

Endurance; Courage; The noble; Greatness of soul.

The noble

The noble · Volume Two

καλόν · kalon — the noble; fine; noble things[86]

At a Glance

The word. The noble names an ethically admirable object or aim, while related language can describe bodily beauty; context determines whether noble, fine or beautiful is appropriate.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic definition makes the manner of aiming decisive: ethical virtue directs its choices toward the noble precisely under that description, with vice set against it.

In this edition. Retain noble in ethical arguments without forcing the same English term onto bodily beauty; the shared Greek family does not remove differences of subject and evaluation.

A place to read. II.7.25.1 This short definition joins choice, pleasures and pains, and the noble; read its qualification as noble before moving to the individual virtues that follow.

Meaning

Kalon can mean beautiful, fine or noble. Ethical passages often concern what deserves choice or esteem because of its character, rather than visual attractiveness.

Use in the book

The Stoic discussion connects nobility with virtue and its actions. The Peripatetic definition makes ethical virtue aim at the noble precisely as noble, and defines several virtues by their relation to it. Its distinction between a happy and a noble life matters: virtue can sustain nobility even under conditions that prevent happiness. Beauty of body and moral nobility can use related language without becoming identical concepts. The local argument determines which English rendering is appropriate.

The definition does more than identify an attractive result. Its repeated qualification about the noble concerns the aim under which the agent chooses, while its opening places that choice within intermediate pleasures and pains. These components connect the general account of ethical virtue

[86] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 123, 145. The adjective's ethical force should not be confused with nobility of birth.

with the later treatment of particular states. The ending introduces vice by opposition rather than supplying a second elaborate definition. Because the passage is compressed and includes explanatory notes in the translation, its few surviving clauses should retain their distinct functions: field of feeling, character of choice, and purpose.

"aiming at the noble as noble" (II.7.25.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.25.1. Ethical virtue aims at the noble as noble. (English edition p. 513.)

II.7.24.9. A noble life is distinguished from a happy life. (English edition p. 511.)

II.7.13.20. The exposition also discusses bodily beauty. (English edition p. 407.)

Translation in this edition

This edition commonly uses "noble" in ethical arguments; "beautiful" or "fine" remains appropriate in other contexts.

Attested Greek forms

καλοῦ

Attested. II.7.25.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 145; English edition p. 513.

τῶν μέσων ἡδονῶν τε καὶ λυπῶν, στοχαστικὴν τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ καλόν, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ὑπεναντίαν εἶναι ταύτῃ·

See also

Beauty (Volume One Lexicon, p. 51); Good; Virtue and excellence; Happiness and flourishing.

Understanding and practical wisdom

Understanding and practical wisdom · Volume Two

φρόνησις · phronēsis — practical wisdom; understanding[87]

At a Glance

The word. Practical wisdom concerns what should be done and the goods relevant to a social creature; the Stoic knowledge definition differs from the Peripatetic deliberative and practical state.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic paragraph gives alternative formulations and directs the reader to understand other virtues similarly, while preserving the different objects of temperance, justice and courage.

In this edition. Use practical wisdom or understanding with the local formulation and retain the marked rational supplement; a broad modern prudence should not displace the account's social and ethical scope.

A place to read. II.7.5b1.1 Compare the two practical-wisdom formulations and then the definitions of the other virtues; the parallel structure explains both shared knowledge language and differences in principal objects.

Meaning

Phronēsis is practical wisdom or understanding directed to living and acting well. It is distinguished from sophia even though both can be translated loosely as wisdom.

Use in the book

The Stoic definition calls it knowledge of what should be done, should not be done and is neither, or of goods, evils and intermediate things for a social rational creature. Its principal concern differs from that of justice or courage while sharing the virtues' end. The Peripatetic definition calls it a state deliberating about and performing good and noble things precisely as such. It is also related to ethical virtue through a qualified reciprocal accompaniment. These formulations retain school-specific differences instead of supplying a single modern notion of prudence.

The first definition sorts what should be done, not done and neither; the alternative sorts goods, evils and neither for a social creature. Rational is

[87] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59, 142, 145. The article uses the exact established Volume One title while explaining the more technical Volume Two context.

supplied, so its textual status remains visible even though it fits the wider account. The instruction to understand other virtues similarly introduces a series whose objects vary. This is a method of definition, not a claim that practical wisdom alone has absorbed justice, temperance and courage as identical names. The reader should follow both the common knowledge structure and the changing sphere to which that knowledge is applied.

"They direct us to understand the other virtues in this way as well." (II.7.5b1.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b1.1. The Stoic knowledge definition. (English edition p. 185.)

II.7.25.3. The Peripatetic deliberative and practical state. (English edition p. 515.)

II.7.20.19. Qualified reciprocal accompaniment with ethical virtue. (English edition p. 493.)

Translation in this edition

"Practical wisdom" keeps it distinct from *σοφία*, wisdom.

Attested Greek forms

Φρόνησιν

Attested. II.7.5b1.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 59; English edition p. 185.

Φρόνησιν δ' εἶναι ἐπιστήμην ὧν ποιητέον καὶ οὐ ποιητέον καὶ οὐδετέρων,

See also

Wisdom; Knowledge; Virtue and excellence; Good deliberation and resourcefulness.

Value and disvalue

Value and disvalue · Volume Two

ἀξία; ἀπαξία · axia; apaxia — value; worth; disvalue; due worth[88]

At a Glance

The word. Value and disvalue express different kinds of worth or disadvantage; selective value, exchange equivalence and moral goodness cannot be collapsed into one scale of assessment.

In Stobaeus. Three senses explain how a natural condition can warrant selection without becoming a moral good, while as circumstances allow restricts the examples of preference.

In this edition. Keep value distinct from good, and appraised exchange equivalence distinct from selective worth; the familiar economic sense does not explain every use of this family.

A place to read. II.7.7f.1 Follow the three meanings and the condition as circumstances allow before reading the health and wealth examples; the analogy for disvalue retains its compressed wording.

Meaning

Axia can concern value for selection, worth in itself, or what is due to a person. Apaxia is the corresponding disvalue. The chapter makes distinctions that the ordinary English "worth" may conceal.

Use in the book

The Stoic exposition distinguishes the good from what merely has value. It gives three senses of value, including an appraiser's exchange equivalent and Antipater's selective value, according to which circumstances allow a choice of health over disease. Justice assigns each their due worth, a use related to distribution rather than a price tag. The Peripatetic discussion likewise distinguishes proportionate equality from numerical sameness. The lexicon retains these contexts instead of replacing them with one modern economic theory of value.

An appraiser's equivalent is one defined sense, while Antipater's selective value explains choosing between health and disease or wealth and poverty. The order of meanings prevents exchange from governing the whole

[88] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59, 75, 83–84. The dictionary forms summarize inflected nouns in the cited passages; no claim that every occurrence is economic is intended.

account. Crucially, the preference is conditioned by circumstances: the list does not establish an exceptionless rule for every action. The final analogy extends opposed meanings to disvalue, but its wording is compressed and qualified in the edition's note. The entry preserves that limit instead of manufacturing a perfectly symmetrical theory.

"as circumstances allow" (II.7.7f.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7f.1. Three senses include exchange and selective value. (English edition p. 265.)

II.7.5o. Having value is distinguished from being good. (English edition p. 237.)

II.7.5b1.1. Justice assigns each their worth. (English edition p. 185.)

Translation in this edition

Translate "value," "worth" or "due worth" according to the construction; mark disvalue separately.

Attested Greek forms

ἀξίαν

Attested. II.7.7f.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 83-84; English edition p. 265.

Πάντα δὲ τὰ κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν λέγεσθαι

ἀπαξίαν

Attested. II.7.7f.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 83-84; English edition p. 265.

κατὰ φύσιν ἀξίαν ἔχειν καὶ πάντα τὰ παρὰ φύσιν ἀπαξίαν. Τὴν δὲ ἀξίαν λέγεσθαι τριχῶς, τήν τε δόσιν καὶ τιμὴν καθ' αὑτὸ

See also

Good; Selection; Justice; Preferred things.

Vice and wickedness

Vice and wickedness · Volume Two

κακία · kakia — vice; badness; wickedness[89]

At a Glance

The word. Vice is the moral defect opposed to virtue, not every natural disadvantage; its relation to evil or a choice-involving ethical state depends on the exposition being reported.

In Stobaeus. The initial Stoic classification pairs vices with virtues and places familiar external opposites together among indifferents, separating ethical defect from ordinary success or adversity in circumstances.

In this edition. Keep vice distinct from the wider word bad and from dispreferred conditions; differences among wrong acts do not dissolve their stated common relation to moral defect.

A place to read. II.7.5a Compare the matching virtue and vice lists with the following indifferent pairs; health, wealth and reputation do not become virtue merely because their opposites are usually unwelcome.

Meaning

Kakia is vice or badness, opposed to aretē. The ethical context can specify an organized condition of the agent rather than an isolated unpleasant event.

Use in the book

The Stoic account classifies what is vice or participates in vice as evil. Its equality-of-errors argument treats vice as the common source of wrong judgments while preserving differences in the external matters and the hardness of a particular disposition. The Peripatetic exposition places vice opposite a choice-involving state that aims at the noble. It distinguishes a vicious life from an intermediate life and from virtue. The lexicon therefore does not equate vice with every natural disadvantage or with every intermediate feeling.

The list is organized by correspondence: practical wisdom and folly, temperance and intemperance, justice and injustice, courage and cowardice. Each side is then extended beyond named examples to whatever partakes in virtue or vice. This prevents the catalogue from being read as an exhaustive

[89] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 57–58, 106, 145. Some passages distinguish deficient knowledge, wrong judgment and hardened state; the article does not flatten them into one event.

definition by enumeration. The subsequent indifferent pairs further isolate ethical defect from external condition. A person's poverty or illness is therefore not classified as vice simply by appearing unfavorable. Later arguments about error and hardened disposition develop the moral category without making these ordinary disadvantages its definition.

"everything that is vice or partakes of vice" (II.7.5a).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5a. Vice grounds the Stoic classification of evil. (English edition p. 179.)

II.7.11l.1. A common source in vice is consistent with qualitative differences among errors. (English edition p. 347.)

II.7.25.1. Vice opposes ethical virtue in the Peripatetic definition. (English edition p. 513.)

Translation in this edition

Use "vice" for the technical moral condition; "badness" may be needed in broader applications.

Attested Greek forms

κακία

Attested. II.7.5a; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 57-58; English edition p. 179.

ἀφροσύνην, ἀκολασίαν, ἀδικίαν, δειλίαν καὶ πᾶν ὅ ἐστι κακία ἢ μετέχον κακίας· ἀδιάφορα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα· ζωὴν θάνατον, δόξαν

See also

Virtue and excellence; Evil; Error and wrongdoing; Disposition.

Virtue and excellence

Virtue and excellence · Volume Two

ἀρετή · aretē — virtue; excellence[90]

At a Glance

The word. Virtue can name ethical excellence or excellence in a craft; Stoic knowledge definitions and Peripatetic choice-involving states remain distinct explanations despite their shared vocabulary.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic argument connects common principles and a shared end with inseparability, while differing principal concerns explain how the virtues can still receive separate names and functions.

In this edition. Use virtue or excellence according to the context and retain disagreements about its constitution; similar English praise does not make a knowledge definition equivalent to a mean-state definition.

A place to read. II.7.5b5.1 Read common principles and the same end before the conclusion about possessing all virtues, then the distinction of principal concerns; the second part qualifies how unity is explained.

Meaning

Aretē is excellence or virtue: a condition in which its possessor functions well. The chapter applies it to moral character, intellectual achievement and even crafts, so "virtue" is not its only possible force.

Use in the book

The Stoic account defines the virtues as forms of knowledge and arts with shared principles and an inseparable end; possessing one entails possessing them all. The Peripatetic exposition expressly denies that ethical virtue is knowledge and calls it a state involving choice of noble things. It also explains excellence through a shoemaker producing a good shoe and a builder building well. Its complete virtue, nobility and goodness, gathers ethical virtues together. These are related but distinct analyses, not interchangeable definitions.

The argument offers reasons for inseparability before stating its consequences. Shared principles and the same end support the claim that possessing one virtue entails possessing all, and that acting according to one

[90] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 63, 117–118, 128. Do not turn agreement on the Greek word into agreement on the constitution or sufficiency of virtue.

involves them all. Difference is then relocated to principal concerns rather than abolished. Practical wisdom supplies the first example: its primary task is distinguished from secondary considerations that support doing the appropriate thing without error. Some of that list is supplied. The reader can therefore distinguish the surviving explanation of commonality from the partly restored inventory illustrating differentiated concerns.

"They differ from one another in their principal concerns." (II.7.5b5.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b5.1. The Stoic virtues are inseparable forms of knowledge. (English edition p. 197.)

II.7.13.4. Peripatetic ethical virtue is not knowledge. (English edition p. 389.)

II.7.15.1. Craft analogies explain excellence as the best disposition. (English edition p. 427.)

Translation in this edition

"Virtue" suits the moral category; "excellence" can preserve the broader application to capacities and crafts.

Attested Greek forms

Ἀρετὴν

Attested. II.7.15.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 128; English edition p. 427.

[Περὶ ἀρετῆς.] Ἀρετὴν δ' ὠνομάσθαι τὴν ἀρίστην διάθεσιν ἢ καθ' ἣν ἄριστα διάκειται

See also

Good; Knowledge; Settled state; The noble.

Wisdom

Wisdom · Volume Two

σοφία · sophia — wisdom[91]

At a Glance

The word. Wisdom is defined here as knowledge of first causes, not every admirable judgment; its specified object distinguishes the noun's local use from the wider ethical ideal called wise.

In Stobaeus. The short definition stands beside practical wisdom as a deliberative and performing state, making the contrast between knowing causes and acting on good and noble matters explicit.

In this edition. Keep wisdom related to practical wisdom without treating them as interchangeable; the adjacent definitions assign different objects and different explanatory forms to the two intellectual conditions.

A place to read. II.7.25.3 Read both brief definitions together: first causes belong to wisdom, while deliberation and performance characterize practical wisdom; the latter contains a marked supplement that retains its status.

Meaning

Sophia is wisdom. The Peripatetic definition assigns it knowledge of first causes, distinguishing it from practical wisdom's deliberation and action.

Use in the book

The short definition is part of a sequence of intellectual and ethical conditions. It gives wisdom a specified object, first causes, rather than making the word a synonym for every admirable form of judgment. The following definition of practical wisdom concerns doing good and noble things as such. Elsewhere the chapter's ideal wise person is called sophos, but the adjective's role in an ethical classification should not silently replace the local definition of the noun sophia. The lexicon keeps the words related without treating every occurrence as the same technical proposition.

The brevity of the definition makes its object especially important. First causes specify the knowledge called wisdom in this sequence, while the following practical-wisdom clause speaks of deliberating and performing.

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[91] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 137, 145. The definition does not enumerate the causes or identify a particular external treatise as its source.

The contrast is therefore not simply between more and less intelligence. It distinguishes what is known from a state oriented toward doing good and noble things as such. The supplied words in the second clause are marked in the translation. No further hierarchy, curriculum or theory of causes should be reconstructed from these two sentences alone.

"Wisdom is knowledge of the first causes." (II.7.25.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.25.3. Wisdom is knowledge of first causes. (English edition p. 515.)

II.7.20.2. Wisdom and practical wisdom both appear among rational qualities. (English edition p. 473.)

Translation in this edition

Use "wisdom" for σοφία and preserve "practical wisdom" for φρόνησις where contrasted.

Attested Greek forms

σοφίαν

Attested. II.7.25.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 145; English edition p. 515.

σοφίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τῶν πρώτων αἰτίων· φρόνησιν δὲ ἕξιν βουλευτικὴν

See also

Understanding and practical wisdom; Knowledge; Cause (Volume One Lexicon, p. 68); Wise and base.

Wise and base

Wise and base · Volume Two

σοφός; σπουδαῖος; φαῦλος · sophos; spoudaios; phaulos — wise; virtuous; morally excellent; base[92]

At a Glance

The word. Wise, virtuous and base characterize ethical agents within their respective accounts; a favorable office or circumstance alone does not establish the disposition that these classifications describe.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic report relates two classes of people to sustained use of virtues or vices, interpreting doing well through practical wisdom, temperance and the other virtues.

In this edition. Read the idealized ethical classification with its explanation of doing well; do not make success, status or possession of authority a substitute for the disposition being described.

A place to read. II.7.11g.2 Follow the movement from the two classes through their use of virtues or vices to the explanatory phrase that is; it defines the kind of doing well asserted.

Meaning

These descriptions mark the agents around whom many technical ethical claims are organized. Sophos stresses wisdom, spoudaios moral excellence, and phaulos the deficient or base person.

Use in the book

The Stoic account recognizes two kinds of human beings, virtuous and base, and relates their conduct to virtues or vices throughout life. Its claims that the wise person knows, rules, acts correctly or is free often concern disposition rather than the possession of an office or a favorable external condition. It can also recognize differences in persuasion or quickness among virtuous agents without increasing their virtue. The Peripatetic exposition uses excellent-person language within a different analysis of acquired state, external conditions and practical judgment.

The paragraph interprets its sweeping claim rather than leaving well as a bare description of success. It explains the virtuous person's conduct through

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[92] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 99, 102, 113–114. The combined article groups related classifications while retaining the different Greek words.

experience in life and through acting wisely, temperately and according to the other virtues. The base person supplies the opposed case. Throughout life gives the classification an enduring scope, but this passage does not test it by comparing particular offices, wealth or outcomes. The entry helps a reader keep the stated ethical criterion visible when later claims use ordinary vocabulary such as ruling, freedom or expertise.

"that is, wisely, temperately, and in accordance with the other virtues" (II.7.11g.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11g.2. Two ethical classes are defined through virtue and vice. (English edition p. 319.)

II.7.11i.6. Rule can belong to disposition without actual office. (English edition p. 331.)

II.7.11p. Differences among virtuous agents concern intermediate qualities. (English edition p. 375.)

Translation in this edition

Do not make "base" mean low social birth, or "wise" merely well informed.

Attested Greek forms

σπουδαίων

Attested. II.7.11g.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 99; English edition p. 319.

φιλοσόφοις δύο γένη τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου

φαύλων

Attested. II.7.11g.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 99; English edition p. 319.

ἀνθρώπων εἶναι, τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων, τὸ δὲ τῶν φαύλων· καὶ τὸ μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἀρεταῖς,

σοφόν

Attested. II.7.11m.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 111; English edition p. 365.

Ψεῦδος δ' ὑπολαμβάνειν οὐδέποτέ φασι τὸν σοφόν, οὐδὲ τὸ παράπαν ἀκαταλήπτῳ τινὶ συγκατατίθεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μηδὲ

See also

Wisdom; Virtue and excellence; Knowledge; Progress.

Affinity and attachment

Affinity and attachment · Volume Two

οἰκειοῦσθαι; οἰκεῖος · oikeiousthai; oikeios — feel affinity; be attached; one's own; congenial[93]

At a Glance

The word. The attested verb-family concerns belonging, congeniality and attachment; its ethical uses connect self-concern with natural goods and wider relationships without requiring an unwitnessed abstract technical noun.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic passage makes natural self-affinity explain a creature's desire to exist and its attraction to health, pleasure and life, giving these objects a stated evaluative role.

In this edition. Explain the attested family rather than inserting the noun oikeiōsis wherever the argument resembles familiar doctrine; the Peripatetic classification of natural goods must retain its own terms.

A place to read. II.7.13.6 Read desire to exist before the paired welcome and avoidance of natural and contrary conditions; the explicit good and bad classifications distinguish this account from strict Stoic indifferents.

Meaning

The oikeios family concerns what belongs to or is congenial to someone, and becoming attached or feeling affinity. Its ethical uses need not be reduced to literal family kinship.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic exposition says the creature has an affinity with itself by nature and accordingly welcomes what accords with nature. It develops this toward children, relatives, fellow citizens and other human beings. Virtue itself later turns toward itself as more choiceworthy than bodily excellences. These developments connect self-concern with concern for others rather than presenting an exclusive selfishness. The text also recognizes natural attachment before rational maturity. The lexicon uses the attested

[93] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 118, 120, 123. This is an explicitly named lexical family; the cited witness is the verb ᾠκειῶσθαι, not an unattested abstract noun.

verb-family rather than assuming that the technical noun oikeiōsis occurs wherever the argument resembles a familiar doctrine.

The desire to exist is explained by the creature's natural affinity with itself, not introduced as a conclusion reached by detached reasoning. Welcome and distress then correspond to accordance with or opposition to nature. Health, pleasure and life are explicitly pursued as good and choiceworthy in their own right, while their opposites are avoided. The supplied for is marked in the translation. This example is therefore important precisely because familiar language about natural attachment enters an evaluation different from the Stoic classification of those conditions as indifferents.

"by nature he has an affinity with himself" (II.7.13.6).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.13.6. Natural affinity with oneself supports attraction to natural goods. (English edition p. 391.)

II.7.13.11. The exposition develops affection through kinship. (English edition p. 397.)

II.7.13.22. Virtue comes to feel affinity with itself. (English edition p. 409.)

Translation in this edition

"Affinity," "attachment" or "one's own" depends on the grammatical form and object.

Attested Greek forms

ᾠκειῶσθαι

Attested. II.7.13.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 118; English edition p. 391.

Καὶ πρῶτον μὲν ὀρέγεσθαι τοῦ εἶναι, φύσει γὰρ ᾠκειῶσθαι πρὸς ἑαυτόν, δι' ὃ καὶ προσηκόντως ἀσμενίζειν μὲν ἐν τοῖς κατὰ

See also

Proper and one's own (Volume One Lexicon, p. 335); Preliminary end; Friendship and cosmic attraction (Volume One Lexicon, p. 171); Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285).

Appropriate action

Appropriate action · Volume Two

καθῆκον · kathēkon — appropriate action; what is fitting to do[94]

At a Glance

The word. An appropriate action is consistent in life and admits a reasonable defense when done; the concept is broader than a fully virtuous correct action.

In Stobaeus. The account moves from preferred things to appropriate activity and extends the concept to nonrational creatures before giving a formulation specific to rational ways of life.

In this edition. Appropriate action preserves the definition's breadth better than an unqualified duty, especially where the concept extends to creatures without human institutions or rational deliberation.

A place to read. II.7.8.1 Read the animal example together with the rational reformulation; this sequence shows why the definition should not become a narrowly human institutional obligation or office.

Meaning

Kathēkon names what is consistent in life and, once done, admits of a reasonable defense. The definition is broader than a fully virtuous correct action.

Use in the book

The Stoic account extends appropriate activity to nonrational animals insofar as they act consistently with their own nature. In rational life it distinguishes complete appropriate actions, also called correct actions, from intermediate ones such as marrying, serving as ambassador or engaging in discussion. The latter descriptions do not themselves establish that the agent acts from virtue. The later Peripatetic exposition employs appropriate actions in a life intermediate between virtue and vice, retaining the vocabulary within a different framework.

The transition from preferred things explains why appropriate action follows evaluative distinctions. The definition concerns something done and the defense it admits, not merely an attractive object. Its extension to animals

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[94] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 85–86, 145. "Duty" may suggest a narrower universal obligation than the account's examples and definition warrant.

makes consistency with their nature sufficient for the wider application. The formulation for rational creatures then locates that consistency in a way of life without retracting the broader extension. This prepares the next excerpt's distinction between complete correct action and intermediate appropriate activities: the general concept must remain wider than its ethically complete form.

"admits of a reasonable defense" (II.7.8.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.8.1. Definition and extension to nonrational creatures. (English edition p. 271.)

II.7.8.2. Complete and intermediate appropriate actions are distinguished. (English edition p. 271.)

II.7.24.10. The Peripatetic intermediate life has appropriate actions. (English edition p. 511.)

Translation in this edition

"Appropriate action" avoids making every kathēkon a complete moral achievement.

Attested Greek forms

καθῆκον

Attested. II.7.8.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 85; English edition p. 271.

προηγμένων ὁ περὶ τοῦ καθήκοντος τόπος. Ὁρίζεται δὲ τὸ καθῆκον· 'τὸ ἀκόλουθον ἐν ζωῇ, ὃ πραχθὲν εὔλογον ἀπολογίαν ἔχει'· παρὰ

See also

Correct action; Selection; Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285); Virtue and excellence.

Assent

Assent · Volume Two

συγκατάθεσις; συγκατατίθεσθαι · synkatathesis; synkatatithesthai — assent; accepting as true[95]

At a Glance

The word. Assent accepts what is presented or asserted, while the Stoic analysis distinguishes its propositional object from the predicate toward which a practical impulse moves in action.

In Stobaeus. Calling impulses assents does not remove their practical component: the paragraph separately identifies the element moving action and the different objects toward which assent and impulse are directed.

In this edition. Keep assent as the technical act, not mere exposure to an impression, and do not impose this specific Stoic formulation on every use of believing elsewhere.

A place to read. II.7.9b Read the general claim beside the distinction of objects; the final transition to passion shows that this analysis prepares the next stage of the ethical exposition.

Meaning

Synkatathesis is assent, the acceptance directed to what is presented or asserted. The technical account distinguishes the thing assented to from the action toward which an impulse moves.

Use in the book

All impulses are called assents, but assent concerns propositions while impulse concerns predicates contained in them. This distinction becomes decisive in the account of the wise person: he does not assent weakly or to what is not apprehensible. Ignorance, opinion and conjecture are analyzed through deficient assent. The account even permits employing a false statement without assenting to it, separating a statement's use from belief in it. These are reported Stoic claims and must not be imposed on every occurrence of believing elsewhere in the anthology.

The opening combines inclusion with distinction: impulses belong under assent, but practical impulses contain something further that moves toward

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[95] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 88, 111, 167. The noun and middle verb are grouped as one lexical family.

action. Their different objects then explain why this is not simply a definition of action as believing a sentence. Predicates and propositions are related without becoming identical. The final transition gives the paragraph a structural role as well: passion is introduced as a species of impulse. The account of passions consequently builds on this analysis of movement and acceptance instead of beginning as an unrelated catalogue of feelings.

"practical impulses also contain the element that moves to action" (II.7.9b).

Porphyry. A persuasive impression need not compel assent. Porphyry says that withholding assent remains up to us: the impression does not drag the recipient toward itself or pull him like a puppet. Persuasiveness and truth are not equated.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9b. Assent to propositions is distinguished from impulse toward predicates. (English edition p. 279.)

II.7.11m.16. Weak, changeable assent defines ignorance. (English edition p. 365.)

II.7.11m.15. Employing falsehood without assent differs from the account's definition of lying. (English edition p. 365.)

II.8.40. Persuasion is distinguished from compelled assent. (English edition p. 611.)

Translation in this edition

"Assent" keeps the technical act distinct from simply receiving an impression.

Attested Greek forms

συγκαταθέσεις

Attested. II.7.9b; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 88; English edition p. 279.

Πάσας δὲ τὰς ὁρμὰς συγκαταθέσεις εἶναι, τὰς δὲ πρακτικὰς καὶ τὸ κινητικὸν περιέχειν. Ἤδη δὲ ἄλλῳ

See also

Knowledge; Belief and opinion; Proposition and predicate; Falsehood.

Aversion

Aversion · Volume Two

ἀφορμή · aphormē — aversion; movement away from action[96]

At a Glance

The word. Aversion opposes rational impulse in the sphere of not acting; this action-related sense differs from the avoidance or shunning employed in the account of fear.

In Stobaeus. The surviving opposition establishes the term, while a marked supplement supplies much of its parallel definition; the explanatory restoration must remain visibly distinct from transmitted wording.

In this edition. Retain action-related aversion and distinguish avoidance in fear; an editorially completed definition should not appear to provide wholly surviving evidence for every detail of the explanation.

A place to read. II.7.9.2 Distinguish the surviving noun and opposition from the supplemented completion of the parallel definition; this short paragraph does not securely transmit an entire general psychological theory.

Meaning

Aphormē is opposed to hormē in the account of rational movement. Here it concerns thought moving away in the sphere of not acting, rather than every dislike or fear.

Use in the book

The text defines rational impulse as movement toward something in action and places aversion opposite it. Much of the explanatory definition of aversion is editorially supplied; the surviving noun and its opposition to impulse remain the direct textual witness. The account later says impulse has several senses and aversion two. Its use in distinguishing altogether indifferent things concerns whether an object stimulates approach or withdrawal. The term should not be silently merged with ekklisis, the avoidance or shunning used in definitions of fear.

The opening proposes how rational impulse could properly be defined, presenting a deliberate conceptual formulation. Aversion is placed in opposition to that movement. Much of the mirror-image explanation lies in

[96] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 79, 87. The article's witness is the unsupplied noun; the supplied completion of its definition is not presented as independently transmitted wording.

the supplied span, however, so it cannot independently prove every detail of a wholly surviving definition. Lexical evidence and explanatory restoration coexist: the term and its opposition remain secure, while the printed reconstruction retains its limits. The action-related setting also distinguishes this paragraph from the separate taxonomy in which avoidance is used to explain fear.

"Opposed to it is aversion" (II.7.9.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9.2. Aversion is opposed to rational impulse; the longer gloss is supplied. (English edition p. 275.)

II.7.9.3. Two senses of aversion are acknowledged. (English edition p. 277.)

II.7.7.2. Altogether indifferent things stimulate neither impulse nor aversion. (English edition p. 251.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "aversion" for ἀφορμή and explain the action-related sense locally.

Attested Greek forms

ἀφορμήν

Attested. II.7.9.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 87; English edition p. 275.

τι τῶν ἐν τῷ πράττειν· ταύτῃ δ' ἀντιτίθεσθαι ἀφορμήν, φοράν τινα ⟨διανοίας ἀπό τινος τῶν ἐν τῷ μὴ πράττειν⟩.

See also

Impulse; Rejection; Fear; Indifferent things.

Avoidance in fear

Avoidance in fear · Volume Two

ἔκκλισις · ekklisis — avoidance; aversion; shunning[97]

At a Glance

The word. Avoidance in fear names the movement away associated with anticipated evil, distinguished from the action terminology of aphormē and from any claim that the anticipated object really is evil.

In Stobaeus. Fear's cause is an opinion with motivating freshness: an evil is thought to approach, and the person takes it as something that genuinely demands avoidance rather than merely distant consideration.

In this edition. Keep the opinion and its active force in view, and distinguish this fear-related avoidance from an impulse away from action described with a different Greek term elsewhere.

A place to read. II.7.10b.2 Read fear's brief definition together with its stated cause, noticing that approaching evil and the need to avoid it belong to the opinion that stimulates the response.

Meaning

Ekklisis is avoidance or shunning. In the definition of fear it is qualified as disobedient to reason, and must be distinguished from aphormē, the action-related aversion opposed to impulse.

Use in the book

Fear is an ekklisis arising from the opinion that an evil is approaching and should really be avoided. Its motivating freshness is an active evaluative force, not simply the date an opinion was formed. The passage does not give a complete independent account of every kind of avoidance. It gives a particular passionate movement with a cognitive cause. The separate discussion of aphormē concerns thought moving away in the sphere of not acting. English "aversion" may cover both, but the Greek terms remain different.

The definition and causal explanation work together. Fear is classified as aversion disobedient to reason; the following sentence identifies the opinion that gives it this direction. The feared evil is approaching rather than simply

[97] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 87, 90. The dictionary form is justified by transmitted ἔκκλισιν.

remembered, and the belief still has the freshness that moves the person toward avoidance. Freshness here describes the opinion's stimulating force, not a measured interval since the event. The report explains what the agent takes the situation to demand. It does not, by describing that belief, endorse the judgment that the approaching thing is truly evil.

"Fear is aversion disobedient to reason." (II.7.10b.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10b.2. Fear is avoidance disobedient to reason. (English edition p. 287.)

II.7.9.2. Aphormē is separately opposed to rational impulse. (English edition p. 275.)

Translation in this edition

"Avoidance" is a distinguishing gloss although the edition uses "aversion" in the fear definition.

Attested Greek forms

ἔκκλισιν

Attested. II.7.10b.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 90; English edition p. 287.

Φόβον δ' εἶναι ἔκκλισιν ἀπειθῆ λόγῳ, αἴτιον δ' αὐτοῦ τὸ δοξάζειν κακὸν ἐπιφέρεσθαι,

See also

Fear; Aversion; Desiderative impulse; Belief and opinion.

Chance and fortune

Chance and fortune · Volume Two

τύχη · tychē — chance; fortune; good or adverse fortune[98]

At a Glance

The word. Chance or fortune can name unforeseen events, their favorable or adverse outcome, or Fortune personified. Its causal implications depend on the particular passage.

In Stobaeus. The anthology contrasts blaming fortune for one's character with several philosophical accounts of hidden causes, conditional order and the limits of practical control.

In this edition. Follow the local argument and preserve restrictions such as most or a little. Capitalizing Fortune marks personification rather than a different Greek noun.

A place to read. II.8.5 Read the dramatic fragment's shift from fortune's figurative body to the conduct of a person who cannot bear events in accordance with nature.

Meaning

Tychē can name unforeseen occurrence, the success or failure that falls to someone, or Fortune personified. The term does not by itself decide whether events lack causes or merely exceed human calculation.

Use in the book

Democritus calls Fortune an image fashioned as an excuse for poor counsel, yet qualifies the contrast: practical insight directs most matters. Epicurus says fortune intrudes only a little upon the wise person. Porphyry instead calls Justice Fortune insofar as her cause is hidden from human reasoning. Iamblichus places fortune within causal order. These are different explanations of the same vocabulary. Dramatic verses may praise Fortune's alliance with good judgment or expose the habit of blaming fortune for one's character; none supplies a universal definition for every excerpt.

The dramatic fragment changes the object of criticism within three lines. Its opening gives fortune a figurative body; the following lines describe a human response to events. The person unable to bear what happens transfers

[98] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 153, 156, 159, 171, 175. Keep "most," "a little," and the standpoint of human ignorance. Removing these restrictions would turn contrasting arguments into a stronger doctrine than their wording supports.

the name fortune to his own character. This exposes a particular use of blame rather than proving that no external contingency exists. The speaker and dramatic situation are not supplied by these lines. Their compact accusation should consequently be read alongside, rather than substituted for, the more extended philosophical accounts collected in the chapter.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.5. A speaker says someone calls his own character fortune. (English edition p. 555.)

II.8.16. Democritus opposes the image of Fortune to practical insight, with qualifications. (English edition p. 563.)

II.8.28. Epicurus limits fortune's intrusion upon the wise person. (English edition p. 575.)

II.8.42.11. Porphyry explains the name Fortune through a cause hidden from reasoning. (English edition p. 629.)

II.8.46.1. Iamblichus denies that occurrence is outside causal order. (English edition p. 647.)

Translation in this edition

Use "fortune" for the distribution of success and adversity, and "chance" where the event's unpredictability is foremost. Capitalization marks personification, not a separate Greek noun.

Attested Greek forms

τύχη

Attested. II.8.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 156; English edition p. 563.

Βαιὰ γὰρ φρονήσει τύχη μάχεται

Τύχη

Attested. II.8.42.11; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 171; English edition p. 629.

Ἡ δὲ Δίκη Τύχη λέγεται, αἰτία οὖσα ἄδηλος ἀνθρωπείῳ λογισμῷ.

See also

Fate; Providence; Choice; Reasoning and calculation (Volume One Lexicon, p. 353); Misfortune and wrongdoing.

Choice

Choice · Volume Two

προαίρεσις; αἵρεσις · proairesis; hairesis — choice; deliberate choice; choosing in advance[99]

At a Glance

The word. Choice and prior choice belong to a family of deliberate movements, but their local definitions differ. Elsewhere choice names a morally decisive personal orientation.

In Stobaeus. Epictetus distinguishes hindrance to the body from hindrance to choice; Porphyry separates choosing a pursuit from attaining it with whatever assistance is required.

In this edition. Use choice generally, preserving choice in advance where the text defines it explicitly. The noun alone does not establish a complete theory of free will.

A place to read. II.7.9a.2 Read the short sequence as related definitions: wish arising from reflection, choice before choice, reasonable desire and voluntary wish distinguish terms that ordinary English can blur.

Meaning

Proairesis and hairesis both concern choosing, but the excerpts do not use them as interchangeable names for a single faculty. The ethical definitions distinguish hairesis, a wish arising from reflection, from proairesis, choice before a choice. Elsewhere proairesis names the agent's morally decisive orientation.

Use in the book

Epictetus separates bodily hindrance from hindrance to choice, adding the condition "unless choice itself wishes it." Porphyry distinguishes choosing a pursuit from attaining it: external assistance can remain necessary. Iamblichus locates strictly understood goods in deliberate choice itself. These contexts give choice an ethical significance without making every desired outcome controllable. They should not be compressed into an unqualified claim that individuals choose everything that happens to them.

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[99] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 87, 157, 166, 175. The entry groups two attested nouns while preserving their local distinction. Porphyry's argument interprets Plato; it is not an anonymous statement of the anthology's own doctrine.

The definitions follow a list of species of practical impulse. They are therefore a local analysis of differences within a wider movement toward action. Their brevity matters: prior choice is explained by its relation to another choice, not by an extended account of every decision's temporal stages. The accompanying definitions also distinguish reasonable desire from its voluntary form. Reading the sequence together helps prevent one English word from flattening several Greek expressions. It does not determine how every later occurrence of choice must be classified.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9a.2. Definitions distinguish reflective choice, prior choice, reasonable wish and willingness. (English edition p. 279.)

II.8.22. Disease hinders the body; choice is not thereby hindered. (English edition p. 567.)

II.8.39.8. Choosing a pursuit does not guarantee its attainment. (English edition p. 607.)

II.8.47.1. Iamblichus locates strictly understood goods in deliberate choice. (English edition p. 651.)

Translation in this edition

Use "choice" where the distinction is not being drawn; retain "choice in advance" in the explicit definition. "Free will" would add a theory not supplied by the noun alone.

Attested Greek forms

προαίρεσιν

Attested. II.7.9a.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 87; English edition p. 279.

Αἵρεσιν δὲ βούλησιν ἐξ ἀναλογισμοῦ· προαίρεσιν δὲ αἵρεσιν πρὸ αἱρέσεως

προαιρέσεως

Attested. II.8.22; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 157; English edition p. 567.

Νόσος σώματός ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρέσεως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴ θελήσῃ.

See also

What depends on us; Will and wish; Self-determination; School and choosing (Volume One Lexicon, p. 378); Fate.

Co-fated conditions

Co-fated conditions · Volume Two

συγκαθείμαρται · synkatheimartai — has been co-fated; is fated together with[100]

At a Glance

The word. The attested perfect verb says that an outcome and its conditions have been fated together. It explains a relation, rather than naming a separate abstract entity.

In Stobaeus. The reply to a fatalist includes keeping watch, fighting and sowing among the conditions of their corresponding outcomes, retaining its opening qualification of perhaps.

In this edition. Explain co-fated as fated together with. Do not substitute inevitable regardless of action, or infer that exertion alone guarantees the desired result.

A place to read. II.8.25.2 Read the reply after the sleeping watchmen objection, noting how each example joins an outcome to the activity or circumstances through which it occurs.

Meaning

The attested perfect verb says that something has been fated together with something else. Here it expresses the joint determination of an outcome and the conditions through which it occurs. This article explains the verbal expression rather than positing an unattested abstract noun.

Use in the book

In the excerpt assigned to Plutarch, an imagined objection says that watchmen can sleep if the naval station is fated not to be captured. The reply allows that the outcome may be fated, but says its manner and means are co-fated with it. Watchkeeping does not occur through sleeping, victory through flight, or harvesting without sowing suitable ground. The examples oppose using fate as an excuse to omit the relevant activity. They do not show that exertion guarantees success, or establish that every event is fated independently of the reply's "perhaps."

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[100] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 158–159. The headword explicitly identifies an attested verbal expression. The supplied article later in the sentence is not needed to establish the verb's occurrence or its relation to the examples.

The objection imagines that a fated result makes vigilance unnecessary. The reply challenges that inference by restoring the means of accomplishment to the description of what is fated. Its examples include both human actions and circumstances: sowing concerns the cultivator, fertile soil the setting; hunting also requires a place where game exists. The point is therefore broader than effort alone. The same paragraph does not promise success whenever someone works hard, and its initial qualification prevents the reader from treating the reply as an unrestricted assertion about every event.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.25.1. The imagined fatalist argues that a fated result makes vigilance unnecessary. (English edition p. 573.)

II.8.25.2. The response includes the necessary activity among the co-fated conditions. (English edition p. 573.)

Translation in this edition

"Co-fated" keeps the relation visible; explain it as "fated together with" rather than substituting "inevitable regardless of what one does."

Attested Greek forms

συγκαθείμαρται

Attested. II.8.25.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 158-159; English edition p. 573.

καθείμαρται μὲν ἴσως ἅπαντα ταῦτα, συγκαθείμαρται δὲ ἑκάστῳ τὸ διὰ τούτων καὶ τὸ ἐν τούτοις

See also

Fate; Necessity (Volume One Lexicon, p. 287); Action (Volume One Lexicon, p. 23); Choice; Chance and fortune.

Correct action

Correct action · Volume Two

κατόρθωμα; κατορθοῦν · katorthōma; katorthoun — correct action; acting correctly[101]

At a Glance

The word. Correct action is appropriate activity in its complete form, performed in accordance with virtue; an outwardly successful result alone does not establish this ethical status.

In Stobaeus. Thinking wisely and acting justly illustrate completeness, whereas marriage, diplomatic service and discussion remain intermediate when described simply as kinds of activity without the agent's virtue.

In this edition. Keep correct action separate from intermediate appropriate action and do not make correct mean merely effective; the source classifies activities through their relation to virtue.

A place to read. II.7.8.2 Compare the two groups of examples as different levels of description; an activity's ordinary social name does not itself show that an agent acts virtuously.

Meaning

Katorthōma is the complete form of appropriate action, an activity in accordance with virtue. The cognate verb describes acting correctly, rather than merely producing a favorable external outcome.

Use in the book

Thinking wisely and acting justly illustrate correct actions. Marrying or serving as an ambassador, considered simply as types of conduct, are intermediate appropriate actions instead. The Stoic description of the wise person makes his actions correct through virtue, while errors characterize the base person. The classification also distinguishes predicates expressing what should be done from goods that one possesses. These technical claims should not become the loose modern notion that an action is correct whenever it succeeds.

Both sides of the contrast contain recognizable activities. Only the complete appropriate actions are defined through accordance with virtue,

[101] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 85–86, 99. The noun and verb are grouped as a lexical family; favorable fortune alone does not establish their technical sense.

however. The intermediate examples do not show that marriage or diplomatic service must be wrong; they show that an ordinary social description leaves ethical completeness undecided. Thinking wisely and acting justly already contain the relevant evaluation in their description. This distinction helps readers follow later statements about the wise person's conduct without assuming that the passage has divided occupations into inherently virtuous and inherently vicious lists.

"activities in accordance with virtue" (II.7.8.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.8.2. Correct actions are complete appropriate actions. (English edition p. 271.)

II.7.8a.1. Benefits expressed as predicates are part of the technical analysis. (English edition p. 273.)

II.7.11g.2. Virtuous agents act correctly through their use of the virtues. (English edition p. 319.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "correct action" distinct from intermediate "appropriate action."

Attested Greek forms

κατορθώματα

Attested. II.7.8.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 85-86; English edition p. 271.

καθηκόντων τὰ μὲν εἶναί φασι τέλεια, ἃ δὴ καὶ κατορθώματα λέγεσθαι. Κατορθώματα δ' εἶναι τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνεργήματα, οἷον

See also

Appropriate action; Error and wrongdoing; Virtue and excellence; Proposition and predicate.

Desiderative impulse

Desiderative impulse · Volume Two

ὄρεξις · orexis — desire; desiderative impulse[102]

At a Glance

The word. Desiderative impulse names orexis within a broader classification of impulse; it must remain distinct from craving, whose Stoic definition adds disobedience to reason and a particular evaluative judgment.

In Stobaeus. The report first establishes impulse as movement toward something and then differentiates rational and nonrational cases, explicitly denying that desire is simply identical with rational impulse as a whole.

In this edition. Distinguish the species orexis from its genus and from disobedient craving; do not use the English word desire to collapse these different levels of the classification.

A place to read. II.7.9.1 Begin with the impression that prompts impulse, then follow the genus and species distinctions before comparing the later definition of craving and the separately classified reasonable wish.

Meaning

Orexis is desire or appetitive striving. The Stoic passage treats it as a species of rational impulse, not as the definition of rational impulse as a whole.

Use in the book

The generic movement of soul includes impulses in rational and nonrational animals. Within the rational class, orexis is narrower. This matters when craving is defined as desire disobedient to reason: the added qualification, rather than the noun desire alone, makes that movement a passion. Reasonable wish is also defined through orexis, showing why desire must not be equated with pathological craving. The distinctions let related movements differ in their relation to reason and place in the taxonomy.

The paragraph begins before desire itself, with an impression of something appropriate that directly prompts impulse. It then defines impulse generically as movement of the soul toward something. Rational and nonrational animals both fall within this discussion, although the corresponding kinds do not have separate names. Desire is narrower than

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[102] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 86–87, 90. Orexis should not be replaced indiscriminately by epithymia merely because both can receive "desire."

rational impulse, not its alternative definition. This order of explanation prevents an apparently familiar English word from doing too much work: the classification establishes what sort of movement is under discussion before later passages judge particular forms of it.

"For desire is not rational impulse itself, but a species of rational impulse." (II.7.9.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9.1. Desire is a species rather than the whole of rational impulse. (English edition p. 275.)

II.7.10b.1. Craving is desire disobedient to reason. (English edition p. 285.)

II.7.9a.2. Wish is reasonable desire. (English edition p. 279.)

Translation in this edition

"Desiderative impulse" identifies the technical family when ordinary "desire" would blur distinctions.

Attested Greek forms

ὄρεξις

Attested. II.7.9.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 86-87; English edition p. 275.

ἀλόγοις ζῴοις· οὐ κατωνομασμέναι δ' εἰσίν. Ἡ γὰρ ὄρεξις οὐκ ἔστι λογικὴ ὁρμή, ἀλλὰ λογικῆς ὁρμῆς εἶδος.

See also

Desire; Impulse; Will and wish; Passion.

Error and wrongdoing

Error and wrongdoing · Volume Two

ἁμάρτημα; ἁμαρτάνειν · hamartēma; hamartanein — error; wrongdoing; erring[103]

At a Glance

The word. Error concerns conduct contrary to right reason or an omission of something appropriate by a rational agent; it includes more than a mistaken calculation or unfortunate result.

In Stobaeus. The definition opposes error to appropriate action complete in every detail, making omitted appropriateness relevant alongside contrary action before later passages compare errors with one another.

In this edition. Retain error for the broad root and wrongdoing where moral force needs explanation; equal errors need not therefore have identical objects, contents or consequences.

A place to read. II.7.11a Read both formulations of error after the repeated definition of complete appropriate action; the contrast explains why something omitted can belong within this ethical classification.

Meaning

Hamartēma is an error or wrong act; the verb describes erring. Its technical treatment in the Stoic account goes beyond an accidental slip in calculation or an unfortunate result.

Use in the book

The exposition opposes correct actions to errors and relates the difference to virtue and vice. Its claim that errors are equal does not say they are alike in every respect: the account expressly preserves differences between them. An analogy with falsehood explains how every false statement fails of truth even when its subject differs. Later passages distinguish conduct that benefits or harms those affected. The equal-error thesis should therefore not be paraphrased as an assertion that all wrong acts have identical contents or consequences.

The excerpt recalls an earlier definition rather than opening an unrelated subject. Completeness is emphasized by in every detail, while the two

[103] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 93, 106, 113. This lexical family is not automatically identical with every reference to ignorance or mistaken opinion.

formulations of error identify failure in different ways. One concerns acting contrary to right reason; the other concerns a rational creature leaving something appropriate undone. The latter is significant because ethical failure is not reduced to a positively performed harmful deed. Later claims about equality among errors depend on a shared criterion of failure, not a denial that omissions and actions differ.

"a rational animal has omitted something appropriate" (II.7.11a).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11a. Correct action and error are opposed. (English edition p. 299.)

II.7.11l.1. Errors are said to be equal but not alike. (English edition p. 347.)

II.7.11o. The report retains both equality and differences among errors. (English edition p. 373.)

Translation in this edition

"Error" preserves the broad root; "wrongdoing" can explain the moral force of the technical classification.

Attested Greek forms

ἁμαρτήματα

Attested. II.7.11l.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 106; English edition p. 347.

Ἴσα τε πάντα λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ ἁμαρτήματα, οὐκέτι δ' ὅμοια. Καθάπερ γὰρ ἀπὸ μιᾶς τινος πηγῆς τῆς κακίας

See also

Correct action; Vice and wickedness; Falsehood; Good.

Fate

Fate · Volume Two

εἱμαρμένη · heimarmenē — fate; the fated order[104]

At a Glance

The word. Fate names an allotted or connected order of events. The excerpts dispute its relation to choice, embodied existence and a providence that may stand above it.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry interprets chosen lives and conditional consequences; Iamblichus distinguishes the soul's subjection in becoming from its freedom through intellectual activity and prior providence.

In this edition. Preserve the local causal or conditional account. A fated consequence does not necessarily mean the initial choice was compelled, and fatalism is too broad a substitute.

A place to read. II.8.39.5 Read Porphyry's distinction between a rational course of life and the different kinds of embodied life before following his account of the choices in Plato's myth.

Meaning

Heimarmenē names an allotted or connected order of events. The excerpts dispute how this order relates to choosing, necessity, embodied life and a higher providence. "Fatalism" is therefore too broad a substitute for the word.

Use in the book

Porphyry interprets fate through conditional laws: choosing a kind of life brings its consequences, but the ordinance does not itself compel that initial choice. He distinguishes primary and secondary lives in explaining Plato's myth. Iamblichus describes the soul as subject to fate insofar as it enters becoming, yet free insofar as it exercises its intellectual activity. In the same sequence he makes fate depend upon prior providence. These accounts preserve meaningful agency in different ways rather than simply denying that there is fate.

Porphyry first clarifies what counts as a life because the later argument depends on the range of things that can be chosen. The Stoic usage he reports

[104] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 165, 169, 173–174. The Greek noun is attested in uninterrupted running text. The astrological interpretation in Porphyry is presented with conjectural qualifications, not as an independently established account of Plato's sources.

concerns a course of rational activities, relations, actions and experiences. Plato's patterns also include animal lives and kinds of human life. Treating those usages as identical would distort the ensuing explanation before the question of fate is reached. The preliminary distinction shows that interpreting necessity in the myth requires attention to the objects and levels of choice, not only to the word fate.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.39.5. Porphyry distinguishes meanings of life before interpreting the chosen life. (English edition p. 603.)

II.8.42.4. Fate is compared with conditional legal pronouncements. (English edition p. 619.)

II.8.43.2. Subjection to fate is proportional to participation in becoming. (English edition p. 639.)

II.8.45.1. Fate depends in being upon providence. (English edition p. 643.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "fate" while explaining the passage's causal or conditional structure. A fated consequence need not mean that choosing its antecedent was compelled.

Attested Greek forms

εἱμαρμένην

Attested. II.8.43.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 173; English edition p. 639.

κατὰ τοσοῦτον καὶ ὑπὸ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἄγεται

εἱμαρμένη

Attested. II.8.45.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 173-174; English edition p. 643.

Κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἐπιπλέκεται ἡ εἱμαρμένη τῇ προνοίᾳ

See also

Co-fated conditions; Providence; Necessity (Volume One Lexicon, p. 287); Choice; Self-determination.

Hindrance

Hindrance · Volume Two

ἐμπόδιον; ἐμπόδιος · empodion; empodios — hindrance; obstacle; obstructing[105]

At a Glance

The word. A hindrance obstructs something in a particular respect. What obstructs bodily activity need not therefore obstruct choice or every possible activity of the person.

In Stobaeus. Epictetus distinguishes disease and lameness from impediments to choice, preserving an explicit condition; the Sophist uses an internal obstacle to explain why instruction can fail.

In this edition. Name what is hindered and retain the condition concerning choice. Keep the large supplied span visible rather than treating all its wording as independently transmitted.

A place to read. II.8.22 Read the two bodily examples and the qualification about choice, keeping the supplied continuation distinct from the surviving opening and unbracketed final address.

Meaning

An empodion is a hindrance; the related adjective describes what stands in the way. The word directs attention to what is obstructed, so a hindrance in one respect need not obstruct every activity of a person.

Use in the book

Epictetus makes disease a hindrance to the body and lameness a hindrance to a leg, while denying that they thereby hinder choice, unless choice itself wishes it. The condition is part of the claim. In the Sophist, obstructing opinions prevent the soul from benefiting from lessons, as something within a body can prevent nourishment from benefiting it. Refutation removes this epistemic obstacle. The two settings distinguish bodily and educational hindrances; neither warrants treating bodily impairment as unreal or supposing that every obstacle can simply be wished away.

The argument proceeds by specifying an object rather than denying that an impediment exists. Disease obstructs the body; lameness obstructs a leg.

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[105] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 157, 254. The noun and adjective form a lexical family. The first sentence of Epictetus provides an unsupplied witness, independent of the substantial supplement later in that excerpt.

The comparison then asks whether the same event necessarily obstructs choice. The qualification that choice itself may wish it remains part of that claim and must not disappear in a summary. The final personal address sharpens the contrast, but does not make the physical conditions unreal. The reader can distinguish levels of obstruction without treating bodily limitation as either a moral failure or a mere illusion.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.22. Bodily hindrance is distinguished from hindrance to choice. (English edition p. 567.)

II.31.129.7. Opinions obstructing learning are removed before instruction can benefit the soul. (English edition p. 991.)

Translation in this edition

Use “hindrance” or “obstacle,” naming its object. In the educational analogy, “obstructing opinions” is more exact than an unspecified disability of the soul.

Attested Greek forms

ἐμπόδιον

Attested. II.8.22; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 157; English edition p. 567.

Νόσος σώματός ἐστιν ἐμπόδιον, προαιρέσεως δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐὰν μὴ αὐτὴ θελήσῃ.

ἐμποδίους

Attested. II.31.129.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 254; English edition p. 991.

τὰς τοῖς μαθήμασιν ἐμποδίους δόξας ἐξελών

See also

Choice; What depends on us; Test and refutation; Learning; Purification.

Impulse

Impulse · Volume Two

ὁρμή · hormē — impulse; movement toward action[106]

At a Glance

The word. Impulse is a movement of soul toward something; rational and nonrational kinds and its relation to impressions prevent a simple identification with rash or unreflective behavior.

In Stobaeus. The passage separates the impression prompting movement from impulse itself, then identifies desire as one species of rational impulse rather than the whole rational genus.

In this edition. Use impulse without importing modern rashness: the local classification includes rational movement and distinguishes its prompting impression, general description and narrower subordinate species from one another.

A place to read. II.7.9.1 Follow the sequence from prompting impression through generic movement to the species; the final warning about desire prevents a familiar motivational word from replacing the broader category.

Meaning

Hormē is defined generically as a movement of the soul toward something. Rational impulse is a movement of thought in the sphere of action; the text distinguishes several narrower senses.

Use in the book

An impression of what is appropriate sets impulse in motion. The account includes impulses in both rational and nonrational creatures, with desire a species of rational impulse rather than its complete definition. It also counts impulsion toward something future and the impulsive state from which movement arises among the senses of the word. All impulses are described as assents, while practical impulses additionally contain what moves toward action. This organized analysis is different from the modern use of "impulsive" for unreflective behavior.

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[106] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 86–88. A movement called rational is not thereby guaranteed morally correct; passion is subsequently treated as a species of impulse.

The definition identifies what prompts impulse, describes the resulting movement generically, and divides that genus by the kind of creature in which it occurs. The report adds that the broad rational and nonrational species have no special names of their own. This absence matters: a familiar noun cannot simply be made to fill the gap. Desire is explicitly assigned a subordinate place within rational impulse. The entry helps readers track these explanatory levels rather than regard every term for motivation as an interchangeable name of one faculty.

"these do not have names of their own" (II.7.9.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9.1. Generic impulse and the impression prompting it. (English edition p. 275.)

II.7.9.3. Impulsion and the impulsive state yield several senses. (English edition p. 277.)

II.7.9b. Impulse and assent have different grammatical objects. (English edition p. 279.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "impulse" distinct from craving, passion and aversion, even where the classifications intersect.

Attested Greek forms

ὁρμὴν

Attested. II.7.9.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 86-87; English edition p. 275.

Τὸ δὲ κινοῦν τὴν ὁρμὴν οὐδὲν ἕτερον εἶναι λέγουσιν ἀλλ' ἢ φαντασίαν ὁρμητικὴν τοῦ καθήκοντος

See also

Assent; Aversion; Desiderative impulse; Passion.

Masterless

Masterless · Volume Two

ἀδέσποτος · adespotos — masterless; having no master[107]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective means having no master. In the quoted myth virtue's masterlessness is connected with each person's honoring or dishonoring it, not with unrestricted control of events.

In Stobaeus. Porphyry first presents a difficulty: how can virtue have no master when the myth also describes constraints imposed through Necessity, the Fates, forgetfulness and a guiding daimon?

In this edition. Keep the claim within the objection and reply that frame it. It does not assert that every embodied action or external circumstance escapes all causal limitation.

A place to read. II.8.39.3 Read the question after the narrated constraints and forgetting, before Porphyry's answer; the masterlessness of virtue is what the objection seeks to explain.

Meaning

Adespotos denies possession or mastery by another. In these philosophical contexts it concerns the soul's authority or the status of virtue, not the absence of every rule, relation or cause.

Use in the book

Porphyry quotes the claim that virtue is masterless while raising a difficulty about lives constrained by Necessity and the Fates. His question asks how such mastery can remain once a life has been chosen; it should not be detached as his final denial of agency. Iamblichus positively says that the life according to intellect restores the soul's masterless authority and releases it from bonds of necessity. That life also holds fast to the gods and is fulfilled by their will. Masterlessness here is therefore compatible with divine orientation, rather than a name for unlimited personal license.

The accumulation of constraints gives the final question its force. The selected life has been ratified; the daimon watches over fate; drinking at the river removes memory. The objector then asks what could remain under our

[107] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 164, 173. The Porphyrian witness is a quotation within an objection; the Iamblichean witness is an affirmative statement. Their argumentative functions are not interchangeable.

mastery. The quotation about virtue is not presented as a settled solution at this point, but as a claim apparently threatened by the narrative. Porphyry's subsequent distinctions address that difficulty. Isolating the adjective would conceal the problem that makes it philosophically important in this excerpt.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.39.3. Porphyry asks how masterless virtue fits the constraints of the chosen life. (English edition p. 599.)

II.8.44. Iamblichus connects the soul's masterless authority with intellectual and divine life. (English edition p. 641.)

Translation in this edition

"Masterless" preserves the pointed connection with a master or owner. "Free" can be used in explanation, but should not hide the particular authority at stake.

Attested Greek forms

ἀδέσποτος

Attested. II.8.39.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 164; English edition p. 599.

ἡ ἀρετὴ ἀδέσποτος

ἀδέσποτον

Attested. II.8.44; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 173; English edition p. 641.

τὴν ἀδέσποτον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξουσίαν

See also

Self-determination; Power to act (Volume One Lexicon, p. 327); Freedom; Fate; Virtue and excellence.

Misfortune and wrongdoing

Misfortune and wrongdoing · Volume Two

ἀτύχημα; ἀδίκημα · atychēma; adikēma — misfortune; wrongful act; wrongdoing[108]

At a Glance

The word. The two nouns distinguish an adverse occurrence from a wrong act. The fragment explains the contrast through fortune on one side and choice on the other.

In Stobaeus. The dramatic saying assigns different explanatory grounds to misfortune and wrongdoing, so a shared bad outcome is insufficient to make the two descriptions interchangeable.

In this edition. Retain both terms and their stated contrast. Do not expand the couplet into a complete doctrine of responsibility, causation or the consequences of every human action.

A place to read. II.8.7 Read the second line as the explanation of the first, where fortune and choice distinguish the grounds on which the two adverse things are described.

Meaning

The two nouns distinguish an adverse occurrence from an unjust act. Their juxtaposition matters: not everything harmful to someone is thereby a wrong that the sufferer chose or committed.

Use in the book

The Menandrian couplet explicitly says that misfortune and wrongdoing differ: one occurs through fortune, the other through choice. It gives an ethical distinction between sources of harm rather than a complete taxonomy of every mixed case. Another Euripidean fragment says that most evils for mortals are self-chosen; its "most" leaves room for other sources. Read together, the excerpts prevent both wholesale excuse through fortune and wholesale blame of sufferers. They remain separately attributed dramatic sayings, not premises in a single continuous proof.

The couplet begins by announcing a difference and then gives one paired explanation. Its concision makes the distinction sharp but leaves its full

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[108] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 154–156. The entry keeps the two attested nouns together because the running text expressly defines them against one another. It does not infer that every adverse event has only one simple cause.

application unstated. It does not classify mixed cases or explain whether an intended act can also encounter unexpected events. The reader can preserve the contrast between what happens through fortune and what is attributed to choice without reconstructing those absent details. In the chapter's wider sequence, the saying supplies a useful distinction rather than a complete theory shared by every contributor.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.7. Menander distinguishes harm through fortune from wrongdoing through choosing. (English edition p. 557.)

II.8.11. A Euripidean fragment calls most mortal evils self-chosen. (English edition p. 559.)

II.8.16. Democritus attacks fortune used as an excuse for poor counsel. (English edition p. 563.)

Translation in this edition

"Wrongdoing" preserves the ethical force of adikēma. "Mistake" alone would weaken the contrast with misfortune; "misfortune" need not imply that chance is literally causeless.

Attested Greek forms

Ἀτύχημα

Attested. II.8.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 154; English edition p. 557.

Ἀτύχημα κἀδίκημα διαφορὰν ἔχει· τὸ μὲν διὰ τύχην γίγνεται, τὸ δ' αἱρέσει.

See also

Chance and fortune; Choice; Injustice (Volume One Lexicon, p. 222); Error and wrongdoing; Cause (Volume One Lexicon, p. 68).

Providence

Providence · Volume Two

πρόνοια · pronoia — providence; prior ordering care[109]

At a Glance

The word. Providence names a prior ordering on which fate depends in Iamblichus's account. The dependence is not an assertion that the two words simply name the same level.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus connects secondary causes and becoming with prior causes and intelligible order, then explains fate as having its being from the providence that takes precedence.

In this edition. Retain the relation of priority and dependence. Do not replace the argument with a simple denial of fate or make all human activity independent of nature and circumstance.

A place to read. II.8.45.1 Read the paired comparisons of movements, order, causes and multiplicity before the conclusion that fate's being depends on providence rather than standing apart from it.

Meaning

Pronoia can denote forethought; in the Iamblichean sequence here it is providence, the prior ordering cause to which fate is connected. Its priority is explanatory and ontological, not simply earlier prediction of particular events.

Use in the book

Iamblichus relates secondary causes to prior causes and multiplicity in becoming to indivisible substance. Fate is interwoven with providence in its very being and exists through it. The following discussion places the human principle of action in harmony with both orders while allowing the soul a relation beyond the whole movement of nature. Providence consequently does not operate as a second competing name for fortune, nor does its priority make the text's account of choosing superfluous.

The paragraph builds its conclusion through several relations of dependence. Fate's movements resemble intellectual activity, its order is modeled on intelligible good order, and secondary causes hang upon prior

[109] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 173–174. This is Iamblichus's account as excerpted, not a definition silently attributed to every author in Volume Two. The proportional qualifications in the surrounding soul argument remain important.

causes. Multiplicity in becoming is then connected with indivisible substance. The claim about providence gathers these relations into one account of priority. Fate is neither simply erased nor presented as an independent first source. This structure matters for the subsequent discussion of human agency, which must be understood within the differentiated orders rather than outside every causal connection.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.45.1. Fate has its being from providence, which takes precedence. (English edition p. 643.)

II.8.45.2. Human agency is discussed in relation to providence, fate and nature. (English edition p. 645.)

II.8.45.3. The soul's external freedom is proportional to its pure rational activity. (English edition p. 647.)

Translation in this edition

"Providence" fits this metaphysical context. "Foresight" alone would leave out the asserted dependence of fate upon it.

Attested Greek forms

πρόνοιαν

Attested. II.8.45.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 173-174; English edition p. 643.

πάντα οὕτω τὰ τῆς εἱμαρμένης συνῆπται πρὸς τὴν προηγουμένην πρόνοιαν.

Attested. II.8.45.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 173-174; English edition p. 643.

τῷ εἶναι τὴν πρόνοιαν ἐστιν ἡ εἱμαρμένη

See also

Fate; Cause (Volume One Lexicon, p. 68); Order (Volume One Lexicon, p. 303); Self-determination; Intellect (Volume One Lexicon, p. 226).

Rejection

Rejection · Volume Two

ἀπεκλογή; ἀπεκλέγεσθαι · apeklogē; apeklegesthai — rejection; rejecting in selection[110]

At a Glance

The word. Rejection is the evaluative counterpart of selection, setting an alternative aside without necessarily treating it as a moral evil or experiencing fear or hatred.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic paragraph joins selective value with disvalue for rejection while denying that either kind of value contributes to happiness in the strict moral classification.

In this edition. Retain the pairing with selection and distinguish rejection from action aversion; replacing one technical noun with the other would blur different stages of the account.

A place to read. II.7.7.3 The sentence qualifies the sense of indifferent before distinguishing selection and rejection; follow both halves rather than reading rejection as an unconditional response to every dispreferred object.

Meaning

Apeklogē is the counterpart to selection: setting aside an alternative in the evaluative selection of things. It is not automatically a passion of fear or hatred.

Use in the book

The Stoic exposition says that indifferents are not indifferent with respect to selection and rejection. Some have selective value, others disvalue for rejection, while neither contributes to happiness as a moral good does. Formulations of the end use selecting what accords with nature and rejecting what is contrary to it. The distinction permits practical discrimination without reclassifying disease or poverty as moral evils. The later Peripatetic exposition employs this vocabulary within a different account of natural goods.

Rejection appears within a carefully restricted account of differences among things between virtue and vice. The paragraph does not introduce a

[110] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 76, 79. The article groups the noun with its cognate verb, not with every Greek expression for avoidance.

second class of moral evils; it explains why calling those things indifferent does not remove practical discrimination. Its structure is symmetrical: selective value belongs on one side and disvalue for rejection on the other. The final restriction concerns contribution to happiness, not the impossibility of choosing among circumstances. This helps a reader avoid interpreting rejection either as indiscriminate hostility or as an admission that the rejected condition must destroy a good life.

"others disvalue for rejection" (II.7.7.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7.3. Selective value is paired with disvalue for rejection. (English edition p. 253.)

II.7.6a.3. Antipater's formulation pairs selecting and rejecting. (English edition p. 241.)

Translation in this edition

"Rejection" preserves the pairing with selection; do not substitute the separate technical noun ἀφορμή.

Attested Greek forms

ἀπεκλογήν

Attested. II.7.7.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 79; English edition p. 253.

τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, οὐ μὴν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογήν· δι' ὃ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀξίαν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἔχειν, τὰ δ' ἀπαξίαν ἀπεκλεκτικήν,

See also

Selection; Dispreferred things; Indifferent things; Aversion.

Reservation

Reservation · Volume Two

ὑπεξαίρεσις · hupexairesis — reservation; qualification of an impulse[111]

At a Glance

The word. Reservation qualifies desire, impulse and initiative, explaining the virtuous person's stance toward possible obstacles rather than promising unconditional power over circumstances or success in external outcomes.

In Stobaeus. The brief claim links qualified undertaking with opposition not arriving unforeseen; it gives no quoted formula stating exactly how a reservation is to be expressed.

In this edition. Keep reservation and explain its qualifying force without inserting a familiar formula absent from this excerpt; the claim concerns how an agent undertakes action and meets opposition.

A place to read. II.7.11s.5 Read the undertaking with reservation beside the denial that opposition arrives unforeseen; both qualifications explain the striking opening assertion about nothing happening contrary to desire.

Meaning

Hupexairesis marks a qualification under which the virtuous person acts. It explains how the report can deny frustrated desire without claiming that external obstacles never occur.

Use in the book

The Stoic passage says that nothing happens to the virtuous person contrary to desire, impulse or initiative because he does all such things with reservation and no opposition arrives unforeseen. The point is the qualified stance of the agent, not magical control of circumstances. The account's preceding distinctions among moral good, selective value and external outcomes help preserve this difference. No formula spelling out the reservation is supplied in the excerpt, and the lexicon does not insert one as if quoted from it.

Both explanatory clauses should carry their full weight. The claim about nothing happening contrary to desire might otherwise look like a promise that events obey the agent. Its because clause redirects attention to the

[111] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 115. The dictionary form is inferred from the transmitted genitive ὑπεξαιρέσεως.

manner in which desire, impulse and initiative are exercised. Preparedness for opposition is then added, not the disappearance of opposition. The paragraph supplies neither an exact reservation formula nor a catalogue of obstacles. Its contribution is a qualification of undertaking; a fuller practical prescription would require evidence beyond this brief excerpt.

"none of the things that oppose him comes upon him unforeseen" (II.7.11s.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11s.5. Qualified impulse explains the wise person's relation to obstacles. (English edition p. 379.)

Translation in this edition

"With reservation" should remain a qualification, not become "without hesitation."

Attested Greek forms

ὑπεξαιρέσεως

Attested. II.7.11s.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 115; English edition p. 379.

ἐπιβολὴν γίνεσθαί τι περὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον, διὰ τὸ μεθ' ὑπεξαιρέσεως πάντα ποιεῖν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μηδὲν αὐτῷ τῶν ἐναντιουμένων ἀπρόληπτον

See also

Impulse; Preferred things; Selection; Wise and base.

Selection

Selection · Volume Two

ἐκλογή; ἐκλέγεσθαι · eklogē; eklegesthai — selection; selecting; choosing among alternatives[112]

At a Glance

The word. Selection describes practical discrimination among alternatives; within the Stoic account, it can favor natural conditions without granting those conditions the moral status of goods.

In Stobaeus. Things between virtue and vice retain differences relevant to selection and rejection, although the report denies that this value contributes to a happy life as virtue does.

In this edition. Use selection to retain the distinction from the Greek vocabulary rendered choice; an ordinary preference does not establish that its object belongs among moral goods.

A place to read. II.7.7.3 Read the qualification not with regard to selection and rejection beside the final denial of contribution to happiness; both claims belong to the same sentence.

Meaning

Eklogē and its verb describe selection. In the Stoic account this vocabulary allows a rational preference among indifferents without granting them the moral status of goods.

Use in the book

Things between virtue and vice are indifferent with respect to happiness, but not necessarily with respect to selection and rejection. They can possess selective value or disvalue. Diogenes formulates the end through reasoning well in selecting and rejecting things according to nature; Antipater similarly emphasizes sustained selection rather than an unconditional guarantee of obtaining the preferred object. The later Peripatetic account also uses selection, but grants natural objects a different status. Shared vocabulary does not make the schools' evaluations identical.

The paragraph resolves an apparent tension created by the word indifferent. It explicitly restricts that description to the former of two senses

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[112] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 76, 79, 119. The noun and verb are grouped as a lexical family; neither implies success in acquiring the selected object.

discussed just before it; it then denies indifference in another respect. Consequently, the same object can lack the ethical contribution assigned to virtue while still warranting discriminating treatment. The paired expressions value for selection and disvalue for rejection describe this second relation. Reading only the first or only the last part would lose the intended combination of practical differentiation and a strict account of happiness.

"but not with regard to selection and rejection" (II.7.7.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7.3. Indifference does not exclude differences relevant to selection. (English edition p. 253.)

II.7.6a.2. Diogenes connects the end with reasoning well in selection. (English edition p. 241.)

II.7.13.9. The Peripatetic account derives appropriate actions from selection. (English edition p. 395.)

Translation in this edition

"Selection" helps preserve its distinction from αἵρεσις and προαίρεσις, rendered with forms of choice.

Attested Greek forms

ἐκλογὴν

Attested. II.7.7.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 79; English edition p. 253.

κατὰ τοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς αἱρέσεως ταύτης, οὐ μὴν πρὸς ἐκλογὴν καὶ ἀπεκλογήν· δι' ὃ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀξίαν ἐκλεκτικὴν ἔχειν, τὰ δ'

See also

Rejection; Value and disvalue; Preferred things; Choice.

Self-determination

Self-determination · Volume Two

αὐτεξούσιον; αὐτεξούσιος · autexousion; autexousios — self-government; self-determination; acting on one's own authority[113]

At a Glance

The word. The family concerns self-government, but the excerpts attach it to different levels of life and activity. It does not by itself promise unrestricted command over circumstances.

In Stobaeus. The Hermetic account distinguishes incorporeal substance from participation in generated things; Porphyry likewise explains kinds of self-government in relation to a creature's appropriate life.

In this edition. Preserve the specified subject and the conditions attached to its freedom. Do not turn one incorporeal claim into independence for every embodied action or outcome.

A place to read. II.8.31.3 Read the self-governing incorporeal substance alongside the soul's participation in the fates of generated things, keeping the distinction of levels rather than collapsing them.

Meaning

The neuter noun and related adjective describe possessing authority over one's own activity. They need not imply independence from every cause, the body or the conditions of a chosen life. The surrounding argument determines the relevant kind and extent of authority.

Use in the book

Porphyry first raises the difficulty that a soul's earlier character might undermine self-government in choosing a life. He then distinguishes kinds of life and insists that a persuasive impression does not drag the agent like a puppet. Embodied self-government is nevertheless suited to, and conditioned by, the creature's constitution. The Hermetic excerpt reserves self-government for incorporeal substance, which fate does not touch. Iamblichus describes the soul considered in itself as self-governing, but qualifies its embodied freedom by the extent of its intellectual activity. The

[113] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 160–161, 163–164, 167–168, 173. The two grammatical forms are treated as one lexical family. Claims about the soul "in itself" must not be transferred without qualification to the embodied person.

shared word thus connects accounts without erasing their different metaphysical commitments.

The paragraph distinguishes what remains unchanged from what becomes involved with generated things. Fate is said not to touch the incorporeal substance because of its stable condition. The subsequent sentence nevertheless describes a soul sharing the fates of what it has participated in. Reading only the initial adjective would remove this complication. The relation between intellectual activity, embodiment and participation therefore matters to the claim's scope. The passage offers a differentiated account of self-government, not a simple assurance that all events affecting a person are subject to that person's command.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.31.3. The Hermetic text calls incorporeal substance self-governing. (English edition p. 583.)

II.8.39.1. Porphyry raises prior character as a problem for self-government. (English edition p. 595.)

II.8.40. Natural inclination and persuasive impressions do not compel assent. (English edition p. 611.)

II.8.41.2. Embodied self-government is related to the creature's constitution and inclinations. (English edition p. 613.)

II.8.43.1. Iamblichus predicates self-governing life of the soul considered in itself. (English edition p. 639.)

Translation in this edition

"Self-government" is useful where authority is the image; "self-determination" is suitable as the lexical heading. Neither should be expanded into unlimited control of outcomes.

Attested Greek forms

αὐτεξούσιός

Attested. II.8.31.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 160-161; English edition p. 583.

ἡ ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσώματος οὐσία αὐτεξούσιός ἐστιν

αὐτεξούσιον

Attested. II.8.40; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 167; English edition p. 611.

Ἔχει δὲ ὁ βίος ὁ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ κατάλληλον τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ αὐτεξούσιον ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ.

See also

What depends on us; Choice; Fate; Masterless; Freedom.

Target

Target · Volume Two

σκοπός · skopos — target; aim[114]

At a Glance

The word. A target is the object set before an agent, while attainment requires activity; the archery comparison makes this relationship clearer than the broad English word aim.

In Stobaeus. The chapter moves from shared or individual ends to a distinction between something aimed at and the activity through which a person reaches it.

In this edition. Translate the image concretely where a shield and archers occur, and do not let aim make the target and successful attainment indistinguishable in the argument.

A place to read. II.7.3c.1 The passage begins with Homer and Plato before turning to archery; read its examples as stages in distinguishing senses, not one unchanged definition.

Meaning

Skopos is what is set before an agent to attain or hit. The archery image distinguishes an object aimed at from the successful activity directed toward it.

Use in the book

The chapter compares a target to a shield set before archers, while the end is attainment of what is set before them. The Stoic account later makes happiness a target and being happy an end. Panaetius uses several archers

[114] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 47, 63–64. The explanatory comparison concerns the structure of action, not a guarantee that an external result is entirely controllable.

with a common target to explain how virtues share an end while differing in the concerns through which they achieve it. The Peripatetic account also distinguishes the target from the activity that realizes it. These passages need their own formulations; "aim" must not erase the relation between an object and an agent's success.

The opening literary references are part of the conceptual sorting. Homer supplies an end shared by a gathering, whereas Plato is credited with identifying an end particular to an individual life. Only then does the shield comparison separate what stands before the archer from the archer's attainment. Its concluding appeal to our activity explains why the distinction is philosophically useful: naming the object does not yet describe success. The two marked supplements in the translation remain editorial assistance rather than evidence that every word of the explanation survives intact.

"they require an activity of ours in relation to the end" (II.7.3c.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.3c.1. Shield, target and attainment are explicitly distinguished. (English edition p. 143.)

II.7.5b5.3. Panaetius compares the virtues with archers aiming at a shared target. (English edition p. 201.)

Translation in this edition

"Target" keeps the archery comparison legible; "aim" suits less concrete contexts.

Attested Greek forms

σκοπὸς

Attested. II.7.3c.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 47; English edition p. 143.

τὴν τοῦ σκοποῦ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. Καὶ ἔστι σκοπὸς μὲν τὸ προκείμενον εἰς τὸ τυχεῖν, οἷον ἀσπὶς τοξόταις· τέλος

See also

End; Virtue and excellence; Happiness and flourishing.

To be chosen

To be chosen · Volume Two

αἱρετέον · haireteon — to be chosen; what one should choose[115]

At a Glance

The word. To be chosen expresses the prescribed activity rather than the choiceworthy good considered as possessed; the passage makes this grammatical difference carry a conceptual distinction.

In Stobaeus. Thinking wisely illustrates a benefit connected with having practical wisdom, allowing the account to distinguish choosing an activity from choosing a good considered in itself.

In this edition. Preserve the contrast with choiceworthy even where ordinary English would treat the terms as interchangeable; do not smooth away the passage's deliberately surprising conclusion.

A place to read. II.7.6f.1 Follow the example of thinking wisely and having practical wisdom before reading the final denial that the choiceworthy good itself is directly chosen.

Meaning

Haireteon is the verbal adjective of requirement or prescription, distinguished here from haireton, choiceworthy. The distinction is grammatical and philosophical, not merely an alternative translation of the same word.

Use in the book

The Stoic passage calls every good choiceworthy but every benefit to be chosen. It illustrates the latter with thinking wisely, considered in connection with having practical wisdom. Its striking conclusion is that one does not choose the choiceworthy good directly; one chooses, if anything, to have it. This prepares the wider distinction between goods and benefits expressed as predicates. The lexicon follows the local analysis without substituting a more familiar general statement that all good things should be chosen.

The example turns on the relation between a possession and its exercise. Practical wisdom is considered as a good one has, whereas thinking wisely identifies a benefit associated with having it. The conclusion is carefully

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[115] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 78, 97. A grammatical article or infinitive can carry part of the distinction; it need not have a one-word English counterpart.

qualified: if anything is chosen in relation to the choiceworthy good, it is having that good. This does not turn goodness into something undesirable. It explains what the analysis treats as the object of choosing. The supplied good in the opening definition is visibly marked, while the activity-and-possession example provides the reader's clearest route through the distinction.

"We do not choose what is choiceworthy; if anything, we choose to have it." (II.7.6f.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.6f.1. The contrast is illustrated through practical wisdom and thinking wisely. (English edition p. 249.)

II.7.11f.1. Other verbal adjectives of choice, desire and wish are distinguished. (English edition p. 313.)

Translation in this edition

Keep "to be chosen" separate from "choiceworthy," even when ordinary English might use either.

Attested Greek forms

αἱρετέον

Attested. II.7.6f.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 78; English edition p. 249.

Διαφέρειν δὲ λέγουσι τὸ αἱρετὸν καὶ τὸ αἱρετέον. Αἱρετὸν μὲν εἶναι ⟨ἀγαθὸν⟩ πᾶν, αἱρετέον δὲ ὠφέλημα πᾶν, ὃ

See also

Choiceworthy; Proposition and predicate; Knowledge; Good.

Use

Use · Volume Two

χρῆσις; χρῆσθαι · chrēsis; chrēsthai — use; making use of[116]

At a Glance

The word. Use concerns how an agent deals with what is available, proportionately and according to fitting worth; possession, acquisition and correct use are distinct questions in the ethical account.

In Stobaeus. The discussion first identifies errors in choosing and obtaining goods, then differentiates relations to itself and to another, making virtue the guide of action rather than treating resources as automatically beneficial.

In this edition. Keep the agent, object and manner of use together, and do not infer from possession of a natural good that its possessor necessarily uses it well or thereby becomes happy.

A place to read. II.7.14.10 Read both relations of use and their corresponding errors before the contrast between base and virtuous agents; the passage identifies proportion and fitting worth as standards of conduct.

Meaning

Chrēsis names use, distinct from possession or acquisition. Obtaining something does not itself settle the ethical quality of its employment.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic account distinguishes errors of choice and acquisition from use, and makes virtue the guide of using what one has. Natural goods may help or harm according to the agent's condition and use. Happiness requires activity, not merely a stockpile of instruments. The Stoic exposition also distinguishes virtues from their exercise while keeping external valuables outside moral good. Use is thus a relation among agent, object and manner, not a claim that every possession is inherently beneficial.

The argument follows an account of mistaken choices and improper acquisition. It then separates two relations of use: to itself and to another. The associated errors concern lack of proportion and failure to preserve the worth of what is fitting. The contrast between base and virtuous people

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[116] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 127–128, 136. The noun and middle verb form a lexical family.

therefore does not depend only on which goods they possess. It concerns the way they act with them, guided by virtue in the good case. Reading use after choice and acquisition keeps these stages distinct without disconnecting them from the same practical life.

"having virtue as the guide of their actions." (II.7.14.10).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.14.9. Errors in choice and acquisition. (English edition p. 423.)

II.7.14.10. Virtue guides use. (English edition p. 425.)

II.7.19.7. Good and bad users differ with a useful possession. (English edition p. 467.)

Translation in this edition

Keep use distinct from acquisition and possession.

Attested Greek forms

χρῆσιν

Attested. II.7.14.10; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 127-128; English edition p. 425.

Περὶ δὲ τὴν χρῆσιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶσα χρῆσις ἢ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀναφοράν ἢ πρὸς ἕτερον,

See also

Good; Virtue and excellence; Wealth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 461); Activity (Volume One Lexicon, p. 25).

What depends on us

What depends on us · Volume Two

τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν · to eph᾽ hēmin — what is up to us; what depends on us; what is in our control[117]

At a Glance

The word. The expression marks what lies within our agency in the relevant respect. The cited argument identifies the use of impressions rather than every external event as what is up to us.

In Stobaeus. The Musonius-Epictetus excerpt attaches freedom and virtue to the correct use of impressions, so the moral achievement depends on how that capacity is exercised.

In this edition. Preserve the specified activity and the condition of correct use. Avoid replacing the expression with a promise that every desired result or circumstance can be controlled.

A place to read. II.8.30.1 Read the distinction between things up to us and other things, then the conditional identification of right use with freedom, steadiness and the virtues.

Meaning

The expression identifies what rests with an agent. It is a substantivized prepositional phrase, not a name for unrestricted control over events. Its extension depends on the speaker's account of human action, character and external circumstances.

Use in the book

The excerpt transmitted under Rufus from Epictetus places the use of impressions up to us and entrusts the remaining things to the cosmos. Porphyry allows choice in taking up crafts and public pursuits while recognizing outside assistance and obstacles. His discussion also considers whether vicious passions can enslave this power. Accordingly, a passage's assertion that something is up to us must be read together with its restrictions; it is not a promise of success or immunity from bodily loss.

The initial division is followed by a more precise identification of its favored member: the use of impressions. The next sentence qualifies what

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[117] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 159–160, 165–168. The positive witness is in running prose. The differing Epictetan and Porphyrian settings are retained rather than made stages of one uniform theory.

follows from that capacity by requiring that it be exercised correctly. Freedom and the other praised conditions therefore do not arise simply from having impressions or from possessing an abstract power of response. The passage evaluates the use made of them. Its theological premise also remains the reported argument's premise, rather than an independent assertion that every aspect of human experience is within personal control.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.8.30.1. The use of impressions is the finest thing placed up to us. (English edition p. 577.)

II.8.39.7. Pursuits depend on agency but may require outside assistance. (English edition p. 605.)

II.8.40. Withholding assent remains possible despite a persuasive impression. (English edition p. 611.)

II.8.42.1. Incurable passions are considered as a limit on agency. (English edition p. 615.)

Translation in this edition

"Up to us" preserves the idiom without suggesting that every associated result is directly controlled. Where the argument contrasts pursuit and attainment, keep that distinction explicit.

Attested Greek forms

ἐφ' ἡμῖν

Attested. II.8.30.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 159-160; English edition p. 577.

Τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἔθετο ὁ θεός, τὰ δ' οὐκ ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

Attested. II.8.40; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 167; English edition p. 611.

ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ τὸ μὴ συγκατατίθεσθαι

See also

Choice; Assent; Presentation and imagination (Volume One Lexicon, p. 329); Self-determination; Power to act (Volume One Lexicon, p. 327).

Will and wish

Will and wish · Volume Two

βούλησις; θέλησις; θέλω · boulēsis; thelēsis; thelō — wish; willingness; will; wish to[118]

At a Glance

The word. The family distinguishes reasonable desire, voluntary wish and expressions of willing. Its relation to choice must be followed through the local definitions rather than collapsed into one faculty.

In Stobaeus. The short ethical sequence connects reflected wish with choice and distinguishes willingness as voluntary wish; elsewhere Epictetus retains a condition involving what choice itself wishes.

In this edition. Use wish, willingness or willing through context. Do not assume that every occurrence of desire, assent and choice is interchangeable or supplies a complete theory of the will.

A place to read. II.7.9a.2 Read the four definitions together, where reflection, reasonableness and voluntariness introduce different relations among wish, choice, prior choice and willingness in a compressed sequence.

Meaning

Boulēsis names wishing; thelēsis names willingness, while the related verb thelō expresses wishing or being willing. The ethical definitions give these terms more particular relations: wish is reasonable desire, and willingness is voluntary wish. Their English equivalents should not erase that local analysis.

Use in the book

The definition also derives choice from reflective wish. Epictetus directs a change in wishing: instead of demanding that events happen as one wishes, one should wish for them as they happen. This concerns the agent's orientation, not power to bring the events about. In Iamblichus, by contrast, divine will fills the intellectual life with good things. The word family can therefore concern either human wishing or divine willing; a single modern conception of the will does not settle both uses.

The passage organizes several closely related expressions through additions to a common field. Reflection helps explain choice; reasonableness qualifies

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[118] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 87, 157–158, 173. This entry groups attested noun and verb forms as a lexical family. The "reasonable desire" definition belongs to its ethical account and is not imposed on every dramatic wish.

desire in the definition of wish; voluntariness distinguishes willingness. These additions matter because a loose English paraphrase can make the definitions look repetitive. Their compressed form does not provide an extended psychological account of how one movement produces another. They instead mark relations the reader should preserve when moving through the larger discussion of practical impulse, before applying an English term to a different speaker's argument.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.9a.2. Wish is defined as reasonable desire, willingness as voluntary wish. (English edition p. 279.)

II.8.23. The agent is urged to adjust wishing to events. (English edition p. 567.)

II.8.24.1. The Pythagorean account distinguishes human choosing and divine guidance. (English edition p. 569.)

II.8.44. The intellectual life is filled with goods by the gods' will. (English edition p. 641.)

Translation in this edition

Use "wish" in the linked definitions and "willingness" for thelēsis. "Will" suits divine agency where the context requires it; it is not automatically a separate faculty of autonomous volition.

Attested Greek forms

βούλησιν

Attested. II.7.9a.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 87; English edition p. 279.

βούλησιν δὲ εὔλογον ὄρεξιν· θέλησιν δὲ ἑκούσιον βούλησιν.

θέλε

Attested. II.8.23; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 157; English edition p. 567.

ἀλλὰ θέλε ὡς τὰ γιγνόμενα γίνεται καὶ εὑροήσεις.

See also

Choice; Desiderative impulse; Desire; Voluntary (Volume One Lexicon, p. 456); Providence.

Admonition

Admonition · Volume Two

νουθετητική; νουθέτημα · nouthetētikē; nouthetēma — admonition; admonitory instruction; injunction[119]

At a Glance

The word. Admonition directs judgment and conduct through warning or encouragement. It includes scolding, but its meaning is broader than a harsh rebuke.

In Stobaeus. The Sophist questions its effectiveness against presumed knowledge; Iamblichus gives brief injunctions a positive role before children understand reasons for themselves.

In this edition. Keep admonition distinct from refutation: the former advises, while the latter exposes conflicting beliefs that can prevent a learner from accepting instruction.

A place to read. II.31.129.5 Read the division between ancestral admonition and another educational approach, where the learner's conviction of being wise explains why advice achieves little.

Meaning

The substantive feminine nouthetētikē names an admonitory form of instruction; nouthetēma is an admonition or injunction. The family concerns directing someone's judgment and conduct through what is said, rather than examination that exposes contradictory beliefs.

Use in the book

The Sophist describes an ancestral practice toward sons: sometimes scolding, sometimes encouraging gently. It calls the whole practice admonition, but argues that this treatment achieves little when the learner already thinks himself wise. Iamblichus gives short admonitory commands a positive place in children's development, after models and habits and before mature causal understanding. Such injunctions adjust conduct to another's

[119] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 234–235, 253. The nominal adjective and related noun are grouped as a lexical family. Iamblichus's positive developmental use is not silently made equivalent to the Sophist's criticism of its limited efficacy.

reason, including a teacher's or lawgiver's. The texts therefore assign admonition different functions and limits according to the learner's condition; neither definition requires it to mean harsh reprimand alone.

The contrast develops within a division of instruction through speech. Calling one route rough and another smoother does not by itself establish that forceful advice succeeds. The ancestral practice varies its manner between anger and gentle encouragement, yet both belong to one educational procedure. The competing approach asks about the learner's willingness to learn. If he already supposes himself skilled in the matter, repeated correction encounters a prior obstacle. The transition therefore concerns the conditions under which instruction can work, rather than a simple preference for either severity or kindness.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.129.5. Scolding and gentler encouragement form one admonitory practice. (English edition p. 987.)

II.31.122.3. Brief injunctions help direct children before fully developed rational understanding. (English edition p. 909.)

Translation in this edition

"Admonition" accommodates warning and encouragement. "Scolding" is appropriate only for one mode explicitly distinguished within the larger practice.

Attested Greek forms

νουθετητικήν

Attested. II.31.129.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 253; English edition p. 987.

τὸ δ' οὖν ξύμπαν αὐτὸ ὀρθότατα εἴποι τις ἂν νουθετητικήν.

νουθετήματα

Attested. II.31.122.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 234-235; English edition p. 909.

τὰ οἰκεῖα παραγγέλματα καὶ νουθετήματα

See also

Teacher and pupil; Upbringing and guidance; Test and refutation; Lack of learning; Reason and account.

Broad learning

Broad learning · Volume Two

πολυμάθεια · polymatheia — much learning; extensive learning; broad learning[120]

At a Glance

The word. Broad learning names acquaintance with many subjects or discourses. The quantity learned does not itself establish understanding, virtue or a beneficial educational result.

In Stobaeus. Serenus places two sharply contrasting sayings together: Heraclitus denies that much learning instills understanding, while Anaxarchus assigns it both benefit and harm.

In this edition. Use a neutral headword while retaining the critical force of much learning in context. Do not turn reported judgments into one agreed educational doctrine.

A place to read. II.31.116 Read the paired reports without making Anaxarchus merely repeat Heraclitus: one denies an automatic result, while the other states opposed possible effects.

Meaning

Polymatheia is extensive learning: acquaintance with many things, studies or discourses. The noun does not decide whether that breadth has become sound understanding or improved the learner's character.

Use in the book

The report from Serenus contrasts two sayings. Heraclitus denies that much learning instills understanding; Anaxarchus says it can greatly benefit but also greatly harm. The point is not that every learned subject is worthless. The Pythagorean saying likewise distinguishes being educated from amassing learned discourses and locates it instead in release from passions, though its local construction is compressed. These witnesses make quantity an inadequate test of formation. Musonius's preference for clear proofs rather than many supplies a related educational concern without using the same noun.

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[120] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 218, 229, 243–244. The lemma follows the attested family despite the local spelling πολυμαθείας. The sayings are transmitted reports, and neither the identity of Serenus nor a fuller work context is invented.

The short report juxtaposes two evaluations rather than resolving them. Heraclitus's saying denies a consequence: accumulating learning does not implant understanding. Anaxarchus's saying instead stresses the scale of its opposed effects, describing great benefit and great harm. The repeated subject makes the difference in emphasis visible. Neither sentence gives a list of acceptable studies or an explanation of when the favorable result occurs. The reader should therefore retain the contrast without reconstructing a shared curriculum or assuming that every extensive education is condemned.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.116. Different reported evaluations separate extensive learning from understanding and assured benefit. (English edition p. 887.)

II.31.96. Being educated is contrasted with amassing learned discourses. (English edition p. 841.)

II.31.125.8. The pupil is directed to seek clarity rather than numerous proofs. (English edition p. 947.)

Translation in this edition

"Much learning" preserves the pointed contrast; "broad learning" suits a neutral heading. "Erudition" can suggest a settled achievement that these sayings put in question.

Attested Greek forms

πολυμάθειαν

Attested. II.31.116; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 229; English edition p. 887.

Ἡράκλειτος μὲν ἔλεγε πολυμάθειαν νοῦν μὴ ἐμποιεῖν

Attested. II.31.116; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 229; English edition p. 887.

Ἀνάξαρχος δὲ πολυμάθειαν κάρτα μὲν ὠφελεῖν, κάρτα δὲ βλάπτειν.

See also

Learning; Knowledge; Intellect (Volume One Lexicon, p. 226);
Education; General studies.

Contemplation

Contemplation · Volume Two

θεωρία; θεωρεῖν · theōria; theōrein — contemplation; theoretical consideration; examining[121]

At a Glance

The word. Contemplation and political action both enter the virtuous life in this account; a conditional preference for contemplation does not erase sociability or make every use of considering something a technical life-classification.

In Stobaeus. When both activities cannot be pursued together, the virtuous person follows one or the other, preferring contemplation while also being drawn toward political action because of sociability in the surviving explanation.

In this edition. Preserve the condition that prevents pursuing both together, not both individually, and do not resolve the account's differing priorities by declaring that only contemplative or only civic activity can be virtuous.

A place to read. II.7.24.3 Read the condition before the preference, and keep the final explanation about sociability; it qualifies any claim that this passage simply withdraws the virtuous person from political life.

Meaning

Theōria ranges from considering a subject to a contemplative form of activity or life. Its ethical use is not necessarily passive spectatorship.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic account distinguishes contemplation and action while giving both a place in virtuous life. If circumstances prevent the virtuous person from pursuing both together, he follows one or the other, preferring contemplation but turning toward civic actions because of social nature. A later statement makes public life a primary choice. The exposition does not resolve this tension by declaring only one activity virtuous. Some uses of the verb simply mean examining a topic; the technical life-classification should not be imposed upon every occurrence of considering something.

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[121] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 144. Different statements about the best and primary lives remain visible.

The condition concerns inability to engage in both activities together. It does not describe a situation where neither is possible. One or the other remains available, and the sentence gives reasons pointing in different directions: preference for contemplation and sociability drawing the agent toward political action. The preceding passage similarly says that noble things are both to be done and contemplated. The later priority given to public life should remain beside these statements rather than be used to delete one of them. Their coexistence is part of what the epitome preserves.

"preferring the contemplative life but turning toward political actions because of his sociability." (II.7.24.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.24.2. Doing and contemplating noble things. (English edition p. 503.)

II.7.24.3. Conditional preference alongside civic impulse. (English edition p. 505.)

II.7.24.7. Public life as a primary choice. (English edition p. 509.)

Translation in this edition

Use "contemplative" in the life-classification and "consider" for a more ordinary verb.

Attested Greek forms

θεωρεῖν

Attested. II.7.24.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 144; English edition p. 503.

παιδευτικόν. Προαιρήσεσθαι μὲν γὰρ καὶ πράττειν καὶ θεωρεῖν τὰ καλά.

See also

Action (Volume One Lexicon, p. 23); Life (Volume One Lexicon, p. 244); Political participation; The noble.

Cynicism

Cynicism · Volume Two

κυνισμός · kunismos — Cynicism; living as a Cynic[122]

At a Glance

The word. Cynicism names a way of life that the wise person may continue but will not newly begin once wise, according to this brief reported distinction rather than a detailed program of Cynic practices.

In Stobaeus. The passage explains living as a Cynic through persistence and then contrasts that continuation with beginning the life after attaining wisdom, keeping the temporal distinction central to its limited assertion.

In this edition. Preserve the supplied explanatory connection and the difference between persisting and beginning, without expanding the sentence into a universal command to adopt or reject every practice associated with Cynics.

A place to read. II.7.11s.3 Read persisting and once wise together, noticing that the apparent contrast turns on whether the life is being continued or newly initiated rather than on a list of its customs.

Meaning

Kynismos names the Cynic way of life in a brief Stoic claim. It is not modern cynicism as distrustful sneering or denial that anyone acts well.

Use in the book

The report says the wise person will live as a Cynic, explaining this as persistence in Cynicism, but denies that he will begin Cynicism once already wise. Continuing and initiating are therefore the substance of the passage. It should not be flattened into a universal command to adopt every Cynic custom or a blanket rejection of the way of life. No detailed program of Cynic practices is given. The lexicon identifies the name and this limited assertion without importing a biography or fuller external account of the school.

The first statement can sound like an unrestricted future prescription until the explanation and contrast are read. Living as a Cynic is equated with persisting in Cynicism; beginning the life once already wise is then denied.

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[122] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 114. The noun is directly witnessed; the related future verb is also printed in the passage.

The supplied explanatory connection remains marked. The small passage gives no account of particular clothing, possessions, exercises or public behavior. Its usable distinction is temporal: continuing and initiating are not treated alike. An expanded picture of the school would therefore exceed what this local witness establishes.

"yet, once wise, he will not begin the Cynic life." (II.7.11s.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11s.3. Continuing a Cynic life differs from beginning it once wise. (English edition p. 379.)

Translation in this edition

Capitalization marks the named ancient way of life.

Attested Greek forms

κυνισμῷ

Attested. II.7.11s.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 114; English edition p. 379.

τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον ⟨ὂν⟩ τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντα ἐνάρξεσθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

See also

School and choosing (Volume One Lexicon, p. 378); Wise and base; Life (Volume One Lexicon, p. 244); Austerity.

Disposition

Disposition · Volume Two

διάθεσις · diathesis — disposition; condition; way of being disposed[123]

At a Glance

The word. Disposition describes how something is constituted or disposed; its relation to state and virtue follows local definitions and should not be assumed identical across the chapter's accounts.

[123] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 59–60, 70–71, 128. The noun can also describe a constitution more generally; context supplies its technical force.

In Stobaeus. After defining vices through forms of ignorance, the Stoic report gives a broader description of virtue as the soul's lifelong agreement with itself rather than a momentary performance.

In this edition. Retain disposition where state is separately contrasted, and do not infer that every occurrence names virtue; a vicious disposition can also be described as hardened in the account.

A place to read. II.7.5b1.2 Read the broader virtue statement after the parallel definitions of folly, intemperance and cowardice, noticing the marked supplied clauses before the summary description of lifelong agreement.

Meaning

Diathesis describes how something is disposed or constituted. The Stoic account treats it as a special category in relation to hexis; its ordinary descriptive uses need not carry that entire classification.

Use in the book

Virtue is generally described as a disposition of soul agreeing with itself through the whole life. The goods classification calls all virtues dispositions, distinguishes pursuits that are states but not dispositions, and separates activities from both. Later arguments can call a vicious disposition hardened and difficult to cure. In the Peripatetic exposition virtue is the best disposition, illustrated through skill in crafts. The distinction is therefore contextual: the English "disposition" must not erase a locally explicit difference from "state," or make every diathesis a Stoic virtue.

The broader definition is introduced only after particular vices have been explained through kinds of ignorance. Their objects differ: what should be done, what is choiceworthy, what is terrible, and related distinctions. The concluding description changes scale, describing virtue as the soul's agreement with itself throughout life. It therefore concerns an enduring organization rather than merely an isolated correct judgment. Some clauses in the preceding parallel series are supplied. Preserving both the shift in scale and the visible restorations makes the summary clearer without turning every detail of the series into secure independent evidence.

"throughout the whole of life" (II.7.5b1.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b1.2. Virtue is a self-consistent disposition throughout life. (English edition p. 187.)

II.7.5f.1. Disposition is distinguished from state. (English edition p. 223.)

II.7.15.1. The best disposition explains excellence in crafts and character. (English edition p. 427.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "disposition" where the text contrasts it with "state."

Attested Greek forms

διάθεσιν

Attested. II.7.5b1.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 59-60; English edition p. 187.

εἰρημένων ἐχόμενοι. Κοινότερον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν διάθεσιν εἶναί φασι ψυχῆς σύμφωνον αὐτῇ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.

See also

Settled state; Virtue and excellence; Vice and wickedness; Habit and disposition (Volume One Lexicon, p. 182).

Education

Education · Volume Two

παιδεία · paideia — education; cultivation; training[124]

At a Glance

The word. Education concerns the formation of a person through teaching and training. Its ends and methods differ across civic, ethical and specifically philosophical arguments.

In Stobaeus. The anthology links education with character, appropriate development and corrected understanding, while retaining disagreements about how teaching, habit and knowledge contribute to virtue.

In this edition. Education is a broad rendering, not an automatic reference to modern schooling. State the local aim and preserve restrictions, conditions and the speaker's setting.

[124] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 216–217, 233–234, 239, 252–253. The article uses surviving body passages, not the title of Chapter 31 or the headings of lost chapters. Normative statements belong to their named speakers.

A place to read. II.31.91 Read the reversal between education leading to victory and victory sometimes producing lack of education, especially the intervening role of insolence after military success.

Meaning

Paideia concerns formation through teaching and training, not simply possession of information. Its scope varies: a civic argument concerns the making of good citizens, an ethical argument the formation of character, and the Sophist a particular treatment of presumptuous ignorance.

Use in the book

In Plato's Laws, good education can bring military victory, whereas victory may bring lack of education through insolence. Iamblichus describes a progression from models and habits to rational accounts. Musonius requires philosophy for the proper education of women as well as men because the virtues sought are shared. In the Sophist, education is distinguished from instruction in crafts and directed against thinking one knows what one does not know. These uses overlap without amounting to one uniform curriculum or one agreed theory of how knowledge produces virtue.

The civic argument begins by distinguishing the benefit of one educated person from the education of a whole group. It then reasons through character to action and from action to possible military success. The reverse movement is not guaranteed: victory can instead encourage insolence and expose people to further evils. The same successful outcome can therefore stand at the end of a good formation or at the beginning of moral deterioration. This contrast explains why education is assessed through what people become, rather than by victory alone.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.91. Education and victory are contrasted as causes with different moral effects. (English edition p. 833.)

II.31.122.1. Proper education directs natural development toward virtue. (English edition p. 905.)

II.31.123.8. Philosophy is required for the proper education of either sex. (English edition p. 927.)

II.31.129.4. Education is distinguished from instruction in crafts. (English edition p. 985.)

Translation in this edition

"Education" is broad enough for the shared term; explain its local end. Avoid treating every occurrence as modern schooling or merely book learning.

Attested Greek forms

παιδεία

Attested. II.31.91; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 216-217; English edition p. 833.

παιδεία μὲν οὖν φέρει καὶ νίκην, νίκη δὲ ἐνίοτε ἀπαιδευσίαν

Attested. II.31.122.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 233-234; English edition p. 905.

ταύτην τοίνυν ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία δεόντως προοδηγεῖ

See also

Upbringing and guidance; Learning; Teacher and pupil; Philosophy; Habit and disposition (Volume One Lexicon, p. 182).

General studies

General studies · Volume Two

ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα · enkyklia mathēmata — general studies; preparatory course of studies[125]

At a Glance

The word. The phrase names a general course of learning regarded as preparation for philosophy. Its use does not itself supply a fixed list of required subjects.

In Stobaeus. Crantor uses an initiation comparison to insist on prior preparation; Xenocrates explains a related function through the soul's softening and the need for philosophical handles.

In this edition. General studies or general course of studies keeps the preparatory breadth. Avoid importing a later standardized curriculum or identifying the educational analogy with a ritual itself.

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[125] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 206, 228. The nominal phrase is justified by the genitive phrase in the Xenocrates body. The Crantor witness has the adjective used substantivally; no absent subject list is supplied.

A place to read. II.31.27 Read Crantor's two parallel exclusions: the greater mysteries do not precede the lesser, and philosophy does not precede working through the general course of studies.

Meaning

The phrase identifies a general course of learning treated as preparation for philosophy. The substantive adjective can occur without mathēmata, whose meaning is then understood from the educational context. The witnesses do not give a fixed list of subjects.

Use in the book

Crantor compares arriving at philosophy before this preparation with initiation into the greater mysteries before the lesser. The analogy concerns order and readiness; it does not identify philosophical study with the ritual itself. In the Xenocrates anecdote, someone lacking the general studies has no "handles" for philosophy: these studies must first soften the soul. Together, the sayings make preparation an active formation of capacity, not simply a collection of credentials. Neither supplies grounds for importing a later standardized curriculum or requiring exactly the same subjects from every speaker in the anthology.

Crantor's comparison makes order and readiness central. Merely arriving at a higher subject does not remove the need for prior work. The repeated structure joins an initiation sequence to an educational sequence without saying that philosophy is literally the same ceremony. Nor does the fragment enumerate the preparatory disciplines or explain how long each should take. Its force is the demand for preparation, not a complete syllabus. The Xenocrates anecdote adds an image of capacity by asking what will let philosophical study take hold.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.27. Crantor presents general studies as prior preparation for philosophy. (English edition p. 777.)

II.31.111. Xenocrates explains their function with handles and softening images. (English edition p. 885.)

Translation in this edition

"General studies" or "general course of studies" keeps the preparatory breadth without asserting a prescribed modern curriculum.

Attested Greek forms

ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων

Attested. II.31.111; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 228; English edition p. 885.

οὐδενὸς τῶν ἐγκυκλίων μαθημάτων μετειληφώς

ἐγκυκλίοις

Attested. II.31.27; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 206; English edition p. 777.

πρὶν ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις διαπονηθῆναι.

See also

Education; Learning; Philosophy; Natural aptitude; Broad learning.

Habituation

Habituation · Volume Two

ἔθος · ethos — habit; habituation; becoming accustomed[126]

At a Glance

The word. Habituation concerns becoming accustomed through training, while character and settled state name related results; the source's wordplay depends on the distinction between habit and character.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic opening joins natural beginnings with right training, so the formation of character involves directed development rather than an assertion that repeated behavior alone produces virtue.

In this edition. Preserve habit and character as distinct words in explaining their resemblance; the later Platonic imitation passage uses the character-word and should not be quoted as the habit-word.

A place to read. II.7.13.1 Read the name explanation beside the beginnings-and-seeds comparison and the qualifier right training; the final extension to living creatures gives the account its field of application.

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[126] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 116–118, 227–228. The short and long initial vowels in ethos, habit, and ēthos, character, matter. The cited Platonic imitation passage has the character-word, not the habit-word.

Meaning

Ethos, with epsilon, is habit, distinguished from ēthos, character, with eta. The Peripatetic account uses their resemblance to explain the formation of character through habituation.

Use in the book

The exposition says that nature gives beginnings or seeds and that right training and habits bring them to perfection. Virtue reaches completion through nature, habit and reason together; repetition is not represented as sufficient independently of its direction. The resulting state should be distinguished from the process of becoming accustomed. A later Platonic excerpt adds that sustained imitation becomes established in character and nature in body, voice and thought. That wider witness concerns the formative effect of imitation, not proof that every repeated performance is good.

The paragraph begins with a relation between names, then explains it through development. Nature supplies beginnings and seeds, but habits and right training bring their perfection. The adjective right matters: repetition is not presented as sufficient whatever its direction. The final sentence situates ethics among living creatures and especially human beings. This short local explanation supports a distinction between formative process and resulting character; it does not supply a complete general theory of learning or prove that every habitual action must be good.

"through habits and right training" (II.7.13.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.13.1. The character/habit wordplay introduces right training. (English edition p. 387.)

II.7.13.5. Nature, habit and reason jointly complete virtue. (English edition p. 391.)

II.31.110y. Imitation becomes established in character and nature. (English edition p. 881.)

Translation in this edition

Use "habituation" for the formation process when "habit" would confuse process and settled state.

Attested Greek forms

ἔθους

Attested. II.7.13.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 116-117; English edition p. 387.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἦθος τοῦνομα λαβεῖν φησὶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους· ὧν γὰρ ἐκ φύσεως ἀρχὰς ἔχομεν καὶ σπέρματα, τούτων τὰς τελειότητας

See also

Character (Volume One Lexicon, p. 72); Settled state; Disposition; Education.

Ignorance

Ignorance · Volume Two

ἄγνοια; ἀγνοέω · agnoia; agnoeō — ignorance; not knowing; fail to understand[127]

At a Glance

The word. Ignorance is not knowing or failing to understand. The Sophist treats it as a broad condition, then distinguishes the narrower presumption of knowledge within it.

In Stobaeus. The dialogue compares a soul missing truth with movement that misses its target, calling ignorance involuntary and distinguishing its ugliness from the disease associated with vice.

In this edition. Preserve the analogy, tentative transitions and uncertain scope of alone. Do not convert the dialogue's language of derangement into an independent modern medical diagnosis.

A place to read. II.31.129.2 Read the movement from missing a target to the distinction between ugliness and disease, keeping the interlocutors' agreements and qualifications within the developing argument.

[127] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 251–253. The disputed scope of "alone" in the surrounding soul argument is not settled by this lexical entry. Its account of ignorance is attributed to the excerpted dialogue, not universalized.

Meaning

Agnoia is ignorance or lack of understanding. The Sophist treats it as a broad condition with distinguishable kinds; it is not simply another word for the particular presumption of knowledge called amathia later in the dialogue.

Use in the book

The argument compares a soul striving toward truth but missing its target with a thing whose movements lack proportion. Ignorance is described as involuntary and, in this analogy, as ugliness of soul rather than the disease associated with injustice and related vices. The dialogue then seeks corresponding divisions of teaching and singles out thinking one knows without having understood. These distinctions explain why instruction must do more than present information. The target image and the dialogue's tentative transitions should remain visible; its strong language about derangement should not be turned into a modern medical diagnosis.

The target comparison treats understanding as an activity directed toward truth. Error arises when that movement goes off course, so the argument connects ignorance with disproportion rather than with a chosen refusal to possess a fact. The reply then accepts a distinction between kinds of badness in the soul. That agreement is a step in the dialogue's division, not a final medical classification. The surrounding discussion will ask what form of treatment corresponds to the condition, which is why the difference between ignorance generally and presumed knowledge later becomes important.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.129.2. Ignorance is analyzed through the target and disproportion analogy. (English edition p. 981.)

II.31.129.3. Teaching is proposed as the art directed at ignorance as a whole. (English edition p. 983.)

II.31.129.4. Presumptuous lack of learning is distinguished within ignorance. (English edition p. 985.)

Translation in this edition

"Ignorance" suits the general noun; "not knowing" or "failing to understand" may better express the verb. Keep the narrower term amathia distinct where the dialogue explicitly distinguishes it.

Attested Greek forms

ἀγνοοῦσαν

Attested. II.31.129.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 251-252; English edition p. 981.

Ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχὴν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν.

ἄγνοιαν

Attested. II.31.129.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 252; English edition p. 983.

περὶ ξύμπασαν ἄγνοιαν

See also

Lack of learning; Education; Knowledge; Test and refutation; Perfection and completeness (Volume One Lexicon, p. 313).

Lack of learning

Lack of learning · Volume Two

ἀμαθία · amathia — lack of learning; unlearnedness; presumptuous ignorance[128]

At a Glance

The word. The expression can mean being unlearned, but the Sophist assigns it a narrower kind of ignorance: supposing that one knows what one has not understood.

In Stobaeus. The dialogue distinguishes education directed against presumed knowledge from instruction in crafts, then asks whether that educational treatment itself has further divisions deserving names.

In this edition. Preserve the local distinction from ignorance generally. Illiteracy or lack of schooling would be too narrow, and ignorance alone would conceal the specified presumption.

A place to read. II.31.129.4 Read the definition of presumed knowledge and the immediate question about its remedy, keeping the tentative phrasing of the proposed classification and causal explanation.

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[128] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 172–173, 252–253. The phrase defining the presumption is unsupplied. Supplements in the later explanation of the self-styled wise person do not provide the entry's sole evidence.

Meaning

Amathia can mean lack of learning. The Sophist gives it a narrower role within ignorance: thinking that one knows when one has not understood. The specialized explanation must not be confused with a mere inability to read or lack of formal schooling.

Use in the book

The dialogue calls this a large and troublesome kind of ignorance and says it appears to account for errors in thought. A person convinced of his own skill will not wish to learn the very things he supposes he knows. This explains the need for refutation before instruction can benefit him. Admonition alone is said to achieve little despite much effort. Elsewhere the term can appear in broader explanations of bad choosing, so the specific Sophist analysis is a contextual definition, not the compulsory sense of every occurrence.

The speaker marks out a troublesome kind within a larger condition. The problem is not simply missing information: it is the belief that one already knows. That difference explains the next classificatory question. Instruction that removes this condition receives the name education, while another branch concerns crafts. The dialogue then refuses to stop merely because it has found a name; it asks whether the newly identified field is indivisible or still requires division. The inquiry models the continuing examination that its diagnosis of presumed knowledge recommends.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.129.4. The dialogue singles out an unfounded claim to knowledge within ignorance. (English edition p. 985.)

II.31.129.5. Conceit of wisdom blocks the wish to learn; admonition has limited success. (English edition p. 987.)

II.8.42.19. Porphyry associates bad choosing with haste and ignorance. (English edition p. 637.)

Translation in this edition

Keep “lack of learning” to preserve the contrast with teaching, and explain the presumption involved here. “Illiteracy” would be too narrow and “ignorance” alone would blur the explicit division.

Attested Greek forms

ἀμαθίαν

Attested. II.31.129.4; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 252-253; English edition p. 985.

τούτῳ γε οἶμαι μόνῳ τῆς ἀγνοίας ἀμαθίαν τοὔνομα προσρηθῆναι.

εἰδέναι

Attested. II.31.129.4; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 252-253; English edition p. 985.

Τὸ μὴ κατειδότα τι δοκεῖν εἰδέναι

See also

Ignorance; Test and refutation; Admonition; Education; Knowledge.

Learning

Learning · Volume Two

μάθησις; μάθημα; μανθάνω · mathēsis; mathēma; manthanō — learning; lesson; subject of study; learn[129]

At a Glance

The word. The family distinguishes learning as an activity, a lesson or subject learned, and the verb to learn. These forms do not automatically imply achieved knowledge or virtue.

In Stobaeus. The anthology presents intellectual growth, gradual listening and observation, testing what is heard, and the removal of opinions that can obstruct a lesson's benefit.

In this edition. Use learning for the activity and lesson or study for its object as needed. Avoid replacing every occurrence with knowledge or treating reception alone as completed understanding.

A place to read. II.31.6 Read the invitation to listen together with the claim that learning enlarges the mind, without adding a curriculum or a fuller argument absent from this single verse.

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[129] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 201, 204, 228, 243–244. The headword groups an attested noun family and its verb. The supplied object in Philemon is not needed as evidence for the unsupplied learning vocabulary elsewhere.

Meaning

Mathēsis is learning, mathēma something learned or studied, and manthanō the corresponding verb. The family distinguishes the process of acquiring understanding from the subjects offered to a learner. Neither term by itself asserts that the learner has achieved complete knowledge or good character.

Use in the book

Empedocles says learning makes the mind grow. The Philemon fragment presents growth as gradual through speaking, listening to others and observing, retaining its "they say." Plato's educational discussions distinguish lessons from the soul's ability to benefit from them: obstructing opinions may first need removal, and a lesson forced on the soul does not remain. Musonius likewise requires the pupil to test what is heard and bring conduct into agreement with sound arguments. Thus learning includes receptive attention, judgment and application; the excerpts do not equate it with the passive accumulation of statements.

The isolated verse couples an exhortation with a reason. Listening is invited because learning is said to make the mind grow. The line itself does not specify a discipline, a teacher's authority or the conditions of successful understanding. Other selected passages supply more detail about learning through observation or testing what is heard. Read together, they allow the idea of growth to remain active without making this brief witness prove that every lesson, every speaker or every accumulation of information necessarily improves its hearer.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.6. Learning is said to enlarge the mind. (English edition p. 747.)

II.31.17. Speech, listening and observation contribute to gradual growth. (English edition p. 767.)

II.31.110z. A forced lesson is contrasted with lasting learning. (English edition p. 883.)

II.31.125.8. The pupil must avoid falsehood and act on sound teaching. (English edition p. 947.)

Translation in this edition

Use "learning" for the activity, "lesson," "study" or "subject" for mathēma as context requires. "Knowledge" should not automatically replace either noun.

Attested Greek forms

μάθησις

Attested. II.31.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 201; English edition p. 747.

μάθησις γὰρ φρένας αὔξει

μανθάνειν

Attested. II.31.110z; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 228; English edition p. 883.

οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν.

See also

Education; Knowledge; Broad learning; Test and refutation; Practice and exercise.

Mental disease and infirmity

Mental disease and infirmity · Volume Two

νόσημα; ἀῤῥώστημα · nosēma; arrōstēma — disease; hardened passion; infirmity[130]

At a Glance

The word. Mental disease describes an opinion hardened into a settled craving-related state; infirmity adds weakness, distinguishing both from susceptibility and from ordinary bodily illness elsewhere.

In Stobaeus. The account includes excessive attachment and opposing aversions, then names infirmities as diseases accompanied by weakness; these are related classifications rather than one undifferentiated condition.

In this edition. Explain the local evaluative metaphor without turning the article into a modern medical diagnosis, and distinguish the settled opinion from a temporary passion or an ordinary bodily disease.

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[130] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 93. The examples belong to the ancient account's evaluations; they are not presented as current medical categories.

A place to read. II.7.10e.2 Read the judgments about choiceworthiness before the attachment and aversion examples, then the brief final distinction; the category depends on evaluation, settledness and weakness in different ways.

Meaning

Nosēma and arrōstēma name moral-psychological conditions in the Stoic account. Medical language describes the settled force of evaluative opinions rather than providing a modern diagnostic classification.

Use in the book

A disease is an opinion associated with craving that has become a hardened state, treating what is not choiceworthy as exceedingly choiceworthy. Love of money, wine and women supply examples; corresponding aversions are also discussed. Diseases occurring together with weakness are called infirmities. The account follows the prior definition of susceptibility, so a tendency, a passing passion and a hardened condition must not be made identical. The terms also need distinguishing from ordinary bodily disease elsewhere in the volume.

The definition specifies a change in condition: an opinion has developed into a settled state and become hardened. Its error is evaluative, treating something not choiceworthy as exceedingly choiceworthy. The examples are then extended by an opposite group arising through aversion, so the account does not restrict the problem to acquisitive attraction. The final sentence introduces infirmities by adding weakness rather than replacing the previous definition. The supplied these in the aversion clause remains marked; the relation between the two groups is preserved without making every explanatory word independently transmitted.

“Diseases occurring together with weakness are called infirmities.” (II.7.10e.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10e.2. Hardened opinion and the distinction between disease and infirmity. (English edition p. 297.)

II.7.10e.1. Susceptibility is the preceding, distinct category. (English edition p. 295.)

Translation in this edition

"Disease" and "infirmity" preserve the source's analogy; the article explains their particular ethical sense.

Attested Greek forms

Νόσημα

Attested. II.7.10e.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 93; English edition p. 297.

Νόσημα δ' εἶναι δόξαν ἐπιθυμίας ἐρρηγυῖαν εἰς ἕξιν καὶ ἐνεσκιρωμένην,

ἀρρωστήματα

Attested. II.7.10e.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 93; English edition p. 297.

μισανθρωπίαν. Τὰ δὲ νοσήματα μετ' ἀσθενείας συμβαίνοντα ἀρρωστήματα καλεῖσθαι.

See also

Disease (Volume One Lexicon, p. 125); Susceptibility to passion; Belief and opinion; Desire.

Music

Music · Volume Two

μουσική; ἀμουσία · mousikē; amousia — music; cultivation of the Muses' arts; lack of such cultivation[131]

At a Glance

The word. Music has a broad educational sense here, including accounts and stories as well as sound. Its contrast with physical training concerns the formation of the soul.

In Stobaeus. The Republic begins education through stories before bodily training, then distinguishes true and false accounts while allowing truth within what is generally called false.

In this edition. Preserve the broad cultural meaning and the falsehood qualifications. Translating music as instrumental performance alone would omit the verbal material expressly included by the dialogue.

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[131] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 27, 225–226. The Republic's statement about falsehood is qualified as generally speaking, and explicitly allows truth within the stories. The article must not convert it into a claim that every educational story is wholly false.

A place to read. II.31.110v.1 Read the question about including accounts in music and the ensuing explanation of children's stories, keeping the distinction between generally false narrative and truth within it.

Meaning

Mousikē can encompass cultivation through poetry and stories as well as musical performance. Amousia is its absence. The local objects of teaching determine the scope, rather than the modern category of instrumental music alone.

Use in the book

The Republic selection contrasts bodily education with music for the soul, then explicitly includes accounts in music. Stories told to children come before physical training; they are described as generally false while also containing truth. This makes the selection and character of stories part of education. In the Heracles fragment, the speaker joins Graces and Muses and prays not to live with amousia. The fragment's cultural aspiration and the Republic's teaching proposal are distinct voices, but both exceed a reference to sound without meaning.

The dialogue anticipates a difficulty with the claim that education begins with false accounts. The reply explains that children first hear stories, which are generally described as false but also contain truth. This qualification prevents the contrast from becoming an assertion that every tale is wholly false. It also shows why music is broader than instrumental sound in this educational setting. Its verbal material can shape the soul before physical training begins. The following discussion of selecting stories develops the responsibility implied by that early influence.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.110v.1. Music includes accounts and childhood stories within education. (English edition p. 875.)

II.4.6. A dramatic speaker rejects a life without the Muses' arts. (English edition p. 81.)

Translation in this edition

Music remains the conventional term, with the broader cultural sense explained where needed. Lack of musical education would be too narrow for every use of amousia.

Attested Greek forms

μουσική

Attested. II.31.110v.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 225-226; English edition p. 875.

ἡ δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ ψυχῇ μουσική.

ἀμουσίας

Attested. II.4.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 27; English edition p. 81.

μὴ ζῴην μετ᾽ ἀμουσίας.

See also

Education; Making and poetry; Divine inspiration; Art of letters.

Natural aptitude

Natural aptitude · Volume Two

εὐφυής; ἀφυής · euphyēs; aphyēs — naturally gifted; well suited by nature; naturally ill suited[132]

At a Glance

The word. The adjective family describes being gifted or ill-suited for learning. Strong natural capacity is not the same as achieved goodness and can require especially suitable nurture.

In Stobaeus. The Republic compares gifted souls with vigorous seeds: under bad upbringing, the strongest nature may become exceptionally bad rather than remaining protected by its potential.

In this edition. Keep aptitude distinct from moral achievement and from a separate natural predisposition. Preserve the seed comparison's conditions of nourishment, season and place.

A place to read. II.31.110g Read how greater vigor increases the need for suitable conditions before the comparison is applied to souls and to the possibility of great good or evil.

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[132] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 214, 222, 224. The positive lemma is supported by its attested superlative and the negative by the adjective itself. It remains distinct from the different noun hypobolē, treated under Natural predisposition.

Meaning

The adjectives concern natural fitness or lack of fitness for an activity. They do not by themselves establish achieved virtue, settled expertise, or a capacity that works independently of education and circumstances.

Use in the book

The Republic excerpt argues that the strongest growth needs suitable nourishment and that the most gifted souls, given bad guidance, can become exceptionally bad. Its concern is the danger of powerful capacities ruined by nurture, not a guarantee that ability produces goodness. A Democritean saying calls a person who contradicts and indulges in idle talk ill suited to learning. Elsewhere Plato's advice to teach through play seeks to reveal what each child is naturally suited for. The vocabulary thus connects capacities, conduct and educational diagnosis without reducing every aptitude to one fixed ranking of human worth.

The biological comparison reverses an expectation that superior natural strength would make nurture less important. A vigorous seed has a greater need of suitable conditions, and a strong nature can fare worse under alien nourishment. Applying that pattern to souls explains why exceptional potential may support exceptional wrongdoing when formation fails. The final question contrasts such power with a weak nature incapable of great effects in either direction. Aptitude is consequently a capacity whose outcome requires explanation, not a moral guarantee already contained in the adjective.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.110g. The most gifted souls can become especially bad through poor upbringing. (English edition p. 859.)

II.31.73. Contradiction and idle talk are said to indicate unfitness for learning. (English edition p. 815.)

II.31.110p. Play in study helps disclose what each child is naturally suited for. (English edition p. 867.)

Translation in this edition

"Gifted" fits the positive adjective; "ill suited to learning" preserves the specified object of the negative one. Avoid "naturally virtuous" unless the passage itself makes that stronger claim.

Attested Greek forms

εὐφυεστάτας

Attested. II.31.110g; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 222; English edition p. 859.

τὰς ψυχὰς φῶμεν οὕτω τὰς εὐφυεστάτας κακῆς παιδαγωγίας τυχούσας διαφερόντως κακὰς γίγνεσθαι

ἀφυὴς

Attested. II.31.73; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 214; English edition p. 815.

ἀφυὴς ἐς μάθησιν.

See also

Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285); Education; Upbringing and guidance; Natural predisposition; Learning.

Natural predisposition

Natural predisposition · Volume Two

ὑποβολή; φυσικὴ ὑποβολή · hupobolē; phusikē hupobolē — predisposition; natural beginning or impulse[133]

At a Glance

The word. The expression names an initial natural orientation toward moral goodness, pictured as a seed of virtue. It is a beginning rather than completed excellence.

In Stobaeus. Musonius explains favorable moral self-descriptions through this natural beginning, then distinguishes people deceived about their goodness from those ashamed to acknowledge its absence.

In this edition. Predisposition preserves the developmental claim. Avoid treating natural potential, the wish to be good or the shame of failure as proof that virtue is already achieved.

A place to read. II.9.8.5 Read the seed of virtue together with the two explanations of mistaken self-description, where deception and shame show why the claimed achievement cannot simply be assumed.

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[133] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 184. The ending of II.9.8.6 is incomplete. Its unfinished predispositions clause must not be completed by importing a preferred conclusion from another text or a general account of innate knowledge.

Meaning

Hupobolē can denote a beginning or contribution toward something. Musonius's expression here is a natural predisposition toward moral goodness, not possession of the completed excellence toward which it points.

Use in the book

The discussion argues from familiar expectations about conduct. People are held responsible for wrongdoing in life even when they have not studied a specialized moral art, and they commonly claim to be good without identifying a teacher. Musonius interprets this as evidence of a natural starting point and a seed of virtue in each person. He immediately distinguishes that endowment from the truth of a person's claim: some are deceived about their own goodness, while others are ashamed to admit its absence. The disposition therefore explains a capacity and expectation, not universal achieved virtue.

The paragraph separates what is present by nature from what people claim to have accomplished. Calling the natural beginning a seed allows for growth without making the mature result inevitable. The subsequent distinction between deception and shame also explains two different relations to the same moral demand. Some people mistake themselves for good; others recognize the difficulty of acknowledging that they are not. Neither response removes the obligation to become good. The developmental image therefore remains compatible with a serious gap between a natural starting point and a person's conduct.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.9.8.5. A natural predisposition and seed of virtue are inferred from moral self-assessment. (English edition p. 683.)

II.9.8.6. The comparison with learned arts ends in an explicit textual gap. (English edition p. 683.)

Translation in this edition

Predisposition keeps the forward direction of the expression. Instinct may suggest a more automatic or determinate response than the argument establishes.

Attested Greek forms

ὑποβολὴν

Attested. II.9.8.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 184; English edition p. 683.

φυσικὴν εἶναι ὑποβολὴν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ πρὸς καλοκἀγαθίαν

See also

Moral goodness; Virtue and excellence; Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285); Practice and exercise.

Pedagogue

Pedagogue · Volume Two

παιδαγωγός; παιδαγωγία · paidagōgos; paidagōgia — pedagogue; child's attendant or guide; supervision of children[134]

At a Glance

The word. A pedagogue here is a household attendant and guide responsible for children, not simply a classroom teacher. The role raises questions about care, authority and formation.

In Stobaeus. Hieronymus criticizes fathers who confuse following and guarding children with leading them well, ending with a quip about the low esteem given to the service.

In this edition. Keep the household and enslaved status visible without endorsing the source's valuations. Preserve its gap and avoid inventing the omitted positive contrast or an actual appointment.

A place to read. II.31.121 Read the criticism of obedience to attendants and the contrast between following and leading, leaving the printed gap before the Pericles anecdote unreconstructed.

Meaning

The paidagōgos is the attendant or guide responsible for a child. The role need not coincide with that of a subject teacher: Iamblichus lists pedagogue and teacher separately among the adult models. "Pedagogue" should

[134] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 222, 233–234. The related role and service nouns are grouped as a lexical family. The Hieronymus excerpt has a lacuna after its unfinished comparison; the missing ideal is not reconstructed.

therefore not automatically be read in its modern sense of professional educator.

Use in the book

Hieronymus criticizes fathers for entrusting children to barbarian pedagogues and regarding obedience as adequate care. His contrast turns on following a child versus leading the child well. The reported Pericles quip about an injured household slave becoming a new pedagogue exposes the low valuation of the service. It does not establish that Pericles owned that slave, actually appointed him, or that every pedagogue was a rejected laborer. The passage questions how families allocate responsibility for what they value most.

The argument challenges the fathers' measure of adequate care. Having someone remain close behind a child or prevent straying is not the same task as providing good direction. The source intensifies the criticism by contrasting the value placed on children with the low value placed on their attendants. The closing anecdote mocks that mismatch: a worker's injury is used to suggest a new pedagogue. It need not describe an appointment that actually followed. The printed gap also prevents the reader from reconstructing the complete positive alternative to mere guarding.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.121. The child's attendant is criticized when supervision substitutes for good leadership. (English edition p. 903.)

II.31.122.2. Pedagogue and teacher appear as distinct adult models. (English edition p. 907.)

II.31.110g. Bad guidance can ruin an exceptionally gifted nature. (English edition p. 859.)

Translation in this edition

Retain "pedagogue" with explanation, or use "child's attendant." "Tutor" can suggest subject teaching that the local contrast does not require.

Attested Greek forms

παιδαγωγοῖς

Attested. II.31.121; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 233; English edition p. 903.

παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ τούτων ἀκούειν κελεύσαντες

παιδαγωγῷ

Attested. II.31.122.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 234; English edition p. 907.

ἐν πατρὶ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ παιδαγωγῷ καὶ διδασκάλῳ

See also

Upbringing and guidance; Teacher and pupil; Education; Servitude; Natural aptitude.

Philosophy

Philosophy · Volume Two

φιλοσοφία; φιλοσοφέω · philosophia; philosopheō — philosophy; philosophical pursuit; practice philosophy[135]

At a Glance

The word. Philosophy names inquiry and practice directed toward living well in these educational passages. It involves preparation, tested arguments and the formation of conduct rather than verbal display alone.

In Stobaeus. Musonius argues that women should practice philosophy because they share reason and a natural orientation toward virtue with men; the moral task is not restricted to one sex.

In this edition. Follow the local practical and intellectual purpose without importing a uniform school curriculum. Natural capacities support the argument for education, not an assertion of virtue already completed.

A place to read. II.31.126.1 Read the shared reason and moral orientation before the question why only men should investigate living well, preserving both the supplement and the rejected word.

Meaning

The noun and verb designate philosophical inquiry or practice. In the educational excerpts the decisive issue is often what philosophy does to a life, rather than affiliation with a named school or success in verbal performance.

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[135] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 206, 239, 243–244. Musonius's emphatic "nothing else" is his definition in this argument, not a license to apply the same restriction to every philosophical excerpt in the volume.

Use in the book

Musonius describes philosophy as investigating how to live well and, more sharply, as the practice of moral excellence. He argues that women should pursue it because they share reason and a natural orientation toward virtue with men. This shared orientation is not a claim that everyone is already virtuous. His account of teacher and pupil makes benefit conditional on deeds agreeing with accepted sound arguments. Crantor, in another setting, presents general studies as preparation for philosophy. These are connected concerns about education, but the preparatory curriculum and Musonius's practical definition remain separately attributed positions.

Musonius begins from capacities used in ordinary human life: communicating, considering particular matters and recognizing moral differences. He then adds a natural desire for virtue and affinity with it. These premises lead to the question why the investigation of living well should be required of men but not women. The argument does not depend on claiming that either already possesses complete virtue. Its educational force lies in joining a shared capacity and a shared moral task, so that the need for philosophy follows rather than disappears.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.27. General studies are presented as preparation for philosophy. (English edition p. 777.)

II.31.123.8. Musonius identifies philosophy with the practice of moral excellence. (English edition p. 927.)

II.31.125.8. Benefit from philosophy requires agreement between deeds and sound arguments. (English edition p. 947.)

II.31.126.1. The argument for women's philosophy rests on shared reason and moral orientation. (English edition p. 949.)

Translation in this edition

"Practice philosophy" is useful where the verb concerns a way of living. Do not reduce the word to argument alone, or remove argument from the practice it is meant to guide.

Attested Greek forms

φιλοσοφία

Attested. II.31.123.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 239; English edition p. 927.

ἐπειδὴ καὶ φιλοσοφία καλοκαγαθίας ἐστὶν ἐπιτήδευσις καὶ οὐδὲν ἕτερον.

φιλοσοφεῖν

Attested. II.31.126.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 244; English edition p. 949.

ὅπερ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν ἐστι

See also

Education; Reason and account; Practice and exercise;
Moral goodness; Virtue and excellence.

Practice and exercise

Practice and exercise · Volume Two

ἄσκησις; ἀσκέω; μελέτη · askēsis; askeō; meletē — practice; training; repeated exercise[136]

At a Glance

The word. The family concerns exercising, rehearsing or repeatedly doing something. Its ethical value depends on what is practiced and how the activity is guided, not on repetition alone.

In Stobaeus. Musonius distinguishes teaching's prior guidance from habit's greater power to produce action; other passages expose a gap between practiced speeches and shameful conduct.

In this edition. Preserve both activity and direction. Practice is not identical with habituation, and praise of its effectiveness should not turn reasoned teaching into mere empty talk.

A place to read. II.15.46.5 Read the contrast between priority in order and priority in effectiveness, where reason teaches how to act and habit has the stronger power to lead into action.

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[136] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 183–184, 190, 194, 202. The lexical families are grouped, not made identical. The proverb's speaker is unidentified; its recurrence elsewhere does not supply a secure named author.

Meaning

The nouns askēsis and meletē concern practice or exercise; askeō is a related verb of practicing or cultivating. The object and guidance of practice determine its ethical value.

Use in the book

Musonius distinguishes claiming virtue from being able to name a study or practice undertaken to acquire it. Lucius's separate report compares verbal knowledge with experience in medicine, navigation and music, then applies the comparison to temperance. Practice develops the ability to act, but rational teaching still comes first in order because noble habituation needs its guidance. The proverb that practice with time becomes nature emphasizes duration. Conversely, Democritus's saying allows practice of excellent speeches alongside shameful deeds, showing that verbal exercise alone does not establish good conduct.

The conclusion assigns two kinds of priority rather than choosing one element as sufficient by itself. A reasoned account teaches how action should be performed and must guide the formation of a noble habit. Habit nevertheless has greater power in bringing the person to act. Knowing how to describe an activity and being able to carry it out are therefore related but different achievements. The argument explains why practice matters without making it directionless: an established habit can be effective while still requiring assessment by the account that should guide it.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.9.8.4. A claim of goodness may lack any identified practice of virtue. (English edition p. 681.)

II.15.46.5. Practical efficacy and the prior guidance of teaching are distinguished. (English edition p. 723.)

II.31.10. Prolonged practice is said to become nature. (English edition p. 751.)

II.15.33. Practicing excellent speeches can coexist with shameful conduct. (English edition p. 711.)

Translation in this edition

Practice or training is preferable to an automatic translation as asceticism. The term need not imply renunciation, and practice may concern argument or performance as well as moral action.

Attested Greek forms

ἄσκησιν

Attested. II.9.8.4; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 183-184; English edition p. 681.

μάθησιν ἀρετῆς ἢ ἄσκησιν

Μελέτη

Attested. II.31.10; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 202; English edition p. 751.

Μελέτη χρονισθεῖσ' εἰς φύσιν καθίσταται.

ἀσκέουσιν

Attested. II.15.33; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 190; English edition p. 711.

λόγους τοὺς ἀρίστους ἀσκέουσιν.

See also

Reason and account; Habit and disposition (Volume One Lexicon, p. 182); Virtue and excellence; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43).

Preliminary end

Preliminary end · Volume Two

ὑποτελίς · hupotelis — preliminary end; initial congenial affection[137]

At a Glance

The word. The preliminary end names the first congenial attachment of a creature not yet rational; it describes a starting condition rather than a smaller mature ethical achievement.

In Stobaeus. Nutritive and perceptive beginnings explain how attachment can precede rational development, while three rival candidates leave the content of that first attachment unsettled.

In this edition. Retain the unusual preliminary end and explain its local definition; replacing it with ordinary purpose would obscure the account's developmental comparison of roots and plant.

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[137] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 47–48. The root/plant comparison marks development; it does not identify the creature with a literal plant.

A place to read. II.7.3c.2 Read the creature's awareness of its own constitution alongside the root image and the three proposed objects; the list does not decide among them.

Meaning

Hypotelis names the creature's first congenial affection or attachment before rational development. It is not simply a smaller version of the mature ethical end.

Use in the book

The account places this starting point where a living creature first becomes aware of its constitution while still nonrational. Its natural beginnings are compared with roots rather than a developed plant. Three possible candidates are given: pleasure, freedom from disturbance, or the primary things according to nature. Naming these candidates does not decide the dispute among accounts of the first attachment. The lexicon therefore keeps the preliminary end distinct from the rationally articulated final aim and from the target of an action.

The root comparison links the definition to capacities already operating in the new creature. Nutrition and perception have beginnings that are effective before rational maturity, so an initial attachment need not already contain a reasoned account of the good life. The passage also says attachment occurs immediately upon coming into being; it is not presented as a later intellectual decision. Yet it offers pleasure, freedom from disturbance and primary natural things as alternatives. Its developmental claim is therefore more determinate than its answer about the object to which the creature first attaches.

"Each of these occupies the place of a root, not yet of a plant." (II.7.3c.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.3c.2. The first congenial affection is defined and three candidates listed. (English edition p. 145.)

II.7.3c.3. The account develops the relation between the initial attachment and later life. (English edition p. 145.)

Translation in this edition

The unusual noun is rendered "preliminary end," with its definition supplied by the passage.

Attested Greek forms

Ὑποτελὶς

Attested. II.7.3c.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 47; English edition p. 145.

Ὑποτελὶς δ' ἐστὶ τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον τοῦ ζῴου πάθος, ἀφ' οὗ κατήρξατο συναισθάνεσθαι

See also

End; Target; Affinity and attachment; Nature (Volume One Lexicon, p. 285).

Progress

Progress · Volume Two

προκοπή · prokopē — progress; moral development[138]

At a Glance

The word. Progress has value without automatically being complete virtue; the Stoic and Peripatetic contexts both distinguish improvement or readiness from the full achievement, though their classifications differ.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic list groups progress with aptitude and memory among preferred things concerning the soul, and also includes arts qualified by their contribution to natural life.

In this edition. Retain progress without calling every improvement a moral good or complete virtue; the preferred class and the later Peripatetic classification of incompleteness each require their own explanation.

A place to read. II.7.7b.2 Read progress beside the other psychic preferred things and their bodily and external counterparts; the threefold distribution shows that favored conditions do not all have identical functions.

Meaning

Prokopē names progress or advancement. Its placement in the account matters: being in progress need not amount to possessing complete virtue.

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[138] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 80–81, 131. The noun also occurs in a broader assessment of philosophical contribution; the technical ethical use is the focus here.

Use in the book

The Stoic list includes progress among preferred things concerning the soul, alongside aptitude, memory and quickness. This grants it value while preserving the division between moral good and preferred indifferent. The Peripatetic exposition calls progress and aptitude incomplete, contrasting them with complete virtue such as justice and nobility-and-goodness. The same word therefore supports comparison without making the accounts identical. Both contexts prevent a reader from identifying every improvement with the full ethical achievement that the account calls happiness or virtue.

Progress is one member of a varied list, alongside aptitude, memory, sharpness of thought and perseverance in appropriate activities. The list also includes arts only insofar as they can further contribute to a life according to nature. These conditions are grouped as preferred, but their individual roles differ. Bodily health and external relations appear in the parallel lists that follow. The context therefore grants value to progress without locating it outside the classification of indifferents. Its presence here should not be mistaken for a claim that gradual advancement already equals complete ethical achievement.

"natural aptitude, progress, memory, sharpness of thought" (II.7.7b.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.7b.2. Progress is among psychic preferred indifferents. (English edition p. 257.)

II.7.18.4. Progress is classified as incomplete in contrast to complete virtue. (English edition p. 443.)

Translation in this edition

"Progress" describes development, not an automatic proof that its end has been reached.

Attested Greek forms

προκοπήν

Attested. II.7.7b.2; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 80-81; English edition p. 257.

ἐκτός. Περὶ ψυχὴν μὲν εἶναι τὰ τοιαῦτα· εὐφυΐαν, προκοπήν, μνήμην, ὀξύτητα διανοίας, ἕξιν καθ' ἣν ἐπίμονοί εἰσιν ἐπὶ τῶν

See also

Preferred things; Virtue and excellence; Perfection and completeness (Volume One Lexicon, p. 313); Wise and base.

Purification

Purification · Volume Two

κάθαρσις; καθαρός; καθαίρω · katharsis; katharos; kathairō — purification; pure; purify; clearing away[139]

At a Glance

The word. Purification removes what obstructs the soul's benefit from instruction. In the Sophist comparison, refutation clears conceit so a person claims only the knowledge actually possessed.

In Stobaeus. The medical analogy links removing an internal obstacle with receiving nourishment; educational purification similarly precedes the benefit of offered studies rather than replacing those studies.

In this edition. Preserve the educational comparison and the specific obstacle. Purification here is not a claim about ritual observance or an automatic guarantee that refutation produces every virtue.

A place to read. II.31.129.7 Read the comparison between nourishment and lessons, especially the change from obstructing opinions to acknowledging only what one really knows and no more.

Meaning

This family names purification and the condition of being clean or pure. Its educational use in the Sophist is explained by a bodily analogy: the removal of what obstructs benefit. The vocabulary does not by itself identify a ritual or ceremonial washing.

Use in the book

Those who purify the soul first remove opinions that obstruct learning, especially the conviction of knowing more than one knows. Refutation brings the person to shame and leaves him acknowledging only the knowledge he actually has. This is a preparatory clearing, not the delivery of

[139] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 253–254. The noun, adjective and verb are attested forms within one family. This entry concerns their explicit educational operation here and does not deny their other philosophical or religious uses.

every subject he still needs to learn. Even the Great King, the dialogue says, remains unclean in the most important respects if unexamined. The comparison makes status irrelevant to the educational requirement while linking purification to the conditions of true happiness.

The order of the comparison explains why adding instruction can be ineffective. Food does not benefit a body while an internal impediment remains; studies likewise fail to help a soul whose opinions obstruct learning. Refutation removes that obstacle by limiting the person's claim to what he actually knows. The resulting disposition is praised, but the passage does not confuse clearing the way with possessing every lesson that may follow. Even high social rank supplies no exemption, since the final example measures the unexamined person through the same educational need.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.129.7. Medical clearing provides the analogy for removing opinions that hinder lessons. (English edition p. 991.)

II.31.129.6. The preceding examination releases grand and rigid self-opinions. (English edition p. 989.)

Translation in this edition

"Purification" preserves the dialogue's extended comparison; explain its object as the removal of obstructing conceit. "Correction" alone can hide the relation to cleansing.

Attested Greek forms

καθαίροντες

Attested. II.31.129.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 254; English edition p. 991.

οἱ καθαίροντες αὐτούς

καθάρσεών

Attested. II.31.129.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 254; English edition p. 991.

μεγίστη καὶ κυριωτάτη τῶν καθάρσεών ἐστι

See also

Test and refutation; Lack of learning; Learning; Medicine (Volume One Lexicon, p. 266); Happiness and flourishing.

Pursuit and practice

Pursuit and practice · Volume Two

ἐπιτήδευμα · epitēdeuma — cultivated pursuit; practice[140]

At a Glance

The word. Pursuit names an ethically directed engagement with an art or part of one, distinguished from knowledge and from an individual activity; cultivated interests therefore do not automatically confer the account's technical wisdom.

In Stobaeus. The examples include music, letters, horses, hunting and general educational arts, while a separate classification places pursuits among states that are not dispositions and differentiates them from virtues and their activities.

In this edition. Keep pursuit distinct from knowledge, disposition and activity, and preserve the supplied words in the definition rather than using the ordinary English breadth of practice to erase the source's categories.

A place to read. II.7.5b11 Read the familiar educational examples together with the explicit denial that they are forms of knowledge, then compare the description of a path through an art with the separate state-classification.

Meaning

Epitēdeuma is a pursuit or cultivated practice. The Stoic exposition distinguishes pursuits from forms of knowledge and from complete virtues.

Use in the book

Love of music, letters, horses and hunting, with general educational arts, are called pursuits rather than knowledge. The account describes a pursuit as a path through an art or part of one toward things according to virtue. Its psychic-goods classification makes pursuits states without being dispositions, while virtues are dispositions and their activities neither. A cultivated interest therefore does not automatically supply the technical knowledge required by the ethical ideal. Ordinary English practice must not erase these explicitly differentiated classes or be confused with a single action.

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[140] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 67, 70–71. The phrase about things according to virtue includes a supplement; the noun and examples survive.

The examples are recognizable cultivated interests, but the report immediately prevents familiarity with them from being mistaken for knowledge. It calls them pursuits and places them among worthy states, with part of that transition supplied. The later classification sharpens the distinction: virtues are dispositions, pursuits are states but not dispositions, and virtuous activities belong to neither class. The definition through an art therefore identifies a structured direction toward virtue without making every practiced activity itself a virtue or an instance of the knowledge required for the wise person.

The definition calls a pursuit "a path through an art or a part of one" (II.7.5b11).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b11. Examples and the path-through-an-art description. (English edition p. 211.)

II.7.5f.1. States without being dispositions. (English edition p. 223.)

Translation in this edition

"Cultivated pursuit" distinguishes the category from a single action or repeated drill.

Attested Greek forms

ἐπιτηδεύματα

Attested. II.7.5b11; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 67; English edition p. 211.

φιλοκυνηγίαν καὶ καθόλου ἐγκυκλίους λεγομένας τέχνας ἐπιτηδεύματα μὲν καλοῦσιν, ἐπιστήμας δ' οὔ, ἐν ⟨τε⟩ ταῖς σπουδαίαις ἕξεσι

See also

Settled state; Disposition; Knowledge; Art and craft (Volume One Lexicon, p. 43).

Settled state

Settled state · Volume Two

ἕξις · hexis — state; settled state; disposition[141]

At a Glance

The word. A settled state describes an established condition rather than mere repetition; the text distinguishes states, dispositions and activities in ways that a single English habit could obscure.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic classification separates virtues as dispositions, pursuits as states only, and virtuous activities as neither, preserving a distinction between having an established condition and exercising it.

In this edition. Retain state or settled state where the classification requires it, and distinguish the resulting condition from habituation or training through which character may come to be formed.

A place to read. II.7.5f.1 Read the three classes and their examples together; pursuits and virtuous activities prevent the word state from becoming a loose synonym for every good concerning the soul.

Meaning

Hexis is a relatively settled condition or state. Its relation to diathesis is expressly classified in the Stoic exposition, while the Peripatetic account gives it a different central role.

Use in the book

The Stoic passage makes all virtues dispositions, but pursuits such as divination states without being dispositions; activities in accordance with virtue are neither. The Peripatetic account distinguishes passions, capacities for passions and states governing how passions are expressed. Virtue is then a choice-involving state at a mean relative to us. “Habit” can mislead if it suggests merely a repeated behavior, for the text distinguishes the settled condition from the training through which it is formed. The chapter’s own classifications should govern each use.

The classification concerns goods associated with the soul, not every possible condition of every object. Divination illustrates a pursuit treated as a state without being a disposition. Activities such as an act of practical

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[141] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 70–71, 139–140. This article separates hexis from the broader lexical family grouped under Habit and disposition in the Volume One companion.

wisdom are then excluded from both categories. The difference between possessing and exercising an excellence consequently has grammatical as well as ethical importance. The paragraph offers examples rather than a universal external definition of hexis. Its local threefold division should be followed before later Peripatetic passages introduce their own relations among feelings, capacities and states.

"are neither states nor dispositions" (II.7.5f.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5f.1. States and dispositions form overlapping but nonidentical classes. (English edition p. 223.)

II.7.20.7. States differ from feelings and capacities to feel. (English edition p. 479.)

II.7.20.12. Ethical virtue is a choice-involving state. (English edition p. 485.)

Translation in this edition

"State" keeps the technical contrast visible; "settled" explains its persistence where useful.

Attested Greek forms

ἕξεις

Attested. II.7.5f.1; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 70-71; English edition p. 223.

περὶ ψυχὴν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν εἶναι διαθέσεις, τὰ δὲ ἕξεις μὲν διαθέσεις δ' οὔ, τὰ δ' οὔτε ἕξεις οὔτε διαθέσεις. Διαθέσεις

See also

Disposition; Habituation; Virtue and excellence; Mental disease and infirmity.

Shame and moral regard

Shame and moral regard · Volume Two

αἰδώς; αἰσχύνη; ἀναισχυντία · aidōs; aischynē; anaischyntia — sense of shame; moral regard; shame; shamelessness[142]

At a Glance

The word. The family includes restraining regard, shame and shamelessness. Their ethical and educational force depends on what occasions the feeling and what change the argument expects from it.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus joins shame at shameful deeds with aspiration toward noble ones; the Sophist describes shame after refutation, while Musonius answers an objection about women's brazenness.

In this edition. Keep the related Greek forms distinct and preserve qualified connections. Neither embarrassment alone nor exposure before others automatically establishes moral failure or a successful education.

A place to read. II.31.122.3 Read shame together with aspiration and the ensuing injunctions, where conduct is first attuned to another's reason through several forms of practice and advice.

Meaning

Aidōs can name a restraining sense of shame or regard for what is fitting; aischynē names shame, while anaischyntia is shamelessness. The words overlap, but a passage's occasion and purpose determine whether shame is a cultivated restraint, a response to exposure, or the opposite of brazen conduct.

Use in the book

Iamblichus places shame at shameful deeds among the dispositions formed before a fully reasoned grasp of conduct. Musonius invokes a sense of shame against the objection that philosophy makes women brazen. The Sophist gives shame a different educational occasion: refutation brings the learner to acknowledge the limits of his knowledge, removing conceit that obstructs learning. The Xenophontic gratitude passage says shamelessness seems to follow ingratitude. These contexts connect shame with formation

[142] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 234–235, 246–247, 254, 263–264. These are related concepts, not three interchangeable grammatical forms. The entry preserves the qualified "seems" in the ingratitude passage and distinguishes the speakers' educational settings.

and judgment, without making every feeling of embarrassment proof of wrongdoing or every exposure an educational success.

The developmental account pairs restraint with a positive direction. Shame draws the child away from shameful acts, while aspiration gives an impulse toward noble ones. The following injunctions then supply a measure through the reason of a teacher or lawgiver. General maxims, deeds, discourses, practical advice and arrangements of life contribute in different ways. The sequence therefore does not rely on shame alone. It places the feeling among several supports for formation, whose purpose is directed conduct rather than the mere experience of being exposed or humiliated.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.122.3. Shame at shameful deeds helps direct developing character. (English edition p. 909.)

II.31.126.7. A sense of shame answers the objection that philosophy encourages brazenness. (English edition p. 961.)

II.31.129.7. Refutational shame prepares the soul to benefit from lessons. (English edition p. 991.)

II.46.22. Shamelessness is said to seem especially connected with ingratitude. (English edition p. 1029.)

Translation in this edition

Use “sense of shame” or “moral regard” for the restraining disposition where appropriate; retain “shame” for the response produced by examination.

Attested Greek forms

αἰσχύνην

Attested. II.31.122.3; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 234-235; English edition p. 909.

τὴν ἐπὶ τοῖς αἰσχροῖς αἰσχύνην

αἰδῶ

Attested. II.31.126.7; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 246-247; English edition p. 961.

ὁ τὴν αἰδῶ μέγιστον ἀποφαίνων ἀγαθόν

ἀναισχυντία

Attested. II.46.22; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 263-264; English edition p. 1029.

ἀναισχυντία, καὶ γὰρ αὕτη δοκεῖ εἶναι μεγίστη ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ αἰσχρὰ ἡγεμών.

See also

Education; Self-control and temperance; Test and refutation; Ingratitude; Character (Volume One Lexicon, p. 72).

Susceptibility to passion

Susceptibility to passion · Volume Two

εὐεμπτωσία · euemptōsia — susceptibility; readiness to fall into passion[143]

At a Glance

The word. Susceptibility is a ready tendency to fall into a passion or other contrary activity; it concerns proneness rather than merely the intensity of a passing feeling.

In Stobaeus. Examples extend from emotional tendencies to theft, adultery and outrage, showing how the category can characterize a person through recurrent readiness for a kind of conduct.

In this edition. Keep susceptibility distinct from a passing passion and from the hardened condition called disease; the successive definitions mark different levels rather than interchangeable psychological labels.

A place to read. II.7.10e.1 Read the emotional examples with the later examples of conduct and the resulting names for agents; the second group broadens the scope of the initial definition.

Meaning

Euemptōsia is a tendency or readiness to fall into a passion. It is distinguished from a momentary passion and from an opinion hardened into an established disease.

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[143] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 93. The dictionary form is supported by the inflected noun in the running definition.

Use in the book

The Stoic exposition lists proneness to distress, irascibility, enviousness and quick temper as examples. It also extends susceptibility to other activities contrary to nature, including theft, adultery and outrage. The term therefore concerns the agent's tendency toward a class of conduct, not merely the intensity of a passing emotion. The following account of diseases introduces a more settled, hardened condition. Keeping these levels apart avoids making every angry movement or weakness into the same psychological category.

The list moves from proneness to distress or quick temper to readiness for actions such as theft and outrage. Its final clause explicitly connects these susceptibilities with the names given to people. That connection explains why the account is concerned with characteristic tendency, not only a single occurrence. The category can therefore have behavioral as well as emotional examples. The next definition of disease adds a hardened settled opinion; keeping that progression visible prevents the earlier, more general readiness from being treated as already the same hardened condition.

"There are also susceptibilities to other activities contrary to nature" (II.7.10e.1).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.10e.1. Definition and examples of susceptibility. (English edition p. 295.)

II.7.10e.2. Diseases are separately described as hardened settled opinions. (English edition p. 297.)

Translation in this edition

"Susceptibility" is descriptive within the report's moral psychology; it need not imply a modern clinical diagnosis.

Attested Greek forms

Εὐεμπτωσίαν

Attested. II.7.10e.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 93; English edition p. 295.

Εὐεμπτωσίαν δ' εἶναι εὐκαταφορίαν εἰς πάθος, ὥς τι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν ἔργων,

See also

Passion; Mental disease and infirmity; Settled state; Vice and wickedness.

Teacher and pupil

Teacher and pupil · Volume Two

διδάσκαλος; μαθητής · didaskalos; mathētēs — teacher; pupil; learner[144]

At a Glance

The word. The teacher and learner are defined by an educational relation that requires more than transmitting many words. The selected argument values understanding, useful subject matter and consistent conduct.

In Stobaeus. Musonius asks the philosophical teacher to reach the hearer's mind with sound argument, while displaying agreement between what he says and what he does.

In this edition. Preserve the damaged word and its uncertainty rather than restoring a familiar adjective. Teacher and pupil name their roles here without establishing a biography or institutional setting.

A place to read. II.31.125.7 Read the return to the argument's starting point, where timely explanation and exemplary conduct replace the ambition to display a multitude of arguments and proofs.

Meaning

These nouns designate the two sides of instruction, not necessarily a modern classroom institution. In Musonius the philosopher as teacher and the pupil have related but distinct responsibilities: persuasive, exemplary teaching and attentive, discriminating reception.

Use in the book

The teacher should not parade a multitude of arguments and proofs, but speak aptly and act consistently with what he says. The pupil must guard against accepting falsehood and seek clear rather than merely numerous proofs. Agreement in conduct is the condition for benefiting from philosophy. Iamblichus also places a teacher among the adult models whose deeds children imitate before they can grasp accounts rationally. Thus the role includes example and direction without making mere deference sufficient. The pupil is not excused from judgment by the existence of an authoritative teacher.

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[144] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 234, 243–244. The damaged word in Musonius's teacher passage remains damaged in the edition; this article draws only on the secure instruction and conduct clauses around it.

The teacher's task is framed through the hearer's benefit. Running through many arguments is contrasted with speaking to the point and reaching the learner's understanding. The damaged word interrupts one description of the desired speech, but the surrounding requirements remain clear. The final emphasis falls on useful subjects and conduct agreeing with the teacher's words. This makes example part of the relation itself rather than an optional addition to an otherwise sufficient display. The next movement of the excerpt also gives the hearer an active task in examining and applying what is heard.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.125.7. The philosophical teacher is responsible for apt speech and matching conduct. (English edition p. 945.)

II.31.125.8. The pupil must scrutinize what is heard and follow sound teaching in life. (English edition p. 947.)

II.31.122.2. The teacher is one of the models presented to children. (English edition p. 907.)

Translation in this edition

"Pupil" or "learner" avoids implying a particular institutional setting. Distinguish the teacher from the pedagogue when both appear in the same list.

Attested Greek forms

διδάσκαλον

Attested. II.31.125.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 243; English edition p. 945.

φημὶ δεῖν τὸν διδάσκαλον τὸν φιλόσοφον

μαθητὴν

Attested. II.31.125.8; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 243-244; English edition p. 947.

τὸν δὲ μαθητὴν ἐντετάσθαι πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα

See also

Learning; Pedagogue; Education; Demonstration (Volume One Lexicon, p. 114); Philosophy.

Upbringing and guidance

Upbringing and guidance · Volume Two

ἀγωγή · agōgē — upbringing; guidance; leading toward a way of life[145]

At a Glance

The word. Upbringing includes the direction of developing conduct, not merely supervision or guarding. The household example asks what sort of guidance children need and how seriously adults value that work.

In Stobaeus. Hieronymus criticizes fathers' inconsistent arrangements, contrasting someone who follows children with someone who leads them well, while Iamblichus develops a positive educational sequence elsewhere.

In this edition. Preserve the particular roles, valuations and printed gap. The criticism does not supply every omitted alternative, nor does its closing joke prove that an appointment actually occurred.

A place to read. II.31.121 Read the fathers' claim to adequate care against the distinction between following and leading, then the contrast between children's value and the esteem of their attendants.

Meaning

Agōgē is leading or guidance and, in the educational setting, upbringing. It emphasizes a directed course of formation rather than a discrete lesson. The desired destination and the quality of the guide are therefore essential to its meaning.

Use in the book

Hieronymus challenges fathers who mistake supervision for good guidance: children need someone who leads well, not merely an attendant following their heels and keeping them from wandering. Iamblichus describes guidance toward virtue as a sequence: sensible examples, habits, short injunctions, then increasingly reasoned accounts and definitions. The progression recognizes differences in maturity. His final goal does not authorize giving exact explanations to minds still unready for them. Upbringing in these passages is consequently neither mere custody nor unrestricted intellectual instruction delivered all at once.

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[145] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 233–235. The noun has body witnesses independent of Chapter 31's heading. The broken contrast in Hieronymus and the later lacuna in Iamblichus are not filled out to manufacture a complete educational system.

The opening invitation is to examine the fathers' understanding, so the inconsistency concerns a mismatch between their judgment and their arrangements. They count obedience to attendants as sufficient care, although children need good leadership rather than mere proximity and guarding. The later contrast between precious children and undervalued workers exposes the same mismatch through social valuation. The unfinished positive contrast must remain unfinished. Its absence does not prevent the surviving argument from distinguishing protective supervision from the more demanding task of directing a child's development.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.31.121. Fathers' understanding of upbringing is tested by the follower–leader contrast. (English edition p. 903.)

II.31.122.2. Models and habits precede full rational understanding. (English edition p. 907.)

II.31.122.4. Guidance toward virtue reaches definitions and causal understanding when learners are prepared. (English edition p. 911.)

Translation in this edition

"Upbringing" suits the care and formation of children; "guidance" makes the directed process explicit in the concluding educational argument.

Attested Greek forms

ἀγωγῆς

Attested. II.31.121; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 233; English edition p. 903.

περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἀγωγῆς

Attested. II.31.122.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 235; English edition p. 911.

ἐπὶ τῷ τέλει τῆς εἰς ἀρετὴν ἀγωγῆς

See also

Education; Pedagogue; Teacher and pupil; Habit and disposition (Volume One Lexicon, p. 182); End.

Acquiring wealth

Acquiring wealth · Volume Two

χρηματιστική; χρηματίζεσθαι · chrēmatistikē; chrēmatizesthai — acquiring money; expertise in resources[146]

At a Glance

The word. Acquiring wealth is a qualified skill involving proper sources, timing, method and limits, not simply successful accumulation; the account records disagreement about whether the activity is intermediate or morally excellent.

In Stobaeus. The exclusive claim about the virtuous money-acquirer is joined to practical questions about when and how long acquisition should continue, while the report preserves differing assessments instead of speaking with one unqualified voice.

In this edition. Use acquiring money or wealth where appropriate rather than importing modern financial institutions, and retain the explicit disagreement about classification instead of treating all profitable activity as morally excellent.

A place to read. II.7.11d.3 Begin with some said and others, then read the questions of source, time, manner and limit; the second sentence does not remove the report's stated disagreement in the first.

Meaning

Chrēmatistikē concerns acquiring resources or money. Expertise in this sphere differs from a bare accumulation of wealth.

Use in the book

The Stoic account includes proper sources, collection, preservation and expenditure in the skill, and records disagreement over whether acquiring money is intermediate or morally excellent. The Peripatetic account makes provision a branch of household management and ranks acquisition occurring naturally above retail dealing. Neither should be paraphrased as approval of any profitable activity. Sources, timing, manner, limits and

[146] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 95, 149. The noun of expertise and the activity-verb need not have the same classification.

justice matter as well as returns. "Finance" risks importing modern institutions not named in the passage; ordinary wealth is not itself the technical skill.

The report marks disagreement immediately: some call acquiring money intermediate and others morally excellent. It then connects proper acquisition with the virtuous person's knowledge of sources, timing, manner and duration. These questions constrain the activity rather than merely describe how to increase a sum. The preceding definition also includes preserving and spending money with a view to adequate resources. Taken together, the passages distinguish expertise from possession and specify limits internal to acquiring well. The disagreement should remain visible even when the surrounding account stresses the virtuous person's competence.

"Some said that acquiring money is intermediate, others that it is morally excellent." (II.7.11d.3).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11d.2. Expertise includes proper sources and use of resources. (English edition p. 305.)

II.7.11d.3. Disagreement over the activity's classification. (English edition p. 305.)

II.7.26.8. Natural acquisition is ranked above retail trade. (English edition p. 537.)

Translation in this edition

"Acquiring money" or "acquiring wealth" is more precise here than "economics."

Attested Greek forms

χρηματιστικὴν

Attested. II.7.11d.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 95; English edition p. 305.

ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ τῶν κατ᾽ ἀγρὸν ἐργαζομένων· τὴν δὲ χρηματιστικὴν ἐμπειρίαν περιποιήσεως χρημάτων ἀφ᾽ ὧν δέον καὶ ἔξιν ὁμολογουμένως

χρηματίζεσθαί

Attested. II.7.11d.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 95; English edition p. 305.

τὸ δὲ χρηματίζεσθαί τινες μὲν μέσον εἶπον εἶναι, τινὲς δὲ ἀστεῖον. Φαῦλον δὲ μηδένα

See also

Household management; Wealth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 461); Use; Good.

Benefaction

Benefaction · Volume Two

εὐεργεσία; εὖ ποιεῖν · euergesia; eu poiein — benefaction; benefit; doing good for someone[147]

At a Glance

The word. Benefaction is doing good for another or rendering a beneficial service. It differs from the recipient's recognition, remembrance or return of that benefit.

In Stobaeus. The selected passages connect benefits with gratitude, future generosity and friendship, while another saying locates the benefactor's reward in doing good itself.

In this edition. Distinguish the act, the benefit received and its return. Preserve the damaged letter's limits rather than supplying an exact system of reciprocal payment.

A place to read. II.46.15 Read the damaged argument linking repayment to the common interest of later beneficiaries, while keeping its printed gap and uncertain construction in view.

Meaning

Euergesia is a beneficial act or service, while eu poiein is the corresponding expression for doing good. A benefit is distinguished from the recipient's acknowledgment or return, though charis can name several parts of this relationship.

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[147] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 143, 262–263. The noun and fixed verbal expression are presented together, not claimed to be the same grammatical form. The uncertain construction of the letter fragment remains explicitly limited.

Use in the book

The fragment from the Letter on Friendship connects repayment with the continued willingness of others to benefit people; its damaged syntax does not permit a fully secure reconstruction of every relation. Iamblichus similarly argues that ingratitude narrows the outward activity of good things and urges recipients to understand and receive benefits rightly. An unheaded saying, however, places the benefactor's greatest reward in doing good itself. These passages provide different reasons for benefaction and gratitude: their arguments are not reducible to calculating an equal material payment for every service.

The surviving letter does more than accuse a recipient of forgetting a favor. It connects an individual response with the prospects of other people who might later be helped. Discouraging benefactors can damage a wider common interest. The printed gap interrupts the argument, however, so its complete sequence cannot be supplied from that conclusion. The passage supports a social reason for repayment without specifying that every benefit requires an equal material return. Other selected sayings give different reasons for doing good and should remain distinct.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.46.15. A damaged argument connects repayment with the prospects of future beneficiaries. (English edition p. 1023.)

II.46.16. The recipient's understanding and gratitude support further acts of goodness. (English edition p. 1025.)

II.46.19. The benefactor's reward is located in the good deed itself. (English edition p. 1027.)

II.7.23.1. Service for the recipient's own sake is distinguished from requital. (English edition p. 501.)

Translation in this edition

"Benefaction" emphasizes an act done for another's good; "benefit" may suit what is received. Distinguish both from "gratitude."

Attested Greek forms

εὐεργεσιῶν

Attested. II.46.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 262; English edition p. 1025.

λόγον ὀρθὸν κατέχειν εὐεργεσιῶν μετὰ φιλίας

εὖ ποιοῦντος

Attested. II.46.19; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 263; English edition p. 1027.

τοῦ μὲν εὖ ποιοῦντος τὴν μεγίστην ἀμοιβὴν

See also

Grace and favor; Ingratitude; Friendship; Recompense (Volume One Lexicon, p. 357); Good.

City

City · Volume Two

πόλις · polis — city; political community[148]

At a Glance

The word. City can mean a dwelling place, its human community or both together; the moral claim depends on inhabitants and their association rather than virtue attributed independently to streets and buildings.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic clarification distinguishes three senses and explains how moral excellence applies, while the Peripatetic civic account defines a complete association sufficient for life and citizenship through participation in authority.

In this edition. Keep the distinction between place and people, and preserve the supplied connection to inhabitants; do not silently modernize the city into an administrative municipality or explain away the difficult Cleanthes argument.

A place to read. II.7.11i.10 Read the three senses before asking which can be morally excellent; the final reference to inhabitants explains why the community and the combination differ from the bare dwelling place.

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[148] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 103, 150. A schematic claim about origins is not a dated history of a settlement.

Meaning

Polis may name a dwelling place, a community of people, or their combination. The Stoic exposition distinguishes these senses before calling the city morally excellent.

Use in the book

The moral claim concerns the organized human community rather than virtue belonging to buildings. A difficult Cleanthes argument retains the printed dwelling-place term and a supplied conditional without replacing it from conjecture. The Peripatetic definition calls the city the most complete association, sufficient for a self-sufficient life, and defines citizenship through participation in authority. These accounts share concern for common life but differ in their explanatory structures. "City" should not be confined to a modern administrative municipality or understood only as streets and houses.

The clarification answers a possible ambiguity in calling a city morally excellent. A dwelling place alone is not described in the same way as the community or the place-and-community together. The combined sense receives the description because of its relation to inhabitants, with the small connecting word supplied. This distinction matters for the preceding argument attributed to Cleanthes about justice within a place of refuge. It also prevents the later definition of a complete civic association from being reduced to its buildings or geographical limits.

The definition includes the sense "as the community of human beings" (II.7.11i.10).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11i.10. Place, people and combination are distinguished. (English edition p. 335.)

II.7.11i.9. Cleanthes' difficult argument concerns moral excellence. (English edition p. 335.)

II.7.26.9. City and citizen are defined. (English edition p. 537.)

Translation in this edition

Use "political community" where a geographical reading would obscure the argument.

Attested Greek forms

πόλις

Attested. II.7.26.9; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 150; English edition p. 537.

διὰ τὸ συμφέρον. Εἶτα ὅτι ἡ τελειοτάτη κοινωνία πόλις ἐστὶ καὶ ὅτι πολίτης ἐστὶν ᾧ μέτεστι πολιτικῆς ἀρχῆς. Πόλις

See also

Civic constitution; Community and communion (Volume One Lexicon, p. 85); Law; Political participation.

Civic constitution

Civic constitution · Volume Two

πολιτεία · politeia — constitution; political association; form of government[149]

At a Glance

The word. A civic constitution concerns the arrangement and purpose of rule, with correctness judged by common advantage as well as the number of rulers; the local names must not be replaced from a familiar scheme.

In Stobaeus. The account allows one, few or all to rule either correctly or badly, distinguishing their aims before naming correct forms and deviations and later allowing mixed arrangements and change.

In this edition. Retain the epitome's own names, including democracy among the correct forms, and do not translate every use as a modern written constitution or judge correctness solely by how many people rule.

A place to read. II.7.26.12 Follow the sequence from number of rulers to aim and only then to names; the second distinction is essential to understanding why each numerical arrangement can be correct or deviant.

Meaning

Politeia may refer to a constitution or political arrangement and, in the first household association, to a political community. Sense depends on the argument.

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[149] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 148, 150–151. Democracy's local placement among correct forms is a distinction to retain.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic account classifies rule by one, few or all and distinguishes common from private advantage. It names kingship, aristocracy and democracy as correct forms, tyranny, oligarchy and mob rule as deviations. These are the local epitome's names, not Aristotle's standard six labels imported unchanged. The text also allows mixed government and changes for better or worse. Household analogies and the city definition therefore should not turn every occurrence into a modern written constitution or make the number of rulers the sole criterion.

The passage first presents three numerical possibilities, then divides each according to its aim. Rule by one, few or all is not automatically correct or bad. Common advantage makes the difference; private advantage makes the arrangement a deviation. Only after establishing this criterion does the account attach names to the forms. That sequence guards against treating the list as a mere vocabulary chart. The later recognition of mixed government and change adds further possibilities without cancelling the criterion by which a governing arrangement is assessed.

"Each arrangement is either correct or bad" (II.7.26.12).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.26.2. The first association uses politeia broadly. (English edition p. 529.)

II.7.26.12. Correct forms and deviations are named. (English edition p. 541.)

II.7.26.13. Mixed government and change are recognized. (English edition p. 541.)

Translation in this edition

"Constitution" suits the form of government; retain a broader phrase for the association.

Attested Greek forms

πολιτείας

Attested. II.7.26.13; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 150-151; English edition p. 541.

τῶν ὀρθῶν πολιτειῶν ἀρίστην. Μεταβάλλειν δὲ τὰς πολιτείας πολλάκις πρὸς τὸ ἄμεινον καὶ τὸ χεῖρον. Καθόλου δ' ἀρίστην εἶναι

See also

City; Common advantage; Rule and kingship (Volume One Lexicon, p. 371); Civil strife.

Civil strife

Civil strife · Volume Two

στάσις · stasis — civil strife; faction[150]

At a Glance

The word. Civil strife arises through claims about equal and unequal shares or through passions concerning honor, rule, gain and wealth; the account distinguishes these grounds from force and deception as means of overthrow.

In Stobaeus. The equality argument describes different demands for distribution, while the passion-based account identifies motivating objects; a supplied contrast restores part of the formulation and remains visibly marked in the translation.

In this edition. Preserve the supplied equal and unequal contrast, and do not infer that every faction described as reasoning has a justified claim or that passion is a separate motive without an object.

A place to read. II.7.26.15 Read the two distributional complaints as counterparts, retaining their supplied words, before comparing the objects of passion and the separately stated causes of constitutional overthrow in the next passage.

Meaning

Stasis here is faction or civil strife within a city, not rest or standing still. The political account classifies its grounds.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic exposition distinguishes strife according to reason from strife according to passion. The former arises through claims about equality: equal people forced to unequal shares, or unequal people to equal shares. The latter involves honor, love of rule, gain or wealth. A supplied contrast restores part of the equality formulation and remains marked in the edition.

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[150] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed p. 151. The dictionary singular is supported by plural στάσεις.

The classification does not assert that every faction is justified or that passion is an extra motive apart from its objects. Force and deception are separately discussed as means of overthrow.

The explanation identifies two kinds of ground for conflict rather than a single catalogue of bad behavior. A distributional complaint can arise when people taken as equal receive unequal shares, or people taken as unequal receive equal shares. Part of this counterpart formulation is supplied. The other ground concerns passions directed toward honor, rule, gain or wealth. The following passage introduces force and deception as causes of overthrow, which should not replace the earlier account of why groups contend. Neither classification independently decides whether a particular faction's claim is just.

"Civil strife in cities arises in some cases from reason, and in others from passion." (II.7.26.15).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.26.15. Reason-based and passion-based grounds. (English edition p. 543.)

II.7.26.16. Force and deception as causes of overthrow. (English edition p. 543.)

Translation in this edition

"Civil strife" distinguishes the local political sense.

Attested Greek forms

Στάσεις

Attested. II.7.26.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 151; English edition p. 543.

Στάσεις δ' ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι γίνεσθαι τὰς μὲν κατὰ λόγον, τὰς δὲ κατὰ πάθος.

See also

Strife (Volume One Lexicon, p. 416); Equality (Volume One Lexicon, p. 147); Civic constitution; Passion.

Common advantage

Common advantage · Volume Two

κοινῇ συμφέρον · koinēi sumpheron — common advantage; what benefits the community[151]

At a Glance

The word. Common advantage supplies the criterion separating correct rule from deviation in the Peripatetic civic account, and later contributes to constitutional stability; it concerns governing purpose rather than the number of rulers alone.

In Stobaeus. The same numerical arrangement can aim at common or private advantage, while attention to common advantage also opposes the instability associated with force and deception in the later discussion.

In this edition. Keep the rulers' aim explicit, and distinguish this civic criterion from the Stoic claim that the goods of virtuous people are common, which belongs to another account of benefit.

A place to read. II.7.26.12 Compare the rulers' common and private aims before the constitutional names; then read the later stability claim as a further role of common advantage rather than a new numerical classification.

Meaning

The phrase names the shared advantage at which correct government aims. It supplies a criterion distinct from the number of rulers.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic exposition says rule by one, few or all can be correct or bad: correct when rulers aim at common advantage, a deviation when they pursue private advantage. It later connects constitutional stability with care for the common advantage. Purpose and governance matter rather than a collective benefit arising merely by chance. This should not be silently equated with the Stoic claim that all goods of virtuous agents are common, which belongs to a different account of good and benefit. Shared civic language does not remove that conceptual difference.

The criterion applies across rule by one, few or all. Its importance lies in what rulers aim at, not merely in a beneficial result that happens by chance. A

[151] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 150–151. Shared purpose does not erase the unequal ancient civic hierarchy nearby.

ruler's private advantage makes the arrangement a deviation even before a constitutional name is assigned. The later account says that constitutions gain stability through attending to common advantage, while force and deception overthrow them. This adds a concern with maintaining civic association. It should remain distinct from the Stoic account of shared goods among virtuous agents, despite the related language of common benefit.

"correct when the rulers aim at the common advantage, bad when they aim at their own." (II.7.26.12).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.26.12. Common and private advantage distinguish correct rule. (English edition p. 541.)

II.7.26.16. Common advantage contributes to stability. (English edition p. 543.)

Translation in this edition

Treat it as the printed phrase, not an abstract noun absent from the text.

Attested Greek forms

κοινῇ συμφέροντος

Attested. II.7.26.12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 150; English edition p. 541.

φαύλως ἔχειν· Ὀρθῶς μέν, ὅταν οἱ ἄρχοντες τοῦ κοινῇ συμφέροντος στοχάζωνται· φαύλως δέ, ὅταν τοῦ ἰδίου. Τὸ δὲ φαῦλον παρέκβασιν

See also

Civic constitution; City; Useful (Volume One Lexicon, p. 449); Concord and agreement.

Concord and agreement

Concord and agreement · Volume Two

ὁμόνοια · homonoia — concord; agreement in mind; agreement with oneself[152]

At a Glance

The word. Concord is agreement of mind, extending to communities, households, friends and a person's relation to himself. Its precise ethical requirements vary between the collected accounts.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic account makes concord knowledge of common goods and requires trust and constancy for true friendship; Iamblichus also develops agreement within a person.

In this edition. Keep the social and inward applications visible. Do not turn every instance into political conformity, or silently replace concord with the distinct word for harmony.

A place to read. II.7.11m.5 Read concord alongside the requirements for true friendship, especially trust, constancy and the contrast with connections held together by outside necessities and opinions.

Meaning

Homonoia is concord or agreement of mind. Its social scope is not limited to political unanimity: the same word can describe friends, households, public associations and an individual's relation to himself.

Use in the book

The Stoic account defines concord as knowledge of common goods and uses it to explain why genuine friendship belongs to the wise. Iamblichus starts from a gathering of like mind, fellowship and union, then extends concord to cities, households and private relationships. He also includes self-agreement: a person governed by one thought and judgment is contrasted with someone divided in judgment and at war within himself. Menander's verse gives a different, compact image of choosing similar companions bringing concord to life's mingling. These uses share agreement but do not collapse social coordination, ethical knowledge and inward consistency into the same definition.

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[152] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 108, 256–257. The present entry concerns homonoia. The separate word symphōnia, also rendered agreement or harmony, is not silently substituted for it.

The Stoic account moves from shared understanding to the stability of a relationship. Concord is not presented as momentary agreement about one proposal: it concerns the affairs of life and knowledge of common goods. Trust and constancy then distinguish true friendship from connections maintained externally by need or opinion. The classification is deliberately restrictive, reserving the name for the wise. It should not be read as a neutral description of every relationship ordinarily called friendship, nor as proof that agreeing with someone on one occasion makes either person wise.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11m.5. Knowledge of common goods explains concord among the wise. (English edition p. 355.)

II.33.4. Choosing similar companions is said to produce concord. (English edition p. 999.)

II.33.15. Iamblichus extends concord from communities to self-agreement. (English edition p. 1005.)

Translation in this edition

"Concord" suits the positive relation; "agreement with oneself" makes the inward application clear. Do not replace every occurrence with either political conformity or musical harmony.

Attested Greek forms

ὁμόνοιαν

Attested. II.7.11m.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 108; English edition p. 355.

τὴν δ' ὁμόνοιαν εἶναι κοινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιστήμην.

ὁμόνοια

Attested. II.33.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 257; English edition p. 1005.

Ἡ ὁμόνοια, καθάπερ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα βούλεται ἐνδείκνυσθαι

See also

Like-mindedness; Friendship; Community and communion (Volume One Lexicon, p. 85); Union (Volume One Lexicon, p. 446); Harmony (Volume One Lexicon, p. 186).

Freedom

Freedom · Volume Two

ἐλευθερία; ἐλεύθερος; δουλεία · eleutheria; eleutheros; douleia — freedom; free; servitude[153]

At a Glance

The word. Freedom receives a moral definition through disposition in the Stoic account and appears among external necessary goods in the Peripatetic list; neither use alone describes everyone's actual legal status.

In Stobaeus. The moral paradox links true freedom with virtue and enslavement with a submissive disposition, while the other account values civic freedom for its contribution to exercising virtue rather than making it virtue itself.

In this edition. Preserve the change in classification and the distinction between moral and civic status, without inferring that legally free people are all wise or that the account abolishes actual enslavement.

A place to read. II.7.16.2 Read freedom among the named external goods and attend to the explanation of their contribution, then compare the Stoic definition rather than silently transferring one classification to the other account.

Meaning

The Stoic claim about true freedom is moral and dispositional. It must be distinguished from civic status and the actual institution of slavery.

Use in the book

The account calls true freedom a good and true servitude an evil; only the virtuous person is free, while the base person is enslaved through a disposition liable to subjection. It does not follow that all legally free persons are virtuous or that actual enslavement is abolished. The Peripatetic list instead includes freedom among external necessary goods contributing to the use of virtue. The same word therefore receives different classifications. Both contexts prevent a moral paradox from becoming a factual description of everyone's legal circumstances.

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[153] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 101, 129. Moral freedom in this claim does not change an enslaved person's civic status or remove the actual institution of slavery.

The Peripatetic list first distinguishes noble from necessary goods. Virtues and their activities are noble; living and what contributes to it are necessary. Freedom then appears with noble birth, wealth, reputation, peace and friendship among external contributors to exercising virtue. It is therefore not being identified with virtue itself. The Stoic account instead calls true freedom a good and explains its opposite through a submissive disposition. Reading both passages preserves a difference in ethical classification while keeping actual civic conditions distinct from the moral claim about who is truly free.

"For each of these contributes something toward the exercise of virtue." (II.7.16.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11i.2. Freedom and servitude are classified through moral disposition. (English edition p. 327.)

II.7.16.2. Freedom is a Peripatetic external good. (English edition p. 433.)

Translation in this edition

Specify the moral or external sense.

Attested Greek forms

ἐλευθερίαν

Attested. II.7.11i.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 101; English edition p. 327.

ἀλήθειαν πενίαν κακόν. Καὶ τὴν μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν δουλείαν κακόν. Δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν

δουλείαν

Attested. II.7.11i.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 101; English edition p. 327.

ἀλήθειαν ἐλευθερίαν ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ κατ' ἀλήθειαν δουλείαν κακόν. Δι' ὃ δὴ καὶ τὸν σπουδαῖον εἶναι μόνον πλούσιον καὶ ἐλεύθερον,

See also

Servitude; Good; Virtue and excellence; What depends on us.

Friendship

Friendship · Volume Two

φιλία; φίλος · philia; philos — friendship; affection; friend[154]

At a Glance

The word. Friendship can mean sharing life, affection or a more strictly defined ethical relation. The anthology distinguishes acquaintanceship, familiarity, chosen companionship, kinship and other forms.

In Stobaeus. Some accounts classify relationships broadly; the Stoic account reserves true friendship for the wise, requiring trust and constancy rather than mere externally maintained connection.

In this edition. Keep each account's scope visible. Ordinary friendship vocabulary does not import cosmic attraction, and the strict Stoic restriction should not govern every speaker's usage.

A place to read. II.7.5l.3 Read the initial definition through the subsequent varieties, where different sources of connection distinguish acquaintance, familiarity, companionship, guest-friendship, kinship and erotic friendship.

Meaning

Philia ranges from shared life and affection to a more strictly defined ethical friendship; philos is a friend. The vocabulary includes companionship, kinship, guest-friendship and erotic relations without making all these relations identical.

Use in the book

The ethical accounts differ. One defines friendship as sharing life; the Stoic account reserves true friendship for the wise because trust, constancy and concord are required. Another argues from natural affection toward children to goodwill toward all human beings. Chapter 33 gathers sayings about like character: the friend is "another I," and like-mindedness makes friendship. The Thucydidean fragment makes security conditional on apparent virtue and likeness; its "apparent" must remain. These are different grounds and standards of friendship, not interchangeable claims that liking

[154] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 74, 108, 120, 256–257. The personal title distinguishes this Volume Two emphasis from the older companion's cosmic grouping. Reported sayings and school-specific restrictions retain their attributions.

anyone proves virtue or that every relationship is maintained for advantage alone.

The list distinguishes relationships by how the participants are connected. Being known to one another differs from becoming accustomed to one another; chosen companionship differs from connection through kinship or different lands. These are not merely interchangeable labels for increasing degrees of intimacy. The general definition of shared life allows the account to organize several kinds of relation without supplying one motive for them all. Later claims about true friendship introduce stricter ethical requirements, so the reader should not silently make this preliminary classification say more than it does.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5l.3. Friendship as shared life is distinguished into several relationships. (English edition p. 233.)

II.7.11m.5. True friendship is reserved for the wise in the Stoic account. (English edition p. 355.)

II.7.13.12. Affection is extended beyond useful or familiar relationships. (English edition p. 397.)

II.33.11. Secure friendship is given qualified conditions. (English edition p. 1003.)

II.33.13. Pythagoras's reported answer calls a friend another I. (English edition p. 1003.)

Translation in this edition

"Friendship" fits personal relations; "affection" is useful where the circle extends to kin or humanity generally. Do not import cosmic attraction into passages about character and friends.

Attested Greek forms

Φιλίαν

Attested. II.7.5l.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 74; English edition p. 233.

Φιλίαν δ' εἶναι κοινωνίαν βίου

φίλος

Attested. II.33.13; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 257; English edition p. 1003.

Πυθαγόρας ἐρωτηθείς, τί ἐστι φίλος, ἀπεκρίνατο· "Ἄλλος ἐγώ".

See also

Friendship and cosmic attraction (Volume One Lexicon, p. 171); Like-mindedness; Concord and agreement; Community and communion (Volume One Lexicon, p. 85); Grace and favor.

Grace and favor

Grace and favor · Volume Two

χάρις; εὐχαριστία · charis; eucharistia — favor; kindness; gratitude; grace; charm[155]

At a Glance

The word. Charis can name a benefit, its requital, its remembrance, or grace and charm. A related noun names gratitude, especially in discussions of receiving benefits.

In Stobaeus. The ethical account distinguishes three reciprocal senses; later sayings develop the relation between kindness and gratitude while sometimes qualifying how rarely the return occurs.

In this edition. Translate through the direction of the relation: favor, kindness, gratitude, grace or charm. One fixed English equivalent would conceal distinctions explicitly drawn by the source.

A place to read. II.7.23.1 Read the three senses in order, distinguishing service for the recipient, requital for service and remembrance, before the explanatory reference to three goddesses.

Meaning

Charis can look from giver to recipient or back again: a favor, its return, or gratitude for it. It also denotes grace or charm. Eucharistia is gratitude or grateful acknowledgment, a related noun especially useful in the discussion of receiving benefits.

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[155] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 143, 260, 262–263. The related gratitude noun is included within the family rather than multiplied into a separate article based only on one grammatical form.

Use in the book

The ethical account explicitly gives charis three senses: useful service for the recipient's sake, requital, and remembrance. It then adds grace in appearance or speech. Chapter 46 exploits the reciprocal senses: the Sophoclean line says charis gives birth to charis, while Apollonius says this happens among few people. Translating the first occurrence as kindness and the second as gratitude can expose the direction of the relation. Iamblichus urges a friendly understanding of benefactions and grateful reception that invites further goodness. This is not the same as charm, and no divine-gift theory follows from the English word "grace."

The threefold definition separates stages of a relation that English often expresses with different words. A useful act can be performed for another person's sake; that act may later be requited; it may also be remembered. These are connected but not identical events. The accompanying reference to three goddesses illustrates the account's arrangement rather than supplying another definition of an individual benefit. Reading the senses separately helps preserve the direction of later sayings in which one favor is said to produce another, or gratitude encourages further good.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.23.1. Service, requital and remembrance are distinguished as senses. (English edition p. 501.)

II.7.23.2. The word also denotes grace in appearance or speech. (English edition p. 501.)

II.46.3. Kindness and its remembered return are linked. (English edition p. 1015.)

II.46.16. Gratitude belongs to the right reception of benefactions. (English edition p. 1025.)

II.46.21. Reciprocity is qualified as uncommon. (English edition p. 1029.)

Translation in this edition

Choose "favor," "kindness," "gratitude," "grace" or "charm" according to direction and context; retaining one English equivalent everywhere would obscure explicit distinctions.

Attested Greek forms

Χάριν

Attested. II.7.23.1; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 143; English edition p. 501.

Χάριν δὲ λέγεσθαι τριχῶς

Χάρις

Attested. II.46.3; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 260; English edition p. 1015.

Χάρις χάριν γάρ ἐστιν ἡ τίκτουσ' ἀεί.

εὐχαριστίας

Attested. II.46.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 262; English edition p. 1025.

διὰ τῆς εὐχαριστίας.

See also

Benefaction; Ingratitude; Friendship; Recompense (Volume One Lexicon, p. 357); Memory (Volume One Lexicon, p. 267).

Household management

Household management · Volume Two

οἰκονομική; οἰκονομία; οἶκος · oikonomikē; oikonomia; oikos — household management; household[156]

At a Glance

The word. Household management includes practical ordering of expenditure, work, property and workers, distinguished from the art that understands household advantage and from the related expertise of acquiring money.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic account makes household competence a virtue-dependent capacity, while the Peripatetic account places the household at the beginning of civic community and describes its ancient structures of authority.

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[156] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 95, 148–149. Oikos denotes members and common life as well as property or a building.

In this edition. Keep theory, practical administration and money acquisition distinct, and preserve the account's gendered and enslaving assumptions rather than silently replacing the ancient household with a modern domestic institution.

A place to read. II.7.11d.2 Read the art's concern with household benefit separately from the definition of management itself, then compare the neighboring money-acquiring skill and its conditions concerning sources and expenditure.

Meaning

The oikonomia family concerns managing an oikos, the household and its resources. It should not automatically be translated as a modern national economy.

Use in the book

The Stoic account defines household-management skill through theory and practice of household advantage, and management itself through expenditure, work, property and those working in the fields. The Peripatetic exposition treats the household as a beginning of the city and distinguishes paternal, marital, masterly and money-acquiring branches of authority. Its gendered and enslaving assumptions remain the ancient account's claims. Both treatments include practical provision, but the later political hierarchy should not become a definition of every occurrence of the word.

The paragraph begins with an exclusive claim: only the virtuous person is a good household manager. It supports that claim by distinguishing an art concerned with both theory and practice from the actual ordering of expenditure and work. Property and agricultural workers are included in the latter description. Acquiring money receives a separate definition, though it is connected with the same person's competence. These distinctions explain why the passage is broader than domestic tidiness but narrower than any profitable administration. Its later civic setting should not erase the practical distinctions made here.

"Household management itself is the ordering of expenditure and work" (II.7.11d.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11d.2. Skill, administration and acquisition are separately described. (English edition p. 305.)

II.7.26.2. The household is a beginning of the city. (English edition p. 529.)

II.7.26.6. Four branches of household management. (English edition p. 535.)

Translation in this edition

"Household management" keeps the institution's scale and membership visible.

Attested Greek forms

οἰκονομίαν

Attested. II.7.11d.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 95; English edition p. 305.

ἕξιν καὶ πρακτικὴν τῶν οἴκῳ συμφερόντων· τὴν δ' οἰκονομίαν διάταξιν περὶ ἀναλωμάτων καὶ ἔργων καὶ κτήσεως ἐπιμέλειαν καὶ

οἶκος

Attested. II.7.26.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 148; English edition p. 529.

καὶ βίου κοινωνία. Τοῦτο δὲ προσονομάζεται μὲν οἶκος, ἀρχὴ δὲ πόλεώς ἐστι· περὶ οὗ δὴ καὶ λεκτέον.

See also

Acquiring wealth; City; Servitude; Use.

Ingratitude

Ingratitude · Volume Two

ἀχαριστία; ἀχάριστος · acharistia; acharistos — ingratitude; ungrateful; failing to return or remember kindness[157]

At a Glance

The word. Ingratitude is failure to acknowledge, remember or return kindness; related wording names the ungrateful person. Ability to repay matters where the passage makes punishment conditional.

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[157] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 261–264. The legal excerpt's rejected negative is retained in Greek and excluded from the translation; the local wording must not be silently changed to a more familiar opposite polarity.

In Stobaeus. Iamblichus condemns ingratitude for itself and its obstruction of further good; other excerpts contrast intrinsic reward, self-punishment and a conditional legal response.

In this edition. Distinguish inability from unwillingness. Respect the editor's rejection of the negative in the legal excerpt, and explain its effect on the polarity.

A place to read. II.46.16 Read Iamblichus's two recommendations after the condemnation: understanding benefits in friendship and receiving them gratefully are meant to invite further acts of goodness.

Meaning

Acharistia is ingratitude, with acharistos describing the ungrateful person. It concerns failure to acknowledge or return kindness. The Xenophontic example distinguishes being able to repay from merely owing a return, so inability alone does not establish its charge.

Use in the book

Iamblichus treats ingratitude as bad in itself and as an obstruction to further good, including the community's share in divine assistance. One unheaded saying argues that lawgivers need not prescribe penalties: the ingrate is already held by his own evil, while the benefactor's reward lies in doing good. The Xenophontic account instead describes severe punishment where someone is able to return a favor but fails to do so, and associates ingratitude with apparent shamelessness. Its capacity condition matters. These accounts present distinct ethical and legal treatments, not a uniform rule that every unpaid favor should be punished.

Iamblichus moves from condemnation to a constructive response. The recipient should first understand benefactions rightly and within friendship, then receive them with gratitude. These are related but separate tasks: merely receiving something does not establish an adequate understanding of the act. The argument also extends beyond an injured giver, describing the restriction of noble activities and loss to the community. This explains why gratitude is treated as a condition for further good. It does not determine the quite different legal conditions stated in the Xenophontic excerpt.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.46.16. Ingratitude is condemned both in itself and for obstructing good. (English edition p. 1025.)

II.46.19. A saying contrasts intrinsic reward with the ingrate's self-punishment. (English edition p. 1027.)

II.46.22. Ability to return the favor conditions the reported punishment. (English edition p. 1029.)

II.46.12. Theognis portrays benefit to the base as bringing no gratitude. (English edition p. 1021.)

Translation in this edition

"Ingratitude" keeps the reciprocal relation clear. Do not render it simply "unpleasantness" or treat inability to repay as unwillingness.

Attested Greek forms

ἀχαριστία

Attested. II.46.16; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 262; English edition p. 1025.

Φευκτὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἀχαριστία δι' ἑαυτήν

ἀχαρίστους

Attested. II.46.22; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 263-264; English edition p. 1029.

οἴονται γὰρ τοὺς ἀχαρίστους καὶ περὶ θεοὺς ἂν μάλιστα ἀμελῶς ἔχειν

See also

Grace and favor; Benefaction; Recompense (Volume One Lexicon, p. 357); Punishment (Volume One Lexicon, p. 339); Shame and moral regard.

Kindness and fair dealing

Kindness and fair dealing · Volume Two

χρηστότης; εὐκοινωνησία; εὐσυναλλαξία · chrēstotēs; eukoinōnēsia; eusunallaxia — kindness; good fellowship; fair dealing[158]

At a Glance

The word. Kindness, good fellowship and fair dealing describe distinct benefits and relations with others, presented as knowledge in the Stoic list and as states with specified purposes in the Peripatetic account.

In Stobaeus. The later definition makes voluntary benefit answer to the recipient's own sake, while good fellowship concerns blameless association; the resulting emphasis includes motive and manner rather than the bare occurrence of exchange.

In this edition. Preserve the unnamed extremes and the tentative language about a neighboring opposite; do not fill gaps in the classification or make strict contractual justice synonymous with every form of fair dealing.

A place to read. II.7.25.11 Read benefiting people for their own sake beside blameless association, noting both the voluntary character of kindness and the unnamed states left at one end of each comparison.

Meaning

These virtues under justice govern benefit, shared life and dealings. Their relation does not erase their separate definitions.

Use in the book

The Stoic definitions make kindness knowledge doing good, good fellowship knowledge of equality in community, and fair dealing knowledge of blameless dealings with neighbors. The Peripatetic account defines states instead: voluntary benefit for the recipient's own sake, blameless association, and care to avoid injustice in contracts. Its last parenthesis tentatively identifies an unnamed opposite of fair dealing with strict justice. Motive and manner therefore matter, not merely whether an exchange occurs or a benefit changes hands.

The recipient's own sake supplies a condition that the fact of receiving a benefit cannot establish by itself. A voluntary act may bring someone an

[158] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 62, 147. Each term and each account retains its distinct definition.

advantage, but this definition also asks what the act is for. Good fellowship then concerns remaining blameless in association, rather than duplicating the same account of benefit. Both definitions leave one contrasting state unnamed. This incompleteness belongs to the report and should not be repaired by inventing a familiar opposite. The earlier knowledge definitions offer another explanatory setting for these related ways of dealing with others.

"voluntarily benefiting people for those people's own sake" (II.7.25.11).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.6. Three knowledge definitions. (English edition p. 193.)

II.7.25.11. Benefit for the recipient and good association. (English edition p. 523.)

II.7.25.12. Contracts and an unusual opposite. (English edition p. 523.)

Translation in this edition

Retain the descriptive phrases rather than merging them into "goodness."

Attested Greek forms

χρηστότητα

Attested. II.7.5b2.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 62; English edition p. 193.

εὐσέβειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας· χρηστότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐποιητικήν· εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἰσότητος

εὐκοινωνησίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 62; English edition p. 193.

θεραπείας· χρηστότητα δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐποιητικήν· εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἰσότητος ἐν κοινωνίᾳ· εὐσυναλλαξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην

εὐσυναλλαξίαν

Attested. II.7.5b2.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 62; English edition p. 193.

εὐκοινωνησίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην ἰσότητος ἐν κοινωνίᾳ· εὐσυναλλαξίαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ συναλλάττειν ἀμέμπτως τοῖς πλησίον.

See also

Justice; Community and communion (Volume One Lexicon, p. 85); Benefaction; Law.

Law

Law · Volume Two

νόμος · nomos — law; right reason; law or convention[159]

At a Glance

The word. Law is defined as right reason commanding and prohibiting action in the Stoic account, while other civic passages concern institutions and provision; moral excellence here is not asserted of every actual enactment.

In Stobaeus. The argument derives the law-abiding person's excellence from its definition of law, then distinguishes following its commands from explaining them, making conduct and understanding separate though related capacities.

In this edition. Preserve the dependence on right reason and the supplied verb in the inference; do not turn the statement into praise of every statute, office-holder or person able to recite a legal text.

A place to read. II.7.11d.6 Begin with the definition of law before reading the exclusive claims about lawful people; the two personal definitions concern carrying out commands and having the capacity to explain them.

Meaning

Nomos is law. The Stoic equation with right reason is not an unqualified statement that every enacted rule is morally excellent.

Use in the book

Law is defined as right reason commanding what should be done and prohibiting what should not. Following and carrying out law differs from being capable of explaining it. The wise person's unique lawfulness depends on this moral definition. Another passage says justice exists by nature rather than convention. The Peripatetic political exposition uses law for marriage, public provision and institutions within a different account of civic life.

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[159] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 94, 96, 152. The contrast between law and nature must also be read locally.

These contexts must not be merged into an endorsement of every actual enactment, or every holder of an office.

The order of the reasoning matters. Law is first identified as morally excellent right reason, and the law-abiding person's excellence follows from that premise. A second distinction concerns the agent: performing what law commands differs from being capable of explaining law. The final exclusion of base people from both capacities belongs to this idealized moral account. It is not established simply by pointing to a person's civic position. Keeping the definition at the beginning prevents the inference from becoming an endorsement of every rule actually enforced by a community.

"right reason that commands what is to be done and prohibits what is not to be done." (II.7.11d.6).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11d.6. Law is right reason. (English edition p. 309.)

II.7.11b.2. Natural justice differs from convention. (English edition p. 301.)

II.7.26.21. Law regulates common meals and education. (English edition p. 549.)

Translation in this edition

State the definition's scope rather than assuming it for every occurrence.

Attested Greek forms

νόμον

Attested. II.7.11d.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96; English edition p. 309.

Τόν τε νόμον σπουδαῖον εἶναί φασι, λόγον ὀρθὸν ὄντα προστακτικὸν μὲν ὧν ποιητέον,

See also

Justice; Lawful and skilled in law; Civic constitution; Reason and account.

Lawful and skilled in law

Lawful and skilled in law · Volume Two

νόμιμος; νομικός · nomimos; nomikos — lawful; law-abiding; skilled in law[160]

At a Glance

The word. Lawful and skilled in law distinguish carrying out law's commands from interpreting it, within the Stoic identification of law with right reason rather than mere familiarity with enacted rules.

In Stobaeus. The account assigns both capacities to the wise person but defines them separately, keeping a relation between rational conduct and explanation without making the adjectives synonyms for holding a legal position.

In this edition. Preserve the conduct and interpretation distinction, and do not translate both adjectives simply as legal when that would hide the different capacities the passage explicitly sets out.

A place to read. II.7.11i.5 Read the renewed definition of law and the two linked capacities together; carries out and can interpret supply distinct reasons for describing the wise person with the two adjectives.

Meaning

Nomimos and nomikos distinguish following and performing what law commands from being able to explain law. Both receive a moral basis through law as right reason.

Use in the book

The Stoic exposition calls only the virtuous person lawful and capable of interpreting law. Its later restatement preserves the conduct/interpretation distinction. The claim is not that anyone holding a legal office is wise, nor that an unwise person cannot remember a statute's wording. It depends on the ideal of consistent rational activity. Keeping the adjectives apart prevents an English word such as "legal" from concealing the difference between living in accordance with the command and having competence to explain it.

The restatement starts by recalling that law is right reason. It then explains lawfulness through carrying out commands and skill in law through interpreting them. The two capacities belong to the same wise person, but

[160] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 96, 102. These ethical definitions are not modern professional qualifications.

their combination does not erase their different functions. The contrary characterization of foolish people likewise depends on this moral definition, not on a test of whether someone can remember a statute. Read beside the earlier separate definitions, the passage makes explanation and consistent conduct mutually relevant without treating either as a mere civic title.

"he carries out what the law commands and alone can interpret it" (II.7.11i.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11d.6. The two adjectives have separate definitions. (English edition p. 309.)

II.7.11i.5. The account restates both capacities. (English edition p. 331.)

Translation in this edition

"Lawful" and "skilled in law" preserve the distinction.

Attested Greek forms

νόμιμον

Attested. II.7.11d.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96; English edition p. 309.

ἀστείου ὄντος καὶ ὁ νόμιμος ἀστεῖος ἂν ⟨εἴη⟩· νόμιμον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ἄνδρα καὶ ἀκολουθητικὸν τῷ νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν

νομικὸν

Attested. II.7.11d.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96; English edition p. 309.

νόμῳ καὶ πρακτικὸν τῶν ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ προσταττομένων· νομικὸν δὲ τὸν ἐξηγητικὸν τοῦ νόμου. Μηδένα δὲ τῶν φαύλων μήτε νόμιμον

See also

Law; Justice; Wise and base; Knowledge.

Like-mindedness

Like-mindedness · Volume Two

ὁμοφροσύνη · homophrosynē — like-mindedness; agreement in thought[161]

At a Glance

The word. Like-mindedness is likeness or agreement in thought. It may concern the relation that makes friendship or the consistency of one person's own understanding and judgment.

In Stobaeus. The brief Democritean maxim links like-mindedness with friendship; Iamblichus extends the term to inward agreement rather than unstable reasoning that sets a person against himself.

In this edition. Keep likeness of mind distinct from the separate word concord, while following their related contexts. Shared wording does not settle the legitimacy of every disagreement.

A place to read. II.33.9 Read the short causal maxim within the chapter on choosing similar companions, without making its brevity supply a complete definition of friendship or agreement.

Meaning

Homophrosynē is likeness or agreement of mind. The word can describe the relation that forms friendship or the consistency of one person's thought. It is related in meaning to concord, but is not simply a different spelling of homonoia.

Use in the book

The Democritean maxim gives the compact causal claim that like-mindedness makes friendship. Iamblichus includes the term in his explanation of concord with oneself: someone who holds to the same understanding is full of like-mindedness, whereas shifting, inconsistent reasoning is described as inner hostility. In the surrounding chapter, similar character can also make a friend desirable, while Thucydides's conditions for secure friendship involve apparent virtue and likeness in other respects. Agreement is therefore presented at different levels—thought, character and stable judgment—without requiring every maxim to have the same scope or argumentative purpose.

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[161] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 256–257. The Iamblichean context criticizes unstable internal division. It does not expressly settle every question about legitimate disagreement or revision of a mistaken opinion.

The maxim identifies a productive relation: like-mindedness makes friendship. It does not enumerate what the friends agree about, how their agreement is reached, or whether every shared belief is true. Those omissions matter when it is placed beside stricter ethical accounts that demand knowledge and constancy. Iamblichus's inward application adds a further setting, in which a person's changing judgments can undermine agreement with himself. These comparisons give the short saying useful context without turning it into a claim that friends must share every opinion.

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.33.9. The maxim says like-mindedness makes friendship. (English edition p. 1001.)

II.33.15. Iamblichus applies it to consistency within a person. (English edition p. 1005.)

II.33.6. A friend of like character is described as desirable. (English edition p. 999.)

II.33.11. Stable friendship has qualified conditions involving likeness. (English edition p. 1003.)

Translation in this edition

"Like-mindedness" preserves agreement in thought. "Similarity" alone is too broad unless the relevant character or judgment is specified.

Attested Greek forms

Ὁμοφροσύνη

Attested. II.33.9; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 256; English edition p. 1001.

Ὁμοφροσύνη φιλίην ποιέει.

ὁμοφροσύνης

Attested. II.33.15; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 257; English edition p. 1005.

ἐπὶ τῆς ἀεὶ αὐτῆς ἐπιμένων διανοήσεως ὁμοφροσύνης ἐστὶ πλήρης

See also

Concord and agreement; Friendship; Character (Volume One Lexicon, p. 72); Sense and judgment (Volume One Lexicon, p. 386); Resemblance and imitation.

Modesty, dignity and wit

Modesty, dignity and wit · Volume Two

αἰδώς; αἰδημοσύνη; σεμνότης; εὐτραπελία · aidōs; aidēmosunē; semnotēs; eutrapelia — modesty; sense of shame; dignity; wit[162]

At a Glance

The word. These social virtues govern responses to reproach, interpersonal bearing and humor, with distinct extremes; the Stoic definition of modesty additionally specifies knowledge that guards against reproach that is justified.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic account gives each virtue its own contrasting failures, so modesty, dignity and wit cannot be reduced to one general preference for restraint or conformity in social life.

In this edition. Preserve justified where modesty concerns reproach, and keep the supplied a mean in wit's definition visible rather than claiming that all three formulations are transmitted in exactly the same form.

A place to read. II.7.25.7 Compare the three pairs of extremes before returning to modesty's knowledge definition; the account distinguishes being appropriately responsive to others from either shamelessness or excessive intimidation.

Meaning

These social virtues concern fitting self-presentation and response to others. Their definitions do not reduce moral conduct to social approval or abstention from every joke.

Use in the book

The Stoic subordinate list defines modesty as knowledge guarding against justified reproach. The Peripatetic account makes dignity a mean between self-will and obsequiousness, modesty between shamelessness and being overawed, and wit between buffoonery and boorishness. Its supplied word for the mean in the wit clause remains identified. The contrasts make appropriate responsiveness central: dignity is not stubbornness, modesty not paralysis, and wit not indiscriminate mockery. The distinct names and local definitions remain visible.

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[162] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 61, 146. Aidōs and aidēmosynē form a related family; the other virtues are grouped by social context.

The three means concern different failures in social conduct. Dignity avoids both self-will and obsequiousness, modesty both shamelessness and being overawed, and wit both buffoonery and boorishness. None is defined merely by being quiet, compliant or pleasing to everyone. The separate Stoic definition of modesty guards against justified reproach, which prevents fear of every criticism from serving as an adequate substitute. Keeping the lists together reveals a concern with discriminating social response, while their different definitions and the supplied words in the wit entry remain visible.

"Dignity is a mean between self-will and obsequiousness" (II.7.25.7).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.5b2.4. Modesty guards against justified reproach. (English edition p. 191.)

II.7.25.7. Three social means are distinguished. (English edition p. 519.)

Translation in this edition

"Sense of shame" explains aidōs where "modesty" might suggest only shyness.

Attested Greek forms

αἰδημοσύνην

Attested. II.7.5b2.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 61; English edition p. 191.

δὲ ⟨ἐπιστήμην⟩ πρεπουσῶν καὶ ἀπρεπῶν κινήσεων· αἰδημοσύνην δὲ ἐπιστήμην εὐλαβητικὴν ὀρθοῦ ψόγου· ἐγκράτειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην

αἰδὼ

Attested. II.7.25.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 519.

σεμνότητα δὲ μεσότητα αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· αἰδὼ δὲ μεσότητα ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· εὐτραπελίαν δὲ ⟨μεσότητα⟩

σεμνότητα

Attested. II.7.25.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 519.

σεμνότητα δὲ μεσότητα αὐθαδείας καὶ ἀρεσκείας· αἰδὼ δὲ μεσότητα ἀναισχυντίας

εὐτραπελίαν

Attested. II.7.25.7; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 519.

αἰδὼ δὲ μεσότητα ἀναισχυντίας καὶ καταπλήξεως· εὐτραπελίαν δὲ ⟨μεσότητα⟩ βωμολοχίας καὶ ἀγροικίας·

See also

Ethical mean; Orderliness and propriety; The noble; Truthfulness and dissembling.

Pardon and leniency

Pardon and leniency · Volume Two

συγγνώμη; ἐπιεικής · sungnōmē; epieikēs — pardon; lenient[163]

At a Glance

The word. Pardon and leniency receive restrictive definitions in this reported theory, connecting responsibility to vice and leniency to setting aside deserved punishment; the claims do not amount to an independent endorsement of every penalty.

In Stobaeus. The account links pardon with judging error not to be the agent's fault, while the lenient person is described as judging the lawgiver's punishments too harsh rather than the author making that judgment.

In this edition. Mark the long supplied explanation of pardon, and keep the lenient person as the subject of the criticism of penalties; do not attribute that assessment directly to the exposition itself.

A place to read. II.7.11d.5 Follow the description of the lenient person through all its linked judgments, comparing the previous account of pardon while keeping the large editorial supplement and the theory's own assumptions visible.

Meaning

Syngnōmē and epieikēs receive restrictive definitions in this Stoic report. They should not automatically receive an unqualified modern praise of forgiveness or fairness.

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[163] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 95–96. The surviving pardon noun witnesses the article; its supplemented explanation is not untouched transmission.

Use in the book

Pardon is denied to the person of understanding because the relevant pardon would treat the wrongdoer as not erring through his own fault, while the report locates error in the agent's vice. The following passage denies leniency understood as setting aside deserved punishment: the lenient person is taken to judge the lawgiver's penalties too harsh. Much of the first explanation is supplied and must remain identified as reconstruction. These are claims of the reported theory, not an independent judgment that every act of mercy is wrong or every legal punishment just.

The explanation treats seeking to set aside deserved punishment, regarding the prescribed penalty as too harsh and judging the lawgiver's assessment contrary to desert as connected attitudes. The judgment about harshness belongs to the lenient person being described. It is not a sudden accusation against the lawgiver by the report. The preceding discussion of pardon similarly connects granting it with a judgment about responsibility, but much of that explanation is supplied. Both passages therefore require attention to who holds each judgment and to which part of the reasoning survives without restoration.

"For the lenient person seeks to set aside punishment according to desert" (II.7.11d.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11d.4. Pardon, responsibility and a long supplement. (English edition p. 307.)

II.7.11d.5. Leniency against punishment according to desert. (English edition p. 307.)

Translation in this edition

Use "lenient" for this restricted epieikēs, not a silently imported theory of equity.

Attested Greek forms

συγγνώμην

Attested. II.7.11d.4; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 95-96; English edition p. 307.

Φασὶ ⟨δὲ⟩ μηδὲ συγγνώμην ἔχειν ⟨μηδενὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ συγγνώμην τε ἔχειν⟩

ἐπιεικῆ

Attested. II.7.11d.5; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 96; English edition p. 307.

Οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ δέ φασιν εἶναι τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, τὸν γὰρ ἐπιεικῆ παραιτητικὸν

See also

Punishment (Volume One Lexicon, p. 339); Law; Value and disvalue; Error and wrongdoing.

Political participation

Political participation · Volume Two

πολιτεύεσθαι · politeuesthai — participate in public life; act as a citizen[164]

At a Glance

The word. Political participation includes wise engagement in public life, qualified by the account's view of justice and constitutions; its place beside contemplation cannot be reduced to competition for office or campaigning.

In Stobaeus. The Stoic claim especially concerns constitutions progressing toward completeness, while the Peripatetic discussion connects civic action with sociability and also preserves a conditional preference for contemplation in another passage.

In this edition. Retain especially and the conditions of participation, and do not let one statement cancel another when the epitome gives both public activity and contemplation places in the virtuous life.

A place to read. II.7.11b.2 Read participation as a consequence of the preceding claim about natural justice, attending to especially and progress rather than imagining an unconditional endorsement of every existing political arrangement.

Meaning

Politeuesthai concerns civic participation, not merely residence in a city or a modern party affiliation.

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[164] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 94, 144. The headword describes the attested verb, not an invented abstract doctrine.

Use in the book

The Stoic account links wise participation with natural justice and especially with constitutions progressing toward completeness. The Peripatetic exposition offers public action among possible virtuous lives, qualifies it by circumstances and sociability, and later calls it a primary choice. It equates practical and political life in that latter statement. These claims coexist with a preference for contemplation. The lexical article records the tension rather than allowing one clause to cancel another. "Politics" here should not be limited to campaigning, competition for office or a particular modern governmental system.

The claim about public life follows the statement that justice exists by nature rather than convention. Participation is therefore presented as a consequence of the ethical account, not merely a preference for civic activity. The qualification especially directs attention to constitutions making progress toward complete ones; it does not require already perfect institutions before any participation can occur. Elsewhere, sociability draws the virtuous person toward political action even alongside contemplation. These different reasons for engagement should remain visible instead of being compressed into a modern description of seeking office.

"especially in constitutions that show some progress toward complete constitutions." (II.7.11b.2).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.11b.2. Wise participation and natural justice. (English edition p. 301.)

II.7.24.3. Social nature draws the agent to civic action. (English edition p. 505.)

II.7.24.7. Practical and political life are equated. (English edition p. 509.)

Translation in this edition

"Participation in public life" avoids narrowing the activity to officeholding.

Attested Greek forms

πολιτεύεσθαι

Attested. II.7.11b.2; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 94; English edition p. 301.

μὴ θέσει. Ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις

See also

City; Civic constitution; Contemplation; Action (Volume One Lexicon, p. 23).

Servitude

Servitude · Volume Two

δοῦλος; δεσποτικός · doulos; despotikos — slave; enslaved person; masterly authority[165]

At a Glance

The word. The household account distinguishes people enslaved by law from those it alleges are slaves by nature, and separates mastery from paternal and marital authority within its unequal ancient social structure.

In Stobaeus. The Peripatetic explanation describes bodily service, dependence and household association, later denying deliberation to slaves; these are the reported justification's assumptions rather than facts endorsed by the lexicon.

In this edition. Preserve the distinction between natural and legal status as the author presents it, and do not disguise enslavement as modern employment or merge masterly authority with every household relationship.

A place to read. II.7.26.5 Read the two claimed forms of slavery inside the account of household formation, then compare the following hierarchy of authority without adopting its assessment of human capacities as established fact.

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[165] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 148–149, 151–152. The ancient theory is reported without adopting its discriminatory claims.

Meaning

Doulos names an enslaved person, and despotikos the master's authority. Neither should be modernized into freely hired staff or neutral management.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic household account distinguishes a slave allegedly by nature from one by law. It claims that the former has bodily strength for service but insufficient independent capacity, and later denies slaves deliberation. These are the ancient author's justifications, not descriptions adopted as fact by the lexicon. Masterly authority is also distinct from paternal and marital authority. A later political list names hired workers separately. Those distinctions reveal the unequal statuses and the account's assumptions without concealing them behind modern employment vocabulary.

The household is formed in the passage through a union directed toward procreation and shared life, together with an assistant. The author then distinguishes alleged slavery by nature from slavery by law. The first category is justified through claims about bodily capacity, dependence and benefit from being ruled. The final appeal to a single common advantage does not remove these unequal assumptions. The following discussion makes authority explicitly hierarchical. Reading the two passages together shows what the account requires of household order without converting its social justifications into neutral descriptions of everyone involved.

"whether a slave by nature" (II.7.26.5).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.26.5. Alleged natural and legal slavery. (English edition p. 533.)

II.7.26.6. Masterly authority as a branch. (English edition p. 535.)

II.7.26.18. Hired workers are separately named. (English edition p. 547.)

Translation in this edition

Keep the enslaved status explicit.

Attested Greek forms

δοῦλον

Attested. II.7.26.5; Wachsmuth II, printed pp. 148-149; English edition p. 533.

συνεργὸν τῆς κοινωνίας προσλαβομένων, εἴτε φύσει δοῦλον, (ἰσχυρὸν μὲν τῷ σώματι πρὸς ὑπηρεσίαν, νωθῆ δὲ καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὸν

δεσποτικόν

Attested. II.7.26.6; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 149; English edition p. 535.

δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι πατρικόν, τὸ δὲ γαμικόν, τὸ δὲ δεσποτικόν, τὸ δὲ χρηματιστικόν.

See also

Master (Volume One Lexicon, p. 262); Household management; Rule and kingship (Volume One Lexicon, p. 371); Human being (Volume One Lexicon, p. 199).

Truthfulness and dissembling

Truthfulness and dissembling · Volume Two

ἀλήθεια; εἰρωνεία; εἰρωνεύεσθαι · alētheia; eirōneia; eirōneuesthai — truthfulness; self-depreciation; dissembling[166]

At a Glance

The word. Truthfulness concerns self-presentation between self-depreciation and boastfulness, while dissembling and mocking sarcasm receive a separate Stoic criticism; these social meanings differ from the logical truth of a proposition.

In Stobaeus. The two accounts examine how people present themselves to others, but one classifies a mean and the other excludes dissembling from the conduct of the free and virtuous person.

In this edition. Do not substitute logical truth for the ethical state of truthfulness, or flatten self-depreciation, dissembling and sarcasm into one English term without their local differences and qualifications.

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[166] Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 108, 146. No particular Socratic or dramatic use of irony is inferred from these clauses.

A place to read. II.7.11m.4 Read dissembling and sarcasm together, attending to the additional ridicule in the second; then compare the separate mean of truthfulness without assuming identical definitions across the two reports.

Meaning

The eirōneia family can concern understating oneself or dissembling. It should not automatically receive the modern literary sense of irony.

Use in the book

The Peripatetic list makes truthfulness a mean between self-depreciation and boastfulness, concerning the presentation of one's qualities. The Stoic exposition condemns dissembling as alien to a free virtuous person and defines sarcasm as dissembling with ridicule. These contexts are related through self-presentation without being identical. Different English words preserve their distinction. Moral truthfulness here must also be distinguished from the logical truth or falsity of a proposition; a taxonomy of social states is not a definition of truth as such.

The argument attaches dissembling to the base person by excluding it from the free and virtuous person. Sarcasm is not introduced as an unrelated vice: it is defined through dissembling plus a measure of ridicule. That added feature matters when translating apparently similar forms of misleading speech. The later mean of truthfulness concerns another arrangement, with self-depreciation and boastfulness as extremes. Neither passage is a general account of how propositions become true. Both instead concern a speaker's conduct and presentation in relation to other people.

"sarcasm, which is dissembling accompanied by a measure of ridicule." (II.7.11m.4).

Places to read

Selected passages in the surviving Volume Two text.

II.7.25.8. Truthfulness is a mean in self-presentation. (English edition p. 519.)

II.7.11m.4. Dissembling and sarcasm are condemned. (English edition p. 353.)

Translation in this edition

"Self-depreciation" suits the deficient extreme; "dissembling" the condemned action.

Attested Greek forms

ἀλήθειαν

Attested. II.7.25.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 519.

φιλίαν δὲ μεσότητα κολακείας καὶ ἔχθρας· ἀλήθειαν δὲ μεσότητα εἰρωνείας καὶ ἀλαζονείας· δικαιοσύνην δὲ μεσότητα

εἰρωνείας

Attested. II.7.25.8; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 146; English edition p. 519.

μεσότητα κολακείας καὶ ἔχθρας· ἀλήθειαν δὲ μεσότητα εἰρωνείας καὶ ἀλαζονείας· δικαιοσύνην δὲ μεσότητα ὑπεροχῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως

εἰρωνεύεσθαι

Attested. II.7.11m.4; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 108; English edition p. 353.

Τὸ δ' εἰρωνεύεσθαι φαύλων εἶναί φασιν, οὐδένα γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ σπουδαῖον εἰρωνεύεσθαι·

See also

Truth (Volume One Lexicon, p. 440); Falsehood; Modesty, dignity and wit; Wise and base.

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